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Western Imperialism in the Middle East, 1914 1958Printer-friendly versionPDF version

Book: Western Imperialism in the Middle East, 19141958 David K. Fieldhouse Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, ISBN: 9780199287376; 400pp.; Price: 65.00 Reviewer: Dr Nigel Ashton London School of Economics Citation: Dr Nigel Ashton, review of Western Imperialism in the Middle East, 19141958, (review no. 575) URL: http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/575 Date accessed: 27 September, 2012

D. K. Fieldhouses goal in this major comparative study of British and French imperialism in the Middle East is to consider the effects of the imposition of the mandate system on the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. He brings to this task the wide-ranging knowledge accrued through a lifetimes research in various aspects of British imperial history, and, more recently, specific regional expertise acquired through the preparation of his study, Kurds, Arabs and Britons: The Memoir of Wallace Lyon in Iraq, 19181944. The result is a work that offers both some fascinating broader insights into the place of the Middle East in the broader pattern of Western imperialism, and some detailed thoughts on the individual mandates themselves. So, Fieldhouse argues that in the broader sense the pattern of British and French rule in the Middle East was similar to that followed elsewhere. Both imperial powers tried to rule through established elites, although the British were much more willing than the French to move their mandates forward towards a qualified form of independence. At the specific, local level, though, Fieldhouse finds no parallel in his wide knowledge of imperial practice elsewhere to compare to the disastrous experiment in social and political engineering undertaken by the British in Palestine. Here, he pulls no punches in his criticisms. The Palestine mandate was, probably the most ignominious failure of its kind in British imperial history, the first time that Britain had ended its rule without leaving an established government behind it (pp. 3445). As Fieldhouse himself acknowledges, this study is essentially a work of synthesis, although one which enriches the existing scholarship by offering a series of astute assessments of the existing state of historiographical debate in the field. Beginning with the Ottoman legacy, Fieldhouse traces the developments in the early years of the twentieth century, including the genesis of Arab nationalist sentiment and the reform of the Ottoman system. In essence, he concludes that, despite its military defeats in the early years of the twentieth century, by 1914 the Ottoman Empire was in the course of reconstruction. Indeed in respect of the Arab lands, one can even talk of a reconquest and reintegration. The great majority of Ottoman subjects remained loyal to the empire and fought for it during the First World War. There was thus no pre-war inevitability about the empires collapse. In terms of the Arab nationalist movement, Fieldhouse provides a lucid summary of the subsequent course of the historiographical debate sparked by George Antoniuss seminal (and still eminently readable) tract, The Arab Awakening. For Fieldhouse, Antonius makes a huge jump from charting the revival of cultural interest in the Arabic language, and the development of Arab nationalist secret societies in Syria, to broader claims about the awakening of a widespread Arab consciousness and desire for independence. Antoniuss arguments were challenged first by C. E. Dawn, who attacked the notion of a dominant and ideologically based Arab nationalist movement before 1914, and held that the majority of Arab notables remained loyal Ottomanists. Thereafter, Albert Hourani, while agreeing with much of Dawns critique of Antoniuss arguments about pre-war Arab nationalism, argued that Antonius also placed too much emphasis on the unity and solidity of the Sharif Husseins wartime movement. For Hourani, and subsequent commentators including Mary Wilson, the Hashemites were in essence pursuing the defence of their own interests via alliance with the British under the banner of Arab revolt. That Antonius overstated the unity of the Hashemite Arab Revolt, and the role of Arab nationalist ideology in its instigation, is perhaps no surprise in view of the support he received from the Hashemite family in his research. Indeed, the Great Arab

Revolt, as formulated by Antonius, remained an ideological reference point for the Hashemites until at least the end of the twentieth century. If the Ottoman Empire was reviving itself before 1914, and if the appeal of Arab nationalism was by no means widespread in the region, then the First World war emerges as the key event, which shattered the existing order, led to the creation of the mandates system, and originated much of the contemporary instability of the region. In terms of the impact and outcome of the war, probably the most interesting and important question Fieldhouse addresses is why, in view of their wartime promises to the Hashemites about Arab independence, the British ended up cooperating with France in the establishment of a League of Nations mandates system for the former Arab lands of the Ottoman Empire? In terms of the promises to the Hashemites contained in the famous Hussein-McMahon correspondence, Fieldhouse points to what he sees as the ambiguities and absurdities (p.57) of McMahons 24 October 1915 letter to the Sharif. Antonius too, in his original analysis of the correspondence, was scathing about the British missives, particularly, with his astute eye for style and dignity, the inappropriate and fawning terms in which the Sharif was addressed. In terms of the substance of what was offered to the Sharif by the British, the correspondence certainly provided a weak and imprecise foundation on which to base subsequent claims to Arab independence. Although theBritish allowed Feisal, Husseins third son, to march into Damascus at the head of the Arab army in October 1918, they proved unwilling to champion his claims to retaining his Syrian kingdom once his relations with the French had broken down in the wake of the 1920 San Remo conference. The apportionment of mandates agreed between the powers at San Remo, which saw the British given Mesopotamia (hereafter Iraq) and Palestine (sub-divided in 1922 into Palestine and Transjordan), and the French given Syria and Lebanon, was dictated by Anglo-French relations and interests. For the Hashemites it remained a betrayal of earlier promises, although compensation was subsequently offered to them, first in the shape of the British installation of Feisal as King of Iraq, and, later, in the form of the British acquiescence in the assumption of authority in Transjordan by the Sharifs second son Abdullah. The British establishment of the new state of Iraq, and its political development under the mandate, is a matter of more than academic interest from the perspective of the early-twenty-first century. Most wisely, Fieldhouse avoids indulging in any misplaced attempts at drawing comparisons between the British imposition of political authority in the wake of their military conquest, between 1918 and 1921, and the singular Anglo-American failure to do likewise in the wake of the contemporary invasion of Iraq, between 2003 and 2006. Nevertheless, book reviewers have the licence to be more self-indulgent than serious authors, so I trust readers will forgive me one or two comparative sallies in this direction. First of all, it is clear that at the end of the First World War, the British in Iraq were regarded not as deliverers, but as infidel invaders. Secondly, post-invasion policy was also poorly thought out. There was no clear plan for Iraq between 1918 and 1920, and thus political developments were prey to competing pressures on the ground, bureaucratic competition back in London, and political tensions in the international arena. The result was drift, and it should have been no surprise when, in July 1920, a major revolt broke out in the Euphrates valley against British rule. Consider Fieldhouses description of the causes of the revolt: the rising was a general reaction to the realities of foreign occupation, sparked off

by evidence of apparent British military weakness in Mosul, and given a crusading spirit by the clerics (p. 87). The costs of suppressing the insurgency were high. The British lost 426 dead, 1,228 wounded and 615 missing or taken prisoner. There were around 8,000 casualties among the insurgents. What mattered more, though, in terms of securing the relative political stability which subsequently prevailed in Iraq through the 1920s and 1930s, was the British political response to the crisis. Here, the essence of the subsequent British strategy was to co-opt, as far as possible, the existing elites. Albeit that at the apex of the Iraqi political system the British imposed an alien monarch, in the shape of Feisal I, who brought with him his own retainers from the Hashemite Arab army, nevertheless, their goal was to establish under him a national government that would attract genuine Iraqi support. Moreover, as Fieldhouse points out, once again illustrating the benefit of his wide knowledge of the workings of British imperialismelsewhere, the key to the British approach to creating the Iraq constitution lies in the fact that, uniquely in British imperial history, it was intended to lead to early independence rather than extended imperial rule (p. 97). Fieldhouse is unsentimental about the realities of the political system established by the British in Iraq. It was democratic in form only, with real power lying in the hands of a small circle of notables, and ex-Sharifian officers close to the king. Parliamentary elections produced little more than a shuffling of the existing pack, while, even after independence in 1932, the British remained the dominant influence behind the scenes until the 1958 revolution swept away the existing social and political order. In essence, what the British did in Iraq was to rule through, and depend on, what H. Batatu, in his monumental study, called the old social classes. Moreover, their establishment of a centralized bureaucratic regime, and an unnecessarily large army, laid the groundwork for the subsequent revolution (p. 116). Thus while, in Fieldhouses view, the British succeeded in creating a viable state from three former Ottoman vilayets, and in satisfying most of what they wanted in terms of their economic and strategic interests for forty years, thereafter they left Iraq to its own devices. Iraq could then fall into what became the common mould of other revolutionaryMiddle Eastern states under military regimes, almost as if the mandate had never existed (p. 116). This characterization reminds me very much of the comments of one Arab official from the former mandate administration in Palestine, who described for me the disappearance of his British superiors almost overnight. The mandate dissolved, he told me, like salt in water. Fieldhouses decision to choose 1958 as the terminal date for this volume is, therefore, logical in the sense that the Iraqi revolution of that year marked the effective overthrow of the social and political order established by the Britishduring the early 1920s. It is nevertheless refreshing for those of us who are used to having to deal with 1956 as the supposed terminal date for the British imperial role in the Middle East, to see it thus subtly revised. As the formerBritish diplomat Harold Beeley observed some while ago, the event which more than any other symbolized the end of an era was the death at the hands of the Baghdad mob of [Iraqi Prime Minister] Nuri Said for whom association with Britain had been axiomatic throughout his long career (1).

While the British achieved some limited, if transient, success in Iraq, Fieldhouse finds nothing to recommend either the conduct or legacy of the mandate in Palestine. Whether conceived of in terms of British imperial interests, the interests of the indigenous inhabitants, or its longer-term effects on regional and international stability, British mandatory rule over Palestine was an unmitigated disaster. The Balfour Declaration of November 1917 was originally framed, in Fieldhouses view, largely to ensure that no potentially hostile country controlled Palestine (p. 147). As problems mounted in the mandate during the 1930s, a key argument against altering or surrendering it remained the fear that the French might step in instead. Thus, although Fieldhouse acknowledges that certain British officials were driven by a belief in the essential justice of the Zionist cause, in his view it was principally considerations of imperial interest and prestige that predominated in the British acquisition and maintenance of the Palestine mandate. That the eventual collapse of the mandate would do significant harm to Britain in both of these respects is certainly a considerable irony. In respect of British attempts to make the mandate workable, Fieldhouse points out that the principal difficulty lay in the attitude of the Arab majority population. The one concession which the British might have offered to win over Arab opinion, the cessation of Jewish immigration, was not in their power to grant under the terms of the mandate. The British also made an unfortunate choice in selecting, as the Mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husayni, who proved to be a most unreliable collaborator. Meanwhile, cooperation with the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish community in Palestine or Yishuv, which had been the foundation of British rule through the 1920s and 1930s, also came under pressure in the wake of the 1939 White Paper, with its proposed limits on Jewish immigration. By 1943, Fieldhouse argues, the majority of the Yishuv had already come to see total independence as essential and were ready to fight Britain to achieve it (p. 186). The 1948 dnouement in Palestine, and the unseemly British scuttle for the door without leaving any effective administration behind, ranks, in Fieldhouses view, as one of the major defeats inBritish imperial history, comparable with that by the Thirteen Colonies in 177683 and the fall of Singapore in 1942 (p. 195). In this respect one might once again note that it is odd that so much of the historiography of the decline of the British imperial role in the Middle East has focused on the humiliation of Suez in 1956. Certainly in terms of Arab perceptions of the British role in the region, it was the outcome in Palestine that mattered much more in ensuing years. Without question, the most successful outcome of the British experiment in mandatory rule lay in Transjordan. Herein, one might observe an irony, for the British approach in Transjordan was almost wholly ad hoc in the early years of the mandate. Indeed, even the creation of Transjordan as a separate mandate was largely unplanned, although Churchills famous description of the emirate as that country I created one Sunday afternoon surely overstates the case. Certainly the first ruler of Transjordan, the Emir Abdullah, played a significant role in establishing the foundations of the state during the 1920s and 1930s, albeit that he could not have succeeded without British support. Here Fieldhouse draws another interesting comparison from his wider knowledge of British imperial rule, noting that Abdullah was in much the same subservient position as rulers of princely states in India or in Northern Nigeria (p. 226). He was the nominal ruler, but in practice was obliged to do as the British representative, or resident, wanted. Abdullahs success in re-negotiating this position was rewarded with Transjordans independence

after the Second World War, although the country did not fully break free of British influence until the negotiated termination of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty under his successor, Hussein, in March 1957. In terms of the pattern of French mandatory rule in Syria and Lebanon, probably the more surprising element to emerge from Fieldhouses account is the extent of the similarities with the British approach. In both cases, the methods adopted involved ruling through elements of the established elites. In both cases, each imperial power took up its mandates principally to defend perceived imperial interests against the possible encroachment, or excessive aggrandisement, of the other. The main difference between the British and French, though, was that the French refused to offer a schedule for independence in their mandates. Moreover, France had relatively little experience of the region to fall back on in working out how to govern its mandates. The French had, in fact, done little actual fighting to gain their share of the Ottoman spoils. It was mainly the British determination to preserve the entente in Europe and Britains post-war lack of resources which explained their willingness to bring the French into the region (p. 251). Thereafter, Fieldhouse draws an interesting comparison between the methods of French colonial rule in Syria andBritish rule in Iraq. The main difference, he argues, lay in the faade (p. 260). In Baghdad, all the main departments had Iraqi ministerial heads who notionally made policy, even if in practice this had to be cleared with a Britishadvisor. This never happened in Syria, where all the main departments were under exclusive French control. Nevertheless, the French succeeded in maintaining control because the local Syrian notables proved largely docile under their rule, which effectively preserved the social status quo. In Lebanon, meanwhile, the French found ready collaborators in the form of the Maronite Christian community, which feared being swamped in an independent Arab state. France reciprocated their loyalty, with Lebanon representing the jewel in its new Middle Eastern empire (p. 328). Nevertheless, the carving out of a greater Lebanon from Syria, incorporating large Sunni and Shia Muslim minorities, laid the foundations both for Lebanons eventual civil war, and the ultimate eclipse of Maronite leadership. In short, Fieldhouse contends, it is arguable that the worst thing the French did in Lebanon was not to postpone independence and continually interfere in Lebanese politics, but to create a plural society (p. 329). Fieldhouse concludes his analysis with an interesting counter-factual section looking at what other outcomes might have been possible had the mandate system not been imposed on the region in the wake of the First World War. He effectively dismisses the possibility that the Allies might have allowed Ottoman rule in some form or another to continue after the war. There had been too much blood spilt for that. What then of the possible outcome had the Britishhonoured their promises to the Hashemites and created an independent Arab state? Fieldhouse argues convincingly that a single Arab state stretching from the Mediterranean to the Yemen under the Sharif was beyond all probabilities (p. 338). There was simply no existing political, administrative, or economic basis on which to found such a state. Could separate, independent Arab states have survived after the war? Probably the best chance would have been in Syria, although Fieldhouse finds the evidence provided by the brief period of Feisals regime in Damascus far from promising. The probability of success elsewhere, he believes, was even lower. Had the British simply withdrawn, then, there would have been no state system and probably a

great deal of confusion and rivalry (p. 340). The mandates were, in theory, a good way to avoid this chaos. Had they in fact acted as devices to aid political development, they could even have been a good thing. In practice, though, Fieldhouse points out (in a choice phrase) that, the mandate was the weasel word that would appear to combine the reality of effective Western control with the ethics of President Wilson (p. 341). In sum, he finds the British record as a mandatory power to be very mixed (p. 345). The French, meanwhile, failed to allow the development of true self-government. Overall, Fieldhouses conclusion on the effects of the system is fair and judicious, reflecting the balanced judgements made throughout this volume: the mandates sowed dragons teeth that were eventually to grow into the complex of tensions and despotisms that constitute the contemporary Middle East (p. 348). For any student wanting a good introduction to the workings of British and French imperialism in the Middle East this volume is to be highly recommended. Regional and imperial historians, too, will find food for thought in Fieldhouses cogent summaries of the evolution of the historiography in this field. Overall, this is a thoughtful and erudite volume which goes a long way towards locating the apparently exceptional case of the Middle East in the mainstream of British and French imperial history.

Notes
1.

H. Beeley, The Middle East, in The Special Relationship, ed. W. R. Louis and H. Bull (Oxford, 1986), p. 290. Back to (1)

December 2009

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----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------http://www.ocs.cnyric.org/webpages/phyland/files/the%20middle%20east%20-%20european %20imperialism.pdf THE MIDDLE EAST EUROPEAN IMPERIALISM In the mid-1800S, The Ottoman Empire weakened. Europeans referred to the empire as the sick man. Many felt it was time to conquer the empire. Russia acted first. Russia had always wanted to control the two straits that connected the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea the Bosporus and Dardanelles. In 1853 a dispute between Russia and the Ottoman Empire led to the Crimean War. Great Britain and France opposed Russia having so much potential power. They sent troops to help the Ottoman Empire. Russia was defeated but the Ottoman Empire was still weakened. Although Britain wanted to stop Russia, they saw nothing wrong in having imperialist goals in the Middle East. Both Britain and France owned shares in a company that had built the Suez Canal. This became a vital waterway between Britain and India. In the 1870s, Britain gained control of the canal company. In 1882, British troops were sent to Egypt to safeguard the canal. From then until 1922, Egypt was under British control. World War I saw the end of the Ottoman Empire. During the war, the Ottoman Empire had sided with Germany. With Germanys defeat, the Ottoman Empire was broken up. The Europeans powers still controlled the former Ottoman Empire. They called each independent area a mandate. Britain controlled Iraq, Jordan, and Palestine. France controlled Syria and Lebanon. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------http://www.answers.com/topic/imperialism-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa
Gale Encyclopedia of the Mideast & N. Africa:

Imperialism in the Middle East and North Africa

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Direct or indirect control exerted by one nation over the political life or economic life (or both) of other nations. Imperialism is generally defined as a phenomenon that began with the overseas expansion of Europe in the fifteenth century. That expansion did not seriously affect the Maghreb or Egypt, however, until the nineteenth century, and, except economically, it did not affect the most populous areas of southwest Asia until the early twentieth century. The major reason for this delay was the power and durability of the Ottoman Empire. Originating around 1300, the Ottoman Empire eventually expanded to include most of the Balkans and the Black Sea area, Anatolia, the Fertile Crescent, and northern Africa as far west as the borders of Morocco. It was for centuries the primary empire in the Middle East and North Africa. (An empire is a singular political unit - not necessarily based on territorial contiguity - that incorporates different peoples who were previously self-governing and who retain some institutional autonomy.) In taking over so many regions, the Turkish-speaking armies of the sultans created an empire that included many different linguistic, religious, and ethnic groups, in which Turks were always a minority. The Ottomans engaged in imperial rivalry to expand their territory. Their rivals were the Holy Roman Empire (later Austria-Hungary), the Russian Empire, and the Iranian state of the Safavids and their successors, which was sometimes called an empire despite its much smaller size because it was multilingual, multiethnic, and periodically expansive. This description of the Ottoman Empire does not differ substantially from the description that could be applied to the Christian European empires established from the sixteenth century onward, except that the Europeans were normally less willing to admit non-Europeans into the ranks of officials. The sultans, like the Russian tsars, were primarily motivated by the desire to acquire land and wealth, whereas the overseas European empire builders sought raw materials and markets. Thus the Europeans had a greater impact on the international division of labor than did the Ottomans, although this analytical distinction was not necessarily reflected in the attitudes of the imperialists and their subjects. Despite the substantial similarities between European and Middle Eastern empires, the term imperialism is rarely used to describe the underlying principles of the Ottoman Empire. More often, imperialism is defined as a peculiarly European phenomenon embodying military or political control of non-European peoples; unrestrained exploitation of their economies for the disproportionate benefit of the European home country; feelings of racial, religious, and cultural superiority over the dominated peoples; and, in some regions, the implantation of European colonies or importation of nonindigenous laborers, often as slaves. Historians in the Marxist tradition have considered economic exploitation by such means as joint-stock companies, forced labor on plantations, and suppression of indigenous manufactures to be the most important aspect of European imperialism. Imperialism, according to this view, is an inevitable stage of a capitalist system that needs to expand in order to survive. Immanuel Wallerstein, whose theories have been particularly influential, portrays imperialism as the imposition upon the entire world of a system through which capitalist Europe made the rest of the world economically dependent and imposed economic underdevelopment by monopolizing resources, reorienting self-sustaining regions toward extraction of primary goods for European

manufacturers, and preventing the emergence of viable mixed economies in nonEuropean areas. Some clear distinctions between the way the Ottomans and the Europeans ran their empires may be noted. The Islamic religion provided a bond for most people under Ottoman rule, whereas European Christianity remained a culturally elitist, minority faith in the parts of the European empires that did not have large colonies of European settlers or where religions of comparable sophistication, such as Islam, impeded religious conversion. Ottoman lands remained comparatively open to trade by foreigners (though not to land acquisition), and the Ottoman government rarely took action to protect its own merchants, as the Europeans commonly did. Finally, the Ottomans generally administered their territories with a lighter hand than did the Europeans. In 1800 most subjects of the Ottoman sultan considered it normal to be ruled from a distant capital by means of a rotation of officials and military forces sent from afar and often speaking a foreign language. Napolon Bonaparte's propaganda effort in 1798 to convince the Egyptians that they were victims of imperial oppression by foreigners fell on deaf ears. Soon thereafter, however, the Christian peoples of the Balkans, stimulated in part by the exposure of community members to European ideas as a consequence of educational or personal contacts outside Ottoman territories, did begin to see themselves as victims of Ottoman domination. Through a series of wars and militant movements - often encouraged by European powers with strategic or ideological agendas - they endeavored to gain their freedom and establish independent states with comparative ethnic and religious homogeneity. The anti-imperialism of the Balkan secessionists eventually affected the Armenian Christians of Anatolia and more slowly gained headway in Arab nationalist circles after 1900. European imperialism took three forms in the early nineteenth century: direct occupation and colonization of Algeria by France from 1830 onward, diplomatic pressure on the Ottoman sultans to grant economic and legal privileges to Europeans and non-Muslim minorities, and treaties with rulers and chiefs controlling seaports in the Persian Gulf and southern Arabia designed to ensure British military control of the sea route to India in return for maintaining the rulers and chiefs in power. In the second half of the century, new forms of European imperialism emerged. Rulers granted concessions to European entrepreneurs for the building of canals, railroads, and telegraph lines; operation of banks; and marketing of primary products. They also sought loans from private European bankers. When Egypt, the Ottoman Empire, Tunisia, and Iran were successively unable to repay these loans, Europeans assumed financial control over customs and other sources of state revenue. In Egypt, fear that Colonel Ahmad Urabi's military rebellion would interrupt these financial controls prompted Britain to suppress the rebellion militarily and commence an occupation in 1882 that would last for seventy years. In 1881 France occupied Tunisia and subsequently imposed a protectorate upon its Husaynid beys. In 1900, primarily for strategic reasons, France began the occupation of the territory that subsequently became Mauritania, and in 1912, in partnership with Spain, it imposed a protectorate on the sultanate of Morocco. France had already recognized Spain's sovereignty over certain "presidios" in the Spanish Sahara. Growing European imperialism gave rise to anti-imperialist sentiments that were vented in popular opposition to concessions, as in the Tobacco Revolt in Iran in 1891

and in the mobilization of political action around religious symbols and leaders (e.g., in Libya, where the Sanusi Sufi brotherhood spear-headed opposition to Italian occupation after 1911). Anti-imperialism also sparked political movements, most notably the Wafd in Egypt, whose members saw the end of World War I as a possible opportunity to escape British rule. Farther west, the Young Tunisian and Young Algerian movements began demanding reform and greater rights for natives. Armenians and Kurds looked to the peace negotiators to grant them independence from outside control, even if it meant accepting some measure of European protection. The mandate system established at San Remo in 1920 to resolve the problems caused by the defeat of the Ottoman Empire extended European imperialism by giving France control of Lebanon and Syria and Britain control of Palestine and Iraq. Legally, the mandate from the League of Nations to France and Britain required them to nurture these territories toward total independence, but these countries' motivation to do so (strongest in Iraq and weakest in Lebanon and western Palestine) was often adversely affected by issues of national interest. In Palestine, in particular, Britain was committed in the terms of the Balfour Declaration (1917) to fostering the establishment of a Jewish national home. In the eyes of many Arabs and Muslims, the migration of tens of thousands of Jews from Europe to Palestine represented a form of settler colonialism similar to that in Algeria. Between the two world wars France and Great Britain had to deal with extremely determined and sometimes violent resistance by both Syrians and Palestinians, while nationalist movements in the Maghreb also mobilized increasing support. Unlike parts of the world rich in raw materials or agricultural products that could not be grown in Europe, most parts of the Middle East and North Africa did not offer great rewards to their imperial masters. Egyptian cotton, Algerian wine, and Iranian oil flowed into international markets, and the Suez Canal was profitable, but the cost of military occupation in the face of rising nationalist hostility, and the cost of infrastructure investment, limited though it was in most areas, brought the economic value of imperialism into question. After World War II, the greatly depleted European powers were no longer able to bear the cost, either in money or manpower. One by one, the countries of the Middle East became free of direct imperial control. Only in the most profitable or politically contested countries was the withdrawal of empire accompanied by significant bloodshed. British withdrawal from Palestine in 1948 brought on Israel's declaration of independence and the first Arab - Israel War. The army coup that terminated British control of Egypt in 1952 was followed by the Suez War in 1956 in which Britain, in alliance with France and Israel, attempted to regain control of the Suez Canal. Through effective political activism that was largely but not totally peaceful, Tunisians and Moroccans were able to terminate the French protectorates by 1956. In 1960, as part of a broader de-colonization process, France's president Charles de Gaulle granted independence to Mauritania. In Algeria, colonists' refusal to permit meaningful reform led the Front de Libration Nationale to launch a revolution in 1954; France's attempt to repress it cost roughly 500,000 Algerian lives and ended in independence for Algeria in July 1962. Francisco Franco granted the Western (formerly Spanish) Sahara independence in 1975, but this led to conflict with Morocco that had not been resolved by the early twenty-first century. As direct imperial control waned and overt indirect control in the form of military bases and foreign ownership of oil companies diminished in the 1950s and 1960s, cultural

imperialism came to be looked upon as a pervasive remnant of the imperialist era. Cultural imperialism was considered to have several components: imposition of EuroAmerican cultural values and lifestyles through market domination by imported consumer goods, motion pictures, and television shows; ideological subversion in the form of secular nationalist political movements philosophically rooted in Western thought; and intellectual domination through the distorted writings and pejorative imaginative constructions of European Orientalists and their successors in the American academic field of Middle East studies. Direct imperial domination had evoked a fairly uniform nationalist reaction throughout the region, but the more nebulous concept of cultural imperialism led its proponents in different directions. In Iran, Jalal Al-e Ahmad's concept of gharbzadegi or "Westoxication" contributed to the explicitly anti-Western character of the 1979 revolution. Other Islamic activist movements have, to varying degrees, shared hostility or suspicion of the West as an imperialist force. The Islamist insurgency that erupted in Algeria in the 1990s was viewed as principally if not totally cultural in nature. The discourse of alQaida, which also emerged in the 1990s, is primarily cultural. Secular intellectuals, on the other hand, have refused to accept Islam as the only alternative to cultural domination by the West. Calls for a decolonization of history and exposure of Orientalist fantasies have come mainly from secularists such as Morocco's Abdallah Laroui and the Palestinian Edward Said. Further stimulus for resistance to Western imperialism came in 1993 from Samuel Huntington's article "The Clash of Civilizations" in the influential journal Foreign Affairs. Huntington visualized a future in which an undefined Islamic civilization was destined to conflict with a similarly undefined Western civilization, and he called for the formulation of a strategy that would assure Western victory in such a confrontation. Middle Eastern religious and secular thinkers alike viewed this projection as a portent of continued Western imperial ambition in the post - Cold War era. Bibliography Amin, Samir. The Arab Nation: Nationalism and Class Struggle. London: Zed Books, 1982. Berque, Jacques. French North Africa: The Maghrib between TwoWorld Wars. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1967. Huntington, Samuel. "The Clash of Civilizations." ForeignAffairs 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22 - 28. Hurewitz, J. C. The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics, 2d edition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1975 - 1979. Monroe, Elizabeth. Britain's Moment in the Middle East1914 - 1971, new revised edition. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. Said, Edward. Orientalism. New York: Vintage, 1979.
RICHARD W. BULLIET UPDATED BY JOHN RUED
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(Nov. 2, 1917) Statement issued by the British foreign secretary, Arthur James Balfour, in a letter to Lionel Walter Rothschild, a leader of British Jewry, as urged by the Russian Jewish Zionist leaders Chaim Weizmann and Nahum Sokolow. The declaration promised the establishment of a homeland for the Jewish people in Palestine that would not disturb the non-Jewish groups already residing there. The British anticipated gaining a mandate over Palestine after World War I (191418) and hoped to win over Jewish public opinion to the side of the Allies. They also hoped that pro-British settlers would help protect the approaches to the Suez Canal, a vital link to Britain's South Asian possessions. HomeAnswers

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A British declaration supporting the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. Few documents had such far-reaching consequences in the modern history of Middle East as did the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917. It was drafted by Zionist leaders, revised and approved by the British war cabinet, and forwarded by Lord Arthur Balfour, the British foreign secretary, to Lord Rothschild, a Zionist philanthropist and one of its drafters. It consisted of a single sixty-seven-word paragraph: "His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." (Hurewitz, 1979) This was one of a number of contradictory promises Britain made during World War I. Needing Arab support against the Ottoman Empire, Britain promised in the Husayn - McMahon Correspondence (1915 - 1916) to support the establishment of an independent Arab nation, which Arabs understood to include Palestine (which Britain later denied); and needing French and Russian support, it promised in the Sykes - Picot Agreement (1916) to rule the region, including Palestine, with its allies. The cabinet issued the declaration for a number of reasons, both immediate and long term. It hoped to enlist American and Russian Jews help to bring America into the World War I and to keep Russia from abandoning it. In addition, the cabinet sought to preempt a similar German pro-Zionist declaration and needed Jewish money for Britain's own war effort. The climate of opinion in England favored Zionist goals for Palestine. Fundamentalist Christians, some of whom were antisemites, considered it their duty to assist Jews to go to Palestine so that biblical prophesy could be fulfilled. Liberals such as Balfour and Prime Minister David Lloyd George believed that the West had committed a historicalinjustice against the Jewish people, one that must be atoned for. To this intellectual climate can be added the sociopolitical factor: Jewish contributions to British society were disproportionate to their numbers and were recognized and admired. Sir Herbert Louis Samuel, who later became the first high commissioner of Palestine, was a philosopher and a statesman who served in several cabinets; and Chaim Weizmann was a chemistry professor who assisted the British munitions industry. Both were persuasive advocates of a Jewish state. By 1917, the war cabinet accepted the view that postwar strategic advantages could be derived from a Jewish state or commonwealth allied to Great Britain. The phraseology of the declaration was carefully chosen; even its ambiguity was deliberate. The phrase "national home" was new, with no precedence in international law; it was used in the declaration to pacify anti-Zionist Jews, who feared that creation of a state would jeopardize the rights of Jews in the diaspora. In private, however, British officials were clear about the objective. Lord Balfour and David Lloyd George explained to Weizmann in 1921 "that by Declaration they always meant an eventual Jewish State" (Ingrams, 1973). Little thought was given to the indigenous Palestinian population, in large part because Europeans considered them inferior. The declaration referred to these Palestinians, who in 1917 constituted 90 percent of the population, as the "non-Jewish communities in Palestine," a phrase that conceals the identity of the majority. Yet the declaration contained a promise to guarantee the civil and religious rights of the "non-Jews," a promise that the British attempted to enforce even at the expense of Jewish religious rights. At the Wailing, or Western, Wall (in Hebrew, ha-Kotel ha-Maravi), the British, in order to protect Muslim property and religious rights to the wall, allowed the Palestinians to restrict Jewish visitation and prayer, even though the wall was the holiest shrine of Judaism. But British political support for a Jewish national home worked against Palestinian national interests. The Balfour policy, which was incorporated in the League of Nations mandate for Palestine, was backed by the European powers and by the British military. It gave the Yishuv (Jewish community) time to grow through immigration, from about 50,000 in 1917 to more than 600,000 by 1947, and time to develop quasigovernmental and military institutions. Palestinians, fearing domination or expulsion, protested and resisted through political violence - in 1920, 1921, 1929, and 1933 - that was put down by the British military. The Palestine Arab revolt of 1936 through 1939 was suppressed by both British and Zionist forces. The Palestinians were a weak, underdeveloped society, no match for the British and, after 1939, for the Zionists. Ultimately, the 1917 Balfour policy paved the way for the establishment in 1948 of the state of Israel and the exodus of some 726,000 Palestinians who left out of fear and panic or were expelled by the Israel Defense Force. The refugees were not allowed to return to their homes and their properties were confiscated.

Bibliography
Hurewitz, J. C. The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics:A Documentary Record, 2d edition, revised and enlarged, Vol. 2: British-French Supremacy, 1914 - 1945. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979. Hurewitz, J. C. The Struggle for Palestine. New York: Green-wood Press, 1968. Ingrams, Doreen. Palestine Papers, 1917 - 1922: Seeds of Conflict. New York: George Braziller, 1973. Jeffries, Joseph Mary Nagle. Palestine: The Reality. New York: Longmans, Green, 1939. Khalidi, Walid, ed. From Haven to Conquest: Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem until 1948. Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1971. Monroe, Elizabeth. Britain's Moment in the Middle East,1914 - 1971. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1981. Stein, Leonard. The Balfour Declaration. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1961. Weizmann, Chaim. Trial and Error. New York: Harper, 1949. PHILIP MATTAR Read more: http://www.answers.com/topic/balfour-declaration-1917#ixzz28wi7N4tf

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Sykes - Picot Agreement (1916)

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World War I document of 1916 that would have divided the Middle East into British and French spheres. The Sykes - Picot Agreement was one of the pivotal diplomatic documents of World War I concerning the Middle East. It was negotiated in secret at the end of 1915 by Sir Mark Sykes of Great Britain and Georges Franois Picot of France, with full knowledge by their respective foreign ministries. It provided for a partition of the Middle East into French and British spheres. The French were to have direct control of Syria, Lebanon, and Cilicia plus a zone of influence extending east from Damascus and Aleppo through Mosul. The British were granted direct control of the Mesopotamian provinces (now Iraq) of Baghdad and Basra as well as a zone of influence extending from Basra to Palestine. Palestine was itself to be placed under international administration. Under the subsequent Anglo - Russian - French Agreement of 1916, the Russians adhered to Sykes - Picot after extensive discussions between Sykes and the Russian foreign minister, Sergei Sazanov. In return for their support, the Russians were granted direct control over much of eastern Anatolia. In a successful attempt at embarrassing the coalition, the terms of the Anglo Russian - French Agreement were made public by the Bolsheviks in the spring of 1918. The Arabs claimed that Sykes - Picot contradicted promises made to them by the Hussein - McMahon

Correspondence, and the Jews claimed that it contravened the Balfour Declaration. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson wished to annul Sykes - Picot, and even Sykes soon repudiated the agreement. Nonetheless, though the French renounced their claim to Mosul and Britain won control of Palestine, the Middle East treaties framed at the Paris Peace Settlements after World War I closely mirrored the Sykes - Picot Agreement.

Bibliography
Anderson, Matthew S. The Eastern Question. New York: St. Martin's, 1966. Fromkin, David. A Peace to End All Peace. New York: Henry Holt, 1989. Hurewitz, J. C., ed. The Middle East and North Africa in WorldPolitics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979. Khalidi, Rashid. British Policy towards Syria and Palestine,1906 - 1914: A Study of the Antecedents of the Hussein - the [sic] McMahon Correspondence, the Sykes - Picot Agreement, and the Balfour Declaration. London: Ithaca Press, 1980.

ZACHARY KARABELL

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Treaty of Svres
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Peace treaty signed by Britain, France, and the Ottoman Empire after World War I. World War I ended in the Middle East with the signing of the Mudros armistice by the Ottoman Empire on 30 October 1918; but the Middle East was only a small concern of the overall peace negotiations held in France in 1919 - German issues took precedence. Each nation and group came with its own agenda. British prime minister David Lloyd George, while mouthing all the proper slogans about goodwill to Middle Eastern peoples, was there to advance the interests of the British Empire. These included British-controlled sea and land routes to India and assurance that no other power be given important strategic areas. French presidentGeorges Clemenceau, compensating for heavy French troop losses, adamantly adhered to each wartime agreement signed by the Allies that would give France a hold on Syria and southern Anatolia. He also hoped for dominance over the Turkish Straits and perhaps over what would become Turkey. U.S. president Woodrow Wilson came with his Fourteen Points. In addition to the big three, representatives of other concerned nations and groups came to the peace negotiations, including the Hijazis, Armenians, Greeks, Italians, and Zionists. No permanent decision were made in 1919 in this atmosphere of claims and counterclaims. At the end of 1919, British troops in Syria were replaced by French troops, giving the Arabs the impression that the Sykes - Picot Agreement would be upheld. In Palestine, anti-Jewish riots broke out. The Arab Syrian Congress elected Faisal ibn Hussein as king of Syria and his brother Abdullah I ibn Hussein as king of Iraq and tensions rose in Iraq and Egypt. Britain realized that a treaty for the Middle East could no longer be postponed and in April 1920 met with France in San Remo, Italy, to forge an agreement on their points of difference. This prepared the way for a peace settlement with the Ottoman Empire - and the Treaty of Svres was signed on 10 August 1920. By this treaty, the Ottoman sultan recognized that his Arab provinces were cut off from his empire. Control over the Straits went to an international commission. Arabia was recognized as independent and a British protectorate over Egypt was acknowledged. Syria and Iraq became provisionally independent under the newly created mandate system - with Syria to be under the French and to include Alexandretta, Aleppo, Damascus, and Beirut; France could deal with King Faisal as it wished. The state of Iraq was formed under British tutelage, with the province of Mosul attached to those of Baghdad and Basra. Palestine, including both sides of the Jordan river, became a British mandate as well, and the (pro-Zionist) Balfour Declaration of 1917 was written into it. Germany's shares of the Turkish petroleum Company went to France, and Britain got oil-pipeline transit rights across Syria. Britain and France immediately moved into their respective spheres, although the League of Nations mandates did not become effective until 1923. The Treaty of Svres, imposed on the Ottoman government, was never ratified - because of internal Turkish affairs - namely the rise to power of Mustafa Kemal Atatrk and the overthrow of the Ottoman sultan. Thus the treaty became obsolete and final arrangements were put off until the Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923.

Bibliography
Hurewitz, J. C., ed. The Middle East and North Africa in WorldPolitics: A Documentary Record, 2d edition. 2 vols. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1975-79. Lewis, Bernard. The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 3d edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Read more: http://www.answers.com/topic/treaty-of-s-vres-1#ixzz28wjg5fYu

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Paris Peace Settlements (1918 - 1923)

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Post - World War I treaties and agreements that reconfigured the Middle East. The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 led to its dissolution. In the long term the victorious Allies' partition of the Ottoman territories was less important than their introduction of a new system of political organization based on the European model of the nation-state. The modern Middle East was shaped physically and politically by the peace agreements. At the initial Paris Peace Conference in 1919 Britain and France, the victorious allies, were more concerned with adjusting their differences and harmonizing their territorial appetites than with a just and durable final settlement. Hence they agreed at the San Remo Conference in April 1920 to divide the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire along the lines of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, with some minor modifications. France received the mandates for Syria and Lebanon, which the League of Nations confirmed in 1922. France waived its claims to Mosul in Iraq in exchange for shares in the Turkish Petroleum Company (later the Iraq Petroleum Company). Britain obtained mandates for Iraq, Transjordan (which it created in 1920), and Palestine. The Zionists succeeded at the Paris conference in convincing Britain to incorporate the Balfour Declaration into the preamble of the Palestine mandate. To the Arab nationalists, the Paris conference was a political disaster; it sowed the seeds of future conflicts in the region. The victorious Allies initially tried to enforce a similar settlement on the defeated Ottoman government in the 1920 Treaty of Svres, which was designed to partition Turkey into very small, unviable segments. But unlike their Arab counterparts, the Turkish nationalists, led by Mustafa Kemal (Atatrk), successfully challenged the clauses of the Svres settlement related to Anatolia and Thrace, forcing the Allies, after a long, debilitating military campaign, to renegotiate a new settlement at Lausanne in July 1923. The Treaty of Lausanne confirmed Turkish sovereignty over the whole of Anatolia; the Svres clauses calling for an independent Armenia and an autonomous Kurdistan were forgotten.

Bibliography
Hurewitz, J. C., ed. The Middle East and North Africa in WorldPolitics: A Documentary Record, Vol. 2: British-French Supremacy, 1914 - 1945. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979. Sachar, Howard M. The Emergence of the Middle East,1914 - 1924. New York: Knopf, 1969. FAWAZ A. GERGES UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND Read more: http://www.answers.com/topic/paris-peace-settlements#ixzz28wjW77m0

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Treaty of Lausanne
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Renegotiation of treaties ending World War I resulting in more favorable treatment of Turkey. Defeat in World War I resulted in a harsh peace treaty for the Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of Svres (1920) stripped Turkey of all its European territory except for a small area around Constantinople (now Istanbul); demilitarized the straits between the Black and Mediterranean seas, opened them to ships of all nations, and placed them under an international commission; established an independent Armenia and an autonomous Kurdistan in eastern Anatolia; turned over the region around zmirto the Greeks; restored the capitulations; and placed Turkish finances under foreign control. By separate agreement, some parts of Turkey left to the Turks were assigned to France and Italy as spheres of influence. Unlike the other nations on the losing side in World War I, Turkey was able to renegotiate its treaty terms. This was the result of the decline of the sultan's power, the rise of the nationalists under Mustafa Kemal Atatrk, and the defeat of the Greeks' attempt to expand their power in Turkey. The latter development placed Turkish forces near British troops in the area of the straits and led to an armistice at Mudanya in October 1922 at which the Allied powers restored Constantinople and the straits to Turkish authority and called for a peace convention to renegotiate the terms laid down at Svres. The Allies invited both of the contesting powers in Turkey - the sultan's government and the nationalists under Kemal - to a conference at Lausanne, Switzerland. This precipitated Kemal's decision to separate the positions of sultan and caliph, abolishing the former, exiling Mehmet VI and giving the residual powers of caliph to his cousin, Abdlmecit II. Thus, when the conference at Lausanne began in November 1922, Kemal's Ankara government was the sole representative of Turkey. smet Paa, later smet nn in honor of his two victories over the Greeks at nn, led the Turkish delegation as the newly appointed foreign minister. He was determined to reestablish Turkish sovereignty and negotiate as an equal with the British, French, and Italians at the conference. However, smet found himself treated as a supplicant rather than the representative of a government with recent victories. Unable to compete with the sophisticated debate of the Allied diplomats, smet responded with his own unique tactics. He feigned deafness, contested every point however minor, read long prepared statements, delayed debate by consultations with his colleagues, and periodically insisted on deferring discussion pending instructions from Ankara. These tactics led to a break of negotiations for two months beginning in February 1923. The Lausanne conference resulted in seventeen diplomatic instruments. Turkey recognized the loss of its Arab provinces, but plans for an independent Armenia and an autonomous Kurdistan were abandoned. The European powers no longer demanded capitulation, and although Turkey agreed to minor financial burdens and tariff restrictions, there were to be no war reparations. The Greeks lost their zone around zmir, and no other powers retained zones of influence. Turkish territory in Europe expanded, but control over Mosul in Iraq and Alexandretta in Syria remained with the British and French respectively. Finally, the conference recognized Turkish sovereignty over the straits, although there were some concessions in the form of a demilitarized zoneand an international commission to supervise transit through the straits. In short, smet achieved virtually all that nationalist Turkey under Kemal's leadership desired.

Bibliography
Ahmad, Feroz. The Making of Modern Turkey. New York: Routledge, 1993. Howard, Harry N. The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History,1913 - 1923. New York: Ferig, 1966. DANIEL E. SPECTOR UPDATED BY ERIC HOOGLUND Read more: http://www.answers.com/topic/treaty-of-lausanne-1#ixzz28wjqKs5K

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Husayn - McMahon Correspondence (1915 1916)

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Correspondence between Sharif Husayn ibn Ali of Mecca and the British high commissioner in Egypt, who promised independence to Arab countries. Ten letters, written between 14 July 1915 and 30 March 1916 but unpublished until 1939, constitute an understanding of the terms by which the sharif would ally himself to Britain and revolt against the Ottoman Turks in return for Britain's support of Arab independence. Sharif Husayn ibn Ali of Mecca asked Sir Henry McMahon, the British high commissioner in Egypt, to support independence of the Arab countries in an area that included the Arabian Peninsula (except Aden), and all of Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan, and Syria up to Turkey in the north and Persia in the east. He also asked Britain to support the restoration of the caliphate. McMahon's reply on 24 October 1915 accepted these principles but excluded certain areas in the sharif's proposed boundaries: coastal regions along the Perisan Gulf area of Arabia; the Iraqi province of Baghdad, which would be placed under British supervision; areas "where Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally France"; and, in Syria, "the districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo." The Arabs assumed that at least Arabia, northern Iraq, central Syria, and Palestine - which was regarded as southern, not western, Syria - were part of the area that was to be independent. They started the Arab Revolt of 1916, which helped the British to defeat the Turks and to occupy the region. After the war, Arabs felt betrayed because Britain conceded Syria to France and promised to help in the establishment of the Jewish national home in Palestine. The British claimed that they intended to exclude Palestine from McMahon's pledges. The interpretations of the letters have been disputed ever since, in part because of official oversight, and because of deliberate vagueness by the British who - to obtain French, Arab, and Jewish support during the war - made conflicting promises they could not keep. Contributing to the confusion are partisan scholars who read into the correspondence interpretations that fit their ideological positions.

Bibliography
Antonius, George. The Arab Awakening. New York: Capricorn Books, 1946. Hurewitz, J. C. The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record, Vol. 2: British-French Supremacy, 1914 - 1945. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979. Kedourie, Elie. In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: The McMahon-Husayn Correspondence and Its Interpretations, 1914 - 1939. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1976. Monroe, Elizabeth. Britain's Moment in the Middle East,1914 - 1956. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963.

Smith, Charles D. "The Invention of a Tradition: The Question of Arab Acceptance of the Zionist Right to Palestine during World War I." Journal of Palestine Studies 22, no. 2 (1993): 48 - 63.

PHILIP MATTAR

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Arab Revolt (1916)

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Uprising of Arab nationalists against the Ottoman Empire during World War I. Although many Arabs had reached the highest positions in the Ottoman government by the end of the nineteenth century, opposition to Turkish authority was spreading through the empire's Arabic-speaking provinces of the Ottoman Empire. A separatist nationalist movement had followers in many Arab towns and cities, including Damascus, Cairo, Baghdad, and Jerusalem by the early 1900s. Members formed secret cultural and political organizations, including groups of Arab officers in the Ottoman military. Prominent secret societies were al-Qahtaniya and al-Fatat; the former sought to establish a dual Arab - Turkish monarchy similar to the Austro - Hungarian Empire. Al-Fatat wanted to establish Arabic as the official language in the Arab provinces, where it would be taught in all schools. Efforts by the Young Turk regime that seized power in 1908 to repress Arab nationalism intensified opposition to the government and increased demands for separation from the empire. The arrest for treason in 1914 of Major Aziz Ali al-Masri, an Ottoman staff officer of Arab origin, brought opposition to the regime among Arab officers to a head. Among the ardent nationalists was the sharif of Mecca, Husayn ibn Ali, a Hashimite descendant of the prophet Muhammad, and his four sons, Ali, Abdullah, Faisal, and Zayd. Because the authorities suspected their loyalty, they were forced to live in Constantinople (now Istanbul) from 1893 until 1908. After they returned to Mecca, Husayn began to rally surrounding tribes against attempts to conscript Arabs into the Ottoman armed forces. Although the Turkish governor-general of Mecca backed down from the conscription order, Husayn sought an alliance with an outside power against further Ottoman attempts to undermine his authority. In February 1914, Husayn sent one of his sons to negotiate with the British agent and consul general in Cairo, Lord Kitchener, but Great Britain was not yet ready to support an Arab uprising against the Ottomans. With Turkey's entry into World War I on the side of Germany (October 1914), the British authorities reconsidered the sharif's offer to revolt in return for guarantees of Arab independence after defeating the Turks. Ottoman efforts to rally support among Muslims throughout Asia for a jihad against the Allies failed to win over many Arab subjects. Rather, most Arab notables were sympathetic to the growing demands for independence, and many looked to Husayn for leadership. As relations between the Arab provinces and Constantinople continued to deteriorate due to poor economic conditions, mass arrests of suspected Arab nationalists, and resentment of conscription, Husayn attempted to reestablish contact with the British. In 1915 he reopened negotiations through Lord Kitchener's successor in Cairo, Sir Henry McMahon. In an exchange of ten letters known as the Husayn - McMahon Correspondence, the sharif offered assistance to Great Britain against the Turks in return for a British promise to recognize the independence of what was to become Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, and most of the Arabian Peninsula, and to endorse proclamation of an Islamic Arab caliphate. The British, however, refused to accept so precise a definition of the area for Arab independence because of conflicting promises and obligations regarding the territory. McMahon eventually replied that Britain would recognize the territory demanded by the sharif except for certain areas "not purely Arab." The imprecision of British promises was the cause of postwar quarrels between Great Britain and Arab nationalists, particularly with regard to Palestine. Following the exchange of correspondence with McMahon, Ottoman authorities initiated a massive crackdown on Arab nationalists. In May 1916, twenty-one leading Arab citizens of Damascus and Beirut were arrested and executed by public hanging. These events undermined what little loyalty remained among Arab subjects of the sultan, and sparked widespread support for open revolt against the Ottomans. Opposition to the government was further intensified by famine resulting from destruction of crops by a locust plague in 1916. In retaliation for Arab opposition, the Turkish authorities refused to permit outside relief supplies into the region; as a result, some 300,000 people died of starvation. Sharif Husayn gave the order to tribes in the Hijaz to strike at Ottoman garrisons and proclaimed Arab independence in May 1916. After three weeks the Ottoman garrison in Mecca fell, followed shortly thereafter by most others in the main towns of the peninsula. Arab forces were supplied by Britain, and British officers served as military advisers. The most prominent was Colonel T. E. Lawrence, an adviser to Faisal. The Arab revolt against the Turks ended in October 1919 when Faisal's armies captured Damascus, and an Arab regime was established with Faisal as king. At the end of the war, Husayn alienated many of his Arab neighbors when he proclaimed himself "king of the Arab countries." Although the British government refused to recognize him as more than "king of Hijaz," he persisted in the grander title, leading to confrontation with Ibn Saud and eventual defeat by the latter, followed by the annexation of the Hijaz into the Saudi kingdom. The Arab revolt played an important and controversial role in postwar negotiations, and in the decisions taken by Great Britain and France about the territorial divisions of the former Arab provinces in the Ottoman Empire.

Bibliography
Antonius, George. The Arab Awakening: The Story of the ArabNational Movement. London: H. Hamilton, 1938. Gershoni, Israel. "The Muslim Brothers and the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936 - 39." Middle Eastern Studies 22, 3 (July 1986): 367 - 397. Haim, Y. "Zionist Policies and Attitudes towards the Arabs on the Eve of the Arab Revolt of 1936 - 39." Middle Eastern Studies 14 (1978): 211 - 231. Hurewitz, J. C. The Struggle for Palestine. New York: Norton, 1950. Kedourie, Elie. In the Anglo - Arab Labyrinth: TheMcMahon - Husayn Correspondence and Its Interpretations, 1914 - 1939. London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000. Lawrence, T. E. Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph. London: J. Cape, 1935. Marlowe, John. The Seat of Pilate. London: Cresset, 1961. Sheffer, G. "British Colonial Policy Making towards Palestine 1929 - 1939." Middle Eastern Studies 14 (1978). Silberstein, Laurence J., ed. New Perspectives on Israeli History:The Early Years of the State. New York: New York University Press, 1991. Smith, Charles D. Palestine and the Arab - Israeli Conflict, 3d edition. London: Macmillan, 1996. Swedenburg, Ted. Memories of Revolt: The 1936 - 1939 Rebellion and the Palestinian National Past. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995. Swedenburg, Ted. "The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry in the Great Revolt 1936 - 1939." In Islam, Politics, and Social Movements, edited by Edmund Burke III and Ira Lapidus. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988. Sykes, Christopher. Crossroads to Israel. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973. Wasserstein, Bernard. The British in Palestine: The MandatoryGovernment and Arab - Jewish Conflict, 1917 - 1929. Oxford, U.K., and Cambridge, MA: B. Blackwell, 1991. Zeine, Zeine N. The Emergence of Arab Nationalism, with a Background Study of Arab - Turkish Relations in the Middle East, 3d edition. Delmar, NY: Caravan Books, 1973. DON PERETZ

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Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud Al Saud

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1880 - 1953 Muslim leader and founder of Saudi Arabia. Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud Al Saud (known as Ibn Saud) became the greatest of all Saudi rulers, restoring the Arabian empire of his ancestors in the early years of the twentieth century. In his reign of more than a half century he not only recovered the lost patrimony of the House of Saud but laid the foundations for the economically powerful Saudi Arabia, over which his sons continue to rule. Along with his ancestors Saud ibn Abd al-Aziz and Abd al-Aziz ibn Muhammad (rulers of the Saudi state at the turn of the nineteenth century), he was the only Arabian ruler since the early Islamic era to unify most of the Arabian Peninsula under a single political authority. As he was growing up in Riyadh, the Saudi capital, where he received a traditional education centered on the memorization of the Quran, he witnessed the last act in the decline of the second Saudi state and its submission to the Al Saud family's central Arabian rivals and former vassals, the Al Rashid of Hail, a town to the north of Riyadh. His father, Abd al-Rahman, failed in the attempt to reassert Saudi independence and the ten-year-old Abd al-Aziz fled into exile in Kuwait with the rest of the family. In 1902, he led a band of forty companions on a dramatic raid that seized Riyadh from its Rashidi overlords. Over the next quarter century bold military, political, and diplomatic initiatives brought all of Arabia except for Yemen, Oman, and the Gulf shaykhdoms under his rule. In reestablishing Saudi authority, Abd al-Aziz self-consciously re-created the religio-political state of his Wahhabi ancestors. It was based on adherence to the strict beliefs and practices of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the eighteenth-century Islamic reformer whose 1744 alliance with Muhammad ibn Saud had created the Saudi state of 1745. Indeed, he looked back to the first Islamic community under the prophet Muhammad in creating, from 1912 on, a series of communities called hujar (pl.; echoing the hijra - the migration of the prophet Muhammad and his early followers to Medina). Here unruly Bedouin tribesmen were settled as Ikhwan, brethren under the command of preacher/warriors who formed the core of Abd al-Aziz's military force. In addition to the crucial legitimacy provided by identification with Wahhabi Islam, he was able to draw on the established loyalty of many central Arabians, which derived from the significant history of rule by the House of Saud. Moreover, Abd al-Aziz and the Saudi clan enjoyed the advantage of membership in the great Anaza tribal federation, conferring noble (sharifian) lineage, thus joining a critical aristocracy of blood to their religious credentials. Abd alAziz was brilliantly adept in his management of tribal relations, utilizing disbursement of material benefits, application of military force, and the establishment of marital ties to build the alliances necessary to secure his power. He made astute use of the bedouin magnanimity, for which he was famous, as when he carefullycontrived to avoid casualties in his capture of Hail, last stronghold of the Al Rashid, then arranged for the comfortable confinement of his defeated rivals in Riyadh. Patient and generous treatment of his rebellious cousin Saud al-Kabir served to deflect a challenge from within the Al Saud and secured the line of succession for the direct descendants of Abd al-Rahman. If mastery of traditional sources of power in Arabian statecraft carried Abd al-Aziz through the initial phases of reconquest, it was his capacity to utilize Western inventions and techniques as well as to adjust to new international realities that enabled him to establish a state that could endure. The source of this aptitude is not obvious and may be largely traceable simply to his superior intuitive abilities. It is likely, however, that it had something to do with his youthful exile in Kuwait, where the (by Arabian standards) cosmopolitan atmosphere meant exposure to information, ideas, and people not usually encountered in the xenophobic isolation of his native Najd. Early in his career of re-conquest he met the British political resident in Kuwait, Captain William Shakespear, and developed an admiring friendship for him. Sir Percy Cox, senior British representative in the Gulf just before World War I, had a very strong influence on Abd al-Aziz, and Harry St. John Philby, a British civil servant who left his government's service to live in Saudi Arabia, provided Abd al-Aziz with advice (not always taken) and a window on the outside world. Abd al-Aziz also relied heavily on a coterie of advisers from Syria, Egypt, and other Arab countries. This awareness of the outside world helped to induce a certain pragmatism, evident early on in his search for British protection and in his 1915 treaty with Great Britain that recognized his independence and guaranteed him against aggression. Similarly, after the 1924 - 1925 conquest of the Hejaz (western Arabia, with the holy cities of Mecca and Medina), he restrained his zealous warriors and assured his retention of that key province by demonstrating to the world Muslim community that he could provide a more efficient and secure administration of the territory than the Hashimite regime that he had defeated. In 1935, he granted generous terms to the imam of Yemen, whom he had defeated in a border war, doing so both to avert possible European intervention and to avoid inclusion in his kingdom of a population whose cultural distinctiveness would have made its assimilation very difficult. In 1928, the pragmatic realism of Abd al-Aziz came into conflict with the tribal aggression and religious militancy of the Ikhwan forces he had unleashed. The Ikhwan's revolt followed his acceptance of the British-drawn borders of Transjordan and Iraq to the north - for the first time imposing the constraints of explicit state frontiers on a society to which such notions were alien. By 1930, Abd alAziz had surmounted this threat, the gravest to his rule, making effective use of automobiles, machine guns, and radio communications to crush the revolt. The passions that drove it, however, remained alive and shook the Saudi kingdom a half century later, in November 1979, when Islamic extremists and disaffected members of the Utaiba tribe, from which many Ikhwan rebels had come, seized the Great Mosque at Mecca in an effort to overthrow the rule of the Al Saud. With the Ikhwan revolt behind him, Abd al-Aziz moved to draw together the disparate parts of his extensive realm. Since Sharif Husayn ibn Ali had assumed the title King of the Hijaz, Abd alAziz adopted the same title after conquering that province; he coupled it somewhat incongruously with the title Sultan of Najd and Its Dependencies in 1926. In the following year, he elevated the second title as well to monarchical status, in effect creating a dual monarchy. In 1932, Abd al-Aziz abandoned this arrangement and explicitly identified the country with the Al Saud family by naming it the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The two earlier Saudi states had been Wahhabi commonwealths, largely isolated from the outside world and ruled by a Saudi imam, the title emphasizing religious authority and obligations. The new kingdom, while remaining committed to its original religious purpose, was a nation-state that developed an expanding network of relations with other nations, including the establishment of close ties with secular states beyond the Arab-Islamic world. To secure the future stability of the state he had created and to preserve the continued rule of his line, in 1933, Abd al-Aziz formally designated his eldest surviving son, Saud, to succeed him. This action, which senior princes, religious leaders, and tribal chiefs publicly endorsed, departed from the usual practice of Arabian tribal society. In addition to guaranteeing that future kings would come from Abd al-Aziz's branch of the Al Saud, it was doubtless also intended to avert the fratricidal conflict that had destroyed the second Saudi state at the end of the nineteenth century. It was understood that Faisal (Ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saud), the next eldest brother, who possessed a much more impressive intellect and had, as foreign minister and viceroy for the Hijaz, exhibited a much greater capacity for public affairs, would succeed Saud. Abd al-Aziz may have had several reasons for favoring Saud as his immediate successor, but the establishment of seniority as the determining factor in succession was clearly preeminent. Saud and Faisal became rivals, but Saud's incompetence eventually drove the senior princes and religious leaders to depose him in favor of Faisal. Nevertheless, the principle that Abd al-Aziz established has, with certain qualifications, been preserved and served to maintain the stability of the kingdom. The crucial economic and security relationships with the United States, a central pillar of the king-dom's foreign policy, grew from decisions that Abd al-Aziz took in the latter phase of his rule. In 1933, he granted the first oil concession to a U.S. company; he signed a petroleum exploration agreement with Standard Oil of California (SOCAL), choosing it over its British rival, the Iraq Petroleum Company. He did so largely because SOCAL could offer more money for his impoverished treasury but also because he saw an advantage in counterbalancing his close relationship with Great Britain with ties to a faraway country having no political involvement (as yet) in the Middle East. There followed the creation of the Arabian American Oil Company consortium and the exploitation of the world's largest oil reserves, bringing staggering wealth to the companies and the kingdom, and the creation of an intimate alignment with U.S. industry that largely determined the course of Saudi Arabia's economic modernization and development. From this time on - especially on radio, in news-reels, and in newspapers - he became known as King Ibn Saud. Equally significant for Saudi Arabia's future were the agreements that Ibn Saud made with the United States to assure his country's external security. The king's meeting with President Franklin D. Roosevelt on a U.S. Navy cruiser in Egypt's Great Bitter Lake, in February 1945, prefigured the close, if informal, U.S. - Saudi security alliance that developed after World War II, as British power declined. In 1947, the king waved aside the suggestion of his son Prince Faisal, the foreign minister, that Saudi Arabia break diplomatic relations with the United States over the Truman administration's support for the United Nations partition plan for Palestine - which paved the way for the creation of an independent Israel and contravened a pledge that Roosevelt had made to Ibn Saud. The king, however, expected the United States to offer him something in exchange and, between 1947 and 1950, secret U.S. undertakings gave the king the assurances he sought without a formal treaty. Thus the foundations were laid for the far-reaching security relationship - embracing arms sales, military training, and the massive defense infrastructure whose scope was revealed only forty years later, in the course of the Desert Shield/Desert Storm operation of the Gulf Crisis of 1990 - 1991. The last years of the long rule of Ibn Saud, when his physical health was in decline, were an unhappy coda to an extraordinary career. As massive oil income began to flow in the early 1950s, the king displayed little understanding of the economic or social implications of vast wealth - and some of the ostentation that became the hallmark of his reign was apparent before his death. Politically, he was no longer able to master the novel and complex challenges of a very different world than the one he had earlier dominated. The government of Saudi Arabia remained the simple affair that suited a largely traditional desert monarchy, with a small retinue of advisers and a handful of rudimentary ministries that had been established in an ad

hoc manner. Somewhat ironically, the last significant governmental act of the old king was to create the Council of Ministers, until today the source of executive and legislative authority in the kingdom. In November 1953, King Ibn Saud died at al-Taif in the Hijaz. He was buried with his ancestors in Riyadh.

Bibliography
Alangari, Haifa. The Struggle for Power in Arabia: Ibn Saud, Hussein and Great Britain, 1914 - 1924. Reading, U.K.: Ithaca Press, 1998. Almana, Mohammed. Arabia Unified: A Portrait of Ibn Saud. London: Hutchinson Benham, 1980. Armstrong, H. C. Lord of Arabia: Ibn Saud. New York: Kegan Paul International, 1998. Besson, Yves. Ibn Saud, roi bedouin: La naissance du royaume d'arabie saoudite. Lausanne, Switzerland, 1980. Bligh, Alexander. From Prince to King: Royal Succession in theHouse of Saud in the Twentieth Century. New York: New York University Press, 1984. Holden, David, and Richard Johns. The House of Saud: TheRise and Rule of the Most Powerful Dynasty in the Arab World. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1981. Lacey, Robert. The Kingdom. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981. Philby, H. St. J. B. Arabian Jubilee. London: Hale, 1952. Philby, H. St. J. B. Saudi Arabia. London: Benn, 1955. Rasheed, Madawi al-. A History of Saudi Arabia. Cambridge, U.K., and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Troeller, Gary. The Birth of Saudi Arabia: The Rise of the House ofSaud. London: F. Cass, 1976. MALCOLM C. PECK Read more: http://www.answers.com/topic/abd-al-aziz-ibn-sa-ud-al-sa-ud#ixzz28wkljkap

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Al Rashid Family
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Rulers based in Hail, north central Arabia, from 1836 to 1921. Although Abdullah ibn Rashid, the first of the Rashidi dynasty, was for a time allied with the Al Saud family, the two families were the principal political rivals in the region for a century. Abdullah came to power in 1836 by obtaining the support of Egyptian occupation forces. After the Egyptians left Arabia, Abdullah and his successors were able to consolidate their rule by winning the loyalty of the powerful Shammar tribal confederation and the residents of the important market town of Hail. Talal ibn Abdullah ibn Rashid (r. 1848 - 1868) was responsible for increasing trade and commerce in Hail. In addition to treating Shiite merchants from Iraq with tolerance, he oversaw the construction of commercial buildings in his capital and the development of agriculture and rural settlement in the hinterland. The apogee of Rashidi rule in Arabia came under Muhammad ibn Rashid, who ruled the longest (1869 - 1897) and conquered the most territory. Rashidi influence extended across northern Arabia to northern Hijaz and the outskirts of Basra, Damascus, and Aleppo, and down as far as Oman. In 1891 the Rashidi capture of Riyadh forced the Al Saud into exile in Kuwait. Rashidi rule ended in 1921 with the Saudi capture of Hail.

Bibliography
Al Rasheed, Madawi. A History of Saudi Arabia. New York; Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Al Rasheed, Madawi. Politics in an Arabian Oasis: The Rashidi Tribal Dynasty. New York; London: I. B. Tauris, 1991. Vassiliev, Alexei. The History of Saudi Arabia. New York: New York University Press, 2000. MALCOLM C. PECK UPDATED Read more: http://www.answers.com/topic/al-rashid-family#ixzz28wkyeXoE

BY ANTHONY B. TOTH

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Arabian American Oil Company

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Petroleum partnership between U.S. firms and Saudi Arabia, 1933 - 1990. The origins of the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) go back to the May 1933 signing of an oil concession agreement between Saudi Arabia's finance minister, Shaykh Abdullah Sulayman, and Lloyd N. Hamilton, an attorney representing Standard Oil of California (SOCAL, now Chevron). Oil exploration was begun three months later by CASOC, the SOCAL subsidiary established to operate the Saudi concession. At that time, SOCAL was seeking a partner to market the oil it was producing in Bahrain and hoped to produce in Saudi Arabia. In 1936 it transferred 50 percent of the Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) and 50 percent of CASOC to the Texas Company (Texaco), receiving in return $21 million in cash and deferred payments, plus a half interest in Texaco's marketing facilities east of Suez, which were reorganized as a subsidiary of BAPCO and named CALTEX. On 3 March 1938 CASOC brought in its first commercial oil well, Dammam number 7. On 1 May 1939 King Abd al-Aziz was present when the first oil tanker was loaded with Saudi crude oil and sailed from Ras Tanura. The development of Saudi Arabia's oil fields was hampered, but not halted, by World War II. In 1940 Italian aircraft bombed Dhahran, where CASOC was headquartered, and the war at sea limited shipping to and from the Perisan Gulf throughout the conflict. During the war, fears of oil depletion sparked U.S. government interest in the resources of Saudi Arabia. Although plans for the U.S. government to buy all or part of CASOC eventually were shelved, in late 1943 steel and other rationed materials were allocated to the company to construct a tank farm, refinery, and marine terminal at Ras Tanura, along with a submarine pipeline to the BAPCO refinery on Bahrain. CASOC had an unusually close relationship with its host government and its personnel made great efforts to be good guests in the kingdom. CASOC also protected its conception of Saudi interests within its parent corporations, primarily by opposing any move that would restrict production. SOCAL and Texaco were equally committed to a long-term relationship with the kingdom. In January 1944, at the suggestion of State Department adviser Herbert Feis, who had taken part in the negotiations over government participation in CASOC, SOCAL and Texaco changed the name of the operating company to the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO). ARAMCO became the chief conduit communicating Saudi Arabia's interests to its parent corporations and to the U.S. government. ARAMCO's rapid growth was assured once the Red Line Agreement was canceled and the company was able to acquire two new partners, Standard Oil of New Jersey and Socony Vacuum, in December 1948. The infusion of capital fueled the rapid development of Ras Tanura and the construction of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline. That, along with continuing exploration and development efforts, transformed ARAMCO into the largest oil-producing company in the world. In 1978, forty years after oil was discovered in commercial quantities in Saudi Arabia, ARAMCO's cumulative total production exceeded 30 billion barrels.

The concern for and protection of one another's interests by Saudi Arabia and ARAMCO's parent companies were remarkable. A notable instance of efforts made on behalf of Saudi Arabia's government took place in 1973 when the parent companies mounted an intensive campaign in the United States to convince policymakers and the public that the continued failure of efforts to resolve the Arab-Israel conflict could lead to an oil embargo if another war broke out. The success of the oil embargo imposed by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) during the Arab-Israel War of 1973 was underpinned by ARAMCO's decision to observe its conditions to the letter. The government of Saudi Arabia supported ARAMCO through its oil-pricing policy. In the early 1980s the government kept prices below the OPEC average, thus enabling the ARAMCO partners to earn huge profits through purchase of cheap Saudi oil, some of which was deliberately produced in excess of the OPEC-established quota. Before the oil revolution of 1970 to 1973, the ARAMCO parents might have hoped to retain some of their equity in ARAMCO's operations, even though "participation" as a concept was developed by the oil minister of Saudi Arabia and a participation agreement was reached between the Persian Gulf producers and their concession holders in 1972. In June 1974 Saudi Arabia took over 60 percent of ARAMCO under that participation agreement. By the end of the year, the government told the unwilling ARAMCO parents that it wanted 100 percent of the company. In 1976 arrangements for the transfer were worked out; in 1980 the government acquired 100 percent participation interest and almost all of the company's assets. Under Saudi ownership the company commissioned construction of east-west pipelines to carry crude oil and natural gas liquids from the Eastern Province to Yanbu, on the Red Sea, and in 1984 it acquired its first four supertankers. In 1988 the name of the company was changed to the Saudi Arabian Oil Company, or Saudi Aramco. During the 1990s Saudi Aramco took complete control of its domestic oil industry, expanded the capacity of its pipelines, and added to its transport fleet. It began acquiring overseas interests, including shares in the Ssang Yong Refining Company in South Korea and Petron, a Philippine refiner, and established an overseas marketing company, Star Enterprises, with Texaco. Saudi Aramco has made every effort to train and employ Saudi nationals. Its first Saudi president, Ali al-Naimi, took the company's helm in 1989. By 2000 more than 85 percent of its 54,500 workers were Saudi citizens, and most of its contracts went to Saudi-owned or joint venture businesses.

Bibliography
Anderson, Irvine H. Aramco, the United States, and Saudi Arabia: A Study of the Dynamics of Foreign Oil Policy, 1933 - 1950. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981. Barger, Thomas C., and Barger, Timothy J. Out in the Blue: Letters from Arabia, 1937 - 1940. Vista, CA: Selwa Press, 2000. Miller, Aaron David. Search for Security: Saudi Arabian Oil and American Foreign Policy. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980. Nawwab, Ismail I.; Speers, Peter C., and Hoye, Paul F. ARAMCO and Its World: Arabia and the Middle East. Dhahran, Saudi Arabia: ARAMCO, 1980. Ttreault, Mary Ann. Revolution in the World Petroleum Market. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985. Yergin, Daniel. The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991. MARY ANN TTREAULT Read more: http://www.answers.com/topic/arabian-american-oil-company#ixzz28wlAeeSB

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Percy Cox
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Gale Encyclopedia of the Mideast & N. Africa: Percy Cox

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1864 - 1937 British diplomat and colonial administrator. After six years (1884 - 1890) in the British and Indian armies, Sir Percy Cox entered the Indian Political Department, where he was to spend most of the rest of his professional life. At this time, the government of India controlled British diplomatic relations with much of the coast of East Africa and with the shaykhdoms of the Persian (Arabian) Gulf. After postings at Zailaand and Berbera (Somalia), Cox was appointed British consul and political agent at Muscat (now a part of Oman), his first major post, in 1899. His knowledge of Arabic was crucial in enabling him to restore the relationship between the sultan, Faysal ibn Turki al Bu Said, and the British and Indian governments, which had become strained as France attempted to replace British influence. By 1903 Faysal's subsidy had been restored, Faysal's son Taymur had attended the Delhi Durbar, and Lord Curzon, the viceroy of India, had visited Muscat and invested Faysal as Grand Commander of the Order of the Indian Empire (GCIE). Cox spent most of the rest of the period before World War I in the Gulf, first as acting political resident and political resident, then as consul general (under the British minister in Tehran) for southwestern Persia (now Iran) including the Gulf islands, at a time when British trade with the area was rapidly increasing. In 1914 Cox, who had been knighted in 1911, was appointed secretary to the Foreign Department of the government of India. But a few months later, at the outbreak of World War I, he became chief political officer to Indian Expeditionary Force "D" that landed at Iraq's Fao Peninsula at the end of 1914. Apart from two years as acting British minister to Tehran (1918 - 1920), the rest of Cox's career was spent in Mesopotamia/Iraq. In the early part of the war, he also played a crucial role (although at a distance) in ensuring the neutrality of the Saudi ruler of Najd, Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud al Saud (Ibn Saud), and postponing, if not ultimately preventing the differences between the former and Britain's other protg, Husayn ibn Ali, Sharif of Mecca, from breaking out into open conflict. Southern Mesopotamia was invaded in the last few weeks of 1914; British imperial troops reached Baghdad in March 1917 and Mosul a few days after the 1918 armistice that ended the war. One of the consequences of the fact that British authorities conducted the Mesopotamia campaign from India and the campaign in Egypt and Palestine from London and Cairo was that Cox, head of Iraq's civil administration, was not informed of the details of the Sykes-Picot Agreement until May 1917. As neither Cox nor his subordinates (notably Arnold Wilson) were kept abreast of London's thinking on possible future developments in the Middle East, they proceeded to set up an administration on the lines of the British Indian provinces with which they were familiar. When it became clear, toward the end of the war, that this kind of old-style colonialism was no longer acceptable (in the new international atmosphere that engendered the League of Nations), the result was a period of great uncertainty for British officials in the field. Lord Curzon had asked Cox to go to Tehran to negotiate a new Anglo - Persian Agreement, but the turbulent political circumstances in Persia made this impossible. By June 1920, when he was appointed British high commissioner in Iraq, after spending nearly two years in Tehran, the situation had become extremely volatile, especially since the award of the Iraqi mandate to Britain at the San Remo Conference in April. During the summer, a rebellion broke out that threatened the whole future of the British connection with the country; Cox advised firmly against the lively "Quit Mesopotamia" campaign in the British press. He went to Iraq in the autumn and managed to secure the candidature of Faisal I ibn Hussein (whom the French had ousted from Syria) for the throne of Iraq. In October 1922, Cox forced through the signature of the Anglo - Iraqi Treaties (which replaced the mandate in form while maintaining its substance) and fixed the borders between Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq over the next two months. After his retirement from Iraq in May 1923, he acted as British plenipotentiary in the negotiations over the Anglo - Iraqi frontier with Turkey in 1924.

Bibliography
Graves, Philip. The Life of Sir Percy Cox. London and Melbourne: Hutchinson, 1941. Sluglett, Peter. Britain in Iraq, 1914 - 1932. London: Ithaca Press, 1976. PETER SLUGLETT UPDATED Read more: http://www.answers.com/topic/percy-cox#ixzz28wlbCK6O

BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

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Faisal I ibn Hussein

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1889 - 1933 King of Iraq, 1921 - 1933; also known as Amir Faisal, leader of the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Turks, 1916; king of Syria for a brief period in 1920. The third son of Sharif Husayn of the Hijaz, Faisal was from a prestigious, wealthy family (Hashimite) that traced its lineage back to the Prophet Muhammad. He spent his early boyhood among the bedouin in Arabia, educated by private tutors, and, at age six, moved to Istanbul, capital of the Ottoman Empire, where he lived during his father's exile until 1908. Faisal completed his education in Istanbul, becoming multilingual and well versed in court etiquette and politics. Life in cosmopolitan Istanbul and his later service as representative from Jidda in the Ottoman parliament, where he was an early spokesman for Arab interests, provided valuable political experience that served Faisal well in his later negotiations with the European powers. In January 1915, Faisal was sent by his father to Istanbul to determine the political situation of the Hijaz and to contact secret Arab societies in Damascus, Syria, to ascertain if there was support for an Arab uprising against the Ottoman Turks. At first, signs were positive; but at a second meeting in Damascus in January 1916, after these groups had been disbanded by Cemal Paa, the few remaining nationalists indicated via the Damascus Protocol that Hussein should initiate a revolt for Arab independence. Hussein incorporated these ideas in his correspondence with the British. Faisal was less sanguine about British support than was his brother, Abdullah I ibn Hussein, but Ottoman Turkish moves to strengthen their hold on Medina made action moreimminent. (The Turks were fighting on the side of the Central powers - Austria-Hungary and Germany - and against the Allies, including Britain and France, in World War I.) Faisal's note to Cemal Paa advocated an Arab umma (community). His statement and the cutting of the railroad lines between Damascus and Medina launched the Arab Revolt on 10 June 1916. Concern in Cairo that the Arab troops in Arabia needed military training led to the dispatch of the British Colonel T. E. Lawrence, who by December 1916 had joined Faisal and suggested to the British that the amir become the field commander of the Hijaz. The suggestion was taken, and, though unable to take Medina, Faisal's troops later occupied Aqaba on 6 July 1917, a victory that provided the Arabs credibility with the British. Faisal was deputized a British general under the command of General Edmund Allenby, commander in chief of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. Faisal's troops, some 1,000 bedouin supplemented by approximately 2,500 Ottoman ex-prisoners of war, proceeded to harass the Ottoman Turkish army as the British moved to take Gaza, Beersheba, and Jerusalem. On 25 September 1918, Allenby ordered the advance on Damascus. As party to the Sykes - Picot Agreement, Britain attempted to assign organized administration of the city both to the French and to the Arabs, but in the confusion of the British advance and the Ottoman retreat, the Damascus Arabs hoisted their own flag before Faisal and his army had time to reach Damascus. With the aid of Faisal's supporter, Nuri al-Said, pro-Faisal officials controlled the city and were later confirmed by the French. Lawrence asserted that Faisal's men had slipped into the city on 30 September to 1 October and had liberated it in advance of the British and Australian troops. At the Versailles conference in 1919, Faisal was caught between British - French international diplomacy and events in the Middle East that were taking their own course. As the Arab representative to Versailles, Faisal pressed claims for Syrian independence, but under British sponsorship. Discussions with American proponents of Zionism and with Zionist leader Chaim Weizmannelicited Faisal's support for Jewish immigration to Palestine, culminating in the Faisal - Weizmann Agreements signed on 3 January 1919. To the published document, Faisal added a handwritten addendum that Arab support for Jewish aspirations would be conditional upon the achievement of Arab independence. Faisal continued to support Jewish immigration within the context of his later pan-Arab federation programs. In May, Faisal called for a general congress to be held in Damascus to endorse his position at Versailles. Convened in June, the meeting was dominated by the prewar Arab nationalist clubs the primarily Iraqi al-Ahd, the Palestinian Arab Club (al-Nadi al-Arabi), which tried to persuade Faisal to relinquish his support for Zionism, and the alFatat (youth) dominated Istiqlal Party. The congress called for an independent Syria that also would include Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine. Backed by the British, who wished to exclude the French from the Middle East, Faisal received a grudging acquiescence for an Arab regime from the politically weakened French president, Georges Clemenceau. Still in session in March 1920, the congress declared Syria (including Lebanon and Palestine) an independent kingdom ruled by Faisal as constitutional monarch. Some Arabs in Palestine proclaimed Palestine a part of Syria, and Basra and Baghdad were declared independent by a group of Arabs in Iraq who wished to be ruled by Faisal's brother, Abdullah. In spite of the international repercussions, Faisal accepted the Syrian draft and allowed Arab nationalists to harass French troops in Syria while he began to negotiate with the forces of Kemalism in Anatolia who had proclaimed an independent Turkey. As the British withdrew their support from the Arabs in Syria, and a new government in Paris followed a more vigorous policy in Syria, the French ordered their high commissioner in Syria, General Henri-Joseph-Eugne Gouraud, to confront Faisal. Occupying Damascus on 26 July 1920, the French forced Faisal into exile the following day and proclaimed Syria to be under French rule. A shift in British priorities affected policy after 1920, influenced by an Arab revolt in Iraq against the British occupation and the policies of Winston Churchill, newly appointed colonial secretary, which included leaving Syria to the French and installing Hashimites elsewhere as local rulers who would "reign but not govern" in order to save the expense of full-scale occupation. At the Cairo Conference in March 1921, Churchill and his aides proceeded to redraw the map of the Middle East and to plan the installation of Faisal as king of a newly created Iraq. The British looked to Faisal as a malleable vehicle for their Mesopotamian/Iraqi policy, which was to secure the area and its oil for themselves. He was deemed suitable to both the Sunni and Shiite Iraqis because of his Hashimite lineage and his Arab nationalist credentials as leader of the Arab Revolt. Any local candidates, such as Sayyid Talib of Basra, were duly eliminated. The British contrived a plebiscite in July 1921 to authorize Faisal's candidacy. In August 1921, Faisal arrived in Iraq to a lukewarm reception and was proclaimed king. The leader of the Arab Revolt brought with him to Iraq a coterie of Iraqi (former Ottoman) Arab nationalist army officers who had supported him in Syria and who now took top positions in the new Iraqi administration. Jafar al-Askari became minister of defense; perennial cabinet minister Nuri al-Said became chief of staff of the new Iraqi army; and Ottoman educator Sati al-Husari instituted an Arab nationalist curriculum in Iraqi schools. Faisal's tenure in Iraq was a tightrope walk between nationalism and cordial relations with Britain, without whose financial and military support and advisers he could not rule. Always maintaining his own goals, while remembering the bitter Syrian experience, Faisal worked from 1921 until his death in 1933 to create a modernized, unified country with a centralized infrastructure, to achieve immediate political independence from Britain, and to continue his dream of uniting Arab areas of the Middle East into a pan-Arab union under Hashimite aegis. From the beginning, the British regretted their choice, as Faisal proved to be less docile than they had anticipated. Throughout the 1920s, Faisal was preoccupied with the fact that Iraq was a British mandate and not an independent state. Faced with local nationalist opposition to himself and to the British presence in the country, he used his considerable personal charisma to garner the support of urban nationalists and tribal leaders in Shiite areas. Comfortable both in traditional dress meeting with bedouin and in Western-style clothes playing bridge with British officials in Baghdad, Faisal negotiated for independence. He also understood the necessity for British political and military support to ensure the territorial integrity of the new state until Iraq was able to build up its own army and defend its interests against the Persians, Saudis, and Turks, from whom Britain managed to secure Mosul for Iraq. During treaty negotiations in 1922, delayed by his appendicitis attack, and again in 1927, the king encouraged the anti-British nationalist opposition, all the while advocating moderation by both sides. The result was an agreement signed in 1930 that gave Britain control of Iraqi foreign policy and finances but also resulted, in 1932, in Iraq's nominal independence and admission to the League of Nations. The Iraqi constitution gave Faisal the power to suspend parliament, call for new elections, and confirm all laws. During his tenure, the king attempted to forge a united Iraq with a nationalist focus instead of the patchwork of disparate religious and ethnic groups. Once independence was assured, Faisal used his prestige and his position as king of an independent Arab state to engage in foreign policy. Faisal never abandoned his interest in Syria. In contact with the French in Syria over the possibility that a Hashimite such as Abdullah or Ali (especially after the latter lost his throne in Arabia to the Saudis) might be installed there as he was in Iraq, Faisal was also active in local Syrian politics. In 1928 he organized a monarchist party aimed at making him ruler both in Iraq and in Syria. To Faisal, Iraqi independence in 1932 would be but the first step toward an Arab union to include not only Syria and Palestine, but possibly Arabia as well. From 1929 until Syrian elections in 1932, Faisal sent emissaries to lobby Syrian politicians, conducted an intense propaganda campaign to promote his interests, and used the Islamic Congress that met in Jerusalem in 1931 to advance his cause. Plans were made for another congress to meet in Baghdad in 1933, despite British opposition to Faisal's pan-Arab plans. The defeat of his cause in the Syrian elections, anti-Saudi revolts in the Hijaz, and his untimely death put Hashimite unity attempts on hold. In June 1933, Faisal left for London on a pre-arranged state visit, leaving an anti-British government in power in Baghdad. He then spent the summer in Switzerland for reasons of health. When word reached him of the crisis with the Assyrian minority in Iraq, Faisal pleaded for moderation. But the exploits of the new Iraqi army that resulted in hundreds of Assyrian civilian deaths were popular in Baghdad, where there were demands for Faisal's resignation. On 7 September 1933, Faisal died of a heart attack in Geneva. He was succeeded by his son, Ghazi ibn Faisal.

Bibliography
Kedourie, Elie. England and the Middle East: 1914 - 1921. Has-socks, U.K.: Harvester Press, 1978. Muslih, Muhammad Y. The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.

Nevakivi, J. Britain, France, and the Arab Middle East, 1914 - 1920. London: Athlone, 1969. Simon, Reeva S. Iraq between the Two World Wars. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986. Sluglett, Peter. Britain in Iraq, 1914 - 1921. London: Ithaca Press for the Middle East Centre, St. Antony's College, Oxford, 1976. Read more: http://www.answers.com/topic/faisal-i-ibn-hussein#ixzz28wm3A6Gj

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Abdullah I ibn Hussein

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1882 - 1951 King of Jordan, 1946 - 1951. Abdullah ibn Hussein, born in Mecca, was a son of Husayn ibn Ali. On his eleventh birthday, he went to Constantinople (now Istanbul) to join his father, who had been summoned by the sultan. In 1908 Hussein was appointed Sharif of Mecca, over the objections of the Committee for Union and Progress (the Young Turks). Between 1910 and 1914, Abdullah represented Mecca in the Ottoman Parliament. The Turkish authorities tried to strip Hussein of his administrative (but not religious) duties when the construction of railroad and telegraph lines made direct rule from Constantinople possible. Hussein resisted, and he was in danger of dismissal when the dispute was shelved due to the outbreak of World War I. In February 1914, Abdullah met Lord Kitchener, then minister plenipotentiary to Egypt, and asked him if Britain would aid Sharif Hussein in case of a dispute with the Turks. Abdullah also met with Ronald Storrs, the Oriental secretary at Britain's consulate in Cairo. This meeting led to a subsequent correspondence between Storrs and Abdullah that later developed into the Husayn - McMahon Correspondence, an exchange in which certain pledges were made by Britain to the sharif concerning an independent Arab kingdom (with ambiguous boundaries) in the Fertile Crescent. The Turks tried to persuade Hussein to endorse the call for jihad against the Allies, but he delayed until 10 June 1916, when the Arab Revolt was declared. Abdullah was entrusted with the siege of the Turkish garrisons in al-Taif and Medina. His brother Faisal, meanwhile, scored quick victories in Syria. Faisal set up an independent Arab kingdom with its capital at Damascus toward the end of 1918; the French drove him out two years later. Meanwhile, Abdullah was defeated in an important battle with the Wahhabi followers of Ibn Saud. Britain placed Faisal on the throne of Iraq, which had been slated for Abdullah. One key to understanding Abdullah is his deep loyalty to Islam, which in his mind was linked to the notion that God had favored the Arabs with a unique position as the carriers of culture and faith. For him, Arabism was inseparable from Islam and meaningless without it. His family, which claimed a direct line of descent from the prophet Muhammad, provided the crucial link between the two. Another key to an understanding of Abdullah's personality is that, as a rule, he sought cooperation, even in the midst of conflict. He preferred bargaining to fighting, and he constantly formulated value-maximizing strategies in which he compromised with his adversaries so that all sides might stand to gain from the outcome. Although Abdullah strove for unity, he engaged in nation-building on a limited scale when unity was unattainable. When he appeared with a small band of armed followers in Madaba, after the French had ousted his brother Faisal from the throne of Syria in 1920, he was intent on leading Syrian political refugees, members of the Istiqlal Party still loyal to Faisal, and the bedouins he could muster in a bid to wrest Arab rights in Syria from the French. With T. E. Lawrence acting as a go-between, he negotiated a deal with the new British colonial secretary, Winston Churchill, under which Abdullah agreed to administer Transjordan for six months, beginning on 1 April 1921, and was granted a subsidy by Britain. One consequence of this was to remove Transjordan from the sphere of applicability of the Balfour Declaration. Abdullah took over the administration of an arid plateau with a population of about 235,000, largely bedouin, poor, and uneducated, a land with some two hundred villages, half a dozen towns, and no major cities. Governmental services were virtually nonexistent. When he died, he left a nation-state comparable with others in the Middle East, although lacking in financial independence. The period from 1924 to 1940 was one in which central administration was developed, with Palestinians gradually replacing Syrians. An exemplary land program gave farmers property securityunmatched in the Fertile Crescent. In 1925 the Man and Aqaba regions were effectively incorporated into Trans-jordan (they had technically formed part of the Hijaz). In the same period, the bedouins, who had preyed on the sedentary population, were successfully integrated into the state, for which John Bagot Glubb, the organizer of the Desert Patrol, was largely responsible. In 1928, Transjordan acquired an organic law under which Abdullah gained recognition in international law. It also provided for constitutional government and a legislative council, but Abdullah had wide authority to rule by decree, under the guidance of Britain. Although Transjordan remained militarily dependent on Britain, on 22 March 1946 a treaty was concluded whereby Britain recognized Transjordan "as a fully independent state and His Highness the Amir as the sovereign thereof." Following a name change, the Hashimite kingdom of Jordan concluded a new treaty with Britain in 1948. Through years of dependency on Britain, Abdullah fell behind the times, continuing to reflect the Ottoman Empire in which he had grown up: dynastic and theocratic, Arabs accepting foreign suzerainty under compulsion. He was out of step with Palestinian and secular Arab nationalism as well as Zionism. He sought to use British influence to forge Arab unity rather than to get rid of the British as a first step toward unity. British residents, notably St. John Philby and Percy Cox, drove a wedge between him and Syrian members of the Istiqlal party, who had perceived the Hashimites as champions of Syria's independence from France. When Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar, a nationalist Syrian leader who had been a longtime supporter of Abdullah, was assassinated in July 1940, Abdullah's base of support in Syria died with him. Abdullah could accept a Jewish homeland only in the context of the old millet system: as a minority with a large degree of autonomy within a kingdom that he ruled. Zionists found this totally unacceptable but valued his accommodating approach to the problem. Yet he was a pioneer of Arab - Jewish understanding. He accepted the Peel Commission Report of 1937, which recommended partition of Palestine, even if he did not embrace a Jewish state. He also publicly accepted the 1939 white paper on Palestine, which was favorable to the Arabs. It has been said that he was driven by personal ambition, hoping to incorporate the Arab portion of Palestine within his domain, yet it is clear that he saw himself as an Arab acting for the Arabs. As his grandson King Hussein pointed out, Abdullah realized that the Jewish community in Palestine was only the tip of the iceberg and that the balance of forces dictated compromise. Abdullah met with Golda Meir, who was acting on behalf of the political department of the Jewish Agency, on 17 November 1947, and it was agreed that Abdullah would annex the Arab part of Palestine under the UN partition plan but would not invade the Jewish part. When the British mandate ended on 14 May 1948, the Jews declared the creation of a Jewish state, and war broke out with the Arabs. The Arab Legion (Jordanian army) occupied what came to be known as the West Bank; Britain accepted this as long as Abdullah kept out of the Jewish zone; when Jewish forces and the Arab Legion clashed over Jerusalem, which was to have been designated an international zone, Britain cut off arms supplies and spare parts, and ordered all of its officers to return to Amman. The Arabs held on to East Jerusalem, but the Arab Legion had to withdraw from the towns of Lydda and Ramla, which laid Abdullah open to charges of betrayal. In the final analysis, his strategy salvaged territory for the Arabs that may one day serve as the basis for a Palestinian state. Abdullah initiated a conference in Jericho at which the Palestinian participants expressed a wish to join in one country with Jordan. Parliamentary elections were subsequently held in the west and east banks, with twenty seats assigned to each. Parliament convened on 24 April 1950, at which time Palestinian deputies tabled a motion to unite both banks of the Jordan. This was unanimously adopted. Abdullah became king of a country that now included the holy places in Palestine, with a population of 1.5 million, triple the population of Transjordan alone. Abdullah was assassinated at the al-Aqsa Mosque on 20 July 1951 by a handful of disgruntled Palestinians believed to be working with Egypt's intelligence service.

Bibliography
Abdullah, King of Jordan. My Memoirs Completed, translated by Harold W. Glidden. London and New York: Longman, 1978. Dann, Uriel. Studies in the History of Transjordan, 1920 - 1949: The Making of a State. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984. Kirkbride, Sir Alec. From the Wings: Amman Memoirs 1947 - 1951. London: F. Cass, 1976. Shlaim, Avi. Collusion across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.

Wilson, Mary C. King Abdullah, Britain, and the Making of Jordan. Cambridge, U.K., and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987. JENAB TUTUNJI Read more: http://www.answers.com/topic/abdullah-i-ibn-hussein#ixzz28wmFzaVF

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Viscount Allenby
Britannica Concise Encyclopedia: Edmund Henry Hynman Allenby 1st Viscount Allenby of Megiddo and of Felixstowe
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(born April 23, 1861, Brackenhurst, near Southwell, Nottinghamshire, Eng.died May 14, 1936, London) British field marshal. He fought in the South African War and served as inspector general of cavalry (191014). In World War I, he commanded with distinction in the Middle East. His victory over the Turks at Gaza (1917) led to the capture of Jerusalem, and his victory at Megiddo, along with his capture of Damascus and Aleppo, ended Ottoman power in Syria. His success was partly due to his innovative use of cavalry and other mobile forces, and he is remembered as the last great British leader of mounted cavalry. As high commissioner for Egypt (191925), he steered that country to recognition as a sovereign state (1922). For more information on Edmund Henry Hynman Allenby 1st Viscount Allenby of Megiddo and of Felixstowe, visit Britannica.com.

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Gale Encyclopedia of Biography: Edmund Henry Hynman Allenby

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The English field marshal Edmund Henry Hynman Allenby, 1st Viscount Allenby (1861-1936), was a commander during World War I. His fame rests largely on his leadership in the Allied victory over the Turkish armies in 1917-1918. Edmund Allenby was born on April 23, 1861, in Southwell, Nottinghamshire, England. He attended the school of a local clergyman and then went to public school. After twice failing to pass the Indian civil service examination, he succeeded in passing the examination for the Royal Military College at Sandhurst. Allenby was commissioned in the army in 1882 and sent with his unit to South Africa, too late for the battle of Majuba Hill, won by Boer force. He returned to England in 1886 and continued to advance in the army. He accompanied his regiment to South Africa again after the Boer War started in 1899, and there he made his reputation as an officer in action. The forces under his command were invariably successful in that long war. At the end of the Boer War, Allenby was promoted from colonel to brigadier general and then to major general by the time World War I began. He was sent to France in command of a cavalry division. He later commanded the V Corps and the 3d Army. He was not an outstanding commander in Europe; his forte was cavalry, and traditional cavalry units were not useful where the front was bogged down in trench warfare. With the need for a new commander in chief in the Middle East, Allenby, because of his unequaled cavalry experience, was chosen. Allenby and Douglas Haig, the British commander in chief in Europe, never had great confidence in each other, and the new assignment for Allenby removed a source of friction on the Western front in Europe. He had unlimited success in his new command. His armies captured Jerusalem and Damascus, defeating the Turkish armies in a brilliant campaign - the last time that cavalry was to be decisive in modern warfare. Allenby and the soldier-scholar T. E. Lawrence of Arabia emerged from that phase of the war as the greatest names. After the war ended, Allenby was promoted to field marshal, made a viscount, and treated as a hero at home. He was also given the post of high commissioner for Egypt, which he retained until his retirement from public life in 1925. Lord Allenby was married and had one son. He died on May 14, 1936. Known to his troops as "the Bull," he had exhibited that animal's positive traits of strength and determination but also its weaknesses of bad temper and rashaction.

Further Reading
The standard biography is Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell, Allenby: A Study in Greatness (2 vols., 1940-1943), a balanced account by a World War II commander. Brian Gardner, Allenby of Arabia: Lawrence's General (1966; British ed. entitledAllenby, 1965), is valuable because the author was the first to make use of the Allenby family correspondence. Other sources are Raymond Savage, Allenby of Armageddon: A Record of the Career and Campaigns of Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (1925), and the pertinent chapter in B. H. Liddell Hart, Reputations, Ten Years After (1928; repr. in Barrett Parker, ed., Famous British Generals, 1951).

Additional Sources
James, Lawrence, Imperial warrior: the life and times of Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby, 1861-1936, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1993.

Oxford Dictionary of British History: Edmund Allenby

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Allenby, Edmund, 1st Viscount Allenby (1861-1936). Soldier and administrator. After extensive service in Africa before 1914, Allenby fought in France
before being posted to Palestine in June 1917. In the Middle East he proved himself a master of mobile warfare. In October 1917 his troops defeated the Turks at Gaza and by Christmas he had occupied Jerusalem. Further rapid progress was halted when his army was milked of reinforcements to be sent to France. But when he resumed his offensive in September 1918, operating in co-operation with the Arab forces organized by Colonel T. E. Lawrence (of Arabia), he destroyed the Turkish armies in Palestine and Syria at the battle of Megiddo.

Columbia Encyclopedia: Edmund Allenby

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Allenby, Edmund Henry Hynman Allenby, 1st Viscount (l'nb), 1861-1936, British field marshal. Educated at Sandhurst, he saw
active service in Bechuanaland (1884-85) and Zululand (1888) and in the South African War (1899-1902). When World War I broke out (1914), he commanded first the cavalry and then (1915-17) the 3d Army in France. Appointed commander of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force in June, 1917, he waged the last of the great cavalry campaigns by invading Palestine, capturing Jerusalem, and ending Turkish resistance after the battle of Megiddo (Sept. 18-21, 1918). He served as British high commissioner for Egypt and Sudan (1919-25). He was made viscount in 1919.

Bibliography
See A. P. Wavell, Allenby (1941) and Allenby in Egypt (1945); B. Gardner, Allenby of Arabia (1965).

Gale Encyclopedia of the Mideast & N. Africa: Edmund Henry Allenby

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1861 - 1936 British officer who commanded British forces in the Middle East during World War I; military governor of Palestine and high commissioner of Egypt. Edmund Henry Allenby's early career included extensive service in Africa, including the Boer War (1899 - 1902). Posted to France at the start of World War I, he was sent to the Middle East in June 1917, where he led Britain's Egyptian Expeditionary Force and took Beersheba and Gaza (1917); with the help of Colonel T. E. Lawrence (of Arabia) and Prince Faisal I ibn Hussein, he occupied Jerusalem in December 1917. He launched his final offensive in 1918, taking Megiddo from 18 September to 21 September. This classic of military strategy led to the collapse of Ottoman Empire forces and the British occupation of Syria. At the peace conference in Paris, Allenby argued, as military governor of Palestine, that Britain should support Faisalas king of Syria, but the League of Nations awarded the French a mandate over Syria; they occupied the new kingdom and ousted Faisal. Created a viscount in 1919, Allenby was appointed high commissioner for Egypt (1919 - 1925). There he advocated accommodation with rising Arab Nationalism, thus clashing over policy with British Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill. His threat to resign persuaded the British government to issue the Allenby Declaration on 28 February 1922, which granted formal independence to Egypt but retained enormous rights for the British over Egyptian affairs.

Bibliography
Wavell, Archibald P. Allenby: A Study in Greatness. 2 vols. London: G. G. Harrap, 1940 - 1943. JON JUCOVY

Wikipedia on Answers.com: Viscount Allenby

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Edmund Allenby, 1st Viscount Allenby

Viscount Allenby, of Megiddo and of Felixstowe in the County of Suffolk, is a title in the Peerage of the United Kingdom. It was created on 7 October 1919 for the prominent military commander Field Marshal Sir Edmund Allenby, with remainder, in default of male issue of his own, to his younger brother Captain Frederick Claude Hynman Allenby and his heirs male lawfully begotten. He was succeeded according to the special remainder by his nephew, the second Viscount. As of 2010, the title is held by the latter's son, the third Viscount, who succeeded in 1984. He is one of the ninety elected hereditary peers that remain in the House of Lords after the passing of the House of Lords Act 1999, and sits as acrossbencher. The family seat is Newnham Lodge, near Hook, Hampshire.

Viscounts Allenby (1919)

Edmund Henry Hynman Allenby, 1st Viscount Allenby (18611936) Dudley Jaffray Hynman Allenby, 2nd Viscount Allenby (19031984) Michael Jaffray Hynman Allenby, 3rd Viscount Allenby (b. 1931)

The heir apparent is the present holder's son, the Hon. Henry Jaffray Hynman Allenby (b. 1968)

The heir apparent's heir is his elder son, Harry Michael Edmund Allenby (b. 2000)

References

Kidd, Charles, Williamson, David (editors). Debrett's Peerage and Baronetage (1990 edition). New York: St Martin's Press, 1990. Leigh Rayment's Peerage Pages
[self-published source?][better source needed]

This entry is from Wikipedia, the leading user-contributed encyclopedia. It may not have been reviewed by professional editors (

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Hussein ibn Ali

Britannica Concise Encyclopedia: usayn ibn Al
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(born 1854, Constantinople, Ottoman Empiredied 1931, Amman, Transjordan) Sharif of the Hshimite line, Ottoman-appointed emir of Mecca (190816), and self-proclaimed king of the Arabs (191624). His claim to be the new caliph (1924) led to a short and unsuccessful war against Ibn Sad. usayn was exiled to Cyprus. One of his sons, Abdullh, became king of Transjordan (present-day Jordan); another became king of Syria and later Iraq as Fayal I. For more information on usayn ibn Al, visit Britannica.com.

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Gale Encyclopedia of the Mideast & N. Africa: Husayn ibn Ali

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1852 - 1931 Arab leader from the Hashimite family. Descended from the Hashimite family of Mecca, Husayn was the amir of Mecca (1908 - 1916), king of the Hijaz (1916 - 1924), and the father of Ali, Zayd, and of King Faisal I ibn Hussein of Iraq and Amir Abdullah I ibn Hussein ofTransjordan, later king of Jordan. In 1893, Husayn moved to Constantinople (Istanbul), seat of the Ottoman Empire, at the bidding of Sultan Abdlhamit II, and remained there for the next fifteen years. During these years of "gilded captivity," Husayn established himself as the leading candidate for the Meccan emirate, and in 1908, the sultan appointed him to that position. Once in Mecca, Husayn found himself at odds with the Young Turk government in Istanbul. While he sought autonomy for himself and the hereditary office of amir for his sons, the Young Turks and the Committee for Union and Progress attempted to extend their control over the Hijaz through the construction of the Hijaz Railroad. Husayn's attitude toward Arab nationalism before World War I has been the subject of some dispute. In 1911, he was approached by Arab deputies in the Ottoman parliament as a possible leader of a pan-Arab independence movement. He declined to take active part in their movement. Yet, by 1914, his sons Faisal and Abdullah were actively involved in various secret societies, and in the spring and summer of 1914, Abdullah met with British officials in Cairo. After the outbreak of World War I, Husayn entered into discussions with Britain about the possibility of an Arab revolt led by him against the Ottomans, but he continued to assure the Young Turks of his loyalty. In 1915, he began a correspondence with Sir Henry McMahon, the British high commissioner in Cairo. The Husayn - McMahon Correspondence established the terms for a British-sponsored Arab revolt, with several critical ambiguities surrounding the status of Palestine.

In June 1916, Husayn launched the Arab Revolt, during which active military leadership passed to his four sons and the British. After the war, he refused to endorse the Versailles Treaty on the grounds that the British had reneged on the Husayn - McMahon correspondence and other wartime promises. At the same time, he came under increasing pressure from Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud Al Saud of the Najd in central Arabia. Estranged from the British, who terminated aid to Husayn after 1920, and bitter about the mandate system, Husayn declared himself caliph (head of Islam) after Turkey abolished the caliphate in 1924. This ill-advised move alienated Husayn from many of his remaining supporters, and in August 1924, Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud Al Saud launched a major assault on the Hijaz. Husayn abdicated, went into exile on Cyprus, and died in 1931 in Amman. He was buried in the al-Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem.

Bibliography
Fromkin, David. A Peace to End All Peace. New York: Holt, 1990. Morris, James. The Hashemite Kings. New York: Pantheon, 1959. Paris, Timothy J. Britain, the Hashemites, and Arab Rule,1920 - 1925: The Sherifian Solution. London: Cass, 2003. ZACHARY KARABELL UPDATED BY MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH Read more: http://www.answers.com/topic/husayn-bin-ali#ixzz28wn5s44G

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Hashimite House (House of Hashim)

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Gale Encyclopedia of the Mideast & N. Africa: Hashimite House (House of Hashim)
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Notable family from Hijaz whose members are Sharifs (descendants of the prophet Muhammad through his grandson Hasan) and who have occupied leadership positions in the twentiethcentury Arab world. The Hashimites are a family whose origins lie in Quraysh family in the Hijaz. Husayn ibn Ali (1852 - 1931) was appointed Ottoman governor of Hijaz in 1908, later breaking with the Ottomans and leading the Arab Revolt in coordination with the British and with urban Arab nationalists in Syria. Members of the Hashimite family went on to establish three monarchical lines after World War I. The first was the short-lived Kingdom of Hijaz. Husayn was proclaimed king of Hijaz in 1924. He abdicated in favor of his eldest son, Ali (1879 - 1935), but Hashimite rule in their native Hijaz ended when Ali was defeated in 1925 by their archrival, Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud Al Saud. The other two Hashimite dynasties were creations of British imperial policies. The British established Husayn's second son, Abdullah I ibn Hussein (1882 - 1951), as amir (prince) of Transjordan in 1920. He headed an autonomous government within the rubric of the Palestine Mandate. Trans-jordan was renamed the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan in 1946. Abdullah was succeeded by his son, Talal ibn Abdullah (1909 - 1972), his grandson, Hussein ibn Talal (1935 - 1999), and his great-grandson, Abdullah II ibn Hussein (1962 - ). Husayn ibn Ali's third son, Faisal I ibn Hussein (1889 - 1933), was proclaimed king of Syria by a gathering of Arab nationalists in 1920, but saw his rule end with a French occupation that same year. The British then installed him as king of Iraq in 1921. He was succeeded by his son, Ghazi ibn Faisal (1912 - 1939). Upon Ghazi's death, Abd al-Ilah (son of Ali ibn Husayn) served as regent until Ghazi's son Faisal II ibn Ghazi (1935 - 1958) was old enough to serve as king. The Hashimite monarchy in Iraq was violently overthrown in a military coup in July 1958. Husayn ibn Ali's fourth and youngest son, Zayd (1898 - 1970), occupied no leadership positions. The family always has stressed its Arab nationalist credentials, as well as its sharifian lineage, attempting to turn these into important sources of legitimacy.

MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH

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Henry McMahon
Gale Encyclopedia of the Mideast & N. Africa: Henry McMahon
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1862 - 1949 Britain's high commissioner in Egypt, 1914 - 1916. During Sir Henry McMahon's tenure as high commissioner, he was responsible for mobilizing war matriel from Egypt for Britain's efforts in World War I. McMahon is best known for his role in the negotiations with Sharif Husayn of Mecca that led to the 1916 Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire. These negotiations are contained in the Husayn-McMahon correspondence. The extent of the territorial concessions that McMahon pledged for an independent Arab state continues to be a subject of debate.

Bibliography
Wucher King, Joan. Historical Dictionary of Egypt. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1984.

DAVID WALDNER

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Arab - Israel War (1948)

Gale Encyclopedia of the Mideast & N. Africa: Arab - Israel War (1948)
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The first conflict between the Arabs and the new state of Israel.

The Arab - Israel war of 1948 culminated half a century of conflict between the Arab and Jewish populations in Palestine. It began as a civil conflict between Palestinian Jews and Arabs following announcement of the United Nations (UN) decision in November 1947 to partition the country into a Jewish state, an Arab state, and an international enclave encompassing the greater Jerusalem area. While the majority of the Jewish population approved the plan, Arabs in Palestine and surrounding countries vehemently objected, considering it a violation of Palestinian Arabs' self-determination. In Palestine, Arab demonstrations against the UN decision and Jewish celebrations welcoming it met head-on and quickly erupted into violent clashes between the two communities. Within a few days armed Arab and Jewish groups were battling each other throughout the country. Palestinian Arab guerrillas received weapons and volunteers from the neighboring states and were assisted by unofficial paramilitary units from Syria and Egypt. The Arabs, however, were not as effectively organized as the Jewish forces. The latter consisted of three principal groups: the Haganah, the defense organization of the mainstream Jewish community; and two dissidentfactions, the Irgun Zvai Leumi (IZL or Etzel; National Military Organization) and Lohamei Herut Yisrael (Lehi; Fighters for the Freedom of Israel), also known as the Stern Gang. The latter two were associated with Revisionist Zionism. Following the partition resolution, casualties mounted on both sides. Arabs attacked Jewish settlements and bombed such urban targets as the Palestine Post and the headquarters of the Jewish Agency. Retaliatory and preemptive Jewish attacks against the Arab population - such as the Etzel raid on Dayr Yasin, which has been viewed by some as an instance of ethnic cleansing - set off a mass flight and military expulsion of the Arab population from areas seized by the Jewish forces. By the end of the mandate in May 1948, when the British army left Palestine, Jewish forces had seized most of the territory allocated to the Jewish state in the UN partition plan as well as land beyond the partition borders. With departure of the British and Israel's declaration of independence on 15 May 1948, the struggle became an international conflict between the Jewish state and the regular armies of Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. Saudi Arabia sent a token unit, and Yemen was nominally involved. Arab states other than Transjordan intervened to preempt the plans of Amir Abdullah, developed in accord with Israel, to take over the largely Arab-inhabited parts of Palestine. In an attempt to gain Transjordan's cooperation in the war against Israel, the other Arab combatants agreed to appoint Abdullah commander in chief of the invading forces. The Arab military plans called for Egypt's units to move north along the Mediterranean coast toward Tel Aviv; for Syria's, Lebanon's, and Iraq's troops to come through Galilee and move to Haifa; and for Transjordan's Arab Legion to approach the coast after occupying central Palestine. The Arab Legion, however, did not cross the UN partition line, and the other Arab forces were blocked from their objectives. Despite appointment of a commander in chief, the Arab armies failed to coordinate their plans, each operating under its own generals without integrating its actions with those of its allies. Except for the Arab Legion, the Arab armies were poorly trained and badly equipped, and morale was low. By June 1948 their offensive lost its momentum. Both sides accepted a twenty-eight-day truceordered by the UN Security Council that went into effect on 10 June. With resumption of fighting on 8 July, Israel's forces, now consolidated and equipped with heavy weapons, took the offensive. Arab areas including Nazareth in Galilee were seized, although attempts to capture the Old City of Jerusalem failed. Efforts to break through Egypt's lines to reach Jewish settlements in the Negev also were unsuccessful. A second truce, initiated on 19 July, was broken several times when Israel's forces attempted to break Egypt's blockade of the Negev; Israel captured Beersheba in October and isolated most of Egypt's units south of Jerus alem. By the end of the year, Egypt's forces were either driven from Palestine or besieged in the south. In the north, another offensive extended the area under Israel's control to Lebanon's territory adjoining upper Galilee. On 5 January 1949, Egypt agreed to accept a Security Council call for a new truce and negotiations for an armistice. Negotiations opened on 13 January 1949, on the island of Rhodes, under the chair-manship of Ralph Bunche. The General Armistice Agreement signed on 24 February 1949 served as a model for similar armistices with Lebanon on 23 March, with Jordan on 3 April, and with Syria on 20 July. Iraq refused to participate in armistice negotiations. The armistice agreements were considered preliminary to permanent peace settlements. They established frontiers between Israel and its neighbors that remained in effect until the Arab Israel War of 1967. A UN Truce Supervisory Organization with four Mixed Armistice Commissions, comprised of Israel and of Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria, was established to deal with disputes between the signatories. Israel's casualties in the war, which it called the War of Independence, were heavy - over 4,500 soldiers and 2,000 civilians killed (about 1 percent of the Jewish population). The Arab regular armies lost 2,000; there were no reliable figures for Palestinian irregulars, although some estimates ran as high as 13,000. Israel extended territory under its control from the 5,400 square miles (13,986 sq km) allocated to it in the partition plan to 8,000 square miles (20,720 sq km), including land allocated to the Arab state and to what became Jewish West Jerusalem; Jordan occupied the old city and Arab East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Israel emerged from the war as a regional power equal in strength to any of its Arab neighbors. A major consequence of the war was the Palestine Arab refugee problem. Although there was no accurate census of the refugees, their number was estimated by the United Nations to be over 700,000 - more than half the Arab population of mandatory Palestine. Failure to prevent establishment of the Jewish state was considered a major disaster in the Arab world; loss of the war, the flight of the Palestinians, and the establishment of Israel were called by many the nakba, a disaster that was to intrude into inter-Arab politics, affect Arab relations with the West, and color Arab self-perceptions for decades to come.

Bibliography
Begin, Menachem. The Revolt: Story of the Irgun. New York: Schuman, 1951. Khouri, Fred. The Arab - Israeli Dilemma, 3d edition. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1985. Morris, Benny. The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem,1947 - 1949. Cambridge, U.K., and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Rogan, Eugene L., and Shlaim, Avi, eds. The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Shlaim, Avi. Collusion across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the ZionistMovement and the Partition of Palestine. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988. DON PERETZ Read more: http://www.answers.com/topic/arab-israel-war#ixzz28wns4jgd

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Haganah
Britannica Concise Encyclopedia: Haganah
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(192048) Zionist military organization. It was organized to combat the attacks of Palestinian Arabs on Jewish settlements, and it effectively defended them despite being outlawed by the British authorities and being poorly armed. Through World War II (193945) its activities were moderate by contrast with more extreme Zionist militias, but it turned to terrorism after the war when the British refused to permit unlimited Jewish immigration to Palestine. In 1947 it clashed openly with British forces and with the forces of the Palestinian Arabs and their allies. When Israel became a state in 1948, Haganah became the core of its national army. Irgun Zvai Leumi. For more information on Haganah, visit Britannica.com.

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Not to be confused with Agana. For the hand-to-hand combat style known as the Haganah system, see Krav Maga. Haganah
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19201948 Yishuv, British Mandate of Palestine Israel Paramilitary (pre-independence) Unified armed forces (postindependence) Defense of Jewish settlements(preindependence) Average: 21,000[1] Palestinian Arab revolt World War II Palestine Civil War 1948 Arab-Israeli War (for two weeks) May 28, 1948

Haganah (Hebrew: "The Defense", HaHagana) was aJewish paramilitary organization in what was then the British Mandate of Palestine from 1920 to 1948, which later became the core of the Israel Defense Forces.

Contents

1 Origins 2 1920 and 1921 Arab riots 3 1931 Irgun split 4 19361939 Arab revolt in Palestine 5 1939 White Paper 6 World War II participation 7 1944 Lord Moyne assassination 8 Jewish Resistance Movement 9 Post World War II 10 Pal-Heib Unit 11 See also 12 Notes 13 Further reading 14 External links

Origins
The predecessor of Haganah was Hashomer (Hebrew: " ;The Watchman") established in 1909, itself a successor of Bar-Giora, founded in 1907. The Bar-Giora consisted of a small group of Jewish immigrants who guarded settlements for an annual fee. At no time did the group have more than 100 members.[citation needed]

1920 and 1921 Arab riots

After the 1920 Arab riots and 1921 Jaffa riots, the Jewish leadership in Palestine believed that the British, to whom the League of Nations had given a mandate over Palestine in 1920, had no desire to confront local Arab gangs that frequently attacked Palestinian Jews.[citation needed] Believing that they could not rely on the British administration for protection from these gangs, the Jewish leadership created the Haganah to protect Jewish farms and kibbutzim. In addition to guarding Jewish communities, the role of the Haganah was to warn the residents of and repel attacks by Palestinian Arabs. In the period between 19201929, the Haganah lacked a strong central authority or coordination. Haganah "units" were very localized and poorly armed: they consisted mainly of Jewish farmers who took turns guarding their farms or their kibbutzim. Following the 1929 Palestine riots, the Haganah's role changed dramatically. It became a much larger organization encompassing nearly all the youth and adults in the Jewish settlements, as well as thousands of members from the cities. It also acquired foreign arms and began to develop workshops to create hand grenades and simple military equipment, transforming from an untrained militia to a capable underground army.

1931 Irgun split

Many Haganah fighters objected to the official policy of havlagah (restraint) that Jewish political leaders (who had become increasingly controlling of the Haganah) had imposed on the militia. Fighters had been instructed to only defend communities and not initiate counter attacks against Arab gangs or their communities. This policy appeareddefeatist to many who believed that the best defense is a good offense. In 1931, the more militant elements of the Haganah splintered off and formed the Irgun Tsva'i-Leumi (National Military Organization), better known as "Irgun" (or by its Hebrew acronym, pronounced "Etzel").

Haganah members in training (1947)

Haganah troops on parade

Haganah Ship Jewish State at Haifa Port (1947)

19361939 Arab revolt in Palestine

During the 19361939 Arab revolt in Palestine, the Haganah worked to protect British interests and to quell Arab rebellion using the FOSH, and thenHish units. At that time, the Haganah fielded 10,000 mobilized men along with 40,000 reservists. Although the British administration did not officially recognize the Haganah, the British security forces cooperated with it by forming the Jewish Settlement Police, Jewish Supernumerary Police andSpecial Night Squads, which were trained and led by Colonel Orde Wingate. The battle experience gained during the training was useful in the 1948 ArabIsraeli War.

1939 White Paper

By 1939, the British had issued the White Paper, which severely restricted Jewish immigration to Palestine, deeply angering the Zionist leadership. David Ben-Gurion, then chairman of the Jewish Agency, set the policy for the Zionist relationship with the British: We shall fight the war against Hitler as if there were no White Paper, and we shall fight the White Paper as if there were no war. In reaction to the White Paper, the Haganah built up the Palmach as the Haganah's elite strike force and organized illegal Jewish immigration to Palestine. Approximately 100,000 Jews were brought to Palestine in over one hundred ships during the final decade of what became known as Aliyah Bet. The Haganah also organized demonstrations against British immigration quotas.

World War II participation

In the first years of World War II, the British authorities asked Haganah for cooperation again, due to the fear of an Axis breakthrough in North Africa[citation needed]. After Rommel was defeated at El Alamein in 1942, the British stepped back from their all-out support for Haganah[citation needed]. In 1943, after a long series of requests and negotiations, the British Army announced the creation of the Jewish Brigade Group. While Palestinian Jews had been permitted to enlist in the British army since 1940, this was the first time an exclusively Jewish military unit served in the war under a Jewish flag. The Jewish Brigade Group consisted of 5,000 soldiers and was deployed inItaly in September 1944. The brigade was disbanded in 1946[citation needed]. All in all, more than 30,000 Palestinian Jews served in the British army during the war[citation needed]. On May 14, 1941, the Haganah created the Palmach (an acronym for Plugot Mahatz strike companies), an elite commando section, in preparation against the possibility of a British withdrawal and Axis invasion of Palestine. Its members, young men and women, received specialist training in guerilla tactics and sabotage.[2] During 1942 the British gave assistance in the training of Palmach volunteers but in early 1943 they withdrew their support and attempted to disarm them.[3] The Palmach, then numbering over 1000, continued as an underground organisation with its members working half of each month as kibbutz volunteers, the rest of the month spent training.[4] It was never largeby 1947 it amounted to merely five battalions (about 2,000 men)but its members had not only received physical and military training, but also acquired leadership skills that would subsequently enable them to take up command positions in Israel's army.

1944 Lord Moyne assassination

In 1944, after the assassination of Lord Moyne, (the British Minister of State for the Middle East), by members of theLehi, the Haganah worked with the British to kidnap, interrogate, and in some cases, deport Irgun members. This action was called The Saison, or hunting season, and was directed against the Irgun and not the Lehi[citation needed]. Future Jerusalem mayor Teddy Kollek was later revealed to be the Jewish Agency liaison officer with the British authorities and he had passed on information that led to the arrest of many Irgun activists.[5] Many Jewish youth, who had joined the Haganah in order to defend the Jewish people, were greatly demoralized by operations against their own people [citation needed]. The Irgun, paralyzed by the Saison, were ordered by their commander, Menachem Begin, not to retaliate in an effort to avoid a full blown civil war. Although many Irgunists objected to these orders, they obeyed

Begin and refrained from fighting back. The Saison eventually ended due to perceived British betrayal becoming more obvious to the public and Haganah youth becoming increasingly vocal in their opposition to the policy[citation needed].

Jewish Resistance Movement

The Saison officially ended when the Haganah, Irgun and the Lehi formed the Jewish Resistance Movement, in 1945. Within this new framework, the three groups had different functions, which served to drive the British out of Palestine and create a Jewish state. The Haganah officially withdrew from the Jewish Rebellion on 1 July 1946, but "remained permanently unco-operative."[6] British estimates of the Haganah's strength at this time were a paper strength of 75,000 men and women with an effective strength of 30,000.[7]

Post World War II

Haganah fighters in 1947

After the war, the Haganah carried out anti-British operations in Palestine, such as the liberation of interned immigrants from the Atlit detainee camp, thebombing of the country's railroad network, and sabotage raids on radar installations and bases of the British Palestine police. It also continued to organize illegal immigration. On May 28, 1948, less than two weeks after the creation of the state of Israel on May 15, the provisional government created the Israeli Defense Forces, which would succeed the Haganah. It also outlawed maintenance of any other armed force. The re-organisation led to several conflicts between Ben-Gurion and the Haganah leadership, including what was known as The Generals' Revolt. The disbanding of the Palmach was particularly bitter. Famous members of the Haganah included Yitzhak Rabin, Ariel Sharon,Rehavam Ze'evi, Dov Hoz, Moshe Dayan, Yigal Allon and Dr. Ruth Westheimer. The Museum of Underground Prisoners in Jerusalem commemorates the activity of the underground groups in the pre-state period, recreating the every day life of those imprisoned there.

Pal-Heib Unit
Some Bedouins had longstanding ties with nearby Jewish communities. They helped defend these communities in the19361939 Arab revolt in Palestine. During the 1948 ArabIsraeli War, some Bedouins of Tuba formed an alliance with the Haganah defending Jewish communities in the Upper Galilee against Syria. Some were part of a Pal-Heib unit of the Haganah. Sheik Hussein Mohammed Ali Abu Yussef of Tuba was quoted in 1948 as saying, "Is it not written in the Koran that the ties of neighbors are as dear as those of relations? Our friendship with the Jews goes back many years. We felt we could trust them and they learned from us too".[8]

See also

History of Israel

Notes

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

^ Johnson, Paul (May 1998). "The Miracle". Commentary 105: pp 2128. ^ Yigal Allon, Sword of Zion. ISBN 297-00133-7. pp. 116, 117. ^ Allon, pp. 125, 126. ^ Allon, p. 127. ^ Andrew, Christopher (2009) The Defence of the Realm. The Authorized History of MI5. Allen Lane. ISBN 978-0-7139-9885-6. pp. 355, 356. ^ Horne, Edward (1982). A Job Well Done (Being a History of The Palestine Police Force 19201948). The Anchor Press. ISBN 0-9508367-1-2. pp. 272, 288, 289 ^ Horne. p. 288, 289.

8.

^ Palestine Post, "Israel's Bedouin Warriors", Gene Dison, August 12, 1948

Further reading
Bregman, Ahron. Israel's Wars: A History Since 1947. London: Routledge, 2002. ISBN 0-415-28716-2. Niv, David. The Irgun Tsva'i Leumi. Jerusalem: World Zionist Organization (Department for Education and Culture), 1980. "Text of the British White Paper Linking Jewish Agency to Zionist Terrorism in Palestine," The New York Times, July 25, 1946, p. 8. Zadka, Dr. Saul. Blood in Zion, How the Jewish Guerrillas drove the British out of Palestine. London: Brassey's, 1995.ISBN 1-85753-136-1. Jim G. Tobias, Peter Zinke. Nakam - Jdische Rache an NS-Ttern. Konkret Literatur Verlag, Hamburg 2000. 173 Seiten, ISBN 3-89458-194-8 (German, about 19441947) Bergman, Ronen. Kollek was British informer. Ynet news. March 29, 2007. [1]

External links

Hagana website The Haganah, from the Jewish Virtual Library Lexicon of Zionism: Haganah (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs) The Haganah: History of the Israeli Underground Defense force, by the ZIIC From Hashomer to the Israel Defense Forces Armed Jewish Defense in Palestine, by Me'ir Pa'il

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Irgun Zvai Leumi

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Militant Jewish underground organization in pre-state Israel. A revisionist group of militants broke from the Haganah in 1931 and formed the Irgun Zvai Leumi (Etzel). In 1937, the Irgun signed an agreement with Vladimir Zeev Jabotinsky, the president of the Revisionist New Zionist Organization, and became the defense organization of the Revisionist movement. During and after the Arab uprising of 1936 - 1939 and the British White Paper of May 1939, the Irgun embarked on a series of terrorist attacks on British and Palestinian targets. With the eruption of World War II, however, the Irgun suspended attacks and many members joined the British forces to be trained and to fight against Nazi Germany. Irgun commander in chief David Raziel was killed in Iraq while leading a group of volunteers on behalf of the British army. A small group of dissident Irgun members, led by Abraham Stern, broke with the Irgun, formed LEHI (the "Stern Gang"), and continued to carry out violent actions against the Mandatory forces. In 1942 Menachem Begin assumed command of the Irgun and, in early 1944, formally embarked on armed revolt against the British in Mandatory Palestine. Though comprised of a small group of poorly equipped Jewish guerrillas, the Irgun inflicted damage on the British forces through a combination of factors, including successful use of the element of surprise, intimate familiarity with the topography and terrain, broad local Jewish sympathy, and a campaign of public relations abroad that built on sympathy for the victims of Nazi genocide. In 1945, after the British Labour government refused to alter its Palestine policies, the Jewish Agency arranged an alliance of Haganah, Irgun, and LEHI forces, the United Hebrew Resistance Movement, which carried out violent actions against the Mandatory forces. In mid-1946, however, the Jewish Agency reinstituted its policy of self-restraint and disbanded the alliance, but by then the Irgun was sufficiently large to independently escalate attacks on British targets. The Haganah and mainstream Zionists consistently opposed the Irgun and its terrorist actions. In July 1946, when the Irgun blew up the British army headquarters and the Secretariat of the Mandate government in the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, it was strongly denounced. Less than a month after the British executed four Irgun members in the Acre Prison, in April 1947, an Irgun force of thirty-four men dynamited their way into the prison and freed 250 Jewish and Arab prisoners. The following day, the daring action was widely reported in the world media. On 14 May 1948, with the proclamation of the State of Israel, the Irgun agreed to disband and join the new Israel Defense Force; they continued, however, to carry out a number of independent actions, the most serious of which led to the Altalena affair. The Irgun did not achieve official recognition until 1968, when President Zalman Shazar formally recognized its efforts, along with those of the Haganah and all groups, including NILI, the Jewish Legion, and LEHI, in the struggle for independence and defense of the State of Israel.

Bibliography
Begin, Menachem. The Revolt: Story of the Irgun. Tel Aviv: Steimatzky, 1951. Bell, J. Bowyer. Terror Out of Zion: The Fight for Israeli Independence. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1996.

CHAIM I. WAXMAN

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White Papers on Palestine

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British policy statements about mandatory Palestine issued from 1922 to 1939. The British government, which ruled Palestine from 1917/1918 to 1948 under a League of Nations mandate, issued periodic policy statements called white papers that related to the tensions and recurring violence between the Arab and Jewish communities there. Two precursors to the series of white papers on Palestine were the Palin Commission Report (1 July 1920) and Haycraft Report (Command 1540, 21 October 1921), which concluded that the Palestinian Arabs' feelings of "hostility to the Jews were due to political and economic causes, and connected with Jewish immigration and with their conception of Zionist policy" as leading to a Jewish state in which Palestinians would be subjugated. Subsequently, the Churchill White Paper of June 1922 (Command 1700) attempted to placate both communities. It stated that the Jewish national home existed by right, but that the Palestinians should not be subordinated to the Jewish community. It declared that all Palestinians were equal before the law and described the Jewish national home as simply "a center in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride." Jews would have the right to immigrate to Palestine, but their immigration must not exceed "the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals." Moreover, London aimed to establish full self-government in Palestine in "gradual stages" and would hold elections for a legislative council. The white paper thus reassured Arabs that they would have a political role and that Jewish im migration would be limited. Nonetheless, the Arab Executive objected to the reaffirmation of the Balfour Declaration (1917), which had supported the establishment of a Jewish home in Palestine, and rejected the legislative council as not guaranteeing majority rights. The World Zionist Organization criticized the limits on immigration and the proposed legislative council, which it wanted to postpone until the Jewish population was larger. The colonial secretary issued the next white paper (Command 3229) on 19 November 1928, as Muslim-Jewish tension escalated over mutual claims at the Western (Wailing) Wall in Jerusalem. The white paper affirmed that no benches or screens could be brought to the wall by Jews, since they had not been allowed during Ottoman rule. Tension escalated, leading to Palestinian attacks against Jews at the wall and in several other towns in August 1929. Four white papers issued in 1930 tried to defuse the conflict. The Shaw Commission of Inquiry (Command 3530, 30 March 1930) found that Jewish immigration and land purchases were immediate causes of "the Arab feeling of disappointment of their political and national aspirations and fear for their economic future," and that these were the underlying causes of the violence. The report declared that the government must issue clear statements safeguarding Arab rights and regulating Jewish immigration and land purchase. Another white paper (Command 3682, 27 May 1930) reaffirmed those findings, welcomed an investigation by an international commission of the conflicting claims to the Western Wall, and recommended appointing a special commission to assess the problems facing landless Palestinian peasants and the prospects for expanded agricultural cultivation. Sir John Hope-Simpson's report, dated 30 August 1930 (Command 3686), was published simultaneously with the Passfield White Paper (Command 3692) of 21 October 1930. Hope-Simpson recommended a drastic reduction in the volume of Jewish immigration because of insufficient cultivable Palestinian land and widespread Palestinian unemployment. He criticized the Jewish National Fund, the Zionist Organization's land-purchasing agency, for forbidding Jews from reselling land to Arabs and banning Arab laborers on Jewish farms. The white paper concurred that stricter controls should be placed on Jewish immigration and land purchase, and asserted - for the first time - that the British government had obligations "of equal weight" to both communities and that it must renew the effort to establish the legislative council proposed in 1922. The Arab Executive was pleased with these British policy recommendations because they acknowledged Arab concerns. But Chaim Weizmann, head of the Jewish Agency, resigned in protest when the Pass-field White Paper was issued. London then backtracked. Zionist officials helped to draft a letter, signed by Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald, to Weizmann on 14 February 1931 that expunged all damaging aspects of the Passfield White Paper and upheld the primacy of the government's promises to the Jewish community. Mollified, Weizmann withdrew his resignation, but the MacDonald "Black Letter," as it became known, infuriated the Arabs. The white paper of 17 May 1939 (Command 6019) followed three years of Arab rebellion. The Peel Commission had recommended on 7 July 1937 that territorial partition between Arab and Jewish states was the only solution because Arab and Jewish aspirations were irreconcilable. Nonetheless, the Woodhead Partition Commission concluded on 9 November 1938 that partition was not feasible. The British government then convened the London Conference, which brought together the Jewish Agency, Arab governments, and Palestinian Arabs in lengthy but fruitless discussions. Afterwards, London issued a white paper that repudiated partition and proposed to create self-governing institutions over a ten-year period. Authority over the eventual independent state would be shared by its Arab and Jewish citizens. The white paper limited Jewish immigration to 75,000 over five years; subsequent immigration would require Arab approval. Jews' purchase of land would be limited in some parts of Palestine and forbidden in others. Jewish and Palestinian Arab nationalisms were too intense and too antagonistic for this plan to succeed. The Zionists viewed the Balfour Declaration as a pledge to establish a Jewish state. When the white paper of 1939 withdrew the Peel Commission's partition proposal, their reaction was strongly hostile, particularly because the restrictions on immigration occurred just as Jews sought to flee Nazi persecution in Europe. Palestinians were relieved that London had set aside partition and would restrict Jewish immigration and land purchase, but were skeptical that London would fulfill its pledges. The MacDonald white paper remained mostly unimplemented, apart from the enforcement of immigration restrictions.

Bibliography
Government of Palestine. A Survey of Palestine, Vol. 1. Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1946. Ingrams, Doreen. Palestine Papers, 1917 - 1922: Seeds of Conflict. New York: George Braziller, 1972. Lesch, Ann Mosely. Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917 - 1939: TheFrustration of a Nationalist Movement. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1979. Stein, Kenneth W. The Land Question in Palestine, 1917 - 1939. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984.

ANN M. LESCH

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Churchill White Paper (1922)

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A 1922 British statement of policy regarding Palestine. Drafted by the first high commissioner of Palestine, Sir Herbert Samuel, the white paper (also called the Churchill memorandum) was issued in the name of Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill in June 1922. A year earlier the Palestinians participated in political violence against the Jews, which a British commission found to have been caused by Arab hostility "connected with Jewish immigration and with their conception of Zionist policy." Samuel therefore urged Churchill to clarify to both communities the meaning of the Balfour Declaration of November 1917 and to reassure the Palestinians. The Churchill statement reaffirmed British commitment to the Jewish national home. It declared that the Jews were in Palestine "as a right and not on sufferance" and defined the Jewish national home as "the further development of the existing Jewish community [Yishuv], with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race [sic], an interest and a pride." In order to fulfill the Balfour policy, "it is necessary that the Jewish community in Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by immigration." At the same time, the memorandum rejected Zionist statements "to the effect that the purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine," which would become " 'as Jewish as England is English.' His Majesty's Government regard any such expectations as impracticable and have no such aim in view." It assured the indigenous Palestinians that the British never considered "the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic [sic] population, language, or culture in Palestine" or even "the imposition of Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole." In addition, the allowable number of Jewish immigrants would be limited to the "economic capacity of the country." The Zionist leaders regarded the memorandum as a whittling down of the Balfour Declaration but acquiesced, partly because of a veiled threat from the British government and partly because, off the record, the Zionists knew that there was nothing in the paper to preclude a Jewish state. (Churchill himself testified to the Peel Commission in 1936 that no such prohibition had been intended in his 1922 memorandum.) The Palestinians rejected the paper because it reaffirmed the Balfour policy. They were convinced that continued Jewish immigration would lead to a Jewish majority that would eventually dominate or dispossess them. Both Zionist and Palestinian interpretations of the memorandum were largely valid: The British did pare down their support for the Zionist program, but the Balfour policy remained intact long enough to allow extensive Jewish immigration and the establishment of semiautonomous Jewish governmental and military institutions.

Bibliography
Caplan, Neil. Palestine Jewry and the Arab Question, 1917 - 1925. London and Totowa, NJ: Cass, 1978. Hurewitz, J. C. The Struggle for Palestine. New York: Green-wood, 1968. Lesch, Ann M. Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917 - 1939: The Frustrations of a Nationalist Movement. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1979. PHILIP MATTAR Read more: http://www.answers.com/topic/churchill-white-paper-1922#ixzz28wohFYQs

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Haycraft Commission (1921)

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A British commission that investigated Palestinian anti-Zionist violence in May 1921. Palestinians attacked the Jewish inhabitants of Jaffa and five Jewish colonies on 1 May 1921, resulting in 47 Jewish deaths and 146 injured, mostly by Palestinians, and 48 Palestinian deaths and 73 wounded, mostly by the military and police. The British high commissioner for Palestine, Sir Herbert Samuel, appointed a commission, headed by the chief justice of Palestine, Sir Thomas Haycraft, to determine the causes of the Arab violence. The commission reported in October 1921 that what triggered the violence was a May Day clash between rival Jewish Communists and Jewish Socialists in nearby Tel Aviv. The fundamental cause, however, was Palestinian "discontent with, and hostility to, the Jews, due to political and economic causes, and connected with Jewish immigration, and with their conception of Zionist policy as derived from Jewish exponents." The report stated that the Palestinians feared that Jewish immigration would lead to unemployment in the short run and to political and economic subjugation in the long run. After the report was issued, the British took some steps to meet Palestinian demands. In December, Samuel established the Supreme Muslim Council to administer the awqaf (religious endowments) and to appoint and dismiss officials and judges of the sharia courts. In January 1922, he allowed the election of Muhammad Amin alHusayni, a popular Palestinian nationalist, as president of the council. In June 1922, Sir Winston Churchill, secretary of state for the colonies, issued a white paper which, while reconfirming continued British support for the Zionists, reassured the Palestinians that they need not fear the "imposition of Jewish nationality" on them, rejected the idea that Palestine would become "as Jewish as England is English," limited Jewish immigration to the "economic capacity of the country," and proposed a legislative council with limited powers. The Palestinians rejected the new policy because it was based on the Balfour Declaration. The Zionists accepted it but criticized the British for backing away from the Balfour Declaration.

Bibliography
Caplan, Neil. Palestine Jewry and the Arab Question, 1917 - 1925. London: Frank Cass, 1978. A Survey of Palestine, 3 vols. Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1946 - 1947; Washington DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991.

PHILIP MATTAR

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Lohamei Herut Yisrael

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Zionist underground militia whose name translates as "fighters for the freedom of Israel," abbreviated as LEHI. Lohamei Herut Yisrael, or LEHI, also known as the Stern Gang, was founded on 26 June 1940 by Abraham (Yair) Stern in a split with the Irgun Zvai Leumi (IZL) over ideology and tactics. It would always remain small, ranging from 200 to 800 members. Stern and his followers viewed Britain as the foremost enemy of the Jewish people and of Zionism and rejected the Irgun's declared truce with Britain for the duration of the Second World War. LEHI's ideology was an evolving blend of fascist, Bolshevik, and messianic nationalist elements, which led the organization in its early years to see Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, and later the Soviet Union, as potential allies in the "anti-imperialist" armed struggle against Britain. In 1941 the group tried to reach an agreement with Nazi Germany in the hope of ousting Britain from Palestine. From 1940 to 1944, while the other Zionist underground groups, including the Irgun, were cooperating with Britain in the war effort, LEHI carried out an anti-British campaign of propaganda and terror attacks, setting off bombs, killing soldiers and police officers, and robbing banks to fund their activities. On 9 January 1942, LEHI members accidentally killed two Jewish bystanders in an attempted robbery of a Histadrut bank in Tel Aviv. The Zionist leadership and the majority in the Yishuv opposed LEHI's methods; LEHI was widely regarded by both Jews and the British as a terrorist underground and was often ostracized and persecuted as such. In the early months of 1942, members of Haganah intelligence and the Palmah began kidnapping LEHI fighters, a policy that would continue on and off until the group's final demise in 1948. LEHI entered a crisis period when Stern was killed by members of the British Criminal Investigation Division (CID) on 12 February 1942. By 1943 the organization had been reconstructed under the leadership of Natan Yellin-Mor, Israel Eldad, and Yitzhak Shamir. Ideologically, LEHI moved to the left after Stern's death, openly embracing the Soviet Union and class struggle in addition to anti-imperialism. It would always remain marginal ideologically but at various times would cooperate organizationally with the other underground groups. When the Irgun began its armed revolt against Britain in February 1944, LEHI joined in. In coordination with the Irgun, LEHI attacked or bombed British military and administrative sites in Palestine, including police and radio stations and CID headquarters. On 6 November 1944, LEHI members assassinated Walter Edward Guinness, Lord Moyne, the senior British minister in Cairo. The assassination led the Yishuv leadership to initiate operations known as "the Saison" to liquidate the dissident underground organizations. In 1945 and 1946, LEHI was an active member of the Hebrew Resistance Movement, an ad hoc framework that coordinated anti-British operations among all the Jewish undergrounds. In April 1948 LEHI participated with the Irgun in the attack on the Arab village Dayr Yasin. On 17 September 1948 LEHI members assassinated the United Nations mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, in Jerusalem. Following this incident David Ben-Gurion declared the organization illegal and it was forciblydismantled. Its members established a political party, the Fighters Party, which won only one seat (and 1.22 percent of the vote) in the elections for the first Knesset in 1949. LEHI members became divided along ideological lines, with Yellin-Mor taking a strong leftist position advocating class struggle, a pro-Soviet foreign policy, and support for proletarian movements in Arab countries. Eldad led the right-wing faction that embraced positions in line with Revisionist maximalism, while Shamir took a less ideological and more pragmatic stance. The split ultimately proved irreconcilable, and the Fighters Party did not survive to the second Knesset elections in 1951. Some members drifted to MAPAM or the Israeli Communist Party, while others joined Menachem Begin's Herut.

Bibliography
Bell, J. Bowyer. Terror out of Zion: The Fight for Israeli Independence. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1996. Heller, Joseph. The Stern Gang: Ideology, Politics, and Terror,1940 - 1949. Portland, OR; London: Frank Cass, 1995. Sofer, Sasson. Zionism and the Foundations of Israeli Diplomacy, translated by Dorothea Shefet-Vanson. New York and Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

PIERRE M. ATLAS

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Read more: Empire and Imperialism - Middle East - Global Imperialism, Europe, And The Ottomans To 1914 - Mesopotamia, India, Britain, and France - JRank Articles http://science.jrank.org/pages/9128/Empire-Imperialism-Middle-East-GlobalImperialism-Europe-Ottomans-1914.html#ixzz28wq7vymF From the eighteenth century onward, the Ottomans were directly threatened by the imperial aspirations of two land-based empires, Russia and Austria (Austria-Hungary after 1867). In addition, the Ottoman Middle East became unwittingly embroiled in the rivalries of two seaborne empires, Great Britain and France, illustrating the global scope of imperial competition. The treaty ending the French and Indian War in North America in 1763 saw France cede not only Canada to Britain but also French claims to India. The swiftest route to India for Britain lay through Ottoman territory, first overland via Syria and Mesopotamia, then by the Suez Canal once it opened in 1869. The British empire centered in India defined British strategic interests in the Middle East as preserving the security of the Egyptian Suez Canal route and dominance in the Persian Gulf to block other powers access to India. By 1914 and the outbreak of World War I, Britain had occupied Egypt (1882), extended its interests to include southern Mesopotamia and the oil fields of southwest Iran, and had backed Kuwaiti secession from Ottoman-controlled Mesopotamia. France, the first to occupy Ottoman land in the Middle East, invaded Algeria in 1830 and colonized it. France later occupied Tunisia in 1881 and took Morocco in 1912, while Italy invaded Libya in 1911. By 1914, the Ottomans controlled no territory in North Africa, nor in eastern Europe, where their remaining possessions were lost in the Balkan Wars of 19121913. Ottoman rule remained in Anatolia and in the central Arab lands of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Mesopotamia (Iraq after World War I), and portions of the Arabian peninsula. European imperial expansion in the Middle East to 1914 was a small part of a global takeover of non-Western lands from the mid-nineteenth century onward that saw nearly all of the African continent and independent territories in Asia either occupied or forced to bow to European demands, as in the case of China. Scholars attribute this imperial expansion to several impulses; the primary factors were the desire to control markets or natural resources and European continental rivalries extended to denial of lands to a rival. Behind the specific reasons lay the basic driving force of European technological superiority established by the scientific and industrial revolutions, creating a reservoir of power and skills lacking in non-European regions.

This facilitated conquest and fueled attitudes of racial superiority referred to as Social Darwinism. A transference of Darwin's theory of natural evolution to societal development, this theory justified white domination of non-whites because they had evolved to a superior level of civilization. More recent approaches to the study of imperialism have expanded the range of scholarly inquiry. Cain and Hopkins's theory of "gentlemanly capitalism," where individuals close to power influenced decisions based on their own investments in areas such as Egypt, has attracted attention, but other studies point to the greater complexity of imperial associations, challenging previous assumptions. Occupation did not automatically mean economic dominance, as shown by France's control of the Imperial Ottoman Bank and the fact that its economic interests in Egypt were greater than those of Britain, the occupying power, demonstrated in the work of Jacques Thobie and Samir Saul. Intertwined with such economic penetration of non-Western areas was the nature of the indigenous response, whether nationalist or, for minorities, often collaboration with overseas capital. Further complicating matters is the question of the impact of outside investment on local economies, possibly leading to Lebanese migration to the Western hemisphere, as Akram Khater has shown, at the same time that Europeans might be migrating to northern African countries for economic opportunities lacking in their own lands, processes seen in the scholarship of Mulia Clancy-Smith, Robert Tignor, and Roger Owen. Finally, much recent scholarship has approached imperialism, Middle Eastern or otherwise, from the vantage point of ordinary people, European or the colonized. This approach automatically makes available many more sources than those found in official government archives, and especially calls attention to the role of women as either part of the imperial venture or the objects of it in the imperial imagination and representation of non-Western women. World War I saw the Ottomans ally with Germany and Austria-Hungary, primarily against Russia, its traditional rival, which formed an Entente with Britain and France. By war's end, Russia, following the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, had renounced imperial ambitions, but Britain and France hoped to gain further spoils, against each other if necessary. All possessions held by the losers were to be taken by the victors, but outright imperial acquisition was barred by American disapproval. Consequently, the mandate system was devised. Under League of Nations supervision, mandate rule meant that all imperial spoils of World War I could be taken by the victors only on the promise that they would prepare the inhabitants for independence at some undetermined future date. There were three classes of mandatesA, B, and Cthe last being those areas least prepared for future self-governance. The Arab lands to be handed over to Britain or France, those under Ottoman sway in 1914, were Class A mandates, deemed closest to self-rule following tutelage by their European overlords. Britain received mandates for Iraq and Palestine, the French for Syria and Lebanon.

Scholars have attributed differing imperial ideologies to Great Britain and France. They consider the former to have governed with more regard for local authority and practices, remaining aloof from local culture, whereas France undertook a mission civilisatrice, or civilizing mission, that signified more direct involvement in local culture and governance. Intended to promote admiration for France that would secure the French occupation, this process has been referred to by Deguilhem as "intellectual colonization." The British mandate for Iraq was affected by its attempt to renege on their wartime promise of 1916 (Sykes-Picot Agreement) to acknowledge French paramountcy in Syria. They did so by installing in Damascus Emir Faisal ibn Husayn of the Hejaz. When the British ploy failed and the French ousted Faisal, Britain gave him the kingship of Iraq in 1921 as compensation and agreed to lessen the scope of its mandatory powers. In return, Faisal agreed to host a British military presence in Iraq; the Hashemite dynasty he created lasted to 1958. The Palestine mandate contradicted the official intent of that arrangement. In the Balfour Declaration of 1917, Britain had promised the Jewish national movement, Zionism, that it would sponsor the growth of a Jewish national home in Palestine; it was understood that Palestine would become a Jewish state. This was done for several reasons: immediate wartime propaganda; sympathy for past Jewish suffering in Europe; and for strategic reasons of empire, to justify a British presence in Palestine to block any potential French threat from Syria/Lebanon to Egypt and the Suez Canal. The Balfour Declaration was written into the British mandate for Palestine. Thus, the people Britain would prepare for self-government were not the Palestinian Arabs, but the future Jewish majority once enough immigrants had arrived; Jews were at most 12 percent of the population in 1920. The legacies of this decision are the Palestinian-Israeli and Arab-Israeli conflicts. French officials divided Syria into districts to encourage factionalism, hoping unsuccessfully to weaken Syrian national awareness and resistance to their rule. At the same time, France arbitrarily enlarged the area it called "Lebanon" by adding to it land considered part of "Syria," in order to establish a more stable base of operations in alliance with the Maronite Catholic community that had campaigned for French rule and protection. This new area, present-day Lebanon, incorporated many more Muslims and non-Maronite Christians, ultimately endangering Maronite minority rule and fostering civil strife in the 1950s and 1970s. Although the mandates did not officially end until 1946, both Syria and Lebanon had their independence recognized in 1945 by the newly formed United Nations. France granted independence to Tunisia and Morocco in 19561957 after little nationalist strife, primarily in the hope of retaining Algeria, which it had incorporated into the French governmental system, making it part of France. Algerians achieved independence in 1962 after a brutal seven-year war for independence costing an estimated one million lives, mostly Algerian.

Egypt, under British occupation, gradually acquired more self-governance, but it took nationalist resistance, as in North Africa, and a revolution in 1952 to create the circumstances leading to full British withdrawal in 1956. As for Libya, Italy's defeat in World War II led to the creation of the Idrisid dynasty that reigned until ousted by Muammar Qaddafi in 1969. The most lasting legacy of Anglo-French imperialism in the Middle East and North Africa following World War I was the creation of states where none had existed previously, the boundaries drawn to suit Anglo-French interests. Out of the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman empire emerged Iraq, never unified previously, a Syria truncated by France's taking its land for the expanded Lebanon, Palestine (intended to become Israel), and, as a result of wartime alliances and tribal rivalries, the creation of Saudi Arabia and the sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf. In addition, Turkey became a state by repelling a Britishencouraged Greek invasion and establishing its independence in the Anatolian heartland of the former Ottoman Empire. These new states, other then Turkey, Iran, and the newly formed Saudi Arabia, remained under foreign occupation or, in Iraq's case, tied to the former occupier, until the decolonization area following World War II. Their sociopolitical trajectories were quite different, starkly contrasted in Turkey's secularization process undertaken by Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) and the creation of the fundamentalist Wahabbite Islamic kingdom of Saudi Arabia. As a result, the nature of national identity and the basis of allegiance to these new states has varied and occasionally been challenged, leaving open the question of Islam as the ongoing basis of loyalty for most Muslims. Turkey itself has seen since World War II the renewed strength of Islam in the public sphere, in part a byproduct of its democratization process. Iran, whose Pahlavi dynasty sought to follow Ataturk's example, experienced an Islamic revolution in 1979 seen by many Iranians as repudiation of American imperial influence on the late shah. Syria and Iraq underwent strenuous secularization driven by Baathist socialist regimes, but the American overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq in the name of democracy may lead to a new regime strongly influenced by Shii Islam and strengthened ties to Iran, which the U.S. has designated as part of the "Axis of Evil." These experiences illustrate the ongoing complexity of the process of state formation and creation of national and religious loyalties, processes set in motion before World War I but only fully attempted afterward. They demonstrate that the impact of European imperialism on the broader Middle East has persisted and has yet to be resolved, with new dynamics put in place by the United States' intervention in Iraq whose consequences will be far-reaching and possibly contrary to the goals articulated by Washington before the invasion.
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Anticolonialism in Middle East - Ottoman Empire And The Mandate System, Islam And Anticolonialism, The Economic Impact Of Colonialism, Resistance To Colonialism Between the early nineteenth century and the outbreak of World War I, much of the area between Morocco and what is now Turkey came under different forms of European colonial rule. Thus France began the conquest of Algeria in 1830, took over Tunisia in 1881, and (in partnership with Spain) took over Morocco in 1912. Britain occupied Egypt in 1882, formalizing the occupation by the declaration of a protectorate in 1914, and Italy began its conquest of Libya in 1911. Anticolonialism in Middle East - Ottoman Empire And The Mandate System With the exception of Morocco, the entire region either had been or still was in the early twentieth century at least nominally part of the Ottoman Empire, a multiethnic geopolitical unit that had been in existence since the late thirteenth century and that came to an end in the 1920s. Although it is misleading to regard the Ottomans as an imperial power, it is nevertheless the case that in spite of the Tanzimat reforms of the nineteenth century, which were generally intended to extend full citizenship to all subjects of the empire, the largely Christian provinces in southeastern Europe had become independent states in the course of the nineteenth century as a consequence of more or less bitter struggles to assert their various ethnolinguistic identities. In contrast, regardless of their ethnicity, the overwhelmingly Muslim population of the Arab provinces continued to regard the (Turkish) Ottomans as the natural defenders of Islam, with the result that most of the Middle East was barely affected by Arab nationalism until the early twentieth century. On the coasts of the Arabian Peninsula, Britain's concern with keeping the route to India safe and open led to a series of treaties with various local rulers between the 1820s and 1916, under which the rulers generally agreed not to grant or dispose of any part of their territories to any power except Britain. In 1839, Britain annexed Aden and turned it into a naval base. Exclusive treaties were signed with the tribal rulers of the interior, and in 1937 the area was divided into the port and its immediate hinterland (Aden Colony) and the more remote rural/tribal areas (Aden Protectorate). Principally because of their remoteness and their apparent lack of strategic importance, central Arabia and northern Yemen were never colonized. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War, the empire's remaining Arab provinces were assigned by the newly created League of Nations to Britain and France as mandates, with Britain taking responsibility for Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan, and France taking responsibility for Lebanon and Syria. The guiding principle of the mandate system was that the states concerned should remain under the tutelage of the mandatory power until such time as they were able to "stand alone," a period that, although not specified, was still understood to be finite. The mandate period was relatively short-lived, ending with the creation of Israel from the former Palestine mandate in 1948.

Anticolonialism in Middle East - Islam And Anticolonialism A number of factors are crucial to understanding the various manifestations of anticolonialism in the Arab world in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the first place, the colonial period coincided with several movements of Islamic renewal; the same phenomenon can also be observed in the Indian subcontinent, West Africa, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. Some movements clearly were, or became, reactions to colonialism, but one of the most influential, the Wahhabis in the center of the Arabian peninsula, both predated colonialism in the region and originated in an area relatively distant from any direct colonial activity. In the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, such renewal or reform movements spread out over a wide geographical area. Some, such as the Sanusi jihad, based in Saharan Libya, later the backbone of resistance to Italian colonization, exhibited an organizational structure similar to that of the Sufi orders, based on a network of lodges; others were urban-based, often around traditional centers of Islamic learning, while yet others were millenarian. Thus in the 1880s, the Sudanese Mahdi preached that he was the divinely appointed regenerator of Islam and consciously imitated the life and career of the Prophet. The renewal movements were by no means always sympathetic to, or even tolerant of, one another. Muhammad al-Mahdi al-Sanusi (18441902), for example, was at pains to point out that the Mahdi was not entitled to claim either the leadership of the universal Islamic community or a transcendental relationship with the Prophet Muhammad, and Wahhabism (if not checked by more prudent political considerations) has often exhibited considerable intolerance toward other manifestations of Islam. The reform movements fed into anticolonialism in a number of ways. One of their effects was to draw a battle line between those rulers and elites in the Islamic world who were prepared to make accommodations to European colonizers and those sections of the community who were not. Thus 'Abd al-Qadir (18081883), the early leader of the resistance to the French, was quick to make use of a fatwa (legal opinion) obtained from the Mufti of Fez stating that those Muslims who cooperated with non-Muslims against other Muslims could be considered apostate and thus could be killed or enslaved if captured. Later in the nineteenth century, Ba Ahmad, the chamberlain of the Moroccan sultan 'Abd al-'Aziz (r. 18941908), believed his only recourse was to buy off or otherwise accommodate the French, who were making incursions into southern Morocco from both Algeria and Senegal. This policy alienated many influential religious and tribal leaders, who were bitterly opposed to the Commander of the Faithful giving up "the lands of Islam" to foreign invaders; some of them considered that this made him illegitimate and transferred their allegiance to a more combative leader. Anticolonialism in Middle East - The Economic Impact Of Colonialism An important effect of colonialism was to hasten the disintegration of long-established social and economic relations and to substitute the often harsher dictates of the market. The pre-colonial world was no egalitarian paradise, but, for example, the confiscation or purchase of land in colonial Algeria and mandatory Palestine and the formation of large landed estates in Syria and Iraq as a result of the establishment of regimes of private property under the mandates often resulted in cultivators either being driven off the land

or being reduced from free peasants to serfs. Being far more incorporated into the world market than they had been before, with the concomitant pressure to cultivate cash crops, forced peasant houeholds to migrate to slum settlements on the edges of the major cities where they faced an uncertain and often near-destitute existence. Anticolonialism in Middle East - Resistance To Colonialism Twentieth-century resistance to colonialism inevitably partook of the general experience of its time, including assertions of national and ethnic identity, which were given added meaning and purpose in the face of alien colonizing. The press, the radio, and political parties and clubs provided new opportunities for disseminating the ideologies of anticolonialism. To these must be added the example first of Germany in the 1930sa previously fragmented state that had turned its recent unification into a means of challenging the old colonizers, Britain and France; and for much of the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s the Soviet Union as a new form of social and economic organization, under which a previously feudal regime was being transformed into an egalitarian welfare state. Such visions were especially attractive to those who had not experienced the realities of daily life under such regimes.

Anticolonialism in Middle East - Algeria

Provided a certain flexibility is adopted, it is possible to identify the major templates of anticolonial resistance, which vary according to the nature of the colonizing process. The Algerian case is probably the most extreme because of the extent of the devastation caused by the colonization process over a period of some 130 years. In the months after the conquest of the city of Algiers in July 1830, the French military began to encourage the settlement of French colons in the city's rural hinterland. At the time, Algeria was, if only nominally, an Ottoman province and had no developed political structures. Local leaders in the west of the country turned first to the Moroccan sultan, but the French warned him not to interfere. The leaders then turned to the Sufi orders, the only bodies with an organizational structure, and Muhi al-Din, the leader of the Qadiriyya order, and his shrewd and energetic son 'Abd al-Qadir were asked to lead a tribal jihad against the French. Between 1832 and 1844 'Abd al-Qadir managed to keep the French at bay with an army of about ten thousand. Initially, he achieved this by making agreements with the French recognizing his authority over certain parts of the country, but by the 1840s the French had decided on a policy of total subjugation and 'Abd al-Qadir, defeated at Isly in 1844, eventually surrendered in 1847. By this time the European population had reached over 100,000, living mostly in the larger towns. In the 1840s, the French had begun a policy of wholesale land confiscation and appropriation, and a number of local risings took place in protest. The settlers had influential allies in Paris, and throughout the nineteenth century the indigenous population faced the gradual erosion of most of their rights. The last major act of resistance until the war of 1954 to 1962 was the rebellion in Kabylia in 1870 to 1871, led by Muhammad al-Muqrani. For a while, al-Muqrani's army

of some 200,000 controlled much of eastern Algeria, but it was no match for the better equipped French troops. After the defeat of al-Muqrani's rebellion (he was killed in battle in May 1871) the local communities involved were fined heavily and lost most of their tribal lands. The Algerian national movement was slow to develop in the twentieth century. The tribal aristocracy had been defeated and no former indigenous governing class or emerging business bourgeoisie existed (as they did in, for example, Morocco, Tunisia, Syria, and Lebanon). Some Algerians felt that France had brought them into the modern world and wanted to become more Frenchthat is, to enjoy the same rights as the French in Algeria without having to give up their Islamic identity. This tendency, generally called assimilationist, was represented by Ferhat Abbas, who sought to become a member of the French Chamber of Deputies. The first strictly nationalist movement, the toile Nord-Africaine (later the Parti du Peuple Algrien), which initially had links to the French Communist Party, was founded by Messali Hadj in 1926, recruiting among Algerian workers in France. Yet another tendency was represented by Ahmad Ibn Badis (18891940), who sought to reform Algerian popular Islam through the Association of 'Ulama', asserting the Muslim nature of Algeria. From the 1930s onwards, rapid urbanization fuelled Algerian resistance to France. By the end of World War II there was some hope on the part of moderates both in France and Algeria that compromises could be worked out that might deflect violent nationalism, but the Algerian European community's dogged insistence on maintaining its privileges meant that these hopes soon evaporated. Ferhat Abbas's movement soon became insignificant. Ibn Badis's death meant that the Association of 'Ulama' lacked influence, leaving Messali Hadj dominating the field, with supporters among Algerian workers in France as well as in Algeria. However, his organization was regarded as too moderate, and a splinter group, the Organisation Secrte, seceded from it in the mid-1940s. Its members included such major revolutionary figures as Ahmed Ben Bella, Ait Ahmad, Murad Didouche, Mohammed Boudiaf, and Belkacem Krim. This group subsequently launched the Algerian Revolution, or war of national liberation, on 1 November 1954. The war lasted until 1962, when Algeria became independent; over the eight years, between 1 million and 1.5 million Algerians and 27,000 French were killed. The war proved intensely divisive, especially as more Algerian Muslims fought as soldiers or harkis on the French side than in the Algerian army. Anticolonialism in Middle East - Tunisia, Egypt, And Morocco In the case of Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco, the decision of Britain and France to take over the reins of government (in 1881, 1882, and 1912) was at least partly precipitated by local opposition to the draconian financial measures that the European powers had forced local governments to impose in order to repay the debts they had contracted on the various European money markets. The ruler of Tunisia, Ahmad Bey (18371855), made strenuous efforts both to modernize Tunisia and to assert its independence from

Istanbul, and he had been substantially aided by France in the latter objective. By the time of his death, Tunisia had a modern army and a modern navy; the Bey's brother-inlaw, who survived him by nearly twenty years, was a modernizing finance minister and prime minister, and an Italian family provided the state's foreign ministers until 1878. In 1861, much to the discomfiture of Muhammad al-Sadiq Bey (18591882), Tunisia adopted a constitution and a modern (that is, generally secular) legal system under which the Bey's prerogatives were quite limited. These reforms were better received in the outside world and among the sizeable local European community than within Tunisia, where a rural rising against the new legal system and the new taxes was put down with considerable brutality in 1864. As happened in Egypt at much the same time, the contracting of substantial foreign debts (generally used to build the infrastructures that made the reforms possible or to pay the European consultantsofficers, engineers, and so forthin charge of putting them into effect) and the general mismanagement and corruption associated with the loans meant that the country found itself increasingly at the mercy of its foreign creditors. Tunisia declared bankruptcy in 1869 and Egypt in 1876. The sterling efforts of the reformer Khayr al-Din (c. 18251889) to balance the budget were no match for French colonial ambitions, which eventually forced the Bey to accept a protectorate under the terms of the Treaty of Bardo in May 1881. By 1892, four-fifths of cultivated lands were in French hands. The situation in Egypt was similar; the additional taxes imposed as a result of British and French administration of the public debt, initiated in 1876 essentially to ensure that the bond-holders got their money back, eventually gave rise to a nationalist movement. Many of its members had the additional grievance that the government of Egypt was conducted by foreigners, that is, a Turco-Circassian aristocracy consisting of the descendants of the viceroy Muhammad 'Ali (17801848) and their courtiers, in which native Egyptians constantly encountered a glass ceiling. Another interesting component of the rebellion led by Ahmad 'Urabi (18391911) between 1879 and 1882 was the emphasis on restoring Egypt fully to the Ottoman Empire. Although relatively large numbers of foreigners resided in Egypt, they were generally neither settlers nor colons in the French North African sense: most were not bureaucrats or farmers and had not lived there for generations; they resided mostly in the cities and engaged in commerce or in service occupations. In addition, most of them were not citizens of the occupying power. In spite of a succession of strong rulers for much of the nineteenth century, Morocco was also unable to avoid colonial penetration, first economic (imports of tea, sugar, candles, and cotton cloth; exports of wool, cereals, and ostrich feathers) and then military. The first major confrontation between locals and Europeans occurred in 1859 to 1860, when Spain besieged Tetouan. A month later, Spain demanded an indemnity as the price of withdrawal, and although the terms were punitive half the indemnity was paid within two years. This involved great hardship, particularly the imposition of non-traditional agricultural taxation, which caused considerable unrest. A massive devaluation of the currency took place, as did a near-universal switch to foreign coinage. Like Tunisia and

Egypt, Morocco gradually moved from a state of general economic self-sufficiency to dependence on the world market. Morocco gradually became dependent on foreign loans and declared bankrupcty in 1903. Largely to preempt German colonial efforts, France and Britain signed the Entente Cordiale in 1904, under which Britain recognized France's preeminence in Morocco and France formally accepted the British occupation of Egypt. Franco-Spanish occupation of Morocco was formalized in 1912.

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Anticolonialism in Middle East - Independence

Some of the anticolonial movements of the twentieth century were urban-based mass movements, often led by charismatic leaders, perhaps most notably Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, who led the Neo-Destour Party between 1954 and Tunisian independence in 1956 and who remained his country's leader until 1987. Allal al-Fassi, leader of the Istiqlal party, might have played a similar role in the history of Morocco. However, in 1953 the French exiled the sultan, Muhammad V, to Madagascar, and as a result the rallying cry of the national movement became the sultan's return from exile, which led in its turn to the sultan/king retaining his position as ruler after Morocco's independence in October 1956 and the virtual eclipse of the secular political parties. In Egypt, a kind of independence was achieved in 1936, but the national movement went through two stages. In the first stage, some but not all powers were handed over to local elites. This arrangement involved some form of power-sharing with the former colonial power, which became increasingly intolerable to wide sections of the population. However, given the balance of forces, it was not possible to break these links by democratic meansthat is, by voting in a political party or coalition that would be able to end the relationship. Thus a second stage was necessary, in which a determined group within the military seized power, destroying in the process the fairly rudimentary institutions of parliamentary government that the colonial powers had put in place. In this way, first General Mohamad Neguib (19011984) and then Gamel Abdel-Nasser (19181970) took power in 1952. Iraq went through a similar process, and 'Abd al-Karim Qasim took power in 1958. A similar but more complex process took place in Syria, although the old social classes still ruling in 1961 had long severed any links they may have had with France.

Anticolonialism in Middle East - Palestine

The final and highly anomalous case of anticolonialism in the Middle East is Palestine, unique among its neighbors in that it was a settler state. The text of the Palestine mandate included the terms of the Balfour Declaration (1917), in which Britain as mandatory power undertook to facilitate the setting up of a "national home for the

Jewish people." In 1922, there were 93,000 Jews in Palestine and about 700,000 Arabs; in 1936, there were 380,000 Jews and 983,000 Arabs; and in 1946, about 600,000 Jews and 1.3 million Arabs; thus the Jewish population increased from 13 percent to 31 percent over a period of twenty-four years. Anticolonialism took different forms, principally through opposition by both Arabs and Zionists to British policy, which they tried to combat in different ways, and Arab opposition to Zionism. The Palestine rebellion of 1936 to 1939 was mostly a peasant insurrection against colonial rule and the settlers; in 1947 to 1948, the Zionists fought and won against an assortment of Arab armies and the poorly organized Palestinian resistance forces; the colonial power had long indicated that it would withdraw. Opposition to colonial rule and colonial settlement was fairly widespread throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and took a variety of different forms, rural and urban, organized and spontaneous, religious and political, showing greater or lesser degrees of coherence. In any colonial situation, a wide spectrum of responses existed, with resistance at one end, acquiescence in the middle, and collaboration at the other end. Some members of the colonized population rebelled and some collaborated, but the majority acquiesced, at least for most of the time. In the nationalist historiography of the colonial period, the struggle for colonial freedom or national independence is often characterized in a way that shows the brave freedom fighters ranged against the brutal colonial authorities. The "achievements" of colonialism have long been open to question, and the divisions and chaos of the postcolonial world make the value of the legacy more questionable as time passes. Nevertheless, it is also important to understand the complexity and multifaceted nature of anticolonialism: the intrigues; the competing and often warring factions; the venality and corruption of many of them. For national maturity, and increasingly for national reconciliation, it will be necessary that such uncomfortable truths are boldly confronted rather than wilfully ignored. BIBLIOGRAPHY Anderson, Lisa. The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830 1980. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986. Batatu, Hanna. The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed Classes and Its Communists, Ba'thists, and Free Officers. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978. Botman, Selma. Egypt from Independence to Revolution, 19191952. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1991. Khoury, Philip S. Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 19201946. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987. Morris, Benny. Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881 2001. New York, Vintage, 2001.

Morsy, Magali. North Africa 18001900: A Survey from the Nile Valley to the Atlantic. London and New York: Longman, 1984. Prochaska, David. Making Algeria French: Colonialism in Bne, 1870 1920. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Sluglett, Peter. Britain in Iraq, 19141932. London: Ithaca Press, for the Middle East Centre, 1976. . "Formal and Informal Empire in the Middle East." In Historiography. Vol. 5 of The Oxford History of the British Empire, edited by Robin W. Winks, 416436. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Peter Sluglett
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Fidele Harfouche The area that is being referred to as Palestine during the historical time period you are referring to, had no intention of "becoming" "Israel." There is a fundamental misuse of history and chronological fact by stating the following sentence. "Out of the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman empire emerged Iraq, never unified previously, a Syria truncated by France's taking its land for the expanded Lebanon, Palestine (intended to become Israel), and, as a result of wartime alliances and tribal rivalries, the creation of Saudi Arabia and the sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf. There was no intention of the land to become Israel, until after the Zionist movement and Belfore Declaration.
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Nationalism - Middle East - The Emergence Of Modern Nationalisms, World War I And Its Settlement, Differential Nationalist Trajectories, After Nationalism? Nationalism is generally regarded as a recent development in the Middle East, a contingent phenomenon produced by the unique conditions of the modern era. Prior to the nineteenth century, concepts of collective identity and allegiance appear to have been defined primarily on the basis of lineage, locale, or religioncommunities of sentiment and solidarity either smaller or larger than the nationalisms that subsequently emerged. For the region's agricultural and pastoralist majority, living in largely self-contained village or nomadic communities, one's clan, tribe, or village are presumed to have been the primary objects of self-identification and affiliation. For the area's literate minority, usually urban residents and immersed in a milieu dominated by religion, collective

identity was defined by a combination of locale (loyalty to one's city), polity (being a member of the ruling elite), and most vitally religion (self-definition as Muslim, Christian, or Jew). Ethnic or linguistic concepts of identity, on the other hand, were conspicuous by their absence. Terminology illustrates the point. Prior to the twentieth century the word Turk denoted a rural resident of Anatolia, not a member of the educated multiethnic elite of the Ottoman Empire. In Arab usage the term Arab referred to the wild Bedouin of the desert, not the area's sophisticated urban population. Nationalism - Middle East - The Emergence Of Modern Nationalisms The nineteenth century was the seedtime of nationalism in the Middle East. The region's geographic, linguistic, and religious heterogeneity has provided the basis for numerous and competing nationalist movements. Fueled by their religious distinctiveness and their contacts with the European milieu where nationalism was becoming the hegemonic referent for collective identity, some of the region's Christian minorities developed nationalist movements prior to the region's Muslim majority. Most prominent in this regard were the Maronites of Mount Lebanon and the Armenians of eastern Anatolia, among whom constructs emphasizing their historical separateness and right to political autonomy took hold in the nineteenth century. Thanks to European assistance, Lebanon gained autonomous status within the Ottoman Empire by the 1860s. Such was not the case in historic Armenia, where an active nationalist movement came into conflict with the Ottoman state as well as with the area's Turkish and Kurdish population in the later nineteenth century, and where fear of nationalism led to the mass expulsion and massacre of Armenians by the Ottoman government in the early twentieth. In both Egypt and Iran, distinct geographical areas existing as autonomous polities with their own ruling structure (Iran since the sixteenth century, Egypt since the early nineteenth) led Westernized Egyptian and Iranian intellectuals to assert the existence of historically unique Egyptian and Iranian "nations" by the later decades of the century. Egyptian nationalism took political form by the later 1870s, when indigenous Egyptian elites sought greater control over an originally Ottoman ruling family and the European financial domination that dynastic extravagance was producing; their movement's slogan "Egypt for the Egyptians" succinctly expresses its overall thrust. Active nationalist activity in Iran dates from the 1890s and was produced by much the same combination of dynastic incompetence and foreign economic penetration; in the Iranian case it generated a formally successful Iranian constitutional movement in the early years of the twentieth century. For the Turks of Anatolia and the Arabs of the Fertile Crescent, both living under Ottoman rule through the long nineteenth century, the causes producing nationalism were parallel. A precondition for modern Turkish and Arab nationalism was the development of a firm sense of ethnic identity. This was stimulated in the Turkish case by the discoveries of European Turkology, the uncovering of the pre-Islamic history of the Turkic-speaking peoples in Central Asia and beyond that fostered identification with

a historic ethnie distinct from both the Muslim community and the multiethnic Ottoman Empire, in the Arab case by the process known as the "Arab Awakening," the blossoming of Arabic literature and history that occurred in the middle decades of the nineteenth century. As elsewhere in the Middle East, increasing elite contact with Europe and a growing awareness of European ideas also played a role. Nationalism is a modular concept, "available for pirating" (to pirate Benedict Anderson's phrase) by all those impressed by Europe and the world supremacy its nations were able to achieve in the modern era. Ads by Google Luxury Property in Israel Exclusive New project in Tel Aviv Apartments Tower by Richard Meier!
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The catalyst turning a heightened sense of ethnic identity into visible Turkish and Arab nationalist movements was the trajectory taken by the Ottoman Empire over the course of the nineteenth century. On the one hand, the empire's territorial crumbling as European powers established their control over its African dominions and the peoples of the Balkans gained independence raised the possibility of a similar dismemberment of its Asian heartlands, thereby generating a search for an alternative base for viable community. On the other hand, the Ottoman government itself assumed a more

reactionary character by the later decades of the nineteenth century. For educated Turks and Arabs, who were absorbing the values of individual liberty and participatory politics from their European mentors, the Ottoman Empire increasingly came to be seen as an undesirable framework for modern life. Turkish and Arab ethnic nationalism became active movements only in the early twentieth century, specifically in the "Young Turk" era (19081918). Among Turks new organizations with an explicitly Turkish emphasis (the Turkish Society, formed 1908; the Turkish Hearth Clubs, formed 1912) emerged; in the press, extravagant ideas of uniting all Turkic-speaking peoples in a ethnically based "Turanian" state were voiced; on the governmental level efforts at increased centralization emphasized the primacy of the Turkish language within the state and sometimes gave precedence to ethnic Turks (although not to the degree once assumed). Similar organizational and intellectual trends occurred in the Arabic-speaking provinces of the Fertile Crescent: new Arab societies with a political agenda (the Ottoman Administrative Decentralization Society, 1912) emerged; demands for Arab autonomy were expressed in the press; and an Arab Congress was held in Paris in 1913 to promote Ottoman decentralization. The continued drive for centralization being undertaken by the Young Turk regime ran counter to what was originally an Arab demand for provincial decentralization. By the eve of World War I, a new trend was developing in the Arab provinces as prominent individuals and secret societies began to think of Arab independence as the only way to avoid subjugation within what politicized Arabs were coming to see as an oppressive "Turkish" state. Modern Jewish nationalism (Zionism) did not require a similar process of the rediscovery of national distinctiveness. A sense of collective uniqueness and solidarity existed among Jews well before the nineteenth century. This sense was solidified by Judaism's liturgical language (Hebrew), the rich tapestry of distinctive customs, and the shared isolation of and discrimination against Jews living in European countries. An active Jewish nationalist movement based on this sense of distinctiveness was produced on the one hand by the gradual process of emancipation and assimilation experienced by Jews in parts of Europe during the nineteenth century, a process of historical change that also involved the acceptance of modern nationalist concepts, and on the other by growing European anti-Semitism, a phenomenon that led Jews to question their future in national states where powerful movements were now defining Jews as an alien element. In direct response to rising anti-Semitism in the Russian Empire, in the 1880s Zionist societies emerged in eastern Europe and began to organize Jewish immigration to Ottoman Palestine. By the late 1890s an international organization of Jews, the World Zionist Organization (WZO; established 1897), had been founded "to create for the Jewish people a homeland in Palestine secured by public law" (its founding declaration), and in the years prior to World War I the WZO worked to encourage Jewish migration and the initial development of distinctive Jewish national institutions in Palestine itself. Nationalism - Middle East - World War I And Its Settlement World War I and its settlement had a crucial impact on nationalism in the Middle East. Ottoman entry into the war on the side of the Central Powers led to Ottoman military

defeat. At war's end, the victorious allies began the process of partitioning the Ottoman Empire in accord with secret wartime arrangements. The postwar attempt at Allied domination was unsuccessful in the primarily Turkish-speaking Anatolian portion of the empire, where a vigorous Turkish nationalist movement led by the charismatic General Mustafa Kemal (later Atatrk) successfully resisted European domination and in the process abolished the Ottoman Empire and replaced it with the new state of Turkey (1923). Quite a different course of events were obtained in the Fertile Crescent, which Great Britain and France divided between themselves. France received a League of Nations mandate for "Syria" (initially including Lebanon, defined as a separate state in 1920), Great Britain mandates for the territories of "Iraq" and "Palestine" (the latter comprising today's Israel and Jordan). In the process of imperial partition, a nascent Arab nationalist movement that had emerged during the war and established an Arab government in Damascus was crushed by French military action. In Palestine, where the terms of the mandate allowed for large-scale Jewish immigration in order to facilitate the emergence of the Jewish "national home," the postwar settlement also laid the basis for the subsequent emergence of the state of Israel. The contrast between the course of events in Turkish-speaking Anatolia and in the Arabic-speaking Fertile Crescent deserves emphasis. Turkish nationalism emerged successful out of the turmoil of World War I and its settlement, realizing its goal of the creation of a Turkish national state predicated on the existence of a linguistically based Turkish ethnic community. Nothing succeeds like success; Turkey has remained the object of national self-definition and allegiance for its Turkish-speaking majority ever since its creation in the early 1920s. In the Arab case a nationalist movement similar in genesis and aspiration, but geographically more vulnerable, was eliminated by European force of arms. In its stead the Fertile Crescent was divided into several artificial political units according to imperial fiat. None possessed deep roots; the reality and viability of all were to be deeply contested in the years to come. Nationalism - Middle East - Differential Nationalist Trajectories The several nationalisms considered above have taken very different paths since World War I and its settlement. In Iran the territorially based nationalism that emerged in the nineteenth century remained dominant under the Pahlavi dynasty (19211979). It was never fully accepted, however, by more religious Iranians, particularly by the country's powerful Shiite religious hierarchy. In the late 1970s the religious class played a leading role in overthrowing the secular nationalist government of the shahs. In the 1980s the promotion of worldwide Islamic solidarity and international Islamic revolution became the leitmotif of Iranian foreign policy. In the 1990s, as the Iranian revolution moderated, the concept of Iran as a distinct national community again received greater emphasis. The precise nature and implications of Iranian collective identity is a contested issue at the start of the twenty-first century, part and parcel of the struggle between more liberal and more conservative Iranians.

With the creation of a cohesive independent state in Anatolia, Turkish nationalism largely shed the grandiose visions of pan-Turkic unity that had been expressed by some of its early proponents. Reified and promoted by the government of the new Turkish state during the long ascendancy of Mustafa Kemal Atatrk in the 1920s and 1930s, belief in the construct of a Turkish nation centered in Anatolia gradually disseminated beyond the elite circles in which Turkish nationalism had been born. The post-Atatrk decades have seen intensive debate among Turks as to the orientation of the Turkish state, particularly over the question of the role of religion in public life; but the participants in these debates have by and large not challenged the existence of a Turkish nation. The one partial exception is Turkey's marginalized Kurdish-speaking population, among whom demands for cultural and political autonomy surfaced in the later decades of the twentieth century and generated a prolonged civil war in eastern Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s. The Zionist movement realized its main goal with the creation of the Jewish state of Israel in 1948. Some religiously oriented groups have never accepted the legitimacy of a Jewish state created as a result of human rather than divine agency. Moreover, fierce debates over the internal character of the state (for example, the role of religion in public life and the relationship of the Palestinian Arab minority to state institutions), as well as over the territorial extent of the state (the fate of the Palestinian-inhabited territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip occupied by Israel in 1967), have continued to perturb Israeli public discourse. However, these debates occur among a Jewish population the vast majority of whom have accepted Israel as their national community of destiny. Ads by Google Peliculas Online Gratis Vea Peliculas Totalmente Gratis Sin Tener Que Descargar
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Egypt was granted formal independence by Great Britain in 1922 in response to a nationalist uprising after World War I, and territorially based nationalism remained the dominant political construct in Egypt for most of the three decades of the parliamentary monarchy (19221952). Its cutting edge was Pharaonicism, an intellectual movement that posited the existence of a distinctive national character deriving from the ancient Egyptians. From the later 1930s the primacy of this locally based nationalism was challenged by voices that insisted upon Egypt's Arab affiliations and that emphasized the common problem of imperialist domination facing all Arab regions. Thereafter, both Egyptian opinion and Egyptian state policy evolved in a more Arabist direction, especially after the Egyptian revolution of July 1952. Under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser, by the late 1950s Egypt had become the champion of Pan-Arabism. In 1958 it joined with Syria in the major experiment in Arab unity of the twentieth century, the United Arab Republic (19581961). The collapse of the UAR when Syria seceded in 1961 in effect marked the turning point in Egypt's involvement in the Arab nationalist movement. A drift away from commitment to Arab nationalism set in Egypt from the 1960s onward. It accelerated under Nasser's successors Anwar al-Sadat and Husni Mubarak, both of whose policies have emphasized Egypt as a separate political entity with its own national interests. The fate of nationalism in the Arabic-speaking lands of the Fertile Crescent since the postWorld War I settlement has been complex. In the interwar era the new states created after the war gradually acquired a degree of reality in the minds of their inhabitants. The effectiveness of state consolidation varied from country to country. It was probably strongest in Lebanon, where spokesmen among the country's slight Christian majority expounded an exclusively Lebanese nationalist ideology focused on the country's long history since the era of the Phoenicians as a uniquely "Mediterranean" nation different from other Arabic-speaking lands. It was probably weakest in Syria, where much of the political elite clung to the vision of the united Arab state that had been destroyed by imperialist partition in 1920. Among Palestinian Arabs a distinctive local identity was on the one hand fostered by the conflict with Zionism, but on the other was undercut as Palestinians sought outside Arab solidarity and support in the same struggle. The process of Arab state consolidation in the Fertile Crescent was uneven. Continuing foreign domination reinforced the perception that the new states created after World War I were artificial entities established to suit imperial interests. An aura of whatshould-have-been hovered over Arab politics in the Fertile Crescent, a belief that Arabs had been swindled out of the unity that was their proper destiny. After World War II this disaffection with existing states and belief in the desirability of their replacement by a

state uniting most Arabs blossomed into Pan-Arabism, the drive for integral Arab unity that was a central component of Arab politics through the 1950s and 1960s. The process of territorial state consolidation was facilitated with the recession of PanArabism from the later 1960s onward. Over the decades the expanding institutions of the territorial state (bureaucracy, schools, vested interests) and its new symbols (flags, monuments, national holidays) bound the population to the state and gave greater substance to what had been artificial entities. At the level of policy-making there has been a clear trend away from the pursuit of Arab unity toward the realization of state interests since the 1960s. Wider Arab nationalist sentimentsbelief in the existential reality of an Arab nation transcending existing state bordershave not totally faded. There is also an impressive degree of inter-Arab economic and cultural cooperation that has developed over time under the auspices of the League of Arab States and similar agencies. Pan-Arab issues, especially Palestine, are capable of arousing deep emotions across the Arab world. But, in the shifting relationship between the alternative concepts of local/statal allegiance and a broader identification with an Arab nation based on the bonds of language and history, the former appears to be the more prominent tendency at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Nationalism - Middle East - After Nationalism?

A significant challenge to nationalism has emerged in the Islamist movements that have gained prominence in recent decades. At the abstract level, the primacy of the religious bond over loyalty to territory, polity, or ethnie is basic to Islamist ideology. The formulation of Sayyid Qutb, founding father of Sunni Arab Islamism, states the position starkly: "There is no country for a Muslim except that where the law of God is established. There is no nationality for a Muslim except his belief, which makes him a member of the Islamic community" (Milestones, p. 103). In political terms, a considerable measure of sympathy, mutual aid, and collaborative action have marked the relations between Islamist activists and movements originating in different countries. From the galvanizing impact of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 on Islamist activism elsewhere, through international support for the mujahideen opposing Soviet occupation in Afghanistan in the 1980s, to the international makeup and operations of Al Qaeda in the 1990s and after, a revived emphasis on the Islamic umma (Arabic, "community" of believers) as the most meaningful community of solidarity and destiny for Muslims has reasserted itself in the contemporary era. But this is not the whole story. Territorial and ethnic nationalism still have their advocates, ideologues, and public figures who question the political salience of the religious bond and who posit that political behavior should be based on non-religious criteria. The current division of the Muslim world into numerous states inevitably influences the practical articulation of contemporary Islamism. Many Islamist activists accept the reality of existing territorially or ethnically based states and operate within the political field determined by state structures, directing their activism toward infusing existing states with a more Islamic content.

By reasserting the centrality of a previously recessive collective identity, the Islamic resurgence of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries has complicated but not totally transformed the nationalist landscape of the Middle East. Sentiments of religious solidarity coexist with territorial, local, and ethnic/linguistic nationalism. The result is a complex, crowded, and unstable universe of imagined communities in which individuals are faced with determining the relevance of alternative referents for self-definition, allegiance, and action. BIBLIOGRAPHY
PRIMARY SOURCES

Antonius, George. The Arab Awakening. London: H. Hamilton, 1938. The classic account of the genesis of Arab nationalism. Haim, Sylvia G., ed. Arab Nationalism: An Anthology. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962. A lengthy introductory essay followed by excerpts to the 1960s. Hertzberg, Arthur, ed. The Zionist Idea: A Historical Analysis and Reader. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959. A lengthy introductory essay and a wide range of excerpts from Zionist thinkers.
SECONDARY SOURCES

Avineri, Sholmo. The Making of Modern Zionism: Intellectual Origins of the Jewish State. New York: Basic Books, 1981. A probing intellectual history. Dawisha, Adeed. Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003. Gelvin, James L. Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. A pioneering analysis of the relationship of elite and nonelite Arab nationalism. Haniolu, M. kr. Preparations for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 19021908. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. The continuation of his 1995 work. . The Young Turks in Opposition. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. A detailed account of the genesis of the main Turkish nationalist movement. Jankowski, James, and Israel Gershoni, eds. Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997. Essays suggesting new approaches to the study of nationalisms in the Arab world since World War I.

Khalidi, Rashid, et. al., eds. The Origins of Arab Nationalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991. Studies of the development of Arab nationalism up to World War I. Khoury, Philip S. Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: The Politics of Damascus, 1860-1920. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1983. A thoughtful exploration of the social basis of Arab nationalism. Laqueur, Walter. A History of Zionism. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972. A comprehensive political and intellectual history of Zionism to 1948. Lewis, Bernard. The Emergence of Modern Turkey. London: Oxford University Press, 1961. A classic exploration of Turkish political and intellectual history. Mottahedeh, Roy. The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985. A masterful study of how religious and nationalist thought intertwine. Qutb, Sayyid. Milestones. Indianapolis, Ind.: American Trust Publications, 1990. Sternhell, Zeev. The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making of the Jewish State. Translated by David Maisel. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998. A revisionist interpretation arguing for the nationalist over socialist ideas in Zionism. James Jankowski
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Pan-Arabism - Bibliography
Pan-Arabism is the concept that all Arabs form one nation and should be politically united in one Arab state. The intellectual foundations of pan-Arabism were laid down in the early decades of the twentieth century, in the context first of Arab alienation from Ottoman rule and later in response to the imperialist partition of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. The doctrine became politically significant in the postWorld War II era, when it produced the drive for integral Arab unity that culminated in the union of Egypt and Syria in the United Arab Republic (19581961). Since the 1960s pan-Arabism has receded as a meaningful political aspiration, giving way to the acceptance of the reality of the existing Arab state structure overlaid by a continuing sense of Arab cultural unity and political solidarity. Both as theory and practice, pan-Arabism was a child of its times. Its roots lay in the linguistic unity of elite culture across the Arabic-speaking world, where classical Arabic provided a common means of communication transcending geographical barriers, and in Arab awareness of their historical importance as the people responsible for the spread of

Islam. This latent Arab consciousness was politicized in the early twentieth century, when educated Arabs in the Fertile Crescent provinces of the Ottoman Empire began to chafe at growing Ottoman centralization as well as at their partial exclusion from participation in Ottoman rule due to the growth of Turkish nationalism. With parallel aspirations for autonomy developing in the several Arabic-speaking provinces of the empire by the preWorld War I years, these first nationalist stirrings in the Fertile Crescent had an implicitly pan-Arab character. The proximate referent for an explicit pan-Arabist ideology was the Arab-run state that emerged in greater Syria by the close of World War I as a result of the wartime Arab Revolt. Although crushed by the French in 1920, Emir/King Faisal's short-lived Arab Kingdom was thereafter a constant reminder of the united Arab polity that might have been were it not for the machinations of imperialism. An explicit ideology positing the existence of one Arab nation and calling for the unity of all Arabs emerged in the interwar years. Articulated particularly by ideologues from the new mini-states of Iraq, Syria, and Palestine, it was in large part a reaction to the externally imposed division of the Arab East. Its key spokesman was the Iraqi educator Sati' al-Husri (18801968), whose numerous essays hammered home the message that language and history were the main determinants of nationhood and consequently that the Arabs, united as they were by one language and a shared history, deserved a parallel political unity. Husri's message was reinforced and deepened by Arab pedagogues of the interwar era, whose histories of the Arab nation expounded on the concepts of linguistic unity and a glorious Arab history reaching into antiquity. By the 1940s the doctrine of the existential reality of the Arab nation had been internalized by much of the younger generation, generating new political movements dedicated to working for Arab political unification. The most important of these was the Ba'th or Renaissance Party formed in Syria in the 1940s, an organization that rapidly found adherents in other eastern Arab lands. Its slogan"one Arab nation with an eternal mission"encapsulated the panArabist vision; its 1947 programthat "[t]his nation has the natural right to live in a single state and to be free to direct its own destiny"set the pan-Arabist agenda. Pan-Arabism became a major political force in the decades after World War II. The circumstances of the postwar erathe entry into political life of a younger generation imbued with pan-Arabist ideas; individual Arab countries obtaining a greater measure of independence from foreign domination, and with it a greater ability to pursue panArabist goals; the existence of the common problems of Western imperialism and the new state of Israel, both of which were perceived as necessitating Arab cooperation to be successfully addressedprovided a receptive medium for the flourishing of political panArabism. The new League of Arab States (formed 1945), although strictly a confederative arrangement in which the separate Arab states retained freedom of action, nonetheless indicated the new postwar mood envisaging greater inter-Arab cooperation in the future. The Ba'th and other pan-Arabist political parties grew in size and influence in states such as Syria, Iraq, and Jordan from the 1940s onward, occasionally succeeding in stimulating a measure of inter-Arab political cooperation and at least lip-service to the goal of Arab unity from their governments. Most meaningful politically was the emergence of a new

champion for pan-Arabism in the 1950s, in the person of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir (Nasser) of Egypt. Although his own nationalist outlook was at base primarily Egyptian nationalist, Nasser nonetheless perceived the desirability of greater inter-Arab cooperation in order to attain the goal of complete independence for the Arab world. Nasser's successes in opposing Western imperialism in the mid-1950s made Nasser and Egypt the natural focus of pan-Arabist hopes. The high point of pan-Arabism as a political movement came in 1958, when pan-Arabist activists in Syria approached Nasser to request the integral unity of Egypt and Syria. Not without reservations, but also snared by his own previous advocacy of Arab nationalism as a mobilizing slogan, Nasser assented. The result was the United Arab Republic (UAR), a new state uniting Egypt and Syria under Nasser's leadership. The creation of the UAR set off considerable agitation for unity with the UAR by pan-Arabist enthusiasts in other eastern Arab states such as Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq, agitation resisted only with difficulty by more localist leaders and forces concerned about their own prospects in any unified Arab state. In the end Nasser's reservations about the UAR were borne out. Frustrated by their marginalization within the counsels of the regime, and opposed to the socialist measures being introduced by the early 1960s, in September 1961 elements of the Syrian military revolted, expelled their Egyptian overlords, and effectively terminated the reality of the UAR (although Egypt retained the name until 1971). The breakup of the UAR was a crucial setback for the pan-Arabist goal of integral Arab unity. To be sure, the dream did not die; when Ba'thists seized power in Syria and (more briefly) in Iraq in 1963, both governments immediately entered into "unity talks" with Nasser. These collapsed (as did the subsequent but less substantial initiatives aimed at negotiating Arab federation initiated by Mu'ammar Gadhafi of Libya in the early 1970s) on the rock of political power-sharing. A further and greater setback for pan-Arabism came in June 1967 with the stunning military defeat of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria by Israel, an Arab catastrophe in which the leading exponents of pan-Arabism, Nasser and the Syrian Ba'th, were indelibly discredited as potential leaders of the drive for Arab political unity. As a political movement, pan-Arabism has receded since the 1960s. Just as the context of the postWorld War II decades provided the necessary medium for its earlier flourishing, so changed conditions since the 1960s have contributed to pan-Arabism's fading. The gradual consolidation of the power and legitimacy of what were initially artificial Arab states; the end of overt imperialist domination, thereby undercutting much of the reason for inter-Arab solidarity; the growing acceptance of the reality of Israel; the increased clout of the Arab oil monarchies, regimes apprehensive about what Arab unity might mean for them; not least the growth of the rival transnational ideology of Islamism, many of whose spokesmen view Arab nationalism as an alien, Westerninspired concept designed to subvert Muslim unity: all these developments of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s have worked against significant movement toward Arab political unity.

Politically, pan-Arabism has stalled since the 1960s. Other than the union of Yemen and North Yemen in 1990, a local development with no broader nationalist implications, there have been no further mergers of separate Arab states since the formation of the UAR in 1958 (the forced "merger" of Kuwait with Iraq in 1990 was quickly reversed by international opposition, including that of most other Arab states). The post-1970 leaders of those states that had led the pan-Arabist movement in the 1950s and 1960s Anwar al-Sadat and Husni Mubarak of Egypt; Hafiz al-Asad of Syria; intermittently Saddam Husayn of Iraqall concentrated on promoting the interests of their respective states, rather than on pursuing integral Arab unity, during their long tenures in power. There have been various regional organizations of Arab states created since the 1970s, the Gulf Cooperation Council formed in 1981 by the six Arab monarchies bordering the Persian Gulf being the most durable and meaningful; but these have been confederative arrangements that guarantee the territorial integrity of their members. If political pan-Arabism is in eclipse, what remains? The League of Arab States continues to exist, and through its various subsidiary organizations has fostered an impressive level of interstate Arab cooperation in the economic, social, and cultural fields. Inter-Arab migration for occupational or educational reasons boomed in the 1970s and 1980s, driven particularly by the demand for Arab labor in the Arab oil states. Literally millions of Arabs lived, worked, or studied in Arab countries other than their homelands in the 1970s and 1980s; this inter-Arab migration decreased from the mid-1980s onward. Perhaps most important in perpetuating and deepening a shared Arab consciousness in recent decades has been the mass media. First radio, then television, more recently the Internet and the emergence of Arab media outlets capable of reaching Arabs everywhere have spread a common Arab culture and kept "Arab" issues, Palestine being the most vital, at the forefront of Arab awareness. Political pan-Arabism may be stalled; but an abiding sense of the Arabs as one people with a common culture, similar problems, and shared aspirations has increased and penetrated more deeply into the fabric of Arab society. The temporal trajectory of political pan-Arabism was thus significantly different from that of the cultural Arabism on which it was in part based. Whereas the former emerged, flourished, and then declined over the course of the twentieth century, the latter has steadily increased and disseminated more widely. Arabism is by no means an exclusive identity; it exists in tandem with affinal ties, a longstanding self-definition as part of the Muslim community (for most Arabs), and a more recent loyalty to the state in which Arabs live. But it remains part of the blend of referents that define collective identity, shape popular sentiment, and inspire political action.
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Pan-Islamism - Jamal Al-din Al-afghani, Late Ottoman Politics, The Khilafat Movement, A World Of Nation-states A term of European origin, pan-Islamism denotes the intellectual and institutional trends toward Islamic unity that emerged among Muslim peoples, starting in the mid

nineteenth century and continuing throughout the twentieth century. The need for a unified Islamic identity was a product of the challenges posed by Western intervention in and domination of Muslim societies during the colonialist period. Leaders throughout the Muslim world appealed to the Islamic tradition to solidify public opposition to foreign occupation and thereby gain political independence. Like its European namesakes pan-Hellenism and pan-Slavism, pan-Islamism used cultural ideas to achieve nationalist political ends. Unlike the ethnic identities emphasized in European nationalisms, however, pan-Islamism emphasized the religious heritage and symbols that both united all Muslims and set them apart from their Western Christian colonialist occupiers. The nationalist purposes to which pan-Islamism was primarily directed may seem at odds with the universal principles on which it rests, but this tension was largely resolved in the practical drive for political, economic, and social progress that enveloped Muslim societies. Nowhere is this resolution more clearly defined than in the life and work of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (18391897), a Muslim reformer and key advocate of pan-Islamism.
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Pan-Turkism - Intellectual Origins And The Impact Of European Works, First Panturkist Ideas, Pan-turkism, 19081922 The term Pan-Turkism refers to an intellectual and political movement advocating the union of all Turkic peoples. Although some promoters of this ideology went as far as calling for a political union including all Turkic groups, many others envisioned only a cultural unity. Pan-Turkism - Intellectual Origins And The Impact Of European Works European works such as Joseph de Guignes's Histoire gnrale des Huns, des Turcs, des Mogols, et des autres Tartares occidentaux, &c. avant et depuis Jsus-Christ jusqu' present (Paris, 17561758) and Arthur Lumley David's A Grammar of the Turkish Language with a Preliminary Discourse on the Language and Literature of the Turkish Nations (London, 1832) paved the way for a debate on Turkish peoples living under different administrations and their common ethnic bonds. David rejected the lumping together of all Turkic tribes under the rubric of Tatars, and proposed the generic name Turk for all these peoples; this made many intellectuals in the Ottoman Empire and other Turkic states reevaluate their approach to their peoples' ethnic origins. A French translation of the work was submitted to the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II in 1833, and was widely read by Ottoman intellectuals and linguists. A Polish convert, Mustafa Celleddin Pasha (Constantine Borzecki), who had fled to the Ottoman Empire after the unsuccessful 1848 revolution, liberally used de Guignes's work in preparing his own study, Les turcs anciens et modernes (Constantinople, 1869). Mustafa Celleddin Pasha maintained that Turks and Europeans were from the same "Touro-Aryan" race. Works of Arminus Vmbry, who traveled widely in Central Asia and underscored the common racial "Turanian" characteristics of the Turkic peoples, and Lon Cahun's Introduction l'histoire de l'Asie (Paris, 1896) presented the "Turanian" race as one that brought

civilization to Europe; this strongly influenced many Turkish intellectuals. Vmbry should be credited as the first non-Turkish savant who, in 1865, entertained the idea of a Turkic "empire extending from the shore of the Adriatic far into China." Many Ottoman intellectuals paid close attention to these new ideas. It is interesting to note that in the prefatory article of the Young Ottoman journal Hrriyet (established 1868), the Turks were portrayed as "a nation in whose medreses Farabis, Ibn Sinas, Ghazzalis, Zamakhsharis propagated knowledge." Another leading Young Ottoman, Ali Suavi, underscored the common ethnic origins of the Turkic groups in his journal Mukhbir (1878). In an essay on Khiva he criticized the Ottoman policy toward this Central Asian khanate and described its people as "Muslim Turks who belong to our religion, nation, and ethnic family." In 1876 Sleyman Pasha prepared the first volume of his "World History" to be used as a textbook at the Royal Military Academy; in it he underscored the common bond uniting the Turkic peoples by drawing heavily on de Guignes's work. Beginning in 1877 history textbooks referred to the Turkish ancestry of the Ottomans, and the Ottoman press developed a keen interest in Turks living in Central Asia and the Caucasus, publishing many articles on them.

Pan-Turkism - First Pan-turkist Ideas

Despite the emergence of a national consciousness among the Turks living in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkic peoples of the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Iran, and a strong focus on their common origins, no intellectual or politician openly promoted unification of the Turkic groups until 1904. In an essay published in 1881 Gaspirali smail (Isma'il Bey Gasprinskii) debated the reasons for the decadence of the great "Turco-Tatar nation scattered in Asia and parts of Europe." He argued that "Turks, Turcomans, Mongols, Tatars, Uzbeks, and Yakuts [were] all from the same family." He advocated similar theses in his journal Tercman, published in Bakhchesaray in the Crimea. The importation of this influential newspaper was occasionally banned by the Ottoman authorities. Nevertheless, it was widely read by Ottoman intellectuals and strongly influenced them. In 1903 a Young Turk journal called Trk started publication in Cairo. This journal promoted a more developed Turkish nationalism and devoted its efforts toward "the moral and material progress of the Turkish world." In it Yusuf Akura, a Young Turk intellectual and a former military officer of Tatar origin, published an essay entitled " Tarz-i Siyaset" (Three kinds of policy). He asserted that there were three alternatives before the Ottoman administrationPan-Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism, and Pan-Turkism and that the best choice would be "to pursue a Turkish nationalism based on race." This essay, which first appeared in 1904, might be considered the first clear-cut intellectual formulation of the Pan-Turkist idea. Following the Russian Revolution of 1905, Gaspirali started using the motto "Unity in Language, Thought, and Work" under the masthead of his journal Tercman. He presented his aim as an attempt to create a united front of Turks living under tsarist rule. He maintained that such unity would enable the Turks to defend their rights better. There is no doubt, however, that in reality he intended more than uniting Turks living in Russia. The Russian Revolution of 1905

and the increased cultural activities of the Turkic peoples under tsarist rule made the Ottoman press in the empire and in exile pay more attention to these groups and to relations between them and the Ottoman Empire. Many Turkic journals, mostly published by Azerbaijani and Tatar intellectuals, promoted closer cultural relations among Turkic peoples. Another organization that developed an interest in such ideas was the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress. Following its reorganization in 19051906, this committee established ties with Turkic intellectuals and provided finance to help some of them publish their journals. The committee supported the creation of a "Turkish Union in the regions from the Adriatic Sea to the Chinese Sea" and promised to extend a helping hand to these Turkic groups once it had toppled the regime of Sultan Abdlhamd II. Strident letters sent from Azerbaijani and Tatar organizations to this committee reveal that such an idea was also popular among the intellectuals of these peoples.
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Pan-Turkism - Pan-turkism, 19081922

The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 brought the Committee of Union and Progress to power in the Ottoman Empire. Many Turkic intellectuals participated in its policymaking bodies along with Turkist intellectuals. The committee supported the establishment of various organizations such as the Trk Ocai (Turkish Hearth) (established in 1912), and it published journals such as Trk Yurdu (Turkish homeland) promoting cultural or political Pan-Turkism and Pan-Turanism. It should be remembered, however, that despite their Turkist and Pan-Turkist proclivities, the leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress viewed these ideologies as tools with which to save the Ottoman Empire and employed them alongside the rival ideologies of Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism. The Ottoman entry into World War I against Russia gave a considerable edge to Pan-Turkism and a free hand to the Committee of Union and Progress leaders in propagating it. The leading ideologues of Pan-Turkism and PanTuranism, such us Moiz Cohen (Tekin Alp), Ziya Gkalp, and mer Seyfeddin, further entertained the idea of a future Turanian state including all Turkic peoples. Ottoman war propaganda made much use of this idea. Despite this fact, the accomplishment of that goal had been envisioned by its major promoters as a gradual and long-drawn-out development. Even in 1918 Ziya Gkalp likened the accomplishment of this distant ideal to reaching a pure communist society. During the war, Ottoman agents worked in the Caucasus and Central Asia and were aided by the German government in their efforts to spread Pan-Turkist sentiments. In the final phases of the war, new governments promoting Pan-Turkism were set up in the Caucasus through Ottoman military incursions. Even after the war, the Young Turk leaders in exile made efforts aimed at arousing Pan-Turkish sentiment in an area stretching from the Caucasus to Central Asia and Afghanistan. During this period between 1918 and 1922, Pan-Turkish ideas were put to a test on the ground; however, the Soviet victories and the establishment of the Turkish Republic reduced Pan-Turkist activities to the publication of a few journals by

various Turkic expatriate groups in France, Germany, Poland, and Romania. Pan-Turkism - Pan-turkism From 1922 To The Present Both the Soviets and the Turkish Republic, which was established in 1923, officially shunned Pan-Turkism and considered it a harmful form of adventurism. This view continued to be the official Soviet position on Pan-Turkism until the end of the Soviet Union. In Turkey, however, various Pan-Turkist groups were allowed to publish journals beginning in 1931. They were nevertheless closely scrutinized by the government. These groups were later backed by the Nazi government and tolerated by the Turkish administration, which wanted to avoid a confrontation with Germany; but with the waning of the German power in 1944, the leading Pan-Turkists were tried and sentenced to hard labor. The subsequent deterioration of TurcoSoviet relations, however, triggered a retrial in 1946 resulting in the dismissal of all charges against the leading Pan-Turkists. Later, Pan-Turkism was promoted by various cultural groups and political parties, the most important of which was the Nationalist Action Party under the leadership of Alparslan Trke. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new Turkic states gave fresh hope to many Pan-Turkists in Turkey, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Developments to date, however, suggest that the most that they can hope for is a better cultural understanding between peoples living in nation-states with clearly molded identities and well-defined borders. BIBLIOGRAPHY Akuraolu, Yusuf. Trk Yili, 1928. Istanbul: Yeni Matbaa, 1928. Ali Suavi. Hive. Paris: n.p., 1873. Arai, Masami. Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Era. Leiden: Brill, 1992. Cohen, M. Trkismus und Panturkismus. Weimar, Germany: G. Kiepenheuer, 1915. Haniolu, M. kr. Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 19021908. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Ismail Bey. Gaspirinski, Russkoe musul'manstvo: mysli, zametki i nabliudeniia musul'manina. Simferopol', Russia: Tipografiia Spiro, 1881. Republished, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985. Kushner, David. The Rise of Turkish Nationalism, 18761908. London: Frank Cass, 1977.

Landau, Jacob. Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992. . Tekinalp, Turkish Patriot, 18831961. Istanbul: Nederlands HistorischArchaeologisch Institut, 1984. mer, Seyfeddin. Yarinki Turan Devleti. Istanbul: Kader Matbaasi, 1914. Ziya, Gk Alp. Yeni Hayat. Istanbul: Yeni Mecmua, 1918. M. kr Haniolu
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Zionism - Bibliography
The historians of nationalism have reached a consensus that modern nationalism began as a secular movement, but almost all its varieties were affected by an undertow of older religious sentiments and loyalties. In many of the nationalisms (for example, in the battles between Greeks and Turks in the second decade of the nineteenth century or in the quarrel between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland) the religious dimension of the quarreling nationalisms was clear and avowed. In the case of Zionism the reverse seemed to be true. When modern Zionism appeared in the nineteenth century, it defined itself in secular terms. It did not come into the world to bring about the age of the messiah that had been foretold in many of the classic texts of the Jewish religion. Zionism offered to answer two major problems that faced contemporary Jews. They were victims of large-scale persecution, most overtly in Eastern Europe, and the Jewish intelligentsia were being all too attracted to the promise of equality in society which was apparently only being offered to those who were willing to abandon their separateness and assimilate into the non-Jewish majority. The modern Zionist movement suggested that a Jewish national home would help solve the problems of persecution and assimilation (the Zionists really meant that they wanted a state of their own). Jews would have a homeland that would always gladly receive them, and Jews who were conflicted about their identity would be able to deal with this question in the safe and nurturing environment of a Jewish community in which they were an autonomous majority. The question of religion did, inevitably, arise at the very beginning of modern Zionism. In the 1830s two rabbis from Central Europe, Yehudah Hai Alkalai and Zvi Hirsch Kalischer, each proposed that with nationalism burgeoning all around themthe Greeks had just won their revolt against the Turks, and other European nationalities were arising to fight for their independenceit was time for the Jews, who could trace their national existence back to biblical times, to assert their own unique identity. Surely, so Alkalai and Kalischer argued, as the oldest of all nationalities, the Jews had the right and even the duty to lead the contemporary parade of nations who were asserting their

rebirths. But Alkalai and Kalischer, both of whom were not only rabbis learned in the Talmud but scholars of the Kabbalah (Jewish esoteric mystical teaching), were very careful to deny that they were announcing the beginning of a messianic movement. They held fast to the inherited doctrine that the messiah could come not as the result of human action, but as a free gift from God. The nationalism that Alkalai and Kalischer were suggesting might have some connection to messianic hopes: kabbalistic teaching had allowed that "stirrings down below" might act to remind heaven of the longing of the Jewish people for the messiah, but no political program could be built on this hope. In the nineteenth century peoples were defining themselves by their history and group identity; the Jews should therefore cease to think of themselves as a persecuted minority and begin to assert themselves as a people among the peoples of the earth. Thus, it is inaccurate to label even the "religious Zionists" as the ancestors of contemporary Zionist messianism. This element in present-day Zionism descends from two sources; the first is the confusion that existed in the minds and hearts of some of the most seemingly secular of the Zionist leaders and thinkers. For example, Chaim Weizmann (18741952), the long-time leader of the World Zionist Organization and the first president of Israel, made no secret of the total secularity of his way of life. Nonetheless, at every crucial moment in the debate over the rights of Zionists to a Jewish national home and, ultimately, to a state in the Holy Land, Weizmann invoked sacred Scripture. He kept saying that "the Bible is our charter." The Zionist contemporary who was second only to Weizmann, David Ben Gurion (18861973), the first prime minister of Israel and the man who led the country to win its independence, was an even more avowed secularist than Weizmann. After years of studying his work, the author of this entry reached the conclusion that he was best defined by a paradox: there is no God, but he chose the Jewish people and gave them the land of Israel. So, at the time of Israel's astounding victory in June 1967, when it conquered the large territories all the way to the Jordan River and the Suez Canal, the pervasive mood in Israel and among the Jewish people as a whole was that a miracle had happened. Never mind whether it was God or the inherent "spirit of the Jewish people" that had performed the miracle. Most Jews were sure that they were living in a version of messianic times; they were free to carve out their own destiny, at least in much of the land that was now under their control. The second source of the new messianism was in a change in the theology of the Orthodox Zionists. In the first years of the twentieth century a young and universally respected rabbinic scholar and Kabbalist, Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook (18651935), arrived in Jaffa to assume the post of chief rabbi of its growing Jewish community. Kook insisted that the Jews were indeed living in messianic times. He asserted that the new Zionist movement, despite its pronounced bias against religion, was despite itself an instrument of God's hands. Modern Zionism was reviving the sacred language, Hebrew. Kook insisted that the religious character of the tongue of the Bible was so deeply ingrained that the revival of Hebrew would inevitably act to bring contemporary Zionists closer to their roots. The secular Zionists, so Kook continued, might think that they were engaged in regaining the soil of the Holy Land for a contemporary Jewish state, but this soil was inherently holy; the labor to regain it and to dwell in it would soon transform the

self-avowed secular people who were devoting their lives to this task. When World War I broke out in 1914, Rabbi Kook interpreted this enormous bloodletting as the war of Gog and Magog, the ultimate destructive war that had been foretold as the last preamble to the messianic age. The gentile world was destroying itself, and the moral credit of its achievements was now worthless. So it went after each major turning point in the course of the Zionist revival. Kook saw every event as part of the immediate drama of messianism. Kook was clearly a holy man, but his teaching contained a unexploded bomb. If the Jewish people were living in the immediate preamble to the messianic age, as he maintained, then what was to be done with the disappointments and the blockages that would occur on the path to redemption? Kook died in 1935, so these questions were left to a lesser figure, his son, Rabbi Zvi Yehudah Kook (18911981), to contemplate. He ultimately succeeded his father as the head of the Mercaz Harav ("the rabbi's center"), the Yeshiva, the School of Tamudic Learning and Theological Thought, which the father had established. This school taught its students not only the conventional studies in Talmudic literature that were the staples of the other yeshivot. At this unique school the students were taught to enter the army and to prepare themselves to be elite combat troops. These young people were imbued by Zvi Yehudah Kook with an activist faith that it was their privilege and duty to help bring the messiah soon, in their own dayand Zvi Yehudah Kook never gave up the dream that all of the land that the Jews had possessed in biblical times, including especially the West Bank, would and must be returned to the Jewish people. The enormous and heady victories of the Six-Day War in 1967 were hailed in this religious circle as proof of their ideology. Yes, the messianic miracle had occurred, and the whole of the land of biblical Israel must now be possessed and never returned. Jewish settlement on the West Bank was a religious commandment, and those who opposed such settlements or hindered them or threatened to make them impossible were never to be forgiven. The most extreme thinking among this element was expressed by some younger people, especially among the rabbis who ministered to the new communities in the West Bank. Several of them were accused of encouraging Yigal Amir, the assassin who murdered Israel's prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, in 1995. Rabin's "sin" was that he had signed the agreement that Israel and the Palestinians had made secretly in Oslo in 1992. On behalf of Israel, Rabin had agreed to allow the Palestinians ultimately to establish a state of their own on the West Bank. He was therefore regarded by the hard-line believers in the "undivided land of Israel" as leaning toward religious and national treason. At the start of the twenty-first century the shock of this murder had not abated because the activist minorityprobably 20 percent of Israel's populationmade no secret that it would engage in civil, and some even in armed, disobedience against any Israeli government that intends to allow the Palestinians a state of their own on most, or almost all, of the West Bank. This embitterment had the most profound effect on the question of the very nature of the Zionist enterprise. When modern Zionism was created, there was an existing consensus among all its factions that the highest authority within the Zionist movement would be the civil government of the national home that was being

established. To be sure, from the very beginning a certain amount of respect was extended to the religious elements within the Jewish community. There was no question that the kitchens of the Israeli army would be kosher everywhere and that the Orthodox rabbinate would be given the ultimate authority on such matters as marriage and divorce among Jews. Through the years some elements in Israel have chafed under these controls, but the majority have made peace with the amount of religious coloration that exists in Israel's public life, but these issues were essentially peripheral. They did not involve religious judgments on the foreign policy of Israel or the questions of relations with the Arab world. In the aftermath of the Six-Day War of June 1967, the newly awakened messianic believers reframed their Zionist aims as politically maximalist. The new messianists proposed to enact their program in the name of God's will. More recently, in the first years of the twenty-first century, modern Zionism is under attack from two other perspectives. The ultraright Zionists are ever more forthright in insisting that if the messiah does not come soon, they will at least solve the problem of keeping a Jewish state Jewish even as it controls a population that, between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River, is already half Arab, either by denying the Arabs full political rights or by creating the conditions for the large-scale "transfer" of Arabs from the land of Israel. Such thinking used to be anathema to the Israeli mainstream, but it has become more thinkable as the armed conflict between Jews and Palestinians has become ever more embittered. By the end of 2003, there were well over two thousand dead among the Palestinians, but there had been nearly a thousand casualties among the Israelis since the outbreak of the "second intifada" in 2000. These deaths occurred in guerrilla warfare, including suicide bombings by the Palestinians, and in reprisals by the Israelis. In the current struggle, Israel's moderates have diminished after each suicide bombing, and no new moderates have appeared among the Palestinians. It seems ever less likely that Israelis and Palestinians will find a way to put their hurts behind them and make peace across the table. They will need strong leadership and pressure from the United States and from some of the rest of the international community. By April 2004 Sharon made the first step toward accepting a notion that no one had ever expected he would accept: the demographic balance in "the undivided land of Israel" was shifting toward an Arab majority. He, therefore, proposed that the Israelis begin by evacuating all 7500 settlers from the Gaza Strip and leaving that to Arab rule. Despite opposition from his own Likud party, Sharon insisted ever more openly that demography commands Israel to cease ruling an unwilling and hostile Arab majority. Sharon's policies make an Arab state living beside Israel an inevitabilty, but one that will take much military and political turmoil to work. On the side of the Palestinians and their sympathizers, especially in the Arab world, there is equally strong awareness that demographic trends are producing an Arab majority in the supposedly "undivided land of Israel." The basic Arab policy seems to have moved in the direction of waiting out the next few years and then demanding that only one state should exist in this land but that this state should be ruled by the principle of "one man, one vote." This notion is often dressed up as the realization of the great democratic

dream, a binational state of Jews and Arabs, in which Jews can be assured that a growing Arab majority will not treat them harshly. Most of those who argue this view, however, do not manage to hide their indifference, or even glee, at the thought that the Zionist venture would then be over. The Jewish state would be gone; it would be replaced by a state with an Arab majority. All the claims that the Jews have made concerning their need and their right for a state of their own in which they could make their own destiny by their own rights would end in failure. These Jewish notions seemed plausibleso the argument goesonly late in the nineteenth century and early in the twentieth when nationalism and even colonialism still had some credit in the world. But modern Zionism will not die so easily and certainly not in the pages of left-wing journals in the Western world or in the pronouncements by Islamic nationalists in their own media in the Arab world. The Jews who founded Zionism and their followers who began to come to Palestine more than a century ago to establish the modern Zionist presence did not suffer and die so that, as Chaim Weizmann once said, they might become "Hebrew nationals in a Palestinian State." Zionists will not allow the state of Israel to pack up and leave but are determined to stay put despite the bitter quarrels. Devotion to Israel's survival as a Jewish state does, and will, force it to fight. By the same token, the Palestinians are not going to leave. The Arab states in the Middle East have no desire to absorb any substantial number of Palestinian Arabs, and the world as a whole, especially the West, is not overly hospitable to those who would enter it as part of a new mass migration. These considerations already existed many decades ago when it became clear that Jews and Palestinian Arabs were, despite themselves, having to find ways of living in some tolerable peace. The reigning suggestion was defined in 1937 by the Peel Commission, the highest-level investigation into the conflict in the Holy Land that the British authorities ever empowered. This body knew very well that there was no happy answer to the conflict between Jews and Arabs, but they ruled that the least obnoxious and most likely mode of making some tolerable peace would be the partition of the land between Jews and Arabs. Ten years later in 1947, the nascent United Nations reiterated the conclusions of the Peel Commission and voted to divide the land between a Jewish and an Arab state. On neither of these two occasions was the recommended solution enacted peacefully because the bulk of the Palestinians and their Arab confederates refused to recognize the legitimacy of giving the Jews even one ell of the land of Palestine for a state of their own. The most interesting new development lies not in Palestinian and Arab opinion, but in a substantial shift among many political liberals who had traditionally supported the Zionist vision and program. This change in opinion began in some circles in 1967 when parts of the liberal intelligentsia shifted allegiance during and after the Six-Day War. They found reason to be annoyed with the Jews for concentrating on so parochial a purpose as the survival of the Jewish state and not on such wider concerns as America's misdeeds in the Vietnam War and, more immediately, on the pains and needs of the Palestinians. By 1967 the memory of the Holocaust, the murder of six million defenseless Jews in Europe, had begun to fade, and the Jewish people as a whole were becoming for

many in the liberal left an annoying reminder of past deaths and past guilts. Israel was now a going concernan increasingly powerful oneand thus the Palestinians became the new "victims" of choice. The undertow of this change in political faction was an increasing impatience with the unique demands that the Zionist state was making for special consideration for the Jewish people. Why, indeed, should the Jews need a state of their own? The main charge that the Arab states have kept raising against the state of Israel is that it is a "rabbinic theocracy" but no one has challenged almost all of the Arab states to not conduct themselves as "Muslim theocracies" with scant concern for the right of minorities. On the contrary, left-liberal doctrine insisted that Jewish nationalism should disappear even as most other nationalisms in the world have an unquestioned right to continue. The most interesting part of this phenomenon is that some of its theories are being advanced by Jews. The older assimilationist doctrines, which stated that the Jews should meld into the majority among whom they lived, are being applied even to the Zionist community in the Middle East: it should accept and gladly welcome absorption among the many million of Arabs in the region. In the early twenty-first century it is being argued by various spokesmen of the liberal leftmany Arabs and some Jewsthat the Zionist state should be dismantled. Let one state be established in which the inevitable Arab majority could supposedly be trusted to treat the Jewish minority fairly according to democratic principles. Anyone who knows the history of the region and has any reasonable assessment of the present tensions knows that this vision is a pipe dream. It is advanced by people who might wring their hands when a supposed democracy of Jews and Arabs in one state does not live up to its promises, but then these thinkers will have lost interest in the problem. Of all the visions that are being held out to the warring Israelis and Palestinians, the one-state solution is by far the least likely because neither side to the conflict can trust the other to rein in its maximalists. The most sober assessment has to be that the problems will continue and that the conflict will not be easily resolved, but modern Zionism and its creation, the state of Israel, are here to stay. Its future is not guaranteed by the coming of the messiah soon, but Israel is not ultimately threatened even by the intifada and the suicide bombers. It exists and will continue to exist by the will of its own people. Jews will not surrender their claim to a home of their own to which those who need to come may come freely, nor their claim to a national center of their own in which Jewish energies may continue to define what the long past of this people means in the present and what it can be understood to mean in the future. See also Judaism; Miracles; Nation; Nationalism. Arthur Hertzberg
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