Aspect of the Proceedings People vs. Teehankee, Jr.

, 249 SCRA 54(1995) APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Br. 45. Facts: Three (3) separate Informations were filed against accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. for the shooting of Roland John Chapman, Jussi Olavi Leino and Maureen Hultman. Initially, he was charged with: MURDER for the killing of ROLAND CHAPMAN, and two (2) FRUSTRATED MURDER for the shooting and wounding of JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN. When Hultman died on October 17, 1991, during the course of the trial, the Information for Frustrated Murder against accused was amended to MURDER. Issue: Whether or not the publicity given the case against the appellant was massive, overwhelming, and prejudicial as to effectively deprive the accused of right to impartial trial. Held : Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a dayto-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. At best, the accused can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. The SC had previously rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. The accused has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden. There is no evidence showing that the trial judge allowed the proceedings to turn into a carnival. Nor did he consent to or condone any manifestation of unruly or improper behavior or conduct inside the courtroom during the trial of the case at bar. Pefianco vs. Moral, 322 SCRA 439(2000) PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Facts: SECRETARY ERLINDA C. PEFIANCO of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) seeks to nullify through this petition for review the Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by then DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria for lack of merit, as well as its Resolution dated 13 January 1998 denying reconsideration thereof. Issues : Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari for failure of petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the motion to dismiss, and in holding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss. Held: More importantly, the DECS resolution is complete in itself for purposes of appeal to the Civil Service Commission, that is, it contains sufficient findings of fact and conclusion of law upon which respondents removal from office was grounded. This resolution, and not the investigation report, should be the basis of any further remedies respondent might wish to pursue, and we cannot see how she would be prejudiced by denying her access to the investigation report. In fine, the trial courts Order of 23 April 1997 denying petitioners motion to dismiss is not a mere error of judgment as the Court of Appeals held, but a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction because, to capsulize, the order is a patent nullity for failure to comply with the provisions of the rules requiring that a resolution on a motion to dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the reasons therefor; and, respondent is clearly not entitled to the writ of mandamus as she did not appeal the DECS resolution dismissing her from service, and there is no law or rule which imposes a ministerial duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation report, hence her petition clearly lacked a cause of action. In such instance, while the trial courts order is merely interlocutory and nonappealable, certiorari is the proper remedy to annul the same since it is rendered with grave abuse of discretion. Requisite of Valid Warrant Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 33(1937) ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Mandamus. Facts : The petitioner asks that the warrant of June 3, 1936, issued by the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, ordering the search of his house and the seizure, at any time of the day or night, of certain accounting books, documents and papers belonging to him in his residence situated in Infanta, Province of Tayabas, as well as the order of a later date, authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury Board to retain the articles seized, be declared illegal and set aside, and prays that all the articles in question be returned to him. Issue : Whether or not search warrant issued by the court based upon the affidavit of an agent in whose oath he declared that he had no personal knowledge of the facts, but that he had knowledge thereof through mere information secured from a person whom he considered reliable is valid.

Held : Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution, relative to the bill of rights, provides that "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Section 97 of General Orders, No. 58 provides that "A search warrant shall not issue except for probable cause and upon application supported by oath particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seize." It will be noted that both provisions require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an outward pledge given by the person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages. In view of the foregoing and under the above-cited authorities, it appears that the affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, it is hereby held that the search warrant in question and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal and do not in any way warrant the deprivation to which the petitioner was subjected.