ILRDINAND A. CRUZ v. JUDGL PRISCILLA MIJARLS, et al.

G.R. No. JS4464, JJ September 2008, 1HIRD DIVISION, (Nachura, J.)

1be ca.e at bar ivrotre. a cirit ca.e, ritb tbe etitiover a. taivtiff tbereiv. 1be .oticitov. covcerv tbat tbe
Cov.titvtiov accora. tbe accv.ea iv a crivivat ro.ecvtiov obriov.t, aoe. vot obtaiv iv a cirit ca.e. 1bv., a art, titigavt iv
a cirit ca.e, rbo iv.i.t. tbat be cav, ritbovt a tar,er`. a..i.tavce, effectiret, vvaerta/e tbe .vcce..fvt vr.vit of bi. ctaiv,
va, be girev tbe cbavce to ao .o. v tbi. ca.e, etitiover attege. tbat be i. a tar .tvaevt ava ivtieat, a..ert. tbat be ba.
tbe covetevce to titigate tbe ca.e biv.etf. riaevtt,, be i. arare of tbe erit. ivciaevt to tbi. aeci.iov.
Petitioner lerdinand A. Cruz sought permission to enter his appearance or and on his behal,
beore the Regional 1rial Court Pasay City, as the plainti in a Ciil Case or Abatement o Nuisance.
Cruz, a ourth year law student, anchors his claim on Section 34 o Rule 138 o the Rules o Court that a
non-lawyer may appear beore any court and conduct his litigation personally.
During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required Cruz to secure a written permission rom
the Court Administrator beore he could be allowed to appear as counsel or himsel, a party-litigant.
1he opposing counsel iled a Motion to Dismiss instead o a pre-trial brie to which Cruz ehemently
objected alleging that a Motion to Dismiss is not allowed ater the Answer had been iled. Judge Mijares
then remarked, a, va/v, va.ava ,vvg varvvovg a .a vre.. O/` and proceeded to hear the pending
Motion to Dismiss and calendared the next hearing on May 2, 2002.
Petitioner Cruz then iled a Maniestation and Motion to Inhibit, praying or the oluntary
inhibition o Judge Mijares. 1he Motion alleged that expected partiality on the part o the respondent
judge in the conduct o the trial could be inerred rom the contumacious remarks o Judge Mijares
during the pre-trial. It asserts that the judge, in uttering an uncalled or remark, relects a negatie rame
o mind, which engenders the belie that justice will not be sered.
Judge Mijares denied the motion or inhibition stating that throwing tenuous allegations o
partiality based on the said remark is not enough to warrant her oluntary inhibition, considering that it
was said een prior to the start o pre-trial. Petitioner Cruz iled a motion or reconsideration o the said
order which was also denied in an order wherein his appearance was also denied or the ailure o Cruz
to submit the promised document and jurisprudence, and or his ailure to satisy the requirements or
conditions under Rule 138-A o the Rules o Court.
In a motion or reconsideration, Cruz reiterated that the basis o his appearance was not Rule
138-A, but Section 34 o Rule 138. le contended that the two Rules were distinct and are applicable to
dierent circumstances, but the respondent judge denied the same, still inoking Rule 138-A.
ISSUL:

\hether or not the Judge Mijares acted with grae abuse o discretion amounting to lack or
excess o jurisdiction when she denied the appearance o Cruz as party litigant and when the judge
reused to inhibit hersel rom trying the case

HLLD:

Petition PAR1IALLY GRAN1LD.
Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, proides:
RULL 138-A

LA\ S1UDLN1 PRAC1ICL RULL

Section 1. Covaitiov. for tvaevt Practice. - A law student who has successully completed his 3rd
year o the regular our-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's
clinical legal education program approed by the Supreme Court, may appear without
compensation in any ciil, criminal or administratie case beore any trial court, tribunal, board or
oicer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic o the law school.

Sec. 2. .earavce. - 1he appearance o the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under
the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly
accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, bries, memoranda or other papers to
be iled, must be signed by the superising attorney or and in behal o the legal clinic.
Judge Mijares held that Cruz could not appear or himsel and on his behal because o his
ailure to comply with Rule 138-A speciically the ailure o Cruz to proe on record that he is enrolled
in a recognized school`s clinical legal education program and is under superision o an attorney duly
accredited by the law school.
loweer, Cruz insisted that the basis o his appearance was Section 34 o Rule 138, which
proides:
Sec. 34. , rbov titigatiov i. covavctea. - In the court o a justice o the peace, a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid o an agent or riend appointed by him or that purpose,
or with the aid o an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally
or by aid o an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member
o the bar.

1his rule recognizes the right o an indiidual to represent himsel in any case to which he is a
party. 1he Rules state that a party may conduct his litigation personally or with the aid o an attorney,
and that his appearance must either be personal or by a duly authorized member o the Bar. 1he
indiidual litigant may personally do eerything in the course o proceedings rom commencement to the
termination o the litigation. 1hereore, Cruz as plainti, at his own instance, can personally conduct the
litigation the Ciil Case. le would then be acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party exercising his
right to represent himsel.
1he trial court must hae been misled by the act that the Cruz is a law student and must,
thereore, be subject to the conditions o the Law Student Practice Rule. It erred in applying Rule 138-A,
when the basis o the petitioner`s claim is Section 34 o Rule 138.
1he conclusion o the trial court that Rule 138-A superseded Rule 138 by irtue o Circular No.
19 is misplaced. 1he Court neer intended to repeal Rule 138 when it released the guidelines or limited
law student practice. In act, it was intended as an addendum to the instances when a non-lawyer may
appear in courts and was incorporated to the Rules o Court through Rule 138-A.
1he case at bar inoles a ciil case, with the petitioner as plainti therein. 1he solicitous
concern that the Constitution accords the accused in a criminal prosecution obiously does not obtain in
a ciil case. 1hus, a party litigant in a ciil case, who insists that he can, without a lawyer`s assistance,
eectiely undertake the successul pursuit o his claim, may be gien the chance to do so. In this case,
Cruz alleges that he is a law student and impliedly asserts that he has the competence to litigate the case
himsel. Lidently, he is aware o the perils incident to this decision.
In addition, it was subsequently clariied in Bar Matter 30, that by irtue o Section 34, Rule
138, a law student may appear as an agent or a riend o a party litigant, without need o the superision
o a lawyer, beore inerior courts. lere, we hae a law student who, as party litigant, wishes to
represent himsel in court. \e should grant his wish.
Additionally, howeer, Cruz contends that Judge Mijares committed maniest bias and partiality
by ruling that there is no alid ground or her oluntary inhibition despite her alleged negatie demeanor
during the pre-trial when she said: a, va/v, va.ava ,vvg varvvovg a .a vre.. O/` It must be noted
that because o this incident, Cruz iled an administratie case against Judge Mijares or iolation o the
Canons o Judicial Lthics, which the Court dismissed or lack o merit. \e now adopt the Court`s
indings o act in the administratie case and rule that there was no grae abuse o discretion on the part
o Judge Mijares when she did not inhibit hersel rom the trial o the case.
In a Motion or Inhibition, the moant must proe the ground or bias and prejudice by clear
and conincing eidence to disqualiy a judge rom participating in a particular trial, as oluntary
inhibition is primarily a matter o conscience and addressed to the sound discretion o the judge. 1he
decision on whether she should inhibit hersel must be based on her rational and logical assessment o
the circumstances preailing in the case beore her. Absent clear and conincing proo o grae abuse o
discretion on the part o the judge, this Court will rule in aor o the presumption that oicial duty has
been regularly perormed.