Just compensation in expropriation - G.R. No. 188995 APO Fruit vs. LBP G.R. No.

188995 (click link) The issue is simply whether or not just compensation should be based on the value of Lot 1406-B prevailing in 1981 or in 1993. Ruling The petition for review lacks merit. 1. Just compensation for Lot 1406-B must be based on value of property prevailing in 1993 What would have been an easy and straightforward implementation of the decision promulgated on January 16, 2001in G.R. No. 137285 was delayed by the petitioners interposition of the issue on the proper reckoning point for computing the just compensation for Lot 1406-B. A reading of the decision in G.R. No. 137285 exposes the interposition as nothing more than an insincere attempt of the petitioner to delay the inevitable performance of its obligation to pay just compensation for Lot 1406-B. Indeed, the Court pronounced there that the compromise agreement was only about the mode of payment by swapping of lots xxx, only the originally agreed form of compensation that is by [lot [12]+ payment, was rescinded.[13] That pronouncement became the law of the case, anything to the contrary of which the petitioner could not validly rely upon.The doctrine of the law of the case means that whatever is irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule between the same parties in the same case, whether correct on general principles or not, continues to be the law of the case for as long as the facts on which the legal rule was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.[14] It applies in a situation where an appellate court has made a ruling on a question on appeal and thereafter remands the case to the lower court for further proceedings; the question then settled by the appellate court becomes the law of the case binding the lower court and any subsequent appeal,[15] andquestions necessarily involved and dealt with in a former appeal will be regarded as the law of the case in a subsequent appeal, although the questions are not expressly treated in the opinion of the court, inasmuch as the presumption is that all the facts in the case bearing on the point decided have received due consideration whether all or none of them are mentioned in the opinion.[16] To reiterate, in G.R. No. 137285, the Court upheld the annulment of the Compromise Agreement and recognized that the agreed upon mode of payment of the just compensation for Lot1406-B with Lot 434 was cancelled. It is notable that the Court mentioned nothing therein about the invalidation of the amount of just compensation corresponding to the mode of payment, which was the value of Lot 434 at the time, which silence was the Courts acknowledgment that the parties understood and accepted, by entering into the Compromise Agreement in 1993, that the just compensation for Lot 1406-B was Lot 434 (or the value of Lot 434, which at the time of the swap in 1993 was definitely much higher than Lot 434s value in 1981). Accordingly, we completely agree with the RTCs observation that when the parties signed the compromise agreement and the same was approved, they had in fact settled between themselves the question of what is just compensation and that both of them had intended that defendant would be compensated on the basis of prevailing values at the time of the agreement. [17] We further completely agree with the CAs conclusion that by agreeing to a land swap in 1993 in the ill-fated compromise agreement, [PEZA] had impliedly agreed to paying just compensation using the market values in 1993.[18] 2. P6,200.00/square meter is the correct just compensation for Lot 1406-B With the annulment of the Compromise Agreement, the payment of just compensation for Lot 1406-B now has to be made in cash. In that regard, the order of the Court to remand to the RTC for the determination of just compensation was indubitably for the sole objective of ascertaining the equivalentmonetary value in 1993 of Lot 1406-B or Lot 434. In due course, the RTC found that just compensation ofLot 1406-B was P6,200.00/square meter. Such finding, which the CA upheld, took into due consideration the clear and convincing evidence proving the fair valuation of properties similar and adjacent to Lot 1406-B at or near 1993, the time in question, namely: (a) The deed of sale executed in 1994 by one of the heirs of the late Salud Jimenez to sell Lot 1406-A to MERALCO for P6,395.00/square meter; (b) A certified true copy of the 1998 zonal valuation of properties along the PEZA Road, Barangay Tejero, Cavite City showing the zonal valuations of residential and commercial properties in the vicinity of Lot 1406-B to beP4,000.00/square meter and P8,000.00/square meter, respectively; (c) An appraisal report done on Lot 1406-B by an independent appraiser stating that the value of properties in the vicinity of Lot 1406-B went forP7,500.00/square meter in 1997; and (d) Other documents showing payments of just compensation by PEZA to the owners of other previously expropriated properties adjacent to or near Lot 1406-B. The uniform findings of fact upon the question of just compensation reached by the CA and the RTC are entitled to the greatest respect. They are conclusive on the Court in the absence of a strong showing by the petitioner that the CA and the RTC erred in appreciating the established facts and in drawing inferences from such facts. We concur with the findings. 3. Estate of Salud Jimenez entitled to Interest of 12% per annum The power of eminent domain is not an unlimited power. Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution sets down the essential limitations upon this inherent right of the State to take private property, namely: (a) that the taking must be for a public purpose; and (b) that just compensation must be paid to the owner. The State must first establish that the exercise of eminent domain is for a public purpose, which, here, is already settled. What remains to be determined is the just compensation. In Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank,[19] the Court has held thatcompensation cannot be just to the owner in the case of property that is immediately taken unless there is prompt payment, considering that the owner thereby immediately suffers not only the loss of his property but also the loss of its fruits or income. Thus, in addition, the owner is entitled to legal interest from the time of the taking of the property until the actual payment in order to place the owner in a position as good as, but not better than, the position he was in before the taking occurred.[20] It is undeniable that just compensation was not promptly made to the Estate of Salud Jimenez for the taking of Lot 1406-B by the petitionerThe move to compensate through the swap arrangement under the Compromise Agreement was aborted or amounted to nothing through no fault of the Estate of Salud Jimenez. The petitioner, which should have known about the inefficacy of the swapping of Lot 434 for Lot 1406-B, could even be said to have resorted to the swapping for the purpose of delaying the payment. Thus, it was solely responsible for the delay. In fact, the Estate of Salud Jimenez was

compelled to seek the rescission of theCompromise Agreement, a process that prolonged even more the delay in the payment of just compensation. . In view of this, the CAs fixing of legal interest at only 6% per annum cannot be upheld and must be corrected,for that rate would not ensure that compensation was just in the face of the long delay in payment. Already in G.R. No. 137285, the Court noted the long delay in payment and was naturally prompted to strongly condemn the cavalier attitude of government officials who adopt such a despotic and irresponsible stance, quoting fromCosculluela v. Court of Appeals,[21] that: [I]t is high time that the petitioner be paid what was due him eleven years ago. It is arbitrary and capricious for a government agency to initiate expropriation proceedings, seize a persons property, allow a judgment of the court to become final and executory and then refuse to pay on the ground that there are no appropriations for the property earlier taken and profitably used. We condemn in the strongest possible terms the cavalier attitude of government officials who adopt such a despotic and irresponsible stance.[22] Accordingly, we hereby impose 12% interest per annumon the unpaid gross value of P81,331,600.00 for Lot 1406-B (i.e., 13,118 square meters x P6,200.00/square meter) from August 23, 1993, the date of the approval of the failed Compromise Agreement, until the full amount of the just compensation is paid, as a way of making the compensation just. This accords with a long line of pertinent jurisprudence, [23] whereby the Court has imposed interest at 12% per annum in eminent domain whenever the expropriator has not immediately delivered the just compensation.

Expropriation by NAPOCOR; how to determine JUST COMPENSATION - G. R. No. 189127 NAPOCOR vs. HEIRS OF MACABANGKIT II The demand for payment of just compensation has not prescribed

Petitioner maintains that, in the event respondent spouses have not been adequately compensated for the entry into their property, their claim for just compensation would have already prescribed,[26] pursuant to Section 3 (i) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended by Presidential Decrees Nos. 380, 395, 758, 938, 1360 and 1443. This provision empowers the NAPOCOR to do as follows: x x x [E]nter upon private property in the lawful performance or prosecution of its business or purposes, including the construction of the transmission lines thereon; Provided, that the owner of such private property shall be paid the just compensation therefor in accordance with the provisions hereinafter provided; Provided, further, that any action by any person claiming compensation and/or damages shall be filed within five (5) years after the right-ofway, transmission lines, substations, plants or other facilities shall have been established; Provided, finally, that after the said period no suit shall be brought to question the said right-of-way, transmission lines, substations, plants or other facilities nor the amounts of compensation and/or damages involved. (Emphasis supplied.) NAPOCORs reliance on this provision is misplaced. The right to recover just compensation is enshrined in no less than our Bill of Rights, which states in clear and categorical language that *p+rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. [27] This constitutional mandate cannot be defeated by statutory prescription. [28] Thus, we have ruled that the prescriptive period under Section 3 (i) of R.A. No. 6395 does not extend to an action to recover just compensation.[29] It would be a confiscatory act on the part of the government to take the property of respondent spouses for a public purpose and deprive them of their right to just compensation, solely because they failed to institute inverse condemnation proceedings within five years from the time the transmission lines were constructed. To begin with, it was not the duty of respondent spouses to demand for just compensation. Rather, it was the duty of NAPOCOR to institute eminent domain proceedings before occupying their property. In the normal course of events, before the expropriating power enters a private property, it must first file an action for eminent domain[30] and deposit with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property.[31] Due to its omission, however, respondents were constrained to file inverse condemnation proceedings to demand the payment of just compensation before the trial court. We therefore rule that NAPOCOR cannot invoke the statutory prescriptive period to defeat respondent spouses constitutional right to just compensation. III NAPOCOR is liable to pay the full market value of the affected property

NAPOCOR submits that it should pay for only ten percent (10%) of the fair market value of the landowners property because, under its Charter,[32] it is only authorized to acquire easements of right-of-way over agricultural lands.[33] Petitioners arguments fail to convince. We have ruled that when petitioner takes private property to construct transmission lines, it is liable to pay the full market value upon proper determination by the courts.[34]

In National Power Corporation v. Gutierrez,[35] the petitioner likewise argued that it should only be made to pay easement fees instead of the full market value of the land traversed by its transmission lines. In striking down its argument and ruling that the property owners were entitled to the full market value of the land in question, we ruled:

x x x While it is true that plaintiff [is] only after a right-of-way easement, it nevertheless perpetually deprives defendants of their proprietary rights as manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon defendants that below said transmission lines no plant higher than three (3) meters is allowed. Furthermore, because of the high-tension current conveyed through said transmission lines, danger to life and limbs that may be caused beneath said wires cannot altogether be discounted, and to cap it all, plaintiff only pays the fee to defendants once, while the latter shall continually pay the taxes due on said affected portion of their property.[36] Similarly, in this case, while respondent spouses could still utilize the area beneath NAPOCORs transmission lines provided that the plants to be introduced underneath would not exceed three meters, [37] danger is posed to the lives and limbs of respondents farm workers, such that the property is no longer suitable for agricultural production.[38]Considering the nature and effect of the Davao-Manat 138 KV transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NAPOCOR perpetually deprives respondents of the ordinary use of their land. Moreover, we have ruled that Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, is not binding upon this Court.[39] *T+he determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function and . . . any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount.[40] We therefore rule that NAPOCOR is liable to pay respondents the full market value of the affected property as determined by the court a quo. IV The trial court did not err in awarding just compensation based on the Approved Schedule of Market Values for Real Property for the Year 2000 As its final argument, petitioner contends that the amount of just compensation fixed by the trial court is unjust, unlawful and contrary to existing jurisprudence, because just compensation in expropriation cases must be determined from the time of the filing of the complaint or the time of taking of the subject property, whichever came first.[41] It therefore posits that since the taking of the property happened in the 1970s, the trial court erred in fixing the amount of just compensation with reference to real property market values in the year 2000.[42] Petitioners contention holds no water. We have ruled in National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay[43] that the reckoning value of just compensation is that prevailing at the time of the filing of the inverse condemnation proceedings for the following reason: [c]ompensation that is reckoned on the market value prevailing at the time either when NPC entered x x x would not be just, for it would compound the gross unfairness already caused to the owners by NPC's entering without the intention of formally expropriating the land x x x. NPC's entry denied elementary due process of law to the owners since then until the owners commenced the inverse condemnation proceedings. The Court is more concerned with the necessity to prevent NPC from unjustly profiting from its deliberate acts of denying due process of law to the owners. As a measure of simple justice and ordinary fairness to them, therefore, reckoning just compensation on the value at the time the owners commenced these inverse condemnation proceedings is entirely warranted. Indeed, respondent spouses would be deprived of their right to just compensation if the value of the property is pegged back to its value in the 1970s. To reiterate, NAPOCOR should have instituted eminent domain proceedings before it occupied respondent spouses property. Because it failed to comply with this duty, respondent spouses were constrained to file the instant Complaint for just compensation before the trial court. From the 1970s until the present, they were deprived of just compensation, while NAPOCOR continuously burdened their property with its transmission lines. This Court cannot allow petitioner to profit from its failure to comply with the mandate of the law. We therefore rule that, to adequately compensate respondent spouses from the decades of burden on their property, NAPOCOR should be made to pay the value of the property at the time of the filing of the instant Complaint when respondent spouses made a judicial demand for just compensation.