Seton Hall UnilJ.

The Primary Cardinal Virtue:

Wisdom or Prudence?
Gerard J. Dalcourt
C
ONTEMPORARY scholastic moralists, and others too, still
accept the theory of the cardinal virtues. Its present-day
form is at least superficially simple, and goes back to Aquinas.
We may describe it briefly in this way. Among the many moral
virtues there are four from which the others are derived or to which
they are in one way or another subordinate. These four virtues
are prudence, justice, temperance, and courage (or fortitude). They
are moral virtues, habits that are good, that help us attain our
ultimate end, that perfect our appetitive faculties. Justice perfects
the will, which is the rational appetite; temperance, the concupiscible
appetite, which is that whereby we tend to the pleasurable good;
courage, the irascible appetite, by which we incline towards the
arduous or difficult good. Prudence is essentially an intellectual virtue
but, since it perfects the practical intellect and guides the will in
choosing rightly, it is thus materially an appetitive habit and may
be counted for this reason among the moral virtues. These are then
to be distinguished from intellectual virtues like the various sciences.
In this paper I shall attempt to prove two main points in regard
to this theory: (1) that when Christian thinkers took it over from
the ancients they made important innovations which resulted
eventually in the substitution of prudence in its Aristotelian sense
for wisdom; I shall also try to show how and when this took place;
(2) that this cha nge was not an improvement but was rather a
distortion.
PLATO
The doctrine that there are four major virtues very likely was
a common dictum of popular Greek morality. At any rate Pindar
56 DALCOURT
mentioned it as though it were.
1
Aeschylus seems to allude to it.
2
And Plato discusses it in a way that shows it was commonly known
and accepted.
Actually, it was Plato himself who became the initiator of the
theory in later philosophies. This was due especially to his fullest
exposition of it in the Republic,3 although he did treat of it in other
dialogues.
4
Aristotle criticized and refined the Platonic definitions
of the virtues in the light of his own psychology. Panetius incor-
porated their ideas within the framework of Stoicism.
5
Cicero
adopted this synthesis and passed it on to the Latin world. The
N eoplatonists also made the theory a standard part of their doctrine
and through the work of Macrobius helped to make it known to
the West. Eventually the acceptance of it, in various forms, by
Ambrose, Augustine, Gregory, Abelard, and Aquinas integrated it
into Christian morality.
Plato's views on the nature of virtue evolved considerably. In
his early works he accepted the Socratic theory that virtue is knowl-
edge and that it is one.
6
Later on, however, he distinguished true
virtue, based on philosophy, from imperfect, social virtue based
on opinion and resulting from habit and hence hardly deserving
of the name virtue. At first he considered them so different as to
be practically contradictories.
7
But he came in his maturer works
to regard them as mutually supplementary, and to consider the
imperfect as preparing the ground for the true, perfect, philosophical
virtues.
8
It is with this in mind that we can best understand his
formulations of the theory.
In the Republic Plato seeks to determine the nature of justice.
To do this he makes use of the analogy between the individual
and the state and of the theory of cardinal virtues. Justice is said
to exist in both individuals and states. However, since the state
is larger than the individual, the amount of justice in it will be
1 Nemean Odes, III.
2 Seven against Thebes, 610.
3 Rep., 428-34, 442-43.
, See especially Laws, 630-631, 687-689, 696, 963, 965. See also Euthe-
demus, 279; Phaedo, 69, 115; Protagoras, 329-330, 349; Symposium, 196;
Meno, 88.
G In his IIcel TOO which is now lost but of whose content
we know much, since in his De officiis Cicero used it as a basis.
e Protagoras, 319B-334C.
7 Phaedo, 68C-69.
8 Rep., 518-22; Laws, 653.
WISDOM OR PRUDENCE? 57
larger than in the individual and justice will be more easily per-
ceptible in it. He therefore proposes to construct a state which will
render it so. In doing this, however, he accepts as obvious that this
state, being perfect, will also be wise, valiant, temperate, and just
(427D). If he can show what it means for a state to have the virtues
of wisdom, courage, and temperance, whatever virtue is left over
will be justice (428A). Wisdom is the virtue of rulers, which makes
them capable of acting for the good of the whole state; courage
is the warriors' special virtue, whereby they know always what
is or is not to be feared; temperance manifests itself primarily in
the class of artisans but is a sort of harmony resulting from the
obedience of the lower classes to the higher; the final virtue left
over is that whereby everybody does his own work and has what
is his own, and this is justice (428-434). Each class thus has its
own cardinal virtue, while justice resides in the state as a whole.
These same habits are found to exist in individuals also. For, analo-
gously to the state, every man has three parts, the reasoning, the
desiring, and the high-spirited (439-441). The rational principle,
which is wise, has care of the whole man; by courage the will is
enabled to retain and execute the commands of reason; temperance
establishes a harmonious subordination of the spirit to the will
and reason; while justice makes this well-adjusted nature act always
as order demands (441-444).
The Platonic conception of the cardinal virtues is quite stable.
As we indicated earlier, he refers to it often, but it remained basically
always the same, despite its ambiguities, dialectical changes, and
apparent contradiction. Sometimes he does give a different listing,
as in the Protagoras (329, 349), where he adds a fifth virtue, holiness.
In this case we can argue, as Jowett indicates, that holiness here
merely reinforces the others and does not refer to a really distinct
virtue. The contexts of other listings indicate they are merely in-
cidental. Anyhow, even if Plato had been willing at times to add
other virtues to the list, the fact remains that he always came back
to the same four.
For our purposes it is much more important to know what he
conceived the virtue of the reasoning part of man to be. Ordinarily
we translate it by "wisdom," but he is not so clear-cut about it.
He often calls it science. In the Republic he calls it (Jorpia,
which is the equivalent of our term "wisdom" taken in its fullest
sense, as when we say a philosopher is a lover of wisdom. In the
Laws he usually calls it which corresponds to our prudence
or practical wisdom, since he meant by it the concrete application
58 DALCOURT
of aorpta, but he also referred to it as 'POVf;, understanding (963).
By these he means not only the capacity to see life and the world
as a whole, but also what results from this, the ability to command,
to give good counsel, and to control one's instincts and passions.
The paradigm of the wise man is the philosopher-king of the Republic,
who has learned to seek wisdom; who has a taste for every sort of
knowledge; who is capable of seeing the absolute in things; who
always loves knowledge of eternal, unchanging being; who loves
the truth and is truthful; who, being absorbed in the pleasures of
the soul, is neither intemperate nor covetous; who is the spectator
of all time and all existence; who is just and gentle; who never
stops until he knows the true nature of every essence, which is what
makes him truly live and grow (473-490).
For Plato then, the virtue of man's highest part is a complex
which includes both wisdom and prudence, and which is the cause
and the culmination of the other virtues. But wisdom is the first and
directs them all. Prudence is a result and an extension of wisdom.
It is the knowledge of what is right and wrong, a natural effect of
understanding the purpose and relations of all things.
ARISTOTLE
Aristotle, on the other hand, divided the virtues into the ethical
(appetitive) and the intellectual. Among the first kind he mentioned
courage, temperance, liberality, magnificence, pride, ambition, good
temper, friendliness, truthfulness, shame, and justice. Among the
intellectual virtues he listed science, art, prudence, understanding,
and wisdom. Although he discussed each of them in detail, and
they include the Platonic tetralogy, he attached no special importance
to the latter. The reason for this presumably is that he had shown
Plato's psychology to be erroneous; this being the case, the theory
of the cardinal virtues which was based on it was also unacceptable.
On the basis of his own philosophy of human nature he was able to
define the virtues clearly and to relate them accurately to the fac-
ulties which they perfected. Having distinguished the vegetative,
sensory, and rational levels of life in man and the various powers
proper to each, he could then point out which habits perfected
which powers.
9
Thus, courage and temperance are virtues of the
9 His division of the virtues into intellectual and ethical results from his
cross-grouping of the sensory and rational into cognitive and appetitive fac-
ulties. The vegetative powers require no habits.
WISDOM OR PRUDENCE? 59
sensory appetites
10
(1117b22-1119b20). Justice belongs to the will
(1135a). Among the perfections of the intellect are prudence and
wisdom. Prudence is proficiency in making jUdgments about par-
ticular, contingent, variable things to be done; it is the consumma-
tion of the practical intellect. Wisdom is the highest knowledge
of the highest objects; it combines the intuitive apprehension of
the universal and necessary first principles with an understanding
of what they entail; it is the full development of the speCUlative
intellect (1139b22-1141b). It is thus the highest virtue and the
only one desired for itself (1177a-1179b). There is, however, a
possible ambiguity in our translation of Aristotle's terminology.
Wisdom and prudence are not ethical virtues as he technically
defines them. But they are ethical virtues in a broader sense, as
necessary means to the ultimate end which is happiness.
CICERO AND STOICISM
At the turn of our era a mellowed stoicism was a popular phi-
losophy. Its theory of virtues, which combined elements from Plato,
Aristotle, and the older Stoics, was known in the Middle Ages mainly
through Cicero's De ofticiis. Its doctrine was simple. Man has
various natural tendencies, for instance, to maintain his life, to
reproduce, to live in societYI to search for truth, to be free, and
to keep up an orderly and rational existence. These determine
what is morally good and therefore what our moral duties are.
The latter, however, fall into four main groups, depending on which
of the four major virtues they proceed from: wisdom, justice, for-
titude, or temperance.
But all that is morally right rises from some one of four sources: it is
concerned either (1) with the full perception and intelligent development
of the true; or (2) with the conservation of organized society, with render-
ing to every man his due, and with the faithful discharge of obligations
assumed; or (3) with the greatness and strength of a noble and invin-
cible spirit; or (4) with the orderliness and moderation of everything
that is said and done, wherein consist temperance and self-control. Al-
though these four are connected and interwoven, still it is in each one
considered singly that certain definite kinds of moral duties have their
origin.ll
10 N ie. E thies., 1117b22-1119b20.
11 De ottieiis, I, 5. Miller's translation in the Loeb Classical Library.
60 DALCOURT
Although Cicero is not always consistent or very precise, later on he
does indicate more clearly the nature of these virtues.
For since all moral rectitude springs from four sources, of which one
is knowledge, another social bonds, the third courage, and the fourth
moderation, it is often necessary in deciding what is one's duty to weigh
one against the other ... And then, the foremost of all virtues is wis-
dom-what the Greeks call aocpfa; for by prudence, which they call cpeo'Pr}(Ju;,
we understand something else, namely the practical knowledge of things
to be sought and of things to be avoided. Again, that wisdom which
I have given the foremost place is the knowledge of things human and
divine, which is concerned also with the bonds of union between gods
and men and the relations of man to man.
12
Cicero elsewhere indicates that the Epicureans also accepted
wisdom, temperance, fortitude, and justice as the main virtues.
13
It is thus clear that the ancients considered wisdom the greatest
of the virtues and that it was accepted as one of the cardinal virtues
by those who held to the theory.
AMBROSE
Among the early Christian writers, St. Ambrose knew Cicero
well; he accepted his theory of the cardinal virtues and helped pass
it on to the Middle Ages by his much read De officiis minislTorum.
He seems also to have been the first to use the term "cardinal"
in referring to these virtues.1
4
He enumerated them as prudentia,
justitia, tortitudo, and temperantia. However, his notion of prudence
corresponds to wisdom, since he explained it as the virtue which
is concerned with the investigation of the true and which infuses
a desire for fuller knowledge (I, 24).
But this presents a problem. Why should Ambrose have sub-
stituted the term "prudence" for "wisdom," when the ancients had
for apparently good reasons opted for the latter, when Cicero had
so clearly distinguished between them, and since Ambrose himself
11 Ibid., I, 45. The first part of this quotation is my own translation.
13 De tinibus, I, 13-16.
14 In his Expositio Evangelii secundum Lucam, V, 49 (PL 15, 1734). A.
Lalande, in his Vocabufaire technique et critique de fa philosoph ie, mistakenly
traces this usage back to Ambrose's De Sacramentis, III, 2. Here, however,
Ambrose is speaking of seven other virtues.
WISDOM OR PRUDENCE? 61
defined prudence as a synonym of wisdom? His motivation was
theological. As a Christian he accepted the authority of the Bible
and in it he read that the fruits of the labors of Wisdom (personified)
are prudence, temperance, justice, and fortitude (Wisdom 8: 7).
Out of respect for the Bible he adopted its terminology but defined
the term "prudence" to mean wisdom, thus reconciling, if one can
call it so, reason and revelation. But we might question whether
there was really a conflict between the two or just the same type
of confusion in the Bible as we found in Plato and Cicero. For they
did not always distinguish clearly between prudence and wisdom
and often used them interchangeably. Nevertheless, the Middle
Ages accepted the biblical usage, but eventually also came to take
"prudence" in its Aristotelian sense. Thus, basically, did the distor-
tion of the ancients' theory come about.
AUGUSTINE
We find the term "prudence" used by St. Augustine also, who,
being one of the greatest authorities looked up to in the Middle
Ages, was to a large extent responsible for its acceptance. In his
view there was only one principle virtue, charity, manifesting itself
in four ways: as temperance, which is love keeping one's self whole
and incorrupt for God; as fortitude, which is .love easily bearing
anything for God; as justice, which is love rightly using all things
in the service of God; as prudence, which is love correctly distin-
guishing those things which help us reach God from those which
would impede US.
I5
Prudence he also defined several chapters later
in the same terms as did Cicero, as knowledge of what should be
sought or avoided.
16
His concept of it is thus closer to Plato's than
to Aristotle's, for it is a sort of general knowledge of right and wrong,
not the ability to see the solution to particular, concrete problems.
Hence it is not distinct from wisdom itself.
We have two texts which illustrate particularly well Augustine's
views on the cardinal virtues. They show that he knew the tradi-
tional position. The first comes from the same early work just
quoted:
15 De moribus Ecclesiae, I, 15 (PL 32, 1322). See also Episiolae, 155.
16 Ibid., I, 25 (PL 32, 1330). See also Enarraliones in Psalmos, 83,
11.
62 DALCOURT
Since it is written there that "the Son of God is the Virtue and Wisdom
of God" (I Cor. 1: 24) and since virtue pertains to action, but wisdom
to the discipline of truth (wherefore the gospel speaks of these two when
it says, "All things were made by him" and "The life was the light of
men" [John 1: 3-41, for the first is the work of action and virtue; the
second has to do with the discipline and knowledge of truth), since this
is so, could anything be more in accord with this testimony of the New
Testament than what the Old says about wisdom: "It reaches out in
its power from one horizon to the other and orders all harmoniously"?
For to reach out with power involves mostly virtue; however, to order
harmoniously involves reason and, so to speak, art itself. But if this
seems obscure consider what came next: "The Lord of all has loved it,
for it teaches the discipline of God and chooses to do his work .... But
if the possessions which are desired in this life are worthwhile, what
is more worthwhile than wisdom, which performs all things?" Could
anything better or clearer be offered, or even anything further? Should
you not think so, consider another text which comes to the same: "Wis-
dom teaches sobriety, justice and manliness." Sobriety, it seems to
me, pertains to the very knowledge of truth, that is, to its discipline;
justice however and manliness to action and performance. These two,
efficiency of action and the sobriety of contemplation, which the Virtue
of God and the Wisdom of God, that is, the Son of God, gives to those
who love Him, are comparable to I know not what, since the same prophet
immediately states how much we should value them. He writes, "Wisdom
teaches sobriety, justice and manliness, and there is nothing more useful
in the life of men."17
He discovered later however that this last text he quoted was a mis-
translation and he corrected himself:
Likewise somewhat later I used the testimony of Wisdom which ac-
cording to our manuscript read "Wisdom teaches sobriety, justice and
manliness" (Wisdom 8: 7). Using this text I said things which were in-
deed true but which were uncovered through the use of an error. For
since the better manuscripts of the same translation render it: "It teaches
sobriety and wisdom, justice and manliness," what is more true than
that wisdom teaches the truths of contemplation (which I thought the
word sobriety referred to) and rightness of action (which I interpreted
the other two, justice and manliness, to mean)? The Latin translator
used these terms for those four virtues which philosophers talk about the
most; he called temperance sobriety, he gave prudence the name of
wisdom; he designated fortitude by the word manliness; only justice did
he render as such. These four virtues, designated by their customary
17 Ibid., I, 16.
WISDOM OR PRUDENCE? 63
names, I discovered only much later in the Greek manuscripts of this same
book of Wisdom.
1s
This text shows that the translator of Wisdom was most likely aware
of the scheme which included wisdom among the cardinal virtues.
But it makes it equally plain that Augustine himself rejected it
and accepted prudence in its place. But what part, then, does wis-
dom have among the virtues according to him? Is it even a virtue?
It is not a virtue, but it is something much higher and better
than any earthly virtue. Man was created to be happy by possessing
God. Essentially, he achieves this beatitude by fixing his will on
the Supreme Good, by loving Him with his whole heart. But love
manifests itself in various ways: by prudence, justice, fortitude,
and temperance. These however are merely means we use to attain
our end. But we cannot love God unless we know Him. Wisdom,
which is the knowledge of God, is a sine qua non of beatitude and
is thus also the principle of all virtue.
19
The pagan philosophers
erred in defining wisdom as the knowledge of things human and
divine, because the knowledge of human affairs is mere science
and only the knowledge of God deserves the name wisdom.
20
GREGORY I
The writings of Gregory I also did much to shape the medieval
mind. They contain in general nothing very original doctrinally,
only a simplified, popularized condensation of Augustine, who was
the only author Gregory really knew well. We find in them also,
however, the recognizable outline of the complex medieval theory
of the virtues. According to Gregory, all virtue has its principle
in wisdom, which is faith in God's revelation.
In the hearts of the elect wisdom is first engendered, before all the
graces that follow; and she comes forth as it were a first-born offspring
by the gift of the Holy Spirit. Now, this wisdom is our faith. For then
we are truly wise to understand, when we yield the assent of our belief
to all our Creator says.21
IS Reiraciaiionum, I, 7, sect. 3 (PL 32, 592).
19 For a masterly presentation of the background to this question, see
E. Gilson, Introduction a i'etude de saini Augustin (Paris, 1949), pp. 1-10;
149-177.
20 De Trinitaie, I, 1, 3.
~ 1 Morais, II, 71.
64 DALCOURT
From faith springs love, which is the main root of the tree of
virtues.
22
The soul awakened to love is then raised to the heights
of goodness by the cardinal virtues, which are a preparation for
other virtues that provide the temper of perfection.
For the gift of the Spirit, which, in the mind it works on, forms first
of all prudence, temperance, fortitude and justice, in order that this
same mind may be perfectly fashioned to resist every kind of assault,
afterwards gives it a temper in the seven virtues, so as against folly to
bestow wisdom; against dullness, understanding; against rashness, coun-
sel; against fear, courage; against ignorance, knowledge; against hardness
of heart, piety; against pride, fear.23
Here by "wisdom" Gregory means the gift whereby one judges
rightly of things sub specie aelernitatis; it is thus different from the
wisdom of faith, since moreover it complements it. But, as for
Augustine, wisdom as synonymous with a theological virtue is viewed
as higher than the cardinal virtues, of which it is source and crown.
Of particular interest too is Gregory's clear delineation of the
way one kind of virtue leads to and is perfected by another. For this
is characteristic of Neoplatonism. Gregory got it from Augustine,
who undoubtedly was influenced on this point, as on many others,
by Plotinus.
N EOPLATONISM
The Neoplatonists, however, were not just minor influences in
the history of our problem. Rather, indeed, we can find in them
crucial links in the development of the doctrine and a further reason
why prudence instead of wisdom became accepted.
Plotinus was somewhat eclectic in his moral theory, making use
of certain ideas of Aristotle and the Stoics, but basically he was
a Platonist. Plato, said Plotinus, had maintained that virtue con-
sists of freeing one's self from the body and becoming like to God,
and had distinguished the imperfect or civil virtues from the perfect
which result from philosophy.24 Plotinus agreed with this, but he
subdivided the latter virtues into those that were purifying and
those of the pure soul. The cardinal virtues exist in a progressively
21 Homilies on the Gospels, 27, 1.
23 Morals, II, 77.
all Enneads, I, 2, 1.
WISDOM OR PRUDENCE? 65
higher mode in each of these three classes. On the level of civil
virtue, they are prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice (I,
2, 1-2). On the second level, where man begins to be freed and
purified of the material and arrives at a certain apathy in the con-
templation of truth, prudence makes the soul impervious to the
clamor of the passions; courage banishes all fear of being separated
from the body; justice is the unchallenged sovereignty of the in-
tellect over material desires (I, 2, 3). On the third level, where the
soul is completely purified and the intellect is supreme and centered
completely on the divine Intellect, the cardinal virtues are wisdom,
which consists in the contemplation of the divine Intellect; temper-
ance, the intimate sympathy of the soul with it; courage, a complete
and continuous direction of one's self to it (I, 2, 5-6).
There are several differences between Plato and Plotinus here.
For the mature Plato, the civil and the perfect virtues are two dif-
ferent kinds of qualities, though reciprocally supplementary;25 for
Plotinus the classes of virtue are merely degrees or steps, which
the soul ascends in its purification. Thus for Plato the civil virtues
are necessary for daily life, but they do not really make the soul
similar to God; Plotinus maintains they do give the soul a certain
resemblance to the deity and so deserve the name of virtue. Then
too there is the obvious difference arising from Plotinus' distinction
of two levels of contemplative virtues. For both Plato and Plotinus,
however, the highest and most perfect virtue is wisdom, as all the
other virtues exist only to achieve it. We also find in both of them
the same ambiguity resulting from the occasional use as synonymous
terms of <1orpta and rpQ6V'YJ<1u;. But in general Plotinus' meaning
is clear, since in the tractate devoted to the virtues he refers to the
exemplary (ideal) virtue in the divine Intellect as bU<1TIj/t'YJ 'Xal
<1orp{a (I, 2, 6-7); to the second degree of contemplative virtue as
both <1orp[a and rp(!6v'YJ<1tt;; but to the political virtue as rp(!6vYJ<1tt;
only (I, ~ , 1); however, in the next tractate he clearly distinguishes
them along Aristotelian lines, subordinating prudence to wisdom
(I, 3, 6).
MACROBIUs
Neoplatonism was known in the Middle Ages to a large degree
through the works of Macrobius, whose influence in that period is
25 Phaedo, 82; 69; Meno, 97-100.
66 DA..LCOURT
recognized to have been immense.
26
His Commentary on the Dream
of Scipio was one of its major authorities in both science and phi-
losophy. A big factor in the medieval acceptance of prudence as a
cardinal virtue was undoubtedly his listing of it as such. But what
made him do so, since, not being very original, he usually kept
close to his main sources, Plotinus and Porphyry, and since the
latter closely reproduces the teaching of the former?
This result does not seem to have been something he foresaw.
It more likely was simply an accident. We believe, however, that
we can explain how it happened. Macrobius, whether he be a Latin
or a Greek, had received a Roman education and so, we can presume,
had absorbed the usual Roman way of looking at things, which was
based on a high regard for the active and practical, as opposed to
the intellectual and contemplative bent of the Greeks, manifested
among other ways by their consideration of wisdom as the highest
virtue. Moreover, in their denigration of the active life, some of the
Greeks had even maintained that it was only the philosopher, he
who had attained wisdom, who could be really happy. Macrobius
protests against and rejects such a view, which went counter to
his whole culture:
Virtues alone make one blessed and only through them is one able
to attain the name. Hence those who maintain that virtues are found
only in men who philosophize, openly affirm that none are blessed except
philosophers. Properly assuming wisdom to be an understanding of
divine things, they say that only those men are wise who search for heavenly
truths with acuteness of. mind and lay hold of them by sagacious and
painstaking inquiry and pattern themselves after them as far as they are
able. In their opinion it is here alone that the virtues (to which they
attribute various functions) are exercised: prudence ... temperance ...
courage ... justice ....
Now according to the limitations of so stringent a classification the
rulers of commonwealths would be unable to attain blessedness ....
Man has political virtues because he is a social animal. ...
Now if the function and office of the virtues is to bless, and, moreover
if it is agreed that political virtues do exist, then political virtues do
make men blessed. And so Cicero is right in claiming for the rulers of
commonwealths a place where they may enjoy a blessed existence for-
ever.27
26 Cf. Cambridge Medieval History, V, 790.
37 Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, I, 8.
WISDOM OR PRUDENCE? 67
Wanting to show that social and political activity could also lead
to beatitude, he simply made no distinction between the political
virtue of prudence and wisdom, its counterpart on the higher levels
of perfection. His medieval readers then simply took him literally.
MIDDLE AGES
The degeneration of Rome and the invasions of the barbarians
brought on the Dark Ages and the loss of Greek philosophy. Western
Europe had no means of knowing the classical theory of the cardinal
virtues. On the contrary, all their sources proclaimed in almost
complete unison that there were four cardinal virtues: prudence,
temperance, courage, and justice. It was in the Bible itself. The
Fathers all maintained it, too, and they also claimed this to be
the universal teaching of the pagans. The few phi1osophical treatises
which the early Middle Ages possessed confirmed this claim: Ma-
crobius was clear about it; Seneca, the leading Roman Stoic, seemed
unobscure about it, but this was because they attributed to him
the widely read little tract Formula vitae honestae written by Martin,
the Archbishop of Braza; in his De officiis, as we have seen, Cicero
held out for wisdom, but this was counter-balanced by his De
inventione in which he called prudence, "the knowledge of what is
good, bad and indifferent," one of the main virtues (II, 53).
The authorities thus being unanimous, the Middle Ages adopted
their theory of the cardinal virtues as a sort of philosophical dogma.
They did not particularly question it, but rather sought to prove
it and to fit it in with their other doctrines.
28
It is questionable
anyhow whether they would have accepted the Grecian view that
wisdom was the greatest and the fount of all other virtues. St. Paul
had clearly retained this position for charity, and, as we have noted,
Augustine had made this point a cornerstone of his own teaching.
Moreover, it might seem, from a Christian point of view, that wisdom
is unnecessary when you have revelation and the theological virtues
which are infused in the soul by baptism. Revelation can answer with
much more, certitude and detail, and much less trouble, the basic
questions about the end and nature of the cosmos with which wis-
dom is concerned. And the virtues of faith, hope, and charity as-
sure even infants of the attainment of their end.
is Cf. O. Lottin, "La theorie des vertus cardinales de 1230 a 1250," in
Melanges Mandonnet (Paris, 1930), II, 223-259.
68 DALCOURT
Another, and a more likely, reason, however, why prudence was
substituted for wisdom can be found in the very notion of virtue
which the Christian Fathers adopted. The Hellenic aee-oJ meant
simply excellence in any sphere, in health, the arts, morality, or
knowledge. For the Greeks, however, the greatest of all virtues
was wisdom. It comes to a man through his own talent and labor
and it makes him quite self-sufficient and happy. Such virtue the
early Christians could comider only pagan pride. They gloried in
opposing to heathen wisdom their Christian folly (I Cor. 1); to
pagan virtues which simply make men satisfied with themselves,
they contrasted their ideals of charity, sacrifice, and humility, which
are true virtues since their exercise brings us closer to God. Mere
knowledge is not virtuous because man can be considered good
only if he acts according to the divine prescriptions.
It is, however, only in the fourth century that we find a really
clear-cut formulation of this view, in Lactantius.
29
Augustine also
developed this theme in various works, defining virtue as "the
very art of living well and right. "30 Virtues acquired only for worldly
glory are useless. On the contrary, an act is virtuous only if it
brings us nearer to God. This is why he could maintain that there
is only one virtue, the love of God, which expresses itself in different
acts.
This Augustinian notion of virtue as the doing of what leads to
heaven was to remain predominant in the Middle Ages. It is re-
flected, for instance, in Peter Lombard's definition of it as "a good
quality of the soul by which one lives rightly, which no one can
abuse and which God alone gives. "31 True, it received some rivalry
from the Aristotelian concept which Boethius made known to all
and which later was taken up by Abelard.
32
However, from the
beginning of the thirteenth century the Augustino-Lombardian view-
point, having incorporated into itself the Aristotelian position, was
supreme. William of Auxerre adopted it and his explanation of
it is typical. "This therefore is the difference between knowledge
and virtue: through knowledge we understand well and through
virtue we live well and rightly."33 Aquinas distinguished between
29 Divine Institutes, VI, 5.
30 City 0/ God, IV, 21; cf. also XXII, 25.
31 Libri Quattuor Sententiarum, II, d. 27, 2.
32 Dialogus inler Philosophum, Iudaeum el Christianum (PL 178, 1651).
33 Summa Aurea ... (Paris, 1500), f128 as quoted by Lottin, Psychologie et
morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siecles (Paris, 1949), III, 143.
WISDOM OR PRUDENCE? 69
different types of virtue but he too maintained that only those
habits which lead us to act rightly are virtues in the fullest sense.
34
This insistence on virtue being active is evident also in the me-
dieval treatment of prudence. William of Conches, in his l1foralium
Dogma Philosophorum, quotes its Ciceronian definition as knowledge
of good and evil and comments that it is a virtue because it forces
us to do good.
35
Alan of Lille is even more explicit and says that
prudence is not merely the distinction of right from wrong but also
the choosing of the former and the spurning of the latter.
36
This
Christian concept of virtue as essentially dynamic, as a quality
which makes us do good, which leads us to act rightly, is obviously
incompatible at least to some extent wIth the view that wisdom is
the greatest of virtues. For wisdom is not active but contemplative.
Since, however, prudence is an extension and application of wisdom
and since it can be easily interpreted in an activistic sense, is it
surprising that Christian thinkers should have substituted it for
wisdom?
We can in this light better understand too how the Aristotelian
notion of prudence eventually supplanted all others. Actually this
happened in the thirteenth century, for it was only then that it
became known in the West. Earlier, as we have seen, Ambrose had
identified prudence and wisdom. Augustine had adopted the Cice-
ronian view of prudence as knowledge of that which should be done
or avoided, but, being just one aspect of love, it necessarily was
accompanied by right action. Abelard also defined it as did Cicero,37
and to this definition, as we just noted, William of Conches and
Alan of Lille added that it makes us do good and avoid evil. As
soon as Aristotle's metaphysics, psychology, and ethics were trans-
lated by the turn of the thirteenth century, his influence on those
who treated of prudence is apparent.
38
It shows up in William of
Auxerre's distinction between the iudicium discretivum and the
iudicium di/linitivum, which corresponds to the Aristotelian dis-
tinction between speculative and practical. Philip the Chancellor
in turn made explicit use of this latter distinction. Albert did like-
34 Sum. Theol., I-II, q. 56, a. 3.
35 (Uppsala, 1929), p. 8.
36 "De Virtutibus et de Vitiis et de Donis Spiritus Sancti," in Mediaeval
Studies, XII (1950), 29.
37 Op. cit. (PL 178, 1652).
38 For this question of the development of the treatise on prudence, cf.
Lottin, Psychologie et morale aux XlI
c
et XlIl
e
s i i ~ c l e s (Paris, 1949), III,
255-280.
70 DALCOURT
wise and moreover identified prudence with the practical intellect.
Aquinas, however, was apparently the first really to understand
and accept the Aristotelian notion of prudence, and he has been
followed in this by most of his disciples.
THOMAS AQUINAS
We find in Aquinas a treatment of the cardinal virtues which is
typical of the medieval approach. His main concern seems to be
to find a rational justification for the theory and to fit into his
doctrine as much of it as he can, for he manifests no serious doubt
in regard to its validity in general. Since his synthesis is also com-
prehensive, ingenious, and influential, it warrants study in some
detail.
Although Aquinas has left us among his Disputed Questions one
on the cardinal virtues, his fullest and most mature thought on the
matter is found in the second part of the Summa Theologica, which
is devoted to moral considerations. Here, having taken up man's
end, he then treated of the means to that end, our actions, first of
all insofar as they are voluntary, then insofar as they result from
passion, then insofar as they are done through habit. It is at this
point, since they are habits, that he treats of the virtues, in Questions
54 to 68.
In Questions 54 to 61 he leads up to the cardinal virtues. Habits
may be distinguished in various ways; if we consider them from
the point of view of their goodness or evil, they are virtues or vices.
Essentially, then, virtues are habits of the mind whereby we act
rightly. Hence virtues in the fullest sense can be said to inhere only
in the will or in a power which is moved by the will, because it is
by the will that we act. Intellectual habits, like wisdom, under-
standing, the sciences, and the arts, are virtues merely in an imper-
fect way because they only give the agent the capacity to act well.
Habits of the will, however, such as charity or justice, fully deserve
the name of virtue because they not only give the agent the power
to act well but they also push him to do good. There is thus a radi-
cal difference between the intellectual and the appetitive virtues,
and the latter are called moral because they regulate our actions.
Question 61 deals with the cardinal virtues. They are moral
virtues, for these, as has been pointed out, are the only ones that
are virtues in the fullest sense. But prudence, an intellectual virtue,
can be a cardinal virtue because in a certain sense it is also a moral
WISDOM OR PRUDENCE? 71
virtue, since its function is to guide action. There can, however,
be but four cardinal virtues. Take them from the point of view
of their formal principle, which is the rational good they tend to
procure. First of all this good must be seen and understood, and
this is done by prudence. Then this good must be established in
the concrete. This is done in three ways; by justice which regulates
our dealings with others; by temperance which restrains the pas-
sions, which unchecked would lead to chaos; and by fortitude whereby
we endure hardships to achieve the good. If we consider the cardinal
virtues from the point of view of their subject of inherence we get
the same number. For there are only four faculties in man which
the moral virtues may perfect: the intellect by prudence; the will by
justice; the concupiscible appetite by temperance; and the irascible
appetite by fortitude. All other virtues then are reducible to these
four.
That these four are the principal ones can be shown in two other
ways. For we may view them as characteristics common to all
virtues. Thus any virtue which does good after rational considera-
tion of a problem is called prudence; any virtue which renders to
people their due is justice; any virtue which moderates the passions is
referred to as temperance; and any virtue which strengthens one's
steadfastness is fortitude. If, however, we view these four as distinct
virtues, we can contrast them with all the others and see them
as the major ones because they deal with the most important aspects
of the moral life. Prudence is concerned with guiding us; justice,
with observance of the rights of others; temperance, with controlling
concupiscence; and fortitude, with firmness in the face of hardships.
The following questions have little that is relevant to our issue.
But Questions 62, 63, and 68 do help complete the picture of Thomas'
theory of the virtues. There are the theological virtues of faith,
hope, and charity, which are supernatural habits, that is, habits
which are directly infused into the soul by God. They are the greatest
of all virtues, and following St. Paul and st. Augustine, Aquinas
teaches that charity is the most excellent of the three. There are
also the gifts of the Holy spirit, such as wisdom, piety, and counsel,
habits which help us further to perform on the supernatural level,
but which rank in importance below faith, hope, and charity. He
considers wisdom to be among the greatest of these, because its object
is the highest. For this same reason the intellectual virtues, al-
though less valuable than the supernatural habits, are essentially
preferable to the moral virtues, and again for the same reason wis-
dom is the greatest of the intellectual virtues. He thus concurs
72 DALCOURT
here with the Greeks that on the level of the natural virtues, if
we consider them simply as such, wisdom is the highest. But it is
only a passing thought which he does not allow to affect his theory
of the cardinal virtues.
The second section of the second part of the Summa takes up each
of the theological and cardinal virtues individually and in detail,
their contrary acts and habits, and the virtues which are reducible
to them. These last are for us the most interesting, although we
need only mention a few for purposes of illustration. Thus among
those reducible to justice are religion, filial piety, gratitude, the
honoring of great men, truthfulness in both word and deed, friendli-
ness, and liberality.
Such was the way in which the theory of the cardinal virtues
developed. Modern scholastics have in general accepted the Tho-
mistic version and repeated it in their manuals with little or no
variation. Perhaps the only exception to this has been Jacques
Leclercq, who has criticized it pointedly in his La philosophie morale
de saini Thomas devani la pensee coniemporaine.
39
CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE TRADITIONAL THEORY
Let us now attempt an evaluation of these developments. We
cannot agree with Aquinas that intellectual habits are not virtues
in the fullest sense.
40
He bases this conclusion on the supposition
that intellectual virtues give only the capacity to act well, whereas
the appetitive virtues make one act well besides. He gives examples.
A person who has the science of grammar has the capacity to speak
well, but being a grammarian does not make a person speak correctly,
for even grammarians commit solescisms. On the other hand, the
habit of justice not only gives a man the capacity to act justly but
also strongly inclines him to do so.
It seems to us, however, that Aquinas here confuses the habit of
grammar and the habit of correct speech. They certainly are not
the same, since we have many students who can parse with ease
the most difficult and lengthy of constructions but consistently
use barbaric language. But for both of these habits Aquinas' view
seems groundless. For, the grammarian not only has the capacity
to understand easily the relationships between words but he would
39 Paris, 1955.
40 Sum. Theal., I-II, q. 56, a. 3.
WISDOM OR PRUDENCE? 73
also have difficulty in stopping himself from analyzing interesting
constructions. Likewise, a person who has the habit of speaking
correctly has not only the capacity to do so but is also thereby
made to do so; it would ordinarily be as hard for such a person to
speak ungrammatically as it would be for a just man to pocket some
change which may not be his. Similarly, too, for the other intel-
lectual virtues. Indeed, it would be more difficult for a man who
is wise not to exercise his wisdom than it would be for a man who
is just, temperate, and courageous to act unjustly, intemperately,
or in a cowardly manner.
We cannot, then, accept his argument that only the moral can
be cardinal virtues since it is only they which are virtues in the
full sense. But there are moreover a couple of other inconsistencies
which further highlight the weakness of his position. He makes an
exception of prudence, because, although it is an intellectual virtue,
it deals with practical matters and so in this way is also a moral
virtue. But, granted that prudence does deal with the practical,
this logically is still not sufficient grounds for Aquinas to say that
prudence does any more than make us know what should be done,
without making us do it. We readily grant that in fact prudence
does do more than just give us the capacity to know what is to be
done in a concrete problem, that it also makes us act prudently,
but we can maintain this consistently because we admit that a
certain spontaneity of action accompanies all intellectual virtues.
This Aquinas denies, and he gives no compelling reason to consider
prudence from his point of view an exception. Furthermore, in
discussing later the nature of prudence,41 he says that wisdom con-
siders the absolutely highest cause, that analogously we can call
any knowledge of the ultimate cause of a given order the wisdom
of that order of things and that thus prudence is wisdom in the
conduct of life. But now, if prudence is a limited form of wisdom
and is considered important enough to be a cardinal virtue, how
can we not consider wisdom itself as also one?
Then again, as we have seen, he maintains that only the moral
can be cardinal virtues, the reason being that only they are virtues
in the full sense of the word.
42
A few pages later, however, he raises
the question of the relative standing of the intellectual and the
moral virtues and he concludes that the intellectual are the more
noble I Moral virtues are rational only indirectly, whereas intellectual
41 Ibid., II-II, q. 47, a. 2.
42 Ibid., I-II, q. 61, a. 1.
74 DALCOURT
virtues are rational by their very essence and it is obvious that the
essentially rational is more noble than what is rational merely
through participation.
The argument he gives to cover himself is interesting. We must
distinguish two ways in which one thing may be greater than an-
other: in itself or from a given point of view. To consider something
in itself is to take it as a species. But, since virtues are specified by
their objects, that virtue will be greater which has the greater object,
and so, since the intellectual virtues have as their object the universal,
they are more noble in themselves than the moral virtues which
have as their objects contingent things. On the other hand, to
consider the virtues in relation to our acts, the moral are the more
noble, since it is they that cause the others to act. This, however,
we have already shown to be not always the case. But, more im-
portantly, since intellectual virtues are in themselves, specifically,
a higher form of virtue than the moral, do they not then have a
greater claim to be among the cardinal virtues? And how could a
specifically higher form of virtue be a virtue in a less full sense than
a lower?
It strikes us too that, besides being unfounded, Aquinas' iden-
tification of moral and appetitive virtues results in serious equivoca-
tion. His argument is partly etymological. Moral comes from mos,
which means any natural or semi-natural inclination to perform
some act. Since, however, it is through our appetitive powers that
we are moved to act, it is properly only their virtues which should
be denominated moral. But on this point, as we have seen, Aqui-
nas' psychology is faulty, since all habits do have a certain elan
vital of their own and may occasionally act autonomously. Ac-
tually, Aquinas was basing himself in part on Aristotle, who had
distinguished habits into the intellectual and the ethical. This
distinction in its Aristotelian context made good sense and was
quite clear, because there "ethical" meant something quite different
than it usually does in English. Instead of meaning "moral," it
was simply the most natural Greek term to indicate that the virtues
of the appetite resulted from habituation rather than education.
Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and ethical, intellectual
virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching, for
which reason it requires experience and time, while ethical virtue comes
about as a result of habit, whence also its name is one that is
formed by a slight variation from the word (habit). 48
43 Nic. Ethics, 1103a14-19.
WISDOM OR PRUDENCE? 75
Aquinas' Latin terminology, on the other hand, is rather ambiguous,
and we fear that many students of Thomism do not realize that
when he speaks of moral virtues he may be referring only to habits
of the appetitive powers and not to something we need to get to
heaven. Eating olives is an appetitive habit, but would hardly be
thought of as making one a morally better or worse person.
A much more serious result of this usage, though, has been an
obscuring and an undue limitation of the limits of the moral. It
is a good deal more clear and useful to define the moral as that
which is necessary or useful to attain our ultimate end, as Aquinas
himself had done earlier in the Summa." In this broader sense any
intellectual or appetitive habit would be a moral virtue, to the
extent that it serves as a needed means, absolutely or relatively,
to our ultimate ends. Thus an appetitive habit like smoking or an
intellectual habit like geometry are not moral virtues because they
are not of any particular direct help in attaining these goals. But
intellectual habits like wisdom, ethics, and prudence, or a combina-
tion of intellectual and appetitive habits like tact, are moral virtues,
just as such appetitive habits as honesty or truthfulness.
It may be objected, however, that we should not use "moral
virtue" in this way, to include intellectual virtues, because when we
speak of moral virtue we always mean something whose object is
goodness, that is, an appetitive habit, and the object of intellectual
habits is not goodness but truth. Now we grant that in common
usage "moral virtue" refers to habits of doing good acts. But it
seems to us that even colloquially it is not identified with the habits
of powers whose object is the good, because many of these habits
are commonly judged immoral. Rather, "good acts" and "moral
virtues" are ordinarily used to speak of acts and virtues which
help us attain our end and so are desirable, "good." And among
all desiderata truth is certainly one of the greatest. Moreover,
although the intellect is not an appetite in the strict sense and does
not tend to the good as such, it is nevertheless a dynamic faculty.
Through it man has a certain natural tendency to seek knowledge.
Why should not the development of this tendency into a habit
be called a virtue if it is also a necessary condition to the attain-
ment of our ultimate end?
44 Sum. Theol., I-II, q. 18, a. 8.
76 DALCOURT
HISTORICAL MEANING OF "CARDINAL VIRTUE"
Historically, the term "cardinal virtue" has been used in several
different senses. The term itself is derived from the Latin carda
meaning hinge. The analogy is clear. The moral life, to develop
aright, depends on certain virtues in the same way that a door has
to swing on hinges to open and close correctly. To be scientifically
useful, however, the notion has to be made more precise.
If we take the term to refer to distinct virtues, then the cardinal
virtues would be those which concern themselves with those matters
that are the most important and crucial for the moral life. What
the latter are would have to be determined empirically. From
another point of view the cardinal virtues would be those to which
the others are reducible. This reducibility could be based on the
superiority of a genus to its species. Thus justice is a greater virtue
than either distributive or commutative justice. Or we could use
the superiority of a virtue concerned with some end over those
which have to do merely with supplying the means to that end.
For example, modesty is a less important virtue than chastity
because its function is to avoid those things which might lead to
unchaste acts.
The term "cardinal virtues" has also been taken to mean the char-
acteristics common to all virtues. Every virtuous action is necessari-
ly wise, just, courageous, and temperate. This use, however, has never
become common.
WISDOM PREFERABLE TO PRUDENCE
We can now conclude by showing that in whatever sense we
understand "cardinal," the Greek acceptance of wisdom, instead of
prudence, as a cardinal virtue is preferable to the scholastic position.
Let us first take the cardinal virtues as those which concern
themselves with the most crucial matters of the moral life. St.
Thomas suggests there are four such crucial areas: the considera-
tion of the good to be sought, the establishing of a corresponding
rational order in our relations with other men, the regulation of our
physical drives, and the bolstering of our moral backbone.
45
We
find this an acceptable listing; so our problem focusses itself on the
, ~ Ibid., I-II, q. 61, a. 2.
WISDOM OR PRUDENCE? 77
first item. Is the consideration of the main goods which we should
seek the work primarily of wisdom or of prudence? Following
Aristotle, Aquinas defines prudence as recta ratio agibilium, the
capacity to figure out rightly what to do when faced with concrete
problems. This is certainly a most important and useful virtue
and it is concerned with the goods we should seek. But these goods
it considers are forever changing, being relative to the particular situ-
ation at hand. If the permanency and comprehensiveness of the goods
considered furnish any criteria, then wisdom is by far the greater
virtue. For it is traditionally defined as the capacity to see all
things in relation to their ultimate ends. Through wisdom we deter-
mine not just what is good in such or such a case, but see the whole
hierarchy of goods, both relative and absolute. It is then primarily
the work of wisdom to show us which goods to seek; prudence func-
tions in a secondary capacity as a sort of applied wisdom. But let
us see what Aquinas himself had to say on the matter when he
raised the question whether wisdom was the greatest of the intellectual
virtues:
I answer that, as stated above, the greatness of a virtue, as to its spe-
cies, is taken from its object. Now the object of wisdom surpasses the
objects of all the intellectual virtues: because wisdom considers the
supreme cause, which is God, as stated at the beginning of the Meta-
physics. And since it is by the cause that we judge of an effect, and by
the higher cause that we judge of the lower effects; hence it is that wis-
dom exercises judgment over all the other intellectual virtues, directs
them all, and is the architect of them all.
Reply to Obj. 2. Prudence considers the means of acquiring happiness,
but wisdom considers the very object of happiness, namely, the supreme
intelligible. And if indeed the consideration of wisdom were perfect
in respect of its object, there would be perfect happiness in the act of
wisdom; but as, in this life, the act of wisdom is imperfect in respect
of its principal object, which is God, it follows that the act of wisdom
is a beginning or participation of future happiness, so that wisdom is
nearer than prudence to happiness.
46
If we take the cardinal virtues to mean those to which all the
others are reducible, we arrive similarly at the priority of wisdom
over prudence. On the one hand, prudence is a restricted form, a
species, of wisdom. It is the wise solution of particular concrete
46 Ibid., I-II, q. 66, u. 5.
78 DALCOURT
problems. Thomas himself speaks of it as such.
4
? In this case then,
prudence is reducible and inferior to wisdom, since all species are
in general so reducible. On the other hand, a thing may be reducible
to another insofar as its function is to help meet the ends of the other.
This obviously is the case of prudence to wisdom. For wisdom un-
covers the overall teleological order of being while prudence finds
ways in the complex variety of existence to adhere to this order.
Prudence, then, is impossible without wisdom, which directs and
corrects it. To have to be directed by another is a clear mark of
subordination and reducibility.
If we conceive of the cardinal virtues as those characteristics
necessary to every virtue, we find here also that it makes more sense
to list wisdom rather than prudence. Wisdom is long-range, while
prudence is short-range vision. Wisdom specifies the ends, for which
prudence finds the right means. Thus a virtue cannot be prudent
unless it is also wise, but it can be wise at least to some extent for
some time without being prudent. This is most likely the reason
why the advice of philosophers is usually admired but disregarded.
But as man is a rational animal, his every really human act tends
to some end through the use of reasonably appropriate means.
His virtues are then characterized by the same rationality. Since,
however, we determine ultimately the reasonableness of an act or
a virtue by their purposes and since it is through wisdom that we
not only establish but also judge of these purposes, we must in the
last analysis ascribe this rationality to wisdom rather than to pru-
dence.
It is, then, a distortion of the theory of cardinal virtues for scho-
lastics to substitute prudence in its Aristotelian sense for wisdom.
But it is also, we may note, inconsistent with basic points of the
Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics. For, in the first place, this
maintains the primacy of the intellectual over the appetitive. This
is why both Aristotle and Aquinas acknowledge man's ultimate
end to consist essentially, not in love of the good, which is only
a result and a supplement, but in knowledge of the truth, in con-
templation. But is it not incompatible with such a view to maintain
that wisdom, the virtue most closely identifiable with our ultimate
end, with contemplation, is not one of the principal virtues?
In the second place, the Thomistic metaphysics with its doctrine
of the transcendentals greatly emphasizes the individual unity of
47 Ibid., II-II, q. 47, a. 2.
WISDOM OR PRUDENCE? 79
all things. This applies also to man and to his moral life. Every
man is an autonomous unit, but all men have basically the same
nature and the same end. This end is something for which their
whole being was made, and so they should seek to make each and
every one of their acts serve to some degree as a means to this end,
which is the perfection of the whole man, to enable him to achieve
his highest possible level of contemplation. In this perspective,
then, to maintain one's health, to build up one's strength, to develop
our aesthetic sensibilities, to increase our mental acuity are just
as much a part of our moral life as the exercise of temperance or
courage. The exclusion of the former dichotomizes the moral life
and deprives it of its natural unity.
Let us conclude on a speculative note. Is it possible that the
decline of philosophy and the universities in the latter part of the
medieval period was due to some extent to the acceptance of the
Thomistic view of the cardinal virtues which emphasizes the appe-
titive aspects of the moral life while shunting to the side wisdom
and the work of the speculative intellect?