Althusser I An Marxism

Introduction
This book consists of four paper s whi ch have emer ged from very
different cont ext s and whi ch have very different mot i vat i ons.
What they have in c ommon is a rejection of t he Al t husseri an
i nt er pr et at i on of Mar x and a reassert i on of t hose el ement s of t he
marxi st t r adi t i on t hat have been suppressed by Al t husseri ani sm.
These el ement s can be s ummed up by t he t hr ee t er ms used by
Al t husser t o describe t he maj or devi at i ons from marxi st
" or t hodoxy" : " huma ni s m" , or a belief in t he creat i ve pot ent i al of
human bei ngs, a creative pot ent i al t hat is st unt ed and al i enat ed
under capi t al i sm; "empi r i ci sm", or t he belief t hat t here i s no
hi gher basis for knowl edge t han experi ence, so t hat t he basis for a
cri t i que of capitalist society can only be t he experi ence of the mass
of t he peopl e oppressed and expl oi t ed under capi t al i sm; and
"hi st or i ci sm", or t he belief t hat knowl edge, bei ng based on
socially medi at ed experi ence and being val i dat ed t hr ough soci al
pr act i ce, is necessarily t he pr oduct of social condi t i ons at a
par t i cul ar t i me and pl ace, condi t i ons whi ch ar e historically
relative and which can be changed by t hose who live under t hem.
These ideas have al ways been subversive of dogmat i c mar xi sm,
whi ch at t empt s t o abst r act marxi sm from t he hi st ori cal experi ence
from which i t derives and at t empt s t o give mar xi sm an absol ut e
aut hor i t y as source of a knowl edge of hi st ory t hat is inaccessible
t o t hose who live and make t hat hi st ory.
The aut hor s of t he paper s t hat make up this collection believe
t hat it is these subversive el ement s of mar xi s m, dismissed as t he
unscientific " humani s t " , "hi st or i ci st " and "empi r i ci st " resi dues
of " bour geoi s " forms of t hought , t hat ar e f undament al t o t he
politically and intellectually l i berat i ng pot ent i al of marxi sm. The
paper s t hat make up this collection t herefore shar e a rejection of
t he most f undament al t enet s of Al t husser i ani sm. Each paper
addresses Al t husseri ani sm i n its own way, and reaches its own
concl usi ons. None of t he papers at t empt s t o provi de an
al t ernat i ve dogmat i sm, a new set of cat ch phr ases, t hat pur por t s
t o pr ovi de t he secret of t he uni verse. Indi vi dual l y and collectively
what t he paper s do insist on is a consi der at i on of t he i mpl i cat i ons
of t he appar ent l y "sci ent i fi c" i nt erpret at i on of marxi sm bei ng
proposed by Althusserians, and reconsideration of those elements
6 INTRODUCTION
of t he marxi st heri t age t hat have been condemned i n t he name of
"sci ence".
The Al t husseri an movement is a very recent phenomenon, and
yet i t has come t o domi nat e t he i nt er pr et at i on of mar xi sm, at least
i n t he Fr ench- and Engl i sh-speaki ng worl ds Al t husser i an
concept s have been assi mi l at ed i nt o t he di scourse of ma ny
marxi st s who have never hear d of Al t husser and are used wi t h
such an easy familiarity t hat many believe t hey come from Mar x
himself. For many marxi st s t he adequacy of the Al t husser i an
i nt er pr et at i on of Mar x i s so self-evident as not t o meri t
exami nat i on. And yet i t i s an i nt er pr et at i on t hat was f or mul at ed
wi t hi n t he last t wo decades on t he basis of a total rejection of
pr evi ous " r eadi ngs " of Mar x, and it is onl y in the last five years
or so t hat it has acqui r ed a mass fol l owi ng. It seems very st r ange
t hat a t heory whi ch rejects t he ent i re hi st or y of mar xi sm as a
chroni cl e of er r or s, whi ch cl ai ms t hat even Mar x was not a self-
consci ous marxi st , whi ch rejects as i rrel evant t he experience of t he
worki ng-cl ass movement wi t hi n whi ch mar xi sm has devel oped,
and whi ch fi nds t he secret of marxi sm i n vari ous avant - gar de
(and often very esot eri c) versi ons of psychoanal ysi s and
phi l osophy of science, shoul d be so r api dl y accept ed as marxi st
or t hodoxy.
The extent t o whi ch t hi s or t hodoxy i s unquest i oned i s shown by
t he st r ong ant i - mar xi st movement now devel opi ng a mong
di si l l usi oned Al t husseri ans who so identify Al t husser i an
or t hodoxy wi t h mar xi sm t hat i n rejecting t he former, often for
good r easons, t hey reject t he l at t er as well. In such a cont ext it is of
i nest i mabl e i mpor t ance t o di ssoci at e mar xi sm from Al t husser i an-
i sm, t o insist t hat t he r eact i onar y el ement s of Al t husseri ani sm
express its dogmat i sm, and to appeal for a seri ous r e- exami nat i on
of t he t rul y r evol ut i onar y el ement s of t he marxist t r adi t i on,
embodi ed i n t he wor k of marxi st s vilified by Al t husseri ani sm and
i n t he l ong hi st ory of popul ar struggles agai nst economi c, pol i t i cal
and cul t ural oppr essi on.
SI MON CLARKE
Althusserian Marxism
t-.., -.
This paper has a l ong hi st ory. The original draft was wri t t en in
1970 on t he basis of an at t empt to relate s..-, c,/ to a
readi ng of c,/ This was a t ask t hat I began wi t h a certain
limited s ympat hy for Al t husser ' s i nt er pr et at i on, at least t o the
extent of agreei ng t hat c,/ is Mar x' s cent ral wor k and of
agreeing t hat c,/ is not si mpl y a wor k of economi cs. However
it was a t ask t hat ended in t ot al frust rat i on as a result of a failure to
find any subst ant i al connect i on bet ween s..-, c,/ (with the
except i on of Ranci re' s cont r i but i on t hat was suppr essed i n the
second edi t i on and in t he Engl i sh t ransl at i on) and c,/
Dr awi ng such a negative concl usi on, and naively i magi ni ng t hat
ot hers woul d reach the same concl usi on, I put t he draft in my
bot t om dr awer .
As the years went by it became clear t hat Al t husser i ani sm was
not t he passi ng fancy of a few avant - gar de i nt el l ect ual s, but t hat it
was rapi dl y becomi ng a maj or intellectual cur r ent , i ndeed the
domi nant f or m of marxi sm a mong t he generat i on of st udent s and
academi cs wh o encount er ed mar xi sm after 1968. After some years
of cont i nui ng fondly to i magi ne t hat it woul d go away of its own
accord, I sat down i n 1976 t o t ake up my critique agai n. The paper
t hat follows is t he result.
It t ur ned out t hat it was not a bad t i me to sit down to a critique
of Al t husser i an marxi sm. In 1976 Al t husseri ani sm seemed to be at
its highest poi nt . Even mar xi st s from non- Al t husser i an
backgr ounds were abdi cat i ng, ei t her espousi ng Al t husseri ani sm
or, tacitly or explicitly, abandoni ng hope for mar xi sm. However,
the t yr anny of Al t husseri ani sm, expressed in its at t empt to
procl ai m itself t he only t rue fai t h, had also r eached such a pi t ch
t hat i ncreasi ng number s of mar xi st s who had happi l y i gnored
Al t husseri ani sm began t o quest i on the Al t husser i an cl ai ms,
diffidently at first, but with gr owi ng self-confidence over t he last
t hree years. Thi s count er - cur r ent was given added st rengt h by t he
f r agment at i on of t he Al t husseri an camp i nt o or t hodox
Al t husser i ans, t he followers of Lacan, of Foucaul t , or of vari ous
br ands of Hi ndess and Hi rst . The claim t o represent t he onl y t rue
faith was weakened, as always, by the schismatic tendencies that
8 SIMON CLARKE
offered a r api d prol i ferat i on of onl y-t rue-fai t hs, cari cat ured in its
most ext reme form by Hi ndess and Hi r st , whose many publ i sher s
coul d not keep up wi t h t he succession of doct r i nal reversals whi ch
t hey inflicted on t hei r increasingly bemused flock.
The initial recept i on of this paper was mi xed. I was very gr at i -
fied by t he ent husi ast i cal l y positive r esponse of t hose comr ades
with whom I was wor ki ng and t hose who shar ed my rejection of
Al t husser i ani sm, but at first these were few and far bet ween. The
most common r esponse was one of surpri se t hat anyone shoul d
reject t he Al t husseri an ent erpri se - as I was doi ng. Thi s
seemed t o reflect t he effectiveness with whi ch Al t husseri ani sm has
est abl i shed its claim t o represent t he onl y t r ue, scientific, ant i -
economi st mar xi sm, and t o consign all ot her i nt er pr et at i ons of
Mar x t o the dust bi n of hi st ory. Many who did not follow
Al t husser, or had little interest i n doct r i nal quest i ons, still felt t hat
Al t husser was aski ng t he right quest i ons, even if his answers were
i nadequat e or i ncompl et e. Many di sl i ked Al t husser' s own
pol i t i cs, or specific Al t husseri an cl ai ms, whi l e still identifying t he
Al t husseri an proj ect with t hat of Mar x. The response from
Al t husseri ans was one of out r age, and newcomer s t o t he debat e
shoul d be war ned t hat my i nt er pr et at i on of Al t husser i s by no
means uncont ent i ous. The paper was descri bed i n t he following
t er ms by anonymous r eader s: "al most ent i rel y i nadequat e . . .
repetitively st at ed . . . i nc ohe r e nt . . . a bal d series of assert i ons . . .
cr ude di st ort i ons . . . mi sr epr esent at i ons . . . grot esque mi sr eadi ng
. . . a form of intellectual di shonest y . . . pat het i c". A r at her less
sympat het i c Al t husseri an reader consi dered it "t he worst article I
have ever read on Al t husser . . . t he very wor st ki nd of dogmat i c,
ill-informed pol emi c . . . absol ut el y appal l i ng . . . a sl ogani si ng and
dogmat i c manner . . . an absence of anal ysi s . . .a series of t ot al l y
unsubst ant i at ed at t acks . . . t he article i s wort hl ess . . . not hi ng
shor t of scandal ous . . . nonsense . . . t he most phi l i st i ne and
phi l osophi cal l y nai ve epi st emol ogy . . . absolutely br eat h-
t aki ng . . ."
Since 1976 t he paper has ci rcul at ed qui t e widely in dupl i cat ed
f or m, and has elicited increasingly f avour abl e responses t hat seem
t o i ndi cat e t hat t he r anks of t he di shonest sl ogani si ng philistines
are growi ng fast, a nd t hat mor e and mor e peopl e are pr epar ed t o
reconsi der Al t husseri ani sm not i n mi nor details but i n its
f oundat i ons. However , despite this gr oundswel l i t r emai ns t he
case t hat it is Al t husseri ani sm t hat domi nat es t he publ i sher s' lists,
and Al t husseri ans who domi nat e a mong edi t ori al advi sers t o
t hose publ i shers pr epar ed t o consi der mar xi st wor ks.
In t he last t hr ee years t here have been consi der abl e
developments within Althusserianism, leading to a proliferation
ALTHUSSERIAN MARXISM 9
of small sect s. Al t hough some of t hese sects reject t he divinity of
Al t husser, I cont i nue t o consi der t hem Al t husseri an because their
heresies ari se out of t he i nt ernal devel opment of t he faith. Thus
the t wo- vol ume r omp by A. Cut l er , B. Hi ndess, P. Hi rst and A.
Hussai n, c,/ -. c,/- :., count er poses
the latest heresy t o somet hi ng identified as "mar xi s t or t hodoxy"
which i s not hi ng ot her t han t he Al t husseri an faith t o whi ch the
aut hor s ori gi nal l y adher ed.
My paper was written before t he emergence of t he mor e recent
Al t husseri an heresies, and so consi dered only t he earlier wor k of
Hi ndess and Hi rst , t.,/ .. / t..- and t hat
only i n f oot not ed asides. In comment i ng on t hat wor k I must now
admi t t hat I occasi onal l y car i cat ur ed i t and at t r i but ed t o Hi ndess
and Hi rst posi t i ons t hat t hey were not t o adopt explicitly until
their self-criticism. At t he t i me t hi s was a pol emi cal device,
drawi ng out t he i mpl i cat i ons of t hei r ar gument t o show the
absurdi t i es t hey were led i nt o. The force of t hi s device was
weakened when, t o my amazement , Hi ndess and Hi r st followed
the logic of their ar gument s t hr ough t o such absurdi t i es.
However , t hi s paper is not concer ned with t he finer poi nt s of
Al t husseri an doct r i ne, nor is it concer ned to pr ovi de a compl et e
account of Al t husser ' s political and t heoret i cal devel opment . It is
concerned wi t h t he f oundat i ons of Al t husseri ani sm laid out i n his
most influential wor ks, s..-, c,/ and t For this
reason, and because t he paper has al ready been qui t e widely
quot ed, I have not made maj or changes in it for publ i cat i on here.
Fi nal l y, a few words need to be said about t he form of this
paper. It is an i nt erpret at i on of Al t husser t hat , at t he t i me it was
wri t t en, was out r ageous. It woul d be possible t o s uppor t t he inter-
pr et at i on by extensive quot at i on from Al t husser' s wor ks, but
extensive quot at i on coul d equal l y well be used t o refute t hi s
i nt er pr et at i on. For this r eason t he form of t he paper is t hat of a
textual comment ar y on Al t husser ' s maj or wor ks, and I have made
very little use of direct quot at i on. This means t hat the reader
shoul d easily be able t o eval uat e my i nt er pr et at i on for hi m or
herself by t ur ni ng to t he ori gi nal texts t hat I discuss. It is
i mpor t ant t o make this poi nt i n or der t o count er t he charges of
di st ort i on or of falsification. I do not imagine t hat my readers ar e
i ncapabl e of r eadi ng Al t husser for themselves and maki ng up
their own mi nds , and I hope t hat t he form of pr esent at i on t hat I
have adopt ed will make this as easy as possible for t hem.
No paper of this length can offer a compr ehensi ve account of
Al t husser i ani sm, nor a compr ehensi ve account of al t ernat i ve
i nt er pr et at i ons of Marx. In this paper I concent r at e on offering a
critical interpretation of Althusser's two basic and most
10 SIMON CLARKE
influential texts. In extensive f oot not es, however, I also offer a
mor e sket chy comment ar y t hat t ouches on l at er devel opment s i n
t he wor k of Al t husser and of his fol l owers, and on wi der
phi l osophi cal and t heoret i cal t endenci es t o whi ch Al t husser i an-
ism is rel at ed. Those who are i nt erest ed in t he cent r al
i nt erpret at i on and cri t i que of Al t husser can read the text wi t hout
get t i ng bogged down i n the mor e esot eri c poi nt s el uci dat ed i n t he
foot not es. Those who are i nt erest ed i n trying t o si t uat e
Al t husser' s work in a wider perspect i ve, or in relating t he wor k of
later Al t husseri ans t o t he canoni cal t ext s, mi ght fi nd some of t he
f oot not e comment ar y suggestive or pr ovocat i ve, even if it does
not pr ovi de r i gor ous analysis. The ai m of the foot not es i s t o
i ndi cat e the ways in whi ch my i nt er pr et at i on of Al t husser' s cent ral
texts can also i l l umi nat e t he ot her aspect s of Al t husseri ani sm not
t ouched on here.
In this paper I concent r at e on Al t husser ' s i nt er pr et at i on of
Mar x' s t heory of society, and part i cul arl y t he Al t husseri an not i on
of t he mode of pr oduct i on. I devot e relatively little at t ent i on t o
Al t husser ' s met hodol ogi cal di scussi ons, or t o his t heor y of
i deol ogy, bot h of whi ch have been influential. Al t husser ' s
met hodol ogy, i nconsi st ent as i t is, seems t o me t o be qui t e
unor i gi nal , offering banal versions of a r ange of the mor e esot eri c
versi ons of neo-posi t i vi sm whose basic posi t i on of a separ at i on of
t hought and reality ( "t heor y" and "obs er vat i on") leads i n bot h
cases t o linguistic i deal i sm of one form or anot her . This met hod-
ol ogy has been extensively discussed el sewhere. In this cont ext I
woul d like part i cul arl y t o r ecommend Edwar d Thomps on' s
spirited defence of t he empi ri cal i di om in :/. t.., / :/.,
The i mpor t ance of this wor k is t hat it addresses t he
met hodol ogi cal pr obl ems confront ed by t he pract i ce of hi st ori cal
mat eri al i sm and so satisfies t he Al t husser i an' s own insistence t hat
phi l osophy cannot legislate for "sci ence", but t hat each "sci ence"
has t o define its own met hods, an insistence syst emat i cal l y
i gnor ed i n t he r umi nat i ons of t he Al t husser i an epi st emol ogi cal
censors. I offer onl y brief foot not e comment s on t he t heor y of
i deol ogy, but I hope t hat this gap is ampl y compensat ed for by t he
paper s by Terry Lovell and by Kevin Robi ns and Kevi n
McDonnel l in this vol ume. Finally, I have written elsewhere on
t he devel opment of t he Al t husseri an model by Poul ant zas and by
t he "vul gar Poul ant zi ans ", and on t he f oundat i ons of
st ruct ural i sm in t he work of Levi -St rauss.
1
Thus this paper is
rest ri ct ed in its scope and shoul d be r ead not in i sol at i on, but as a
part of a growi ng movement of intellectual and political resi st ance
t o Al t husseri ani sm t hat cannot be glibly dismissed as t he
moralistic droolings of outraged bourgeois humanists to which the
Al t husseri ans (like their pol i t i cal ment or s) woul d reduce all
opposi t i on.
The i nt er pr et at i on of Mar x t hat I offer in opposi t i on to t he
Al t husseri ans is charact eri sed as br oadl y as possi bl e in t he hope
t hat I can avoi d count er posi ng one rigid or t hodoxy t o anot her .
Marxi sm has been pl agued since its i ncept i on by t he fact t hat t he
l eadershi p of marxist political movement s has not t rust ed its
followers t o r ead Mar x for t hemsel ves, but has insisted on offering
predi gest ed versi ons of Mar x. I do not want to offer such a
subst i t ut e i n t hi s paper . Thus t he paper i s at t i mes very dense,
because it is t ryi ng to deal concisely with maj or quest i ons, and at
times onl y suggestive, because it is t ryi ng to open up di scussi on of
Mar x' s wor k and not t o i mpose a new cl osure. If at t i mes t he t one
of t he paper is assertive and dogmat i c this is because t here ar e
some poi nt s on which I t hi nk it is essential to make a st and, even if
they cannot be el abor at ed in a brief space. However , I have no
aut hori t y for my views beyond t he texts t hat Mar x has left behi nd
and t he mass of conflicting i nt er pr et at i ons t hat have been a par t of
the living real i t y of the worki ng-cl ass movement . Thus I am mor e
t han happy for t he reader t o di sagree, and i f my t one st i mul at es
di sagreement and induces t he r eader t o make up his or her own
mi nd, t hen my aim woul d have been achi eved. Thi s paper is a
pol emi c and not an encyclical, t he aim of which is to ask peopl e
not t o t ake Al t husseri ani sm at face val ue; t o ask t hem t o r ead
Mar x before t c,/ before s..-, c,/ and to
read it not as t he fossil form of t he Logos but as t he pr oduct of a
lifetime' s i nvol vement in political and i deol ogi cal struggle in
which Mar x sought to forge a weapon for t he pr ol et ar i at in t he
bat t l e for soci al i sm, a socialism whi ch for Mar x coul d only have a
/.-- face.
:/. ,.-.-
The devel opment of capi t al i st crisis and of worki ng-cl ass
militancy in t he mid-1960s creat ed the cont ext in whi ch left
intellectuals in Britain, as el sewhere, devel oped an interest in t he
Marx of t he worki ng-cl ass movement , t ur ni ng away from t he
vari ous at t empt s t o i nt erpret Mar x i n t erms of a phi l osophy of t he
subject. Thi s was the cont ext i n whi ch Al t husser repl aced Sart re
and Lukcs as the " gr i d" t hr ough which Mar x was read. At t he
time it seemed t hat Al t husseri ani sm was merely a passi ng phase, a
st op on t he way t o Mar x himself. However t he Al t husseri an
ent husi asm had lasted j ust l ong enough t o leave a gener at i on who
had come t o read Mar x t hr ough Al t husser, t o subst i t ut e t
for Mar x, s..-, c,/ for r eadi ng c,/ The legacy of this
phase is not an Althusserian movement, as caricatured briefly by
12 SIMON CLARKE
:/../ t. whi ch l acked any pol i t i cal base. The legacy is
f ound in a new or t hodoxy in t he i nt er pr et at i on of Mar x, embodi ed
in a series of concept s and assumpt i ons whose Al t husser i an
ori gi ns have been largely effaced. Thi s is the new cont ext
in whi ch it seems to me t hat a renewed cri t i que of Al t husseri ani sm
is necessary, a cri t i que which focuses on t he poi nt whi ch earlier
cri t i ques del i berat el y and specifically omi t t ed, the quest i on of t he
adequacy of Al t husser ' s i nt erpret at i on of Marx.
2
In or der to write such a critique it is necessary to find some basis
on whi ch the cri t i que may be coherent l y present ed. The most
i mpressi ve at t empt t o i mpose a purel y t heoret i cal coherence on
Al t husser' s work is t hat of Gl ucksmann, who sees Al t husseri ani sm
as a vari ant of bour geoi s met aphysi cal phi l osophy.
3
One coul d
const r uct equally convi nci ng account s of Al t husseri ani sm as a
var i ant of t he Lacani an i nt erpret at i on of Fr eud, i n whi ch t he
economi c plays t he role of Fr eudi an unconsci ous, the political t he
role of the consci ous, and t he t heori st t hat of the anal yst .
4
One
coul d add ot her st ruct ural i st influences t o the Lacani an
i nspi rat i on and see Al t husseri ani sm as an "over det er mi ned"
syst em: t he phi l osophy of t he concept deri ved from Cavaills,
5
t he
Lvi-Straussian concept i on of society as an "or der of or der s " .
6
One coul d follow Poul ant zas i n seeing Al t husseri ani sm
al t ernat i vel y as an at t empt t o t r anscend t he opposi t i on bet ween
st r uct ur e and hi st ory represent ed by t he opposi t i on bet ween
Sart re and Lvi-Strauss, at t empt i ng t o hi st ori se Lvi-Strauss's
st r uct ur es by st r uct ur i ng Sart re' s pract i ce. All these const r uct i ons
coul d be convi nci ng, but all have to -,. a coherence on
Al t husser, and none give him a marxi st pedi gree.
Exami nat i on of t heoret i cal ant ecedent s can reveal a host of
cont r adi ct or y influences on Al t husser' s wor k, but cannot reveal its
,./ f oundat i ons. However much Al t husser may bor r ow from
bour geoi s t heori st s, his -, poi nt is mar xi st , and, specifically,
t he mar xi sm of t he or t hodox communi st movement . Ther e i s no
doubt t hat Al t husser ' s work begins as a r econsi der at i on of Stalinist
" dogma t i s m" i n t he light of devel opment s subsequent t o t he
Twent i et h Congress of t he CPSU, and represent s an at t empt t o
devel op a critique of the " economi s m" of t hat dogmat i sm t hat
does not fall i nt o t he twin "devi at i ons " of " huma ni s m" and
"hi st or i ci sm".
7
These have historically been t he t erms whi ch have
been appl i ed t o t he opposi t i on t o dogmat i s m from t he ri ght and
from the left, f or ms of opposi t i on t hat re-emerged i n t he
communi st movement i n t he wake of dest al i ni sat i on. Hence
Al t husser seeks essentially t o per pet uat e communi st or t hodoxy,
but t o set t hat or t hodoxy on a new f oundat i on, and t hi s expl ai ns
his readiness to draw on sources which have hitherto been
unor t hodox for a communi st . His ent i re wor k is charact eri sed by
the t ensi on bet ween t he or t hodox and the unor t hodox, t he t wo
bei ng br ought t oget her ar ound t he supposed focus of Al t husser' s
wor k, t he r ei nt er pr et at i on of marxi st t heory. Thi s r ei nt er pr et at i on
involves t he i nvocat i on of a real , but hi t hert o unknown, Mar x,
who can onl y be recovered from t he marxist texts t hr ough t he gri d
of a " r eadi ng" , which has in fact involved t he abandonment of
most of Mar x' s work as non- mar xi st , and t he r epl acement of most
of Mar x' s own concept s by ot her s i nt roduced by Al t husser.
In this paper I want t o est abl i sh t hat the i nt er pr et at i on of Mar x
pr oposed by Al t husser in no sense represent s a renewal of
mar xi sm. Rat her I want t o show t hat Al t husser ' s at t empt t o
refound a di spi ri t ed or t hodoxy leads him i nexorabl y t o t he
adopt i on of t heoret i cal and phi l osophi cal posi t i ons which can be
ri gorousl y charact eri sed as "bour geoi s ". Hence Al t husseri ani sm
offers fami l i ar, if rat her esot eri c, bourgeoi s ideologies wr apped,
often i nsecurel y, in marxi st r het or i c, which serves to give bot h
bourgeoi s ideologies and Stalinist politics an aut hent i cal l y marxi st
appear ance. It is this dupl i ci t y whi ch makes Al t husseri ani sm so
danger ous, for it induces many sincere marxi st s to ent er a
l abyri nt h i n which i ncreasi ng frust rat i on can lead t hem t o
abandon mar xi sm itself.
In t he first section I shall try to i ndi cat e t heoret i cal l y t he course
which led Al t husser from an at t empt to find a new f oundat i on for
the aut hor i t y of the intellectual wi t hi n the par t y, and of the par t y
within t he wor ki ng class, to the adopt i on of a bourgeoi s theory of
society and associ at ed bourgeoi s phi l osophy. I shall t hen try to
establish t he bourgeoi s f oundat i ons of Al t husser ' s wor k by
exami ni ng his and Bal i bar' s mai n cont r i but i ons.
.//..-- s/-- -. /.,. /,,
The cont ext of Al t husser' s proj ect is the per i od of dest al i ni sat i on
after t he Twent i et h Congress of t he CPSU. For Al t husser, as a
phi l osopher , dest al i ni sat i on meant the end of Zhdanovi sm, of
subor di nat i on of phi l osophy t o t he part y, and so t he possibility
bot h of recoveri ng t he professi onal respect of col l eagues and of
i nt erveni ng i n political activity on an i ndependent basi s, as an
i nt el l ect ual . The project whi ch t he Al t husseri ans set themselves
was t he pol i t i cal rest orat i on of t he Fr ench Communi s t Part y
( PCF) t hr ough t he rest orat i on of t he t hought of Mar x, seeking i n
the r evol ut i onar y experience of t he Soviet Uni on in 1917, and of
Chi na i n 1937, t he lessons whi ch, medi at ed by t heory, coul d
under pi n a r at i onal politics in Fr ance in t he 1960s. This project
rested on a belief, also expressed in the i nt r oduct i on to t
that the political errors of the PCF were to be explained by its lack
14 SIMON CLARKE
of t heor y, a lack of t heor y whi ch made t he Par t y very vul ner abl e t o
t heoret i cal and pract i cal " oppor t uni s m" i n the event of its
abandonment of Stalinist dogmat i sm.
8
Thi s project appar ent l y
begi ns, t herefore, wi t h an i nnocent r et ur n t o t he texts of Mar x.
The i nnocence of this r et ur n is, however , only superficial.
Al t husser does not appr oach t he wor ks of Mar x, Lenin or Ma o as
a disinterested st udent of the texts. These wor ks pr ovi de onl y an
aut hor i t y t o whi ch he, as an i nt el l ect ual , can refer t o s uppor t an
ambi t i on which is al ready inscribed in his political proj ect . The
starting poi nt of Al t husser' s project is t he critique of t he cr ude
economi sm and evol ut i oni sm of Stalinist dogmat i sm, while
avoi di ng t hose i nt er pr et at i ons dubbed " humani s t " , whi ch
Al t husser sees as bei ng simply t he ot her face of economi st i c
i nt er pr et at i ons, t he t wo uni t ed i n their "hi st ori ci st " under s t and-
ing of t he marxi st dialectic. Al t husser' s initial project is t herefore
to pur ge mar xi sm of all traces of "hi st or i ci sm".
Ranci re argues very convincingly t hat what ever ori gi nal
pol i t i cal ambi t i on t he critique of Stalinist dogmat i sm ma y have
had, t he project soon became its own j ust i fi cat i on. Since Al t husser
was commi t t ed t o t he t r ansf or mat i on of t he PCF from wi t hi n, i t
was necessary for hi m to find an aut hor i t y for his t heor y hi gher
t han t hat of t he par t y, which had hi t her t o rul ed i n such matters.
His wor k, t herefore, soon comes t o be domi nat ed by the need t o
find in Mar x t he j ust i fi cat i on not directly for his politics, but for
his proj ect of intellectual subversi on. The basis of his " ant i -
hi st or i ci sm" i s t herefore the need t o est abl i sh the a ut onomy of
t heor y and t he aut hor i t y of t he t heori st . Thi s under pi ns t he early
insistence on t he separ at i on of marxi st phi l osophy from hi st ori cal
mat eri al i sm, t he defence of the a ut onomy of "t heor et i cal
pr act i ce", the insistence on t he pri ori t y of dialectical over
hi st ori cal mat eri al i sm and so of phi l osophy over politics, as well as
the l at er t r ansf or mat i on of t he definition of phi l osophy whi ch
al t ered these r el at i onshi ps, but left t he posi t i on of t heor y and t he
t heori st unchanged.
Rancire argues t hat Al t husser' s proj ect soon finds itself in a
hopelessly cont r adi ct or y posi t i on. I n or der t o subvert t he PCF
from within on t he basis of the aut hor i t y of t heory and i n t he
absence of a significant political base, it is necessary to have t he
confidence of t he l eadershi p of t he par t y. Until t heor y has
achi eved t he t r ansf or mat i on of t he par t y, it is necessary to
subor di nat e oneself t o t he l eadershi p of t he part y i n or der t o be
able t o cont i nue t he process of t heoret i cal subversi on. The l ong-
t er m st rat egy of t heoret i cal subversi on of t he dogmat i sm whi ch
cont i nued t o domi nat e t he PCF demanded a short -t erm t act i c of
accommodation to, if not defence of, the theses of the leadership of
t he PCF. It i s this cont r adi ct i on whi ch, as Ranci re shows,
i l l umi nat es anot her series of f undament al Al t husser i an di st i nc-
t i ons: t he separ at i on of i deol ogy, within whi ch pol i t i cs is fought
out , from science, of an empi ri cal from a t heoret i cal rhet ori c.
9
These di st i nct i ons make it possi bl e for Al t husser to dissociate his
t heoret i cal l y subversive f or mul at i ons from t hei r appar ent political
i mpl i cat i ons, a t echni que whi ch is appar ent in his essay "Mar xi sm
and Huma ni s m" , in t and which was used to count er t he
accusat i on of Maoi st t endenci es on the appear ance of t he essay
" On the Mat eri al i st Di al ect i c".
10
Ranci re chart s t he progressi ve inversion of tactical and
strategic consi der at i ons in Al t husser ' s wor k from 1963 onwar ds. It
was in 1963 t hat Al t husser made his onl y di rect political
i nt er vent i on, objectively on behal f of the l eader shi p of the PCF,
at t acki ng t he nascent st udent movement for its chal l enge t o t he
integrity of science. This at t ack had serious consequences for the
subsequent devel opment of t he st udent movement i n its creat i on
of an "aut hor i t ar i an left" cur r ent whi ch st ood above t he revolt of
the st udent s and young wor ker s. Fr om this t i me the at t ack on
" e c onomi s m" was veiled, all Al t husser' s pol emi cs bei ng ai med at
" huma ni s m" and "hi st or i ci sm", t heoret i cal t endenci es which t he
cognoscent i knew t o be compl ement ar y t o " economi s m" , but
which al so happened t o represent t he i nt ernal opposi t i on t o the
PCF l eader shi p from t he ri ght and from t he l eft . " The subversive
elements of Al t husseri ani sm became increasingly esot eri c, while
the at t acks on " huma ni s m" and "hi st or i ci sm" st r engt hened t he
l eadershi p t hey were supposed t o under mi ne, pr ovi di ng a means of
rest ori ng t he aut hor i t y of t hat l eadershi p among t he intellectuals
by at t acki ng its political opponent s in t he name of the texts of
Mar x and Leni n and not di rect l y of the aut hor i t y of the part y. The
crunch came in 1965, with t he publ i cat i on of s..-, c,/ This
wor k came under shar p at t ack from the PCF l eadershi p not for t he
at t ack on "hi st or i ci sm", whi ch was t he esoteric r adi cal el ement i n
t he work (but whi ch, as we shall see, can equally have react i onary
i mpl i cat i ons), but for t he aut onomy whi ch was at t r i but ed t o
t heory, precisely Al t husser' s defence against t he subor di nat i on of
his intellectual project to t he di ct at es of t he pol i t i cal l eadershi p of
the part y. The latter was wor r i ed because t he left l eadershi p of t he
Communi s t st udent s' or gani sat i on, the UEC, was using similar
ar gument s t o defend its ri ght t o political aut onomy. It coul d not
therefore t ol erat e a compet i ng aut hor i t y in t he i nt er pr et at i on of
Mar x, even i f t hat aut hor i t y was Mar x himself. In response t o j ust
criticism, Al t husser reissued s..-, c,/ wi t h t he omi ssi on of
the mor e scandal ous t ext s, and made his self-criticism in t.-- -.
t//,/,
::
16 SIMON CLARKE
I do not out l i ne this sor di d hi st ory as t he basis of an . /--.-
cri t i que, but because i t i s necessary t o an under st andi ng of t he
origins of Al t husser i ani sm. When Al t husser under t ook t he t ask of
regenerat i on i n t he earl y 1960s, t o count er pose Mar x t o t he par t y
as an aut hor i t y was a very radi cal move. Al t husser al most
i mmedi at el y came under pressure from wi t hi n t he par t y, t he resul t
of whi ch was t hat Al t husser' s project came t o be focused entirely
on est abl i shi ng its own possibility by est abl i shi ng the a ut onomy of
t heor y. Wi t h Al t husser ' s self-criticism t he aut onomy of t heor y i n
rel at i on t o t he par t y, and with i t t he at t empt t o put f or war d an
ori gi nal i nt er pr et at i on of Mar x, was effectively abandoned. His
seri ous wor k is t herefore largely confi ned to his peri od of
i ndependence from 1960 to 1965.
In t hi s peri od t he at t empt t o est abl i sh t he aut onomy of t heor y
t hr ough t he r ei nt er pr et at i on of Mar x led t o t he i mposi t i on of a
par t i cul ar concept i on of society on Mar x' s work. Hence t he
par t i cul ar , and r at her par ochi al , ambi t i on of Al t husser ' s
rei nt erpret at i on acqui r ed a much wi der significance. The t r agedy
of Al t husseri ani sm is t hat the concept i on of society in quest i on is
t hat whi ch domi nat es bot h Stalinist dogmat i sm and bourgeoi s
soci ol ogy.
Rancire focuses his cri t i que on t he affinity between Al t husser ' s
concept i on of t he rel at i on bet ween t heor y and politics and t he
mechani cal mat eri al i st concept i on whi ch Mar x dest royed i n his
"Theses on Feuer bach" . However t he affinity between Al t husser ' s
wor k and t he domi nant forms of bour geoi s ideology i s bot h
br oader and mor e f undament al t han t hi s.
The link bet ween Al t husser' s par t i cul ar ambi t i on and his
adopt i on of a bour geoi s ideological concept i on of society is very
di rect . Al t husser' s par t i cul ar ambi t i on is to est abl i sh t he
aut onomy and aut hor i t y of ment al over manual l abour . This
rel at i onshi p bet ween t he ment al and t he manual is, however , a
pecul i ar charact eri st i c of capitalist pr oduct i on rel at i ons. In or der
to show, t herefore, t hat this pecul i ar charact eri st i c of capi t al i sm is
socially necessary, Al t husser has recourse t o a t heor y whi ch
establishes the social necessity of capi t al i st pr oduct i on rel at i ons
t hemsel ves, and this "et er ni sat i on" of capitalist r el at i ons of
pr oduct i on is precisely t he defining charact eri st i c of bour geoi s
ideology. Thus it is t hat Al t husser follows mechani cal mat er i al i sm
in confusing t he social and t echni cal divisions of l abour : in
identifying t he separ at i on of ment al from manual l abour , and t he
subor di nat i on of one t o t he ot her , wi t h t he technical r equi r ement s
of pr oduct i on wi t h an advanced division of l abour , and not wi t h
/. .--- / ,/ .. //. -. /. ..
,,,- / /. ... ,.. / //. /, ,/ This
confusion is t he basis of a series of ideologies whi ch serve to justify
the subor di nat i on of l abour : t o capi t al i n bour geoi s i deol ogy, t o
the r ef or mer i n Utopian soci al i sm, t o t he par t y and t o t he st at e i n
Stalinism. It is the ideological f oundat i on of t he et erni sat i on of
bourgeoi s rel at i ons of pr oduct i on, const i t ut ed in its classical form
by t he pol i t i cal economy whose definitive cri t i que was made by
Mar x and whose r enunci at i on i s t he necessary basis of any
aut hent i c marxi sm.
13
Let us l ook mor e closely at t hi s ideology.
Classical political economy bases itself on a di st i nct i on bet ween
pr oduct i on, whi ch is seen in t echni cal t erms as t he r eal m in whi ch
l abour sets t o work means of pr oduct i on t o make pr oduct s, and
di st r i but i on, i n which t he pr oduct i s t r ansf or med i nt o revenues
which accr ue to the var i ous classes in society. Relations of
di st ri but i on are therefore super i mposed on pr oduct i on as t he
social f r amewor k within whi ch mat eri al pr oduct i on t akes pl ace. In
the capi t al i st mode of pr oduct i on t he super i mposi t i on of rel at i ons
of di st r i but i on on rel at i ons of pr oduct i on is achi eved simply by
ascribing revenues t o fact ors of pr oduct i on and assi gni ng classes
to t hese fact ors as " owner s " . It is therefore owner shi p of the
means of pr oduct i on which provi des the f oundat i on for t he maj or
di st ri but i ve classes of which society is composed. Thi s concept i on
of society is based on t he "t ri ni t y f or mul a", the form of
appear ance of bourgeoi s rel at i ons of pr oduct i on accordi ng t o
which t he "fact ors of pr oduct i on" ar e t he sources of the revenues
of t he component classes of society. It is a form of appear ance
which et erni ses bourgeoi s rel at i ons of pr oduct i on, because it
makes t hem appear as rel at i ons al ready inscribed i n the technical
st ruct ure of t he mat eri al pr oduct i on process. It is an ../,,
because it post ul at es as et ernal t hat which is hi st ori cal l y specific, it
is a /.,. ideology because what it post ul at es as et ernal is t he
bourgeoi s pr oduct i on rel at i on. In so far as such et erni sat i on of
bourgeoi s rel at i ons of pr oduct i on is the -. . -- of bourgeoi s
i deol ogy, in t he ri gorous sense of t hat t er m, it is t hi s concept i on of
society whi ch is the f oundat i on of all bourgeoi s i deol ogy.
This concept i on of society, al t hough it is f undament al l y bour -
geois, can al so be found under l yi ng certain i deol ogi es which have
pl ayed a maj or role in t he worki ng-cl ass movement . The rel at i on
bet ween Ri cardi ani sm a nd Utopian socialism i s well known.
Ut opi an soci al i sm i s charact eri sed by t he above bourgeoi s
concept i on of society, basi ng itself on a -/ cri t i que of bourgeoi s
rel at i ons of ./.- and so ai mi ng at t he t r ansf or mat i on of
rel at i ons of di st ri but i on wi t hout any t r ansf or mat i on of bourgeoi s
rel at i ons of pr oduct i on, t he revol ut i on bei ng i nt r oduced from
... because of t he necessarily -/ basis of t he Utopian
critique. At a later stage of capitalist development "economism"
18 SIMON CLARKE
gave this bourgeoi s concept i on a new radi cal twist. Bour geoi s
rel at i ons of di st r i but i on cont i nue t o be f ounded on t he t echni cal
rel at i ons of bour geoi s pr oduct i on, but t he soci al i sat i on of
pr oduct i on, concei ved as an i ncreasi ng technical scal e of
pr oduct i on, leads progressively and nat ur al l y from compet i t i ve
capi t al i sm t hr ough monopol y capi t al i sm t o state capi t al i sm,
which is equat ed wi t h socialism. Economi s m has a mor e scientific
appear ance t han ut opi ani sm had. In real i t y, however, i t has no
scientific f oundat i on at all, for it is si mpl y not the case t hat t he
socialisation of pr oduct i on can be reduced t o t echni cal
concent r at i on, nor t hat the l at t er i ncreases wi t hout limit. Hence
t he adopt i on of this "economi st i c" versi on of socialism, by basi ng
itself on a concept i on of society whi ch is in t urn f ounded on t he
et erni sat i on of capi t al i st rel at i ons of pr oduct i on, has t he
per pet uat i on of such rel at i ons as its pract i cal consequence. Thi s
economi sm ent ered t he Russian worki ng-cl ass movement t hr ough
Pl ekhanov and Menshevi sm, and was criticised, t hough not
unambi guousl y, by Leni n. In the wake of t he revol ut i on and t he
NEP, this economi sm crept back i nt o t he CPSU i n t he form of
Stalinist dogmat i sm, provi di ng t he means wi t hi n the Soviet Uni on
t o establish t he identification of devel opment of t he pr oduct i ve
forces with the devel opment of soci al i sm and t o est abl i sh t he
aut hor i t y of t he st at e, as represent at i ve of t he social char act er of
t he process of pr oduct i on, over the i sol at ed workers who are onl y
its technical agent s.
Mar x' s most fertile years were devot ed t o t he el abor at i on of t he
cri t i que of classical political economy. In this critique Mar x shows
t hat t he errors of pol i t i cal economy deri ve from its concept i on of
pr oduct i on. For Mar x the rel at i ons of pr oduct i on ar e not
separ at ed from and cont r ast ed with mat er i al pr oduct i on as an
externally deri ved /- i mposed on a pre-existent -.-
Pr oduct i on is seen as a process which is indissolubly social and
mat er i al , ,..- // / -./ ,.. -. / /
./- Mor eover t hi s uni t y is not a har moni ous uni t y, at least in
a class society, but is a -., .-, t he -., .-,
/ /. /. -. ./- / ,..- In a capitalist society t hi s
cont r adi ct or y uni t y exists in the specific historical form of t he
cont r adi ct i on bet ween pr oduct i on as /. ,..- / ./.. -.
/. ,..- / .../.. It is this cont r adi ct i on whi ch Mar x
identifies at t he begi nni ng of c,/ in t he " Hegel i an" first
chapt er , where i t i s l ocat ed at t he hear t of t he commodi t y. The
clear di st i nct i on bet ween val ue and use-val ue, l ocat ed i n t he
"el ement ar y f or m" of capitalist weal t h, makes i t possible for Mar x
to devel op / /. / -. t he cont r ast bet ween concret e useful
labour and abstract value-creating labour, the point which "is
crucial t o an under st andi ng of political e c onomy" because i t
under pi ns such concept s as "l abour power " , "const ant and
vari abl e capi t al ", and "sur pl us val ue". The l at t er concept , is, for
exampl e, t r ansf or med. It i s no l onger seen as t he revenue whi ch
accrues to a di st ri but i ve class as its share of t he mat er i al pr oduct . It
is now seen as t he pr oduct of t he l abour process as a process of
pr oduct i on of val ue, of t he -,./- i mposed on the wor ker
within the l abour process t o wor k beyond t he t i me necessary t o
r epr oduce t he value of his or her l abour power :
We now see that the difference between l abour, consi dered on the one
hand as produci ng utilities, and on the other hand as creating value, a
difference which we discovered by our analysis of a commodi t y,
resolves itself into a distinction between two aspects of the product i on
process.
The product i on process, considered as the uni t y of the l abour
process and the process of creating value, is the process of product i on
of commodi t i es; considered as the unity of the l abour process and the
process of valorisation, it is t he capitalist process of pr oduct i on, or the
capitalist form of the pr oduct i on of commodi t i es.
This under st andi ng of pr oduct i on therefore makes possible a
t heory whi ch gives expl oi t at i on and class rel at i ons an /...
f oundat i on in pr oduct i on i nst ead of a ./... f oundat i on in a
part i cul ar mor al eval uat i on of the j ust i ce of rel at i ons of
di st r i but i on.
The -., f oundat i on of pr oduct i on is t he key to t he
marxi st t heor y of history and t o t he marxi st concept of t he totality.
Fi rst , t he /. / -- / ,/- expressed (perhaps
mi sl eadi ngl y) in the t endent i al " l a w" of t he falling rat e of profit
and t he count ervai l i ng t endenci es it calls fort h, expresses t he
concret e // ..../,-.- of t he f undament al cont r adi ct i on.
Secondl y, t he relations of pr oduct i on are from t he begi nni ng /
rel at i ons, " t he relations of pr oduct i on i n t hei r t ot al i t y const i t ut e
what are called the social rel at i ons, society, and specifically, a
society at a definite stage of hi st ori cal devel opment . "
1 5
There is,
t herefore, no quest i on of r educt i oni sm i n t aki ng t he rel at i ons of
pr oduct i on as the st ar t i ng poi nt for t he analysis. The
det er mi nat i on of social rel at i ons as rel at i ons of pr oduct i on is /.
,./ -. ...--. // ,. /, .// / ./-
. ./.-.. .-.. /. .--- ./- / ,..- -. .
...--.. ..../,.. /- / / ./- The basis of this
process i s t he cont r adi ct or y f oundat i on of pr oduct i on whi ch
const ant l y forces capital beyond t he i mmedi at e process of pr oduc-
t i on in or der to accompl i sh its val ori sat i on. In c,/ Mar x shows
this ri gorousl y for di st r i but i on, ci rcul at i on and even consumpt i on
as moments of the total process of social production which are
20 SIMON CLARKE
./.-.. ///, in t he rel at i ons const i t ut ed a r ound t he
i mmedi at e process of pr oduct i on, s ubor di nat ed t o the pr oduct i on
of value as moment s of the process of val ori sat i on of capi t al .
Correspondi ngl y, t he social rel at i ons of pr oduct i on appear in
specific economi c, political and i deol ogi cal forms, and t hei r
det er mi nat i on as moment s of the "r el at i ons of pr oduct i on i n t hei r
t ot al i t y" can onl y be t hr ough their hi st ori cal subsumpt i on under
the domi nant rel at i on of pr oduct i on i n t he devel opment of t he
cont radi ct i on on whi ch t hat rel at i on is based, t he analysis of whi ch
can establish concret el y bot h the /- / .--- of social
rel at i ons by t he capi t al rel at i on and t he ,./ /- of t hat
domi nat i on.
It is very i mpor t ant to stress t he fact t hat Mar x is concer ned with
the concret e hi st ori cal devel opment of the f undament al
cont r adi ct i on, wi t h specific and det er mi nat e historical processes,
and not with t he necessary devel opment of t he concept , whet her
this is i nt erpret ed in the Hegel i an sense of the di al ect i cal
devel opment of t he Idea or in t he positivist sense of t he deduct i ve
el uci dat i on of t he f undament al post ul at es of t he t heory. Mar x is
devel opi ng a t heory of real human hi st ory, he is not at t empt i ng to
legislate for hi st ory, t o dictate t heoret i cal l y what history can and
cannot be. It is in this sense t hat mar xi sm is not a hi st ori ci sm: it
does not seek to f or mul at e either anal yt i cal or dialectical laws of
historical devel opment . Hence t he cont r adi ct or y f oundat i on of
pr oduct i on underl i es t he historical devel opment of a society based
on t hat form of pr oduct i on, but t he cont r adi ct i on cannot
det ermi ne its own out come. Thus even t he "absol ut e general law
of capitalist accumul at i on" is i mmedi at el y qualified: "l i ke all
ot her laws, it is modi fi ed in its wor ki ng by many ci r cumst ances. "
16
For exampl e, t he " l a w" of the falling r at e of profit does not
det ermi ne t hat t he rat e of profit will fall. What it does det er mi ne is
t hat an increase in t he organi c composi t i on of capi t al , effected by,
for exampl e, t he concent r at i on or cent ral i sat i on of capi t al , will
lead to a fall in t he r at e of profit .-/. it is compensat ed by an
increase in the rat e of expl oi t at i on. Hence the l aw tells us to expect
t hat the concent r at i on and cent ral i sat i on of capi t al will be
associ at ed not wi t h a necessary fall in t he rat e of profit, but wi t h
the most st r enuous efforts on the par t of capi t al t o increase t he rat e
of expl oi t at i on by i ncreasi ng t he product i vi t y of l abour , by
intensifying l abour or by l engt heni ng t he wor ki ng day. Thi s l aw i s
not t he logical el abor at i on of the concept , it is the t heor et i cal
f or mul at i on of a f undament al aspect of t he everyday experi ence of
the worki ng class. In exactly the same way social rel at i ons are
subsumed under t he domi nant rel at i on of pr oduct i on not i n a
logical reduction which dissolves the specific characteristics of
t hose r el at i ons, but in a specific historical process t hr ough whi ch
capi t al , i nst i t ut i onal i sed (it must be added) in t he capitalist
ent erpri se, seeks to over come t he social barri ers set to its
val ori sat i on and in so doi ng .-. to seek to t ur n the whol e of
society i nt o a machi ne for t he pr oduct i on of surpl us val ue. This is a
specific hi st ori cal process, it is a t endency t hat is resi st ed, and it is a
cont r adi ct or y process in whi ch t he barri ers ar e never finally
over come. Hence the domi nat i on of capi t al i n any part i cul ar
society has specific limits, t hose limits being hi st ori cal limits t hat
are est abl i shed t hr ough st ruggl e and t hat cannot be defined in
advance. It is /. ..- / any part i cul ar soci al relation has
been hi st ori cal l y subsumed under t he capital rel at i on t hat i t can be
consi dered as a form of t hat rel at i on, and only to t hat extent. This
s ubs umpt i on is never det er mi ned in advance, it is always
cont est ed, and it has const ant l y to be r ei mposed if it is to be
mai nt ai ned. Thus Marx is not t ryi ng to devel op a predi ct i ve t heory
t hat can r educe the worl d to a set of f or mul ae, he is t ryi ng to
devel op a deeper under st andi ng of the forces in pl ay in order to
i nt ervene mor e effectively t o change t he wor l d: " The phi l osophers
have onl y -.,... the wor l d, the poi nt , however is to /-,. i t "
wr ot e Mar x i n the last of his "Theses on Feuer bach", and
pr esumabl y he meant it.
The er r or s of economi sm derive directly from its failure to grasp
the significance of Mar x' s cri t i que of classical pol i t i cal economy,
and so from its ret ent i on of the bourgeoi s concept i on of
pr oduct i on which charact eri ses t he latter. On t he one hand, t he
.,- of the forces and rel at i ons of pr oduct i on abolishes t he
dialectical rel at i on bet ween t he t wo aspects of t he process of
pr oduct i on, so t hat the pr i macy of pr oduct i on t akes the form of a
t echnol ogi cal det ermi ni sm which necessarily rest s on the met a-
physical f oundat i on of dogmat i c claims about t he nat ur e of t he
wor l d. On t he ot her hand, because t he "forces and rel at i ons of
pr oduct i on" are seen as t echni cal rel at i ons of pr oduct i on on whi ch
are super i mposed social rel at i ons (of di st r i but i on) , the -
., f oundat i on of pr oduct i on, and so t he basis of the marxi st
t heory of hi st ory, is abol i shed. Inst ead we have a rel at i on bet ween
the "forces and rel at i ons of pr oduct i on" whi ch i s al t ernat el y one
of cor r espondence and di sl ocat i on, and t he t heor y of history is
repl aced by a met aphysi cal l aw of hi st ory, the "di al ect i c", seen as a
mechani cal , ext ra-hi st ori cal l aw which det er mi nes history as a
succession of modes of pr oduct i on by governi ng t he progressi ve,
and exogenous, devel opment of the forces of pr oduct i on whi ch
underl i es it, each mode bei ng defined ahi st ori cal l y by the specific
/- / ,,,- of t he surpl us (rat her t han form of ,..
-. appropriate to a particular level of development of the
22 SIMON CLARKE
product i ve forces. The Stalinist t heor y of modes of pr oduct i on, its
separ at i on of dialectical from hi st ori cal mat eri al i sm, and its
evol ut i oni sm are all consequences of t he adopt i on of t he bour geoi s
concept i on of pr oduct i on.
1 7
There can surel y be no doubt t hat t he st art i ng poi nt of any
at t empt t o rest ore marxi sm must be t he critique of this dogmat i c
version of mar xi sm. To this extent Al t husser ' s project does at least
begin at the begi nni ng, even if it does not make its t rue objective
explicit. Al t husser is also qui t e right to poi nt out t hat not every
critique of economi sm is a marxi st cri t i que. In par t i cul ar , even if
we mi ght doubt t he political mot i ves and t he wider t heoret i cal
i mpl i cat i ons of his at t ack, Al t husser is qui t e right to poi nt out t he
compl ement ar i t y of t he " humani s t " cri t i que t o the " e c onomi s t "
devi at i on i t sought t o t ranscend. To this ext ent Al t husser i s qui t e
right t o at t ack t he "hi st or i ci sm", t hat i s t o say the met aphysi cal
phi l osophy of hi st or y, charact eri st i c of bot h " e c onomi s m" and
" humani s m" . However the quest i on we have to ask of Al t husser is
whet her he act ual l y gets t o the r oot of t hese "devi at i ons", whet her
he offers a f undament al critique which will enabl e us to rest ore its
aut hent i cal l y r evol ut i onar y char act er t o mar xi sm, or whet her he
rat her offers us a renewed version of dogmat i sm, depri ved of its
most " s candal ous " di mensi ons, t o accompany the el i mi nat i on of
the most " s candal ous " aspects of Stalinism in the renewal of t he
revisionism of t he PCF.
In his s.,/, :/- t.. Al t husser spells out for t he first t i me
his under st andi ng of t he "Stalinist devi at i on". He sees Stalinism as
a renewal of t he economi sm of the Second I nt er nat i onal , " t he
,/.-. ...-,. / /. s.-. t-.--/ He al so sees this
economi sm as a /.,. devi at i on, det er mi ned as a mome nt of
the economi sm- humani sm coupl e whi ch i s supposedl y char act er -
istic of bourgeoi s i deol ogy. Fi nal l y, he not es t hat this i deol ogy is
bourgeoi s because i t eliminates t he rel at i ons of pr oduct i on and t he
class struggle. Al t husser present s t hese findings, which have, in
one form or anot her , long been al most a commonpl ace a mong
marxi st critics of Stalinism, as an ori gi nal and t ent at i ve di scovery
("this is only a hypot hesi s") . However , we must give Al t husser
credit for recogni si ng t he economi sm of Stalinism, even if he di d so
rat her late. But we now come t o t he hear t of t he mat t er. We have t o
ask whet her Al t husser offers us a marxi st critique of this i deol ogy.
The answer is t hat he does not . To see this we must l ook at t he
way Al t husser appear s t o under st and this coupl e. Al t husser does
not pr ovi de a /../ critique of t he coupl e at all. He argues
t hat t he compl ement ar i t y of the el ement s of t he coupl e i s based on
the compl ement ar i t y of the " e c onomi s m" of the capi t al i st ' s
ideology and the "humanism" of legal ideology, the law being the
poi nt at whi ch t he t wo are j oi ned as a pai r. The " economi s m" , i n
the sense of /. -., / /. .-- - .// .---
/.. is not quest i oned at all by Al t husser. As I shal l argue in this
paper , Al t husser ret ai ns t he bourgeoi s concept i on of pr oduct i on
at t he cor e of his versi on of mar xi sm. The i mpl i cat i on of
Al t husser ' s cri t i que is t hat his objection is to t he ...-- of
bot h economi sm and humani s m, and not t o t he concept of
pr oduct i on on which t hey ar e based. This is t he sense in which he
regards "hi st or i ci sm" as t he f oundat i on of bot h " economi s m"
and " huma ni s m" . These t wo devi at i ons ar e based on t he
illegitimate general i sat i on of their specific or i ent at i ons t o society
of t he l awyer and the capi t al i st . This is, cor r espondi ngl y, why the
focus of Al t husser ' s i nt er pr et at i on of Mar x is t he nat ur e of t he
marxi st t ot al i t y, for he is seeki ng a non- r educt i oni st concept of the
whol e as a st ruct ured combi nat i on of el ement s whi ch can, in a
sense, .-/. " huma ni s m" and " economi s m" . The error of
Stalinism is not, t herefore, founded in its concept i on of
pr oduct i on, but in its concept i on of the t ot al i t y, not in its under -
st andi ng of t he economi c, but i n its at t empt t o r educe the "rel at i ve
a ut onomy" of ot her "i ns t ances " of the whol e. Al t husser is t ryi ng
to devel op a non- met aphysi cal concept i on of t he whol e in which
the bour geoi s (met aphysi cal ) concept of pr oduct i on can cont i nue
to find a pl ace.
It is not surpri si ng t hat Al t husser is unabl e to provi de a
t heoret i cal cri t i que of the "economi s m- humani s m coupl e", for in
the course of his critique he rejects as "i deol ogi cal " precisely t he
t heory whi ch Marx devel oped t o provi de this cri t i que, the t heor y
of commodi t y fetishism. The coupl e is not const i t ut ed at the level
of t he l aw, on the basis of t he compl ement ar i t y of t he capitalist and
the l awyer, but at a much mor e f undament al level, t hat of t he
commodi t y. The t heor y of commodi t y fetishism shows us
precisely how, in the exchange of commodi t i es, social rel at i ons
appear in t he form of rel at i ons of ./. to /-, To put t he
poi nt "phi l osophi cal l y":
Ci rcul at i on is the movement in which the general al i enat i on appears as
general appropri at i on and general appr opr i at i on as general
al i enat i on. As much, t hen, as the whole of this movement appears as a
social process, and as much as the individual moment s of this
movement arise from the conscious will and part i cul ar purposes of
i ndi vi dual s, so much does the totality of t he process appear as an
objective interrelation, which arises spont aneousl y from nat ur e; . . . cir-
cul at i on, because a totality of the social process, is al so the first form in
which t he social relation appears as somet hi ng independent of t he
individuals, but not only as, say, in a coin or in exchange value, but
extending to the whole of the social movement itself. The social
24 SIMON CLARKE
relation of individuals to one another as a power over the individuals
which has become aut onomous. . . is a necessary result of the fact that
the point of departure is not the free social individual.
18
It is t he t heory of commodi t y fetishism t hat makes it possi bl e to
under st and t he ideological significance of the law, and it is t he
t heory of commodi t y fetishism t hat enabl es us t o penet r at e t he
ideological "humani s m- economi s m coupl e" and so t o criticise i t
by t r ansf or mi ng our concept i on of soci al rel at i ons, and not by
simply r ear r angi ng t hem i nt o a new t ype of whol e.
Rancire' s cri t i que of Al t husser bri ngs out very clearly the
,// significance of Althusser' s approach to Stalinist
economi sm. Fundament al l y Al t husser ' s t heoret i cal rel at i on t o
economi sm r epr oduced the rel at i on of or t hodox communi s m t o
the politics of Stalinism. Fr om the point of view of t he or t hodox
communi st part i es in the 1960s dest al i ni sat i on involved a br eak
with the methods of the Stalinist per i od, without a fundamental
break with its pol i t i cs. The "excesses" of the Stalinist per i od f ound
their justification i n ar gument s whi ch rested on reduct i oni sm and
evolutionism, whi ch made it possi bl e to defend any pol i cy as
necessary means t o an inevitable end. Dest al i ni sat i on i nvol ved an
abandonment of t he reduct i oni st evolutionism of Stalinism, so
maki ng it l egi t i mat e to quest i on the means empl oyed (and this is
precisely how Al t husser poses t he quest i on in his s.,/, :/-
t.. Stalinism involved t he adopti on of unjustified means in
pursui t of unquest i onabl e ends). Thi s limited freedom of
manoeuvr e, however, coul d not t hr ow i nt o quest i on the aut hor i t y
of t he part y and t he inevitability of soci al i sm. Al t husser i ani sm
offered the part y one means of defendi ng its posi t i on, by justifying
t he aut hor i t y of t he part y on t he basis of its scientific
under st andi ng of t he "conj unct ur e" r at her t han its pri vi l eged
relation t o an i nevi t abl e future, and by basi ng the inevitability of
socialism on pol i t i cal and not " e c onomi c " factors and so
dissociating the comi ng revol ut i on from t he crisis of capi t al i sm.
This latter di ssoci at i on of economi c from political st ruggl e and of
economi c from political crisis must pr ove very at t ract i ve for a
part y which is seeki ng precisely to ret ai n cont rol of gr owi ng
worki ng-cl ass mi l i t ancy on t he shop floor and t o est abl i sh its
political moder at i on in a peri od of capi t al i st cr i si s. "
It woul d be absur d t o reduce t he appeal of Al t husser' s wor k t o a
nar r ow concern of t he l eadershi p of t he Fr ench Communi s t Part y.
The maj or appeal of Al t husseri ani sm has been t o young
intellectuals, part i cul arl y i n academi c i nst i t ut i ons, most of whom
have no affiliation wi t h the Communi s t Part y, and most of whom
woul d no doubt seek t o dissociate Al t husser ' s politics from his
theoretical "achievements". We therefore have to understand the
basis of t he appeal of Al t husseri ani sm t o t hese intellectuals.
Cert ai nl y it has a superficial appeal in r espondi ng to the most
out r ageous aspects of Stalinist dogmat i sm, in havi ng a
superficially advanced and sophi st i cat ed char act er , in offering a
central pl ace i n the r evol ut i onar y process t o t he i nt el l ect ual , while
deval ui ng t hose ( "economi c") worki ng-cl ass st ruggl es from whi ch
t he intellectual is excl uded, and in havi ng a rhet ori cal "ul t r a-
leftist" di mensi on in assert i ng the ubi qui t y of a "class st r uggl e"
which i s rel at ed only i n t he "l ast i nst ance" t o t he "economi c
st r uggl e". However , it is difficult not to believe t hat seri ous
marxi st s woul d feel distinctly uneasy t hat t he deeper appeal of
Al t husser i ani sm i s not t o t hei r political, but t o t hei r bourgeoi s
intellectual instincts. On t he one hand, Al t husseri ani sm ri gorousl y
r epr oduces bot h the division i nt o academi c "di sci pl i nes" and t he
rel at i ons of aut hor i t y of t he bourgeoi s academi c i nst i t ut i on. On
t he ot her hand, Al t husseri ani sm ri gorousl y r epr oduces t he
familiar doct ri nes of bour geoi s sociology and phi l osophy, and i n
par t i cul ar t he domi nant forms of each, st ruct ural -funct i onal i sm
and neo-posi t i vi sm. The r easons for this convergence are not har d
to find, for bourgeoi s soci ol ogy is based precisely on the rejection
of the "evol ut i oni st economi s m" of mar xi s m, and so is
pr eoccupi ed with the ar t i cul at i on of the levels of a compl ex whol e,
while bour geoi s phi l osophy is based on the rejection of the
"hi st or i ci sm" of mar xi sm, and so is preoccupi ed wi t h the et ernal
st at us of scientific t r ut hs. (I am not ...-, sociology and
phi l osophy to their cent ral ideological pr eoccupat i ons. It is -
/ these are their concerns that they are /.,..
Bourgeoi s sociology follows classical political economy in being
based on a concept i on of pr oduct i on as a t echni cal process whi ch
under pi ns the et erni sat i on of capitalist rel at i ons of pr oduct i on and
so charact eri ses this soci ol ogy ri gorousl y as a form of bourgeoi s
ideology. Cont empor ar y st r uct ur al funct i onal i sm, like Al t husser-
i ani sm, rejects a crude t echnol ogi cal det er mi ni sm. It follows
classical political economy in basi ng itself on the .--
/....- /. ./-/ ./- -/--, / - -./
,..- -. / ./- / ./.- -... /,
.-./, / /. -.- / ,..- .// . -,,.. - /.
./- / ,..- The former cannot , however , be reduced to
the l at t er, for they involve t he rel at i on of " owne r s hi p" whi ch is
defined politically and/ or ideologically. Social rel at i ons cannot
t herefore be reduced t o t echni cal rel at i ons. The st art i ng poi nt of
soci ol ogy cannot t herefore be the " economy" , the relations of
pr oduct i on, for this onl y exists within society. The st art i ng poi nt
can onl y be the pre-given whol e, "soci et y". On this basis
structural-functionalism defines a variety of different levels
26 SIMON CLARKE
accor di ng to t he funct i ons t hey fulfil in rel at i on to t he whol e. The
identity of funct i ons and levels vari es from one account t o
anot her , but t he basi c principle i s unchanged. The di fferent i at i on
of functions det er mi nes t hat each level shoul d have its own
specificity and its own aut onomy relative t o ot her levels. The
different funct i ons are hi erarchi cal l y or der ed, t he t echni cal
requi rement s of mat eri al pr oduct i on nor mal l y being pr i mar y
because of t he supposed pr i mar y requisite of physi cal
r epr oduct i on. The hi erarchy t akes t he form of limits i mposed by
one level on the vari at i on of ot her levels. Within these limits of
vari at i on the different levels are t hemsel ves st ruct ured under t he
domi nance of t hei r relative functions i n t he whol e, and not under
the domi nance of ot her levels. They are therefore det er mi ned as
levels of the compl ex whol e, and not as expressions of ot her
levels.
20
Bourgeoi s phi l osophy rests on si mi l ar ideological f oundat i ons. I
have al ready not ed t he historical f oundat i on of the subj ect -obj ect
rel at i on in commodi t y fetishism. Mor e specifically, with its
secul ari sat i on, phi l osophy acqui res t he pr i mar y role of defender of
the scientific cl ai ms of bourgeoi s i deol ogy (that is to say, of
guar ant or of t hose " t r ut hs " of bour geoi s science whi ch are "hel d
t o be sel f-evi dent " and so which cannot be est abl i shed by t hose
sciences t hemsel ves). The cont empl at i ve charact er of bour geoi s
science, which is based on the bourgeoi s separat i on of ment al from
manual l abour , becomes the basis on whi ch the aut hor i t y of
science is est abl i shed ideologically. The historical char act er of the
concept s of science is systematically effaced and t hey ar e given an
eternal reality of t hei r own. Hence t he bourgeoi s phi l osophy of
science is focused precisely on l egi t i mat i ng the supposedl y
universal char act er of historical cat egori es and of giving par t i cul ar
t rut hs an et ernal st at us. This is as much t he case with nomi nal i sm
or convent i onal i sm, for which no reality cor r esponds t o t he
categories of sci ence, as it is wi t h posi t i vi sm, for t he cat egori es
whose validity is relative remai n t hemsel ves equally, or even -.
securely, absol ut e. Hence bourgeoi s phi l osophy i s admi r abl y
suited to Al t husser ' s t ask, which is precisely to est abl i sh t he
aut hor i t y of his own version of science.
21
In ot her di sci pl i nes, as I shall i ndi cat e in passing in this paper ,
Al t husser r epr oduces the most avant - gar de posi t i ons of bour geoi s
ideology. In this paper I shall concent r at e on Al t husser' s t heor y of
society, since ot her s have discussed his phi l osophy at l engt h. The
i mpor t ance of Al t husser in ot her fields shoul d not , however , be
i gnored. In par t i cul ar , in political science Al t husser i ani sm, as
i nt erpret ed by Poul ant zas, offers a mar ked convergence wi t h the
approach of systems theory.
22
In the study of cultural phenomena
Al t husser i ani sm legitimates t he most avant - gar de forms of neo-
Fr eudi ani sm, in t erms of t he supposed .-../ function of
i deol ogy, t he "i nt erpel l at i on of t he subj ect ".
Thi s r epr oduct i on of t he most avant -garde t heoret i cal posi t i ons
of t he cont empor ar y bourgeoi s social sciences must go a l ong way
t o expl ai ni ng t he appeal of Al t husseri ani sm t o young intellectuals,
for many of t he latter come t o marxi sm i n r esponse t o the inability
of t he bour geoi s disciplines t o cope with t he radi cal i sat i on of t he
intellectuals which has under l ai n the cont empor ar y "cr i ses" i n
t hose disciplines. It is easy for Al t husseri ani sm to capt ure t hese
i nt el l ect ual s, for it offers an easy familiarity embedded in a radi cal
rhet ori c whi ch claims fami l i ar t hemes for mar xi sm. This is t he
great danger which Al t husseri ani sm poses, for it is al so
charact eri sed by the same dead- ends, and t he same empt y circles
as the t heori es t hat have been rejected. If Al t husseri ani sm is t aken
for mar xi sm, t he responses of many will be a rejection of mar xi sm
al ong wi t h bourgeoi s t heori es, and a t urn t o t he mor e congeni al
familiarity of empi ri ci sm. If marxi sm is to capitalise on t he
"cr i ses" in t he social sciences it is essential t hat Al t husseri an
mar xi sm be revealed for what it is a superficially radi cal
rhet ori c wi t hi n which t he di scredi t ed doct ri nes of t he bourgeoi si e
find their last (latest?) rest i ng place.
23
In this paper I shall l ook at Al t husser' s most i mpor t ant wor ks,
t and s..-, c,/ in or der to establish t hat
Al t husser ' s work is consi st ent l y under pi nned by a concept i on of
the rel at i ons of pr oduct i on which is, in t he strict sense, bourgeoi s.
As a result of this Al t husseri ani sm r epr oduces t he ar gument s of
bourgeoi s ideology. My critical comment s on Al t husser will
largely be di rect ed t o est abl i shi ng this connect i on between t he
concept i on of pr oduct i on and t he r epr oduct i on of bourgeoi s
sociological and phi l osophi cal posi t i ons, and with showi ng
schemat i cal l y t hat t he marxi st concept of pr oduct i on, devel oped
i n Mar x' s critique of classical political economy, has qui t e
different i mpl i cat i ons for t he t heory of society and for phi l osophy.
Li mi t at i ons of space di ct at e t hat the l at t er ar gument s are
necessarily onl y i ndi cat i ve. In t he last anal ysi s it is not my
f or mul at i on of Mar x' s cri t i que of political economy t hat I woul d
like t o count er pose t o Al t husser i ani sm, but t hat of Marx himself.
Thi s cri t i que was the qui t e self-conscious pr oduct of ten years of
wor k i n whi ch Mar x knew precisely what he was doi ng. Its
recovery does not requi re a " s ympt omat i c" r eadi ng, but a nai ve
one, a r eadi ng which pays at t ent i on to what Mar x says, -. ./
, /. ,-, wi t hout readi ng Mar x t hr ough the grid of
bourgeoi s ideology. If " mar xi s t s " woul d onl y r ead Marx, and
particularly Marx's critique of political economy in c,/ and in
28 SIMON CLARKE
:/.. / s.,/. /.. forget t i ng about his " abs ences " and
"si l ences" unt i l t hey have mast er ed t he clear and i nsi st ent
ar gument s t hat ar e ,..- in his wor k, Al t husser i ani sm woul d
become no mor e t han a bad memor y.
2 4
In looking at t and s..-, c,/ I shall show how t he
at t empt t o est abl i sh t he aut onomy of t heor y leads t o a bour geoi s
i nt erpret at i on of Mar x. t r epr oduces the ant i -reduct i oni st
ar gument s of bour geoi s sociology, s..-, c,/ r epr oduces t he
anti-historicist ar gument s of bour geoi s phi l osophy, before
at t empt i ng t o "dehi st or i ci se" t he Stalinist concept of t he mode of
pr oduct i on. I shall begin with a brief look at t he di spl aced
ant i ci pat i on of future posi t i ons in Al t husser' s essay on
Mont esqui eu.
:/. ,. ../-..
In ret rospect we can al ready see Al t husser ' s project at wor k in his
essay on Mont esqui eu. This essay br oaches t he subject of Mar x' s
dialectic obl i quel y, by at t r i but i ng t o Mont esqui eu hi msel f t he
discoveries whi ch ar e later seen as mar ki ng Mar x' s scientific
revol ut i on. In t hi s essay we learn t hat Mont esqui eu di d not have a
circular expressive t ot al i t y, but a t ot al i t y in which t her e was
det er mi nat i on in t he last instance by t he "pr i nci pl e", but in whi ch
the reverse effectivity of the " n a t u r e " on the "pr i nci pl e" was
possible wi t hi n cert ai n limits.
25
This concept i on is t hen compar ed
to t hat of Mar x: " I n bot h cases it is a mat t er of a unity whi ch may
be har moni ous or cont r adi ct or y, i n bot h cases this det er mi nat i on
does nevertheless cede to the det er mi ned el ement a whol e regi on of
effectivity, but subor di nat e effectivity. " Thi s essay also di scovers a
way of br eaki ng with historicism t hat was later adopt ed by Bal i bar
in s..-, c,/ The unity of nat ur e and principle of t he st at e
may be either adequat e or cont r adi ct or y. In t he latter case t he st at e
form will change. Hence we have a dynami c but non-t el eol ogi cal
totality.
26
This essay l eads us already t o quest i on the marxist char act er of
Al t husser' s most f undament al concept s, when he can fi nd t hese
concept s in t he wor k of the -./-/ -./ Mont esqui eu.
The concept of det er mi nat i on in t he last instance is par t i cul ar l y
i l l umi nat ed by t hi s essay, for it is clearly given a mechani cal
i nt erpret at i on here: t he last i nst ance limits the free var i at i on of t he
ot her i nst ances, but within these limits it has no pri vi l eged
effectivity. The last instance is t herefore seen in essence as an
..-/ rest ri ct i on on the range of possi bl e forms, but in no way as
det ermi ni ng wi t hi n this r ange. Thus t he concept of "rel at i ve
aut onomy" , as aut onomy within l i mi t s, is al ready prefi gured in
this essay. The essay strikingly confi rms Ranci re' s ar gument t hat
Al t husser assi mi l at es Mar x t o mechani cal mat eri al i sm.
We can deal very briefly wi t h t he first t wo essays in t which
mar k t he t ent at i ve and expl or at or y begi nni ngs of Al t husser' s
ret urn t o Mar x. The first essay i nt roduces the di scussi on by not i ng
the Feuer bachi an pr obl emat i c embedded i n Mar x' s early works.
27
The second essay, " On t he Young Mar x" , explicitly at t acks the
economistic f oundat i on of Stalinism for t he first time. However,
the at t ack is focused on modes of under st andi ng Mar x' s wor k,
rat her t han on Mar x' s wor k itself. The essay i nt roduces t he
concept s of t he " pr obl emat i c" and t he "epi st emol ogi cal br eak".
The essay at t acks "hi st or i ci st " i nt erpret at i ons of Mar x' s wor k,
i nt r oduci ng a cari cat ure of Hegel as a sur r ogat e for " economi s m" ,
and affirms t he scientific char act er of Mar x' s wor k as well as t he
political need t o ret urn t o t hat wor k. However , t he project i s
defined in t er ms of the r enunci at i on of ideological probl emat i cs in
favour of a r et ur n to real i t y: it is the ../ char act er of t he
historicist i nt erpret at i on whi ch is chal l enged her e, in its belief in
the coherence of the worl d of ideology. This idealist historicism is
criticised in t er ms of a mat eri al i st hi st ori ci sm, a logic of the
i r r upt i on of real history in i deol ogy itself: accor di ng to Althusser
Mar x did not change pr obl emat i cs, but br oke wi t h ideological
pr obl emat i cs as such, t o f ound science directly on an encount er
with reality.
28
This f or mul at i on may be closer t o Marx t han l at er versions, but
it was i nadequat e for Al t husser ' s purposes for several reasons.
First, t he historicist concept i on of ideology will al ways t hreat en
to s wamp a positivist concept i on of science and so t hreat en t he
aut onomy and t he integrity of t heory because t her e i s no way of
,.-..-, the break wi t h i deol ogy, and so hi st ory, in any
part i cul ar case. Secondly, t he concept i on of sci ence, which comes
"wi t hi n a hai r sbr eadt h of ' posi t i vi sm' ",
2 9
leaves no place for t he
phi l osopher t o play an i ndependent role as t heoret i cal l y (later
politically) i nformed arbi t er of scientificity. Thi r dl y, the mode of
at t ack on Stalinism, whi ch is to reduce Stalinism to "historicism"
and t o assi mi l at e "hi st or i ci sm" t o "Hegel ", di ct at es t hat Al t husser
compl et e t he el i mi nat i on of "hi st or i ci sm" from his i nt erpret at i on.
These pr eoccupat i ons soon come t o prevail i n t he Al t husseri an
i nt er pr et at i on of Marx.
In t he essay "Cont r adi ct i on and Over det er mi nat i on" Al t husser
devel ops his at t ack on economi sm, now comi ng i nt o t he open and
at t acki ng t he vulgar not i on of history as the si mpl e expression of
the basi c cont r adi ct i on bet ween forces and rel at i ons of
pr oduct i on. Thi s latter not i on i s assimilated t o Hegel t hr ough t he
concept of i nversi on, so t hat t he essay focuses on t he rel at i ons
between Marx's and Hegel's dialectics, the problem being that of
30 SIMON CLARKE
the specificity of t he marxist di al ect i c. Al t husser' s basi c ar gument
is t hat if Mar x had simply inverted t he Hegel i an di al ect i c, he woul d
have r emai ned wi t hi n the i deol ogi cal pr obl emat i c of Hegel i an
phi l osophy.
30
The specific propert i es of Mar x' s concept of di al ect i c are
expressed i n t he concept of over det er mi nat i on. The Russian
revol ut i on di d not t ake place because i n Russia the cont r adi ct i on
between forces and relations of pr oduct i on had reached its highest
poi nt of devel opment , but because of an "accumul at i on of
ci rcumst ances and cur r ent s" whi ch /.. i nt o a r upt ur al uni t y",
maki ng i t possi bl e for the general c ont r a di c t i on. . . t o become
.. in t he st r ongest sense, to become a r upt ur al pr i nci pl e". The
cont radi ct i on is therefore very compl ex, this compl exi t y being
expressed in t he concept of over det er mi nat i on:
The .-, /., [the accumul at i on of "cont r adi ct i ons", "ci rcum-
st ances", "cur r ent s"] -.. in this "fusi on" into a revol ut i onary
rupt ure, -... /, /. .- ..-. -. .//.., by what they
are, and accordi ng to the specific modalities of their act i on. In
-.-, this .-, they .-.. and complete their basic
ani mat i ng uni t y, but at the same time they also bring out its -.. the
"cont r adi ct i on" is inseparable from the total st ruct ure of t he social
body in which it is found, i nseparabl e from its formal -.- of
existence, and even from the --. it governs; it is radically //...
/, /.- det ermi ni ng, but also det ermi ned in one and t he same move-
ment , and det ermi ned by the vari ous /.../ and --. of t he social
format i on it ani mat es; it might be called .....--.. -
,-,/.
::
Ret urni ng t o Mar x, Al t husser argues t hat Marx does not si mpl y
invert Hegel' s dialectic, but changes bot h its t er ms and its
relations. The t erms civil society and st at e are replaced by t he ideas
of mode of pr oduct i on, social class and st at e. Inst ead of a dialectic
in which t he super st r uct ur e is an expression of t he st r uct ur e,
Al t husser i nt r oduces the not i ons of "det er mi nat i on in t he last
instance by t he (economi c) mode of pr oduct i on" and " t he relative
aut onomy of t he superst ruct ures and their specific effectivity. "
This essay is of cent ral i mpor t ance in est abl i shi ng t he
framework wi t hi n which di scussi on of t he marxist di al ect i c will
t ake place. It is therefore essential to isolate the basi s of t he
critique of Stalinism in pl ay here. It is wor t h poi nt i ng out initially
t hat it is not based on any exami nat i on of t he works of Mar x or of
Lenin. It is r at her based on t he obser vat i on t hat many different
"ci r cumst ances" and "cur r ent s ", somet i mes referred t o as
"cont r adi ct i ons ", were i n pl ay i n t he Russi an r evol ut i on, and t hat
these current s and ci rcumst ances cannot be ..... to t he st at us of
.,.- of a basic contradiction. The problem is therefore that
of t he rel at i on of t he "cont r adi ct i ons " in pl ay in a "cur r ent
s i t uat i on" t o t he basic cont r adi ct i on. Economi s m i s unabl e t o
explain t he object with whi ch Al t husser has conf r ont ed it, so an
al t ernat i ve concept i on of t he dialectic is called for.
The power of Al t husser' s ar gument hangs on t he appr opr i at e-
ness of t he pr obl em he poses. This pr obl em is not a t heoret i cal
pr obl em: t he series of cur r ent s each with its own essence and
effectivity is present ed to t heor y as a given, not itself subject to a
critical exami nat i on whi ch is reserved for t he concept of t he
dialectic. The expl anat i on of t he revol ut i on is al ready given.
Russia was t he weakest link because "it had accumul at ed t he
largest sum of historical cont r adi ct i ons t hen possi bl e. " This sum is
expl ai ned by t he f undament al cont radi ct i on of bei ng "t he most
backwar d and t he most advanced nat i on", whi ch i n t ur n alludes t o
the fact t hat Russia was "pr egnant with t wo r evol ut i ons. "
33
Russi a' s r evol ut i onar y si t uat i on is therefore expl ai ned ul t i mat el y
by her r evol ut i onar y si t uat i on t he perfect circle of empi ri ci sm.
The expl anat i on of t he Russi an revol ut i on is not in quest i on. We
al ready know all the compl ex factors whi ch act as "effective
det er mi nat i ons ". As marxi st s we also know t hat "of course t he
basic cont r adi ct i on domi nat i ng the pe r i od. . . is act i ve in all t hese
' cont r adi ct i ons' and even i n t hei r ' fusi on' ".
34
The pr obl em i s t o
reconcile t he t wo t heoret i cal l y. But if the "effective det er mi na-
t i ons " are known i ndependent l y of t he di al ect i c, this dialectic can
be no mor e t han an empt y r het or i c, a decl ar at i on of faith in t he
uni versal , but invisible, power of the mar xi st dialectic. For
Al t husser t he account of t he "effective det er mi nat i ons " is t he
given t o whi ch the di al ect i c must be moul ded. The concept of
over det er mi nat i on is t herefore count er posed to t he concept of
expressi on on t he basis of t he principle of t he irreducibility of t he
" r e a l " (i.e. t he worl d of appear ances) . Where does this pri nci pl e
come from? Far from bei ng a marxist pri nci pl e, it is the cardi nal
pri nci pl e of bourgeoi s empi ri ci sm. In effect this principle asserts
t hat t he wor l d is as it appear s in bourgeoi s i deol ogy, so t hat t he
object is al r eady given in t hat ideology. Mar x asserts t hat /. ./.
-- /. ..-/.. ./ / ,,.-. -. .-..-. /.
./. //. .. / /- / ,,.-. /-
.,... - /. .,. / /.,. ../,, Al t husser' s
obj ect i on t o economi sm r epr oduces the obj ect i on of bourgeoi s
empi ri ci sm and not t hat of mar xi sm.
In view of Al t husser' s ar gument s t hat mar xi sm is not an
empi ri ci sm it is i mpor t ant to be very clear what is meant here by
/.,. empi ri ci sm. The er r or of bourgeoi s empi ri ci sm is not , as
Al t husser woul d have us believe, t hat it seeks knowl edge of reality.
For most people this is not "empiricism", for it is virtually a
32 SIMON CLARKE
t aut ol ogy: t he concept of knowl edge implies a real i t y t hat i s '
known (even if t hat reality is spi ri t ual ). The er r or of bourgeoi s
empiricism is t hat it mi st akes its own ideological pr econcept i ons
for reality, t hus it gives us knowl edge only of its ideological
pr econcept i ons: i nst ead of t aki ng reality for its obj ect , it t akes its
given object for t he real. For Mar x, t herefore, what appear s at first
as t he " r e a l " is reduci bl e, not because Marx is a met aphysi ci an
who want s t o find ideal essences beneat h reality, t hat ar e i n some
sense mor e real t han reality, but because t he appear ances must be
subjected t o critical exami nat i on t o discover whet her or not they
accord with real i t y. Thus t he er r or of bourgeoi s empi ri ci sm is t hat
it is insufficiently critical of its own preconcept i ons. Mar x does not
count er pose his own privileged vision of reality t o t he mystical
illusions of bougeoi s ideology, he count er poses t he concept of the
critique to t he concept of t he given, so it is t hr ough a cri t i que of t he
pr econcept i ons of bourgeoi s i deol ogy t hat Marx arri ves at a mor e
adequat e basis for knowl edge, and mor e adequat e can onl y mean
mor e adequat e ./, Bourgeoi s ideology is not merel y a
part i cul ar poi nt of view, it is a poi nt of view t hat is //.
:
Al t husser does not quest i on t he f undament al concept s of
Stalinism, and i n part i cul ar t he economi st concept i on of
pr oduct i on whi ch underlies its concept i on of t he cont r adi ct i on
between forces and relations of pr oduct i on as t he ,.-.- of
hi st ory. He r at her seeks t o devel op an al t ernat i ve concept of t he
whole which will relate the economi st i c "rel at i ons of pr oduct i on"
to history in a --...- manner . Thus this cri t i que focuses
not on the concept of pr oduct i on, but on t he quest i on of the
-,/., of a whole whi ch bot h is and is not subject to
det er mi nat i on by the economi c. The "compl exi t y" of this whol e
expresses t he cont r adi ct or y r equi r ement s i mposed on it.
Al t husser' s cri t i que of economi sm calls t o mi nd t he al t ernat i ve
appr oaches t o Ri cardi ani sm of Mar x and of vul gar economy.
Ri car do' s t heor y of value led hi m i nt o a cont r adi ct i on, for he
sought t o identify the forms of surpl us value (profit and rent)
i mmedi at el y wi t h surpl us val ue itself, despite t he fact t hat t he t wo
cont r adi ct ed one anot her . Vul gar economy r es ponded t o
Ri car do' s " r educt i oni s m" by abandoni ng any at t empt t o devel op
the cri t i que of i mmedi at e appear ances, and so abandoned
Ri car do' s t heor y of val ue. Mar x, on the ot her ha nd, offered a
.. of Ri car di ani sm' s met aphysi cal concept of val ue, maki ng
value a soci al , hi st ori cal , phenomenon, and ri gorousl y rel at i ng the
forms of appear ance of sur pl us val ue t o sur pl us val ue as
-/-.. /- foundi ng t he cont r adi ct or y rel at i on bet ween
the t wo i n t he devel opment of t he cont radi ct i on i nher ent i n t he
commodity itself. Althusser, faced with the contradictions of
economi sm, follows vul gar economy i n maki ng t he appear ance
the measur e of all t hi ngs, a nd so in effectively abandoni ng t he l aw
of val ue, whi ch is t he specifically capi t al i st form of t he
cont r adi ct i on bet ween forces and rel at i ons of pr oduct i on, by
abandoni ng i t t o the last i nst ance whi ch never comes, i nst ead of
subjecting the met aphysi cal dogmat i st f or mul at i on of the law to a
marxi st cri t i que.
36
The poi nt can be made by l ooki ng not at a superficial account of
1917, but l ooki ng at t he specific features of leninism in t hat
cont ext . Leni n did not have the pr obl em of discovering a
f or mul at i on of the dialectic sufficiently "sophi st i cat ed" t o rel at e
an accumul at i on of al r eady given " cont r adi ct i ons " t o a
f undament al cont r adi ct i on. Leni n' s pr obl em was precisely t he
opposi t e, it was the pr obl em of l ocat i ng, in all t hei r complexity, t he
conflicting social forces in pl ay in Russia in 1917. The essential
conflicts and their i nt errel at i ons were not i mmedi at el y appar ent ,
but were onl y located on t he basis of a r i gor ous marxi st analysis
whi ch st ar t ed from t he f undament al cont r adi ct i on i nt r oduced by
the mode of domi nat i on of capi t al over Russi an society. It was this
analysis whi ch enabl ed Leni n t o locate t he f undament al class
divisions in Russi a, most not abl y in :/. t.../,-.- / c,/-
- s. and in t-,./- and to l ocat e t he rel at i on between t he
resulting conflicts, expressed in the objective (because founded in
the rel at i ons of pr oduct i on) uni t y of t he sl ogan "Br ead, Peace and
Land" . Far from t aki ng t he " cur r ent s " and "ci r cumst ances" as
given, Leni n subjected t hem to a ri gorous exami nat i on. It was onl y
/. ..- / the Bolshevik Part y l ocat ed t he f undament al
cleavages in Russian society as .//..- /- of the same
f undament al cont r adi ct i on t hat the " r upt ur al uni t y" creat ed by
the Bol shevi ks was an objective r at her t han an oppor t uni st i c
uni t y. Leni n' s mar xi sm consi st s not only in his faith in an ability to
.. a uni t y from t he given current s and ci rcumst ances, but al so
in his under st andi ng t hat a successful socialist revol ut i on depends
on t he /... /.-.- of such a uni t y.
The next essay, " On t he Mat eri al i st Di al ect i c", seeks t o give some
subst ance t o the claims of "Cont r adi ct i on and Over det er mi na-
t i on" while at t he same t i me r espondi ng t o criticism by seeking t o
establish t he aut onomy of t heor y. This dual ai m makes the essay
confusi ng.
The essay st art s with a concept i on of t he "soci al f or mat i on" as
bei ng compos ed of a series of levels, t he levels bei ng defined as
pract i ces. The det er mi nant practice i s "mat er i al pr oduct i on" .
Pract i ce itself is defined as "any process of -/-- of a
determinate given raw material into a determinate ,.. a
34 SIMON CLARKE
t r ansf or mat i on effected by a det er mi nat e human l abour , using
det er mi nat e means (of ' pr oduct i on' ) . In any pr act i ce t hus
concei ved, t he ...--- moment (or element) is nei t her t he raw
mat eri al nor t he pr oduct , but t he pract i ce i n the nar r ow sense: the
moment of t he //. / -/-- itself, which sets to wor k,
in a specific st r uct ur e, men, means and a technical met hod of
utilising the means ".
3 7
The di scussi on of this concept i on of t he social f or mat i on is
actually cent red on one pi vot al pract i ce, namel y t heoret i cal
pract i ce. Wi t hi n t heoret i cal pract i ce " Theor y" i s cent r al : the
"Theor y of pract i ce in gener al ", "i n which is t heoret i cal l y
expressed t he essence of t heoret i cal pract i ce in general , t hr ough it
the essence of pract i ce, and t hr ough it t he essence of
t r ansf or mat i ons, of the ' devel opment ' of things in gener al ".
Theory is t he guar di an of or t hodoxy in bot h t heoret i cal and
political pract i ce.
38
Havi ng est abl i shed the cent ral i t y of Theor y, Al t husser proceeds
to establish its aut onomy. Thi s is achi eved by insisting t hat the
det er mi nant mome nt of t heoret i cal pract i ce i s t he means of
t heoret i cal l abour " ' t heor y' and met hod" , so t hat t heoret i cal
practice is not domi nat ed by ei t her its raw mat er i al or its
product .
39
Althusser further insists t hat t he st ruct ure of practices
within which t heoret i cal pract i ce is inserted is compl ex, bri ngi ng
us back t o t he over det er mi ned compl ex whol e. Al t husser tells us
no mor e about this whol e, beyond t he deni al t hat his is a pluralist
concept i on since t he unity of t he whol e is not sacrificed. It is
simply t hat t he uni t y is "t he .-, / /. -,/., .//", which
sounds very like t he cont i ngent uni t y of t he worl d of appear ances.
This uni t y al so, we are assured, implies domi nat i on: /. -,/.
.//. / /. .-, / ... ./.. - .---.

The ori gi nal i t y of this essay lies in its i nt r oduct i on of a
part i cul ar concept of "pr act i ce" as a cent ral concept of marxi sm.
The concept is not , however, i nt r oduced on t he basis on a readi ng
of Marx, /. .. .,//, - .. ./// /. .--, /
/../ ,. The r eason for this is also clear t he essay
in quest i on is a response to criticism from within t he PCF. The
response to criticism is not a defence of posi t i ons t aken, but a
defence of t he aut onomy of t heor y.
This small fact is of enor mous significance for under st andi ng
Al t husser' s mar xi s m, for it is from this pr agmat i c ori gi n t hat a
compl et el y new version of Mar x i s devel oped t o pr ovi de t he out er
defences of t he aut onomy of t heor y. This version of Mar x does not
derive from a ..-, of Mar x at all, but from t he need to invent
a Mar x who can defend t he i sol at i on, aut onomy, and aut hor i t y, of
theoretical activity. The link between the two is provided by the
concept of ,. a nd t he link is pl ai n in this essay, for t he
i nt er pr et at i on of Mar x is pr oposed very clearly on the basis of a
discussion of "t heor et i cal pr act i ce". In or der t o establish t he
aut onomy of t heory Al t husser i nt roduces a concept i on of pr act i ce
in whi ch pract i ce is defi ned as -.. ,/ ., whi ch
involves t he /- / / ,/ ., /- /. /
./- - .// -... so t hat it becomes trivially t he case
t hat any and every pract i ce in Al t husser' s sense is aut onomous , for
the connect i on bet ween pract i ces has been di ssol ved. Hence t he
appar ent l y very concret e concept of pract i ce offered by Al t husser
is in fact an ideological abst r act i on, for it abst r act s from t he soci al
rel at i ons wi t hi n whi ch any pract i ce must exist. In generalising t hi s
result to all ot her pract i ces, Al t husser generalises the i deol ogi cal
concept i on of pr oduct i on, and t he associ at ed concept i on of
society, whi ch is implicit wi t hi n it: the concept i on of pr oduct i on as
a concret e pract i cal act i vi t y i ndependent of t he social rel at i ons
wi t hi n whi ch it is i nsert ed. In adopt i ng t he l i beral defence of t he
aut onomy of science, Al t husser adopt s t he liberal view of society
whi ch accompani es it.
41
The obvi ousness of t he cent ral i t y i n mar xi sm of the concept of
pract i ce, as defined by Al t husser, does not bear very close
exami nat i on. This can be br ought out most clearly if we l ook at
what Al t husser calls " mat er i al " pr oduct i on. The appl i cat i on of
t he general concept of pract i ce t o t he pract i ce of mat er i al
pr oduct i on gives us a defi ni t i on of the l abour pr ocess in which men
work up nat ur e with means of pr oduct i on. In this process t he
l abour of t r ansf or mat i on i s fi rst said t o be t he det er mi nant
moment , but we soon fi nd t hat we have t o "abs t r act from men i n
the means of pr oduct i on" , so t hat it is the means of l abour whi ch
are det ermi nant .
42
Thi s cl ai m is asserted wi t h respect to t heoret i cal
pract i ce, and general i sed t o ot her pract i ces. The t er m
" det er mi nant " is given no cont ent , for we ar e never told ./ is
det er mi ned by t he means of l abour. Far from bei ng obvi ous t hat
the l abour process is det er mi ned by the means of l abour , t hi s is in
general not the case, but is rat her ,./ // /...-.-
/ /. ,/ -.. / ,..- In ot her modes the l abour
process i s " det er mi ned" by l abour , and not by the means of
l abour . In capitalist society the l abour process is det er mi ned by
capi t al and the domi nat i on of the means of l abour i s one form of
this det er mi nat i on.
43
It is i mpossi bl e to concept ual i se this in t he Al t husseri an
f r amewor k, for t he r educt i on of pr oduct i on t o t he l abour pr ocess
as a process of pr oduct i on of use-values -,/. /. ./.- /-
., / /. ,/ who is conspi cuous by his absence from t he
labour process, -. / /. /.-.-.-/ ./- / ,..- /
36 SIMON CLARKE
,/ ., In t he obvi ousness of the bourgeoi s concept of
pract i ce t here i s no r oom for t he rel at i ons of pr oduct i on, so t hat
t he process of pr oduct i on comes to be seen as a purel y t echni cal
process. The identification of t he domi nance of capi t al wi t h some
supposedl y nat ur al domi nat i on by the means of pr oduct i on,
inscribed in t he "essence of pract i ce in gener al ", implies t he
et erni sat i on of capitalist rel at i ons of pr oduct i on, which is precisely
why this concept i on of pr oduct i on is at the base of bourgeoi s
social science.
The domi nat i on of Al t husser' s " ma r xi s m" by this bourgeoi s
concept i on of society extends to his concept i on of t he rel at i on
between t he var i ous practices whi ch makes up the whol e. The
social whol e compri ses four f undament al pract i ces: mat eri al
pr oduct i on whi ch t ransforms nat ur e, political pr act i ce which
t ransforms social rel at i ons, ideological pract i ce which t r ansf or ms
consci ousness, and scientific pract i ce which t r ansf or ms not i ons
i nt o knowl edge. The latter t hree pract i ces are related t hr ough their
their objects: t hey represent different modes of appr opr i at i on of
t he "cur r ent si t uat i on", which can make their differentiation
rat her difficult at times. Theoret i cal practice grasps t he social
whole in t hought in order to i nform political pract i ce, whi ch can
then t r ansf or m t hat whole i n act i on. The pr oduct of t heoret i cal
practice t herefore acts as means of pr oduct i on of political pract i ce,
whose pr oduct i n t urn provi der r aw mat eri al for t heoret i cal
pract i ce. Political pract i ce is t herefore t he "real -..-- the
nodal st rat egi c poi nt , in whi ch .//... /. -,/. .//.
(economic, political and ideological)".
44
In this whol e mat eri al pr oduct i on is said to be det er mi nant in
the last i nst ance. This is, as least initially, concei ved in the
mechani cal way al ready identified in the essay on Mont esqui eu.
The ( "economi c") mode of pr oduct i on dictates, with t he force of
nat ural necessity, certain modes of di st ri but i on, consumpt i on and
exchange, and cert ai n rel at i ons bet ween the economi c, political
and ideological. In other wor ds the (economi c) mode of
pr oduct i on det er mi nes the /- of t he aut onomy of t he political
and the ideological by i mposi ng certain const rai nt s on the
"pol i t i cal and ideological social r el at i ons", and by assigning
certain funct i ons i ndi spensabl e t o economi c pr oduct i on t o the
political and ideological levels.
45
In this concept i on the political and t heoret i cal (whet her
scientific or i deol ogi cal ) represent t he concret e acts in which the
social worl d is practically and ment al l y appr opr i at ed.
4 6
It is t he
worl d of t he social act or of soci ol ogy. The economi c, by cont rast ,
represents t he appr opr i at i on of nat ur e, the worl d of mat eri al
pr oduct i on of t he bourgeoi s economi st .
47
The "det er mi nat i on i n t he last i nst ance by t he economi c" t ur ns
out t o represent simply t he bourgeoi s t heor y of functional pr e-
requisites, wi t h the pre-requi si t es hi erarchi cal l y ordered, mat eri al
pr oduct i on and r epr oduct i on being t he mos t f undament al . The
Al t husseri an critique of t he supposedl y pl anar quality of t he
Hegel i an t heoret i cal space certainly leads us to a st ruct ural
concept i on, but it is t he concept i on of t he bourgeoi s social
sciences. Al t husser' s " pr act i ce" is si mpl y the desocialised
pr oduct i on of the classical political economi st s, or t he ahi st ori cal
social act i on of cont empor ar y soci ol ogy. Al t husser follows
bourgeoi s social science in divorcing capi t al i st social rel at i ons
from their historical f oundat i on and seeks i nst ead t o found t hem
in an ahi st ori cal concept of pract i ce, j ust as political economy gave
t hem an et ernal f oundat i on i n the nat ur e of pr oduct i on, and
sociology in the nat ur e of social act i on. It is t he similarity of :/.
s... / s/ .- to t he st ruct ure of pract i ce t hat expl ai ns
the uncanny resembl ance of t he compl ex whol e st ruct ured i n
domi nance to :/. s/ s,.-
s
The Al t husseri an concept i on of t he social whol e has i mpor t ant
political i mpl i cat i ons. The separat i on of pr oduct i on, as the r eal m
of necessity, from t he "pol i t i cal " and "i deol ogi cal ", or
di st ri but i on and exchange, as t he social real m i mmedi at el y implies
t hat political i nt ervent i on in the former is fruitless, while in t he
latter it is pr oper and possi bl e. In exactly t he same way bourgeoi s
sociology regards pr oduct i on as non- pr obl emat i c, confining its
at t ent i on to " r epr oduct i on" , itself seen in exclusively "s oci al "
t erms. The " economi c" struggle is necessarily defensive, confined
by rel at i ons of pr oduct i on which it cannot chal l enge, concerni ng
only the rat e of expl oi t at i on.
49
While t he capital rel at i on, accordi ng t o this i deol ogy, cannot be
challenged directly, political action can act on and t ransform t he
whol e. This "over-pol i t i ci sat i on" of t he t heor y means t hat it is
always ul t i mat el y "hi st ori ci st ", in the sense t hat in t he expl anat i on
of hi st ory it always has ul t i mat e recourse to t he consci ousness of a
historical subject.
50
This is not a ret urn to t he left historicism of t he
self-conscious class subject. Class consci ousness cannot be
revol ut i onary for Al t husser since i deol ogy necessarily obscures
t he charact er of t he social rel at i ons which a revol ut i onary pract i ce
must t ransform.
51
Onl y a revol ut i onary scientific t heory can gui de
revol ut i onary politics, t he Part y being t he means by which t heor y
t akes c omma nd of pr ol et ar i an politics. Gui ded by this t heory, t he
Part y can establish t he political significance of a part i cul ar
" cur r ent " or "ci r cumst ance", can identify it as a "di spl acement ",
a " condens at i on" or a "gl obal condens at i on" of t he f undament al
contradiction (rather than a petty-bourgeois adventure). The
38 SIMON CLARKE
revol ut i on must therefore be ent r ust ed t o the i mmense t heoret i cal
l abour of the schol ar-hero, not t o t he suppor t i ng cast of millions,
and must wai t on the specific "t empor al i t y" of t heoret i cal
pract i ce. Thi s is precisely t he bourgeoi s materialist concept i on,
charact eri st i c of Utopian soci al i sm, whi ch Marx criticised in the
t hi rd thesis on Feuerbach.
Al t husser' s "self-criticism", whi ch removes Theor y from its
pedestal and gives it to the "pr ol et ar i at ", doesn' t i mpr ove mat t ers
for the phi l osopher alone can ext ract it from the nor mal st at e in
which it is cont ami nat ed by bour geoi s ideology. Thus Al t husser
argues, agai nst Vico, t hat hi st ory is "even mor e difficult to
under s t and" t han nat ur e "because ' t he masses' do not have the
same .. ,/ relation with hi st ory as t hey have wi t h nat ur e
(in pr oduct i ve wor k) , because t hey are always separ at ed from
history by /. //.- / /., .-..-. /....- real
history and man t here is al ways a screen, a separ at i on, a /
../,, / /, Hence marxi st science can only be di scovered
by t he phi l osopher who brings t he class struggle i nt o t heor y, and
grasps t he class struggle t hr ough t heor y. This is the " cont r i but i on
of communi st s t o sci ence" (and t o the "masses") , and i t sounds
very like a renewed form of Zhdanovi sm.
5 2
It is f undament al l y because Al t husser does not quest i on the
bourgeoi s concept i on of the " economi c" t hat he does not break
with economi st i c politics, for t he marxi st critique of t he bourgeoi s
concept i on of pr oduct i on t r ansf or ms the associated concept i on of
politics. If bourgeoi s rel at i ons of pr oduct i on ar e t reat ed as
technical rel at i ons, they cannot be challenged politically. The
struggle of t he wor ki ng class at t he level of pr oduct i on cannot
affect the social rel at i ons within whi ch pr oduct i on t akes pl ace, but
can only limit the rate of expl oi t at i on. The political struggle is
therefore di ssoci at ed from t he st ruggl e at t he poi nt of pr oduct i on,
and concerns political and legal measures t o t r ansf or m class
rel at i ons, whi ch are supposedl y const i t ut ed by " owner s hi p" of the
means of pr oduct i on. The marxi st concept of pr oduct i on, by
cont rast , leads to a quite different under st andi ng of pol i t i cs. On
the one hand, it sees - / ,..- the f oundat i on of the
r epr oduct i on of t he capital r el at i on, and so the f oundat i on of
resistance t o t he capital r el at i on. On t he ot her hand, i t sees the
bourgeoi s st at e as a devel oped form of the capital r el at i on, in the
sense t hat t he bourgeoi s state is seen as a medi at ed expressi on of
the domi nat i on of capi t al , whose effectiveness is therefore
subor di nat e t o t he domi nant rel at i on of pr oduct i on. A
../.-, as opposed to a purel y i nsurrect i onary, politics has
therefore t o combi ne the st ruggl e at the poi nt of pr oduct i on with
the struggle for state power in such a way that the domination of
capi t al in all its forms can be overcome. Thus a marxi st politics has
t o over come i n pract i ce t he separat i on of "economi cs " and
"pol i t i cs" whi ch Mar x over came i n t heor y. And i t shoul d go
wi t hout saying t hat Mar x coul d only over come it in t heory because
the wor ki ng class was /.., overcomi ng it in practice.
53
...... Readi ng Capi t al
s..-, c,/ seeks to realise t he proj ect mapped out in t
of establishing an " ant i - hi st ori ci st " i nt erpret at i on of Mar x.
The project i s domi nat ed by the need t o defend the aut onomy of
scientific t heoret i cal pract i ce. It is therefore essential to show t hat
t he aut onomy of t heor y was the cornerst one of Mar x' s work. Thi s
is at t empt ed in t he first essay of the book.
Accor di ng t o Al t husser Mar x' s epi st emol ogi cal break consi st ed
in his br eaki ng with t he empiricist concept i on of knowl edge,
defined as the identification of the "real obj ect " and the "obj ect of
knowl edge", which i s al so t he f oundat i on of "hi st ori ci sm".
54
Once
the object of knowl edge and the real object have been radi cal l y
di st i ngui shed from one anot her , of course, it is a simple mat t er to
keep historicism at bay. Al t husser' s ar gument i s based on t he
trivial and insignificant obser vat i on t hat t heoret i cal practice i s an
empirically distinct pr act i ce. Hence it is based once again on t he
pri nci pl e of the "i rreduci bi l i t y of appear ances ". Althusser seeks t o
demonst r at e t hat this radi cal distinction is f ound in Mar x by
di st ort i ng quot at i ons from t he 1857 I nt r oduct i on and by insisting
t hat Mar x' s own t heoret i cal revol ut i on t ook pl ace entirely wi t hi n
t hought . I shall deal wi t h t he latter poi nt first.
Mar x' s epi st emol ogi cal break entailed a t r ansf or mat i on of t he
" pr obl emat i c" of classical political economy. What was t he basis
of this t r ansf or mat i on, if it was effected purel y within t hought ?
The answer is t hat t he new pr obl emat i c is a mut at i on of t he ol d,
which is al ready implicit wi t hi n t he latter. The new pr obl emat i c is
pr oduced, t herefore, not by Marx, but by t he ol d pr obl emat i c
itself.
55
The Hegelian aut ogenesi s of the concept is replaced by t he
aut ogenesi s of t he pr obl emat i c as subject of t heoret i cal pract i ce.
Inst ead of t he dialectical ..../,-.- of t he cont radi ct i on we have
its analytical ./--- giving a r upt ur al , rat her t han
cont i nuous, but no less teleological account of the hi st ory of
t heory.
56
Real and r at i onal are di vorced, t he former onl y
i nt erveni ng in the l at t er in so far as scientific pract i ce is subver t ed
by t he i nt rusi on of extra-scientific "i nt er est s".
57
Marx freed t he
pr obl emat i c of political economy from t he i nt rusi on of bour geoi s
interests, so maki ng possible the aut odevel opment of t he
pr obl emat i c which had hi t hert o been bl ocked. The pol i t i cal
i mpl i cat i on i s clear and i nt ent i onal : preserve t he aut onomy of
science.
58
40 SIMON CLARKE
The specific ar gument is abs ur d. While it is t rue t hat classical
political economy is i nconsi st ent , it is not t r ue t hat this
inconsistency det ermi nes a par t i cul ar direction of t heoret i cal
devel opment : t he same i nconsi st ency led t o the repl acement of
classical political economy not onl y by marxi sm, but al so by neo-
classical economi cs. There is no sense whatever in whi ch the
concept " l abour power ", nor any of the ot her f undament al
concept s whi ch Mar x i nt r oduced, is implicit within t he classical
di scourse. The specificity of Mar x' s concept s in rel at i on to t hose of
the classics ../-.. /, /. -/-- / /. -., /
,..- from one in which soci al rel at i ons between classes were
super i mposed on technical rel at i ons between fact ors t o one i n
which t he t wo const i t ut e a cont r adi ct or y unity. In t he classical
concept i on expl oi t at i on concerns t he ./.- of a given
pr oduct . In Mar x' s concept i on expl oi t at i on domi nat es t he
,..- of t hat pr oduct . In t he classical concept i on t here is no
cont radi ct i on bet ween the t echni cal relations of pr oduct i on and
the social rel at i ons of di st r i but i on, nor is t here conflict within
pr oduct i on, for pr oduct i on and di st ri but i on are separ at ed from
one anot her . In Mar x' s concept i on pr oduct i on of use-values is
subor di nat ed t o the pr oduct i on of social rel at i ons, i n t he capitalist
mode of pr oduct i on to the pr oduct i on of ./.. so t hat t here is a
cont radi ct i on wi t hi n pr oduct i on, and the forces and rel at i ons of
pr oduct i on const i t ut e a -., unity, in the capi t al i st mode
of pr oduct i on t he cont radi ct ory uni t y of pr oduct i on as pr oduct i on
of ./.. and as pr oduct i on of .../.. There is no way in which
Mar x coul d have arrived at this concept i on of pr oduct i on had he
been confined t o speculative t hi nki ng, t o t he worl d of t heory.
Al t husser' s ar gument i s based on t he separat i on of t hought and
reality. Thi s leads him t o accept wi t hout quest i on t he basic
formul at i on of t he classical pr obl em of knowl edge, a f or mul at i on
in t erms of t he confront at i on of a knowi ng subject wi t h the object
t o be known.
5 9
In t he Al t husseri an vari ant t he subject and object
are known as "t heoret i cal pr act i ce" and the "concr et e- r eal ". The
fact t hat Al t husser dissociates his "subj ect " from t he empirical
human subject whi ch is its " s uppor t " in humani st phi l osophy does
not prevent hi m from r epr oduci ng t he bourgeoi s phi l osophy of t he
subject: t he hi st ory of bourgeoi s phi l osophy for t he last hundr ed
years has been domi nat ed by t he at t empt t o achieve precisely this
di ssoci at i on. The f undament al pr obl em which Al t husser' s
phi l osophy has to face is t hat of bourgeoi s phi l osophy, t hat of
reuni t i ng subject and object, real -concret e and concret e-i n-
t hought . Wi t hi n such a t heoret i cal field the reuni on can only be
achieved met aphysi cal l y, by God, Nat ur e or t he Par t y. It makes no
difference whether this metaphysical philosophy of guarantees is
its own justification (original definition of phi l osophy) or is
endor sed by t he Part y (revised definition).
60
This phi l osophy of knowl edge is bour geoi s in the strict sense
because of its connect i on wi t h the et erni sat i on of the bour geoi s
rel at i ons of pr oduct i on, whi ch is the defining feat ure of bour geoi s
ideology. Thi s et erni sat i on is based on t he ext ract i on of t hese
rel at i ons of pr oduct i on from historical reality and their fixation as
the given pr esupposi t i on of history. Rel at i ons of pr oduct i on ar e
t ur ned i nt o a fixed met aphysi cal cat egory whose objective
f oundat i on i s no l onger historical but mus t be established by
phi l osophy as et ernal . The bourgeois i deol ogi cal concept i on of
society therefore calls fort h a phi l osophy whose t ask is to pr ovi de
the , f oundat i on for the fixed, et ernal , and so i deal ,
categories of t hat i deol ogy, a phi l osophy whi ch must be anal yt i cal
r at her t han dialectical, and based on t he radi cal separat i on of
t hought and reality. It is in this sense t hat we can call such a
phi l osophy a /.,. phi l osophy. This phi l osophy will have its
vari ant s. A crude r educt i oni sm will call fort h a crude positivism to
justify its claims t hat t he absol ut e, t he t echni cal rel at i ons of
pr oduct i on, is also real. A mor e sophi st i cat ed t heor y which t akes
the " mode of pr oduct i on" of "soci et y" for its st art i ng poi nt must
reject such a crude posi t i vi sm, for t he st art i ng poi nt , "soci et y" or
the " mode of pr oduct i on" i s an abst r act i on t o which no reality
cor r esponds. In either case the rel at i on bet ween the abst r act
det er mi nat i ons and t he concret e as t he "concent r at i on of many
det er mi nat i ons" is not seen, as it is for Mar x, as the //
rel at i on between f undament al rel at i ons and their historically
devel oped forms, but as t he .,.-/,/ rel at i on bet ween
t heory and reality. The quest i on of t he mat eri al i st dialectic in t hi s
version of " mar xi s m" has t o be settled by phi l osophi cal and not by
historical investigation because the basic concept of marxism has
been pl ucked out of hi st ory and t r ansf or med i nt o an et ernal
cat egory of t hought .
Mar x rejected t he "t heoret i cal field" of t he classical phi l osophy
of knowl edge, the concept i on of the rel at i on of men and women t o
the worl d in t erms of a universal subject-object opposi t i on. Hegel
had first shown t he way t o overcome this opposi t i on, but he di d so
onl y formalistically, identifying the t wo i mmedi at el y and seei ng
the objective as the " i mmanent i s at i on" of t he subjective. In
put t i ng the Hegelian dialectic on a mat eri al i st foundat i on Mar x
overcame this opposi t i on in a historical and a materialist way, not
dissolving it in t hought , but rat her est abl i shi ng the foundat i on of
the opposi t i on in a real historical process in whi ch the subjective
and objective moment s are di ssoci at ed from one anot her .
Specifically, the philosophical opposition of subject and object is
42 SIMON CLARKE
the expressi on i n phi l osophy of t he cont rast bet ween t he t wo
moment s of exchange which devel ops with t he devel opment of
commodi t y rel at i ons (cf the quot at i on from the c.-.. on
page 25 above) . The t heory of commodi t y fetishism provi des the
means by whi ch the essential uni t y of subject and object can be
recovered, while at t he same t i me graspi ng t he opposi t i on between
the t wo cat egori es as a specific hi st ori cal form of appear ance of
social rel at i ons. Mar x' s concept i on of the commodi t y as a
"sensuous- super sensuous"
6 1
uni t y perfectly capt ures this char ac-
teristic of t he social, provi di ng t he means t o reveal t he ideological
charact er of "t he probl em of knowl edge". It is an idealist fiction to
imagine t hat t he wor l d can be t he direct object of the -.-,/-
of some subject, and it is correspondi ngl y an idealist fiction to
conceive of i deol ogy or knowl edge in t erms of a .- of t he worl d,
whet her t hat of the empirical subject or of the " pr obl emat i c"
which possesses him or her. :/. ./. - -/, /. /. .. /.
/ ,/ .-,,.-.- - /. ./. . /. ./. - -/,
. - ./ .-,,.-.- c-.-,/- - -/, /. /. -....
,,,- / , / /. / ,. / .-..
.,..-.. ,.- and so is mar ked by t he char act er of t hat
social pract i ce. Thus the difference between bourgeois and marxist
political economy is essentially a difference bet ween t wo class
pract i ces. However , it is not fundament al l y t he difference between
the criteria of science appl i ed by different classes, nor the
difference in class "i nt er est s". The difference is bet ween the
different pract i ces in which different classes are engaged and from
which t he not i ons t hat form t he st art i ng poi nt of t heoret i cal
reflection are abst ract ed. Bourgeoi s political economy t akes as its
st art i ng poi nt t he not i ons i n whi ch t he bourgeoisie t hi nks its own
pract i ce, whi ch are the not i ons embedded i n t hat pract i ce. Its
apol oget i c char act er is founded in t he trinity formul a on whi ch it is
based. Marxi st political economy, by cont rast , reflects on the
practical activity of the pr ol et ar i at under capitalism.
62
Its
superi ori t y over bourgeoi s political economy does not lie in a
claim to t r ut h as against falsity, nor in its identification with the
"negat i ve mo me n t " of t he dialectic of hi st ory, nor in its
renunci at i on of the i nt rusi on of class interest, but in its ability to
compr ehend t he class practice of t he bourgeoisie as well as t hat of
t he pr ol et ar i at , expressed i n its ability t o compr ehend bourgeoi s
political economy. These are t he t erms i n which Mar x conduct ed
his cri t i que of political economy.
In or der t o establish t hat Mar x renounced Hegel i ani sm i n
separat i ng t he or der of reality from the order of knowl edge,
Al t husser t akes the unusual st ep of l ooki ng at Mar x' s wor k,
specifically the 1857 Introduction. This is a strange choice of text,
since it is overwhel mi ngl y, and qui t e self-consciously, Hegel i an in
i nspi rat i on.
63
Mar x i s here t ryi ng t o l ocat e t he i mpl i cat i ons of t he
mat eri al i st critique of t he Hegel i an dialectic before setting out on
t he project t hat woul d cul mi nat e in c,/ The text is t herefore of
except i onal interest, but can hardl y be used if one want s to .-.
Mar x from Hegel. The i mpor t ance of t he text must be qualified by
the observat i on t hat it does not represent a reflection on t he
accompl i shed marxi st dialectic, but r at her an "ant i ci pat i on of
r esul t s", whose achi evement woul d t ake anot her ten years.
64
We
shoul d not , t herefore, r egar d this text as a subst i t ut e for the act ual
oper at i on of the marxi st dialectic in c,/
Al t husser concent rat es on the t hi rd section of t he I nt r oduct i on.
In this section Mar x is l ooki ng at t he consequences of t he
abandonment of t he Hegel i an pr oposi t i on t hat the real is t he
pr oduct of t hought , a pr oposi t i on based on the -//- /
t hought and reality. In t he course of his ar gument Mar x not es t hat
it is a ./,, to say t hat "t he concret e t ot al i t y is a t ot al i t y of
t hought s, concret e in t hought , in fact a pr oduct of t hi nki ng a nd
compr ehendi ng". Hegel ' s error lies not in this t aut ol ogi cal
obser vat i on, but in his seeing the "concr et e in t hought " as a
"pr oduct of t he concept whi ch t hi nks and generat es itself out si de
or above observat i on and concept i on" i nst ead of seeing it as a
"pr oduct , rat her, of t he wor ki ng up of obser vat i on and concept i on
i nt o concept s". Since Mar x has only j ust not ed t hat the "r eal
concr et e" i s t he poi nt of depar t ur e for observat i on and
concept i on, it is qui t e clear t hat Marx does not i nt end to separ at e
t hought and the real , but taxes Hegel with effecting this separ at i on
on t he basis of a t aut ol ogy. In the same vein Mar x notes t hat even
for speculative t hought which does not engage with the real wor l d
t he subject, society, /. /- /. -., remai ns t he
pr esupposi t i on. Al t husser defends his separ at i on of " t hought "
and "r eal i t y" by pi cki ng up these Hegel i an "t aut ol ogi es" and
at t r i but i ng t hem t o Mar x.
Al t husser also picks up on Marx' s di scussi on of t he rel at i onshi p
bet ween t he or der of cat egori es in t he devel opment of the anal ysi s
and t he order i n whi ch t hey appear historically i n or der t o
establish the "ant i - hi st or i ci st " charact er of Mar x' s concept i on of
t heory. Marx poi nt s out Hegel ' s confusion of "t he way i n whi ch
t hought appr opr i at es t he concr et e" wi t h " t he process by which t he
concret e itself comes i nt o bei ng". This confusi on leads Hegel t o
seek t o analyse t he rel at i ons bet ween t he elements of
cont empor ar y society i n t erms of "t he hi st ori c posi t i on of t he
economi c rel at i ons in t he succession of different forms of soci et y".
This identification of t he or der of appear ance of categories wi t h
their contemporary relationship is a double error. First, the
44 SIMON CLARKE
order of / ,,.-. of t he categories does not cor r espond
to the or der of their / ,- (i.e. in whi ch t hey were
"hi st ori cal l y deci si ve"). It is onl y retrospectively t hat we can use
the abst r act categories t o under s t and previ ous forms of society.
Secondly, t he devel opment of new rel at i ons is not necessarily
subor di nat e t o existing rel at i ons, but may subor di nat e the latter
and so -/- t he st ruct ure of t he totality and not simply
..../, it. For exampl e money exists before capi t al , expressi ng t he
" domi nant rel at i ons of a less devel oped whol e", whereas it
subsequent l y expresses "t hose subor di nat e rel at i ons of a mor e
devel oped whol e which al ready had a historic existence before this
whole devel oped in the di rect i on expressed by a mor e concret e
cat egor y".
Al t husser concl udes from this section t hat "t he pr oduct i on
process of knowl edge t akes pl ace entirely within knowl edge",
despite t he fact t hat t he whol e sect i on is qui t e explicitly concerned
with t he "hi st ori cal exi st ence" of t he categories and not with their
t heoret i cal pr oduct i on, ar gui ng not t hat their or der i s det er mi ned
within knowl edge, but t hat it is "det er mi ned, r at her , by their
rel at i on t o one anot her i n moder n bourgeoi s soci et y".
65
What Mar x criticises in this passage is not Hegel' s
"hi st or i ci sm", his search for a rel at i on between t he hi st ori cal and
t heoret i cal devel opment of t he categories. It is t he ../,/
charact er of Hegel ' s sol ut i on, whi ch projects on t o hi st ory t he
dialectic of cont empor ar y society, to which he obj ect s because it
makes cont empor ar y society i nt o t he pi nnacl e of hi st ory: "t he so-
called hi st ori cal present at i on of devel opment is f ounded, as a rul e,
on t he fact t hat the latest form regards the previ ous ones as steps
leading up to itself, and, since it is only rarely and under quite
specific condi t i ons able to criticise i t s e l f . . . it al ways conceives
t hem one- si dedl y". It is /... /. ./. /.. /./, -
/.,/ t hat Hegel can proj ect t he or der of cat egori es of
cont empor ar y society, which express their rel at i on in cont em-
por ar y society, on t o history.
66
Hegel' s er r or s which Mar x locates in the 1857 I nt r oduct i on do
not derive from his identification of real and ideal, but from t he
,.///, ../ /- of this identification which l eads him to
see t he dialectic as being l ocat ed entirely in t hought . The form of
the dialectic cannot be const r uct ed in t heory, but requi res a
prodi gi ous l abour of historical investigation to uncover it. r/
.//.. ..-/. /.//.,/ ,../, ./
..-/. u.,./ . The implictions of t he simple
"i nver si on" of Hegel ' s dialectic, whi ch Althusser der i des, are far-
reachi ng. Thus , while the myst i cal side of Hegel ' s di al ect i c was
easily identified in principle, its practical criticism was "no trifle".
The ext ract i on of t he r at i onal kernel di d not consist i n di scoveri ng
a new "abst r act and i deal i st " form, but i n divesting t he "r eal
cont ent " of any such f or m, for the mat eri al i st dialectic is t he "r eal
course of history itself' .
67
The form of t he dialectic could not be
di scovered i n t heor y, nor i n " hi s t or y" as t he real i sat i on,
mani fest at i on or r epr esent at i on t.//.-,. of a dialectic whi ch
lies ... it. It is the el i mi nat i on of t he ../ /.-.- of t he
Hegel i an dialectic t hat is t he i mmedi at e basis of the compl exi t y of
t he marxi st dialectic. The first part of t he 1857 I nt r oduct i on makes
this clear, argui ng t hat the Hegelian dialectic t ends t o reduce t he
compl exi t y of t he t ot al i t y of moment s of t he process of soci al
pr oduct i on, seeing t hese moment s as unmedi at ed identities. The
mat eri al i st f oundat i on of t he marxist dialectic means t hat t her e i s
no possibility of di scoveri ng beneat h the medi at i ons of the pr ocess
a mor e f undament al i dent i t y of its moment s.
6 8
Marxist di al ect i c
t hus differs from t he Hegel i an in t hat its medi at i ons are r eal ,
reality offering a .-. to t he devel opment of real
cont radi ct i ons whi ch cannot be dissolved i n t hought but whi ch
must be overcome in reality. The Mar xi an dialectic is t hus
di ssi mul at ed, not in t he form of the ,..-- of the Lacani an
unconsci ous, but in t he medi at ed f or m of /. //
..../,-.- of the mat eri al i st dialectic.
El i mi nat i on of t he idealist foundat i on of t he Hegelian di al ect i c
implies the r enunci at i on of the t empt at i on t o accompl i sh pur el y
formal reduct i ons of t he compl exi t y of t he real . Because Al t husser
does not under st and t hi s, he does not under s t and t he significance
of Mar x' s critique of Ri car do. Ri cardo di d not simply forget t o
ment i on the word "sur pl us val ue", he insisted on seeing the f or ms
of surpl us val ue as si mpl e mani fest at i ons of surpl us val ue, wi t hout
realising t hat these forms cont radi ct t he essence t hey are supposed
t o express. Mar x' s r esponse was not t o i nvoke some "rel at i ve
a ut onomy" t o accommodat e this cont r adi ct i on, but t o devel op t he
-.. -..- /.,/ .// .,/. ./.. -/.
,,.-. in the forms of profit, interest and rent .
It is precisely to t he ext ent t hat Hegel ' s dialectic remai ns ent i rel y
wi t hi n knowl edge t hat it is a simple, unmedi at ed, idealist di al ect i c.
In setting the dialectic on a materialist f oundat i on .. -
-,/, , . /-/ ,.- ./- /-./..,. /.
-/-.. /. ./- /....- /-./..,. -. /. ./ /, /-,
/. ./. - /, In c,/ as t he result of i nt ensi ve
hi st ori cal i nvest i gat i on as well as t heoret i cal el abor at i on, Mar x
arrives at the mat eri al i st dialectic. In t he devel opment of t he basi c
cont r adi ct i on i n t he hear t of the commodi t y bet ween use val ue a nd
val ue Marx is not descri bi ng a formal mechani sm occurri ng wi t hi n
thought. As Engels noted: "As we are not considering here an
46 SIMON CLARKE
abst ract process of t hought t aki ng place solely in our heads, but a
real process whi ch actually t ook pl ace at some part i cul ar t i me or is
still t aki ng pl ace, these cont r adi ct i ons, t oo, will have devel oped in
practice and will pr obabl y have f ound their sol ut i on. We shall
trace t he nat ur e of this sol ut i on and shall discover t hat it has been
br ought about by the est abl i shment of a new rel at i on whose t wo
opposi t e sides we shall now have t o devel op, and so on" . The
relation bet ween t hought and t he real is clear to Mar x: "t he ideal is
not hi ng else t han the material wor l d reflected by t he huma n mi nd,
and t r ansl at ed i nt o forms of t hought " . Marx even war ns us against
Al t husser: "If t he life of the subj ect mat t er is ideally reflected as in
a mi rror, t hen it may appear as if we had before us a mer e ,
const r uct i on".
6 9
Al t hough ri gorousl y empiricist in Al t husser' s
sense, this coul dn' t be further from bourgeoi s empi ri ci sm, from
the t r eat ment of reality as a pl anar worl d of irreducible
appear ances. It is this bourgeoi s empiricism which di ct at es t hat
the cat egori es which are mobi l i sed t o explain these appear ances
can onl y be l ocat ed in t hought , on the basis t hat onl y the
appear ance is real. The radi cal separ at i on of t hought and reality is
therefore t he epistemological basis of the doct ri ne whi ch seeks to
t ransl at e t he appear ances of bourgeoi s society i nt o absol ut es, t o
dehistoricise bourgeoi s social rel at i ons and so give t hem an eternal
charact er.
70
Al t husser' s adopt i on of this phi l osophy has more t han a hint of
.. .. If t he dialectic is t orn from its materialist f oundat i on and is
rel ocat ed in t heor y, it reverts to t he "wholly abst ract , ' specul at i ve'
form in whi ch Hegel had bequeat hed i t ". In this form "t he entire
heritage of Hegel was limited to a sheer pat t er n by t he help of
which every t heme was devised, and t o a compi l at i on of words and
t urns of speech which had no ot her purpose t han t o be at hand at
the right t i me where t hought and positive knowl edge were
lacking". Thi s is precisely t he dialectic of Stalinist di amat . But
Al t husser does not follow Mar x in setting this mystified dialectic
on its feet, in reversing the Stalinist subor di nat i on of "hi st or i cal "
t o "di al ect i cal " mat eri al i sm. He r at her sweeps away the dialectic
al t oget her. Engels not ed t he consequence of this react i on t o
Hegel i ani sm: "Onl y when Feuer bach decl ared speculative
concept i ons unt enabl e did Hegel i ani sm gradual l y fall asleep; and
it seemed as if the reign of the old metaphysics, with its fixed
categories, had begun anew in science .... Hegel fell into oblivion;
and there developed the new natural-scientific materialism which
is al most i ndi st i ngui shabl e theoretically from t hat of t he
eighteenth cent ury. . . . The l umber i ng cart -horse of bourgeoi s
wor kaday under st andi ng nat ur al l y st ops dead i n confusi on before
the ditch which separates essence from appearance, cause from
effect; but if one goes gaily hunt i ng over such badl y broken gr ound
as t hat of abst ract t hi nki ng, one must not ride cart -horses. "
71
It is
its domi nat i on by such a met aphysi cal mat er i al i sm, expressed in
its art i cul at i on in t er ms of fixed cat egori es, t hat explains the failure
of classical economi cs. It is only t he appl i cat i on of the di al ect i c
t aken from Hegel , but set on its feet, t hat enabl es Marx and Engel s
to see these categories not as fixed but as .,.- / ,..
-.-, - -., // /, This is t he
revol ut i onary /../ significance of Mar x' s "hi st or i ci sm", it
comes from Hegel, and it is suppressed by Althusser.
72
It is not
surpri si ng, t hen, t hat Al t husser cannot under s t and Mar x' s t r ue
br eak, t hat with t he -.,/,/ -./- of classical political
economy.
Al t husser' s cri t i que of t he Hegelian dialectic is not ori gi nal . It
r epr oduces t hat of t he revisionism of t he Second I nt er nat i onal ,
and its ambi t i on is t he same: to di vorce marxi st science from
marxi st politics. For bot h, the r evol ut i onar y side of t he marxi st
dialectic is el i mi nat ed by t he separat i on of science and i deol ogy, of
fact and val ue, on t he basis of the Kant i an separat i on of t hought
and reality, resulting in t he claim t hat mar xi sm is not a " mo r a l "
t heory. In bot h cases politics is t aken out of the hands of t he
wor ki ng class and put i nt o t hose of t he par t y. It is no coi nci dence
t hat the neo-positivist phi l osophy of knowl edge espoused by
Al t husser, whet her in "t heor et i ci st " or "pol i t i ci st " var i ant s, is
precisely t he moder n version of t he posi t i vi sm empl oyed by t he
earlier revisionists. " The Hegelian dialectic const i t ut es t he
perfidious element i n t he Marxi an doct r i ne, the snare, the obst acl e
which bars t he pat h to every logical appr eci at i on of things . . .
What Marx and Engels achieved t hat was great was not achi eved
t hanks t o the Hegel i an dialectic, but agai nst it. "
73
Mar x was
undoubt edl y right to revise one of Hegel ' s laws of the di al ect i c:
"Hegel r emar ks somewher e t hat all facts and personages of great
i mpor t ance i n worl d hi st ory occur, as i t were, twice. He forgot t o
add: t he fi rst t i me as t ragedy, the second as farce. "
74
In t he second essay of s..-, c,/ Al t husser t urns back to t he
specificity of Mar x' s t heoret i cal discovery. Since many of t he mai n
poi nt s ant i ci pat e Bal i bar ' s fuller di scussi on, I shall deal onl y
briefly with this essay.
Althusser st art s wi t h a very l engt hy discussion of different
concept i ons of hi st ori cal t i me, r educi ng "hi st or i ci sm" t o t he
supposedl y Hegel i an concept i on of hi st ori cal t i me charact eri sed
by a homogeneous cont i nui t y and cont empor anei t y. Al t husser ' s
concl usi ons can be briefly st at ed: t he principle of t he
"irreducibility of the real" dictates that each level of the complex
48 SIMON CLARKE
whole shoul d have its own t i me, while t he concept i on of
knowl edge as an aut onomous pract i ce dictates t hat t he times
cannot be rel at ed t o a "single cont i nuous reference t i me " because
the compl ex whol e is not a ./ /. but - /. / /-./..,. in
which the rel at i ons between t he levels are therefore /.--/ and
not t empor al . The final concl usi on is t hat "t her e is no hi st ory in
general , but onl y specific st r uct ur es of hi st ori ci t y". The ar gument
is trivial and i rrel evant , the concl usi on dependi ng on t he doubl e
i nsul at i on of t he real as i rreduci bl e and unknowabl e. Since t here is
no way of leaving t heory, whi ch knows not hi ng of t i me, it is
difficult to see how a t heory of hi st ory of any ki nd is possible.
There is no way of getting from "t he ' devel opment of f or ms ' of t he
concept i n knowl edge" t o "t he devel opment of the real categories
in concret e hi st or y" wi t hout encount er i ng a single cont i nuous
reference t i me which r eadmi t s t he possibility of "hi st or y in
general ".
75
After much polemicising agai nst "hi st or i ci sm" Al t husser
eventually comes to pose the cent ral quest i on of his t ext : "what is
the object of c,/ This is discussed in t er ms of Mar x' s
originality wi t h respect to classical political economy. Al t husser
takes the definition of political economy f ound in Lal ande' s
t--. t//,/.. as t he basis of his discussion.
76
Since
this relates essentially t o vul gar and not t o classical economy the
discussion is very confused. Al t husser regards the key features of
Marx' s cri t i que to be his cri t i que of t he ant hr opol ogi cal
concept i on of human needs and of the "empi ri ci st -posi t i vi st "
concept i on of economi c facts as in essence measur abl e. This leads
Althusser to i nt erpret the first par t of t he 1857 I nt r oduct i on, which
establishes t he pri ori t y of rel at i ons of pr oduct i on over t hose of
consumpt i on, di st ri but i on and exchange, as a cri t i que of the
supposed ant hr opol ogi cal basis of classical political economy.
If Al t husser were right about Mar x' s critique of political
economy, t hen Ri cardo woul d have been a marxi st . Althusser
concedes t hat Ri car do' s economi cs was based on pr oduct i on, even
believes, wr ongl y, t hat he "gave every out war d sign of
recogni si ng" t he relations of pr oduct i on, only l acki ng t he word.
While Al t husser notes t hat this absence is crucial, he doesn' t seem
t o have any idea why. Ri cardo di d not ignore t he rel at i ons of
pr oduct i on because he saw t hem as being const i t ut ed by some
ant hropol ogi cal l y defined needs, but because he saw pr oduct i on i n
purely t echnol ogi cal t erms, so l eadi ng him to est abl i sh class
relations at t he level of di st r i but i on. Nor was Ri car do so naive as
t o ignore t he fact t hat profit receivers own means of pr oduct i on, or
t hat rent receivers own l and. Hi s er r or was t o see t he social aspect
of relations of production as social relations of distribution
.,.-,.. - an et ernal st ruct ure of pr oduct i on, and so to see
the ,..- of surpl us value as a nat ur al process, onl y its
,,,- bei ng socially det ermi ned. t /. ./- /
,..- /. ,..- / / ./- and not si mpl y of
mat eri al pr oduct s t hat enables Marx t o exami ne t he /- of val ue
as well as its magni t ude, and so to uncover the f undament al
cont r adi ct i on bet ween val ue and use-val ue which is the basis of t he
ar gument of c,/ It is this discovery t hat capitalist rel at i ons ar e
not eternal but / a discovery whi ch depends on t he cri t i que
of met aphysi cal mat er i al i sm by the dialectic deri ved from Hegel ,
t hat const i t ut es Mar x' s "hi st or i sat i on" of classical pol i t i cal
economy.
77
In r enounci ng t he Hegelian heri t age and r et ur ni ng t o
met aphysi cal mat eri al i sm Althusser proves t he poi nt by his
inability t o separat e Mar x from Ri car do.
Al t husser correct l y argues that Mar x sees pr oduct i on as bei ng
"charact eri sed by t wo indissociable el ement s: the //. ,.
. .. and t he / ./- / ,..- beneat h whose
det er mi nat i on this l abour process i s execut ed". Havi ng not ed t he
i ndi ssoci abl e charact er of the el ement s, Al t husser goes on t o
discuss t hem qui t e separat el y! The ar gument is purely Ri car di an:
t he process of pr oduct i on as a t echnol ogi cal process det er mi nes
cert ai n functions. The "rel at i ons of pr oduc t i on" assign agent s t o
t hese functions by di st ri but i ng t hese agent s i n relation t o t he
means of pr oduct i on. The relations of pr oduct i on do not t herefore
det er mi ne t he ,..- of surplus val ue under capi t al i sm, but
onl y its ,,,-
The t wo essential features of the l abour process, for Al t husser,
are its mat eri al nat ur e, and the domi nant role of the means of
pr oduct i on i n t hat process. Althusser correct l y notes t hat Mar x' s
insistence on the mat er i al charact er of t he l abour process, on t he
i mpor t ance of use-val ue to political economy, led him to give
pr oper consi derat i on t o t he necessity for mat eri al r epr oduct i on.
But he also sees this as the key to t he di scovery of "t he concept of
t he .-- /- / ..-. of t hese mat er i al condi t i ons",
7 8
t he
di st i nct i on bet ween const ant and vari abl e capi t al . Althusser seems
blissfully unawar e of t he fact t hat t he l at t er distinction is a ./..
rel at i on and not a ,/,/ rel at i on, and so derives from t he
(social) relations of pr oduct i on and not from t he (technical) nat ur e
of t he l abour process. He shares his i gnorance with classical
political economy, whi ch could not distinguish fixed and
circulating from const ant and variable capi t al precisely because i t
coul d not under st and t he dual nat ur e of pr oduct i on. The capaci t y
for capital expended on l abour power t o vary has not hi ng
whatever to do with the material features of the labour process,
50 SIMON CLARKE
but depends on t he ability of t he capitalist t o compel t he l abour er
t o work beyond the time of necessary l abour.
This is not t he only exampl e of Al t husser' s confusi on: it is
consistent. Thus we find t hat such a technologistic i nt erpret at i on
also emerges from Al t husser' s discussion of t he supposed
domi nance of t he means of l abour over the l abour process. This
domi nance is simply asserted in t he wake of a quot at i on to the
effect t hat t he means of l abour can be used to i ndi cat e "t he degree
of devel opment of t he l abour er " and "t he social rel at i ons in which
he l abour s ". It is similarly assert ed t hat "t he means of l abour
det ermi ne t he typical form of t he l abour process consi dered: by
establishing t he mode of at t ack on t he external nat ur e subject t o
t r ansf or mat i on in economi c pr oduct i on, they det er mi ne t he -..
/ ,..- the basic cat egory of marxist analysis (in economi cs
and hi st ory); at the same t i me t hey establish t he level of
,..., of product i ve l abour " .
The assert ed domi nance of t he means of l abour is cent ral to
Al t husseri ani sm bot h i n est abl i shi ng the aut onomy of t heoret i cal
practice and in foundi ng t he domi nat i on of capi t al . It is used in
t wo senses: firstly t hat of the domi nance of t he means of l abour
over l abour . However , this domi nance, for Mar x, is simply the
expression wi t hi n t he l abour process of the domi nat i on of capital
over l abour , and as such is specific to the l abour process under
capitalism. Secondl y in t he sense of the quot e above, t hat the
means of l abour det ermi nes t he l abour process. In an empirical
sense the assert i on is trivial: given certain t ool s onl y certain
operat i ons can be performed. But in the t heoret i cal st ruct ure of
marxi sm this is very far from bei ng true. The basic cat egory of
marxist analysis is the (historical) concept of t he social form of
pr oduct i on and not the (technical) concept of t he means of l abour.
Given Al t husser' s Ri cardi an concept i on of pr oduct i on, it is
inevitable t hat he shoul d also have a Ri cardi an concept i on of the
relations of pr oduct i on. These ar e seen as co- det er mi nant of t he
mode of pr oduct i on. This is not , however, in t he marxist
-., uni t y of forces and rel at i ons of pr oduct i on, but in
the classical har mony of t he "uni t y of this doubl e uni t y", .-, /
/. ./-//, ...--.. ./- / ,..- -. /. //,
...--.. ./- / ./.- The former represent s t he
./.- / /.-- the l at t er the ./.- / ,.-
s
This concept i on of the "r el at i ons of pr oduct i on" makes it very
difficult to give any meani ng to "det er mi nat i on in t he last instance
by t he economi c" . The economi c cannot be det er mi nant i n t he
fi rst i nst ance because t he "rel at i ons of pr oduc t i on" are
fundament al l y political or i deol ogi cal , and not economi c
relations. This is because Althusser's "relations of production",
like t hose of classical political economy, are ./- /
./.- -,,.. - ,..- by law or cust om which assign
ri ght s to shares in t he pr oduct by vi rt ue of t he .-./, of fact ors.
Hence "rel at i ons of pr oduct i on" can onl y be legal or i deol ogi cal
rel at i ons, t hey ,..,,. /. ..-. of a legal-political and
ideological .,.... as a condi t i on of their pecul i ar
emphasi s". This means t hat t he political or ideological levels ar e i n
fact det er mi nant . Al t husser tells us t hat it is the rel at i ons of
pr oduct i on which establish "t he ..,.. / .//.., del egat ed to a
cert ai n level of t he social t ot al i t y", but since the "r el at i on of
pr oduct i on" is itself const i t ut ed by such a level it is difficult to see
how this coul d est abl i sh t hat the economi c is det er mi nant in t he
last instance. In t he end Althusser has recourse to a new concept of
causality t o escape t he di l emma: t he i dea of st ruct ural -causal i t y-
in - a - compl ex - whol e - st ruct ured - in - domi nance - in - t he - last -
i nst ance-by-t he-economi c. As part of an i nt erdependent whol e t he
economi c is an effect of t he st ruct ure of the whole itself. The
causal i t y is t herefore one in which t he whol e is a cause visible onl y
in its effects. It is this invisible whole t hat is secretly domi nat ed by
t he economi c.
81
Thi s idea of t he compl ex pre-given whol e st r uct ur ed in
domi nance is not as ori gi nal as it may sound. Al t husser has
managed t o r epr oduce the t heoret i cal st r uct ur e of cont empor ar y
bourgeoi s soci ol ogy. This is not surpri si ng as the t heoret i cal
f oundat i on of bot h is t he concept i on of pr oduct i on also f ound in
classical political economy. It is this "abs ent pr esence" in t he
Al t husseri an di scourse t hat makes it possi bl e for "sophi st i cat ed"
readers to find a cont ent for its rhet ori c. Al t hough the r het or i c is
unfami l i ar to t he sociologist, the cont ent is very well known.
Althusser asks how we can concept ual i se t he levels of a soci al
f or mat i on and t hei r i nt errel at i on. The st art i ng poi nt i s t he " pr e -
gi ven" whol e, t he i rreduci bl e appear ance with which bour geoi s
sociology begins. The pri nci pl e of ar t i cul at i on of this whol e must
be pri or to any of t he pre-given levels of this whol e and is f ound, in
bourgeoi s soci ol ogy, in t he idealist fiction of "soci et y", whi ch is a
cause visible only in its effects. Scandal is normal l y avoi ded by
adopt i ng a " nomi nal i s t " i nt erpret at i on of this fiction, whi ch exists
onl y i n t heory whi ch, of course, must not be confused with t he real .
Thi s theoretical fiction det ermi nes the differentiation of gl obal
social functions, t he functions being hi erarchi sed i nt o mat er i al ,
social and i deol ogi cal r epr oduct i on on t he basis of an " a n-
t hr opol ogy of needs".
8 2
The pre-gi ven whol e of bour geoi s
sociology is t hus compl ex, and it is st r uct ur ed in domi nance in t he
last i nst ance by t he "economi c", or mat eri al pr oduct i on.
Corresponding to these functions are specific, relatively
52 SIMON CLARKE
aut onomous , institutional levels which ensure t hat t he functions i n
quest i on will be fulfilled. Economi c i nst i t ut i ons ensure mat eri al
r epr oduct i on by assigning funct i ons t o agents t hr ough t he division
of l abour . Political i nst i t ut i ons assign agent s to functions by
means of t he law of propert y and cont ract . Ideol ogi cal i nst i t ut i ons
"assure t he /-. of men wi t h one anot her in t he ensembl e of t he
forms of their existence, t he rel at i on of i ndi vi dual s to their t asks
fi xed by t he social st r uct ur e".
8 3
The domi nat i on of Al t husser' s
" mar xi s m" by the t heoret i cal "pr obl emat i c" of bourgeoi s
sociology is t ot al . The consequences of i gnori ng Mar x' s critique of
Ri cardo are grave, for Ri cardo is not simply a hi st ori cal figure, he
is the very f oundat i on of cont empor ar y bourgeoi s soci ol ogy.
Mar x avoi ds the need t o i nt r oduce concept s of "over det er mi na-
t i on" and "det er mi nat i on in t he last i nst ance" by -/--, /.
-., / ,..- The rel at i ons of pr oduct i on are not the
expression in pr oduct i on of politically or ideologically const i t ut ed
relations of di st ri but i on. The l at t er are subor di nat e t o t he former.
Marx is not so naive as to believe t hat rel at i ons of pr oduct i on do
not pr esuppose, either empirically or analytically, rel at i ons of
di st ri but i on:
If it is sai d t hat , since product i on must begin with a certain di st ri but i on
of the i nst rument s of pr oduct i on, it follows that di st ri but i on at least in
this sense precedes and forms t he presupposi t i on of pr oduct i on, then
the reply must be t hat pr oduct i on does indeed have its det ermi nant s
and precondi t i ons, which form its moment s. At the very beginning
these may appear as spont aneous, nat ural . But by the process of
pr oduct i on itself they are t ransformed from nat ural i nt o historic
det ermi nant s. . . . The quest i ons raised above all reduce themselves in
the last instance to the role pl ayed by general-historical relations in
product i on, and their relation to the movement of hi st ory generally.
The quest i on evidently belongs within the t reat ment and investigation
of pr oduct i on itself.
84
The quest i on concerns, t herefore, /. ,-, / ,..- - /.
// ..../,-.- / .//..-.. /, It has not hi ng to
do with t he quest i on of t he empi ri cal possibility of pr oduct i on
wi t hout super st r uct ur es, nor wi t h t he met aphysi cal quest i on of the
possibility of a concept of pr oduct i on defined wi t hout reference to
superst ruct ures.
85
:/. ,-, / ,..- /.-... - /,
-. - - /. --. / / /, - /. -.- /
,//,
Mar x t akes pr oduct i on in society as his st ar t i ng poi nt . In this
sense he st art s with society as a pre-given whol e. But this pre-given
whole is t he concret e historical anchor age of his anal ysi s, and not
its t heoret i cal poi nt of depar t ur e. The /../ st ar t i ng poi nt is
production, and the specific differentiation and articulation of
"l evel s" is devel oped on t he basis of t he analysis of pr oduct i on.
Mar x makes t he poi nt i n a quot e whi ch Al t husser uses t o est abl i sh
"over det er mi nat i on":
The specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus-labour is
pumped out of direct producers, determines the relationship of rulers
and ruled, as it grows directly out of production itself, and, in turn
reacts upon it as a determining element. Upon this, however, is
founded the entire formation of the economic community which grows
out of the production relations themselves, thereby simultaneously its
specific political form . . .
86
In his analysis of this quot at i on Al t husser collapses t hese t wo
sent ences i nt o one i n argui ng t hat t he text proves "t hat a cer t ai n
form of combi nat i on of t he elements pr esent necessarily i mpl i ed a
cert ai n form of domi nat i on and servi t ude indispensible t o t he
survi val of this combi nat i on, i.e. a cert ai n ,// confi gurat i on
c./.-,. of soci et y". But /.. t hi s is not at all what Mar x
says. The first sent ence s.. makes no reference to pol i t i cal
confi gurat i on, but refers rat her t o t he "r el at i onshi p of rul ers and
rul ed, ,. ../, . / ,..- .// and it is this
rel at i onshi p which reacts back on t he economi c form of sur pl us
l abour ext ract i on. The second sent ence i s separ at ed from t he fi rst
by the emphat i c " however " and argues t hat the economi c
communi t y and its specific political form i s founded on " t hi s " , t he
" t hi s " referring t o t he combi nat i on of specific economi c form and
rel at i on of ruler t o rul ed which grows out of pr oduct i on as f or ms
of t he relation of pr oduct i on.
To argue t hat economi c, political and ideological rel at i ons have
to be anal ysed as ///, ..../,.. /- / /. ./- /
,..- is not to offer an " economi s t " posi t i on. It is to ar gue
t hat the uni t y of t he different forms of social rel at i on as r el at i ons
of class expl oi t at i on i s mor e f undament al t han any separ at i on or
specification not onl y of "pol i t i cal " and "i deol ogi cal " but al so of
" economi c" rel at i ons as distinct forms of the rel at i ons of
pr oduct i on. If t he differentiated forms of appear ance of t hese class
rel at i ons are t aken as they present t hemsel ves, as pre-gi ven,
"relatively a u t o n o mo u s " levels, any at t empt t o explain one i n
t er ms of anot her , even "i n the last i ns t ance" is bound to be
reduct i oni st . Mar x' s analysis reveals, however , t hat class r el at i ons
whose i mmedi at e f oundat i on is the pr oduct i on of surpl us val ue in
t he process of pr oduct i on, are not purel y " economi c" , but ar e i n
class societies mul t i di mensi onal power rel at i ons whi ch are
expressed in par t i cul ar ideological f or ms. This is why c,/ is
not simply a wor k of economi cs. In it Mar x does devel op
rigorously the economic form of the relations of production, but
54 SIMON CLARKE
he also devel ops an analysis of t he typical i deol ogi cal form of t he
capital rel at i on as t he basis of his critique of pol i t i cal economy,
and he at least indicates the way t o devel op t he pol i t i cal f or m, as
exemplified in the quot e above.
87
Bal i bar' s cont r i but i on to s..-, c,/ bri ngs out clearly t he
connect i on bet ween the ant i -hi st ori ci st project of t hat work and
the adopt i on of the bourgeoi s concept of pr oduct i on. In or der t o
const ruct an analytical version of Mar x the basi c concept s must be
purged of historicity and f ounded entirely "wi t hi n t heor y".
Hi st ory will t hen be a const ruct of t he mode of pr oduct i on and not
its st ar t i ng poi nt .
8 8
Classical political economy and its ideological
heir, funct i onal i st sociology, pr ovi de precisely t he t ranshi st ori cal
f oundat i on on which t o const r uct the concept " mode of
pr oduct i on" . Bal i bar bases his concept of t he mode of pr oduct i on
on a uni versal , t ranshi st ori cal concept i on of pr oduct i on- i n-
general as t he i nvari ant of hi st or y. Each specific mode is t hen a
vari ant combi nat i on of the i nvar i ant elements and rel at i ons which
enter t hi s combi nat i on, and hi st ory the succession of such modes.
The concept " mode of pr oduct i on" is t hus t he basis of t he t heory
of hi st ory (as t he basis of compar i s on) , and of t he science of society
(in specifying each mode as a series of art i cul at ed pract i ces whose
art i cul at i on is the object of t he science of society).
The el ement s of the mode of pr oduct i on ar e t he l abour er , the
means of pr oduct i on and t he non- wor ker . The rel at i ons which
combi ne t hese el ement s are t he rel at i on of real appr opr i at i on and
the pr oper t y rel at i on. In t he capitalist mode of pr oduct i on
"capi t al is t he owner of all t he means of pr oduct i on -. of l abour
; and t herefore it is t he owner of t he entire pr oduct " , and this is
the specifically capitalist form of the pr oper t y rel at i on. The
relation of real appr opr i at i on is t hat desi gnat ed by Mar x as /.
./ -./ ,,,- / /. -.- / ,..- /, /.
,... - /. //. ,.., or simply as t he appr opr i at i on of
nat ur e by man" . Initially i n Bal i bar' s pr esent at i on t hi s rel at i on
involves onl y t he l abour er and t he means of pr oduct i on. However
we subsequent l y find the capi t al i st i nt erveni ng as well, t he
capitalist' s cont r ol being a "t echni cal l y i ndi spensabl e moment of
the l abour pr ocess", so t hat t he rel at i on of real appr opr i at i on
comes to be defined as /. .. ,... //, . ./
/. -.- / / ,..- Al t hough Bal i bar' s exposi t i on is
hardl y clear, it eventually emerges t hat /. .//..-. /....- /..
./- ,.../, / /....- /. / ./- /
./.- -. ./- / ,..- Hence t he difference is
assimilated t o t hat between supposedl y distinct t echni cal and
social divisions of labour: the organisation of production and the
organi sat i on of expl oi t at i on. The mode of pr oduct i on i s t he
combi nat i on of t hese rel at i ons, /. ./-/, /....- /.. .
--.- -. /. -...,.-..-.
s.
Bal i bar devel ops t he obvi ous ant i -hi st ori ci st i mpl i cat i ons of t he
concept at some l engt h in his second chapt er .
90
Text ual s uppor t is
given for this posi t i on, t he texts in quest i on being t hose of Fr eud
seen t hr ough t he eyes of Lacan. Unf or t unat el y, however, Bal i bar
has little mor e of subst ance t o say about t he concept itself, and
gives us no reason to believe t hat it is Mar x' s concept at all. In a
section which di d not appear in the first edi t i on of s..-, c,/
Bal i bar i nforms us, wi t hout evi dence, t hat " Mar x const ant l y
defines t he ' rel at i ons of p r o d u c t i o n ' . . . by its /-. / .-./, of
t he means of pr oduct i on, and t herefore by the mode of
appr opr i at i on of t he social product whi ch depends on i t ". This
" pr oper t y" connect i on must be sharpl y di st i ngui shed from t he law
of pr oper t y, we have t o l ook for " t he rel at i ons of pr oduct i on
/./-. the legal f or ms, or bet t er: behi nd t he secondary uni t y of
pr oduct i on and l aw" . We are not , however , told either how t o do
t hi s, or what we will find.
91
The section on t he pr oduct i ve forces i s no mor e i l l umi nat i ng.
Bal i bar describes t he respective l abour processes charact eri st i c of
manuf act ur e and moder n i ndust ry, not i ng t hat the former can be
charact eri sed by t he .-, / //.,.. ; -. /. -.- /
//. t he l at t er by /. .-, / /. -.- / //. -. /. /.
/ //.
92
Bal i bar t hen concl udes t hat -...-. of t he
rel at i onshi p bet ween t he elements of t he combi nat i on, t he nat ur es
of t hose el ement s themselves are t r ans f or med" (my emphasi s) ,
al t hough he has merely not ed t hat t he t wo change concomi t ant l y
and hasn' t even di scussed the causat i on of t he change.
Al t hough Bal i bar adds very little t o Al t husser ' s brief comment s
on t he concept of " mode of pr oduct i on" , he does rai se t he
quest i on of "det er mi nat i on in the last i nst ance" whi ch Al t husser
essentially i gnor ed. The argument is t ermi nol ogi cal l y confused. It
begins with an ext r aor di nar y di scussi on of fetishism, whi ch even
Bal i bar has subsequent l y recognised is /. which I shall
chari t abl y i gnore.
93
Balibar devel ops t he concept of det er mi nat i on i n t he last
i nst ance i n rel at i on t o t he feudal mode of pr oduct i on, basi ng
himself on a quot at i on from c,/ vol . III, in whi ch Mar x
consi ders l abour rent . In this passage Mar x not es t hat t he non-
coi nci dence of necessary and surpl us l abour i n t i me and space
implies t hat t he sur pl us l abour of t he direct pr oducer must be
ext ort ed by " ot her t han economi c pr essur e". Bal i bar argues t hat
this is t he "char act er i st i c difference bet ween t he feudal mode of
production and the capitalist mode of production". This
56 SIMON CLARKE
difference in t ur n derives from "t he form of -/-- of t he
factors of t he pr oduct i on pr oces s " i n t he t wo modes of
pr oduct i on. Hence i n the capi t al i st mode of pr oduct i on " t h e
coincidence of /. //. ,. -. /. ,. / ,..-,
./.. implies t hat t he "cor r espondi ng ' t r ansf or med f or ms' in this
social st r uct ur e, i.e. the forms of t he relations bet ween classes, ar e
t hen ../, .-- /- (profit, rent, wages, i nt erest ), whi ch
implies not abl y t hat /. . .. - -...-. - /.- at this
level". (This is the t heory of "r evenue sour ces". ) On the ot her
hand "i n t he feudal mode of pr oduct i on t here is a ..--
between t he t wo processes. . . . Surpl us-l abour cannot t hen be
ext ort ed by ' ot her t han economi c pressure' . . . . Even before we
have anal ysed t he ' t r ansf or med f or ms' for t hemsel ves, we can
concl ude t hat i n t he feudal mode of pr oduct i on t hey will not be t he
t r ansf or med forms of t he economi c base al one, . . . - ../,
.-- /. ../, -. -././/, ,// -. .--
Finally, Bal i bar reaches a definition of det er mi nat i on in the last
i nst ance: :/. .--, ...--- - / ...--. .// /
/. --. / /. ... .,. /. ...--- ,/ .
.
The f undament al error whi ch underl i es this account is l ocat ed in
its initial premi ses, the belief t hat t he defining feat ure of t he feudal
mode of pr oduct i on is its domi nat i on by the pol i t i cal . A number of
poi nt s in Bal i bar' s analysis l ead us to seek an al t ernat i ve basis for
the differentiation of t he social forms of pr oduct i on. Firstly, t he
passage from c,/ on whi ch it is based concerns l abour rent, t he
-,/. /- of feudal ,.-. .- and not t he feudal " mode of
pr oduct i on" . In the cont i nuat i on of the passage Mar x discusses
ot her forms of feudal rent in whi ch l abour and surpl us l abour .
coi nci dent i n t i me and space. None of the passage makes any
reference t o det er mi nat i on by t he political level, but merely t o t he
use of " ot her t han economi c pr essur e". Hence t he at t empt t o
explain t he supposed domi nat i on by the political by reference t o
the "f or m of -/-- of t he factors of the pr oduct i on pr oces s "
does not even get off t he gr ound.
9 5
Secondly, it is wor t h not i ng t hat
i n the very quot at i on with whi ch Bal i bar i nt r oduces t he discussion
Marx refers not t o politics but t o Cat hol i ci sm as appear i ng t o pl ay
the chief par t in the mi ddl e ages.
96
Thi rdl y, as he realises in his
"Sel f-Cri t i ci sm", Bal i bar' s cl ai m t hat capitalist rel at i ons ar e
directly economi c gives the economi c an aut onomy whi ch woul d
under mi ne t he whol e t heory of over det er mi nat i on.
97
Four t hl y, i f
the economi c is not det er mi nant in t he first i nst ance, it is difficult
to see how a t heoret i cal ar gument can est abl i sh t hat it is
det er mi nant i n t he last i nst ance wi t hout rel yi ng on an
ant hr opol ogy of needs whi ch woul d assert t hat mat eri al
reproduction is the prime function of society, an assertion which is
not only t heoret i cal l y unaccept abl e, but whi ch i s al so
demonst r abl y false: i n t he capitalist mode of pr oduct i on mass
st arvat i on is a far less significant barri er to r epr oduct i on t han t he
t hr eat of a decl i ni ng rat e of profit.
The belief t hat t he political is domi nant / det er mi nant in feudal
society is not a marxi st belief, but one whi ch bourgeoi s hi st or i ans
count er pose to mar xi sm. It is a concept i on which derives very
directly from t he i deol ogy i n which t he bourgeoi s r evol ut i on was
conduct ed, an i deol ogy whose most syst emat i c expression i s t o be
f ound i n classical political economy. Al t hough t he l at t er was
ahi st ori cal , r egar di ng bourgeoi s rel at i ons / ,..- as et ernal ,
i t was not so nai ve as t o believe t hat capi t al i sm had no pr ehi st or y.
Its ahi st ori cal char act er lies precisely in seeing this pr ehi st or y as
no mor e t han t he prehi st ory / ,/- It does t hi s by
cont rast i ng t he et ernal bourgeoi s rel at i ons of ,..- wi t h
historically given rel at i ons of ./.- t he latter onl y comi ng
i nt o har mony wi t h t he former with t he t r i umph of capi t al i sm.
Hence t he pre-capi t al i st modes are all charact eri sed by pol i t i cal
i nt ervent i on whi ch di st ort s rel at i ons of di st ri but i on t hat woul d
ot herwi se have ari sen spont aneousl y as capitalist rel at i ons on t he
basis of the et ernal st r uct ur e of pr oduct i on. Political i nt er vent i on
i s requi red because i n non-capi t al i st modes t he surpl us does not
accr ue "nat ur al l y" t o t he expl oi t i ng classes. The feudal l or d i s
t herefore seen as a disfigured capi t al i st l andowner , usi ng his
political power t o secure not onl y his l and rent, but al so t he
"pr of i t " of t he capi t al i st or "sel f - empl oyed" pet t y pr oducer , and
even t o depress t he " wages " of the di rect producers.
98
Cl assi cal
political economy is a very r evol ut i onar y doct r i ne, expressi ng t he
alliance bet ween capi t al , art i san and peasant in its cri t i que of
feudal rel at i ons of pr oduct i on. The pr obl em wi t h Al t husser i ani sm
is t hat it is mi xed up with t he wr ong revol ut i on.
99
There is no mor e basis for t he claim t hat t he political is det er -
mi nant in feudal society t han for t he cl ai m t hat it is det er mi nant in
capitalist society. Ther e is no difference in pri nci pl e bet ween t he
t wo. In every class society rel at i ons of expl oi t at i on are not si mpl y
economi c rel at i ons bet ween part i cul ar i ndi vi dual s, they ar e class
rel at i ons in whi ch t hose individuals rel at e as member s of social
classes. Thus t he existence and t he per pet uat i on of a class r el at i on
is t he hi st ori cal presupposi t i on of part i cul ar rel at i ons of
expl oi t at i on, and t he per pet uat i on of class rel at i ons i n any class
society requi res a st at e t hat will act politically in an at t empt to
confine member s of t he exploited class wi t hi n t he boundar i es of
t he domi nant class rel at i on. The st at e is as much a class st at e in
capitalist society as it is in feudal society, and capitalist soci et y, as
much as feudal society, requires a class state. Within capitalist
58 SIMON CLARKE
society t he st at e i s necessary t o preserve t he commodi t y char act er
of l abour power , and i t has t o do this not onl y i n t he per i od of
"pr i mi t i ve accumul at i on", when capitalist social rel at i ons are
being f or med, but al so as t he f undament al aspect of its everyday
oper at i on in capitalist society.
100
It is the commodi t y char act er of
l abour power t hat defines t he class char act er of t he capi t al
rel at i on, and t he subor di nat i on of the l abour er s t o t he wage form
involves t he i nt ervent i on of t he st at e. Wi t hi n feudal society t he
state i s necessary t o preserve t he dependent char act er of t he
l abour er , a necessity whi ch is all t he more pressi ng to t he extent
t hat l and has not been ent i rel y engrossed by t he domi nant class.
Thus t he charact eri st i c feudal class rel at i on, t he rel at i on of
personal dependence, pr esupposes historically t he existence of an
aut hor i t y t hat i s able t o i mpose and t o preserve t hat rel at i on of
dependence.
101
Thus nei t her feudal nor capi t al i st class rel at i ons
can be consi dered in i sol at i on from t he class st at e t hat is one aspect
of t hose rel at i ons.
In or der t o const ruct a t ranshi st ori cal concept of t he mode of
pr oduct i on Bal i bar t akes as his st art i ng poi nt Mar x' s definition of
the l abour process, found in c,/ but as likely to be encount er ed
i n any engi neeri ng t ext book. Fr om this Bal i bar derives t he
el ement s whi ch enter his concept of the mode of pr oduct i on,
al t hough t he elements do not exist out si de t he mode of
pr oduct i on, their cont ent bei ng specified by t he t wo rel at i ons of
the mode of pr oduct i on. Al t hough marxi st t er ms are appl i ed t o
these rel at i ons they are, as I have not ed, essentially t he classical
concept i ons of the rel at i ons of pr oduct i on det er mi ned by t he
t echni cal requi rement s of t he l abour process, and rel at i ons of
di st r i but i on whi ch receive a politico-legal or i deol ogi cal definition
i n t er ms of t he di st ri but i on of (relation of owner shi p t o) the means
of pr oduct i on. If these t wo rel at i ons are t o be super i mposed on
one anot her as rel at i ons whi ch define a single combi nat i on t hey
must connect t he same el ement s with one anot her . This i s
awkwar d, since the non- wor ker who appr opr i at es surpl us l abour
and figures i n t he rel at i ons of di st ri but i on does not pl ay any rol e,
as a non- wor ker , in pr oduct i on itself. Vari ous expedi ent s are
adopt ed t o avoi d embar r assment : i n t he capi t al i st mode of
pr oduct i on t he capi t al i st is i nsi nuat ed i nt o t he process of
pr oduct i on as a technically i ndi spensabl e el ement of the l abour
pr ocess, t he element of co- or di nat i on and cont r ol . In t he Asiatic
mode of pr oduct i on t he non- wor ker ,,. to pl ay a par t in t he
l abour process as personi fi cat i on of t he "hi gher uni t y", " t he
communal condi t i ons of real appr opr i at i on".
1 0 2
The non- wor ker
is t herefore implicitly assi gned a place in t he l abour process as
expression of a general requirement of co-operation. This,
however, raises furt her difficulties, for t he non- wor ker is not a
feat ure of all societies, but only of / soci et i es.
103
He cannot
t herefore appear as a t ranshi st ori cal el ement of t he i nvar i ant
./. ..--, .,/.. / ./-
Fur t her pr obl ems arise in the t r eat ment of t he //.. ( l abour
power ) ",
104
for it is not t he same el ement which ent ers t he forces
and rel at i ons of pr oduct i on, as is i ndi cat ed by t he par ent hesi s. t
,../, .-, ./- / ./.- - ./-/
/... / /. //. ,. / .,/- /. // //..
.-,./ /. -., / //. /- / / //. ,.. and t he
t wo are syst emat i cal l y confused in Bal i bar ' s t r eat ment . If we
define the rel at i on of pr oduct i on i n t er ms of pr oper t y, t hen t he
non- wor ker owns t he means of pr oduct i on and the //.. in t he
slave mode of pr oduct i on, and the means of pr oduct i on and //.
,.. (in one phase of t he circuit of capi t al ) in the capitalist mode
of pr oduct i on. On t he ot her hand, t he forces of pr oduct i on
i mpl i cat e nei t her l abour er nor l abour power , /. -.. //.
:/. .-- /....- /.. //, .//..- -., /. / /
.. / ,// .--, It is onl y because he saw t he
capitalist mode of pr oduct i on as a hi st ori cal phenomenon t hat he
coul d unravel t he confusi on of the physi cal aspect of l abour as
concret e useful l abour and its social aspect, under capi t al , of
val ue-creat i ng abst r act l abour . It is no use argui ng lamely t hat t he
el ement s have no cont ent until specified in a mode, because this
ar gument is ci rcul ar and so vacuous. :/.. - .-. ./... -
.// //. //.. -. //. ,.. . /. -. /-, j ust as
t her e is no sense in which the non- wor ker and the form of co-
oper at i on ar e t he same t hi ng.
If the t wo rel at i ons of Bal i bar' s combi nat i on can onl y be
br ought t oget her by et erni si ng expl oi t at i ve rel at i ons of pr oduct i on
and by confusi ng t he social and t he physi cal , his char act er i sat i on
of t he rel at i ons is al so faulty. I shall focus on t he concept of
rel at i ons of pr oduct i on. The rel at i on of pr oduct i on is concei ved as
a rel at i on of di st r i but i on mapped on t o t he general st r uct ur e of
pr oduct i on, hence as a relation of di st ri but i on of means of
pr oduct i on, hence as a pr oper t y r el at i on. This is the or t hodox
Stalinist definition.
" The economi c rel at i on of pr oduct i on appear s . . . as a rel at i on
between t hree funct i onal l y defined t er ms : owner cl ass/ means of
pr oduct i on/ cl ass of expl oi t ed pr oducer s. "
1 0 5
This rel at i on is
consistently defi ned in t erms of t he legal rel at i on of owner shi p.
The i mmedi at e pr obl em this poses is t hat of di sent angl i ng t he
rel at i on of pr oduct i on from t he legal forms in which it appear s.
1 0 6
Thi s is doubl y difficult for t he Al t husser i ans. First, because t hei r
epistemology demands that the extraction of the non-legal relation
60 SIMON CLARKE
shoul d be effected in t heor y, hence analytically. If "we are obliged
. . . to descri be it in t he pecul i ar t ermi nol ogy of legal cat egor i es" it
is difficult to see how this can be done.
107
Secondl y, and mor e
f undament al l y, because t he "r el at i on of pr oduc t i on" is simply a
rel at i on of di st ri but i on ma ppe d on t o pr oduct i on by the legal
connect i on of ownershi p of means of pr oduct i on, it is -/, t he
l at t er legal connect i on t hat const i t ut es the rel at i on of pr oduct i on.
Hence t her e i s no rel at i on of pr oduct i on ot her t han t hat defined
legally for t he Al t husseri ans. This is because t hey do not ask what
is the basi s on which the sur pl us pr oduct is ,.... but r at her
what is t he basis on which t he /.., ,.... surpl us pr oduct
becomes t he ,,., of t he expl oi t er, a quest i on whi ch is a purel y
legal quest i on of /. to shar es in t he pr oduct . Hence Bal i bar
cannot do anyt hi ng mor e t han t o ,./, this legal rel at i on at t he
level of pr oduct i on. Thus t he Al t husseri ans ar e consistently and
necessarily unabl e t o specify any concept of " pr oper t y r el at i on"
t hat is di st i nct from t he legal rel at i on of owner shi p.
There is, certainly, a rel at i on between owner shi p of t he means of
pr oduct i on and ownershi p of shares of t he pr oduct , /. /.
../,/ ./- -... - ,/ ., /, /. -,
/-./ .// /. ...-.. / t he capitalist is
.-/.. t he surpl us pr oduct because he has /. one of t he
factors of pr oduct i on. That t hi s formul a is i ndeed ideological can
be est abl i shed even at t he level of t he i sol at ed process of
pr oduct i on. The capitalist cannot own t he surpl us pr oduct /...
he owns t he means of pr oduct i on, for the l at t er are soon used up i n
pr oduct i on. He owns t he sur pl us because he owns t he .//.
pr oduct . He owns t he whol e pr oduct because he owns means of
pr oduct i on -. l abour power . However , so l ong as t he prol et ari at
i s domi nat ed by "bour geoi s r omant i c i l l usi ons" about t hei r
" h u ma n " rights and dignities,
108
i t i s ideologically mor e sound
t hat t hey t hi nk of the wage as t hei r share i n t he pr oduct t han as the
price of t hei r subst ance.
Mar x goes beneat h t he level of appear ances to ask not what is
the basi s of t he pr oper t y of t he exploiter in t he surpl us pr oduct of
the direct pr oducer , but r at her what is the basis of t he ,..- of
the sur pl us pr oduct by the di rect pr oducer ? Thi s quest i on /.. .
../, ./- / ,..- and is pr i or to any quest i ons of
rel at i ons of di st ri but i on a nd so of legal rel at i ons. Havi ng
est abl i shed t he basis in pr oduct i on of t he expendi t ur e of surpl us
l abour , t he quest i on of t he appr opr i at i on of t hat surpl us l abour i s
relatively trivial. Hence t he rel at i on of pr oduct i on is mor e
f undament al t han t he pr oper t y rel at i ons whi ch express it. To see
this it is worth working back from the "trinity formula".
The capitalist owns the surplus product because he owns the
means of pr oduct i on and l abour power . But he owns means of
pr oduct i on and l abour power because he is a capitalist, because he
can const ant l y repl ace means of pr oduct i on and l abour power as
t hey are used up. He is therefore a capi t al i st /./. he is owner of
t he means of pr oduct i on. As an .-. t he capitalist is in a /-//,
,--./ posi t i on to the l abourer, for it is in t he mar ket t hat
l abour er and capi t al i st meet as .-. The quest i on we have to
ask concerns t he basis of the ./-.. ,--., of t hi s
encount er : why can t he capitalist buy t he wor ker ' s l abour power ,
while the wor ker cannot buy the means of pr oduct i on? Why can
t he l abourer be uni t ed with t he objective condi t i ons of l abour onl y
under the domi nat i on of capital? The answer lies i n t he
ci rcumst ances i n whi ch capitalist and l abourer enter not
pr oduct i on but ci rcul at i on, t he capi t al i st as owner of --.,
,/ (not means of pr oduct i on) , t he wor ker as owner of not hi ng
but his or her l abour power . The capi t al i st rel at i on of pr oduct i on
is, cor r espondi ngl y, not founded on t he rel at i on between l abour er
and owner of means of pr oduct i on, but on t hat bet ween free
l abour and capi t al , and this is why it cannot be seen as an
i nt erpersonal r el at i on. :/. ./- ./ .// .. . -.-..
- /.-.-.-//, ,,., ./- /. ./- /....-
/. This rel at i on is not ../-.. by t he legal connect i on of t he
member s of t hese classes t o t he el ement s of t he l abour pr ocess, but
by t he -.. / ,,- / /. .//..- /. - /. /
,. / / ,..- (which i ncl udes not only pr oduct i on,
but also ci rcul at i on, di st ri but i on and consumpt i on) .
1 0 9
The basis of this rel at i on i n the capi t al i st mode of pr oduct i on
must be sought i n t he condi t i ons whi ch det ermi ne t hat t he
capi t al i st as owner of money confront s t he l abour er as owner of no
mor e t han his l abour power. This i s not t he quest i on of t he
hi st ori cal condi t i ons of the capitalist mode of pr oduct i on, but
r at her of t he pr ocess wi t hi n t he capi t al i st mode of pr oduct i on by
whi ch the l at t er .,... its own condi t i ons of exi st ence. In
ot her words t he key t o t he capital rel at i on i s not t o be f ound i n t he
i sol at ed process of pr oduct i on, but in t he process of / /
.,..- Al t hough Bal i bar recogni ses t hat t he analysis of
r epr oduct i on is i mpor t ant , he fails to under st and t hat it is
f undament al t o t he definition of the mode of pr oduct i on itself.
110
Bal i bar' s separ at i on of pr oduct i on and r epr oduct i on is a
common one, based on an over hasty r eadi ng of c,/ In c,/
Mar x does consi der t he different moment s of t he circuit of capi t al
i ndependent l y of one anot her , i n t ur n, before he l ooks at t he
circuit of capi t al as a whol e. It is onl y when he t ur ns to
r epr oduct i on i n vol ume one and t o t he circuit of capi t al i n vol ume
two that Marx ties the argument together and situates the previous
62 SIMON CLARKE
di scussi on. It is onl y when he does this t hat t he social form of t he
capitalist mode of pr oduct i on is revealed, because it is onl y in t he
circuit as a whol e t hat t he pr oduct i on and r epr oduct i on of capi t al
has its rat i onal e. Thi s shoul d be clear if we consi der t he moment s
of t he circuit separat el y, for if we do so we ar e unabl e to find t he
f undament al class rel at i on of capi t al i st society. In t he
consi derat i on of the commodi t y form, t he moment of ci rcul at i on
consi dered i n i sol at i on, Mar x cannot fi nd any class rel at i ons, but
only rel at i ons between free and equal owner s of commodi t i es. In
the consi derat i on of t he pr oduct i on process Mar x cannot fi nd
class rel at i ons either, for here we have onl y rel at i ons bet ween
i ndi vi dual capitalists and i ndi vi dual wor ker s. The capi t al i st
process of pr oduct i on is a process of pr oduct i on of capi t al , onl y to
the ext ent t hat it is a process of pr oduct i on of surpl us val ue.
Surpl us value is t he difference bet ween t he val ue expended in
vari abl e capi t al and t he val ue realised i n t he sale of the pr oduct ,
after deduct i on of const ant capi t al , and nei t her of these sums exist
if pr oduct i on is consi dered in isolation. Thus t he pr oduct i on of
surpl us val ue presupposes t he commodi t y form of t he pr oduct and
of l abour power, while t he capitalist form of ci rcul at i on
presupposes the pr oduct i on of surplus value: capitalist pr oduct i on
and ci rcul at i on pr esuppose one anot her in t he uni t y of the circuit
of capi t al . The circuit of capi t al describes t he series of economi c
forms t aken by capi t al and l abour i n the subor di nat i on of l abour
t o t he pr oduct i on of capi t al . Thi s series cannot be reduced t o one
of its forms: t he class rel at i on is t he unity of f or ms expressed in t he
circuit of t he r epr oduct i on of the capi t al rel at i on. Thi s uni t y is
expressed i n the conf r ont at i on of capital with free l abour , and t he
persi st ence of the capi t al rel at i on depends on preservi ng t he
"f r ee" charact er of l abour , i.e. the commodi t y form of l abour
power. In par t s VII and VI I I of vol ume one Mar x shows how t hi s
commodi t y form i s preserved t hr ough t he per manent di sposses-
sion of t he worker in the circuit of capi t al , t hr ough t he expansi on
and cont r act i on of t he reserve ar my of l abour , and t hr ough t he use
of t he law and of force. It is this class r el at i on, i.e. a t ot al social
rel at i on, t hat i s t he presupposi t i on of t he pr oduct i on and
accumul at i on of capi t al , whose forms ar e descri bed i n t he
met amor phoses of t he circuit of capi t al . Thi s rel at i on cannot be
r educed to the economi c f or ms in which it appear s (this is precisely
the fetishism of t he commodi t y t hat inverts t he rel at i onshi p
bet ween social rel at i on and economi c cat egory), let al one t o one of
t hose forms. The basis of capitalist soci al rel at i ons is t he
commodi t y form of l abour power, and not t he capi t al i st ' s
owner shi p of the means of pr oduct i on. The l at t er i s only one
aspect of one form of capital within its circuit, an aspect which is,
mor eover , ./-//, rat her t han //, necessary for t he
capitalist t o be abl e t o set i n mot i on t he l abour power whi ch he has
pur chased, and as such t he f oundat i on for t he illusions about t he
t echni cal necessity of capi t al expressed i n t he "t r i ni t y f or mul a"
and dest royed by c,/
:::
Havi ng di scussed the rel at i ons of pr oduct i on at some l engt h
t here is little to be sai d about the Al t husseri an concept i on of t he
forces of pr oduct i on, for it is simply t he ot her side of t he coi n. It is
because the t echni cal division of l abour is seen as a set of posi t i ons
det er mi ned by t he t echnol ogy of pr oduct i on, because rel at i ons of
pr oduct i on ar e et erni sed, t hat the f or ces/ r el at i ons di st i nct i on i s
seen in t erms of a di st i nct i on bet ween technical rel at i ons of
pr oduct i on and social rel at i ons of di st r i but i on, expressed i n t er ms
of the technical and social division of l abour or of the supposedl y
distinct rel at i ons of real appr opr i at i on and rel at i ons of
pr oduct i on. It is because Mar x sees t he rel at i ons of di st r i but i on as
moment s of t he rel at i ons of pr oduct i on, and sees t he l at t er as
indissolubly t echni cal and social, t hat he had "di ffi cul t y" i n
"cl earl y t hi nki ng t he di st i nct i on bet ween t he t wo connect i ons".
1 1 2
.-/,//, we can argue t hat the t echni cal charact eri st i cs of t he
forces of pr oduct i on i mpose const r ai nt s on the rel at i ons wi t hi n
whi ch pr oduct i on t akes pl ace, j ust as -/,//, we can ar gue
t hat the rel at i ons of pr oduct i on i mpose const rai nt s on t he forces
which can be br ought i nt o play. But t hi s does not mean t hat we can
i sol at e t wo sets of rel at i ons of pr oduct i on, t wo divisions of l abour ,
one technical and one social. The di st i nct i on between t he t wo i s
not "a real di st i nct i on but si mpl y a -./ .--
cor r espondi ng t o t wo ways of concept ual i si ng the same process.
Techni cal and social division are t wo aspect s of the -. ..-
The functions whi ch ensure the t echni cal r epr oduct i on of t he
process are t he same as t hose whi ch det ermi ne its soci al
r epr oduct i on".
1 1 3
The analysis of c,/ is f ounded on t he
-., .-, of use value and val ue, not on the har moni ous
"uni t y of this doubl e uni t y". It i s smal l wonder t hat Bal i bar ' s
concept of t he rel at i on of real appr opr i at i on is difficult to
deci pher. Ei t her he i s unabl e t o separ at e technical and social
divisions of l abour , or he reduces t he rel at i on to a t echni cal
charact eri st i c of t he l abour process.
114
Havi ng specified t he i nadequacy of t he Al t husseri an concept of
mode of pr oduct i on i n rel at i on t o t he capitalist mode of
pr oduct i on, I shall t ur n briefly to i ndi cat e its weakness in rel at i on
t o pre-capitalist modes . I have al r eady not ed i n rel at i on t o t he
feudal mode of pr oduct i on t he classical bourgeoi s t er ms i n whi ch
Bal i bar poses t he quest i on. We are now abl e t o see t he significance
of the Ricardian definition of relations of production in terms of
64 SIMON CLARKE
owner shi p of means of pr oduct i on for the analysis of pre-capi t al i st
modes . Thi s definition is in essence t he i mposi t i on of t he
i deol ogi cal form of t he "t r i ni t y f or mul a" on pre-capi t al i st modes
of pr oduct i on. Pre-capi t al i st "r el at i ons of pr oduct i on" ar e, as I
have not ed, seen as politically i mposed r el at i ons of di st r i but i on.
To define these rel at i ons of di st r i but i on t heoret i cal l y, i n
accor dance with t he t ri ni t y formul a, it is necessary to seek
" f act or s " t o which t o at t r i but e the " r evenues " of t he var i ous
classes, revenues whi ch fall to the class by vi rt ue of its
" owne r s hi p" of the fact ors. Hence it is necessary to t r anspose
capi t al i st legal forms, most not abl y capi t al i st " owner s hi p" , i nt o
pre-capi t al i st modes of pr oduct i on t o under s t and t he rel at i ons of
pr oduct i on of t hose modes as debased forms of t he ideological
i nt er pr et at i on of capi t al i st rel at i ons of pr oduct i on.
The appl i cat i on of this analysis t o pre-capi t al i st modes
pr oduces (bourgeoi s) r evol ut i onar y concept i ons. I have di scussed
the feudal mode above. The view of ot her modes also reflects t he
rel at i on of capital t o such modes. Thus t he sl ave-owner of t he
anci ent worl d is seen as a capi t al i st f ar mer - l andowner , free of t he
bur den of rent, but whose idyllic worl d was dest royed by t he
Bar bar i an hordes who br ought , precisely, feudal i sm. In Asia t he
despot expl oi t ed his cont r ol of gover nment al funct i ons t o di vert
the sur pl us to himself by force, a concept i on whi ch coul d
l egi t i mat e colonial expl oi t at i on of the mor e " ba c kwa r d" peopl es,
and serve as an awful war ni ng t o the civilised worl d of t he danger s
of absol ut i sm.
116
The devel opment of capi t al i sm, in this
concept i on, can be identified with t he mar ch of reason a nd
uni versal i t y, sweepi ng away t hese vari ous artificial barri ers so t hat
the social relations al ready inscribed in t he "r el at i on of real
appr opr i at i on" can assert themselves. The devel opment of
capi t al i sm is then seen as an essentially pol i t i cal devel opment .
117
Mar x di d not st udy any but the capitalist mode of pr oduct i on
syst emat i cal l y. He has, however , offered us a schemat i c account in
the sect i on of the c.-.. on t he "f or ms whi ch precede
capitalist pr oduct i on" . Whi l e it is t rue t hat this section is pri mari l y
concer ned to distinguish t hese forms from t he capitalist form, it is
sufficiently clear t hat it does not need to be t r ansf or med by a
" s ympt oma t i c " readi ng.
At first sight this text appear s emi nent l y sui t ed t o an
Al t husser i an readi ng since it is cent red on t he concept of pr oper t y.
However , the t erm is not used in any j uri di cal sense in this text, but
refers t o t he specific way i n which "t he wor ker relates t o t he
objective condi t i ons of his l abour ". The t er m " pr ope r t y" i s
t herefore essentially a s ynonym for t he t er m " mode of
production",
118
referring to specific forms of co-operation in total
social pr oduct i on. The pr oper t y rel at i on in this text is t herefore t he
form of t hat co- oper at i on which i s essential bot h t echni cal l y and
socially as form of rel at i on t o the objective condi t i ons of l abour ,
co-operat i on whi ch expresses t he fact t hat " t he human bei ng i s i n
the most literal sense .- ,///-
::.
It is difficult to
distinguish t he pr oper t y rel at i on from the rel at i on of real
appr opr i at i on, because t he t wo are essentially the same t hi ng, t he
j uri di cal pr oper t y rel at i on bei ng si mpl y an expressi on of t he
relation of real appr opr i at i on.
1 2 0
Rel at i ons of expl oi t at i on emer ge
on the basis of t he latter not as super i mposed rel at i ons of
di st ri but i on, but as exploitative f or ms of co- oper at i on.
Mar x' s di scussi on of the pre-capi t al i st forms of pr oper t y is
ai med precisely at t he at t empt t o est abl i sh an " ext r a- economi c"
origin of pr oper t y. In a passage whi ch a sympt omat i c r eadi ng
reveals as bei ng ai med at Al t husser himself Mar x not es:
What Mr Pr oudhon calls the ..-- origin of pr oper t y . . . is
the ,./.,. rel at i on of the i ndi vi dual to the objective condi t i ons
of labour . . . Before we analyse this further, one mor e poi nt : t he
worthy Pr oudhon woul d not only be abl e t o, but woul d have t o, accuse
,/ and .,. //. as forms of propert y of havi ng an .
.-- origin. . . . But the fact that pre-bourgeoi s history, and each
of its phases, al so has its own .--, and an .-- /.-.- for
its movement , is at bot t om only the t aut ol ogy that human life has since
time i mmemor i al rested on pr oduct i on, and, i n one way or anot her , on
/ pr oduct i on, whose relations we call, precisely, economi c
relations.
121
The "det er mi nat i on by t he e c onomi c " which is expressed in
Mar x' s concept of t he mode of pr oduct i on does not t herefore
consist i n t he at t empt t o erect pr e- bour geoi s modes of pr oduct i on
on the basis of a bourgeoi s " e c onomi c " f oundat i on. It consi st s
r at her in specifying /. /- / /. / ./- ./- .//
,..- /. ,/. in different f or ms of society. The rel at i ons
of pr oduct i on on whi ch these var i ous modes of pr oduct i on ar e
based will ar t i cul at e different f or ms of expl oi t at i on, and
correspondi ngl y different rel at i ons of di st ri but i on. They will be
manifested i n specific and i nt er dependent economi c, i deol ogi cal
and political f or ms, which must be under st ood as ///,
..../,.. forms of t he rel at i on of pr oduct i on. This emerges very
clearly from Mar x' s not es on the var i ous pre-capi t al i st forms.
122
The fi rst f or m i s t hat i n which t he i ndi vi dual onl y rel at es t o t he
objective condi t i ons t hr ough t he communi t y. The basis of this
mode of pr oduct i on is a part i cul ar form of " pr ope r t y" defi ned,
wi t hout any reference t o its i deol ogi cal " a ppe a r a nc e " or its
political "expr es s i on", by t he medi at i on of the rel at i on of t he
individual to the objective conditions of his or her life by the
66 SIMON CLARKE
communi t y. -This form of rel at i on " can realise itself in very
different ways", from t he cl an communi t y t o vari ous forms of
Asi at i c, Slavonic and pr e- Col ombi an societies. In the cl an
communi t y the communi t y ,,. nat ur al or divine pr esupposi -
t i on, and each i ndi vi dual conduct s himself as co- pr opr i et or . In t he
Asi at i c realisation t he communi t y ,,. as a par t of a mor e
compr ehensi ve uni t y embodi ed in a higher pr opr i et or , so t hat real
communi t i es ,,. onl y as heredi t ary possessors.
123
The political
.,.- of the communi t y may t ake a mor e democr at i c or
despot i c form. " I n so far as it actually realises itself in l abour , " t hi s
may be t hr ough i ndependent family l abour or t hr ough communal
l abour . These vari ous i deol ogi cal , political and economi c forms
are qui t e explicitly concei ved as the forms i n whi ch t he communal
rel at i on of pr oduct i on is art i cul at ed. Of course t he analysis is
r udi ment ar y, and i n par t i cul ar Mar x doesn' t pose t he quest i on of
the rel at i on bet ween t he var i ous forms i n whi ch t he rel at i on of
pr oduct i on i s expressed and t he different f or ms of t hat rel at i on.
The account provi des t he st ar t i ng poi nt , however, which i s not t he
rel at i on of di st r i but i on, not t he physical l abour process, nor t he
ar t i cul at ed combi nat i on of the t wo, but the social form of
pr oduct i on, which i s pr i or t o bot h.
Mar x' s discussion of t he ot her forms of pr oper t y is mor e
f r agment ed, but follows t he same lines. The anci ent form is seen as
a pr oduct of the modi fi cat i on of the communal form. Communa l
and pri vat e " pr ope r t y" now coexist. The communi t y i s based on
the need for collective or gani sat i on t o defend the land agai nst
encr oachment by ot her s, and so has a warl i ke organi sat i on and i s
based i n the t own. Thi s means t hat " member s hi p i n t he c ommune
r emai ns the presupposi t i on for the appr opr i at i on of land and soil
. . . a ,..,,- r egar ded as divine et c. " The t hi rd, Ger mani c,
form has only vestigial communal pr oper t y, as "a uni fi cat i on
made up of i ndependent subjects, l anded pr opr i et or s, and not as a
uni t y" . The commune does not in fact exist as a st at e or political
body.
124
In t hese sketches Mar x offers the st art i ng poi nt , if no mor e, for a
marxi st t heor y of modes of pr oduct i on. The st art i ng poi nt , t he
t ranshi st ori cal absol ut e, i s not provi ded by an abst r act and empt y
st r uct ur e of unspecified el ement s, but by the "t aut ol ogy t hat
huma n life has since t i me i mmemor i al rest ed on pr oduct i on, and,
i n one way or anot her , on / pr oduct i on" . The task of t he
t heor y of pre-capi t al i st modes of pr oduct i on is to t ake this as t he
st ar t i ng poi nt and t o do what Marx has done for the capi t al i st
mode of pr oduct i on, t o specify the " one way or anot her ".
1 2 5
Two poi nt s mi ght be rai sed i n i mmedi at e obj ect i on t o this
approach, however. The account has made no reference to
expl oi t at i on, nor has i t made any reference t o t he forces of
pr oduct i on. The former obj ect i on i s mi sgui ded. To st ar t with
forms of appr opr i at i on of the sur pl us is to risk i mpl yi ng a
teleology in whi ch modes of pr oduct i on are i nst i t ut ed - ..
effect expl oi t at i on.
126
Such an appr oach is i nadequat e, for
expl oi t at i on can only t ake pl ace wi t hi n a const i t ut ed mode of
pr oduct i on, so t hat modes of pr oduct i on cannot be t heori sed
simply as modes of expl oi t at i on. We have al ready seen t hat in the
case of t he capi t al i st mode of pr oduct i on the condi t i on for
capitalist .,/- is a specific form of or gani sat i on of total
social pr oduct i on in which ,.- is effected t hr ough
commodi t y ci rcul at i on. The forms of expl oi t at i on charact eri st i c of
the modes of pr oduct i on di scussed here can be anal ysed in a
parallel way. Thus i n t he Asi at i c form expl oi t at i on of the
communi t y by t he despot a n d / o r t he priest depends on communal
relations of pr oduct i on and on specific forms of i deol ogi cal and
political expressi on of these r el at i ons. Slavery and ser t dom,
likewise, ar e " onl y further devel opment s of the form of pr oper t y
resting on t he cl an syst em". Her e t he wor ker i s excl uded from the
communi t y, and so "st ands i n no rel at i on what soever t o the
objective condi t i ons of his l a bour " but rat her "hi msel f appear s
among the nat ur al condi t i ons of pr oduct i on for a t hi r d i ndi vi dual
or communi t y" . Hence "sl avery, bondage, et c. . . . i s always
secondary, der i ved, never ori gi nal , al t hough (it is) a necessary and
logical result of pr oper t y founded on t he communi t y and l abour i n
the communi t y".
1 2 7
The quest i on of t he forces of pr oduct i on i s one whi ch Mar x does
not adequat el y cover in these not es. It is clear t hat t he "f or m of
pr oper t y" is underl ai n by par t i cul ar forms of t he forces of
pr oduct i on. In one sense t he form of propert y cor r esponds t o,
"depends par t l y on . . . t he economi c condi t i ons in whi ch it [the
commune sc; relates as pr opr i et or to t he l and and soil in
reality". Thus t he differences i n forms of pr oper t y depend on
differences in t he extent to whi ch " t he i ndi vi dual ' s pr oper t y can in
fact be realised solely t hr ough c ommuna l l abour " ( aqueduct s i n
the Asiatic mode , warfare i n t he anci ent ).
128
However t he ext ent t o
which c ommuna l l abour i s possi bl e depends i n t ur n on the
presence of communal forms of soci al or gani sat i on. We cannot
therefore deri ve t he form of pr oper t y from the form of t he forces of
pr oduct i on. Per haps at last we have come upon t he need for
st ruct ural causal i t y. Per haps the compl exi t y of Mar x' s t ot al i t y lies,
as Balibar i ndeed argues, in /. ./- /....- /.. .
--.- -. /. -...,.-..-.
::.
even if Bal i bar
misidentifies t he connect i ons.
68 SIMON CLARKE
The quest i on of t he r el at i onshi p bet ween forces and rel at i ons of
pr oduct i on is i nt i mat el y connect ed with the quest i on of hi st ory,
which bri ngs us back to Bal i bar ' s text. Havi ng est abl i shed a
st ruct ural i st definition of t he mode of pr oduct i on i n t erms of t he
combi nat i on of forces and rel at i ons of pr oduct i on t he classic
st ruct ural i st pr obl em of t he reconci l i at i on of st r uct ur e and hi st ory
appear s. The mode of pr oduct i on has t o est abl i sh some t empor al
mode of existence.
The concept of r epr oduct i on provi des an initial means of
deri vi ng a t empor al i t y from t he synchroni c st r uct ur e of t he mode
of pr oduct i on. But since t he forces and rel at i ons of pr oduct i on
form a har moni ous uni t y, this .,-- of t he mode of pr oduct i on
simply proj ect s the st r uct ur e i nt o its " et er ni t y" as a const ant and
unchangi ng st ruct ure.
130
Thi s i s i l l ust rat ed by Bal i bar ' s t r eat ment
of the concept of cont r adi ct i on.
The concept of cont r adi ct i on defines t he dynami cs of t he
st r uct ur e in the sense of t he existence of t he st r uct ur e in t i me. But it
i s i nscri bed within t he st r uct ur e, and so cannot be t he means by
whi ch t he suppressi on of t he st r uct ur e is effected. Cont r adi ct i on is
not , t herefore, f undament al , and its r esol ut i on does not t ake t he
form of t r ansf or mat i on of t he st ruct ure, but of renewed st r uct ur al
equi l i br i um. The concept of cont r adi ct i on is t herefore the basis of
the under st andi ng of t he dynami cs of t he mode of pr oduct i on,
whi ch t akes the form of stasis, but cannot hel p t o under s t and its
./-, the t ransi t i on from one mode of pr oduct i on t o
anot her.
131
To explain this Bal i bar i nt r oduces a different sort of
mode of pr oduct i on, a "t r ansi t i onal mode " , whose dynami c i s al so
a di achr ony.
In t he capitalist mode of pr oduct i on, accor di ng t o Bal i bar, t he
forces and rel at i ons of pr oduct i on " c or r e s pond" t o one anot her .
The rel at i onshi p bet ween t hem is one in whi ch t here is a
.,/ /-- of one connect i on by t he ot her " , so t hat t he
cont r adi ct i on bet ween t hem is non- ant agoni st i c, in t he sense j ust
di scussed. On t he ot her hand, t here ar e modes such as t he
manuf act ur i ng mode in whi ch the forces a nd rel at i ons are in a
st at e of " non- cor r es pondence" so t hat we see a -/-- /
-. /, /. .//. / /. /. in this case of t he forces by t he
r el at i ons, t o bri ng t he t wo back i nt o cor r espondence i n t he
capi t al i st mode of pr oduct i on. Repr oduct i on in a t r ansi t i onal
mode t herefore t akes t he form of supersessi on, but as t he pr oduct
of t he effect of the rel at i ons of pr oduct i on on t he forces, and not of
t he devel opment of cont r adi ct i ons. Thi s s ounds suspiciously like a
new var i ant of "hi st or i ci sm", and Bal i bar seems awar e of t he
danger , suddenl y dissolving his t ransi t i onal mode and announci ng
it as a combination of modes of production, bringing the analysis
back into t he pur i t y of the synchr oni c but leaving di achr ony once
mor e unexpl ai ned.
132
The t r ansi t i onal mode of pr oduct i on brings us back t o t he
concept of t he "conj unct ur e", t he cur r ent si t uat i on, in whi ch it is
political pract i ce which t akes t he whol e social f or mat i on as its
object, and so t o t he historicism of t he class subject whi ch keeps
creeping back. In a t ransi t i onal mode of pr oduct i on t he rel at i ons
of pr oduct i on t r ansf or m the forces of pr oduct i on. They ar e abl e t o
do this because t he " non- economi c" levels of t he mode of
pr oduct i on ar e no longer limited by the " economi c" . Thei r
aut onomy is unambi guousl y absol ut e, for it is pol i t i cal pract i ce
"whose result is to -/- and / t he limits of the mode of
pr oduct i on".
1 3 3
Thi s t heory of di spl acement , draft ed i n t o fi l l
gapi ng t heoret i cal holes, i s given no cont ent . We ar e si mpl y t ol d
t hat when forces and rel at i ons do not " cor r es pond" t he political
will be domi nant and t r ansf or mat i on will be possi bl e, but t he
concept of "cor r es pondence" r emai ns empt y. It seems t hat for
Balibar, or for Classical Political Economy, it is onl y t he capi t al i st
and primitive communi st modes whi ch are char act er i sed by
cor r espondence, and so are non-t ransi t i onal .
134
The concept of t he t ransi t i onal mode does not even formal l y
solve the pr obl em which gave rise to it, for it is still necessary to
explain how t he t ransi t i on t o t he t r ansi t i onal mode i s effected.
Balibar' s "Sel f-Cri t i ci sm" provi des t he means of deal i ng wi t h
di achrony wi t hout rel apsi ng i nt o t el eol ogy. In his self-criticism
Balibar makes t hree rel at ed poi nt s. Fi rst , he not es t hat
r epr oduct i on i s not aut omat i c i n t he capitalist mode of pr oduct i on
since it is not , as he had t hought , a purel y economi c mat t er , but
also involves t he "s uper s t r uct ur e", at least in the r epr oduct i on of
l abour power . Thi s makes i t possible for t he r epr oduct i on of t he
capitalist mode of pr oduct i on t o be i nt errupt ed.
135
Secondl y, he
notes t hat t he combi nat i on of forces and rel at i ons of pr oduct i on
cannot be seen simply as a combi nat i on of i ndependent l y
const i t ut ed sets of rel at i ons, as t hey ar e in s..-, c,/ but
must be seen as a combi nat i on made - /. /./- -. .-..
/. -//..-. / /. ./- / ,..- /.-./..
::c
Thi s
means t hat t he mode of pr oduct i on can be t r ansf or med by a
t r ansf or mat i on of the rel at i ons of pr oduct i on, by political
practice. Thi r dl y, Bal i bar poi nt s out t hat t he object of his text was
the concept of t he " mode of pr oduct i on" , whereas it is social
format i ons whi ch change.
137
Thi s under mi nes the at t empt t o offer
a general t heor y of modes of pr oduct i on or a t heor y of hi st ory.
The net resul t of t hese t hree poi nt s is t hat it becomes possi bl e for
any mode of pr oduct i on t o change, t he class st ruggl e t aki ng t he
relations of production as its object and so transforming the mode
70 SIMON CLARKE
of pr oduct i on. Hence t el eol ogy is el i mi nat ed onl y at t he expense of
r ei nt r oduci ng the class subject of hi st ory, and seeing modes of
pr oduct i on as creat i ons of such class subj ect s. We are t hus back
wi t h a st ruct ural i st versi on of t hat "left hi st or i ci sm" whi ch is t he
but t of so much criticism in s..-, c,/
138
But t he ambi t i on
has been achi eved, marxi st science has been di vorced from marxi st
pol i t i cs, and so t hi s version of "left hi st or i ci sm" can,
par adoxi cal l y, be put at t he service of revisionism:
If t he effects within the st ruct ure of pr oduct i on do not by themselves
const i t ut e any challenge to the limits . . . t here may be -. / /.
-.- (the "mat er i al base") of a .//..- ../ out si de t he
st r uct ur e of product i on: it is this ot her result which Marx suggests
marginally in his exposi t i on when he shows t hat the movement of
pr oduct i on produces, by the concent rat i on of product i on and t he
gr owt h of the prol et ari at , one of the condi t i ons of the part i cul ar form
which the class struggle t akes in capitalist society. o. /. -/, /
/ .,,/. -. / /. ,// / ./- .// -,/. -
, / /. .., / /. ... / ,..- (Last emphasi s is
mine.)
139
The t heoret i cal r ecour se to a class subj ect is di ct at ed by t he
absence of any pri nci pl e -.-/ t o t he mode of pr oduct i on whi ch
can be t he basis of an expl anat i on of t r ansi t i on. The concept of
class is t hen i nt r oduced as the t r anscendent pri nci pl e whi ch,
gui ded by t he scientifically at t est ed pr ogr a mme of The Pr ol et ar i an
Par t y, will create an entirely new st r uct ur e from the debri s of t he
old.
140
The absence of an i nt ernal pri nci pl e of t ransi t i on depends
on t he i nt erpret at i on of t he rel at i onshi p bet ween forces and
rel at i ons of pr oduct i on as one of cor r espondence or non-
ant agoni st i c cont r adi ct i on. Let us exami ne this thesis a little mor e
closely.
It shoul d not be necessary t o poi nt out t hat such a concept i on
deri ves from classical political economy and can find no suppor t i n
Mar x' s wor k. It i s embar r assi ng t o have t o poi nt out t o " ma r xi s t s "
t hat t he cont r adi ct i on bet ween forces and rel at i ons of pr oduct i on
is ant agoni st i c, since pr oduct i on bot h r epr oduces -. .,.-. t he
general condi t i ons of pr oduct i on. The t./. /. c.. is not
ambi guous: " At a cert ai n st age of their devel opment , the mat er i al
pr oduct i ve forces come i nt o conflict wi t h t he existing rel at i ons of
pr oduct i on . . . Fr om forms of devel opment of the pr oduct i ve
forces these rel at i ons t ur n i nt o fetters. Then begins an epoch of
social revol ut i on . . ."
141
Thi s is not si mpl y a rash, cr ude, hast y,
mi sgui ded, " Hegel i an" f or mul at i on, but r at her i s the way i n whi ch
Mar x const ant l y concept ual i ses the rel at i on bet ween the forces
and relations of production. The whole of c,/ is no more than
an el abor at i on of this cont r adi ct i on i n t he capi t al i st mode of
pr oduct i on.
In the text on pre-capi t al i st forms Mar x not es, i n di scussi ng t he
ancient mode , t hat "t he pr esupposi t i on of t he survi val of the
communi t y is t he preservat i on of equal i t y among its free self-
sust ai ni ng peasant s, and their own l abour as t he condi t i on of the
survival of t hei r pr oper t y".
1 4 2
However , r epr oduct i on does not
simply r epr esent t he "general f or m of per manence"
1 4 3
of these
general condi t i ons of pr oduct i on, for "t he survi val of the
commune as such i n t he old mode requi res the r epr oduct i on of its
member s i n t he pr esupposed obj ect i ve condi t i ons. Pr oduct i on
itself . . . necessarily suspends t hese condi t i ons little by little . . .
and, with t hat , t he communal syst em declines and falls, t oget her
with the pr oper t y rel at i ons on whi ch i t was based".
144
The uni t y of
forces and r el at i ons of pr oduct i on is t hus a cont r adi ct or y uni t y of
the form of co-operat i on and its objective condi t i ons. Since
pr oduct i on i s si mpl y t he act i on of men and women, t hr ough
det er mi nat e r el at i ons of pr oduct i on, on t he objective condi t i ons of
pr oduct i on, it is a t aut ol ogy to not e t hat the devel opment of
economi c condi t i ons, wi t hi n det er mi nant economi c r el at i ons, will
alter t he mat er i al f oundat i on of t he l at t er, ul t i mat el y t o condi t i on
t hei r r epl acement by new economi c rel at i ons consi st ent wi t h new
economi c condi t i ons: " The ai m of all these communi t i es i s
survival; i.e. .,..- / /. -..../ ./ -,.
,,. . Thi s .,..- /.... /. -. -.
-../, -.. ,..- -. ...- / /. /. /- Thus
the preservat i on of t he old communi t y includes the dest r uct i on of
the condi t i ons on whi ch i t r est s". Mar x concl udes t hat "i n t he last
analysis, t hei r communi t y . . . resol ves itself i nt o a specific st age in
the devel opment of t he pr oduct i ve forces of wor ki ng subjects to
which cor r espond t hei r specific rel at i ons amongst one anot her and
t owar ds nat ur e. Unt i l a cert ai n poi nt , r epr oduct i on. Then t ur ns
i nt o di ssol ut i on".
144
Mar x' s own posi t i on i s clear a nd consi st ent . Two obj ect i ons
mi ght be rai sed t o it, however. Fi rst l y, t he last quot at i on mi ght be
i nt erpret ed as t he basis of a ,//,/, / /, in whi ch t he
pr oduct i ve forces are seen as t he aut onomous mot or of hi st ory
act i ng on hi st or y from out si de. It mi ght be ar gued t hat , j ust as
Hegel proj ect ed his own society i nt o t he past as t he end al ready
inscribed i n t he begi nni ng of hi st ory, and Ri car do, mor e
mundanel y, f ounded the et erni t y of his own society i n t he t echni cal
features of pr oduct i on i n gener al , so Mar x inscribes t he
communi st fut ure i n bot h t he pr esent and the past t hr ough an
al t ernat i ve mechanical mat eri al i st phi l osophy of hi st ory. Thi s is not
the case for two reasons. First, it is true that Marx appears to
72 SIMON CLARKE
r egar d i t as the hi st ori cal t endency of every mode of pr oduct i on t o
devel op t he forces of pr oduct i on, and he appear s t o r egar d modes
of pr oduct i on as succeedi ng one anot her accor di ng to the level of
devel opment of the forces of pr oduct i on. However , he does insist
on anal ysi ng each mode of pr oduct i on as a specific hi st ori cal
phenomenon, charact eri sed by its own par t i cul ar form of
condi t i ons and rel at i ons of pr oduct i on. Mar x onl y est abl i shed t he
progressi ve char act er of t he capi t al i st mode of pr oduct i on so, unt i l
and unl ess this i s done for ot her modes as well, Mar x' s t ent at i ve
suggest i ons must be t aken t o be specul at i ve and hypot het i cal .
Secondl y, this specul at i ve suggestion t hat hi st ory is progressi ve is
not a suggest i on t hat t he hi st ory of any par t i cul ar society is
progressi ve. In Hegel ' s phi l osophy of hi st ory wor l d hi st ory, as t he
progressi ve self-realisation of t he Idea, is di ssoci at ed sharpl y from
t he hi st ory of par t i cul ar societies, whi ch go i nt o decline once t hey
have pl ayed their worl d-hi st ori cal rol e. Mar x t akes this idea from
Hegel , but sets it on a mat eri al i st f oundat i on, recogni si ng t hat it is
onl y wi t h capi t al i sm t hat worl d-hi st ory makes its appear ance, so
t hat it is t he expansi on of capi t al i sm on a wor l d scale whi ch first
defines the hi st ori cal posi t i on of non-capi t al i st modes of
pr oduct i on, and so defines t he progressi ve devel opment of t he
pr oduct i ve forces as a worl d-hi st ori cal phenomenon.
The second objection whi ch mi ght be rai sed is less seri ous: it is
the obj ect i on t hat Mar x' s concept i on of t he dialectic of forces and
rel at i ons of pr oduct i on yields an idealist /., / /, because
forces and rel at i ons of pr oduct i on are seen as generat i ng hi st ory of
t hemsel ves, wi t hout any reference t o t he class st ruggl e, " mot or of
hi st or y". Thi s obj ect i on depends on t he concept i on of society i n
whi ch forces and rel at i ons of pr oduct i on ar e purel y economi c
phenomena, while class st ruggl e, and t he hi st ory i t pr oduces, ar e
pur el y political. As we have seen, t hi s is far from Mar x' s
concept i on of t he rel at i ons of pr oduct i on, accor di ng t o whi ch
t hese social rel at i ons are not technical r el at i ons but are t he social
basis of // t he " economi c communi t y" and "i t s specific pol i t i cal
f or m". The devel opment of t he rel at i ons of pr oduct i on, under t he
i mpact of changes in t he condi t i ons of pr oduct i on, is t herefore a
devel opment of t hese rel at i ons i n their economi c, political and
i deol ogi cal forms. In a class society t hese rel at i ons ar e
differentiated class r el at i ons, and their devel opment , under t he
i mpact of changes i n economi c condi t i ons, and subject t o t he
const r ai nt of t hose condi t i ons, is the devel opment of a mul t i -
facet ed class struggle. Thi s struggle is not , however, somet hi ng
di vor ced from pr oduct i on, l ocat ed i n some relatively aut onomous
pol i t i cal i nst ance, t aki ng t he whol e social f or mat i on as its obj ect .
:/. / .,,/. /. /- / ..../,-.- / /. ..../,.. /-
/ /. ./- /,..- - --,..- .-- ,// -.
../,/ .,,/.
:
c-/.- .//..-- -.//../ .-.-.,.-,
Al t husseri ani sm is based on a pol emi cal t echni que whi ch can only
be descri bed as intellectual t er r or i sm. Three t er ms, "hi st or i ci sm",
"empi r i ci sm" and " huma ni s m" ar e draft ed i n t o sweep away all
possible opposi t i on. To be labelled by such a t erm is to be labelled
a class enemy, an intellectual sabot eur . The power of t he t er ms,
however, depends on the claim t hat mar xi sm represent s a radi cal
br eak with all forms of "hi st or i ci sm", "empi r i ci s m" and
" huma ni s m" i n t he name of science. In this paper I have ar gued
t hat far from defining marxi sm, Al t husser uses his triple banner to
expunge t he r evol ut i onar y t heor et i cal , phi l osophi cal and political
cont ent of mar xi sm i n favour of bourgeoi s soci ol ogy, idealist
phi l osophy a nd Stalinist politics.
The most f undament al aspect of Al t husseri ani sm is its ant i -
historicism. I have dealt with this quest i on at consi der abl e l engt h
in discussing s..-, c,/ I have ar gued t hat Mar x rejects not
"hi st or i ci sm" but t he idealist phi l osophy of hi st ory, f ound i n
Hegel and in classical political economy. Thi s phi l osophy is based
on t he et erni sat i on of t he present and t he projection of this et erni t y
i nt o bot h t he fut ure and t he past . In t hi s sense such a phi l osophy of
history is ahi st or i cal , for it dissolves real history in f avour of t he
ideal play of concept s. Mar x' s hi st ori ci sm is a mat eri al i st , but
dialectical, hi st ori ci sm which count er poses real hi st ory t o t hese
idealist fant asi es, and so whi ch historises t he present .
Al t husseri ani sm t akes up not Mar x' s critique of Hegel but t hat
offered by mechani cal mat eri al i sm, criticising t he specul at i ve
aspect of Hegel i ani sm, but not its i deal i sm. Al t husseri ani sm does
this by adopt i ng t he posi t i on of classical political economy, whi ch
offers t he mechani cal materialist var i ant of Hegel' s phi l osophy of
history, emul at i ng the unf or t unat e Pr oudhon. It does not abolish
the ideological i mpl i cat i ons of this concept i on, but ignores t hem.
They are conceal ed by the founderi ng of the Al t husseri ans as they
seek t o come t o t erms with history. Havi ng rejected Pr oudhoni s m
t o discover t he capitalist mode of pr oduct i on as t he t er mi nus of
history, they have t o choose bet ween t he domi nance of t he forces
of pr oduct i on, giving the economi sm of Meillassoux or Ter r ay, or
that of t he rel at i ons of pr oduct i on, giving the historicism of
Balibar (revised), Cut l er, or Hi ndess and Hirst ( mar k one) , or else
to abandon all marxist pret ensi ons by abandoni ng reality
altogether (Cut l er, Hi ndess, Hi rst and Hussai n).
146
Their opposition to Marx's "historicism" leads the Althus-
74 SIMON CLARKE
seri ans t o reject t he met hod of hi st ori cal mat eri al i sm whi ch sees
t he dialectic in t hought as t he ret raci ng, in t hought , of t he di al ect i c
i n oper at i on i n hi st ory. Thi s leads t hem t o separat e "di al ect i cal "
from historical mat eri al i sm, and t o repl ace t he marxist dialectic by
t he most avant - gar de versi ons of absol ut e idealism, denyi ng t he
reality of either subject or object of knowl edge in favour of t he
uni que reality of knowl edge itself. The abol i t i on of its mat er i al
f oundat i on ret urns t he dialectic t o its myst i cal form, and so l eads
to its rejection in favour of an anal yt i cal logic. Such a logic is
-.,/,/ in t he Hegel i an and marxi st sense t hat it t akes
moment s of processes for absol ut e cat egori es, and so eternises t he
hi st ori c. This anal yt i cal phi l osophy of knowl edge is t herefore t he
epi st emol ogi cal f oundat i on for t he adopt i on of t he bour geoi s
concept i on of capi t al i st society. " Th e o r y " i s cont ent t o t ake
bour geoi s society as it present s itself, and so to present t he forms of
bour geoi s society as et ernal condi t i ons of existence of society.
Thus t he critique of "empi r i ci sm" conceal s the truly empi ri ci st
f oundat i ons of Al t husseri ani sm. Its adopt i on of t he most banal
forms of appear ance of bourgeoi s society is present ed as a process
whi ch t akes place ent i rel y i n t heory. When t he concept s of t hat
i deol ogy generat e in t hought t he worl d of appear ances we live in
from day t o day t he rel at i on bet ween concr et e- i n- t hought and
concret e-real becomes unpr obl emat i c. The concept s on whi ch t he
edifice is based have t he obvi ousness of bour geoi s ideology, and so
t hei r origin is never quest i oned. When t hey generat e the i deol ogy
from which t hey were pl ucked, their adequacy i s not quest i oned
ei t her. It is in Al t husseri ani sm itself t hat we find t he reflexive
st r uct ur e of i deol ogy, it is Al t husser i ani sm which pr oduces t he
"effect of recogni t i on-mi srecogni t i on in a mi r r or connect i on".
1 4 7
The t hi rd sin in t he Al t husseri an canon is " huma ni s m" . In t
t heoret i cal humani s m was a pr i me t arget , al t hough
i deol ogi cal humani s m coul d be t ol er at ed. Since s..-, c,/
(or is it since " Pr ague Spr i ng"?) even i deol ogi cal humani s m has
come under at t ack. The cri t i que of " huma ni s m" i s not of maj or
t heoret i cal significance. Ther e can be few marxi st s who believe
t hat Mar x t akes t he "free social i ndi vi dual "
148
as his poi nt of
depar t ur e, and few who woul d disagree t hat i n this sense mar xi sm
is based on t he idea of the "pr ocess wi t hout a subj ect " deri ved
from Hegel.
149
Al t husser ' s at t ack on humani s m i s of pri mari l y
i deol ogi cal significance. It is clear t hat humani s m has become a
seri ous political t hr eat t o t he domi nance of or t hodox par t y
mar xi sm i n t he per i od of t he "hi st or i c compr omi s e" and t he
"al l i ance of t he left". Al t hough in this political conf r ont at i on
humani s m coul d har dl y be accused of adopt i ng pr ol et ar i an
political posi t i ons, it is not so clear in t he ../,/ conf r ont at i on
of humani s m and or t hodox mar xi sm t hat the former i s t he bear er
of bourgeoi s, t he l at t er of pr ol et ar i an, ideology. I ndeed Ranci re
argues at s ome l engt h t hat t he reverse is the case.
On the one hand, argues Ranci r e, al t hough t her e have been
bourgeoi s humani s t ideologies, such as t hat of Feuer bach,
humani sm is onl y a peri pheral bourgeoi s ideology.
150
The
concept i on of " ma n " embodi ed i n t he domi nant bourgeoi s
ideology i s not at all man t he subj ect , but t he man whose human
nat ur e must be moul ded t o fi t society, the man of ei ght eent h-
cent ury mechani cal mat eri al i sm, " t he man of phi l ant hr opy, of t he
humani t i es a nd of ant hr opomet r y: t he man one moul ds , hel ps,
surveys, meas ur es " . Thi s is precisely t he man of classical political
economy, t he man who must be pl anned, regul at ed, gover ned,
i nst ruct ed by a superi or class, t he man who under pi ns t he
functional i nt er pr et at i on of t he class division of society. Thi s
bourgeoi s concept i on of man persi st s in the ideologies of
Oweni sm, of radi cal phi l ant hr opy, and even of Mar x in :/.
c.-- t../,, ( and, it mi ght be added, in his and ot her
marxi st s' concept i on of women) . It is al so precisely t hi s bourgeoi s
concept i on of man which domi nat es the revi si oni sm of t he
or t hodox communi s t part i es, t he concept i on of t he pr ol et ar i at
who must cont i nue t o be led, pl anned, co- or di nat ed, disciplined
and i nst ruct ed by the super i or class of appar at chi ks. It is t he
concept i on whi ch Al t husser adopt s , but with whi ch Mar x br oke
definitively i n t he t hi rd thesis on Feuer bach when he asked who
educat es t he educat or s.
On the ot her hand, Ranci r e cont i nues, the same wor d, " ma n " ,
whose nat ur e i n bourgeoi s i deol ogy condemns him t o servi t ude, i s
appr opr i at ed by t he prol et ari at as t he means of ar t i cul at i ng its
rejection of this servi t ude. It is a word whi ch emerges
spont aneousl y t i me after t i me, in t he pract i cal st ruggl es of the
prol et ari at , as t he expression of a revol ut i onary aspi r at i on, as the
locus of t he possibility of a different society t han t hat in whi ch
bourgeoi s man is encased. In t he cont ext of t hese struggles t he
concept of man t he subject ( and increasingly of woma n t he subject
t oo) is t he pr act i cal expression of t he revol ut i onary phi l osophi cal
concept, t he negat i on of the negat i on, for it is only in t hat concept
t hat the aspi r at i ons of the oppr essed can be given a r evol ut i onar y
form, l ooki ng forward to a possibility which t r anscends the
negat i on of humani t y r at her t han back t o a past whi ch was its
pr econdi t i on. It i s not surpri si ng t hat havi ng followed St al i n' s lead
i n el i mi nat i ng t he negat i on of t he negat i on from mar xi sm,
Althusser can see no need t o r et ai n t he concept of " ma n " .
It is not onl y because his own t hought is domi nat ed by the
/.,. concept of man that Althusser is unable to understand
76 SIMON CLARKE
t hat t he same wor d can have very different meani ngs i n different
pr act i ces. It also follows directly from his concept i on of i deol ogy.
For Al t husser a wor d does not deri ve its meani ng from its
i nsert i on in a social pract i ce, but r at her conceal s a concept whose
meani ng derives from its posi t i on in a set of concept s. The wor d
" ma n " conceal s t he bour geoi s concept of ma n, and so its i nt r usi on
i nt o a pr ol et ar i an di scourse must represent the i nt rusi on of
bour geoi s i deol ogy ( and not si mpl y of sexism). Ideol ogy i s
embodi ed in a wor d, and is to be fought by t he theorist who can sift
t he good from t he bad wor ds, dr aw t he "t heor et i cal di vi di ng line
bet ween t rue i deas and false i deas " (cf. not e 60). Al t husser cannot
see t hat the r evol ut i onar y concept of humani t y emerges as t he
expressi on of a pol i t i cal struggle not agai nst t he .. of bour geoi s
humani s m, but agai nst its ,. agai nst t he practical t yr anny of
domi nat i on in every i nst i t ut i on of bour geoi s society of whi ch t he
bour geoi s concept of man i s but t he i deol ogi cal expressi on. He
cannot see this because he cannot di vor ce himself from t he
sociological concept i on of ideology as a r epr esent at i on, a
di st or t ed vision, an i magi nary i nt erpel l at i on of t he subj ect ,
di vor ced from t he pract i ce of bourgeoi s domi nat i on whi ch is, for
Al t husser , simply an expressi on of t he t echni cal division of l abour .
Al t husseri an pol i t i cs i s summed up i n his reply t o J ohn Lewi s.
The meani ng Al t husser gives t o t he sl ogan "t he masses make
hi s t or y" which he count er poses t o Lewi s' s slogan " me n ma ke
hi s t or y" i s qui t e t he opposi t e of t he Maoi st emphasi s on t he
i mpot ence of the bourgeoi si e confront ed wi t h the collective power
of t he masses. For Al t husser the pr ol et ar i at must be t aught t he
--,.-. of t he bourgeoi si e:
When one says to the proletarians that it is men who make history, one
doesn' t need to be a scholar to understand that sooner or later one will
contribute to their disorientation and disarming. One leads them to
believe that they are all powerful as men, while disarming them as
proletarians in the face of the real omnipotence, that of the bourgeoisie
which controls the material (means of production) and political (state)
conditions which direct history. When one sings the humanist song to
them, one distracts them from the class struggle, one prevents them
from giving themselves and using the only power they have: that of
,-- - / and of the ,-- / /. / the unions
and the party.
151
.
1. Edward Thompson, :/. t.., / :/., London, 1978.
S. Clarke, "Marxism, Sociology and Poulantzas's Theory of the
State", c,/ -. c/ 2, 1977. S. Clarke, "Capital, Fractions
of Capital and the State", c,/ -. c/ 5, 1978. S. Clarke, :/.
t.-.- / s../- Hassocks, 1980. I should stress that in
writing all these papers I have benefited enormously from
discussion with many comrades in Coventry and in various groups
of the Conference of Socialist Economists. This work is very much
a collective product, even though written by one individual. Thus I
am ready to accept full responsibility for its content, but am loathe
to accept individually any credit that may be due.
2. N. Geras, "Althusser's Marxism", .. t./ s.... 71, 1972, p.
77n; A. Glucksmann, "A Ventriloquist Structuralism", .. t./
s.... 72, 1972, p. 69. J. Rancire, t /.,- ..//.. Paris,
1974, p. 9.
3. A. Glucksmann, op. cit. Spinoza is Althusser's philosophical
inspiration, from whom many central formulations are drawn. Cf.
L. Althusser, t, - s.//c- (hereafter ESC), London,
1976, pp. 132-41, 187-92. P. Anderson, c-..- - r..-
- London, 1976, pp. 64-5. Anderson also notes the
remarkable similarity of many of Althusser's themes to those of
Adorno' s .,.. t/. which is based on lectures delivered
in Paris in 1961 (ibid, pp. 72-3).
4. Cf. N. Poul ant zas, "Vers une thorie marxi st e", :.-, ..-.
May 1966, p. 1978. This penetrating critique precedes Poulantzas's
conversion to Althusserianism.
5. M. Dufrenne, "La philosophic du no-positivisme", t, 1967.
6. CI. L6vi-Strauss, s../ .-/,/,, London, 1968, pp. 312-
14.
7. The terms "humanism" and "historicism" are used very loosely by
Althusserians. This looseness is fundamental to Althusserianism,
whose principal critical weapon is the identification of an
opponent as "humanist", "historicist" or both. The terms
"empiricist" and "economist" are used more rarely. Brewster
offers attested definitions of the terms in his glossary in L.
Althusser and E. Balibar, s..-, c,/ (hereafter RC),
London, 1970, p. 314.
The polemical use of these terms is based on establishing the
(almost trivially) non-marxist character of certain simplistic
formulations which are characterised as "historicist", "human-
ist", "economist" or "empiricist" and then generalising the
application of the terms so that they cover totally different
theories. Thus it is not very contentious to argue that marxism is
not a historicism in the Hegelian sense of seeing history as the
product of the development of the concept, and so seeing
knowledge as the self-realisation of history (although it is not clear
that some versions of Althusserianism do not come very close to
this). The early work of Lukcs certainly tended in this direction,
with history being interpreted as the product of the development
of the class consciousness of the proletariat, and marxism as the
self-realisation of that history. This kind of historicism is
developed in the Stalinist identification of proletarian class
consciousness with the party so that the party is both the subject of
history and history's self-realisation. The result is the Stalinist
identification of the political authority of the party with the
SIMON CLARKE
scientific authority of marxism. Thus for Stalin the strength of
marxism is its scientific character that enables it to predict the
course of history and so to guide the party. The authority of the
party is therefore based on the scientifically attested truth of its
proclamations, a truth that is necessary because history speaks
through the party (even where the truth is reversed from year to
year). When I refer to Stalinist politics in this paper I refer to this
attempt to legitimate the authority of the party over its members,
and ultimately over the working class, by reference to its superior
access to historical truth given to it by the science of which it is the
custodian.
The Althusserian polemical technique is to condemn all forms
of historicism by condemning one example of historicism. For
Althusser the fault of Stalinism is its historicism, therefore it is
essential to introduce an anti-historicist conception of science, so
that the scientist rather than the party becomes the judge of truth.
(After the party slapped his wrists Althusser recognised that
science could not be insulated in this way and that it was therefore
necessary for the party to intervene, through philosophy, to
protect the scientist from subversive bourgeois influences: thus
Althusser adopts a historicist theory of error but an anti-historicist
theory of truth!) Thus Althusser identifies anti-stalinism with anti-
historicism. However it is not Stalinism's /- that underlies
its politics, for a consistent historicism is subversive of Stalinism,
which is why Lukcs was forced to recant. If knowledge is a
historical product, rooted in the real world, then neither the party
nor science can claim a monopoly of historical truth. Historical
truth has to be found in history and in the lives of those who make
history, it has to be distilled from the experience of the mass of the
working class and is not to be discovered by theoretical
practitioners or political manipulators of the concept. It is the
idealism of Stalinist historicism that is at fault, the idealist
identification of truth with the party as the ideal expression of
history, and it is the mechanical materialist conception of theory
as detachable from its history, as having its own authority, and so
as being the party' s guide, that underlies this idealist historicism.
This aspect of Stalinism is reinforced by Althusserianism, whether
it is the scientist or the party who decides the truth. Thus the
Althusserian identification of Stalinism with "historicism" and the
condemnation of all forms of historicism in fact serves to
strengthen the defences of Stalinist politics while launching a
vicious assault on any attempt to challenge the party's (Theory's)
monopoly of truth.
The terms "humanism", "empiricism" and "economism" are
submitted to similar polemical distortions. If history cannot
provide a basis for opposition to the authority of science and of the
party it embodies, nor can the individual, for the individual is also
a bourgeois illusion. This radical "anti-humanism" is obtained by
generalising the trivial observation that Marx is not a crude
utilitarian and justified by reference to Marx' s observations about
the dehumanisation wrought by capital. In exactly the same way
experience, whether of the individual or of the class, is devalued in
the name of "anti-empiricism": the claim that knowledge has
nothing to do with experience, but is based on a renunciation of
experience as necessarily ideological. This claim is obtained by
generalising the trivial observation that Marx was not a Humean
empiricist who believed that knowledge could be obtained by
mechanical procedures of induction. In this way all possible
sources of opposition to the authority of the party' s writ are
anticipated and denounced as expressions of bourgeois ideology:
neither history, not the individual, nor experience, can undermine
the authority of knowledge, for the validity of knowledge is
guaranteed by its procedures, and its purity is protected by
philosophy, the intervention of the class struggle in theory.
Needless to add that in the course of this paper I shall stress the
"historicist", "humanist" and "empiricist" foundations of
marxism.
The last term whose meaning needs to be clarified in this note is
"economism". The term "economism" is used by Althusserians in
a narrower sense than usual, to refer to tendencies that regard the
"economy" as playing a dominant or determinant role. However,
in the marxist tradition "economism" has generally referred to a
separation of the economic from the political, such as is centrally
characteristic of Althusserianism. Thus the economism of the
Second International that was challenged by Lenin involved the
separation of trade union and political struggle so that the party
concerned itself only with "political" matters, while the struggle
for the mass of the workers was "purely economic". This
separation was based on a particular technicist conception of the
economy which saw no need to contest the domination of capital
at the point of production and no continuity between "economic"
and "political" struggle. It is in this sense that I use the term here.
It should finally be noted that when I use the terms such as
"Stalinism", "dogmatism", "bourgeois ideology" I try to use them
in a precise technical sense and do not use them as terms of abuse
(many are still proud to be bourgeois or Stalinist). "Stalinism"
refers to the interpretation of Marx which became the orthodoxy
of the Third International, which has deep roots in the working-
class movement but was codified in Stalin's t/./ -.
u/ ./- written for the u, / /. ctsi
s..... and which served as the standard of orthodoxy from its
publication in 1937. This text is too often ignored by latter-day
marxists. It is by no means as unsophisticated as many might
think, and it was not transcended by the revelations of the
consequences of the kind of politics that flowed from it. It is my
argument in this paper that Althusser only manages to break with
this interpretation of Marx by abandoning Marx altogether in
favour of pluralism. "Dogmat i sm" refers to a tendency, of which
Stalinism is one version, that treats marxism as a cosmology and
80 SIMON CLARKE
regards a particular interpretation of that cosmology as canonical.
Thus dogmatism leads very directly into what I have already
defined as Stalinist politics. By "bourgeois ideology" I intend to
refer to theories that are based on the denial of the historical, and
so relative and mutable, character of bourgeois social relations.
This is the ../--, feature of bourgeois ideology.
8. Rancire, op. cit., pp. 58-60. L. Althusser, t (hereafter
FM), London, 1969, Introduction.
9. FM, pp. 11-13, 233. cf. p. 199 where we find a clear expression of
Althusserian opportunism: ideological notions are acceptable in
ideological struggle, but must be expunged from science.
10. Rancire, op. cit., pp. 71-4, 78-9. The essay in question referred
approvingly to Mao Tse-tung's o- c-.- According to
Rancire the concept of the /.... the "oversight", has its
pragmatic origin in this encounter, ibid., p. 79.
11. ibid., Ch. 2. It is only much later (1972-3) that Althusser actually
spelled out the relationship between humanism, economism and
historicism and revealed that he had really been attacking
economism (ESC, pp. 86-90). P. Anderson, op. cit., p. 39, sees
Althusser's anti-humanism as subversive of the humanist rhetoric
of the PCF in the 1960s. However the subversive character of
Althusser's argument was selective, aimed only at the right
opposition within the party, and not the leadership itself. The
distinction between science and ideology enables Althusser to
oppose "theoretical humanism", and so to oppose "Italianism"
within the party, while recognising that it may be "necessary" for
socialism to adopt a humanist ideology (cf. "Marxism and
Humanism" in t .
12. Rancire, op. cit., pp. 74-7, 94-102. Rancire dates the positive
interest of the PCF leadership in Althusser's work from 1965.
ibid., p. 77. Althusser presents this reversal in ESC as the result of
cosy discussion with the party leadership about Spinoza!
13. Cf. K. Marx, c,/ vol. 1 (Penguin edition), London, 1976, pp.
96, 173-4 and footnotes. L. Colletti, "Bernstein and the Marxism
of the Second International", in t- s... t.-- London,
1972, defines revisionism by its conception of the economy,
tracing this conception to later marxism and to bourgeois
sociology.
14. c,/ vol. 1, pp. 125, 132, 304.
15. Marx and Engels, s./... r/ vol. 1, Moscow, 1962, p. 90.
16. Marx, c,/ vol. 1, p. 798.
17. J. Banaji,"Modes of Production in a Materialist Conception of
History", c,/ -. c/ 2, 1977, offers an excellent critique of
this theory of modes of production, even if his alternative is rather
idiosyncratic. J. Stalin, t/./ -. u/ ./- is
the standard statement of it.
18. Marx, c.-.. Harmondsworth, 1973, pp. 196-7. Althusser's
s.,/, :/- t.. originally appeared in - :., and is
reproduced in ESC, see especially pp. 86-90. E. B. Pashukanis,
ALTHUSSERIAN MARXISM
81
t. -. - London, 1978, offers the classic analysis of the
foundations of the legal form and its connection with commodity
fetishism. Such a marxist critique of bourgeois ideology reveals
also the basis of the complexity of the bourgeois category of the
subject which Althusser reduces to the term " man" and identifies
with any form of humanism: "The net result of abstracting these
definitions from the actual social relation they express, and
attempting to develop them as categories in their own right (by
purely speculative means) is a confused jumble of contradictions
and mutually exclusive propositions"(ibid., p. 152). Althusser's
tangle of contradictions derives from the theory of ideology he
takes from Lacan. This is one of the more esoteric areas of
Althusserianism that I shall not look at in detail. Very roughly
"ideology" in Althusser's later work is any theory that posits a
subject of society. Ideology is necessary for everyday life, because
the individual must imagine him or herself to be a subject to
function properly in society, but ideology is also always distorted
because society is a complex reality that outflanks the subject.
Thus science has to understand society as the complex reality
beyond subjects, the complex whole that is partially misrepre-
sented in particular ideologies. Clearly this theory of science and
ideology raises problems of the relation between the two, for how
can there be a knowledge of the whole that is not partial? This has
led Hindess and Hirst to reject the distinction between science and
ideology and to follow Foucault in seeing society as consisting in
no more than the sum of "discourses" through which individual
subjects live their relation to society, thus leaping from positivism
to pragmatism in one mighty bound. The problem arises because
of the radical discontinuity introduced between experience and
reality which makes it impossible to reconcile the two. The result is
to propose that we must renounce one or the other. Hindess and
Hirst make a speciality of disproving their own theories by a
... . /...- and then espousing the absurd instead of
abandoning their theories. Such are the perils of the life of the
mind.
19. I am concerned here only with Althusser's relation to the
Communist Party in the mid-1960s. Subsequent developments
have seen the leadership espousing the "Italian" deviation that has
come to be known as Eurocommunism, leaving Althusjser out on a
limb. He has subsequently become mildly critical of the party
leadership on occasion.
20. Althusser would call this an "expressive totality" because every
aspect expresses the functional determination by the whole. He
counterposes this to the "structure-in-dominance". Since,
however, the "dominance" of a particular level is itself determined
functionally, this seems to be no less an "expressive totality".
21. Cf. the programme of the collection "Thorie" (edited by
Althusser) which was printed on the cover of its early volumes,
including FM and RC: "The 'Thorie' series aspires to take heed of
82 SIMON CLARKE
the .. / encounter that is happening before our eyes between,
on the one hand, the conceptual development of the philosophical
principles contained in Marx's discovery, and on the other hand,
certain works in the fields of epistemology, the history of
ideologies and of knowledge and in scientific research." Quoted by
G. Therborn, s.-. c/ -. s., London, 1976, p. 57n.
22 I have discussed Poulantzas's work at length elsewhere: S. Clarke,
"Marxism, Sociology and Poulantzas's Theory of the State",
c,/ -. c/ 3, 1977, and "Capi t al , Fractions of Capital and
the State", c,/ -. c/ 5, 1978.
23 Stripped of its radical rhetoric this convergence between
"radicalising" sociology and PCF revisionism may be seen as an
expression of a political convergence. Lebowitz, s.-. -.
s., 37, 1973, pp. 385-403, has argued that the debate between
neo-classical and neo-Ricardian economics expresses the struggle
between the bourgeoisie and a technocracy which is radicalised by
the experience of the growing contradiction between capital and
labour expressed in terms of the irrationality of capitalism and not
of the class struggle. It therefore underpins a utopian socialism
based on a moral critique of capitalism which counterposes the
rationality of the eternal relations of production to the
irrationality introduced by bourgeois relations of distribution,
and so seeks to overthrow the latter while preserving the former.
This replacement of a class critique by a moral critique, itself based
on a distributional view of classes, is also found in radical
sociology. It is, moreover, the basis on which the European
communist parties are seeking to widen their appeal.
24. This assertion has particularly incensed Althusserian readers, for
it implies the self-evidently absurd proposition that "knowledge is
a process with a subject", for which absurdity I do not apologise. I
do not imply that Marx's work it "transparent", complete and
without ambiguity. Precisely because it is the work of subject, not
the mechanical product of a "problematic", it is very incomplete
and often ambiguous. This should not detract from the fact that
the .-/ /. of Marx's work is clear and insistent, and it
should not distract attention from what Marx actually wrote to
what he might have written.
25. L. Althusser, t/ -. u, London, 1972, pp. 52-3. For
Montesquieu the "nat ure" of government refers to the form of
sovereignty (monarchy, despotism, republic), the "principle" to
the "human passions" which underlie the different forms.
26. ibid., pp. 49-50, 53. Montesquieu also anticipates Althusser' s
Marx in linking ideology to class via interests, ibid., p. 93.
27. As Rancire points out, Althusser systematically obliterates the
young Marx' s originality with respect to Feuerbach by seeing
Marx' s /- of the Feuerbachian problematic as a simple
application, op. cit. pp. 24-6. This historisation already transforms
the Feuerbachian "problematic" by transforming the status of the
Feuerbachian categories from natural categories to forms of
historical existence. I shall not discuss Althusser's exposure of the
idealist character of Marx' s early works in this paper. In so far as
Althusser' s schematic comments have any value they derive largely
from A. Cornu (Karl Marx et F. Engels, Paris, 1955). The idea of the
epistemological break depends not on an interpretation of Marx' s
work but on Althusser's philosophy of knowledge.
28. FM, pp. 57, 77-8, 82. It is ominous that Althusser believes that the
French political scientists and English economists gave Marx "his
decisive experience of the .. ..., of reality via those who
had /... it directly and /.,/ ./ /. /. ,//.
../-- The English economists had already described the
"actual mechanism" of exploitation "as they saw it in action in
English reality" FM, p. 78. (Original emphasis unless stated
otherwise.) Althusser has considerably modified his interpretation
of the break. He now believes that the philosophical break, which
is based on Marx's adoption of a proletarian political position,
preceded the scientific ("epistemological") break. Moreover the
latter did not replace error (ideology) by truth (science), but rather
was a break with /.,. ideology on the basis of ,/.-
ideology. It was still an epistemological break, however, because it
introduced the (scientific) opposition between truth and error
(ESC, pp. 65-8, 121).
29. FM, p. 187n.
30. FM, p. 91. The discussion of Marx' s relation to Hegel is centred on
the extremely vague notion of the "problematic" whose function is
to give scientific status to caricatures. The discussion really has
nothing to do with Hegel at all. The term "Hegel" is clearly used to
refer to the unmentionable Stalin, but even Stalin's dialectic is
more complex than Althusser's caricature allows. In particular
Stalin does not have a concept of an "expressive totality". For
Stalin the contradiction between forces and relations of
production arises precisely because of historical lags that mean
that the relations of production have a different "temporality"
from that of the forces of production. The forces of production
develop continuously, the relations of production discontinuously.
This could be called the "ratchet" theory of history, the ratchet
being the device by which continuous motion is transformed into
discontinuous motion (cf. Stalin, t/./ -. u/
./- and the orreries in Edward Thompson, :/. t.., /
:/.,.
31. FM, pp. 99,101.
32. FM, p. 111.
33. FM, p. 97.
34. FM, pp. 113, 100.
35. This is the sense of the famous discussion in the c.-.. of the
concept of population: "The population is an abstraction if I leave
out, for example, the classes of which it is composed" (ibid, p. 100).
36. Cf. R. Rosdolsky, "Comments on the Method of Marx' s Capital",
.. c.-- c.. 1, 3, 1974, p. 71, who compares the
contradictions into which Stalinism is led to those which befell
84 SIMON CLARKE
Ricardianism. Althusser finally abandons any marxist concept i on
of value in his preface to c,/ vol. 1, in t.-- -. t//,/,
(hereafter LP) , London, 1971, p. 87. A. Cut l er, B. Hi ndess, P. Hi rst
and A. Hussai n have belatedly come t o t he conclusion t hat Mar x' s
theory of value is irrelevant to Al t husseri ani sm. Thei r
c,/ -. c,/- :., London, 1977-8, is essentially a
rehash of the st andar d criticisms of t he t heory of value.
37. FM, pp. 166-7. Thi s conception replaces t he "universal concept of
Feuerbachi an ' pr act i ce' " with a "concr et e conception of t he
specific differences that enables us to situate each part i cul ar
practice in the specific differences of the social st r uct ur e" ( FM, p.
229). Sociologists call this the principle of "st r uct ur al
differentiation" and it is based on t he functional division of l abour
of a har moni ous society.
38. FM, pp. 168-70. Gl ucksmann, op. cit., discusses at length t he
metaphysical implications of this concept i on.
39. FM, p. 173.
40. FM, pp. 201-2.
41. A liberal defence of science t hat has very reactionary i mpl i cat i ons
when it comes to the defence of t he academy. L. Al t husser,
"Probl mes tudiants", ...//. c.. Jan. 1964. Cf. J.
Rancire, op. cit. , chs. 2 and 6. It is this concept i on of pract i ce t hat
underlies the systematic confusion of science as a social and science
as a mental practice, between the social relations within which
science is accompl i shed and the process of scientific pr oduct i on
itself. Theoretical practice is for Al t husser // a social pract i ce
which is part of the complex st ruct ured whole, and is / a
privileged pract i ce in which the unity of t he whol e is accompl i shed,
in which it achieves its "knowl edge effect". RC, pp. 66-7. Cf. A.
Callinicos, .//.. - London, 1976, pp. 113-14. Not e
t hat the t erm ./.. aut onomy" means "aut onomous in rel at i on
t o " and not, as it is sometimes i nt erpret ed, the absurd not i on of
"mor e of less aut onomous " .
42. FM, pp. 166, 167, 173, 184. No expl anat i on or defence of this
progressive reduct i on is given.
43. This is the sense of Marx' s discussion in c,/ vol ume I, of t he
t ransi t i on from manufact ure t o moder n industry discussed at
length by Balibar ( RC, pp. 233-41). Marx, c,/ vol. 1, pp. 548-9
is unambi guous.
44. FM, pp. 167-9, 175-6, 178-80, 210, 215.
45. An alternative concept i on of the st ruct ure of the marxist totality
implicit in this essay is developed in t he t heory of t.//.-, in
s..-, c,/ In this conception t he economi c is permanent l y
present in the political and ideological real ms, on the anal ogy of
t he presence of t he Freudi an unconsci ous in the conscious as t he
"absent presence of a present absence". The economi c, like
Lacan' s unconsci ous, exists only in its effects. The phi l osophi cal
inspiration for this conception is not Mar x but Spinoza. It is only
by recourse to t he Spinozist concept i on of the relation bet ween
God and Subst ance, with the economi c t aki ng the role of God and
the political the role of Subst ance, t hat Al t husser can find a place
for t he economi c at all. Since it is only an act of faith that can
establish the det ermi nat i on, even in the last i nst ance, of t he
economi c once a secular, bourgeoi s, concept i on of society is
adopt ed, it is hardl y surprising that Al t husser' s domi nant
phi l osophi cal inspiration is t hat of metaphysical theology. The
t heory of t.//.-, has been devastatingly criticised by
Gl ucksmann, op. cit., pp. 83-8. It was abandoned as part of
Al t husser' s self-criticism since it is an essential foundat i on of his
t heoret i ci sm in its implication t hat the st ruct ure is only visible to
the Theori st . It cannot therefore survive t he subor di nat i on of the
pr i est hood to the secular power.
46. Cf. "Leni n wrote that ' politics is economi cs in a concent rat ed
form' . We can say phi l osophy is, in the last i nst ance, the /../
concent rat e of pol i t i cs" ( ESC, p. 38).
47. This is reflected in Al t husser' s formul at i on of t he distinction
between the technical and social division of l abour which is the key
to his pract i cal defence of revisionist politics. Rancire, op. cit., pp.
243-8.
48. T. Par sons, :/. s... / s/ .- NY, 1937; :/. s/
s,.- Gl encoe, 1951. Parsons enables us to fill many gaps in
Al t husser' s theory. For exampl e, the t heory of functional
prerequi si t es provides us with the means of identifying and
del i neat i ng the practices which make up t he complex social
practice in a rather less arbi t rary and . / manner t han t hat
adopt ed by Althusser (cf. FM, p. 191).
49. This concl usi on is very clearly drawn in Al t husser' s preface to
c,/ vol ume I, in whi ch he argues that t rade-uni on struggle is
necessarily defensive because it can only concern the rate of
expl oi t at i on (L. Al t husser, t.-- -. t//,/, op. cit., pp. 82-3).
This inept preface has been tactfully demol i shed by E. Mandel , in
c-. .//.. Pari s, 1974. N. Poul ant zas, t// t.. -.
s/ c/. London, 1973, p. 86 makes the same distinction
between t rade-uni on and political struggle.
50. Cf. Poul ant zas, "Vers une thorie et c. ", op. cit., pp. 1979-81.
51. The idea of ideology as a necessary mystification runs t hrough all
of Al t husser' s work. The t heory is developed in an essay published
in 1970, "Ideol ogy and the Ideological State Appar at uses" (in
t.-- -. t//,/,. Rancire (op. cit., pp. 140-7) offers a
devast at i ng critique of this essay. May 1968 had under mi ned t he
Al t husseri an conception of ideology as an i magi nary relation,
repl aci ng this with a concept i on of ideological domi nat i on as a
system of material power relations embedded i n and reproduced
by specific institutions. Al t husser adopt s the r het or i c of the latter
concept i on to reproduce his own, idealist, t heory of ideology. The
idea of t he ideological st at e appar at us is therefore purged of its
radi cal cont ent , for ideological struggle becomes once more t he
t ask of t he phi l osopher. The political condi t i on for this react i onary
posi t i on was the "st abi l i sat i on" of the universities after 1968, in
86 SIMON CLARKE
which the PCF part i ci pat ed with ent husi asm. Althusser mai nt ai ns
the old idea of ideology as i magi nat i on, analysed not t hr ough an
analysis of the functioning of t he ideological appar at us, but
t hr ough an // analysis of ideology as "i nt er pel l at i on" of
the subject, t he appar at us then being simply the means by whi ch
the illusion is foisted on the domi nat ed. Rancire also discusses t he
/,/ charact er of Al t husser' s concept i on of ideology, whi ch
emerges clearly from an earlier text "Thorie, prat i que thorique et
formul at i on thorique. Idologie et lutte idologique" ( mi meo,
n. d. ). In this text ideology is given an explicitly /,/
function, which is to permit agents to perform the tasks det er mi ned
by the "social st r uct ur e": "In a class society, as in a classless
society, the function of ideology is to guarant ee the /-. bet ween
men in the ensembl e of the forms of t hei r existence, t he rel at i on of
the individuals t o their tasks fixed by t he st ruct ure . . . " Fur t her on
the "pr i mar y funct i on" of ideology is defined explicitly as its
indispensability for "social cohesi on", and this latter is referred to
somet hi ng called the "social st r uct ur e", which is , the
division of society into classes (ibid, pp. 29-31), quot ed by
Rancire, op. cit., pp. 229-31). (Cf. N. Poul ant zas, t// t..
pp.206-8.) In t he "Ideological St at e Appar at us " paper this
function is fulfilled by the interpellation of t he subject, which is t he
necessary condi t i on for individuals to relate to the real rel at i ons
within which they live. This in t ur n is because, it is stressed, t he
reproduct i on of t he relations of pr oduct i on is secured "for the
most p a r t . . . by t he legal-political and ideological super st r uct ur e"
t.-- -. t//,/, p. 141). Thus Althusser reproduces
Dur khei mi an functionalism to the last detail: the function of t he
collective conscience is to ensure social reproduct i on by
const i t ut i ng biological individuals as social actors. Different
societies then differ accordi ng to t hei r forms of individuality,
which is functionally related to the form of t he division of l abour .
52. ESC, pp. 55-7. Althusser is only able to set Vico against Mar x
because of this ext raordi nary assert i on t hat the rel at i ons of
product i on are nat ur al relations. Cf. Mar x' s endorsement of Vi co,
c,/ vol. I, p. 493n.
53. This "soci ol ogi cal " conception of t he separat i on bet ween t he
economi c and t he political, t hat cor r esponds to a surrept i t i ous
cont rast between the technical and the historical, bet ween
product i on and reproduct i on, between the nat ural and the social,
and between the i mmut abl e and the mut abl e, is very different from
Lenin' s di st i nct i on between t rade-uni oni st and revol ut i onary
politics. It is a concept i on that can be found equally in St al i n' s
version of the distinction between the forces and rel at i ons of
pr oduct i on, in the political economi st s' distinction bet ween the
product i on and distribution of weal t h, in the soci ol ogi st s'
distinction between economy and society. It shoul d not be
surprising, t herefore, that academi c marxi sm should also be very
vulnerable to it. The "soci ol ogi sat i on" of marxi sm as an
87
alternative to (or an eclectic combi nat i on of) bot h Stalinism and
bourgeoi s sociology was pi oneered in Britain by t he new .. t./
s.... which i nt roduced Al t husser to the Angl o-Saxons as part of
its project of making old-fashioned marxi sm mor e "sophi st i cat ed"
by compl ement i ng "economi s m" with a variety of sociological
theories, without ever challenging the economistic conception of
the " economy" , or comi ng t o grips with anyt hi ng so mundane as
capitalist product i on. Edwar d Thompson, in his early polemic
against this tendency, hit the nail on the head when he noted the
historical, capitalist, cat egory of the "economi c", drawing out
William Morri s' s lesson t hat capitalist society was founded upon
forms of exploitation which are -./-../, economi c, moral
and cul t ural , and concl uded t hat "social and cul t ural phenomena
do not trail after the economi c at some remot e remove: they are, at
their source, immersed in t he same nexus of r el at i onshi p" (E.
Thomps on, "The Peculiarities of t he Engl i sh", s/ s.,.
1965, pp. 254-6).
54. RC, pp. 35-6, 40-1, 130n.
55. RC, pp. 27-8.
56. Several comment at or s have not ed the similarity of Althusser' s
phi l osophy of science t o t hat of Thomas Kuhn (e.g. D.
Schwat zman, "Al t husser, Dialectical Mat eri al i sm and the
Phi l osophy of Science", s.-. -. s., 39, 1975-6, pp. 321-
24), in t hat for Althusser science is based on the t ransformat i on
and devel opment of probl emat i cs, for Kuhn it is based on the
t ransformat i on and devel opment of paradi gms. However there is a
major difference: for Kuhn a scientific revol ut i on is an irrational
event, while Althusser' s t heory remai ns firmly within positivistic
rat i onal i sm. Althusser' s phi l osophy of science has r at her complex
origins. Althusserians relate it to the wor k of the surrealist
phi l osopher Gast on Bachel ard, but it extracts only one aspect of
Bachel ard' s work and rei nt erpret s it in the light of the French
convent i onal i st t radi t i on of Poincarand Duhem as developed by
Cavaills and Granger in t he light of Vienna positivism. For all
these t hi nkers the defining feature of science is its separat i on from
reality. Since we have no direct access to reality, realism can only
be an ideological illusion. Science can only wor k on ideas, t hus the
t ask of science is to investigate t he relations between ideas, not the
rel at i on between ideas and some supposedly i ndependent reality.
In part i cul ar science simply seeks to purify our ideas of t he
i rrat i onal by formalising and systematising t he i deas with which it
is present ed in order to eliminate any cont radi ct i ons. Science
therefore has only one foundat i on, the principle of non-
cont radi ct i on. The aim of science is to det ach ideas from any
subjective considerations t hat are domi nat ed by t he ideology of
naive realism. Thus science seeks not t r ut h, in the sense of
correspondence with t he world beyond science, but consistency.
The locus of scientific activity is therefore t ransferred from t he
consciousness of the scientist to t he concept, t hought becoming t he
SIMON CLARKE
devel opment of a system of concept s of whi ch the t hi nker is not
conscious.
This phi l osophy is not as st range as it often appear s in
Althusserian guise. The basic idea is t hat of neo-positivism: science
starts with a series of observat i on st at ement s that have to be
organised i nt o a deductive system. Thus science involves
observat i on and formalisation as its empirical and t heoret i cal
phases, formal i sat i on seeking t o devel op theoretical st at ement s
from which observat i on st at ement s can be deduced wi t hout
cont radi ct i on. However, the major pr obl em positivism has al ways
faced is t hat of distinguishing between "t heor et i cal " and
"obser vat i onal " st at ement s by di scoveri ng a neutral observat i on
language. Car nap originally pr oposed the language of physics as
the neutral l anguage of a unified science, but this privilege was
indefensible, and so Car nap adopt ed a principle of t ol erance so
t hat the l anguage selected was arbi t rary. Fr om here it is a shor t st ep
t o Neur at h' s convent i onal i sm which effectively abol i shed t he
separat i on between t heory and observat i ons, an abol i t i on pushed
to the limit in the wor k of Bachel ard and Cavaills.
The history of positivism is l ong and compl ex, but this extremely
formalistic and rationalistic version pr oved unt enabl e al most as
soon as it was formul at ed. On the one hand, consistency is only
provabl e for certain incomplete mat hemat i cal axi omat i sat i ons, so
the t heory' s validity is at best confined to limited mat hemat i cal
applications (Cavaills was concerned only with mat hemat i cs
while Bachelard saw mat hemat i cs as t he model for all t he sciences).
On the ot her hand, studies in t he hi st ory of science reveal t hat a
t ol erat i on of inconsistency is often essential to scientific progress,
the best -known exampl e being the coexistence of the cor puscul ar
and wave t heori es of electromagnetic energy. More generally t he
neo-positivist phi l osophy of science has collapsed and is
progressively giving way to realist i nt erpret at i ons.
This neo-positivist phi l osophy of science has been ont ol ogi sed
by Foucaul t , a former st udent of Al t husser' s, and, following
Foucaul t , by Hi ndess and Hi rst and ot hers. In this phi l osophy of
the concept human individuals become simply the i nst rument s of
an i mpersonal t hought , the "pr obl emat i c", "epi st eme" or
"di scour se" t hat they live out. Bot h reality and the subject become
constructs of the concept, having no i ndependent existence, so
there is no escape from the t yranny of the concept. If a link to
reality is desired it can only be established by some ki nd of
"t ranscendent al correl at i on", which al most inescapably entails a
faith in a supr eme being who guarant ees the correspondence
between t hought and the real ( Gl ucksmann, op. cit., p. 74). The
source of this ont ol ogy is Heidegger, not Marx, the Concept
replacing Hei degger' s Being (see M. Dufrenne, " La phi l osophi e du
no-positivisme", t, 1967; E. Morot -Si r, t t.-.. t-.
..../. Par i s, 1971), but it is al so strongly reminiscent of
Dur khei m' s collective conscience. If discourses exist pri or to t hose
who live within t hem, t hen this phi l osophy calls fort h an objectivist
t heory of meani ng t hat can establish the meani ng of t he discourse
as bei ng i mmanent within it, and not const i t ut ed by a subject. Thus
it leads directly into Dur khei mi an semiology derived from Lvi-
Strauss and French neo-Saussureani sm. Finally Lacan' s psycho-
analysis, also inspired by t he Dur khei mi an Lvi-Strauss, provides a
t heory of t he subject as the construct of t he discourse,
"i nt er pel l at ed" into t he discourse, giving t he illusion of
subjectivity that is the basis of the illusory charact er of all ideology
(cf. S. Cl ar ke, :/. t.-.- / s../-. Thus from a
simple t aut ol ogy, t hat wor ds are not the same as t he things they
denot e, Althusserianism develops i nt o an al l -embraci ng met a-
physical fog which tries to deny t he existence of anyt hi ng but the
Wor d. The proponent s of this metaphysic usually defend it on the
gr ounds t hat it is materialist, not t hat it is marxist. It is supposedly
materialist because it sees knowl edge as the result of "pr act i ce" by
anal ogy with material pr oduct i on, t he pr oduct of t he mechanical
appl i cat i on of logical precept s to a given raw mat eri al requiring no
human intervention. Coul d any materialism be mor e mechanical,
less marxi st ? Althusserianism has succeeded in ext ract i ng the
rat i onal kernel from the mystical shell of the Hegel i an dialectic,
but it t hrows out the kernel, the concept of cont radi ct i on, and
retains t he shell.
57. This is t he only connect i on specified by Althusser ( RC, pp. 53, 58,
141). Al t hough he insists t hat his t heory is not idealist (RC, pp. 41-
2), his insistence on the radically anti-historicist under st andi ng of
science ( RC, pp. 133-4) seems to imply that science depends on its
i nsul at i on from reality, and so implies a t heory of science which
can only be idealist. The t ask of phi l osophy on t he new definition is
t o mai nt ai n this insulation. Hence t he absurd idea t hat Lenin wrot e
./- -. t-,- to defend .-. (cf. Rancire,
op. cit., pp. 115-21, Pannekoek, t.-- t//,/. London,
1975).
58. With his self-criticism this poi nt is clarified and modified. On the
one hand, Althusser makes it clear t hat Mar x was simply the name
of the pl ace where marxi sm happened as a mut at i on of Ger man
phi l osophy, English political economy, and Fr ench socialism on
the basis of the class struggle (ESC, p. 56). On the ot her hand, t he
break was not with ideology in general, but with /.,.
ideology, prol et ari an ideology maki ng the break possible (ESC, p.
121).
59. Al most all comment at or s see Althusser as a bourgeois
phi l osopher, including many Althusserians in t he wake of
Al t husser' s self-criticism: P. Hirst, :/../ t. 2, 1971.
Cutler and Gane deny t hat this is the case, but only by arguing t hat
Al t husser seeks not guarant ees but knowledge of scientificity,
which doesn' t raise any pr obl em of correspondence with the real
because science makes no reference to the real: ./ modes of
pr oduct i on constitute an inexistant (imaginary) obj ect " (A. Cutler
and M. Gane, "On the Quest i on of Phi l osophy", :/../
SIMON CLARKE
t. 7/ 8, 1973, pp. 37-8, 46). Convent i onal i sm is as much a
variant of the bourgeoi s phi l osophy of science as is agnost i ci sm of
theology: it refuses an answer instead of denying t he quest i on.
Despite its appar ent liberalism in denyi ng t he scientist privileged
access to reality, it simply displaces t he privilege of the scientist by
locating it in his own domai n. B. Hi ndess and P. Hi rst offer a
demonst r at i on by ... . /...- the Asiatic mode of
product i on does not exist because the scientist (or Hi ndess and
Hirst) cannot const ruct it as an i magi nary object t.,/
.. / t..- RKP, London, 1975, Ch. 4). Convent i onal i sm
is only one posi t i on implicit in s..-, c,/ (cf. ESC, p. 192,
where Al t husser recognises the risk of nominalism " a nd even
idealism". He believes that it is sufficient to assert the pr i macy of
the real over t hought to escape t he difficulty). We also find crude
positivist references to one-t o-one correspondence ( pp. 68,255),
and the quasi-logical positivist reliance on the privileged access of
t heory to the "essence of practice in gener al " ( FM, p. 169, cf. RC, p.
216, Gl ucksmann, op. cit., pp. 73-5). I shall not discuss the
cont ort i ons of Althusser as bourgeoi s phi l osopher, but see not e 56
above and compar e the definition of t he probl emat i c of bourgeoi s
phi l osophy given in RC, p. 35, and t he idea of bourgeoi s
phi l osophy as handmai d of science, remedi al response to scientific
crisis (or even condi t i on of an epistemological break), r at her t han
as an ideological response to a scientific advance.
The new definition of phi l osophy subordi nat es phi l osophy to the
class struggle, abandoni ng the aut onomy of theory tsc,-.
However, the role of the phi l osopher, representative now of the
prol et ari at i nst ead of Theory, is unchanged. The mai n difference is
a political one: t he phi l osopher has no basis on which to challenge
the aut hori t y of the party in mat t ers of t heory. (Al t husser argues
t hat "mar xi sm affirms the pri macy of politics over phi l osophy"
but indicates t hat phi l osophy is not the "servant of pol i t i cs"
because of its "relative aut onomy" ( ESC, p. 58n). However he has
now depri ved himself of any basis on which to contest the
aut hori t y of the party, and so "relative aut onomy" becomes quite
abst ract ). The phi l osopher is still guardi an of revol ut i onary puri t y,
now defending a spont aneous materialist against the i nt rusi on of
the domi nant bourgeoi s ideology, instead of defending a higher
rationality agai nst the false ideas which come from social practice.
Al t hough the sources of t r ut h and error are inverted, it is still t he
phi l osopher al one who can distinguish t hem. Thus the new
definition ret ai ns the key features of Al t husseri ani sm: t he
neutrality of science and t he necessity of philosophy. Phi l osophy
now joins the class struggle in science, the object of whi ch is not the
opposi t i on of ment al to manual l abour , the appr opr i at i on of t he
creativity of t he worker by capi t al , but the struggle between
spont aneous materialism and i nt rudi ng idealism! The t ask of
phi l osophy is to identify the class enemy within, t he insidious
presence of wor ds (rather t han probl emat i cs Cut l er and Gane,
op. cit., pp. 38-40) which cont ami nat e the i nnocence of t he
91
spont aneous materialist, to draw a "t heoret i cal dividing line
between t rue ideas and false ideas, a political dividing line between
the peopl e (the prol et ari at and its allies) and the peopl e' s enemies.
Phi l osophy represents t he class struggle in t heory. In ret urn it helps
the peopl e to distinguish in /., and in all .. (political, ethical,
aesthetic, etc.) between t rue ideas and false i deas" (L. Althusser,
"Phi l osophy as a Revol ut i onary Weapon" , ts 64, 1970, p. 10.
Rancire offers a penet rat i ng critique of the new definition, op. cit.,
ch. 3. Cutler and Gane, op. cit., show its philosophical
incoherence). This is precisely dogmat i sm: scientific t rut hs ar e
elevated to the status of eternal t rut hs as phi l osophi cal theses
which become the i ndubi t abl e foundat i on of science itself (cf.
Al t husser' s argument against Lewis in exactly these terms, ESC,
pp. 61-2). Is it just coincidence t hat the new definition emerges as
the challenge t o the PCF moves out of t he universities, and
becomes precisely the at t empt to subvert t he "i nnocent
mat er i al i sm" of the workers with seditious words? Al t husser, t he
PCF, and the management of Renaul t can uni t e in defence of t he
i nnocence of the honest worker.
61. The t er m --///.--// is applied by Mar x t o t he
commodi t y. t,/ I, Berlin, 1952, p. 84.
62. These ar e the terms in which Mar x and Engels conceived their
work in t he c--.- -/. "The t heoret i cal conclusions of
t he communi st s are in no way based on ideas or principles t hat
have been invented, or discovered, by this or t hat would-be
universal reformer. They merely express, in general t erms, act ual
rel at i ons springing from an existing class struggle, from a historical
movement going on under our very eyes. " s./... r/ Vol. I,
p. 46.) Cf. J. Rancire, " Mode d' empl oi pour une rdition de t.
/. c,/ :.-, ..-. 1973. Al t husser appear s to have
moved t owards such a concept i on in ESC, but he does not spell it
out , nor does he develop its implications for his earlier argument s.
63. As Br ohm argues, Mar x clearly retains the basi c laws of the
Hegelian dialectic: t he idea of t he "process of theoretical
abst ract i on as dialectical concret i sat i on", the idea of "t he
dialectical relation between law and phenomenon, essence and
appear ance" and the idea of the negat i on of the negation
(suppressed by Stalin for his own good reasons). J. - M. Br ohm,
"Loui s Althusser et la dialectique matrialiste", in c-.
.//.. pp. 62-82. Cf. Ni col aus' s foreword to his t ransl at i on of
t he c.-.. London, 1973. It shoul d be r emember ed t hat
" Hegel " in Althusser' s discourse is only a st r aw- man, st andi ng in
for the "hi st ori ci st " humani sm- economi sm coupl e. Hence
Al t husser' s present at i on of Hegel is, to say the least, schematic and
misleading.
64. For whi ch reason Mar x di dn' t publish it, as he not es in the Preface
to t he c.. / t// t--, ;s./... r/./ I, p. 361).
65. RC, p. 41, c.-.. pp. 101-7. Cf. p. 94: "pr oduct i on and
consumpt i on . . . appear as moment s of one process, in which
92 SIMON CLARKE
product i on is t he real point of depar t ur e and hence also the
pr edomi nant moment . "
66. "These categories therefore express the forms of being, the
characteristics of existence, and often only individual sides of this
specific soci et y. " ibid., p. 106.
67. Engels, "Revi ew of Marx' s c.. / t// t--, s./...
r/ vol. I, pp. 372-3. Thi s review is i mport ant because,
al t hough it tries to popul ari se, it relates the accomplished Cri t i que
back t o the unpubl i shed 1857 I nt r oduct i on. That the wor k was no
trifle is best shown by the devel opment of Marx' s analysis bet ween
1857 and 1867. The chapter on Money, written one mont h after the
1857 I nt r oduct i on, continues to appl y the dialectical met hod in an
idealist manner , so that, for exampl e, t he cont radi ct i on bet ween
t he commodi t y as value and as use-value is const i t ut ed in t hought
c.-.. p. 145). In this chapt er Mar x is straining to get beyond
such formul at i ons (p. 151) and does succeed elsewhere in t he text
(cf. p. 204). But he does not establish an adequat e formul at i on of
t he materialist dialectic in the analysis of the commodi t y and of
money until t he c.. and, mor e completely, c,/ itself.
68. c.-.. pp. 93, 99-100. lt seems likely that - /-/ .-.
the latter passage provides the i nspi rat i on for the Al t husseri an
concept ual i sat i on of the rel at i on between t he various "i nst ances"
("A definite pr oduct i on t hus det ermi nes a definite consumpt i on,
di st ri but i on and exchange, as well as ../-. ./- /....-
/.. .//..- --.- ibid., p. 99).
69. Marx, Engels, s./... r/ vol. I, p. 374. Marx, Aft erword to
Second Ger man Edition of c,/ ibid., p. 456.
70. It requires the critical power of the rat i onal , materialist, dialectic to
overt hrow this empiricism. "I n its mystified form, dialectic became
the fashion in Ger many, because it seemed to transfigure and
glorify the existing state of things. In its rational form it is a scandal
and abomi nat i on t o bourgeoi sdom and its doctrinaire professors,
because it includes in its compr ehensi on and affirmative
recognition of t he existing state of t hi ngs, at the same t i me, al so,
the recognition of the negat i on of t hat state, of its inevitable
breaki ng up; because it regards every historically devel oped social
form as in fluid movement , and therefore takes i nt o account its
transient nat ur e not less t han its moment ar y existence; because it
lets not hi ng i mpose upon it, and is in its essence critical and
revol ut i onary. " ibid., pp. 456-7.
71. Engels, ibid., pp. 370-1. It is interesting to note t hat Al t husser' s
earliest publ i shed work was a t ransl at i on of Feuerbach.
72. Hegel is t he theoretical source. As Rancire not es ( "Mode
d' empl oi ") t he historical source is the slogans of the devel opi ng
worki ng class movement , slogans whose echo reverberat es
t hrough all of Mar x' s works.
73. E. Bernstein, ....-,.- .. s./-. 1899, p. 42, quot ed
by Br ohm, op. cit., p. 85.
74. Marx, t,/..-/ o.-. s./... r/ vol. I, p. 247.
75. RC, p. 108. The only coherent t heory of hi st ory within this
framework would be an idealist one in which t he st ruct ures are
inserted in the real as essence of the real. It is difficult to see how
else the relation between such pure concepts as the "mode of
pr oduct i on" and reality can be conceived t han in the "ideal t ype"
relation which Althusserianism constantly insists is idealist (A.
Badi ou, t. c-., .. ./. Paris, 1969. Cf. RC, pp. 117-18; N.
Poul ant zas, t// t.. etc., pp. 145-7). It is common for
Al t husseri ani sm to reserve its most coherent criticism for the
errors i nt o which it falls itself. Poul ant zas consistently formulates
t he rel at i on between modes of product i on and social format i ons as
t he rel at i on between t heory and reality (ibid., pp. 15-16; c/. -
c-.-,, c,/- London, 1975, p. 22. Cf. Balibar, "Self-
Cri t i ci sm", :/../ t. 7/ 8, 1973, p. 68). The only way to
avoi d this is to abandon t he at t empt to relate the "ideal t ype" to
reality at all, and follow t he logic of neo-Kant i ani sm by
abandoni ng reality al t oget her (Cutler and Gane, op. cit., pp. 37-8.
46; Hirst and Hindess, op. cit., . -..-. This structuralism is
r enounced by Balibar in his self-criticism (op. cit., pp. 60-61). B.
Hi ndess and P. Hirst ( op. cit., pp. 5-9) follow Bal i bar' s self-
criticism in concluding t hat t here can be no general theory of
modes of pr oduct i on, and so no t heory of history. All we can have
are general concepts which we then use to develop specific concepts
which in t ur n produce an analysis of the current si t uat i on, the
latter bei ng a theoretical const ruct and not somet hi ng given to
t heory (ibid., p. 4). The reason for this is familiar: "The
r epr oduct i on of the t ransformat i on of a det ermi nat e structure of
social relations is the out come of specific class struggles . . .
conduct ed under certain definite condi t i ons" (ibid. , p. 9). What a
par adox: anti-historicism is pushed to the limit only to end up,
having expelled history definitively from t heory, handi ng history
over to the class subject and its study to the empiricism of
bourgeoi s historians. This is the par adox of bourgeoi s philosophy
history can only be ./. "r eal " "i deal ". In their later work
Hi ndess and Hirst resolve the par adox by abandoni ng the
ant i nomy of theory and reality in favour of a realistic pragmat i sm.
Not e t hat Stalin does not fall into the "hi st ori ci st " deviation as
defined here by Althusser. For Stalin, the relations of product i on
always /, /./-. the devel opment of the forces of product i on and
this is t he source of the -// t hat for Stalin (as for Althusser)
replaces Mar x' s concept of -.- Thus Stalin, in
t/./ -. u/ ./- offers precisely t he complex
st ruct ural whole t hat Al t husser espouses.
76. RC, pp. 157, 160. Cf. C. Colliot-Thlne, "Rel i re 'le Capi t al ' ".
c.. .. /.--. ,/.. 9, 1972.
77. Hence "t hi s epoch-maki ng concept i on of history was the direct
t heoret i cal premise for the new materialist out l ook. " Engels, op.
cit., p. 372.
78. This error is not just a slip. Fur t her down the same page we find
even mor e explicitly: " The economi c concepts of const ant and
94 SIMON CLARKE
variable capi t al , of Depar t ment I and Depar t ment II, ar e merely
the economi c det ermi nat i ons, in t he field of economi c analysis
itself, of t he concept of the -./ condi t i ons of t he l abour
process. " Compar e his Ri cardi an definition of wages (t.-- -.
t//,/, p. 126), and above all his rejection of Mar x' s t heory of
value as Hegel i an in his Preface to c,/ This law is reduced to
"a special case of . . . the law of t he distribution of t he available
l abour power ; between the vari ous branches of pr oduct i on",
ibid., p. 87. "Vul gar economists commi t t wo kinds of errors: (1)
either they assign the ' economi c definiteness of f or m' to an
' objective pr oper t y' of things (Marx, c,/ vol. II, p. 164) . . . (2)
or they assign ' certain propert i es materially i nherent in
i nst rument s of l abour' to the social form of the i nst r ument s of
l abour (ibid.) . . . These t wo mi st akes, which at first glance seem
cont radi ct ory, can actually be reduced to t he same basic
met hodol ogi cal defect; the identification of the mat eri al process of
product i on with its social form, and the identification of the
./-/ functions of things with their / funct i ons" (I. Rubi n,
op. cit., p. 28. The definitive St al i ni st verdict on Rubi n' s
i nt erpret at i on was delivered at t he so-called "Menshevi k t r i al " of
March 1931).
79. RC, p. 173. The quot e coul d have come straight from Stalin.
80. The concept " mode of pr oduct i on" is rapidly increasing its scope
as the essay progresses, from being a concept of the l abour process
expressing t he mode of at t ack of t he means of l abour on nat ur e to
becomi ng t he concept of the social whole itself. RC, pp. 173-8.
Marx himself never used the concept consistently or systemati-
cally.
81. RC, pp. 177, 180, cf. ESC p. 125, where this is "recogni sed to be
st ruct ural i st ".
82. As Gl ucksmann notes, op. cit., p. 80, this ant hropol ogi cal
foundat i on is implicit in s..-, c,/ Cf. B. Hi ndess and P.
Hirst, op. cit., pp. 14-15.
83. L. Al t husser, "Thorie, pr at i que thorique", op. cit., p. 29, quot ed
by Rancire, t /.,- etc., op. cit., pp. 229-30. This concept i on of
ideology is identical to t hat of Tal cot t Parsons. Ot hers have not ed
the r emar kabl e similarity of Al t husser' s and Parsons' s concept i ons
of t heory (P. Wal t on and A. Gambl e, t- ./.-- s.,/.
/.. London, 1972), and of politics (Poul ant zas, . .-. /..
p. 1979, quot es T. Parsons, :/. s/ s,.- pp. 126-7). Of
course t he bourgeoi s analysis of t he whol e leads i mmedi at el y to
bourgeoi s analyses of t he functionally differentiated "relatively
aut onomous " levels. Hence "all t he levels of the social s t r uc t ur e . . .
imply specific social rel at i ons" (Balibar, RC, p. 220). These levels
convent i onal l y implicate classes, st at us groups and part i es. A
"mar xi st " analysis uses the same t er m, class, for each level but this
is no mor e t han a rhetorical device, for the content of t he t erm is
identical to the sociological concept at each level. Hence
Al t husseri ani sm legitimates Poul ant zas' s at t empt t o pass
bourgeoi s political sociology off as marxi sm by wr appi ng it in the
95
accredi t ed radical t ermi nol ogy. In the same way it legitimates, by
giving marxist credentials to the bourgeois concept i on of ideology
as i magi nat i on, neo- Fr eudi an account s of ideological "systems of
r epr esent at i ons", which agai n show a mar ked convergence with
Par sons' s work.
84. Mar x, c.-.. p. 97.
85. It is because Al t husser' s "ant i -hi st ori ci sm" involves the
abandonment of a dialectical, historical mat eri al i st , met hod in
favour of an analytical one that Althusserianism is compelled to
pose t he quest i on in the l at t er t erms. These are precisely the t erms
of analytical phi l osophy' s critique of marxi sm: cf. G. A. Cohen,
" On some criticisms of historical mat eri al i sm", ../-
s., s.,,/.-.- 44, 1970, pp. 121-42. Hi ndess and Hirst, op.
cit., p. 19, see det ermi nat i on in the last instance by t he economic as
somet hi ng to be founded "i n the concept of t he economy i t sel f .
The entire project of t hese aut hor s is based on t he at t empt to
establish -/,//, t he condi t i ons of possibility of society, or of
part i cul ar modes of pr oduct i on. They have successively reached
t he predi ct abl e conclusions firstly, that one cannot establish
-/,//, the condi t i ons of existence of a given historical society,
for one can only establish the logical precondi t i on of a -.,
Thus " t heor y" can only study the concept of t he "mode of
pr oduct i on" and has no purchase on the concret e reality of t he
"social format i on". They have then discovered t hat it is not
possible to establish -/,//, the relations of det ermi nat i on
post ul at ed by marxism between different forms of social relations,
nor the relations of succession between different modes of
pr oduct i on, and have therefore concl uded t hat marxism is
arbi t rary, based on hypot heses that are analytically grat ui t ous.
This conclusion shoul d come as a great comfort to marxists, for the
i mpl i cat i on is that marxi sm is not simply a series of tautologies. It
is a t heory with a real historical content. Edwar d Thompson deals
with this aspect of Al t husseri ani sm in his cri t i que, :/. t.., /
:/., bringing out the political implications of this sort of
sociological arrogance. Mar x criticises Hegelianism for exactly this
sort of idealism, that believes t hat the features of capitalism can be
discovered in the concept of "capi t al i sm", in t he Int roduct i on to
the c.-..
86. RC, pp. 175-6. The quot e is from c,/ vol ume III. Cf. E.
Lacl au, "The Specificity of the Political", t--, -. s., 4,
1, 1975, pp. 104-6.
87. Before s..-, c,/ Al t husser regarded the l at t er work as a
"posi t i ve st udy" rat her t han a "syst emat i c exposi t i on of Mar x' s
t heoret i cal posi t i on" ( FM, p. 47)! Cf. Pashukani s, op. cit., J.
Hol l oway and S. Pi cci ot t o, "Capi t al , Crisis and t he St at e", c,/
-. c/ 2, 1977.
88. This ar gument occupies a considerable pr opor t i on of the text of
s..-, c,/ It is based on the radical separ at i on of t hought
and the real, the claim t hat a concept cannot be historical because it
96 SIMON CLARKE
is founded in theory, and so falls with this separat i on. It is wort h
not i ng t hat if the concept of mode of product i on is purely in
t hought it is difficult to see how history can be either its st art i ng
point or its product . The belief t hat it can be is what constitutes
Bal i bar' s project as a st ruct ural i sm. Hirst and Hi ndess solve the
probl em in t hei r parody of Al t husseri ani sm by abol i shi ng history
al t oget her, op. cit. (conclusion).
89. RC, pp. 201-15.
90. The t heory has an "ant i -evol ut i oni st " character, br eaki ng with any
idea of a "progressive -..-.- / .//..-- of t he f or ms " or
/-. / ,,. with a logic aki n to a destiny". RC, p. 225. It is
"hi st ori ci st " as soon as it tries to explain history as proj ect i on of'
st ruct ures, t hough. Cf. not e (15).
91. RC, pp. 226-7, 229. A t hor oughl y Ri cardi an definition what is
this " mode of appr opr i at i on of t he social pr oduct " if not a relation
of di st ri but i on? In this passage Balibar systematically adopt s
Adam Smi t h' s definition of product i ve labour in t er ms of t he
"mat eri al nat ur e of the l abour and its obj ect s" (p. 232).
92. RC, pp. 236-9. Balibar presumabl y means unity of //.. and
means of l abour in this passage. In the quot e above he presumabl y
means t hat the capitalist owns means of product i on and //.
,.. Sympt omat i c slips! Hi ndess and Hirst, op. cit., reproduce
such slips, e.g. p. 11. Cf. L. Al t husser, t.-- -. t//,/, p. 87.
N. Poul ant zas, t// t.. p. 32. As Gl ucksmann, op. cit., p.
81, poi nt s out , this cont rast is only sufficient to distinguish
capitalist from non-capitalist modes of product i on, as i ndeed is the
definition of modes of pr oduct i on itself. It might seem t hat this
distinction introduces a break with the ..-- of capitalist
social rel at i ons. This is not the case, for the small pr oducer is
simply t he "self-employed" capitalist who has al ways featured
promi nent l y in bourgeois ideology. Balibar merely seeks the
technical condi t i ons which make "sel f-empl oyment " possible.
Hirst and Hi ndess t ake up Gl ucksmann' s criticism, mi st aki ng
Bal i bar' s posi t i on for t hat of Mar x, op. cit., pp. 227-9.
93. "Sel f-Cri t i ci sm", op. cit., p. 56. Bal i bar appears t o have t ransposed
Al t husser' s terminology, so t hat Bal i bar' s "det er - mi nant in the last
i nst ance" signifies Althusser' s "domi nant i nst ance". It is also not
clear whet her "domi nance" refers to the really or t he apparent l y
domi nant "l evel ". In the quot e from Marx on p. 217 of RC, Mar x
makes it qui t e clear that he is concerned with the appear ance, for in
Rome "i t s secret history is the history of its landed pr oper t y". Cf.
c.-.. p. 97. In all the confusion we get the i mpressi on t hat
Balibar has actually explained det ermi nat i on in the last instance!
This illusion is fostered by the ambi guous use of the t er m " mode of
pr oduct i on". Mut ual functional i nt erdependence in t he whol e is
det ermi nat i on by the "mode of pr oduct i on" if the t er m refers to
the whol e, but not if it refers to t he "economi c". Cf. not e (80).
94. RC, pp. 222-4. The instances are now completely aut onomous , if it
is det ermi ned t hat they be det er mi nant . Det ermi nat i on in t he last
instance now simply means t hat t he economi c will det ermi ne t hat it
doesn' t det ermi ne anyt hi ng.
95. c,/ vol. III, Moscow, 1962, pp. 770-2. RC, p. 233.
96. RC, p. 217. Poul ant zas cannot make up his mi nd either: t//
t.. pp. 15, 32, 70.
97. "Self-criticism", op. cit., pp. 65-6.
98. Hi ndess and Hirst, op. cit., ch. 5, offer a devel opment of this
appr oach. They follow t he implications of Bal i bar' s self-criticism
in criticising the ar bi t r ar y charact er of the assumed political
i nt ervent i on, realising t hat forces and rel at i ons of product i on are
not i ndependent . They therefore ask what are the technical
condi t i ons for given rel at i ons of "surpl us-product appr opr i at i on",
i.e. rel at i ons of di st ri but i on, by asking what are the technical
condi t i ons which enabl e t he feudal l andowner t o intervene
politically to separat e t he direct producer from his means of
pr oduct i on. They then l ocat e the power of t he l andowner in t he
r epr oduct i on of this separat i on, so denyi ng t hat relations of
personal domi nat i on ar e essential to the feudal mode of
pr oduct i on. They don' t seem to realise t hat this is because they
have described a disfigured capitalist mode of pr oduct i on, a feudal
Robi nsonade, in which "sel f-empl oyed" small producers are
exploited by a class of capitalist l andowners and merchant
capitalists who lease means of product i on t o t hem. Hindess and
Hi rst can abolish rel at i ons of ,.-/ dependence only because
they implicitly assume t he prevalence of generalised commodi t y
rel at i ons to impose / domi nat i on t hr ough t he operat i on of t he
mar ket . This is only implicit because they see t he st at e as a market
subst i t ut e, imposing "compet i t i on" on t he peasant ry. It is
fort unat e that their t heor y is not meant to have any relation to
reality. The idea t hat feudal rent is based on t he effective right of
./.- of the peasant woul d have surprised many a feudal lord.
99. The t heory of "st at e monopol y capi t al i sm" reproduces the critique
of feudal society expressed by classical political economy. It is now
t he monopol i es which are using political i nt ervent i on to modify
rel at i ons of di st ri but i on artificially, and t he communi st part y
which criticises t hem on the basis of the et ernal character of
capitalist relations of pr oduct i on, seeing in "mar ket socialism" the
resol ut i on of the cont radi ct i ons of capitalism. Cf. Poul ant zas,
t// t.. pp. 55-6, for which bot h pre-capitalist modes and
monopol y capitalism requi re state i nt ervent i on.
100. Cf. A. Aumeeruddy, B. Laut i er and R. Tor t aj ada, " Labour Power
and the St at e". c,/ -. c/ 6, 1978.
101. For Mar x this relation of dependence is clearly a / relation and
not as Hindess and Hi rst imagine, an intersubjective relation
between particular individuals. It is only t he at t empt to i mpose
feudal relations of di st ri but i on on a capitalist mode of product i on
t hat leads to the belief t hat feudalism is cont rast ed with capitalism
by the necessary role of t he political in the former. Within this
framework political intervention is explained not as an aspect of
98 SIMON CLARKE
the i mposi t i on of a class relation on the members of t he society,
somet hi ng cent ral to every class society, but because "r el at i ons"
do not cor r espond to "forces" of product i on, as they supposedl y
do in a capitalist society.
102. RC, pp. 214, 219. In the feudal mode the l andl ord is "agent of co-
ordi nat i on . . . agency of combi nat i on"( Hi r st and Hi ndess, op. cit.,
pp. 238-9). Cf. Poul ant zas, t// t.. p. 25.
103. Because "surpl us l abour " is pri mari l y a /.--/ concept for
Al t husseri ans, only the mode of ,,,- det ermi nes whether
or not it is inserted in exploitative social relations. Thi s makes it
very difficult to identify class societies non-arbitrarily, cf. Hindess
and Hi rst , op. cit., pp. 24-8, 67-8. L. Althusser, Preface to c,/
p. 88.
104. RC, p. 212.
105. RC, p. 233. Paradoxically this definition can give rise to
" humani s t " t empt at i ons, for only ./. can own t hi ngs.
106. This is especially difficult in t he capitalist mode of pr oduct i on since
it doesn' t appear directly in legal form.
107. RC, p. 232. Accordi ng to Balibar this is Mar x' s posi t i on. As P. P.
Rey t. .//-. .. c/. Pari s, 1973, pp. 93- l l l ) poi nt s out , i n
c,/ it is only exceptionally and metaphorically t hat the relation
of pr oduct i on is described as a propert y relation. Mar x is not
concerned with this analytical quest i on, but with t he quest i on of
historical pri macy. Cf. c.-.. p. 98; Preface to t he c..
s./... r/ I, op. cit., p. 363.
108. " To t he extent to which t hei r ideology is freed from bourgeoi s and
pet i t -bourgeoi s concept i ons, t he masses will not recognise one
anot her as ' men' nor seek to claim their ' human di gni t y' . " S.
Karez, :/.. . t/.. t. .//.. Paris, 1974, quot ed by
Rancire, t /.,- op. cit., p. 161.
109. Marx' s analysis of the "ci r cui t " of social capital is clear and
unambi guous: c,/ vol. 1, ch. 23 and vol. 2, chs. 1-4. Too often
a " s ympt omat i c" reading is a subst i t ut e for the har der , but more
rewarding, wor k of an act ual readi ng.
110. Balibar inverts t he relation bet ween product i on and r epr oduct i on,
so that analysis of the latter i nt roduces no "new condi t i ons" ( RC,
p. 263) but is rat her simply an account of "t he relation between the
/, of social product i on and its part i cul ar forms (branches) in
a given synchr ony". ( RC, p. 264). Balibar doesn' t under st and that
analysis of product i on ,..,,. that of r epr oduct i on
( Gl ucksmann, op. cit., p. 82). Cf. the amazi ng cont or t i ons of
Hindess and Hirst, op. cit., p. 270, where the revol ut i onary
theoretical distinction between capitalism "i n f or m" and
capitalism "i n t he strict sense" is i nt roduced to get to Sraffa' s neo-
Ri cardi an definition of capitalism as "commodi t y pr oduct i on by
means of commodi t i es".
111. Cf. on this poi nt S. Cl arke, ' "Soci al i st Humani sm' and the critique
of economi sm", u, r//, :.-/ 8, 1979.
112. RC, p. 213.
99
113. Rancire, t /.,- p. 244.
114. RC, p. 174.
115. RC, pp. 214, 238-9.
116. The concept of Asiatic society has had the most chequered career
subsequently, buffeted by changes in the role of the st at e in
capitalist society, by t he devel opment of t he "soci al i st " state, and
by t he anti-colonial struggle.
117. Thi s follows ul t i mat el y from the failure to r oot "rel at i ons of
pr oduct i on" i n pr oduct i on, and so t he belief t hat t he
t ransformat i on of relations of pr oduct i on is condi t i oned by t he
political rat her t han by the level of devel opment of the forces of
pr oduct i on. This essentially "soci ol ogi cal " view of the devel op-
ment of capitalism, most clearly expressed in Barri ngt on Moor e,
:/. s/ o,- / t/, -. t.-, Allen Lane,
London, 1967, is also found in marxist work: cf. P. Ander son,
t-.,. / /. .//. s. London, 1974; Hindess and Hi rst ,
op. cit.; and my own :/. t.../,-.- / c,/- London,
1974.
118. "The original unity between a particular form of communi t y (clan)
and the correspondi ng propert y i n nat ure . . . . whi ch appears i n one
respect as the part i cul ar form of propert y has its living reality in
a specific -.. / ,..- c.-.. p. 495. Cf. pp. 471, 485-
6, 489-93.
119. ibid., p. 84.
120. RC, p. 213. "Pr oper t y, in so far as it is only t he conscious relation
. . . i s only realised by product i on itself. The real appr opr i at i on
t akes place not in the ment al but in the real, active relation to these
condi t i ons. " c.-.. p. 493.
121. ibid., p. 489. This is why Marx uses the r at her misleading t er m
" pr oper t y" t hr oughout this text. He is seeki ng to show t hat
bourgeois propert y is simply an expression of a "nat ural l y arisen
. . . historically devel oped" relation, ibid., p. 485.
122. Poul ant zas, t// t.. pp. 30-1, 126, offers a confused
analysis of this text based on the definition of relations of
pr oduct i on as purely economi c relations. But the distinction
between political and economi c cannot be , the definition of
t he relations of pr oduct i on. (Cf. Lacl au, op. cit., pp. 104-6.)
123. These appearances must be sharply distinguished from t he real
presupposi t i on, the real relation of the individual to the objective
condi t i ons of his or her life. The concept of t he Asiatic mode of
product i on does not st and or fall on the presence or absence of
part i cul ar forms of legal propert y nor, for that mat t er, of
communal forms of l abour. The concept allows for vari at i on in t he
forms of l abour, the legal and ideological forms, and the political
forms. Hence much of Perry Ander son' s criticism ( op. cit.,
appendi x) of t he concept is beside the poi nt . It need hardly be added
that Hindess and Hirst's "proof of the impossibility of the Asiatic
mode is as incoherent as the rest of their book (op. cit., ch. 4).
124. c.-.. op. cit., 415, 483-4.
100 SIMON CLARKE
125. ' " As l ong as the l abour process, ' we read in c,/ ' is onl y a mere
process bet ween persons and nat ur e, its simple elements remai n
common to all social forms of devel opment . ' But every part i cul ar
historical stage of this process ' further develops its mat eri al
foundat i ons and social forms. ' And precisely these social /- in
cont rast to the naturally given ' cont ent ' , are what is i mpor t ant "
(Rosdol sky, op. cit., p. 66).
126. This is t he logical implication of Althusserianism, implicit in
s..-, c,/ and developed by Hindess and Hi rst , op. cit.
"Hi st or i ci sm" comes back in since t he class subject is t he only agent
capabl e of t ranscendi ng t he existing mode of pr oduct i on and
i nt roduci ng a new one. J. Banaji, op. cit., offers a devast at i ng
critique of t he appr oach to modes of product i on which t akes the
form of expl oi t at i on as its st art i ng poi nt . See also S. Cl arke,
"' Soci al i st Humani s m' and t he cri t i que of economi sm", op. cit.
127. c.-.. op. cit., pp. 493, 489, 495-6.
128. ibid., pp. 486, 475.
129. RC, p. 215.
130. RC, pp. 239, 272. It is because t he relations are purely formal t hat
they can only be /-,.. by bei ng -/-.. Hence we find
Al t husseri ani sm taking up t he structuralist opposi t i on of
reproduct i on stasis and revol ut i on-t ransformat i on. Thi s gives
the rhet ori c a radical appear ance " no change wi t hout
revol ut i on", but in fact represents a repetition of old conservative
positions " n o change wi t hout revol ut i on, so no change". It is
interesting t hat the Althusserian opposi t i on of st r uct ur e and
practice, and of structure and history, reproduce t hose of
functionalist sociology, and most specifically of Lvi-Strauss. In
each case t he only way of avoi di ng t hat stasis which results from
seeing t he process as a simple expression of the st ruct ure is to
i nt roduce a t ranscendent subject of history. For bot h Al t husser and
Lvi-Strauss this subject can only be t he scientist. Cf. my :/.
s../- / c t..s. ( Ph. D. thesis, University of Essex,
1975, chs. 4 and 5).
131. RC, pp. 284-91.
132. RC, pp. 304-7. We have at last reached the break with Stalinism.
The Stalinist dialectic is inverted so that it is the rel at i ons of
product i on t hat domi nat e the forces of product i on. Thi s means
that there is no longer any evol ut i oni sm, since the devel opment of
the relations of product i on is i ndet ermi nat e, to be resolved by the
cont i ngent out come of part i cul ar political struggles.
133. RC, p. 306. Cf. Poul ant zas, t// t.. pp. 87-9, who criticises
this concept i on, only t o hand t he same function t o the st at e: "The
function of t he absolutist state i s . . . t o produce -,.,..-
./- of product i on (i.e. capitalist relations) and to put an end to
feudal rel at i ons: its function is to -/- and to / t he limits of
the mode of pr oduct i on" (ibid., pp. 160-1).
134. RC. p p . 215-16. Only in these t wo modes do t he forces and relations
divide up their "s uppor t s " i n t he same way. RC, p. 303. The feudal
101
mode cannot be charact eri sed by correspondence, since t he
political is there domi nant . Poul ant zas tries to get ar ound this
difficulty by distinguishing between homol ogy and correspond-
ence, t// t.. p. 27n, without specifying what distinguishes
the concepts from one anot her.
135. Balibar, "Self-criticism", op. cit., pp. 66, 63.
136. ibid., p. 63. This doesn' t mean t hat he abandons Ri cardi ani sm,
merely t hat he now sees t he relations of di st ri but i on as domi nant in
the combi nat i on. The capitalist mode of pr oduct i on is still "a mode
of appr opr i at i on of t he unpai d l abour of ot hers which is only
distinguished by a ' different way' of extorting i t " (ibid., p. 68). Even
after Hindess and Hi rst , it is not clear what is meant by
" domi nance" in this cont ext .
137. ibid., p. 60. These t hree poi nt s sum up the "or i gi nal i t y" of Hi ndess
and Hi rst with respect to Balibar, mar k I.
138. The ot her alternative is t he economi sm of E. Ter r ay, - -.
t-.. s.. MRP, 1972.
139. Hence the class struggle in product i on has not hi ng to do with t he
revolution, which must be left to the political pr ogr amme of t he
prol et ari an party, whi ch alone can creat e the revol ut i onary
conj unct ure.
140. It is not clear whether t he new social format i on is to be created by a
real class or by the concept of class. Bal i bar' s argument depends
heavily on his claim t hat the new st ruct ure cannot develop out of
the old because its elements are const i t ut ed independently of one
anot her , and so are debri s of the dest ruct i on of the old, not
devel opment s out of it ( RC, pp. 276-83). This claim is nonsensical.
If the separat i on of l abourers from their means of product i on is not
/. -. -. concent rat i on of these means of product i on in t he
hands of capitalists, t hen product i on woul d cease. "The same
process which placed t he mass face to face with the /...
-.- / //. as free workers also placed these condi t i ons, as
,/ face to face with t he free wor ker s", K. Mar x, c.-.. p.
503.
141. s./... r/ vol. I, op. cit., p. 363.
142. c.-.. op. cit., p. 476.
143. RC, p. 359.
144. c.-.. op. cit., pp. 486, 493-5.
145. For marxism, therefore, class struggle is not a dynami c practice
count erposed to a static st ruct ure. This opposi t i on of structure and
process is characteristic of metaphysical mat eri al i sm which finds
the fixity of its categories compromi sed by t he flux of history. For
marxi sm the st ruct ure is itself a st ruct ure of processes, the fixed
poi nt s are moment s of a developing t ot al i t y. Cf. Poul ant zas,
t// t.. pp. 64-5, who separates rel at i ons of product i on
from social relations of product i on and opposes t hem as st ruct ures
t o pract i ce.
146. C. Meillassoux, .-/,/,. .--.. .. c. Hague, 1964;
Terray, op. cit.; Balibar, "Self-criticism", op. cit.; A. Cut l er,
102 SIMON CLARKE
" Res pons e" , :/../ t. 7/ 8, 1973; Hindess and Hi rst , op.
cit.; Cut l er, Hi ndess, Hirst and Hussai n, op. cit.
147. RC, p. 67. This is exactly t he same phenomenon as we find in
bourgeoi s sociology, where the division between high t heory and
empiricist research, bot h slaves t o t he same banal bourgeois
ideology, guarant ees bot h by leaving t he ideology itself
unquest i oned as debate centres on the "oppos i t i on" between
empiricism and theoreticism. In t he case of Talcott Par sons this is
not i mmedi at el y obvious, since he presents a very familiar ideology
in a part i cul arl y systematic way. When we come to a work like
Hi ndess and Hi rst , op. cit., i t becomes t ransparent . The supposedl y
"t heor et i cal " argument s of t hat work are unconvi nci ng because
they are in fact empirical claims whi ch are t oo often pat ent l y false.
The const ant reference t o some supposedl y theoretical "necessi t y"
cannot conceal the fact t hat this "necessi t y" rests on unsyst emat i c,
i nconsi st ent , often i ncoherent , and not infrequently false, empirical
premi ses.
148. c.-.. p. 197.
149. L. Al t husser, Preface to vol ume one of c,/ in t.-- -.
t//,/, One significant feature of this concept is its use to
consign the t heory of fetishism to t he realm of ideology. This is
ironic because it was t heory, t he centrepiece of t he Al t husseri an
t heory of t.//.-, whi ch was at the core of t he version of
marxi sm present ed in the first edi t i on of s..-, c,/ The loss
of this t heory derives from its supposed implication of a "free
social i ndi vi dual " cont empl at i ng the appearance as form of
present at i on of the essence. "Essence" and "appear ance", it is
argued, are simply scientific and ideological concret es-i n-t hought ,
which cor r espond to a single concrete-real, the real appearance.
Lat er Al t husseri ans abandon the distinction between science and
ideology as an arbitrary one, so t hat "essence" and " appear ance"
are simply different, equally valid, poi nt s of view emergi ng from
different discourses. This is t he basis on which Cut l er, Hi ndess and
Hirst and Hussai n, op. cit., reject any pri ori t y t hat mi ght be claimed
by marxi sm. While this is t he logical consequence of the
Al t husseri an version of Mar x, based on the opposi t i on of st ruct ure
and process and of t heory and reality (and so a nomi nal i st view of
t heory), it has not hi ng to do with Mar x' s theory of fetishism, since
(i) bot h essence and appear ance are equally real, the essence
describing t he processes of which the appearances ar e discrete
moment s; (ii) fetishism does not implicate the free social individual
cont empl at i ng a st ruct ure, but t he social individual engaged in the
practical activities which are the st ruct ure.
150. Rancire, t /.,- pp. 22, 24, 26.
151. s.,-. :/- t.. Paris, 1973, pp. 48-9 (cf. ESC, pp. (63-4).

Althusser I An Marxism

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