JR 2012seminar

JudicialReviewConference
10am4pm,Wednesday20thJune2012 TheLawSociety,113ChanceryLane,London
AccreditedwiththeSolicitorsRegulationAuthority&BarStandardsBoardfor5CPDhours
RichardClaytonQC JonathanMoffett AndrewSharland PaulGreatorex SarahHannett AnnabelLee 45GraysInnSquare,GraysInn,LondonWC1R5AH Tel:02074045252Fax:02072427803 Email:clerks@45.co.ukWebsite:www.45.co.uk
JudicialReviewConferenceJune2012
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TABLEOFCONTENTS Page 5 7 11 SpeakerBiographies Timetable
TopTenPublicLawCases RichardClaytonQC
25 69
75 99
Bias Slides AndrewSharland
103 119
Practiceandprocedureupdate Slides AnnabelLee Policies: theexpandingroleofthecourts Slides JonathanMoffett Judicialreviewandhumanrights Slides SarahHannett
123 142 149 156 Irrationality Slides PaulGreatorex

45GraysInnSquare,GraysInn,LondonWC1R5AH
Amajorplayerinadministrativeandpubliclaw
Chambers&Partners

5 TIMETABLE
10.00am RichardClaytonQC Toptencasesoftheyear 10:40am AndrewSharland Bias 11.20am 11.40am AnnabelLee Practiceandprocedureupdate 12:20pm 12.30pm 1.30pm 2.10pm SarahHannett Judicialreviewandhumanrights 2.50pm 3.05pm PaulGreatorex Irrationality 3.45pm 4.00pm End Questionandanswersession Coffee JonathanMoffett Policies: theexpandingroleofthecourts Lunch Questionandanswersession Coffee
AnexcellentchoiceforAdministrativeLaw
Legal500

SpeakerBiographies
AbouttheSpeakers:45GraysInnSquareisaleadingsetofchamberswithalonghistoryof specialisinginpubliclaw.MembersofChambersappearinmanyoftheleadingcasesinthe field.BothChambersasawholeandeighteenofitsbarristersindividuallyarelistedinthe legaldirectoriesasleadersinadministrativeandpubliclaw. RichardClaytonQCpracticesat45GraysInnSquare,coveringawide rangeofadvisoryandlitigationpubliclawwork:e.g.communitycare andmentalhealth,education,healthcare,humanrights,local governmentviresandfinance,constitutionalandstandardsissues, education,planningandenvironmentalcases,PrivyCounciland internationalconstitutionalwork,andpublicprocurement.HeistheUKrepresentativeto theVeniceCommission,theCouncilofEuropesadvisorybodyonconstitutionallaw,wasthe ChairmanoftheConstitutionalandAdministrativeLawBarAssociationin20082010,anda formerViceChairofLiberty.RichardhasbeenanAssociateFellowattheCentreforPublic LawatCambridgeUniversitysince2001.RichardisrankedinChambersDirectoryandthe Legal500asaLeadingSilkinPublicLaw,HumanRightsandLocalGovernmentLaw.Hehas appearedinanumberofHouseofLordsandPrivyCouncilcases.Recentworkincludes, actingforcarehomeownersinachallengetochargessetbythelocalauthority, R(SouthwestCareHomesvDevonCountyCouncil,May2012,R(Condliff)vNorth StaffordshirePCT[2012]1AllER689(CAArt8andhealthcare),R(Bahia)vSSHD[2011] EWCACiv895)(CABarCouncilinterventionconcerningcostsandBoxallprinciples), R(Rahman)vBirminghamCC[2011]EWHC944(Admin)(Publiclawequalitydutiesand budgetcuts),R(BuckinghamshireCC)vKingstonCC[2011]EWCACiv457(CAcommunity careandconsultation),R(Lewis)vPersimmonHomes[2009)1WLR83(localgovernment andbias)andR(Reynolds)vIndependentPoliceComplaintsCommission[2009]3AllER237( therighttoinvestigatingadeathunderArt2),
Jonathan Moffett has an extensive public law practice, with an emphasis on judicial review and statutory appeals, and he has particular expertise in the interface between public law and human rights. His practice encompasses matters across the full range of public law, including regulatory judicial review, local government law (including community care), education matters, healthcare law, immigration law, environmental and planning matters, and equalities and human rights. Jonathan is
rankedasaleadingjuniorinadministrativeandpubliclawbybothChambers&Partnersand The Legal 500, and he is a member of the AttorneyGenerals A Panel of Counsel to the Crown, the Welsh Governments panel of counsel, and the Equality and Human Rights Commissions panel of counsel. He is coauthor (with Jonathan Auburn and Andrew Sharland,bothalsoof45)ofOUPsforthcomingmajorpractitionerstextonJudicialReview. AndrewSharlandwascalledtotheBarin1996.Hehasalarge practiceinadministrativeandpubliclaw,coveringcommunity care,mentalhealth,education,prisons,paroleboard,coroners andplanning.Heisrankedinthelegaldirectories(Chambers andPartnersandLegal500)asaleadingjuniorin administrativeandpubliclaw,localgovernmentlawandeducationlaw.Recentcases includeR(EssexCC)vSecretaryofStateforEducation[2012]EWHC1460(Admin) (successfulchallengetotheSecretaryofStatesdecisiontocutfundingforSureStart programmesinEssex)andKennedyvTheCharityCommission[2012]EWCACiv317 (Article10ECHRandFreedomofInformationAct2000(hearingbeforetheSupreme Courtpending).HeisontheTreasuryAPanel.HecowrotetheHumanRightsvolume ofAtkinsCourtForms(Butterworths,2007)andMedialawandHumanRights(OUP, 2009).AndrewiscurrentlywritingapractitionerstextbookonjudicialreviewforOUP (withJonathanMoffettandJonathanAuburn). PaulGreatorexhasaverybusypracticeinallareasofpublicand administrativelawandisfrequentlyinstructedinjudicialreviews.He hasparticularexpertiseinimmigration,education,communitycare, planningandnationalsecuritycases.Healsopractisesintheareasof mentalcapacityandemploymentlawaswellaslocalgovernment
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mattersgenerally.HeisontheTreasuryBpanelanddirectoriesrecommendhimasajunior inadministrativeandpubliclawandeducationlaw. SarahHannetthasabusypubliclawpractice,whichfocuseson localgovernmentlaw,education,communitycareandhuman rights.SheappearsregularlyintheAdministrativeCourtandthe UpperTribunalonbehalfofclaimants,theGovernment,local authoritiesandotherpublicauthorities.Herrecentcasesinclude: R(CampbellParkParishCouncil)v.MiltonKeynesCouncil[2012]EWHC1204(Admin) (successfulapplicationtoquashaparishcouncilreorganisationorder),R(Houghton andWytonParishCouncil)v.HuntingdonCouncil[2012]EWHC1302(Admin) (successfulapplicationforaprotectivecostsorderonbehalfofaparishcouncil);NCv. LeicestershireCountyCouncil[2012]UKUT85(AAC)(testtoapplywhenissuinganote inlieuratherthanastatementofSEN),CalaI[2010]EWHC2866(Admin);[2011]LGR 204(successfulchallengetodecisionofSSCLGtoquashregionalstrategies)andCalaII [2011]EWCACiv639;[2011]EWHC11(Admin);[2011]1P&CR451.Shewas appointedtotheAttorneyGeneralsBPanelofCounselin2012,andisamemberof theEqualityandHumanRightsCommissionspanelofcounsel.Sarahisrecommended asaleadingjuniorinEducationLawinChambersandPartners2012,wheresheis describedasestablishingagrowingfieldinthefieldofdiscrimination.Sarahisthe barristerdirector(andcofounder)ofthe45GraysInnSquare/CityUniversitySchool ExclusionsProject,whichprovidesprobonorepresentationbystudentstoparents appealingagainsttheirchildspermanentexclusionfromschool.Sarahisa contributingeditortotheEducationLawJournalandtheformereditoroftheLocal GovernmentBulletin.SheistheauthorofthechapteronSpecialEducationalNeedsin McManus,EducationandtheCourts(forthcoming),acontributingauthortoCoppel, InformationRights(Hart,2010)andcowrotetheHumanRightsvolumeofAtkins CourtForms(Butterworths,2010).Insummer2008SarahwasafellowattheCenter forConstitutionalRightsinNewYork,forwhichshewasawardedaPegasus ScholarshipbyInnerTemple.PriorbeingcalledtotheBar,Sarahwasalecturerin publiclawandhumanrightsatKingsCollege,London.
AnnabelLeehasabroadrangeofexperienceinpubliclawincludinglocal government,education,communitycare,immigration,information rightsandhumanrights.Sheregularlyadvisespublicbodiesonboth proceduralandsubstantivematters.
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TOP TEN PUBLIC LAW CASES OF LAST 12 MONTHS
Community Care 1. In SL v Westminster City Council 1 the claimant was an Iranian with mental health problems including tendencies towards self-harm. Westminster conducted an assessment of his community care needs. It was found that Westminster considered that he should continue to have weekly meetings with a care coordinator who offered advice and encouragement to the claimant, arranged and renewed contact with counselling groups and generally monitored his condition and progress but did not consider that constituted care and attention. At first instance, Burnett J agreed. However, the Court of Appeal held that this level of support qualified as care and attention. Laws LJ appeared particularly impressed by the fact that the care coordinator monitored the claimants mental state to avoid a relapse or deterioration. Care and attention is not limited to acts done by the LAs employees or agents.
2. The Court of Appeal went on to consider whether that care and attention was not otherwise available than by the provision of accommodation under s. 21 of the National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990. The Court of Appeal held that care and attention is not otherwise available to an individual unless it would be reasonably practicable and efficacious to supply it without the provision of accommodation. The Court rejected a broader submission to the effect that it means that the provision of accommodation is reasonably required in order for care to be furnished in a way that fully meets the Claimants needs. On the facts, stable accommodation was plainly necessary for the support provided by the care coordinator to be effective.
3. The local authority has applied for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court.
1
[2011]EWCACiv954
4. In R (McDonald) v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea 2 , the claimant had a small and neurasthenic bladder and had to urinate some three times during the night but was unable to access a commode without help from a carer due to her physical disabilities. In October 2008, her assessed need was stated in her needs assessment to be assistance to use the commode at night. The defendant proposed to meet that need by providing argued that the assessed need was more properly expressed by reference to the underlying rationale of her situation as a need to urinate safely at night, which could be met by providing incontinence pads or sheeting. The defendant did not in fact implement that planned change. In November 2009 and April 2010, the defendant reviewed the claimants needs which were described as help to access the toilet during the night and to be kept safe from falling and injuring herself. The defendant proposed to meet those needs by providing incontinence pads. The defendant contended that those reviews of the care plan constituted a re-assessment of her needs.
5. The Supreme Court upheld the defendants decisions as lawful. The assessments were drafted by care workers and should be construed in a practical manner. The reviews were to be read as including a re-assessment of the claimants needs. The LA could re-assess for a number of reasons including changes to eligibility criteria, medical or technological change or simply because it had changed its mind as to the proper assessment of needs. The proposed method of meeting the claimants needs was not an interference with her Article 8 rights; and in any event was not a disproportionate interference with such rights. Nor was it a breach of s .21 of the DDA 1995: the defendants decision could not be characterised as the application of a practice, policy or procedure within the meaning of the legislation and in any event was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. Lord Dyson considered that the provision of assistance to use the commode or the provision of pads were different ways of meeting need rather than different descriptions of need as such (a point on which Lady Hale, who dissented, took a different view).
[2011]UKSC33
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13 6. The case of R(KM) v Cambridgeshire County Council has been considered by both the Court of Appeal 3 and the Supreme Court 4 over the past year. Following the remarks of Lady Hale in McDonald the Supreme Court was asked to review the correctness of the decision in R v Gloucestershire County Council ex p Barry 5 which it declined to do in the circumstances of the case.
7. The claimant was a profoundly disabled man, aged 26, who lived with his mother, brother and sister. He had been born without eyes, and suffered from other physical and mental difficulties. He required help in feeding and caring for himself. Under section 2(1) of the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970, the council had a duty to make arrangements for the claimants care, including the provision of specified services for him. The Community Care, Services for Carers and Children's Services (Direct Payments) (England) Regulations 2009 allowed local authorities to discharge their obligations by making a direct payment to the service-user so that they could themselves decide how to spend it. The council exercised that power and made an offer to the claimant which he rejected. An independent social worker assessed the claimant's needs in the sum of 157,000. The claimant made a final offer of approximately 85,000, but failed to explain how the sum had been calculated. The claimant argued that his assessment was irrational and/or unlawful as it lacked adequate reasoning, and he should have been paid 120,000.
8. The Supreme Court decided that when a local authority was required to consider whether it was necessary, in order to meet the needs of a disabled person, to make arrangements for the provision of any of the matters specified in s.2(1) of the 1970 Act, it should do so in three separate stages: First, it should consider what were the needs of the disabled person.
3 4
[2011]EWCACiv682 [2012]UKSC23 5 (1997)LGR638

Second, in order to meet those identified needs, it should consider whether it was necessary to make arrangements for the provision of any of the specified services.
Third, if the answer to the second stage was affirmative, it should consider the nature and extent of those services. There was also a fourth potential stage of inquiry.
In cases where the disabled person qualified for a direct payment under the 2009 Regulations, the local authority was required to consider what was the reasonable cost of securing provision of the services identified at stage three. One important aspect of the second stage was to ask whether the needs of the disabled person could reasonably be met by family or friends, by other organs of the state, or out of the person's own resources. 9. The question at the second stage encompassed consideration of the relationship between the scale of the local authority's resources and the weight of other demands upon it, in other words, the availability of its resources: see R v Gloucestershire CC ex p Barry [1997] A.C. 584. That was also stated in the secretary of state's current guidance, entitled "Prioritising need in the context of putting people first: A whole system approach to eligibility for social care", dated February 2010. That guidance was therefore precisely in accordance with the law. However, the Council had not relied upon resource constraints in reaching its decision. (
10. For the purpose of the fourth stage, costing each of the requisite services upon a blank sheet of paper would be unacceptably laborious and expensive. Many local authorities therefore used a mechanism known as a "resource allocation system" (RAS) which ascribed points to each eligible need, and an annual sum to the total points. The Council had also used a second indicative tool, called an "upper banding calculator" (UBC), which reflected factors elevating the requisite level of services and ascribed an additional sum. What was crucial was that once the indicative sum had been identified, the requisite services in each case should be costed in a reasonable degree of detail so that a judgement could be made as to whether the indicative sum was too high, too low or about right. It had been
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15 rational for C to use the RAS and UBC provided that the result was crosschecked. M's rationality challenge therefore failed.
11. The Council should have made a more detailed presentation to the claimant of how he might reasonably choose to deploy the offered sum, and of its own assessment of the reasonable cost of carers. It had failed to provide a timely explanation, and a belated explanation had not repaired that deficit. However, it appeared that the council's calculations had proceeded on the false premise that M would receive no support from his family. Any flaw in councils computation was likely to have been in his favour.
12. Furthermore, the independent social worker had uncritically endorsed the wishes of the claimant in his report, which had led him to believe that he had a higher entitlement. It would be a pointless exercise of discretion to quash the councils assessment so that the claimant's entitlement might be considered again, perhaps to his disadvantage. The Supreme Court went on to approve the decision in R(L) v Leeds City Council 6 and to approve the decisions in R (Savva) v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC. 7
Disciplinary issues and Article 6

13. In R (G) v The Governors of X School 8 the claimant had been employed as a teaching assistantattheschool.Followingallegationsofasexualrelationshipwithapupil,hewas suspended and disciplinary proceedings were instigated. The claimant sought to have legalrepresentationduringthoseproceedingsbuttheschoolrefused. 14. Attheconclusionofthedisciplinaryproceedings,theclaimantwasdismissed.Underthe SafeguardingVulnerableGroupsAct2006,theschoolreportedthecircumstancesofG's dismissaltotheIndependentSafeguardingAuthority(ISA).Itwasyettomakeadecision about whether to place the claimant on the children's barred list. It was not disputed that the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 Art.6 (1) applied to proceedings
6 7
[2010]EWHC3324(Admin) [2010]EWCACiv1209 8 [2011]UKSC30

beforetheISAbecausethedecisionoftheISAwoulddirectlydeterminetheclaimant's civil right to practise his profession and work with children generally. However, the claimant argued that the refusal to allow him legal representation also breached his righttoafairhearingunderArt.6(1). 15. The Court of Appeal upheld the claim and decided where an individual was subject to twoormoresetsofproceedings(ortwoormorephasesofasingleproceeding)anda civilrightorobligationenjoyedorowedbyhimwouldbedeterminedinoneofthem,he might, by force of Art.6, enjoy appropriate procedural rights in relation to any of the othersiftheoutcomeofthatotherwouldhaveasubstantialinfluenceoreffectonthe determination of that civil right or obligation. The issue that had to be considered is what was the kind of connection required between a set of proceedings (where an individual's civil rights were not being explicitly determined) and another set (where theywerebeingexplicitlydetermined,forart.6toapplyinbothsetsofproceedings). 16. TheSupremeCourtdisagreedwiththeCourtofAppealsconclusion,holdingthatitwas not the function of the schools disciplinary proceedings to determine the civil right in issue but rather it was concerned only with the claimants employment at the school. Therefore,inandofitselftheschoolsdisciplinaryproceedingsdidnotengageArt.6and it followed that the employee had no right to legal representation at the disciplinary hearing.
17. The Supreme Court held that the European Court of Human Rights had adopted a pragmatic, casesensitive approach to the problem of what kind of connection was neededbetweentwosuchsetsofproceedingsbeforeArt.6(1)couldapply.Anumberof factors had to be taken into account including whether the decision in the first set of proceedingswascapableofbeingdispositiveofthedeterminationofcivilrightsinthe secondoratleastcausingirreversibleprejudicebypartiallydeterminingtheoutcomeof thesecond;howcloselythetwosetsofproceedingswerelinked;whethertheobjectof the two proceedings was the same; and whether there were any policy reasons for
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art.6(1)nottoapplyinthefirstsetofproceedings:seeRingeisenvAustria(No.1), 9 Le ComptevBelgium, 10 RuizMateosvSpain 11 andAlFayedvUnitedKingdom 12 .
18. TheCourtofAppeal'stestof"substantialinfluence oreffect"wasausefulformulation andshouldbeadopted.CentraltotheCourtofAppeal'sreasoningforitsdecisionthat Art.6(1)appliedtothedisciplinaryproceedingswastheconclusionthatthefindingsof the disciplinary panel would be likely to have a profound influence on the decision reachedbytheISA.
19. However,theISAguidancenotesandcaseworkerguidanceshowedthattheISAwas required to exercise its own independent judgment both in relation to making findings of fact and assessing their significance before deciding whether it was appropriatetoplaceapersononthebarredlist.Therewasnoreasontodoubtthat caseworkerswoulddoastheywereinstructed.Theabsenceofanoralhearingdid notpreventtheISAfrommakingitsownfindingsoffact.Itwasalsoquiteclearthat the internal proceedings before the employer and the barring proceedings before theISAwereseparateanddistinctfromeachotherandwerenotinextricablylinked. Theirdecisionsandproceduresweredirectedtodifferentissues. Consultation
20. The linked cases of Vale of Glamorgan Council v Lord Chancellor 13 and R (Murray & Co) v Lord Chancellor) 14 dealt with the closure of Barry Magistrates Court and Sittingbourne Magistrates Court respectively: both claims failed. The closure decisions had followed a review of court buildings in England and Wales. The statutory framework was that the defendant had a general duty to ensure that there was a sufficient system to support the carrying on of the business of magistrates courts and a power to provide court houses to fulfil that duty (Courts
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A/13)(197980)1E.H.R.R.455 (A/43)[1982]E.C.C.240 11 A/262)(1993)16E.H.R.R.505 12 17101/90)(1994)18E.H.R.R.393 13 [2011]EWHC1532(Admin) 14 2011]EWHC1528(Admin

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Act 2003 ss. 1 and 3). There was no duty to consult in the event of closure, but a voluntary consultation had been carried out.
21. In Vale of Glamorgan Council the claimants argued that the defendant had failed properly to consult on alternatives to the closure of Barry Magistrates Court. The court rejected this argument. It held that there is no general principle that a minister entering into consultation must consult on all the possible alternative ways in which a specific objective might arguably be capable of being achieved. That would make the process of consultation inordinately complex and time consuming if that were so. It was for the defendant, subject to rationality, to identify the issues for consultation, and was entitled to decide only to consult about the closures. It was open to any consultee to suggest alternatives, but the defendant was not then required to recirculate any such suggest or to further consult on it.
22. Arguments based on failure to have regard to relevant considerations were rejected on the basis that it was not mandatory for the defendant to have regard to the factors identified. There was also an unsuccessful challenge based on a failure to give reasons.
23. In Murray & Co initially the main complaint about consultation was that the defendant had not disclosed the criteria that it would adopt in deciding which courts to close. However, the criteria (i.e. the number of courtrooms, standard of custody facilities, standard of security, standard of victims and witnesses facilities, and Disability Discrimination Act compliance) were so obvious that they did not need to be spelled out in the consultation procedure.
24. The claimant then sought to argue that the benchmarking criteria by which those matters were assessed ought to have been disclosed. This argument failed because the benchmarks had not been established at the start of the exercise, but only developed when the responses were being considered. The court held that there was no duty to provide this information. Having noted that there is not, in general,
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19 a duty to circulate submissions made in response to a consultation exercise, the court went out: What of matters that emerge internally during a consultation? While they cannot be equated with matters that emerge as a result of external responses, there are some similarities. To require a public body engaged on a consultation exercise routinely to circulate information about the way its consideration of the matters before it is developing and afford an opportunity for further responses has the potential to lead to a never-ending dialogue and to be inimical to the principle that there must come a time when finality has to be achieved. It is clear from the decisions in Bushell v Secretary of State for the Environment 15 and Edwards v Environmental Agency [2006] EWCA Civ 877 at [para] 103; [2008] UKHL at [para] 44 that there is in general no obligation on a minister to communicate advise received from officials or internal material or information to consultees. There may, as we have stated, be exceptional cases, for instance, where the matters which have emerged lead the public authority to wish to do something fundamentally different from the proposals consulted upon, or fairness otherwise requires further consultation on a matter or issue that has been thrown up. One such situation may be where the internal material undermines the value of the responses that have been made to a consultation. We are, however, satisfied that this is not one of those exceptional cases.
Legitimate expectation 25. In R. (Davies) v Revenue and Customs Commissioners the appellants claimed that they were not liable to pay tax as residents because they had moved abroad to work although they retained some links in the UK. 16 They relied on guidance issued by the then Inland Revenue entitled Residents and non-residents liability
15 16
[1981]AC75at[para]102 [2011]UKSC47
to tax in the United Kingdom (IR20), and argued that this gave rise to a legitimate expectation.
26. This raised an issue about what type of statement can found a legitimate expectation. The lead judgment for the majority on this point was given by Lord Wilson. He referred to the judgement of Lord Bingham in R v Inland Revenue Commissioners ex parte MFK in which he had held, in relation to an ad hoc application for advise, that the assurance had to be clear, unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification. 17 A more formally published statement might be binding in any case falling clearly within its terms. Lord Wilson was dealing with formally published guidance but he declined to hold that there was any rigid distinction between the two kinds of case. The correct approach was:
It is better to forsake any arid analytical exercise and to proceed on the basis that the representations in the booklet for which the appellants contendmusthavebeenclear;thatthejudgmentabouttheirclaritymustbe made in the light of an appraisal of all relevant statements in the booklet when they are read as a whole; and that, in that the clarity of a representationdependsinpartupontheidentifyofthepersontowhomitis made,thehypotheticalrepresenteeisthe[ordinarilysophisticatedtaxpayer irrespectiveofwhetherheisinreceiptofprofessionaladvice.
27. Applying that approach the guidance was poorly drafted but showed sufficiently clearly that what was needed was a distinct break from the previous pattern of life in the UK. If this could not be gathered from the guidance then it was so unclear as to communicate to its readers nothing to which legal effect might be given
28. Lord Mance disagreed about the effect of the guidance but not about the test to be applied. He said: the question is how on a fair reading of the promise it would have been reasonably understood by those to whom it was made [taken from Dyson LJ in Association of British
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[1990]1WLR1545
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21 Civilian Internees Far Eastern Region (ABCIFER) v Secretary of State for Defence. 18 The primary issue in each appeal is thus how, on a fair reading, IR20 would have been reasonably understood by those to whom it was directed. It is for the courts to resolve this as a matter of law (para. 70).
29. A further issue was whether a legitimate expectation could be gathered from the practice of the Inland Review but this failed on the facts. As Lord Wilson pointed out, such a claim is inherently more difficult to prove:
[T]hepromiseorpracticemustconstituteaspecificundertakingorgroup,by which the relevant policys continuance is assured: R (Bhatt Murphy) v Independent Assessor per Laws LJ at [43]. 19 The result is that the appellants need evidence that the practice was so unambiguous, so widespread, so well establishedandsowellrecognisedastocarrywithinitacommitmenttoagroup oftaxpayersincludingthemselvesoftreatmentinaccordancewithit.(para.19)
Reasons 30. In R. (Savva) v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC the substantive decision in this case involved the manner in which the local authority had calculated a personal budget to meet the appellants assessed needs for community care services. 20 The case also raised issues about the duty to give reasons. At first instance, the judge held that although the statute did not impose a duty to give reasons, they were required as a matter of fairness. The judge noted that statutory guidance emphasised consistently the need for transparency even though it did not expressly require reasons to be given.
31. The Court of Appeal approved this reasoning. It noted a recognised trend in the direction of requiring reasons (para. 19) and held that [w]hen a local authority
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[2003]EWCACiv473 [2008]EWACACiv755 20 [2010]EWCACiv1209

converts an established right the provision of services to meet an assessed eligible need into a sum of money, the recipient is entitled to be told how the sum has been calculated (para 20).
32. The court rejected an argument that it would be too onerous to give reasons. The court accepted that there was a burden but it is what simple fairness requires (para. 20). If basic reasons were not given then the recipient would not have any means of satisfying him/herself that the amounts had been calculated properly. In most cases reasons could be a brief listing of the required services and assumed timings and costs.
33. The case also raised the question whether or not a duty to provide reasons may be satisfied by notice in the decision letter that reasons will be provided on request. Noting that there was a dearth of authority, the court addressed the point as a matter of common sense. If reasons were offered but not requested then an application for judicial review would be refused (para. 23).
Public sector equality duty 34. Claims involving the public sector equality duty remain very topical. In the last month the claim in R(Essex County Council) v Secretary of State of Education 21 succeeded, whereas another in R(Siwack) v Newham LBC was dismissed. 22
35. In R(Bailey) v Brent LBC the Court of Appeal decided that the local authority had not acted unlawfully when deciding to close half of its public libraries. 23 The local authority's decision to reduce its expenditure on public services was primarily one for it to make as a democratically elected body. There was evidence before the judge that the library service that had existed was not sustainable and that new methods were required. That did not, however, avoid the requirement to comply with s.7 of the 1964 Act and s.149 of the 2010 Act. Given the scale of the spending reductions necessary the local authority's decision that the library service
21 22
[2012]EWHC1460(Admin) [2012]EWHC1520(Admin) 23 [2011]EWCACiv1586
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23 should bear a share of the reduction was not unlawful. The local authority was aware of its statutory duties, including those relating to race discrimination. Duties under the 2010 Act, and the implications of those duties, were set out in detail in the report. It was fanciful to suggest that it was so obvious that library provision, as distinct from other services, had discriminatory effects upon the Asian community that it needed to be a significant factor in fundamental decisions as to the apportionment of resources. The decision on which libraries to close was carefully considered by the local authority; a full consultation was conducted and fully reported to the local authority decision makers. The local authority was not in breach of its duty under s.149 of the 2010 Act to have due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination, in failing to give further consideration to the racial dimension, in so far as it affected the Asian community in relation to other communities. The local authority was not plainly confronted either on behalf of the Asian community, or otherwise, with the issue that was now said to exist. Factors were rightly and rationally considered when making the decisions as to which libraries should be closed and decisions were explained in the reports. A racial dimension did not render that choice unlawful. The section 149 duty to have due regard did not require further consideration and analysis when the decision was taken.
36. In R(Greenwich Community Law Centre) v Greenwich LBC the law centre appealed the refusal its application for judicial review of the decision to cease funding it. 24 It provided legal advice to some of the most vulnerable people in an area of London, relying on funding and one of its key funders had been the local authority. Available grants for the voluntary sector were reduced in January 2011 as a consequence of the Government's comprehensive spending review. The local authority reviewed its decision-making process to determine to whom funds should be given and undertook a full equality impact assessment and a recommissioning exercise which led to a tendering process to provide legal advice services which were split into four modules. The law centre was unsuccessful in
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[2012]EWCACiv496
its tender for one of the contracts which was awarded to a different provider which had scored more highly in the selection criteria. At a later meeting, two local authority councillors exercised their right to call in the decision on the question of accessibility and the geographical spread of the services. After a consideration of those matters at a final meeting, the local authority reaffirmed its decision.
37. The Court of Appeal held that the Court needed to ask whether, as a matter of substance there had been compliance by the local authority with its duties; it was not a tick-box exercise: see R(Baker) v Secretary of State for Communities.
25
It
was only if a characteristic or combination of characteristics was likely to arise in the exercise of the public function that they needed to be taken into consideration: see R(Bailey) v Brent LBC. 26 The local authority in practice dealt with all those groups with the protected characteristics identified in section 149 of the Equality Act which realistically might be affected by their decision. It had structured its policy so as to ensure that those groups were the principal beneficiaries of such funds as remained available. The alteration effected by the re-commissioning exercise from funding each member of the law centre to provide all relevant types of legal advice to choosing to fund one organisation only to provide each module of legal advice was not a significant change in policy but was a shift in the way in which the objectives of the policy were achieved which was designed to ensure greater savings for the good of the beneficiaries of the service. A change from one provider to another without more would not usually engage equality considerations. The local authority fully recognised the accessibility implications and the equality implications were also specifically discussed at its final meeting and it was impossible to suggest that there was not due regard to that consideration
RICHARD CLAYTON QC
19 June 2012
25 26
[2008]EWCACiv141 [2011]EWCACiv1586
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BIAS27
A. Introduction Summaryofthelaw 1 A decisionmaker must not have a personal or pecuniary interest in the outcomeofthedecision.Heorshemustnotbeprejudicedfor,oragainst,a particularpartyasaresultof,forexample,friendshiporenmity.Further,the decisionmaker must not predetermine the decision but consider it on the merits,withanopenmind. 2 A decisionmaker must not only be impartial but also be perceived to be impartial. The former is important because it ensures a high quality of decisionmaking unaffected by irrelevant matters. The latter is important because it maintains public confidence in the decisionmaking process. Decisionmakersmustalso,incertaincircumstances,beindependentofthe executive,thelegislatureandtheparties. Natureofthedecisionmaker 3 The case law on bias relates to a wide variety of decisionmakers including those exercising judicial, quasijudicial 28 and administrative functions. 29 As withproceduralfairness,thenatureofthedecisionmakerremainsrelevant inrelationtotheparticularrequirementsofbias.Allegationsofbiasarenot limited to low level decisionmakers but include challenges to senior membersofthejudiciary. 30
27 28
AndrewSharland,45GraysInnSquare. Examplesofquasijudicialdecisionmakersincludeauditors,PortervMagill[2001]UKHL67,[2002]2AC357 andarbitrators,LakerAirwaysIncvFLSAerospaceLtd[2000]1WLR113,QBD. 29 Administrativedecisionmakersincludecouncillorsandministersaswellaslocalauthorityofficersandcivil servantsingovernmentdepartments. 30 SeeegRvBowStreetMetropolitanStipendiaryMagistrate,expPinochetUgarte(No2)[2000]1AC119,HL (disqualificationofLawLord);DimesvGrandJunctionCanal(1852)3H.L.Cas.759,HL(disqualificationofLord Chancellor);HowellvMillais[2007]EWCACiv720andElFarargyvElFarargy[2007]EWCACiv1149,[2007]3 FCR711(HighCourtJudges).

4 Theruleagainstactualbiasappliestoalltypesofdecisionmakers. 31 Thelaw on automatic disqualification or presumed bias arising as a result of the decisionmaker having a direct financial interest in the outcome of the decisionalsoappliestoalldecisionmakers. 32 However,thepromotionofa causecategoryofpresumedbiasprobablydoesnotapplytoadministrative decisionmakers. 33 The rule against apparent bias applies equally to all decisionmakers where the matters that give rise to the allegation of apparent bias relate to personal interests albeit the context, including the natureofthedecisionmaker,isrelevanttodecidingwhethertheallegationis made out. 34 However, where the matter that gives rise to apparent bias relates to predetermination, the rules applicable to judicial and administrative decisionmakers are sufficiently different to merit separate consideration. 35 Therequirementunderart6(1)ECHRthatatribunal must be independent applies to administrative and judicial decisionmakers providedthattheyaredeterminingcivilrightsandobligationsoracriminal charge The scope of the common law right to an independent tribunal is presentlyunclear. 5 The text in this chapter refers to decisionmakers generally unless the rule beingdiscussedislimitedtoeitherjudicialoradministrativedecisionmakers. Where rules applicable to judicial decisionmakers are discussed, the term judgewillbeusedalthoughthisincludesjuror,laymagistrateandmembers oftribunals. TheimpactofArticle6(1)ECHRonthelawofbias 6 The incorporation of art 6(1) ECHR into domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998 has had a significant impact on the law in this area. Article 6(1)
31 32
RvInnerWestLondonCoroner,expDallaglio[1994]4AllER139,CA,162perSimonBrownLJ. RvSecretaryofStatefortheEnvironment,expKirkstallValley[1996]3AllER304,QBD,325perSedleyJ. 33 BovisHomesLtdvNewForestDistrictCouncil[2002]EWHC483(Admin),para87perOuseleyJ.However,the factualcircumstanceswouldneedtobeconsideredtoseewhethertheygaverisetoapparentbias. 34 RvSecretaryofStatefortheEnvironment,expKirkstallValley[1996]3AllER304,QBD,321perSedleyJ. 35 R(Lewis)vRedcarandClevelandBC[2008]EWCACiv746,[2009]1WLR83,para92perRixLJ.
26
27 ECHR provides that when civil rights and obligations or a criminal charge are determined an individual is entitled to an impartial and independent tribunal.Independenceandimpartialityaretwoseparateconceptsalthough they are linked. 36 Impartiality refers to a state of mind or attitude of the decisionmakerinrelationtotheissuesandthepartiesinaparticularcaseor decision.Thewordimpartialconnotesanabsenceofbias,actual,presumed and apparent. 37 Independence is the structural or institutional framework thatsecuresthisimpartiality.Decisionmakersshouldbeindependentofthe parties,theexecutiveandthelegislature. 7 Thetestforapparentbiashasbeenadjustedtoreflecttheapproachtakenby the European Court of Human Rights to the requirement that a tribunal shouldbeimpartialsothatwhatisnowdecisiveistheappearancetothefair minded observer 38 rather than, as had previously been the case, the appearance to the Court. 39 Subsequent to this adjustment, the House of Lords has suggested that there is now no difference between the common law test of bias and the requirement under art 6(1) ECHR of an impartial tribunal. 40 However, whilst the test applied under the common law and art 6(1)ECHRwhenconsideringwhetheradecisionisflawedasaresultofbiasor lackofimpartialityisbroadlysimilarthisdoesnotmeanthatthesameresult will invariably be reached under art 6 (1) ECHR and the common law. In particular, the approach to the defence of necessity may well be different andincaseswherethisdefenceisrelevantitwillbeimportanttodetermine whetherart6(1)ECHRisengaged. 41
36 37
GilliesvSecretaryofStateforWorkandPensions[2006]UKHL2,[2006]1WLR781,para38perBaronessHale. GilliesvSecretaryofStateforWorkandPensions[2006]UKHL2,[2006]1WLR781,para38perBaronessHale. TheEuropeanCourtscaselawonart6(1)ECHRisdividedupintosubjectiveimpartiality(actualbias)and objectiveimpartiality(apparentbiasandpresumedbias)ratherthanthetripartitedivisionunderthecommon law. 38 PortervMagill[2001]UKHL67,[2002]2AC357,para103perLordHope. 39 RvGough[1993]AC646,HL. 40 LawalvNorthernSpiritLtd[2003]UKHL35,[2004]1AllER187,para14.SeealsoInreMedicamentsand RelatedClassesofGoods(No2)[2001]1WLR700,CA,para85perLordPhillipsMR. 41 Itwillonlybeengagedifthetribunalisdeterminingcivilrightsandobligationsoracriminalcharge.
The introduction, as a result of the incorporation of art 6(1) ECHR into domestic law, of a requirement that a determination of a civil right or obligation be before an independent tribunal has also had a profound impact on English law. A substantial number of administrative decisions affecting an individuals civil rights and obligations are made by decision makers who are not independent within the meaning of art 6(1) ECHR. The difficulties caused by this and the extent to which any such lack of independence can be cured by subsequent judicial review are considered below.
Reliabilityofoldcases 9 Care should be taken when considering older judicial authorities for a numberofreasons.Firstly,whatmayhavebeenconsideredacceptablesome decades,orevencenturies,agomaynolongerbeconsideredacceptableina modern democratic State. 42 Secondly, such cases may well have been decidedapplyinganoldandnowsupersededtestsuchastherealdangerof bias test articulated by the House of Lords in R v Gough 43 or some earlier testsuchasareallikelihood 44 orreasonablesuspicionratherthanthereal possibility which has been applied since the House of Lords decision in PortervMagill. 45 Theapplicationofadifferenttestmayleadtoadifferent resultalthoughthisis,ofcourse,notinevitable. 46 B.ActualBias
42 43
LawalvNorthernSpiritLtd[2003]UKHL35,[2004]1AllER187,para22. [1993]AC646,HL. 44 RvCambourneJustices,expPearce[1955]1QB41,DC,51perLordGoddardCJ. 45 [2001]UKHL67,[2002]2AC357. 46 Locabail(UK)LtdvBayfieldPropertiesLtd[2000]1QB451,CA,para17,wheretheCourtofAppealstatedthat intheoverwhelmingmajorityofcaseswejudgethatapplicationofthetwotestswouldanywayleadtothesame outcome.ThiscommentwasmadeinrelationtotherealdangertestinRvGough[1993]AC646,HLandthe reasonablesuspiciontestappliedinearliercaselaw.
28
29 Introduction 10 Casesonactualbiasarerareforanumberofreasons. 47 Firstly,itislikelythat decisionmakers, particularly judges are rarely biased. 48 Secondly, it is very difficulttoestablishcasesofactualbiasbecausethelawdoesnotpermitthe questioning of decisionmakers about the possible existence of such bias. 49 Thirdly,andperhapsmostimportantly,itisfareasiertosetasideadecision onthegroundsofapparentbias 50 andthereforethereisusuallylittleorno advantage in pleading actual rather than apparent bias. The only potential advantage of alleging actual bias rather than apparent bias is that proof of theformermayovercomeanywaiverargumentwhilethelatterwouldnot. 51 11 The rule against actual bias applies to administrative as well as judicial and quasijudicialdecisionmakers. 52 Definition 12 Actualbiasariseswhenadecisionmakerallowsadecisiontobeinfluenced by partiality or prejudice or it has been demonstrated that the decision maker has been influenced by partiality or prejudice in reaching his decision. 53 Actual bias deprives a litigant of their right to an impartial tribunal.Italsounderminesthefairnessofadministrativedecisions. Consequencesofactualbias 13 Wheretheexistenceofsuchpartialityorprejudiceisestablished,eitherthe decisionmakerisrequiredtorecusethemselves,ifthematterisestablished beforethecommencementoftrialorthetakingofthedecision,or,ifactual
47 48
Locabail(UK)LtdvBayfieldPropertiesLtd[2000]1QB451,CA,para3. Locabail(UK)LtdvBayfieldPropertiesLtd[2000]1QB451,CA,para3. 49 Locabail(UK)LtdvBayfieldPropertiesLtd[2000]1QB451,CA,para3. 50 Locabail(UK)LtdvBayfieldPropertiesLtd[2000]1QB451,CA,para3(thecourtreferstolitigantsonly needingtodischargethelesserburdenofshowingapparentbias). 51 RvSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment,expAlFayed[2001]ImmAR134,CA,paras8689per KennedyLJ,para111perRixLJ. 52 RvInnerWestLondonCoroner,expDallaglio[1994]4AllER139,CA,162perSimonBrownLJ. 53 InreMedicamentsandRelatedClassesofGoods(No2)[2001]1WLR700,CA,para38perLordPhillipsMR; Locabail(UK)LtdvBayfieldPropertiesLtd[2000]1QB451,CA,para3.
bias is established subsequently, the judgment or decision must be quashed. 54 C.Presumedbiasorautomaticdisqualification Summary 14 Thesecondcategoryofbiasrelatestocaseswheretherelationshipbetween thedecisionmakerandoneofthepartiesissuchthatthelawpresumesthat the decisionmaker is biased and consequently the decisionmaker is disqualified from considering the matter without the need for any further investigation of the factual circumstances. This type of bias has often been categorised as relating to automatic disqualification. However, such nomenclatureispotentiallyconfusingbecausethepartiesareable,incertain circumstances,towaivetheirrighttoobjectpermittingthedecisionmakerto considerthematter. 55 15 Untilrecently,presumedbiaswasthoughttobelimitedtocaseswherethe decisionmakerhadadirectpecuniaryorfinancialinterestintheoutcomeof thedecision. 56 However,theHouseofLords,inRvBowStreetMetropolitan StipendiaryMagistrate,expPinochetUgarte(No2) 57 extendedthescopeof presumed bias to include cases where the decisionmaker promotes a cause. 16 Ifacourtconcludesthatthecircumstancesofthecasedonotfallwithinthe establishedcategories of presumedbias, the factual circumstances must be consideredtoseewhethertheygiverisetoapparentbias. Financialinterest
54 55
Locabail(UK)LtdvBayfieldPropertiesLtd[2000]1QB451,CA,para3. TJonesJudicialbiasanddisqualificationinthePinochetcase[1999]PL391,399,suggeststhattheruleshould bethoughtofasoneofautomaticdisclosureratherthandisqualification. 56 RvGough[1993]AC646,HL,673,perLordWoolf. 57 [2000]1AC119.
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31 Rationaleforrule 17 The rationale for the rule in relation to judges is that it would undermine public confidence in the integrity of the administration of justice if a judge was able to lawfully decide a case in which he or she had a direct financial interest. 58 Natureoffinancialinterest 18 Itisonlydirectfinancialintereststhatgiverisetopresumedbiasunderthis head and, absent a waiver by all of the parties, disqualify the decision maker. 59 Itisnotentirelyclearwhattheworddirectmeansinthiscontext; itmaybeusedasanantonymfortooremoteoritmaybeusedtocontrast the interest with an indirect interest such as a close relatives financial interest.ThebetterviewisthatexpressedbySedleyJinRvSecretaryofState for the Environment, ex p Kirkstall Valley 60 Sedley J who suggested that directwasastheantonymofaninterestwhichistooremotebecausethis eliminated a potential and unnecessary complication in the law. 61 Indeed, financialinterestsofcloserelatives,ifthedecisionmakerisawareofthem, arelikelytodisqualifythedecisionmaker. 62 19 Examples of decisionmakers being disqualified as a result of their direct financialinterestsinclude: (1) theLordChancellorwhohadasubstantialshareholdingina canal company that was a party in the proceedings before him; 63
58 59
RvGough[1993]AC646,HL,661perLordGoff. Thecasesrefertopecuniary,proprietaryandfinancialinterestswithoutdifferentiationbetweenthevarious typesofinterest.Financialinterestisusedinthischaptertoincludeproprietaryandpecuniaryinterests. 60 [1996]3AllER304,QBD,325326. 61 Ibidat3256. 62 SeeGuidetoJudicialConduct(publishedbytheJudgesCouncil),para3.8whichsuggeststhatknownfinancial interestsofthejudgesfamilywilldisqualifythem.Judgesfamilyincludesajudgesspouse,son,daughter,son inlaw,daughterinlaw,andanyothercloserelativeorpersonwhoisacompanionoremployeeofthejudgeand wholivesinthejudgeshousehold. 63 DimesvGrandJunctionCanal(1852)3H.L.Cas.759,HL.
(2) aCouncillorwhowasanestateagentforthevendorofland affected by a decision of the Council to permit development. 64 20 Contingent and nonbeneficial interests are not sufficient to give rise to presumed bias. 65 Examples of decisionmakers not being disqualified as a resultoffinancialinterests,eitherbecausetheyarenotdirectorforsome otherreason,include: (1) ajudgewhowasatrusteetoanorganisationthathadshares inacorporation; 66 (2) ajudgewhoheldsharesinabankwhichhadbeenrobbedby theaccused. 67 Sizeofthedirectfinancialinterest 21 Not every direct financial interest is sufficient to establish presumed bias. Although older authorities indicated that a decisionmaker is disqualified howeversmallhisorherfinancialinterest, 68 itisclearthatthisisnolonger good law. The rule is subject to a de minimis exception. 69 To automatically disqualifyadecisionmaker,theoutcomeofthecasemustrealisticallyaffect thedecisionmakersfinancialinterestalthoughanydoubtshouldberesolved infavourofdisqualification. 70 Itdoesnotmatterthatthedecisionmakerin
64 65
RvHendonRuralDistrictCouncil,expChorley[1933]2KB696,DC. RvManchester,SheffieldandLincolnshireRailwayCo(1867)LR2QB336,HC,339.SeealsoJonesvDASLegal Expenses[2003]EWCACiv1071,[2004]IRLR218(Nopresumedbiaswherethehusbandofatribunalchairwasa barristerwhohadoccasionallybeeninstructedbythedefendantcompany). 66 RvRand(1866)LR1QB230,DC,232perBlackburnJ. 67 RvMulvihill[1990]1WLR438,CA. 68 SeeegRvRand(1866)LR1QB230,DC,232perBlackburnJ.SeealsoRvCamborneJustices,expPearce [1955]1QB41,CA,47perSladeLJ. 69 Locabail(UK)LtdvBayfieldPropertiesLtd[2000]1QB451,CA,para10. 70 Locabail(UK)LtdvBayfieldPropertiesLtd[2000]1QB451,CA,paras8,10.CfRvHammond(1863)9LT423 (BailCourt)andRvSecretaryofStateforTrade,expAndersonStrathclydeplc[1983]2AllER233,DC,237.
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33 question states that he or she was unaware of the financial interest at the timeofmakingthedecision. 71 Natureofdecisionmaker 22 Direct financial interests disqualify administrative as well as judicial and quasijudicial decisionmakers. 72 In relation to certain administrative decisionmakerssuchascouncillorsandlocalauthorityofficers,inadditionto the common law prohibition, there are statutory prohibitions preventing themfrompartakingindecisionsinwhichtheyhaveafinancialinterest. 73 23 The fact that the Council itself, rather than the Councillors, has a financial interestintheoutcomeofthedecisiondoesnotgiverisetopresumedbias. 74 Promotionofacause 24 TheHouseofLords,inRvBowStreetMetropolitanStipendiaryMagistrate, expPinochetUgarte(No2), 75 extendedtheambitofpresumedbiasbeyond financialintereststoincludethedisqualificationofajudgewhowasinvolved, whether personally or as a director in a company, in promoting the same causesinthesameorganisationasapartytothesuit. 76 TheHouseofLords concluded that Amnesty International Charity Limited (AICL) had a non pecuniaryinterestinachievingaparticularresultbyvirtueofitsrelationship withAmnestyInternational,whohadintervenedinsupportofthecasethat Senator Pinochet should not be immune from extradition proceedings. Further, Lord Hoffmann, by virtue of the fact that he was chairman and a
71 72
SeeSupperstone,GoudieandWalker,JudicialReview(4thedn,2010),para12.6.4. RvSecretaryofStatefortheEnvironment,expKirkstallValley[1996]3AllER304,QBD,325perSedleyJ (Chairmanofurbandevelopmentcorporationhadundisclosedinterestinlandthatwouldmateriallyincreasein valueifplanningpermissionwasgranted).SeealsoRvHendonRuralDistrictCouncil,expChorley[1933]2KB 696,DC(Councildecisionquashedbecauseoneofthecouncillorsdisqualifiedasaresultofadirectfinancial interest). 73 SeeLocalGovernmentAct2000,s4952andLocalAuthorities(ModelCodeofConduct)Order2007(SI 2007/1159). 74 RvSevenoaksDistrictCouncil,expTerry[1985]3AllER226,QBD,233perGlidewellJ. 75 [2000]1AC119,HL. 76 RvBowStreetMetropolitanStipendiarymagistrateexpPinochetUgarte(No2),[2000]1AC119,HL,135per LordBrowneWilkinson;139perLordGoff.
directorofAICL,alsohadasimilarinterestinachievingsucharesult.Insuch circumstances,hewaspresumedtobebiasedandthereforecouldnot,inthe absenceofawaiverbyallparties,considerSenatorPinochetsappeal. 25 The preciseambit of the House of Lords decision in Pinochet Ugarte is not entirely clear. 77 Their Lordships emphasised that the factual circumstances wereveryunusual. 78 Thedecisionhasbeendescribedasahighlytechnical one. 79 26 In Meerabux v Attorney General of Belize, 80 the Privy Council distinguished Pinochet, concluding that the mere fact that the chair of the disciplinary tribunalwasamemberoftheBarAssociationdidnotidentifyhimwiththe complaint brought by that association against a former member of the SupremeCourtofBelize.Thechairmanwasthereforenotactingasajudgein hisowncauseandwasnotdisqualifiedfromconsideringthematter. 81 27 The decision in Pinochet Ugarte introduced unnecessary complexity and uncertainty into the law of presumed bias. 82 Some commentators have questioned whether there is a need for the presumed bias category at all, suggesting that such cases would be better considered under the apparent bias test. 83 Such an approach has been adopted in Australia where the
77 78
SeeAOlowofoyeku,TheNemoJudexRule:Thecaseagainstautomaticdisqualification[2000]PL456. RvBowStreetMetropolitanStipendiarymagistrateexpPinochetUgarte(No2),[2000]1AC119,HL,135per LordBrowneWilkinson. 79 MeerabuxvAttorneyGeneralofBelize[2005]UKPC12,[2005]2AC513,para21.LordHope,whowrotethe PrivyCouncilsopinioninMeerabuxwasoneoftheLawLordswhodeliveredaspeechinPinochetUrgarte. 80 [2005]UKPC12,[2005]2AC513. 81 MeerabuxvAttorneyGeneralofBelize[2005]UKPC12,[2005]2AC513,para24.(ThePrivyCouncilsuggested thatthepositionwouldhavebeendifferentiftheChairmanofthedisciplinarytribunalhadtakenpartinthe decisionswhichledtothemakingofthecomplaints.Afterrejectingtheallegationofautomaticdisqualification thePrivyCouncilwentontoconsiderwhetherthecircumstancesofthecasegaverisetoapparentbias).Seealso LeesonvGeneralCouncilofMedicalEducationandRegistration(1889)43ChD366,CA(CounciloftheMedical DefenceUnionhadbroughtacomplaintagainstadoctor.Twoofthemembersofthedecisionmakingbodywere membersoftheMedicalDefenceUnionbutnottheCouncil.TheCourtofAppeal,byamajority,concludedthat thetwomembersdidnothaveadisqualifyinginterest). 82 SeeAOlowofoyeku,TheNemoJudexRule:Thecaseagainstautomaticdisqualification[2000]PL456fora carefulcritiqueofthedecisioninPinochetandtheproblemswiththelawonpresumedbias.SeealsoKMalleson, JudicialBiasandDisqualificationafterPinochet(No2)(2000)63MLR119.Mallesonsuggeststhatpresumedbias isunnecessaryandthatallcasespresentlyconsideredunderthepresumedbias/automaticdisqualificationrule shouldbeconsideredapplyingtheapparentbiastest. 83 SeeegHWoolf,JJowellandALeSueur,DeSmithsJudicialReview(6thedn,2007),paras10032036.
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35 presumedbiasrulehasbeenabandonedandeachcaseisnowconsideredto seewhetherthefactsgiverisetotheappearanceofbias. 84 Thereismuchto besaidfortheAustralianapproachwhichwouldsimplifythelawonbias.The CourtofAppeal,inR(Kaur)vInstituteofLegalExecutivesAppealTribunal, 85 inobitercomments,indicatedsympathywithsuchaviewwhenitsuggested that there may not be two separate doctrines of promotion of a cause presumedbiasandapparentbias. 86 28 Thepromotionofcausecategoryofpresumedbiasdoesnotappeartoapply toadministrativedecisions. 87 Furthercategoriesofpresumedbias? 29 Whilst some commentators 88 have suggested that the Court of Appeal in AWGGroupLtdvMorrison 89 furtherextendedtheambitofpresumedbiasto includecaseswherethejudgehasafriendshipwithawitness,itissuggested that this case is better analysed as a case of apparent bias. The Court of Appeal in AWG did refer to automatic disqualification; however, it is clear from both the context, and the case law relied upon, that the Court of Appeals conclusion was that the factual circumstances gave rise to the existence of apparent bias rather than a finding that the relationship was suchthatthejudgeshouldbeautomaticallydisqualified.90
84
EbnervOfficialTrusteeinBankruptcy(2000)205CLR337,AusHC,351.Themajorityanddissentingjudgments inEbnersetouttheargumentsforandagainsttheretentionoftheautomaticdisqualificationorpresumedbias. 85 [2011]EWCACiv1168,[2012]1AllER1435. 86 Ibid,paras4446perRixLJ. 87 BovisHomesLtdvNewForestDistrictCouncil[2002]EWHC483(Admin),para87perOuseleyJ. 88 SeeegHWoolf,JJowellandALeSueur,DeSmithsJudicialReview(6thedn,2007),para10025,andJMaurici, TheModernLawofBias[2007]JR251,para45. 89 [2006]EWCACiv6,[2006]1WLR1163. 90 [2006]EWCACiv6,[2006]1WLR1163,paras49perMummeryLJ.SeealsoR(Bennion)vChiefConstableof MerseysidePolice[2001]EWCACiv638,[2002]ICR136(Theclaimantunsuccessfullyattemptedtoextendthe ambitofpresumedbiastocaseswherethedecisionmaker,aChiefConstablehearingadisciplinarymatter,was thenamedrespondentinadiscriminationclaimbroughtbythepoliceofficersubjecttothedisciplinaryaction).
Consequencesofpresumedbias 30 If presumed bias is established, the decisionmaker is disqualified from hearing the case, or making the decision, as the case may be, 91 unless the parties waive their right to object. If the decision has already been made it will normally be quashed. 92 If one member of the court or decisionmaking body is found to have such a disqualifying interest, this is likely to be sufficient to vitiate the decision regardless of whether the other decision makersarenotsodisqualified. 93 D.ApparentBias Introduction Scopeofapparentbias Mattersthatmaygiverisetotheappearanceofbias 31 Whilst presumed bias is mainly concerned with direct financial interests, apparentbiasismainlyconcernedwithnonfinancialorpersonalinterests. 94 Englishcourtshavenotsoughttolaydownprecisecategoriesofcasewhen the appearance of bias may arise. However, cases of apparent bias tend to fallintofourbroadandoverlappingcategories: 95 (a) disqualification as a result of personal interest, friendship or enmitytowardsaparty,witnessorprofessionaladviser; (b) disqualificationbyconduct,includingpublishedstatements,either inthecourseof,oroutside,thedecisionmakingprocess; (c) disqualificationbyassociation;
91
DimesvGrandJunctionCanal(1852)3H.L.Cas.759,HL,793perLordCampbell;RvRand(1866)LR1QB230, DC,232perBlackburnJ;LeesonvGeneralCouncilofMedicalEducationandRegistration(1889)43ChD366,CA, 384perBowenLJ;RvGough[1993]AC646,HL,661perLordGoff. 92 R(AlHasan)vSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment[2005]UKHL13,[2005]1WLR688,paras4244per LordBrown.LordBrownscommentsrelatetoapparentbiashowevertheyareequallyapplicabletopresumed bias.SeeCh29fordiscussionofdiscretionarygroundsforrefusalofrelief. 93 RvHendonRuralDistrictCouncil,expChorley[1933]2KB696,DC(Councildecisionquashedbecauseoneof thecouncillorsdisqualifiedasaresultoffinancialinterest). 94 Theruleagainstapparentbiasalsoappliestocasesofindirectfinancialintereststhatfalloutsidethescopeof presumedbias. 95 ThesefourcategoriesdrawonDeaneJsjudgementinWebbvR(1994)181CLR41,AusHC,74.
36
37 (d) disqualification by extraneous information, where knowledge of someprejudicialbutinadmissiblefactorcircumstancesgivesrise totheappearanceofbias. 32 The apparent bias test is also applied to cases where it is alleged that the decisionmakerisguiltyofpredetermination. Predeterminationandapparentbias 33 Predetermination and apparent bias are conceptually different. This differencecanbeillustratedusingthefactsofRvChesterfieldBC,expDarker Enterprises. 96 A renewal of a sex shop licence was refused by a sub committeeofthecouncilwhichhadbeenchairedbyacouncillorknowntobe strongly opposed to sex shops in general and to the applicants shop in particular.Thecommitteehadalsoincludedacouncillorwhowasadirector of the Cooperative Society which owned the neighbouring retail premises andwhichhopedtoexpandintothesexshoppremisesifitslicencewasnot renewed. The challenge to the chairmans involvement concerned an allegation of predetermination whilst the challenge to the other committee membersinvolvementconcernedanallegationofpersonalinterestthatgave risetotheappearanceofbias. 97 34 Whilst apparent bias and predetermination are conceptually different there ispotentialforoverlap.Forexample,adversecommentsaboutapartybya decisionmaker prior to the decision may be evidence of a personal enmity towards a party and thus amount to personal interest bias or may be
96
[1992]COD466,HC.TheuseofthisexampleistakenfromRvSecretaryofStatefortheEnvironment,exp KirkstallValleyCampaignLtd[1996]3AllER304,HC,3212perSedleyJ. 97 InDarkerthechallengetothechairmanonthegroundsofpredeterminationwasunsuccessfulbutthe challengetothedecisionconcerningthecouncillorwhowasadirectoroftheCooperativeSocietywas successful.

evidence that the decisionmaker is not approaching the decision with the requiredopenmindandthusamounttopredetermination. 98 Natureofdecisionmaker 35 Generally,theapparentbiastestappliesequallytojudicial,quasijudicialand administrative decisionmakers. 99 A judge who had a friendship with a witness should not hear the claim. 100 Equally, a member of a planning committee who had a friendship with an applicant for planning permission must take no part in the consideration of the planning application. 101 However, care has to be taken when applying decisions that relate to one typeofdecisionmakertoanothertypeofdecisionmakerbecausecontextis important. 102 36 Inrelationtopredetermination,thesituationismorecomplex.Whilstjudicial decisionmakersmustapproachamatterwithanopenmindandbeseento approachmatterswithanopenmind,theapproachtakentoadministrative decisionmakersisconsiderablymoreflexible.Suchdecisionmakersmaybe democratically elected and may have expressed very strong views on the merits of proposals before they come to determine them because, for example,theirpartymayhaveapolicyontheapplicationortheymayhave spokenoutinfavouroragainstthembecausetheissueinquestionisparty political. Whilst such strong expressions of views by a judge would be very likely to require recusal, requiring administrative decisionmakers to recuse themselves in such circumstances is problematic because their democraticallyelectedrolerequiresthemtoexpressviewsonsuchmatters.
98
SeeegElFarargyvElFarargy[2007]EWCACiv1149,[2007]3FCR711(Appellantsallegationthatajudges inappropriateandoffensivecommentsdemonstratedthathehadaclosedmindwererejectedbuttheallegation thatthesamecommentsgaverisetotheappearanceofbiaswasacceptedbecausetheydemonstratedtothe fairmindedobserverthattherewasarealpossibilitythatthejudgewouldcarryintohisjudgementthescornand contemptthatthecommentsconveyed). 99 RvSecretaryofStatefortheEnvironment,expKirkstallValleyCampaignLtd[1996]3AllER304,HC,321per SedleyJ;R(Lewis)vRedcarandClevelandBC[2008]EWCACiv746,[2009]1WLR83,para62perPillLJ. 100 Locabail(UK)LtdvBayfieldPropertiesLtd[2000]1QB451,CA,para25. 101 R(Gardner)vHarrogateBC[2008]EWHC2942(Admin),[2009]JPL873. 102 FlahertyvNationalGreyhoundRacingClub[2005]EWCACiv1117,TheTimes,5October2005,para29per ScottBakerLJ.
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39 Predeterminationbyadministrativedecisionmakersisthereforeconsidered separately. Rationaleforrule 37 Therationalefortheruleagainstapparentbiasisthatjusticemustnotjustbe done but be seen to be done. 103 It is therefore not sufficient that the decisionmaker is not biased. He or she must also not be perceived to be biased because such a perception undermines confidence in the administrationofjusticeandadministrativedecisionmaking. 104 Thetestforapparentbias 38 TherelevanttestforapparentbiaswasdefinitivelysetoutbytheHouseof LordsinPortervMagill. 105 Thequestiontobeconsiderediswhetherthefair mindedandinformedobserver,havingconsideredthefacts,wouldconclude that there was a real possibility that the decisionmaker was biased. 106 The decisioninPortervMagillbroughtEnglishlawbroadlyintolinewiththatof Canada,AustraliaandNewZealandaswellasScotland. 107 Italsomeantthat therewasnodifferencebetweenthecommonlawtestofapparentbiasand therequirementofsubjectiveimpartialitycontainedinArticle6(1)ECHR. 108 39 The real possibility test differs from the previous real danger test articulatedinRvGough 109 intwoways.Firstly,thequestioniswhetherthere is a real possibility of bias rather than a real danger of bias. Notwithstanding the view that there is no difference between these two formulations 110 it is suggested that the real possibility connotes a slightly
103 104
GilliesvSecretaryofStateforWorkandPensions[2006]UKHL2,[2006]1WLR781,para23perLordHope. GilliesvSecretaryofStateforWorkandPensions[2006]UKHL2,[2006]1WLR781,para23perLordHope. 105 [2001]UKHL67,[2002]2AC357. 106 PortervMagill[2001]UKHL67,[2002]2AC357,para103perLordHope. 107 MerrabuxvAttorneyGeneralofBelize[2005]UKPC12,[2005]2AC513,para22. 108 LawalvNorthernSpirit[2003]UKHL35,[2004]1AllER187,para15perLordSteynandRvAbdroikov[2007] UKHL37,[2007]1WLR2679,para14perLordBingham. 109 [1993]AC646,HL. 110 InreMedicamentsandRelatedClassesofGoods(No2)[2001]1WLR700,CA,para85perPhillipsMR.
lowerthresholdthanrealdanger.Secondly,theappearanceofbiasistobe consideredfromtheperspectiveofthefairmindedandinformedobserver rather than as previously, when it had been considered from the courts perspective. 111 40 Therealpossibilitytestinvolvesatwostageprocess. 112 First,theCourtmust ascertain all the circumstances which had a bearing on the suggestion that the decisionmaker was biased. 113 This should be done with a degree of precision. 114 Secondly, the Court must consider whether those circumstanceswouldleadafairmindedandinformedobservertoconclude thattherewasarealpossibilitythatthedecisionmakerwasbiased. 115 Thecharacteristicsofthefairmindedandinformedobserver 41 Thefairmindedandinformedobserverisajudicialconstruct 116 and,likethe reasonable man so important to the law of negligence, a creature of fiction. 117 Individual members of the public who might justifiably claim that theyarefairmindedandinformedwillhavewidelydifferingcharacteristics, experience,attitudesandbeliefswhichcouldimpactonissuesrelatingtothe existence of apparent bias. 118 It is therefore not surprising that judges sometimes disagree as to the view of the fairminded and informed observer. 119
111
ManOWarStationLtdvAucklandCityCouncil[2002]UKPC28,[2003]1LRC598,para10;RvAdroikov[2007] UKHL37,[2007]1WLR2678,para81perLordMance.Thepreviousview,whichconsideredmattersfromthe courtsperspective,wascontainedinRvGough[1993]AC646,HL,670perLordGoff.. 112 FlahertyvNationalGreyhoundRacingClub[2005]EWCACiv1117,TheTimes,5October2005,para27per ScottBakerLJ. 113 FlahertyvNationalGreyhoundRacingClub[2005]EWCACiv1117,TheTimes,5October2005,para27per ScottBakerLJ. 114 FlahertyvNationalGreyhoundRacingClub[2005]EWCACiv1117,TheTimes,5October2005,para32per ScottBakerLJ.SeealsoNationalAssemblyforWalesvCondron[2006]EWCACiv1573,[2007]LGR87paras256 perRichardsLJwhoexpresslyendorsedScottBakerLJscommentsontheneedforprecision. 115 FlahertyvNationalGreyhoundRacingClub[2005]EWCACiv1117,TheTimes,5October2005,para27per ScottBakerLJ. 116 RvAdroikov[2007]UKHL37,[2007]1WLR2678,para81perLordMance. 117 HelowvSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment[2008]UKHL62,[2008]1WLR2416,para1perLord Hope. 118 RvAdroikov[2007]UKHL37,[2007]1WLR2678,para81perLordMance. 119 RvAdroikov[2007]UKHL37,[2007]1WLR2678,para80perLordMancewhoaccuratelycharacterisedthe 3:2splitbetweentheirLordshipsasturninglargelyondifferentperceptionsoftheviewthatwouldbetakenbya fairmindedandinformedobserver.
40
41 Thefairmindedobserver 42 The fairminded observer does not take the complainants view but an objective view. 120 They take a balanced approach 121 and always reserve judgement on every point until they have seen and fully understood both sides of the argument. 122 They are not unduly sensitive or suspicious. 123 However,neitheraretheynaveorcomplacent. 124 Thefairmindedobserver knows that fairness requires that a decisionmaker must be, and must be seen to be, unbiased. They know that decisionmakers, like anybody else, havetheirweaknesses. 125 43 The fairminded observer is not an insider (ie a member of the decision making body) otherwise they would run the risk of having an insiders blindness. 126 They are able to distinguish between what is relevant and irrelevant and are able, when exercising his judgement, to decide what weightshouldbegiventothefactsthatarerelevant. 127 Theinformedobserver 44 The informed observer has access to all the facts that are capable of being knowntothepublicgenerally. 128 Thesefactsarenotlimitedtothoseknown by the complainant or even a hypothetical observer at the time of the
120 121
PortervMagill[2001]UKHL67,[2002]2AC357,para104perLordHope. LawalvNorthernSpiritLtd[2003]UKHL35,[2004]1AllER187,para14perLordSteyn. 122 HelowvSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment[2008]UKHL62,[2008]1WLR2416,para2perLord Hope. 123 JohnsonvJohnson(2001)201CLR488,AusHC,509para53citedwithapprovalbytheHouseofLordsin HelowvSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment[2008]UKHL62,[2008]1WLR2416,para2perLordHope, para14perLordRodgerandpara39perLordWalker. 124 HelowvSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment[2008]UKHL62,[2008]1WLR241,para2perLordHope. 125 HelowvSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment[2008]UKHL62,[2008]1WLR2416,para2perLord Hope. 126 GilliesvSecretaryofStateforWorkandPensions[2006]1WLR781,[2006]UKHL2,para39perLadyHale. 127 GilliesvSecretaryofStateforWorkandPensions[2006]1WLR781,[2006]UKHL2,para17perLordHope. 128 GilliesvSecretaryofStateforWorkandPensions[2006]1WLR781,[2006]UKHL2,para17perLordHope.
decision under challenge but include facts discovered subsequently as a resultoffurtherinvestigation. 129 45 The informed observer is aware of the relevant legal traditions and culture but they are not wholly uncritical of such a culture. 130 They do not have a masteryoftheminutiaeoflegaldrafting. 131 46 There has been a tendency to attribute knowledge of legal matters to the fairminded and informed observer that has, to an extent, eroded the difference between the Courts perspective and that of the informed observer. 132 This approach contrasts with that taken in Australia where the testisbasedonthefairmindedlayobserverwhoisnottobeassumedto have a detailed knowledge of the law. 133 Given the underlying rationale of the rule against apparent bias, there is much to be said for the approach advocatedbytheCourtofAppealinLocabailthatmattersoutsidethekenof theordinary,reasonablywellinformedmemberofthepublicoughtnotbe reliedupon 134 otherwisethepublicmayhaveaperceptionthatthedecision inquestionisunfaireventhoughtheCourthaveconcludedthatthefactual circumstancesdonotgiverisetoanappearanceofbias. 135 Evidencefromthedecisionmaker
129
FlahertyvNationalGreyhoundRacingClub[2005]EWCACiv1117,TheTimes,5October2005,para27per ScottBakerLJ;VirdivTheLawSocietyofEnglandandWales[2010]EWCACiv100,[2010]1WLR2840,paras42 49perStanleyBurntonLJ;BelizeBankvAttorneyGeneralofBelize[2011]UKPC36,paras3739perLordKerr. 130 LawalvNorthernSpiritLtd[2003]UKHL35,[2004]1AllER187,para22perLordSteyn.SeealsoGilliesv SecretaryofStateforWorkandPensions[2006]1WLR781,[2006]UKHL2,atparas3941perLordHope(The fairmindedandinformedobserverisawareoftribunallife);R(Pounder)vHMCoronerfortheNorthandSouth DistrictsofDurhamandDarlington[2010]EWHC328(Admin),para29perBurnettJ(thefairmindedand informedobserverisawareofaspectsofthecoronialprocessincludingthefactthattheCoronersetsthescope oftheinquestandalsodecideswhichwitnessestocall). 131 DavidsonvScottishMinisters[2004]UKHL34,20051SC(HL)7,para8perLordBingham. 132 SeeegTaylorvWilliamson[2002]EWCACiv1380. 133 JohnsonvJohnson(2001)201CLR488,AusHC,paras1113,perGleesonCJ,Gaudron,HcHugh,Gummowand HayneJJs. 134 Locabail(UK)LtdvBayfieldPropertiesLtd[2000]1QB451,CA,para17. 135 InReP(ABarrister)[2005]1WLR3019,VisitorstotheInnsofCourt,para107perColmanJforadiscussionas totheextentofknowledgeofthehypotheticalobserverandhowitrelatestotheunderlyingrationaleofthe apparentbiasrule.
42
43 47 Ajudgeshouldnotadduceevidenceeitherdetailingwhatwasintheirmind atthetimeoftheimpugneddecisionorassertingthattheywerenotbiased. Suchevidenceisunhelpfulbecausewhatisinissueiswhetherthefactsgive risetoanappearanceofbiasratherthanwhatwasinthemindofaparticular decisionmaker at the relevant time. 136 As such, no weight should be attachedtosuchevidence. 137 48 The position is less clear in relation to administrative decisionmakers althoughthebetterviewisthatlittleornoweightshouldbeplacedonsuch evidence. 138 49 Thedecisionmakermay,however,adduceevidenceastowhetherheorshe wasawareofthefactualmattersthatgaverisetotheallegationofapparent bias. 139 If the party alleging apparent bias accepts this evidence it can be treated as accurate. 140 If it is not accepted the court does not have to rule whetheritshouldbeacceptedorrejectedbutmustconsiderwhetherthereis arealpossibilityofbiasnotwithstandingtheexplanationadvanced. 141 Thejudicialoath 50 Thefactthatjudgestakeanoathofofficeisarelevantfacttobeconsidered by the fairminded and informed observer and the real possibility of bias must be assessed in light of the oath to administer justice without fear or
136 137
GilliesvSecretaryofStateforWorkandPensions[2006]UKHL2,[2006]1WLR781,para17perLordHope. PortervMagill[2001]UKHL67,[2002]2AC357,para104perLordHope. 138 R(Georgiou)vLondonBoroughofEnfield[2004]EWHC799(Admin),[2004]LGR497,para36perRichardsJ (CourtappliedPortervMagillandrefusedtoplaceanysignificantweightonevidencefrommemberofa planningcommitteeastowhethertheyapproachedthematterwithanopenmind).SeealsoR(Agnello)v LondonBoroughofHounslow[2003]EWHC3112(Admin),[2004]LGR536,para79perSilberJ(Refusaltotake intoaccountprotestationsofdecisionmakerthathehadactedfairly).CfR(IslandFarmDevelopmentLtd)v BridgendCountyBoroughCouncil[2006]EWHC2189(Admin),[2007]LGR60,para30perCollinsJ(doubting RichardsJsapproachinGeorgiou).SeealsoR(Lewis)RedcarandClevelandBoroughCouncil[2008]EWCACiv 746,[2009]1WLR83,para66perPillLJwhoappearedtoprefertheapproachofRichardsJinGeorgiou disregardingsuchevidence.However,PillLJwentontostatethat[a]seriesofstatementsfromCouncil memberssayingthattheyhadopenmindswouldnotinevitablyconcludetheissue.Thisuseoftheword inevitablytendstosuggestthatwhilstsuchevidenceisnotconclusiveitmaybepersuasive. 139 InreMedicamentsandRelatedClassesofGoods(No2)[2001]1WLR700,para86perPhillipsMR. 140 InreMedicamentsandRelatedClassesofGoods(No2)[2001]1WLR700,para86perPhillipsMR. 141 InreMedicamentsandRelatedClassesofGoods(No2)[2001]1WLR700,para86perPhillipsMR.
favourandthejudgesabilitytocarryoutthatoathbyreasonoftheirtraining and experience. 142 However, the taking of the oath is not, by itself, a sufficientguaranteetoexcludealllegitimatedoubt. 143 Otherrelevantmatters 51 Thecourtshaveconsidered,aspartoftherelevantfactsknowntothefair mindedandinformedobserver,thefollowingmatters: (a) Training: In the context of administrative decisionmaking, some weight may be placed on the fact that the decision makers have received relevant training and have agreed to beboundbyacodeofconduct. 144 (b) Conflict rules: The fact that a solicitor would be precluded from acting for a party as a result of the Law Societys conflictruleswouldtendtoindicatethatthatsolicitorshould nothearthematter,althougheachcasewilldependonthe particularfactualcircumstances. 145 (c) Decisionmakers profession: The qualifications of the decisionmaker and that fact that they are a member of a professionmaybeafactorthattendstoindicatethelackof an appearance of bias 146 although this cannot, by itself, be decisive as decisions by senior members of the judiciary, a
142
Locabail(UK)LtdvBayfieldPropertiesLtd[2000]1QB451,CA,para21citingwithapprovalcommentsmade bytheConstitutionalCourtofSouthAfricainPresidentoftheRepublicofSouthAfricavSouthAfricanRugby FootballUnion1999(4)SA147,177. 143 DavidsonvScottishMinisters[2004]UKHL34,20051SC(HL)7,para18perLordBingham. 144 NationalAssemblyforWalesvCondron[2006]EWCACiv1573,[2007]LGR87para53perRichardsLJ(Training andagreementtobeboundbyaCodeofConductcitedasfactorsthattendedtoindicatethelackofappearance ofbias);SeealsoR(Georgiou)vLondonBoroughofEnfield[2004]EWHC799(Admin),[2004]LGR497,para34 perRichardsJ(Lackoftrainingaddedtoconcernaboutdecision). 145 Locabail(UK)LtdvBayfieldPropertiesLtd[2000]QB451,CA,para58. 146 R(ZoolifeInternationalLtd)vTheSecretaryofStateforEnvironment,FoodandRuralAffairs[2007]EWHC 2995(Admin),para81perSilberJ(Qualifiedvetwhowasamemberofahighlyrespectedprofession,whose membersaresubjecttostrictethicalandprofessionalstandardswouldsuggestthatshewouldactfairlyand honourably).
44
45 profession with the highest professional and ethical standards have, with a degree of regularity, been quashed onthegroundsofapparentbias. (d) Complaints:Theexistence,extentandnatureofcomplaints aboutaparticulardecisionarelikelytobeofsomerelevance toconsideringtheviewsofthefairmindedobserver.Whilst thefactthatanaggrievedpartycomplainedaboutadecision is unlikely to be of significant relevance, a number of complaintsbymembersofthepublicandpersonsconcerned islikelytocarryconsiderableweight. 147 (e) Ombudsmans reports: Conclusions as to the existence of bias by bodies such as the local government ombudsman, whilst not decisive, are likely to be given considerable weight. 148 (f) Previous or subsequent recusal: The fact that the decision maker has recused him or herself in relation to similar decisions may also provide significant evidence that the decision the individual did participate in is vitiated by apparentbias. 149 (g) Decisionmakersconductinlitigation:Acoronerwhohears an inquest and lodges detailed grounds of resistance in a judicial review resisting a challenge to his conduct of that
147
R(Gardner)vHarrogateBoroughCouncil[2008]EWHC2942(Admin),[2009]JPL873,para32perSullivanJ(A memberofthepublichadcomplainedtotheOmbudsmanandfellowcouncillorshadexpressedtheirconcerns. TherehadalsobeenacomplainttotheStandardsBoard).SeealsoR(Compton)vWiltshirePrimaryCareTrust [2009]EWHC1824(Admin),[2010]PTSR(CS)5,para93perCranstonJ(Viewsofseniorpoliticalleaderssuchas thelocalMPandCouncillorsgivensomeweight). 148 R(Gardner)vHarrogateBoroughCouncil[2008]EWHC2942(Admin),[2009]JPL873,para32perSullivanJ. 149 R(Gardner)vHarrogateBoroughCouncil[2008]EWHC2942(Admin),[2009]JPL873,para33perSullivanJ.

inquestwhichcommitshimtoaviewonadisputedissueof factcannothearthenewinquest. 150 Irrelevantmatters 52 Thequashingofadecisiononthegroundsofapparentbiasleadstodelayand increasedcosts.Itisthereforenotsufficientforapartytoshowapossibility of bias however fanciful. The possibility of bias must be real 151 otherwise valid decisions would be quashed which would undermine, rather than enhance, public confidence in the decisionmaking process. However, the inconvenience, costs and delay that would be caused if the decision in question was quashed are not relevant when applying the real possibility test. 152 Time 53 Thegreaterthepassageoftimebetweentheeventrelieduponasshowinga real possibility of bias and the case in which the objection is raised, the weaker,otherthingsbeingequal,theobjectionwillbe. 153 Applicationtoadvisors 54 The apparent bias of advisors to the decisionmaker is also capable of vitiating a decision. 154 In such circumstances, the court must ask itself whether the fairminded and informed observer would conclude, after
150
R(Pounder)vHMCoronerfortheNorthandSouthDistrictsofDurhamandDarlington[2010]EWHC328 (Admin),paras312,perBurnettJ. 151 DavidsonvScottishMinisters[2004]UKHL34,20051SC(HL)7,para49perLordHope. 152 AWGGroupLtdvMorrison[2006]EWCACiv6,[2006]1WLR1163,para6perMummeryLJ. 153 Locabail(UK)LtdvBayfieldPropertiesLtd[2000]1QB451,CA,para25.SeealsoManOWarStationLtdv AucklandCityCouncil[2002]UKPC28,[2003]1LRC598(Thefactthatthejudgehadnotspokentothewitness forover8yearssincehebecameajudgetendedtoindicatethattherewasnoappearanceofbias).Seealso HowellvMillais[2007]EWCACiv720,para26perClarkeMR. 154 RvGough[1993]AC646,HL,554and670(Magistratesclerks);R(Compton)vWiltshirePrimaryCareTrust [2009]EWHC1824(Admin),[2010]PTSR(CS)5(Consultantsappointedtoanalysetheconsultationresponses. CranstonJrejectedanargumentthattheprinciplesarticulatedinGoughwerelimitedtomagistratesclerks);R (PrimaryHealthInvestmentPropertiesLtd)vTheSecretaryofStateforHealthandothers[2009]EWHC519 (Admin)(Consultantsonvaluationofcurrentmarketrent);R(PersimmonHomesLtd)vValeofGlamorgan Council[2010]EWHC535(Admin)(Localauthorityofficersadviceinareportonplanningmatters).CfR(Zoolife InternationalLtd)vSecretaryofStateforEnvironment,FoodandRuralAffairs[2007]EWHC2995(Admin),para 79perSilberJ(Doubtexpressedastotheapplicabilityoftheappearanceofbiastesttoadvisors).
46
47 consideration of all the relevant circumstances, that the advisors participationinthedecisionmakingprocessgaverisetoarealpossibilitythat thedecisionwouldbeinfectedbysuchparticipation. 155 55 Inconsideringwhethertherewasarealpossibilitythattheapparentbiasof the advisors has infected the decisionmaker, factors that are likely to be relevant include the nature of the advice itself, the matter to which the advice pertains and the relationship between the advisor and the decision maker. 156 Consequencesofapparentbias 56 Asamatterofprinciple,afindingofapparentbiasshouldnormallyresultin the decision impugned being quashed regardless of whether there is any evidencethattheoutcomewouldhavebeendifferentbutfortheexistence of such bias. 157 However, where one member of a multiperson decision making body is found to be tainted by apparent bias this may not be sufficienttomakethedecisionunlawful. 158
155
RvGough[1993]AC646,HL,554and670perLordGoff.Thetestsetoutinthetexthasbeenmodifiedtotake intoaccounttheHouseofLordsmodificationofthetestinPortervMagill[2001]UKHL67,[2002]2AC357.Lord Goffreachedhisconclusionsafterconsideringtwoearlierauthoritiesconcerningappearanceofbiasrelatingtoa magistratesclerkwhoadvisedthemagistratesonpointsoflaw:RvSussexJustices,expMcCarthy[1924]1KB 256,DCandRvCamborneJustice,expPearce[1955]1QB41,DC. 156 R(Compton)vWiltshirePrimaryCareTrust[2009]EWHC1824(Admin),[2010]PTSR(CS)5,para91per CranstonJ.

157
R(AlHasan)vSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment[2005]UKHL13,[2005]1WLR688,paras4244per LordBrown.SeeCh29fordiscussionofdiscretionarygroundsforrefusalofrelief. 158 R(Berky)vNewportCityCouncil[2012]EWCACiv378,paras2930perCarnwathLJ,para46perMooreBickLJ doubtingdictatothecontraryinR(BovisHomesLtd)vNewForestDistrictCouncil[2002]EWHC483(Admin), paras1035perOuseleyJ.SeealsoInreMedicamentsandRelatedClassesofGoods(No2)[2001]1WLR700,CA, para99(CourtofAppealconcludedthatbecausethedisqualifiedtribunalmembermusthavediscussedthe matterwiththeothertwotribunalmemberstheywerealsodisqualifiedfromhearingthematter).CfR(Fraser)v NationalInstituteforHealthandClinicalExcellence[2009]EWHC452(Admin),(2009)107BMLR178,para110 perSimonJ(ChallengetoarecommendationofNICEonthebasisthatfourindividualsoutalargegroupwere taintedbyapparentbias.SimonJstated,obiter,thatthepublicinterestmightbesuchthatevenifthefour individualsweresotaintedthedecisionmaynotnecessarilybequashed.Itissuggestedthatthiscomment shouldbeinterpretedasreferencetorefusingtoquashintheexerciseoftheCourtsdiscretionratherthanan assertionthatthedecisioninquestionwouldnothavebeenunlawful,seeparasXXX).SeealsoASMShippingLtd vBruceHarris[2007]EWHC1513(Comm),TheTimes,6August2007,paras446perAndrewSmithJ.Seefurther, BAALtdvCompetitionCommission[2009]CAT35,[2009]CompAR240atparas182199andBAALtdv Competition[2010]EWCACiv1097,paras3236perMauriceKayLJ.
57
Participation is not limited to voting or discussion and, in certain circumstances, remaining with the other decisionmakers whilst they make theirmindupmaybesufficienttotaintthedecision. 159
Recusalprocedure 58 TheCourtofAppealhasgiventhefollowingguidanceonappearanceofbias inthejudicialcontext: (a) ifapartybecomesawareofanymatterthattheythinkmaygiverise totheappearanceofbias,thisshouldberaisedinformally,ifpossible, with the judge, for example, by letter, making the complaint and invitingtherecusal; 160 (b) if the judge considers the objection as being more than tenuous or frivolous, the matter should be transferred, if possible, to another judge to avoid the risk of a complaint of bias. This can be done notwithstanding that the judge in question totally denies the complaint; 161 (c) if a transfer is not feasible, the recusal application should be consideredbyanotherjudgeifpossible; 162 (d) Priortosuchanapplication,thejudgeagainstwhomtheapplicationis madeshouldseektoclarifywhatinterestitisallegedgivesrisetothe conflictsothatheorshecanmakefulldisclosuretotheparties.This disclosure should be recorded so that there is no controversy as to thenatureofthedisclosure. 163
159
SeeRvSecretaryofStatefortheEnvironment,expKirkstallValleyCampaignLtd[1996]3AllER304,HC,328 9perSedleyJ. 160 ElFarargyvElFarargy[2007]EWCACiv1149,[2007]3FCR711,para32perWardLJ. 161 ElFarargyvElFarargy[2007]EWCACiv1149,[2007]3FCR711,para32perWardLJ;JonesvDASLegal ExpensesInsuranceCoLtd[2003]EWCACiv1071,[2004]IRLR218,para35(i). 162 ElFarargyvElFarargy[2007]EWCACiv1149,[2007]3FCR711,para32perWardLJ. 163 JonesvDASLegalExpensesInsuranceCoLtd[2003]EWCACiv1071,[2004]IRLR218,para35(ii)(iv).
48
49 59 Afailuretoobjectwhenapartybecomesawareofmattersthatgiveriseto anappearanceofbiasmayleadtotherighttocomplainbeingwaived. 164 Lawyersdutytoadviseonapparentbias 60 If an apparent bias issue arises, the partys lawyer must explain the implicationsofthesituationincludingtheimplicationsofanadjournment. 165 The partys lawyer should advise their client about the judicial oath and explain that judges are trained in considering cases objectively and disregarding any personal views that they may hold. 166 However, lawyers should not express a view on the integrity of a particular judge or seek to influencethedecisiontakenbytheclient. 167 Matterswhichmaygiverisetotheexistenceofapparentbias 61 The Court of Appeal has cautioned against excessive citation of authority when considering the essentially factual question of whether a fairminded and informed observer would think that, considering the relevant circumstances, there was a real possibility that the decisionmaker was biased because there is a danger that such citation may cloud rather than clarifyperception. 168 Whilstthiscautionarynotemustnotbeforgottenitis still of benefit to consider previous case law in relation to various matters, situationsorrelationshipsthathaveorhavenotgiverisetotheappearance ofbias. Backgroundandcharacteristicsofthedecisionmaker
164
SeeparasXXX.SeeAdamsonvSwanseaUniversity[2010]UKEAT0486_09_2302(EATfoundwaiverasaresult ofdisclosureinaccordancewiththeCourtofAppealsguidanceinJonesvDASLegalExpensesInsuranceCoLtd [2003]EWCACiv1071,[2004]IRLR218). 165 SmithvKvaernerCementationFoundationsLtd[2006]EWCACiv242,[2007]1WLR370,paras3337. 166 SmithvKvaernerCementationFoundationsLtd[2006]EWCACiv242,[2007]1WLR370,paras3337. 167 SmithvKvaernerCementationFoundationsLtd[2006]EWCACiv242,[2007]1WLR370,paras3337. 168 R(PD)vWestMidlandsandNorthWestMentalHealthReviewTribunal[2004]EWCACiv311,[2004]1MHLR 311,paras89.CfLawalvNorthernSpiritLtd[2003]UKHL35,[2004]1AllER187,para15perLordSteynwho suggestedthattheconsiderationofanalogoussituationsmayarguablythrowlightontheproblem.
62
TheCourtofAppealinLocabailsuggestedthat,whilsteverythingwilldepend on the facts, it was unlikely that an objection could be based on religion, ethnic or national origin, gender, age, class, means or sexual orientation of the decisionmaker. 169 Ordinarily, no objection could be based on the decisionmakerssocialoreducationalorserviceoremploymentbackground or history or that of any member of their family. 170 Further the fact that a decisionmaker has a particular disability does not, by itself, prevent them fromconsideringmattersrelatingtosuchadisability. 171
Membershipoforganisations 63 Without more, no objection to a decisionmaker can be based on previous political associations or membership of social or sporting or charitable bodies 172 orMasonicassociations. 173 Thefactthatajudgewasamemberof the International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists and received its journal which sometimes contained extreme proIsraeli views did not preclude her from considering Palestinian asylum claims as she had at no pointendorsedsuchviewsoridentifiedherselfwiththem. 174 Therewas no
169
Locabail(UK)LtdvBayfieldPropertiesLtd[2000]1QB451,CA,para25.TheCourtofAppealinLocabailwas applyingtherealdangertestinRvGough[1993]AC646,HL,however,itislikelythattheseobservationsapply withequalforcenotwithstandingthefactthatthecurrenttestrequiresconsiderationofwhetherafairminded andinformedobserverwouldconcludethattherewasarealpossibilityofbias.SeealsoHelowvSecretaryof StatefortheHomeDepartment[2008]UKHL62,[2008]1WLR2416,para13perLordRodger(LadyCosgrove,a prominentJewishjudgedismissedanapplicationforreviewbroughtbyaPalestinianasylumseeker.Therewas nosuggestionwasmadethatthemerefactthatLadyCosgrovewasJewishmeantthattherewasanappearance ofbias). 170 Locabail(UK)LtdvBayfieldPropertiesLtd[2000]1QB451,CA,para25. 171 SeeBakervQuantumClothingGroup[2009]EWCACiv566,paras3334perJacobLJ(SedleyLJsmildtinnitus didnotpreventhimfromhearinganappealrelatingtonoiseinduceddeafnessinthetextileindustry). 172 Locabail(UK)LtdvBayfieldPropertiesLtd[2000]1QB451,CA,para25.Ofcourse,thesituationmaybe differentifthesportingorcharitableorganisationisapartytothehearing,seeegegRvBowStreetMetropolitan StipendiaryMagistrateexpPinochetUgarte(No2)[2000]1AC119,HL(AmnestyInternationalintervenedin casebeforeLordHoffmannwhowasadirectorofanorganizationcloselyassociatedwithAmnestyInternational. SeeparasXXXforadiscussionofthisjudgement). 173 Locabail(UK)LtdvBayfieldPropertiesLtd[2000]1QB451,CA,para25.SeealsoR(PortRegisSchoolLimited) vNorthDorsetDistrictCouncil[2006]EWHC742(Admin)(Twocouncillorswhowerefreemasonsconsidereda planningapplicationwhichbenefitedaMasoniclodge.NewmanJconcludedthattherewasnoappearanceof bias.Theresultmayhavebeendifferentifthecouncillorshadbeenmembersoftheparticularlodgeinquestion thatbenefitedfromtheplanningapplication). 174 HelowvSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment[2008]UKHL62,[2008]1WLR2416.Inadditiontothe lackofassociationwiththeviewstheHouseofLordsplacedweightonthefactthat,shehadswornajudicialoath andbyvirtueoftheofficeforwhichshehasbeenselected,thejudgewaslikelytobeintelligent.
50
51 requirementforhertoactivelydisassociateherselfwiththeviewscontained inajournalthatshereceived. 175 64 In the local authority context, membership of various internal council committees is unlikely to give rise to the appearance of bias 176 although membership of external bodies which have supported a particular proposal maygiverisetotheappearanceofbias. 177 Personalrelationshipwithoneoftheparties 65 Ifajudgehasapersonalfriendship,familyrelationshiporcloseacquaintance witheitherofthepartiesoranymemberofthepublicinvolvedinthecase suchasawitness,thisislikelytogiverisktoafindingofapparentbias. 178 The factthatawitnesswhoisknowntothejudgestepsdowndoesnotprevent theappearanceofbiasarising. 179 66 Similarly, a councillor who shared transport with a fellow councillor of the samepoliticalgrouptoandfromcouncilmeetingsandsawhersociallyona relatively frequent basis should not have considered her application for
175
HelowvSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment[2008]UKHL62,[2008]1WLR2416,para55perLord Mance. 176 R(Cummins)vLondonBoroughofCamden[2001]EWHC1116(Admin),paras260263perOuseleyJ (MembershipofLeisureandCommunityServicersCommitteewhowereeffectivelypromotingadevelopmenton landownedbytheCouncildidnotprecludeparticipationinthedecisionwhetherornottograntplanning permission).CfGeorgiouvEnfieldLondonBoroughCouncil[2004]EWHC799(Admin),[2004]LGR497,paras28 34,39perRichardsJ(AcouncillorwasamemberoftheConservationAdvisoryCommittee,anadvisorybodythat hadexpressedunqualifiedsupportforaproposal.Thecouncillorsubsequentlyparticipatedinthedecisionto grantplanningpermissiontothatproposal.RichardsJconcludedthatthedualmembershipdidgiverisetothe appearanceofbias).TheCourtofAppealinR(Lewis)vRedcarandClevelandBoroughCouncil[2008]EWCACiv 746,[2009]1WLR83concludedthattherewasnobasisforsuggestingthatamemberoftheExecutivewho signedtheheadsofagreementinrelationtoaplanningapplicationcouldnotalsobeamemberoftheplanning committee.TheCourtofAppealsapproachinLewisisclosertothatofOuseleyJinCumminsthatRichardsJin Georgiouhowever,theCourtofAppealrefusedtheAppellantsinvitationtooverruleGeorgiou. 177 BovisHomesLtdvNewForestDistrictCouncil[2002]EWHC483(Admin)(Councilloronplanningcommittee wasalsoamemberoftheNewForestCommittee(NFC),anonstatutorybodywhichdrewitsmembershipfrom variouscouncils,theForestryCommissionandtheCountrysideAgency.TheNFChadexpressedaviewonthe mattertobeconsideredbythecommitteeandthis,thecourtconcluded,didgiverisetoanappearanceofbias). 178 Locabail(UK)LtdvBayfieldPropertiesLtd[2000]1QB451,CA,para25. 179 AWGGroupvMorrison[2006]EWCACiv6,[2006]1WLR1163,para2628perMummeryLJ.
planningpermissionnotwithstandingthefactthattheirrelationshipwasnot sufficientlyclosetobedescribedasafriendship. 180 Professionalrelationshipwithoneoftheparties 67 Apastprofessionalrelationshipbetweenadecisionmakerandawitnessor partyisunlikelytogiverisetotheappearanceofbiasalthoughitwilldepend on the particular facts of the case and the closeness of relationship. 181 Equally, a professional relationship between the decisionmakers partner and one of the parties is unlikely to give rise to the appearance of bias. 182 However, an ongoing professional relationship between the decisionmaker andapartymaywellgiverisetotheappearanceofbias. 183 68 Amedicalmemberof adisabilityappealtribunalwhohad,foranumberof years, provided reports on behalf of the Benefits Agency as an examining medical practitioner, was able to consider appeals against the Benefits Agencysrefusaltoawardbenefitsbecausetherewasnobasisforsuggesting that she would not fairly evaluate reports by other examining medical practitioners. 184 The fairminded observer would appreciate that her professional detachment and her ability to exercise medical judgement on medicalissueslayattheheartofherrelationshipwiththeBenefitsAgency.
180
R(Gardner)vHarrogateBC[2008]EWHC2942(Admin),[2009]JPL873.SeealsoR(Compton)vWiltshire PrimaryCareTrust[2009]EWHC1824(Admin),[2010]PTSR(CS)5(Personalrelationshipbetweendecision makerandadvisordidnotgiverisetoapparentbiasonthefactsofthecase). 181 FlahertyvNationalGreyhoundRacingClubLtd[2005]EWCACiv1117,TheTimes,5October2005,paras4651 (Inquisitorialdisciplinaryhearingintoallegationsofgreyhounddoping).SeealsoManOWarStationLtdv AucklandCityCouncil[2002]UKPC28,[2003]1LRC598(Judgehadaprofessionalacquaintancewithoneofthe partysprincipalwitnessesalthoughhehadnotspokentohimsincehebecameajudgesome8yearspriortothe appealinquestion.ThePrivyCouncilconcludedthatthefactsdidnotgiverisetoanappearanceofbias).Seealso Locabail(UK)LtdvBayfieldPropertiesLtd[2000]1QB451,CA(InoneofthefivejoinedcasesanIndustrial Tribunalchairhadsome30yearsagoworkedfortheInlandRevenue,oneofthepartiestothecase.TheCourtof Appealconcludedthatitwasfancifultosuggestsuchapreviousemploymentsolongagowouldgiverisetothe appearanceofbias). 182 JonesvDASLegalExpensesInsuranceCoLtd[2003]EWCACiv1071,[2004]IRLR218(Thehusbandofan EmploymentTribunalschairhadoccasionallybeeninstructedbyoneoftheparties.Thisdidnotgiverisetoan appearanceofbias). 183 SmithvKvaernerCementationFoundationsLtd[2006]EWCACiv242,[2007]1WLR370,paras1516and20 21(Parttimejudgehadactedandcontinuedtoactforcompaniesinthesamegroupasoneoftheparties.Itwas concededthat,absentwaiver,thejudgeshouldhaverecusedhimself). 184 GilliesvSecretaryofStateforWorkandPensions[2006]UKHL2,[2006]1WLR781.SeealsoR(PD)vWest MidlandsandNorthWestMentalHealthReviewTribunal[2004]EWCACiv311,[2004]1MHLR311(Noapparent biasarisingfromthefactthatamemberofaMentalHealthReviewTribunalwasemployedasaconsultantby theMentalHealthTrustresponsiblefortheareainwhichthepatientinquestionwasdetained).
52
53 69 However, the fact that a lay member of a tribunal is seeking or has sought employment with a firm, a director of which is one of the principle expert witnessesinacase,wassufficienttogiverisetotheappearanceofbias. 185 Personalrelationshipwithoneofthepartieslawyers 70 Apersonalrelationshipbetweenthedecisionmakerandoneoftheparties lawyersisunlikelytogiverisetoanappearance ofbias.Barristersregularly appear in front of colleagues or former colleagues, some of whom will be sufficiently close to be regarded as friends, however this is not generally objectionable. 186 Professionalrelationshipwithoneofthepartyslawyers 71 ThefactthatthedecisionmakerisamemberofthesameInn,circuit,local Law Society or Chambers as one of the advocates is not likely, by itself, to give rise to an appearance of bias. 187 The fact that the decisionmaker has workedforoneofthepartiesalongtimeagodoesnot,byitself,giveriseto theappearanceofbias. 188 Equally,thefactthatadecisionmakerhad,when working as a solicitor, occasionally instructed one of the counsel appearing before him does not give rise to an appearance of bias. 189 A tenuous
185
InReMedicamentsandRelatedClassesofGoods(No2)[2001]1WLR700,CA.SeealsoHowellvMillais[2007] EWCACiv720(Thejudge,PeterSmithJ,hadbeenindiscussionstoworkasaconsultantforasolicitorsfirm. Thesediscussionshadbrokendownacrimoniously.Thesolicitorsfirmwasrepresentingtrusteesandapartnerof thefirmwasapartytothelitigationasatrusteeofthesettlements.TheCourtofAppealconcludedthat,insuch circumstances,PeterSmithJshouldhaverecusedhimself). 186 Locabail(UK)LtdvBayfieldPropertiesLtd[2000]1QB451,CA,para25. 187 Locabail(UK)LtdvBayfieldPropertiesLtd[2000]1QB451,CA,para25.SeealsoTaylorvLawrence[2002] EWCACiv90,[2003]QB528,paras613andLakerAirwaysIncvFLSAerospaceLtd[2000]1WLR113,HC(No appearanceofbiaswhenarbitratorwasabarristerfromthesamesetofchambersasoneofthecounsel instructedinthearbitration).Thepositionmaybedifferentifthedecisioninquestionmighthaveasignificant impactonchambersfinancesbecause,forexample,counselisactingunderaCFAandthusthedecisionmakers financialcontributionstochambers,seeSmithvKvaernerCementationFoundationsLtd[2006]EWCACiv242, [2007]1WLR370,paras1719. 188 Locabail(UK)LtdvBayfieldPropertiesLtd[2000]1QB451,CA(InoneofthefivejoinedcasestheIndustrial TribunalChairmanhadworkedfortheInlandRevenue,oneofthepartiestothecase,30yearspreviously).
189
SeeGWilliamsvCaterLinkLtd[2009]UKEAT0393_08_2307,para20perMcMullenJ(TheEATindicatedthat iftheprofessionalrelationshipwasextensive,lengthy,recentand/orongoingdifferentconsiderationsmight apply).
connectionbetweenadecisionmakerandafirmofsolicitorsrepresentinga partyalsodoesnotgiverisetotheappearanceofbias. 190 72 However, an appearance of bias will arise if a lawyer appearing before a tribunal has, in the past, sat with one or more of the lay members of that tribunalinajudicialcapacity. 191 Insuchcircumstances,thereisariskthatthe laymembersofthetribunalmaybesubconsciouslybiasedinfavourofthat counsels submissions given the relationship of trust and confidence that is likelytohavedevelopedbetweenthelaymemberandthecounsel. 192 Hostilitytowardsapartyorawitness 73 Ifajudgeishostiletowardsoneofthepartiesoranadministrativedecision makerishostiletosomeoneinvolvedinthedecisionthisisalsolikelytobe sufficient to disqualify them from considering the matter. 193 This is particularlytrueifthecredibilityofthatindividualisimportant. 194 74 Evidenceofsuchhostilityoftenarisesfromcommentsmadebythedecision maker prior to, or during, the hearing or in the decision Examples of comments or behaviour that have given rise to the appearance of bias include: (a) Coroner describing members of victims families as unhinged and mentallyunwell; 195 (b) raciallyoffensivejokesaboutaSheikhinmatrimonialproceedings. 196
190
SeeBakervQuantumClothingGroup[2009]EWCACiv566(IndirectlinkbetweenSedleyLJandsolicitorsfora partythroughconnectionwiththeBritishTinnitusAssociation). 191 LawalvNorthernSpiritLtd[2003]UKHL35,[2004]1AllER187(AppearancebeforetheEmploymentAppeal TribunalbycounselwhosatasaparttimejudgeintheEmploymentAppealTribunal). 192 LawalvNorthernSpiritLtd[2003]UKHL35,[2004]1AllER187,para21. 193 Locabail(UK)LtdvBayfieldPropertiesLtd[2000]1QB451,CA,para25. 194 Locabail(UK)LtdvBayfieldPropertiesLtd[2000]1QB451,CA,para25. 195 RvInnerWestLondonCoroner,expDallaglio[1994]4AllER138,CA. 196 ElFarargyvElFarargy[2007]EWCACiv1149,[2007]3FCR711.
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55 75 Examplesofcommentsorbehaviourwhichdidnotgiverisetotheappearanceof biasinclude: (a) unusually robust and emotive language in a judgment finding that a bankwasguiltyofunfairdismissal; 197 (b) (c) (d) aggressivequestioningbytribunalmembers; 198 avituperativeexchangebetweenatribunalchairmanandcounsel; 199 the suggestion by the chairman of the Parole Board that he was sceptical that that the prisoner would be honest with his supervisors. 200 Indirectfinancialinterests 76 If the decisionmaker has a direct financial interest this gives rise to the presumed bias, and absent waiver, the decisionmaker is disqualified. If, however, the decisionmakers financial interest is indirect such an interest mustbeconsideredapplyingthetestforapparentbias. 201 Indirectfinancial interests are unlikely to give rise to the appearance of bias unless they are particularlysignificant. 202 Inappropriatecontactwithparties 77 Decisionmakers, particularly those acting in a judicial capacity, should take caretoavoidinappropriatecontactwithoneofthepartiesintheabsenceof the other party. Conversations between a judge and counsel for one of the
197 198
RoyalBankofScotlandGroupPlcvWilson[2009]UKEAT0363_08_2406. DochertyvStrathkelvinDistrictCouncil1994SC395,EAT. 199 EgertonvRentokillInitialManagementServicesLtd(EAT/141/99,22January1999) 200 R(Bates)vParoleBoard[2008]EWHC2653(Admin). 201 SeeRvSecretaryofStatefortheEnvironment,expKirkstallValley[1996]3AllER304,HC,334335perSedley J. 202 SeeegJonesvDASLegalExpensesInsuranceCoLtd[2003]EWCACiv1071,[2004]IRLR218(Husbandof tribunalchairreceivedsomeworkfromoneoftheparties.Noappearanceofbias);RvHoldernessBorough Council,expJamesRobertDevelopmentsLtd[1993]1PLR108,CA,120121perButlerSlossLJ,1112perSimon BrownLJ(Councillorwhowasabuilderentitledtositonplanningcommitteeconsideringapplicationsbyrival builders.Noappearanceofbias).SeealsoRvBristolBettingandGamingLicensingCommittee,expOCallaghan (oneoftheLocabailappeals)[2000]1QB451,CA(Judgeheldsharesandwasanonexecutivedirectorinafamily companywhowerelandlordstoabookmaker.Therenewalofthebookmakerslicencewasbeingchallengedby wayofjudicialreview.Noapparentbiasgiventhenominalandindirectinterest).
parties, in the absence of the other party, are likely to give rise to the appearanceofbiasparticularlyiftheotherpartyisnotlegallyrepresented. 203 78 OntheothersideofthelineisThompsonvCollins 204 wheretheallegationof apparentbiasarosefromashorttelephoneconversationbetweenoneofthe partiessolicitorsandthejudgeconcerningcasemanagement.Thecontents of the conversation were referred to the other side. In such circumstances, the Court of Appeal concluded that there was no basis for suggesting that therewasanappearanceofbias. 205 PrejudicialPublicity 79 If the decisionmaker sees prejudicial information in the media that was inadmissible before them, this may give rise to the appearance of bias although it will depend on the circumstances including the nature of the informationandtheexpertiseofthedecisionmakingbody. 206 Judicialandquasijudicialdecisionmakers:Priorinvolvementinthecase 80 Prior consideration of a case does not, by itself, disqualify a judge from consideringthematteratalaterstage. 207 Somethingmoreisrequired. 208 If, forexample,thejudgehasreachedastrongviewastothecredibilityofone
203
SeeGillvHumanwareEuropeLimited[2009]UKEAT0312_08_2702,paras2127(EmploymentTribunalchair hadtwoconversationswiththeRespondentscounselintheabsenceoftheClaimantwhowasunrepresented. OneconversationrelatedtotheChairsviewsastothecentralityofaparticularwitness.Thesecondconversation concernedtheRespondentscounselseekingtoprovideanexplanationforsomeoftheevidencegivenbya Respondentswitness.TheEATconcludedthateachincidentbyitselfwassufficienttogiverisetothe appearanceofbias). 204 [2009]EWCACiv525. 205 Ibidatparas3237.WardLJdescribedtheconversationasregrettableandunfortunatebutconcluded,in lightofthecircumstancesofthecase,thattheallegationofapparentbiaswasfranklynonsense. 206 SeeR(Mahfouz)vProfessionalConductCommitteeoftheGeneralMedicalCouncil[2004]EWCACiv233,80 BMLR113(CourtofAppealrejectedanapparentbiasargumentarisingoutoffactthatsomemembersofthe disciplinarytribunalhadseennewspaperarticlesthatreferredtopreviousmisconductbythedoctora considerabletimeago). 207 SeeAmecCapitalProjectsLtdvWhitefriarsCityEstatesLtd[2004]EWCACiv1418,[2005]1AllER723,para20 perDysonLJ.SenguptavHolmes[2002]EWCACiv1104,TheTimes,19August2002,paras3536perLawsLJ.See alsoSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartmentvAF(No2)[2008]EWCACiv117,[2008]1WLR2528(Judge whopreviouslyconsideredwhethertherewassufficientevidencetojustifyacontrolorderwasabletoconsidera furtherapplicationcontestingthecontrolorder). 208 AmecCapitalProjectsLtdvWhitefriarsCityEstatesLtd[2004]EWCACiv1418,[2005]1AllER723,para20per DysonLJ.
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57 ofthepartiesorkeywitnessesthisislikelytobesufficienttodisqualifythe judgefromreconsideringthematter. 209 81 ThefactthataLordJusticerefusedpermissiontoappealonthepapersdoes not, without more, give rise to the existence of apparent bias preventing them from considering the substantive appeal. 210 However, if the judge, in refusing permission, expresses themselves in an intemperate manner this may be sufficient to disqualify them. 211 A similar approach, it is suggested, would apply to judges in the Administrative Court who have refused permissiontoapplyforjudicialreviewonthepapers. 212 82 Whilstpriorjudicialinvolvementisusuallyunlikelytobeobjectionable,ifthe judicial decisionmaker has had previous involvement in the case in a differentcapacitythisislikelytobeproblematicandmaywellgiverisetothe appearanceofbias.Thus,agovernor,whowaspresentwhenanorderfora squat search of all prisoners was made by a different governor, should not have heard a subsequent disciplinary hearing where one of the issues was the legality of the order because, by his presence, he gave the order tacit assent and endorsement. 213 The governors decision that the order was lawfulwasthereforequashedonthegroundsofapparentbias. 83 Thepriorinvolvementindecisionsbyadministrativedecisionmakersisdealt withbelowinthecontextofpredetermination.
209
SeeegEalingLondonBoroughCouncilvJan[2002]EWCACiv329(CourtofAppealdecidedthemattershould notberemittedtothesamejudgeforaretrialbecausehesaidoftherespondentatapreliminaryhearingthathe couldnottrusthimfurtherthanhecouldthrowhim). 210 SeeSenguptavHolmes[2002]EWCACiv1104,TheTimes,19August2002;SeealsoDrDwrCymru CyfyngedigvAlbionWater[2008]EWCACiv97(CourtofAppealconcludedthatRichardsLJcouldsit notwithstandingthefactthatwhenherefusedpermissiononthepapershegaveafullyreasonedjudgement refusingpermissionwhichindicatedthathehadalreadyconsideredtheissueswithagreatdealofcareand attention). 211 SeeSenguptavHolmes[2002]EWCACiv1104,TheTimes,19August2002,para34perLawsLJ. 212 SeeSenguptavHolmes[2002]EWCACiv1104,TheTimes,19August2002,para3perLawsLJ. 213 SeeR(AlHasan)vSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment[2005]UKHL13,[2005]1WLR688,para39per LordBrown.
Judicialandquasijudicialdecisionmakers:Priorexpressionofviews 84 TheCourtofAppealinLocabailsuggestedthat,whilsteverythingwilldepend on the facts, a previous expression of views either in judicial decisions or extracurricular utterances (whether in textbooks, lectures, speeches, articles, interviews, Law Commission reports or responses to consultation papers) would not give rise to the existence of apparent bias unless the expressionofsuchviewsisinextremeandunbalancedterms. 214 InLocabail itself,oneofthecasesconcernedamemberoftheBarandparttimejudge whoheardapersonalinjuryclaimandwhohadwrittenvariousproclaimant articles in the personal injury field. The Court of Appeal concluded that the toneandtrenchantnatureofthecommentsinthesearticleswassufficientto giverisetotheappearanceofbias. 215 85 The mere fact that a judge has expressed a previous judicial opinion on a matter is not sufficient to establish apparent bias because judges can be expected,uponhearingfreshargumentappliedtonewfactsinalatercase, to revise an opinion expressed in an earlier case. 216 Equally, the fact that a judgehas,ascounsel,previouslygivenanopiniononapointoflawisunlikely tobesufficienttoestablishtheexistenceofapparentbias. 217 86 Whilst it is permissible for a judge to give an indication of his preliminary views prior to hearing one partys evidence, he must not close his mind to suchevidenceorgivetheappearancethathehasclosedhismind. 218
214
Locabail(UK)LtdvBayfieldPropertiesLtd[2000]1QB451,CA,para25.SeealsoR(AlHasan)vSecretaryof StatefortheHomeDepartment[2005]UKHL13,[2005]1WLR688,paras910perLordRodger. 215 Locabail(UK)LtdvBayfieldPropertiesLtd[2000]1QB451,CA,paras7189.SeealsoPeninsulaBusiness ServicesLtdvRees[2009]UKEAT0333_08_2307(ParttimeEmploymentJudgewasamemberofasmallfirmof solicitorsthathadplacedanadvertisementdenigratingemploymentlawconsultants.TheAppellantwasalarge employmentconsultant.Decisionsetasidebecauseoftheappearanceofbias). 216 SeeDavidsonvScottishMinisters[2004]UKHL34,20051SC(HL)7,para10perLordBingham.SeealsoR(Al Hasan)vSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment[2005]UKHL13,[2005]1WLR688,para10perLord Rodgerwhereexamplesofcaseswherejudgeshaveoverruledtheirownpreviousdecisionsaregiven. 217 SeeKartinyerivCommonwealthofAustralia(1998)156ALR300,AusHC,para24. 218 SeeAmjadandothersvSteadmanByrnePracticeNote[2007]EWCACiv625,[2007]1WLR2484,para1014 (Thejudgesstatementthathecouldnotsee,inlightoftheclaimantsevidencehowthedefendantcouldwin togetherwithacriticismbythejudgeofthedefendant,apoliceofficer,whohadnotyetgivenevidencebutwho, accordingtothejudge,demonstratedrigidthinkingtypicalofmembersofthepoliceforcedidgiverisetothe appearanceofbias).
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59 87 Where an auditor called a press conference to inform the public of his provisional conclusions in his investigation into alleged misconduct by councillors, the expression of such provisional conclusions did not demonstratetheappearanceofbias. 219 88 Thepriorexpressionofviewsbyadministrativedecisionmakersisdealtwith belowinthecontextofpredetermination. 220 Judicialandquasijudicialdecisionmakers:Previouspoliticalinvolvement 89 The European Court of Human Rights has held that where a judge has exercisedapriorlegislative,executiveoradvisoryfunctioninrespectofthe subjectmatter or legalissues before him, theyshould not hear such a case because they are not sufficiently impartial. 221 Applying this to the domestic law context, the mere fact that a judge had previously been a Member of Parliament or a Minister, is not sufficient, by itself, to give rise to the appearance of bias if the judge is subsequently asked to rule on legislation that was enacted during his or her time in Parliament or Government. 222 Whatisrequiredisanexusbetweentheissuebeforethecourtandtherole of the judge while they were a Minster or Member of Parliament. 223 The appearance of bias is likely to arise where a judge is called upon to rule judiciallyontheeffectoflegislationwhichheorshehasdraftedorpromoted
SeePortervMagill[2001]UKHL67,[2002]2AC357.TheHouseofLords,whenreachingthisconclusion,took intoaccountthefactthattheauditorhademphasisedthathisfindingswereprovisionalandthatapublic statementwasappropriateinlightofthelevelofpublicinterest.Further,theauditorssubsequentconductalso indicatedthathewasactingproperly. 220 SeeparasXXX. 221 SeePablaKyvFinland(2004)42EHRR34,para34.ThisparagraphhasbeencitedwithapprovalbytheHouse ofLordsinR(AlHasan)vSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment[2005]UKHL12,[2005]1WLR688,paras 3536perLordBrown.SeealsoProcolavLuxembourg(1995)12EHRR193andMcGonnellvUnitedKingdom (2000)30EHRR289. 222 SeeR(Ewing)vSecretaryofStateforJustice[2008]EWHC3416(Admin),paras3031perBeatsonJ. 223 See R (Ewing) v Secretary of State for Justice [2008] EWHC 3416 (Admin), para 32 per Beatson J. See also PiersackvBelgium(1982)5EHRR169.
219
during the parliamentary process. 224 Equally, if a judge has, in the past, expressed a view on an issue that arises in a case before them in their previous ministerial or parliamentary capacity this may well be sufficient to giverisetotheappearanceofbiasprovidedthatthereisasufficientlyclose relationshipbetweenthepreviouswordsorconductandtheissuebeforethe Courtortribunal. 225 E.Predeterminationinadministrativedecisionmaking Introduction 90 Whilst it is imperative that judges are both impartial and perceived to be impartial, administrative decisionmakers, particularly those who have been democratically elected, are in a different position. Administrative decision makers must not have a personal or pecuniary interest in the matter being considered however, in contrast to judges, they are permitted to have expressedstrongviewsinrelationtomattersthattheyaretoconsiderandbe predisposed, sometimes strongly, in favour of, or against, a particular decision.Thedecisionmakingstructure,thenatureofthefunctionsandthe democratic political accountability of some administrative decisionmakers permitpredispositiontowardsaparticulardecision. 91 Anadministrativedecisionmakerspredispositionmayariseforanumberof reasons.Itmayariseasaresultofpoliciesadoptedbythedecisionmakers politicalpartyorgovernment. 226 However,predispositionisnotlimitedtothe
SeeDavidsonvScottishMinisters[2004]UKHL34,20051SC(HL)7,para17perLordBingham.LordBingham thoughtthattherewasariskthatthejudgemightsubconsciouslystrivetoavoidreachingaconclusionthat wouldunderminetheassurancesthathehadgiventoParliament. 225 See Davidson v Scottish Ministers [2004] UKHL 34, 2005 1 SC (HL) 7, para 53 per Lord Hope. Cf Panton v Minister of Finance [2001] UKPC 33 (President of the Court of Appeal of Jamaica heard a case where a party alleged that certain provisions of the Finance Act 1992 were unconstitutional. The President of the Court of Appealhad,atthetimetheFinanceAct1992waspassed,beentheAttorneyGeneralandhadcertifiedthatthe Actwasconstitutional.Notwithstandingthis,thePrivyCouncilconcludedthatthecircumstancesdidnotgiverise toanappearanceofbiasbecausetherewasnoevidencethat,whenhewasAttorneyGeneral,hehadappliedhis mindtotheissueoftheconstitutionalityofthevarioussectionsinissue). 226 SeeegR(Lewis)vRedcarandClevelandBoroughCouncil[2008]EWCACiv746,[2009]1WLR83.
224
60
61 applicationofpartyorgovernmentpolicy.Predispositioncanalsoariseasa result of strongly held personal views. For example, a councillor may be stronglyopposed,asaresultofhispersonalmoralviews,tosexshops. 227 92 Whilstadministrativedecisionmakersarepermittedtobepredisposedforor againstaparticulardecision,whatisnotpermittedispredeterminationofthe decisioninquestioninthesensethatthedecisionmakerhasmadeuphisor hermindearlyorrefusedtoconsiderthematteronitsmerits.Itisthecourts role to draw the line between legitimate predisposition and illegitimate predetermination. Thecommonlawtesttobeapplied 93 There have been two conflicting lines of judicial authority on the correct approach to allegations that administrative decisionmakers have predetermineddecisions. 228 Onelineofauthoritysuggestedthatthetestto be applied is whether the administrative decisionmaker did in fact predeterminetheissuebecauseoftheadoptionofaninflexiblepolicyorby effectivesurrenderofthebodysindependentjudgment. 229 Asecondlineof authority suggested that the test was whether there was an appearance of predetermination. Under this line of authority the question that the court needed to consider was whether a fairminded and informed observer, havingbeenappraisedofalltherelevantfacts,wouldhaveconsideredthat therewasarealpossibilityofpredetermination. 230
227
ThisexampleistakenfromtheRvChesterfieldBoroughCouncil,expDarkerEnterprisesLtd[1992]COD466, HC. 228 R(Lewis)vRedcarandClevelandBoroughCouncil[2008]EWCACiv746,[2009]1WLR83,para93perRixLJ. 229 SeeRvSecretaryofStatefortheEnvironment,expKirkstallValleyCampaignLtd[1996]3AllER304,HC,319 perSedleyJ;R(Cummins)vLondonBoroughofCamden[2001]EWHC1116(Admin);BovisHomesvNewForest DistrictCouncil[2002]EWHC483(Admin);R(IslandFarmDevelopmentLtd)vBridgendCountyBoroughCouncil [2006]EWHC2189(Admin),[2007]LGR60,paras3032perCollinsJ(Planningapplicationconsidered,interalia, bycouncillorwhohadbeenamemberofapressuregroupopposingthedevelopment). 230 SeeR(ReadingBoroughCouncil)expQuietlynnLtd[1986]85LGR387;GeorgiouvEnfieldLondonBorough Council[2004]EWHC799(Admin),[2004]LGR497,paras3031perRichardsJ(Applicationforlistedbuilding consentandplanningpermission.OneofmembersofplanningcommitteewasalsoamemberoftheCouncils conservationadvisorygroupwhichhadexpressedunqualifiedsupportfortheproposals.Thedecisionwas quashed);PortervMagill[2001]UKHL67,[2002]2AC357(Auditorpublishedpreliminaryfindings.Thedecision makerinPorterwasmorequasijudicialthatadministrativeinnature);NationalAssemblyforWalesvCondron
94 The Court of Appeal in R (Lewis) v Redcar and Cleveland BC 231 resolved this issue, at least for the timebeing, in favour of the second line of authority. Thus, the task for a court, when considering whether an administrative decisionmaker has impermissibly predetermined an issue, is to consider whether a fairminded and informed observer, knowing the facts, would think that there was a real possibility that the decisionmaker did not approachthematterwithanopenmind. 95 TheCourtofAppealinLewismadeitclearhoweverthat,notwithstandingthe fact that the test to be applied concerned the appearance of predetermination,thetestwouldbeverydifficulttosatisfy. 232 Inrelationto theplanningapplicationinissueinLewis,theCourtofAppealconcludedthat thefollowingmattersdidnotprovideevidenceofpredetermination: (a) the fact that a planning application was promoted by the counciloncouncilownedland; (b) (c) thecouncilspecuniaryinterestinthegrantofpermission; the fact that councillors on the planning committee had previouslyexpressedsupportforthescheme; (d) the fact that a member of the planning committee had also been a member of the cabinet that had previously signed headsofagreementwithadeveloperandmadeforcefulpublic statementsinsupportoftheproject;
[2006]EWCACiv1573,[2007]LGR87(Planningapplication.Committeememberallegedtohavesaid,priorto meetingthathewasgoingtogowiththeinspectorsreport.TheCourtofAppealconcludedthatthiscomment didnotgiverisetoanappearanceofpredetermination). 231 [2008]EWCACiv746,[2009]1WLR83.ThiscaseissometimesincorrectlyreferredtoasPersimmonHomes TeessideLtdvR(Lewis). 232 [2008]EWCACiv746,[2009]1WLR83,para109perLongmoreLJ.Subsequentpredeterminationchallenges applyingLewishaveusuallybeenunsuccessful,seeegR(Batey)vBostonBC[2008]EWHC3516(Admin) (Unsuccessfulchallengetograntofplanningpermission);R(SainsburysSupermarketsLtd)vWolverhamptonCity Council[2009]EWHC134(Admin),[2009]JPL1354(Claimantschallengetograntofplanningpermissiononthe groundsofpredeterminationarisingfrom,interalia,anearlierinprincipledecisiontoexerciseCouncils CompulsoryPurchaseOrderpowersinTescosfavour.Insufficienttoestablishpredetermination);R(Chandler)v LBofCamden[2009]EWHC219(Admin),[2009]LGR417(Unsuccessfulchallengetoestablishmentofan academy.Noevidencethatcouncillorshadclosedminds);R(PersimmonHomesLtd)vValeofGlamorganCouncil [2010]EWHC535(Admin)(Allegationthatcouncilsofficers,indraftingareportpredeterminedissues.Challenge rejectedonthebasisthattherewasinsufficientevidencetodemonstratethatofficersmindswereclosed.)
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63 (e) thefactthatthedevelopmentwasapartypoliticalissueorthe factthatcouncillorsvotedonpartylines. 233 96 Unfortunately,thepreciseratiooftheCourtofAppealsdecisioninLewisis difficulttoascertain.AllthreeLordJusticesgaveseparatejudgements,each adopting a slightly different analysis. There is some suggestion that rather than considering the appearance of predetermination from the perspective ofthefairmindedandinformedobservertherelevantperspectiveisthatof the Court, 234 thus returning to the discredited approach of R v Gough 235 . However, the better view is that it must be the appearance to the fair minded and informed observer. 236 Equally, whilst all three judgments concludedthatthetestwastheappearanceofpredetermination,therewas somesuggestionthattheimportanceofappearancewasmorelimitedthan inthejudicialcontextalthoughitisnotentirelyclearhowonecanapplythe fairmindedandinformedobservertestpartiallyorlessrobustly. 237 Section25LocalismAct2011 97 Section 25 of the Localism Act 2011 seeks to clarify the common law on unlawfulpredeterminationinrelationtocertaindecisionmakersbyseeking tohighlightthedistinctionbetweenaclosedandanemptymind. 98 Section25(2)providesthatadecisionmakerisnottobetakentohavehad, ortohaveappearedtohavehad,aclosedmindwhenmakingadecisionjust because:
233
SeeR(Lewis)vRedcarandClevelandBoroughCouncil[2008]EWCACiv746,[2009]1WLR83,para61perPill LJwhostatedthattheonlypossibleevidenceinsupportofthepredeterminationallegationwastheholdingof theplanningcommitteeduringthepreelectionpurdahperiod.However,theCourtofAppealwentonto concludethatthisdidnotgiverisetotheappearanceofpredetermination. 234 [2008]EWCACiv746,[2009]1WLR83,paras6771perPillLJ. 235 [1993]AC646,HL. 236 [2008]EWCACiv746,[2009]1WLR83,para97perRixLJ.LongmoreLJaddedhisowncommentsalbeithedid notexpresslyaddressthisissue.LongmoreLJhoweveragreedwithbothRixLJsandPillLJsjudgments. 237 [2008]EWCACiv746,[2009]1WLR83,para71perPillLJ.
(1)
thedecisionmakerhadpreviouslydoneanythingthatdirectlyor indirectlyindicatedwhatviewthedecisionmakertook,orwould ormighttake,inrelationtothematter,and
(2) 99 Section 25 applies when a person makes an allegation of bias or predetermination or otherwise there is an issue about the validity of a decisionbycertainpublicbodiesanditisrelevanttothatissuewhetherthe decisionmaker,oranyofthedecisionmakers,hadorappearedtohavehad aclosedmind(toanyextent)whenmakingthedecision. 238 100 Section 25 of the Localism Act 2011 only applies to a limited number of administrativedecisionmakers.Itonlyappliestodecisionsmadebycounty councils,districtcouncils,countyboroughcouncils,Londonboroughcouncils, theCommoncounciloftheCityofLondon,theGreaterLondonAuthority,a National Park authority, the Broads Authority, the Council of the Isles of Scilly,aparishcounciloracommunitycouncil. 239 101 It also only applies to decisions by members of the listed decisions makers (whether elected or not) or a decision maker that is acoopted member of thatauthority. 240 F.Exceptions Introduction 102 By far the most important exception to the rules against bias and requirement of independence is waiver. Of secondary importance is the doctrine of necessity. Some commentators suggest that there are further thematterwasrelevanttothedecision.
238 239
LocalismAct2011,s25(1). LocalismAct2011,s25(4). 240 LocalismAct2011,s25(3).
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65 exceptionstotherulesagainstbiasrelatingtocontractandstatute. 241 The formerexceptionisoflimitedrelevancetothejudicialreviewclaimswhilst thelatterisbetterregardednotasaseparateexceptionbutasaspeciesof necessity. Waiver Introduction 103 A party can waive their right to object in cases involving presumed bias, 242 apparentbias 243 andlackofindependence 244 althoughthereissomedoubt whether waiver applies to cases of actual bias possibly because waiver in suchcircumstanceswouldbecontrarytothepublicinterest. 245 104 (1) (2) madeinfullknowledgeofallthefactsrelevanttothedecision whethertowaiveornot;and (3) Voluntary clearandunequivocal. 246 madevoluntarily;and Foranywaivertobebindingonapartyitmustbe:
241 242
SeeSupperstone,GoudieandWalker,JudicialReview(3rdedn,2005),paras11.1811.19. RvBowStreetMetropolitanStipendiaryMagistrateexpPinochetUgarte(No2)[2000]1AC119,HL,138per LordGoff.SeealsoLocabail(UK)LtdvBayfieldPropertiesLtd[2000]1QB451,CA,para15andJonesvDASLegal ExpensesInsuranceCoLtd[2003]EWCACiv1071,[2004]IRLR218,para30. 243 Locabail(UK)LtdvBayfieldPropertiesLtd[2000]1QB451,CA,para26. 244 MillarvDickson[2001]UKPCD4,[2002]1WLR1615,para31perLordBingham.However,seeLordClydes viewatp1646thatitmaynotbepossibletowaiverighttoanindependenttribunalunderArticle6(1)ECHRin criminalcases. 245 RvSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment,expFayed[2001]ImmAR134,CA,paras869perKennedy LJ,paras111perRixLJ. 246 MillarvDickson[2001]UKPCD4,[2002]1WLR1615,para31perLordBingham.SeealsoLocabail(UK)Ltdv BayfieldPropertiesLtd[2000]1QB451,CA,para15;R(Agnello)vLondonBoroughofHounslow[2003]EWHC 3112(Admin),[2004]LGR536,para87perSilberJ.Asimilardoctrineexistsinrelationtotherighttoan independentandimpartialtribunalunderArticle6(1)ECHR,seeegDeweervBelgium(1980)2EHRR439and PfeiferandPlanklvAustria(1992)14EHRR692.
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Waiverwillonlybesufficientlyvoluntaryifapartyhasnotbeenpressurised by his or her lawyers, 247 if they have them, or the decisionmaker. 248 The party must have adequate time to consider the issue 249 and have sufficient informationabouttheiroptionsincluding,ifpossible,theextentofanydelay causedifthedecisionmakerisaskedtorecusethemselves. 250
FullKnowledge 106 The parties must have full knowledge of the relevant facts that give rise to presumedorapparentbiasorlackofindependence. 251 Ifthedecisionmaker fails to disclose such facts but a party is aware of them from other sources this is likely to be sufficient. 252 However, the doctrine of constructive knowledge,wherebyinformationinthepublicdomainisimputedtoaparty eventhoughtheywerenotawareofit,isunlikelytobeapplicabletowaiver inthiscontext. 253 107 Disclosure of the full facts does not mean disclosure of every detail that a party may wish to know. 254 It is limited to the essential or salient facts. 255 Salientfactsincludethestateofthelaw. 256 Clearandunequivocal 108 Waivercanbeexpressorimplied.Acourtmayimplywaiverfromthepassage of time that has elapsed since the party became aware of the basis for
247
SmithvKvaernerCementationFoundations[2006]EWCACiv242,[2007]1WLR370,paras3237(Claimants barristersuggestedthattherecorder,whowasheadofhisChambers,hadgreatintegrityandthateverything wouldbeaboveboard.TheCourtofAppealconcludedthatinsuchcircumstances,waiverwasnotvoluntary.) 248 JonesvDASLegalExpensesInsuranceCoLtd[2003]EWCACiv1071,[2004]IRLR218,para334. 249 JonesvDASLegalExpensesInsuranceCoLtd[2003]EWCACiv1071,[2004]IRLR218,para35(vi). 250 SmithvKvaernerCementationFoundations[2006]EWCACiv242,[2007]1WLR370,para31. 251 Locabail(UK)LtdvBayfieldPropertiesLtd[2000]1QB451,CA,para26. 252 BAALtdvCompetitionCommission[2009]CAT35,[2010]CompAR23,para153. 253 BAALtdvCompetitionCommission[2009]CAT35,[2010]CompAR23,paras154156. 254 JonesvDASLegalExpensesInsuranceCoLtd[2003]EWCACiv1071,[2004]IRLR218,para36. 255 JonesvDASLegalExpensesInsuranceCoLtd[2003]EWCACiv1071,[2004]IRLR218,para36. 256 MillarvDickson[2001]UKPCD4,[2002]1WLR1615,para34.Alitigantwhoisawareofthefactsthatgiverise totheappearanceofbiasbutisnotawarethathewasentitledtoobjectwillnotbesaidtohavewaived,seeRv EssexJustices,expPerkins[1927]2KB475DC,489perAvoryJ.
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67 making an objection. 257 A court is likely to be more willing to imply waiver whenthematterthatgivesrisetotherighttoobjectisobvious. 258 109 Ithasbeensuggestedthatapartycanavoidtheapplicationofthedoctrineof waiver if they express concern that there has been a breach of the rule against bias but do not seek the decisionmakers recusal. 259 Whilst this approach may beconsistent with the requirement that anywaiver must be unequivocal,itissuggestedthattopermitapartytobeabletoavoidwaiver without making a recusal application would be wrong and this does not representthelawinEnglandandWales. 260 Theburdenofproof 110 The legal burden is on the party alleging bias, predetermination or lack of independencetoprovehisorherunawarenessoftheessentialfacts. 261 Necessity 262 111 Alongestablishedexceptiontotheruleagainstbiasisthatofnecessity.Ifno other decisionmaker is empowered to consider the matter, the decision makerwhohasadisqualifyinginterestmustconsideritnotwithstandingthe existence of the disqualifying interest. 263 Such an exception applies to presumedandapparentbiasbutpossiblynotactualbias. 264
257
BirminghamCityCouncilvYardley[2004]EWCACiv1756,TheTimes,13December2004,paras2831per GageLJ,para37perKennedyLJ. 258 MillarvDickson[2001]UKPCD4,[2002]1WLR1615,para35. 259 VakautavKelly(1989)167CLR568,AusHC,577perDawsonJ,587perTooheyJ. 260 BAALtdvCompetitionCommission[2009]CAT35,[2010]CompAR23,para152. 261 CompetitionCommissionvBAALtd[2010]EWCACiv1097,paras5052perMauriceKayLJ. 262 Seegenerally,RTracey,Disqualifiedadjudicators:Thedoctrineofnecessityinpubliclaw[1982]628,andI Leigh,Bias,NecessityandConventionRights[2002]PL407. 263 SeeegDimesvGrandJunctionCanal(1852)3H.L.Cas.759,HL(LordChancellorwhohadadisqualifying pecuniaryinterestwhilstdisqualifiedfromconsideringthesubstantivelitigationcouldsigntheenrolmentorder whichwasrequiredinorderforthecasetoproceedtotheHouseofLords).SeealsoPhillipsvEyre(1870)LR6QB 1,HC(GovernorofacolonywasabletoassenttoanActofIndemnitywhich,interalia,affordedhimprotection, astobecomelawitrequiredhissignature.) 264 SeeKingsleyvUnitedKingdom(2001)33EHRR13,para37wherecounselfortheUnitedKingdomGovernment acceptedthatthedoctrineofnecessitydidnotapplytocasesofactualbias.Suchanapproachisconsistentwith publicpolicyandthelawonwaiver.
112
The scope of the necessity exception has been considerably reduced as a resultoftheEuropeanCourtonHumanRightsdecisioninKingsleyvUnited Kingdom. 265 In Kingsley, the European Court concluded that the Gaming Board,theonlybodyempoweredtodecidewhethertheapplicantwasafit and proper person to be a director of a casino company, did not have the requiredappearanceofimpartialityandthatthereforetherewasabreachof Article6(1)ECHR.Thus,wherethedecisionchallengeddeterminescivilrights andobligationsoracriminalchargethedoctrineofnecessitywillnotapply.
113 UntilrecentlytheCourthadthepowerpursuanttoCPR54.19(3)totakethe decision itself. However, this provision has been revoked 266 and therefore the only course of action available to the Court if it concludes that the decisionmakerisnotindependentorimpartialwithinthemeaningofArticle 6(1)EHCRistomakeadeclarationofincompatibility. 267

265 266
(2001)33EHRR13. SeeCivilProcedure(AmendmentNo2)Rules2007. 267 SeeHumanRightsAct1998,s4.
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Slide 1
BIAS AND PREDETERMINATION

ANDREW SHARLAND 4-5 GRAYS INN SQUARE
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Slide 2
Structure of lecture
General law of bias
Actual bias Presumed bias/automatic disqualification Appearance of bias Predetermination
Practical considerations Recent developments
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Slide 3
Actual bias
Very rare Hard to prove Automatically disqualifies decision maker
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Slide 4
Automatic disqualification
Direct financial interest, see Dimes v
Proprietors of Grand Junction Canal

De minimus exception
Applied flexibly: Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield promotion of cause, see Pinochet (No 2) Friendship with a proposed witness, see AWG
Group Ltd v Morrison
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Slide 5
Appearance of bias (1)
Lord Hope in Porter v Magill
whether the fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias.
Relevant observer a reasonable member of the public neither
unduly compliant or nave nor unduly cynical or suspicious and adopting a balanced approach.
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Slide 6
Appearance of bias (2)
Court vs reasonable observer Real danger vs real possibility Facts and circumstances of case very important Relevant facts are those apparent to the court upon investigation and are not restricted to the circumstances available to the hypothetical observer at the original hearing, see Flaherty v National
Greyhound Racing Club
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71 Slide 7
Exceptions
Waiver
Extent of knowledge Criminal/civil
Necessity
Common law Article 6 (1) ECHR
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Slide 8
Predetermination
Predetermination vs bias
Conceptually distinct, see Sedley J in R v Secretary of State
ex parte Kirkstall Valley
Predetermination vs predisposition Current test: whether a fair-minded and informed observer, knowing the facts, would think that there was a real possibility that the decision-maker did not approach the matter with an open mind.
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Slide 9
Practical considerations
Evidence from the decision-maker The judicial oath Training Complaints Previous or subsequent recusal Application to advisers Recusal procedure Lawyers duty to advise on bias
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Slide 10
Recent developments
Local authority predetermination
R (Berky) v Newport CC S 25 Localism Act 2011
The fair-minded and informed observer

Virdi Belize Bank
Competition Commission v BAA Ltd Various other cases
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Slide 11
R (Berky) v Newport CC
Challenge to grant of planning permission No application to cross examine Applied Lewis v Redcar Multi-person decision-making Doubted Ouseley J in Bovis Homes
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Slide 12
Section 25 Localism Act 2011
Purpose: to clarify the common law on unlawful predetermination To whom does s 25 Localism Act 2011 apply? Previous actions of a decision maker not determinative (not limited to views on matter for decision) Differences between s 25 and Redcar?
just because
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73 Slide 13
Virdi and the informed observer
Role of clerk who retired with disciplinary tribunal Knowledge of the informed observer
Court/fair minded observer Knowledge not limited to facts publicly available at the time
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Slide 14
Belize Bank and the informed

observer
Appointment to statutory appeal board Lord Kerr (the majority)
Notional observer capable of being known Not limited to what is immediately in the public domain
Lord Brown (dissenting)

Problems with the concept of the informed observer
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Slide 15
BAA v Competition Commission
The CAT decision
Appearance of bias Waiver
The CA decision
More limited finding re appearance of bias No operative effect Contamination Waiver
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Slide 16
Other cases

R (Kaur) v Institute of Legal Executives AvB CD (DRC) v SSHD R (National Association of Memorial Masons) v Cardiff CC
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JUDICIALREVIEWPRACTICEANDPROCEDUREUPDATE2012
AnnabelLee 45GraysInnSquare Introduction 1. Thispapercoversrecentdevelopmentsinpracticeandprocedureinjudicialreview proceedings. It is intended to give a focused update relating to the key developments of practical importance in the last 12 months. The principal topics coveredare: (a) Standing (b) Delay (c) Academicchallenges (d) ProtectiveCostsOrders (e) Costsgenerally (f) Oralhearings (g) Appeals 2. In relation to each of the main topics I have briefly summarised the relevant legal principles for those who have less familiarity with the principles of judicial review, before turning to the recent developments. My talk will focus on the recent developmentsoutlinedinthispaper. Standing Summary
3. The Senior Courts Act 1981 section 31(3) provides that the court shall not grant permissiontoapplyforjudicialreviewunlessitconsidersthattheapplicanthasa sufficientinterestinthemattertowhichtheapplicationrelates. 4. The question of what amounts to a sufficient interest is a question of fact and degree having regard to the relationship between the claimant and the matter to which the claim relates and other circumstances of the case. In practice, a broad approachtostandingisoftentaken. RecentDevelopments 5. In R (on the application of Williams) v Surrey CC [2012] EWHC 516 (Admin) the claimant applied for permission to seek judicial review of a decision of the local authoritytointroduce"communitypubliclibraries"withinitsarea.Shewaspartofa loosegroupofindividualswhoopposedthelocalauthority'spolicy.TheClaimantdid notliveorworkinthelocalauthority'sarea,butlivedjustoutsideandworkedata universityclosetotheborder.Thelocalauthoritychallengedherstandingtobring theproceedings,allegingthatshewasa"manofstraw",selectedasclaimantbythe groupbecauseofhereligibilityforlegalaid. 6. The Court found that the Claimant had the requisite standing to bring the proceedingseventhoughshelivedandworkedoutsidethelocalauthoritysarea.At paragraph[13]theCourtsaid: Itisclearthatthereareawiderangeofpeoplewhocanlegitimatelyclaim to have an interest in the implementation in accordance with the Act of policies involving libraries, and that interest can extend, quite legitimately, waybeyondthosewholive,workorpaylocaltaxeswithintheSurreyCounty Council area. This is not an unusual situation in modern legislation and currentpracticeswithintheAdministrativeCourt,and,astherangeofcases thatwerecitedinargumentshow,interestgroupsandthosewhohavean interestinmattersofpublicconcernacrossawholespectrumofinterests, from planning and environment through to equality and community legislation and the payments and collection of revenue, and I am not
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intendinganexhaustivelist,areheldtohaveasufficientinterestinbringing judicialreviewproceedingsincaseswhereitisarguablethattherehasbeen abreachofrelevantlegislationortherelevantlawandthattherehasbeen as a result an impact on a section of the community which need not necessarilyincludetheindividualwhoisbringingtheproceedings. Delay Summary 7. Aspractitionerswillbewellaware,therearestricttimelimitsforbringingclaimsfor judicialreview.CPRrule54.5states: (a) (b) promptly;and in any event not later than 3 months after the grounds to theclaimfirstarose. (1) Theclaimformmustbefiled
make
8. Inaddition,section31oftheSeniorCourtsAct1981provides: (6) WheretheHighCourtconsidersthattherehasbeenunduedelayin making an application for judicial review, the court may refuse to grant(a)leaveforthemakingoftheapplication,or(b)anyrelief sought on the application, if it considers that the granting of the relief sought would be likely to cause substantial hardship to, or substantially prejudice the rights of, any person or would be detrimentaltogoodadministration. (7) Subsection(6)iswithoutprejudicetoanyenactmentorruleofcourt whichhastheeffectoflimitingthetimewithinwhichanapplication forjudicialreviewmaybemade.
9. An added complication is that under European law, the requirement to bring proceedings promptly must be interpreted consistently with the principles of certaintyandeffectiveness:Uniplex(UnitedKingdom)LtdvNHSBusinessServices Authority [2010] PTSR 1377; R (Buglife) v Medway Council [2011] EWHC 746 (Admin). Recentdevelopments 10. In R (on the application of U & Partners (East Anglia) Ltd) v Broads Authority [2011]EWHC1824(Admin)theClaimantappliedforjudicialreviewofthegrantof planning permission by the Defendant, relying on the provisions of domestic regulationswhichtransposedintodomesticlawtheprovisionofanEUdirective.The Claimant brought the claim a week short of three months from the date of the decision.Bythentheinterestedpartyhadspentsubstantialsumsinrelianceonthe planningpermission. 11. CollinsJheldthatalthoughtheClaimanthadnot brought its claim promptly the application would be allowed for two reasons. The firstwasthestrengthoftheClaimantscaseasthegrantofplanningpermissionwas clearlyultravires.ThesecondwasthattherehadbeenabreachoftheDirectiveand EUlawdidnotpermitthebringingofproceedingstobesubjecttoatimelimitthat depended on the exercise of judicial discretion. The limit had to be certain, otherwisetheprotectionofrightsderivedfromtheDirectivewouldnotbeeffective. Member States could introduce reasonable time limits for bringing proceedings underDirectivestransposedintodomesticlawbuttheyhadtodosoinawaywhich avoideduncertainty. 12. In R (Berky) v Newport City Council [2012] EWCA Civ 378 a resident challenged a decisionofthelocalauthoritytograntplanningpermissiononthreegrounds: (a) Thedecisionrequiredanenvironmentalstatementandinadequatereasons weregiven; (b) Thedecisionmakingprocesswastaintedbyrealorapparentbias;and
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(c) Thedecisionwasirrational. 13. The Court distinguished between the first ground, which turned on a requirement derivedunderEUlaw,andthebiasandirrationalitygroundswhichdependedpurely ondomesticlaw.TheirLordshipsconsideredthecaseofUniplex(UnitedKingdom) Ltd v NHS Business Services Authority [2010] PTSR 1377 where it was held that in thefieldofpublicprocurement,anundefinedtestanalogoustothatofpromptness offended the European principles of certainty and effectiveness. Following R (U & Partners(EastAnglia)LtdvTheBroadsAuthorityaboveandR(Buglife)vMedway Council[2011]EWHC746(Admin)thisalsoappliedtochallengesongroundsofan environmentalimpactassessment. 14. Therefore, the issue arose as to whether Community and domestic law challenges should be subject to different time limits. Carnwath LJ took the view that Uniplex wasconcernedonlywiththetimeallowedforcommencingproceedingsanddidnot affectthecourtspowerundersection31(6)towithholdremediesiftherehadbeen unduedelay.LordJusticeMooreBickandSirRichardBuxtondifferedonthispoint anddidnotrecognisethedistinctionmadebyCarnwathLJ.SirRichardBuxtonsaid that the recognising the difference would put form over substance. The consequencewasthattherecouldnotbeunduedelayincommencingproceedings iftheclaimisbroughtwithinthreemonths. 15. In R. (on the application of Macrae) v Herefordshire DC [2012] EWCA Civ 457 the Claimant issued his claim for judicial review from the grant of planning permission twodaysbeforetheexpiryofthethreemonthtimelimitunderCPRr.54.5. 16. LordJusticeSullivansummarisedtheproblemat[10]: thereisstillarequirementofpromptnessinthelightofcertaindecisions oftheEuropeanCourtofJustice,nowtheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropean Union. It is submitted that the promptness requirement is not compatible withtherequirementoflegalcertaintyasappliedbytheCJEUandthatitis undesirable that there should be two approaches to the need for promptness,ontheonehandtopurelydomesticcasesandontheotherto thosecaseswherethereisanEUdimension.
17. InthiscaseSullivanLJconsideredthatitwasnotnecessarytoresolvetheinteresting issueofwhethertherequirementthataclaimforjudicialreviewbeissuedpromptly as well as within the threemonth time limit in CPR r.54.5 was compatible with Europeanlaw 18. In this particular case, the issues of promptness and adequacy of reasons were interlinked. One of the circumstances that would be relevant to the question of whether an application for judicial review was made promptly was the extent to whichthedecisiontobereviewedwasplainorlefttheapplicantinthedark asto thereasonsbehindit.LordJusticeSullivansaidat[12]: Whetheranapplicationforpermissiontoapplyforjudicialreviewismade promptly will depend upon all the circumstances. One of those circumstancesistheextenttowhichtheallegederroroflawinthedecision isplainorwhetherthedecisionleavestheclaimantinthedarkastothe basis on which it was taken. In the latter case it would normally be reasonablefortheclaimanttoseektoascertain,sofarashereasonablycan, whatwasthebasisforthedecisionbeforeheresortstolitigation. 19. In R. (on the application of Offerton Park Parish Council) v Stockport MBC [2011] A.C.D. 120 the defendant alleged that, although the application for judicial review hadbeenissuedwellwithinthreemonthsofthedateofthedecision,theclaimant hadnotactedpromptlyandthereshouldbenorelief.Thedefendantassertedthat theclaimantshouldhaveissuedtheproceedingsandobtainedinterimreliefbefore thedefendantsetitscounciltax.Thefailuretodosomeantthatthedefendantset itscounciltaxwithoutbeingabletoincludeaprecept.Ifthedecisiontoabolishthe claimwasquashed,theonlywaytheclaimantcouldbefundedwouldbefromthe generalbodyofcounciltaxpayers. 20. Thejudgerejectedthisassertion.Hesaidthatthecourtshouldbeslowtorefusea remedy with the result that the electors of the parish would be denied the representationtowhichtheywereentitled.Moreover,theclaimanthadsentaclear preactionprotocolletterinadvanceofthecounciltaxbeingsetandthedefendant tookonitselfthelitigationrisk. 21. In Allman v HM Coroner for West Sussex [2012] EWHC 534 (Admin) the claimant appliedforpermissiontoapplyforjudicialreviewofapreinquestreviewdecisionof
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the defendant coroner who ruled that the Claimant was not a properly interested personandthereforecouldnotquestionwitnessesorchallengetheirevidence.The deceasedhaddiedasresultofarailwayaccident.Priortohisdeathhebelievedthat he was the targeted victim of electromagnetic stalking and harassment, which adverselyinfluencedhisstateofmindandthoughtprocesses.Beforehisdeath,the Claimant had promised the deceased that if he died, he would ensure that the authoritiesknewthekillingwasunlawful. 22. HHJAnthonyThorntonQCfoundat[27]: I conclude by deciding, as well, that Mr Allmans claim related to the DeputyAssistantCoronersrulingwasoutoftimesinceitwasnotfiled,as requiredbyCPR54.5,promptlyeventhoughitwas,apparently,filedexactly 3 months after the ruling since it was received in the Administrative Court Officeon11April2011exactly3monthsafterthedateoftheruling.The3 month period is a long stop provision, a claimant must file the claim promptly and will be shut out if the claim is filed within the 3month periodbutisnotfiledpromptly.Inthiscase,noreasonhasbeengivento show why the claim could not have been filed within, say 6 weeks of the rulingtotakeageneroustimescale. 23. In R. (on the application of Williams) v Surrey CC [2012] EWHC 516 (Admin) the Claimant challenged the local authoritys plan to introduce community public libraries.Theclaimhadbeenfiledonedaybeforethethreemonthperiodexpired. Theissuewaswhetherithadbeenissuedpromptly. 24. Thecourtdiscussedtheissueatparagraphs[31][32]: TheprincipalsubmissionthatwasmadeonbehalfoftheCouncilwasthat this was a decision which, even if it was only finally set in stone with sufficient rigidity to enable it to be susceptible to judicial review at the meetingheldinOctober2011,hadbeeninplayformanymonths.Theissues wereclearandhadbeenformanymonths.Thosewhowishedtoobjecton
Equality Act grounds were in full possession of all material, and the usual and frequently cited grounds for promptitude in relation to decisions of public authorities such as the present defendant applied here, and indeed bywaitinguntilnearlytheendofthethreemonthperiodtheclaimantshave put the Council into a difficult position in that steps are still being taken, subject tothebarimposedon20thJanuarybytheinjunction,andmanyof these steps could have been avoided pending the litigation had the action beenstartedearlier. These are of course very powerful considerations, but set against that are theconsiderationsthatfacedtheclaimantandthosewhoshareherinterest inthislitigation.Apubliclawactionofthiskindmustbe,andclearlyis,one of the most difficult pieces of litigation that a citizen can be involved in. Thatisnottosaythatotherlitigationofaprivatelawnatureisnotcomplex or stressful, but this is litigation of a wholly different order to the kind of litigationthattheclaimantswouldordinarilybeexpectedtobeinvolvedin, if they are involved in litigation at all. It involves very complex considerations of law and fact, as I have already indicated and it involves thenecessityoffindingameansoffundingandifnecessaryavoidingsofar aspossibletherisksofhavingtopaycostsinanadversecostsorderduring orattheendoflitigation.Itisastepofenormousmagnitudeintermsof the stress involved and in terms of the need, as I see it, the social and practicalneed,toensurethatthereiscommunitysupportbythosewitha like interest. For those reasons it is, first of all, reasonable that no real attemptwasmadetostartthinkingofjudicialreviewuntilthedyewascast inOctober.Therewastheneed,asIseeit,andreasonableneedinorderto minimisethefinancialrisks,toseewhetheritwaspossibletoobtainpublic fundingforaclaimantandthatwasobtained,sothereisnowadecisionof the Legal Services Commission that this is a claim which falls within the merits test of the Legal Services Commission structure now in place, and there was the need for extensive research by the claimant's solicitors, and that inevitably involved the need to instruct experienced counsel and the preparation of a detailed letter before action to comply with the relevant protocolandthentodraftthenecessaryproceedings.Selfevidently,thatis
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notanequivalentprocesstotheissuingofaclaimforminordertochasea debt. It is, as I have already said, complex, difficult and timeconsuming, evenforthosewhotheclaimantisfortunatetohaveassistingherandeven giventheexperienceofthosewhoaresupportingher. 25. In R. (on the application of Kilroy) v Parrs Wood High School Governing Body [2011]EWHC3489(Admin)theClaimantschoolgovernorsoughtjudicialreviewofa decisionoftheDefendantgoverningbodytosuspendhimfromofficeforaperiodof sixmonths.Hecommencedtheinstantproceedingsonedaybeforetheexpiryofthe threemonthperiodreferredtoinCPRr.54.5,explaininghisdelaybythefactthathe hadmistakenlybeenattemptingtopursueanalternativeremedy. 26. The Court found that the Claimant had adequately explained his initial failure to commence judicial review proceedings. His pursuit of an alternative remedy might havebeenerroneous,butitcouldnotbesaidthathehadignoredmattersandthe governingbodyhadnotbeenprejudiced. AcademicChallenges 27. The Administrative Court has a discretion to entertain claims that have become academic and such discretion has been exercised cautiously and where there are goodpublicinterestreasonsfordoingso. 28. R.(ontheapplicationofKilroy)vParrsWoodHighSchoolGoverningBody[2011] EWHC3489(Admin)alsoconsideredtheargumentthattheproceedingsshouldbe discontinued because the matter had now become academic. The Defendant submitted that the proceedings had become academic because by the time the matter reached the court the Claimants suspension period had already run its course.
Summary
RecentDevelopments
29. TheCourtstatedat[19]: The submission made by the Defendant that these proceedings are now academic is one that needs to be approached with some circumspection. Whilst I accept that this factor may be relevant if and when the point is reached when it is necessary to consider what if any remedy ought to be granted,I donotconsideritrelevant totheissueofwhethertheClaimant should be permitted to maintain a claim. If the Claimant has been treated unlawfully,thenthefactthattheconsequencesofwhatonthishypothesis wouldbeunlawfulconducthadplayedthemselvesoutbythetimetheclaim for judicial review comes to court, does not entitle a Defendant who has actedunlawfullytoavoidafindingtothateffect.Thatisparticularlythecase whereanyunlawfulsuspensionoftheClaimantmighthaveaneffectonthe validityofbusinessconductedbytheDefendant. ProtectiveCostsOrders Summary 30. The cost rules are contained CPR 44 and the general rule set out in CPR 44.3(2) is thattheunsuccessfulpartywillbeorderedtopaythecostsofthesuccessfulparty. Theriskoflosingaclaimandincurringcostsliabilitytotheothersideisadeterrent to bringing judicial review claims and protective costs orders (PCOs) provide a methodtocircumventthisriskbythecourtmakinganorderthatregardlessofthe outcome,theclaimantwillnotberequiredtoanyormorethanaparticularsumof thedefendantscosts.Thecourtmayalsoimposeareciprocalcapastowhatcosts theclaimantwillbeabletorecoverfromdefendantiftheclaimissuccessful. 31. The leading case on PCOs is R (Corner House Research) v. Secretary of State for TradeandIndustry[2005]EWCACiv192.Inthatcase,theCourtofAppealsetout thefollowingprinciplesat[74]:
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a. APCOmaybemadeatanystageoftheproceedings,onsuchconditionsas thecourtthinksfit,providedthatthecourtissatisfiedthat: (i)theissuesraisedareofgeneralpublicimportance; (ii)thepublicinterestrequiresthatthoseissuesshouldberesolved; (iii)theapplicanthasnoprivateinterestintheoutcomeofthecase; (iv) having regard to the financial resources of the applicant and the respondent(s)andtotheamountofcoststhatarelikelytobeinvolveditis fairandjusttomaketheorder; (v) if the order is not made the applicant will probably discontinue the proceedingsandwillbeactingreasonablyinsodoing. b.If thoseactingfor theapplicantare doingsopro bono,thiswillbelikely to enhancethemeritsoftheapplicationforaPCO. c.Itisforthecourt,initsdiscretion,todecidewhetheritisfairandjusttomake theorderinthelightoftheconsiderationssetoutabove. 32. In that case the Court of Appeal granted a full PCO protecting Corner House from having to pay any costs if it lost. However, the Court also imposed a limit on the coststhattheclaimantcouldrecoverifitwassuccessful,andinsodoingidentified twofurtherprinciples,namelythatthecostsmustbenomorethanmodestand costscanonlyberecoveredforjuniorcounsel. 33. TheprinciplessetoutinCornerHousehavebeenfurtherdefinedinsubsequentcase law.Broadly,thefollowingrefinementscanbeidentifiedfromsubsequentcaselaw: a. The principles set out in Corner House should be treated as guidance and not as rules and should be flexibly applied: R (Buglife) v Thurock Thames Gateway Development Corporation [2008] EWCA Civ 1209 and Morgan v HintonOrganics[2009]EWCACiv107.
b. Inrelationtotherequirementforanissueofpublicimportanceandpublic interest, Smith LJ in R (Compton) v Wiltshire Primary Care Trust [2008] EWCA Civ 749 stated i) there is no absolute standard by which to define whatamountstoanissueofgeneralpublicimportance,ii)therearedegrees towhichtherequirementmaybesatisfied,someissuesmaybeoffirstrank generalimportanceandothersofalesserrank,iii)makingajudgmentisan exerciseinwhichtwojudgesmaylegitimatelydisagreewithouteitherbeing wrong and iv) Corner House does not define what amounts to an issue of generalpublicimportance,butprovidessomeexamplesthatdoesnotseek to limit issues to that nature, it does not say that only issues of national importancewillqualify(see[73][78]). c. In relation to private interest, the no private interest principle in Corner House has been narrowly interpreted, and the better view is that this is a relevantfactorbutnotdecisiveastowhetheraPCOshouldbegranted:see Wilkinson v Kitzinger [2006] EWHC 835 (Fam), approved by the Court of AppealinR(England)vLondonBoroughofTowerHamlets[2006]EWCACiv 1742. d. There is no additional hurdle that a PCO is only available in exceptional circumstances:seeBuglifeandCompton(above). e. As to what constitutes a modest amount, counsel undertaking public interest work cannot expect anything like their ordinary rates and anyone claiming to act in the public interest or undertaking a public service must expecttheirchargestobediscounted:seeR(MedicalJustice)vSSHD[2010] EWHC1425(Admin). 34. Inaddition,specialprinciplesapplyinsomeenvironmentaljudicialreviewswhichfall withintheambitofthe AarhusConvention,although thescopeoftheseprinciples unfortunatelyremainsunclear.Thecauseoftheemergenceofdifferentprinciplesin thecontextofenvironmentaljudicialreviewsisArticle9oftheAarhusConvention whichprovides:
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ACCESSTOJUSTICE (1) Each Party shall, within the framework of its national legislation, ensure that any person who considers that his or her request for information under article 4 has been ignored, wrongfully refused, whetherinpartorinfull,inadequatelyanswered,orotherwisenot dealt with in accordance with the provisions of that article, has access to a review procedure before a court of law or another independentandimpartialbodyestablishedbylaw [] (4) In addition and without prejudice to paragraph 1 above, the proceduresreferredtoinparagraphs1,2and3aboveshallprovide adequate and effective remedies, including injunctive relief as appropriate, and be fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive. 35. The Supreme Court in R (Edwards) v Environment Agency (No.2) [2010] UKSC 57 consideredthemeaningofprohibitivelyexpensiveandmadeareferencetotheECJ onwhetherthetestwassubjectiveorobjective.LordHopeat[35]heldthatthere was no clear answer but the balance seemed to lie in favour of the objective approachfollowingtheearliercaseofR(Garner)vElmbridgeBC[2010]EWCACiv 1006. RecentDevelopments 36. In R (on the application of Young) v Oxford City Council [2012] EWCA Civ 46 the applicant applied for a protective costs order in respect of his appeal against a decisionofthelocalauthoritytograntplanningpermissionfortheredevelopment ofauniversitycampusnexttohishome.Hiscase wasthatthe localauthorityhad failedtotakeintoaccounttherelevantplanningpoliciesandthenoisefromthesite. 37. LordJusticeRichardswentthroughtherelevantprinciplesat[9]:
Theprinciplesgoverningprotectivecostsordersinthepresentcontextare stillessentiallythoseinR(CornerHouseResearch)vTheSecretaryofState forTradeandIndustry[2005]1WLR2600,asconsideredinR(Compton)v Wiltshire Primary Care Trust [2008] EWCA Civ 749 and R (Buglife) v Thurrock Thames Gateway Development Corporation [2008] EWCA Civ 1209.Itseemstomethattheadditionalorqualifyingprinciplesconsidered in R (Garner) v Elmbridge Borough Council [2010] EWCA Civ 1006 and in subsequent cases considering Garner do not apply here. Even though this can broadly be termed an environmental case, it does not engage directly effectiveprovisionsofEUlawbringingintheobligationsimposedonstates by the Aarhus Convention; and environmental cases are not otherwise subject to materially different principles from the normal Corner House principles. 38. ThequalifyingprinciplesinR.(ontheapplicationofGarner)vElmbridgeBC[2010] EWCACiv1006,[2012]P.T.S.R.250didnotapplysincethecasedidnotengagethe EU law provisions bringing in the obligations imposed by the Aarhus Convention 2001.OnthebasisofthenormalCornerHouseprinciplesthecourtdeclinedtomake aprotectivecostsorder,takingintoaccountthefollowingfivefeaturesofthecase: (a) Firstly,theissuesraisedwerenotofgeneralpublicimportanceandnordid thepublicinterestrequirethattheyshouldberesolvedonappeal.Thereal questionwassimplywhethertherelevantlocalplanningpoliciescouldhave been intended to apply to the very particular circumstances of the case. Moreover, the validity of the planning permission was a matter of local communityinterestratherthanoneofgeneralpublicimportance. (b) Secondly,theClaimanthadaveryrealpersonalinterestintheoutcomeof thecase:hisprimarygroundforbringingtheproceedingswastheimpactof noiseonhousesadjoiningthesite,includinghisown.
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(c) Thirdly, while there was a vast disparity between the Claimant's resources and those of the local authority, it would be wrong to say that he had no significantmeans. (d) Fourthly, the court could not accept the Claimant's assertion that in the absenceofaprotectivecostsorderhewouldhavetoabandontheappeal. (e) Finally,althoughaprotectivecostsorderhadbeengrantedtotheClaimant in the Administrative Court, the reasons for that hinted at an element of pragmatismratherthananyacceptancethattheissueswereonesofgeneral publicimportance. 39. On19October2011,aftercomingunderpressureatalllevels(AarhusCompliance Committee,theCommission,theECJanddomesticpressurefromreportsbyJackson LJ and Sullivan LJ); the Ministry of Justice published a consultation entitledCost Protection for Litigants in Environmental Judicial Review Claims. The consultation applies to England and Wales and the exercise closed on 18 January 2012. The consultationvoicesproposalswhichareintendedtobringadegreeofclaritytoan areawhichstillplacesagreatdealofdiscretioninthehandsofthecourt. 40. Themainproposalsdiscussedintheconsultationareasfollows: (a) The rules are to apply to judicial review cases falling under the Aarhus Convention and they are applicable to all claimants regardless of whether theyareanaturalorlegalperson; (b) APCOwillbeobtainedbylodginganapplicationbutneednotbebackedup bygroundsandevidenceexceptinspecialcircumstances; (c) A PCO will only be granted if permission to apply for judicial review is granted;
(d) ThePCOwilllimittheliabilityoftheclaimanttopaythedefendantscoststo 5,000andalsolimittheliabilityofthedefendanttopayclaimantscoststo 30,000; (e) Thedefendantmayapplytohavethecapremovediftheclaimantisnotin needofcostsprotectionwhereinformationontheclaimantsresourcesis publicly available. Consultees are also asked whether there should be an optiontoraisethecapaswellasremoveit. 41. InR.(ontheapplicationofSimmons)vBoltonMBC[2011]EWHC2729(Admin)the terms of the PCO permitted either party to apply within seven days to vary or discharge the PCO. After eight days, the Claimants solicitor wrote a letter to the courtofficeapplyingtovarytheorderandaskedtheCourttotreattheletterastheir formal application. A few weeks later the Claimants solicitors sent an application noticetotheCourtseekingthehearingoftheapplicationtovarythePCO.Theissues werewhether: (a) Eithertheletterortheapplicationnoticeconstitutedavalidapplicationto varythetermsofthePCO;and (b) Whethertimeformakingthatapplicationshouldbeextended. 42. The Court found that the letter did not constitute a valid application for the purposes of the PCO. The Court emphasised that although judicial review was governedprocedurallybyCPRPart54itwasalsogovernedbytheotherprovisions of the Rules except where those provisions had been excluded or modified. Therefore, CPR Part 23 applied to any application for a court order. CPR r. 23.3 requiredapersonmakinganapplicationtofirstfileanapplicationnoticeunlessthe courtdispensedwiththatrequirement. 43. Thecourtsaidthatalthoughtheapplicationnoticewastechnicallydefectiveinthat itsoughtanordertolistanapplicationthathadnotbeenmadeitshouldbereadin context. The Claimants solicitors had written to the local authority setting out its case for a variation of the PCO. The Court was therefore prepared to regard the
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noticeasinsubstanceanapplicationtovarythePCO.TheCourtstillhadtodecide whether it would extend time for the brining of the application. The Claimant had providednosatisfactoryexplanationforthefailuretocomplywiththetermsofthe PCO and the application for an extension of time had not been made promptly. However,theeffectofgrantingreliefwasstark.Consideringtheeffectsofthefailure tocomplyandtheeffectsofgrantingrelief,theextensionwasgranted. Costsgenerally 44. R. (on the application of Bahta) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 895 involved applications for judicial review of immigration decisions which had been resolved without a contested court hearing. The appellants had claimed their costs unsuccessfully, and appealed. Although the appellants had achieved what they had sought in their claims (the grant of ILR or permission to work), the Secretary of State had stated that the proceedings had beensettledforpurelypragmaticreasonsandreliedonthefactthattheyhadbeen withdrawnbyconsent.Theconsentorderhadeachincludedaprovisionthatcosts liability should be determined on the basis of written submissions. The Court held thatthetermsoftheconsentorderdidnotexcludetherightofappeal,whichcould onlybeexcludedbyplainwords. 45. Onthemainissue,theCourtheldthattherewasnosubstancetothesecretaryof statesclaimthatthegrantofILRwaswhollyunrelatedtothecourseofthejudicial review proceedings. The Court also held that the Secretary of State had not been entitled to refuse ILR pending an appeal to the Supreme Court from a Court of Appealdecisionrulingthatthoseinthepositionoftheappellantswereentitledto ILR. 46. TheCourtheldthatthedateatwhichthecostsapplicationisdecidedistherelevant dateforestablishingwhetherproceedingsshouldhavebeencommenced,butthat consideration is required of the whole sequence of events and the conduct of the partiesthroughout,includingtheconductofthepartiesafterthedefendanthastold theClaimantthatreliefisbeingofferedandwhatitis.
47. Itwasunacceptableforthedefendantnottoaddresstheissuesonceanadequately formulatedletterofclaimwasreceived.Intheabsenceofanadequateresponse,a Claimant was entitled to institute proceedings. If the claimant then obtained the reliefsoughtorsubstantiallysimilarrelief,theClaimantcouldexpecttobeawarded costsagainsttheDefendant.TheDefendantmustfollowthePracticeDirection(Pre Action Conduct) or any relevant preaction protocol. The procedure was not inflexible and an extension of time may be sought if supported by reasons. Notwithstanding their heavy workload, there is no special rule for government departments in this respect: that an order for costs would add to their financial burdens was not a reason for depriving other parties, including publicly funded parties,ofcoststowhichtheywereentitled. 48. The court said that it was not a good reason to deprive a publicly funded party of costsbecausethoseactingwillobtainsomeremunerationevenifnoorderismade. Itwasnolongeracceptabletomakenoorderbecauseitinvolvedtransferringfunds from one public body to another. Nor was it relevant that publicly funded lawyers are, or are claimed to be, inadequately remunerated. Whether an order for costs shouldbemadedependsonthemeritsoftheparticularapplication,andthespecific circumstancesneedtobeanalysed. 49. Thecourtexpressedseriousreservationsaboutthedefendantsclaimtoavoidcosts whenaclaimissettledforpurelypragmaticreasons.Althoughtheremaybecases in which relief is granted for reasons entirely unconnected with the claim made, there would need to be a clearly expressed explanation which would need to be analysed. 50. The starting point in the CPR is that a successful claimant was entitled to his/her costs,andcompliancewiththepreactionprotocolwasimportant.Adefendantwho has not complied with it should not be able to invoke the principle in R (Boxall) v Waltham Forest LBC (2001) 4 CCLR 258 that costs orders should not discourage settlement. The court emphasised that the circumstances of each case do require analysis and, although the principle of proportionality requires some limits to be placedonthis,judgesshouldnotbetooeasilydeterred.
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51. In M v London Borough of Croydon [2012] EWCA Civ 595 the Court gave general guidanceoncostsissuesinrelationtoAdministrativeCourtcaseswhichsettledon allissuessaveastocosts.Inthiscase,alocalauthorityhadconcededaclaimmade byanasylumseekerinrelationtohisage.Thelocalauthorityeventuallyconceded theClaimantsagebutrefusedtopaythecostsoftheproceedings. 52. TheCourtreviewedtheauthoritiesandheldthatfollowingR(Bahta)vSSHD[2011] EWCACiv895thegeneralrulewasthatwhereaClaimantobtainedallthereliefhe sought, whether by consent or after a contested hearing, he was the successful party and was entitled to all of his costs unless there was a good reason to the contrary. However, where a Claimant only obtained some of the relief which he sought the position on costs was more nuanced. In such cases, there could be argument as to which party was more successful in light of the relief which was soughtandnotobtained,or,eveniftheClaimantwasacceptedtobethesuccessful party, there might be an argument as to the importance of the issue, or costs relatingtotheissue,onwhichhefailed.Whilsttheallocationofcostswoulddepend onthespecificfacts,therewasnoreasonwhyaClaimantshouldnotrecoverallof his costs where he was successful. Where he is only partially successful, the Court would normally determine questions such as how reasonable the Claimant was in pursingtheunsuccessfulclaim,howimportantitwascomparedwiththesuccessful claim and how much the costs were increased as a result of pursuing the unsuccessful. In a case where there had been some compromise which did not actuallyreflecttheClaimantsclaimsthecourtwasoftenunabletogaugewhether therewasasuccessfulpartyinanyrespectandinsuchcasestherewasanargument thatthedefaultpositionshouldbenoorderforcosts. 53. Intheinstantcase,theCourtawardedtheClaimant50%ofhiscostsuntilpermission and 100% thereafter. The factors which the Court took into account included the factthatthelocalauthorityhadampletimetodealwiththeissuebeforetheclaim was issued and until permission was granted. The local authority had failed to acknowledgeserviceuntiltheywerewelloutoftime.
54. InAL(Albania)vSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment[2012]EWCACiv710 theCourtgaveguidance astotheappropriatecostsorderwherestatutory asylum andimmigrationappealsweredisposedofbyconsentandwheretheappellantshad obtainedabenefitfromtheappellateprocess,namelyeitheraremittaltotheUpper Tribunalorthegrantofsomestatus. 55. The court found that the appellants were clearly identifiable as the successful parties and they were therefore entitled to their costs underCPR r.44.3(2)(a). Accordingly,thecrucialquestionwastheidentificationofthesuccessfulparty.Lord JusticeMauriceKaysaidat[23]: ItfollowsfromwhatIhavesaidthatthecrucialquestionincasessuchas thiswillbetheidentificationofthesuccessfulparty.Astothis,therecent guidanceinMwillberelevantinthepresentcontext,eventhoughweare notinPreActionProtocolterritory.Itisdifficulttoseewhy,specialprotocol considerationsapart,thepositionshouldbesignificantlydifferent.Afterall, in the context of a second appeal, the respondent will usually be familiar with the appellants case well before the determination of the UT. I understand why the Secretary of State usually chooses not to engage with an appeal to this Court before permission to appeal has been granted (althoughshewillhavebeenservedwiththeappellantsnoticewellbeforea LordJusticehasconsideredtheapplicationforpermissiononthepapers).It isamatterofprioritisingresources,astowhichtheseareespeciallydifficult times.However,thatisnotasufficientreasontoplaceabarrierintheway of an identifiably successful appellant. I repeat, indeed, emphasise, that there may be circumstances in a particular case where, for example, the identificationofsuccessisnotstraightforward,orwhereidentifiedsuccessis accompanied by some feature which raises a genuine conduct issue, or where the Court finds itself unable to come to a clear conclusion without embarking upon a disproportionate investigation. However, if the present casesaretypical,suchconsiderationswillnotbethenorm.
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OralHearings Summary 56. TherelevantruleiscontainedinCPRrule54.18whichstates: Thecourtmaydecidetheclaimforjudicialreviewwithoutahearingwhereall thepartiesagree. 57. TheCourtalsohaswiderangingpowersofcasemanagement.Underthegeneral rulesfordealingwithapplicationsrule23.8provides: Thecourtmaydealwithanapplicationwithoutahearingif (a) (b) thepartiesagreeastothetermsoftheordersought; thepartiesagreethatthecourtshoulddisposeoftheapplication withoutahearing,or (c) RecentDevelopments 58. In BP v SSHD [2011] EWCA Civ 276 the appellant appealed against the refusal to granthimanoralhearinginrelationtohisclaimforjudicialreviewofadecisionof the respondent Secretary of State made under the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999s.4.Priortothehearing,theClaimantwasgrantedindefiniteleavetoremain andwasnolongerentitledtowelfaresupportunders.4ofthe1999Act.TheCourt thereforeconsideredthatthematterwasacademicandorderedthatthehearingbe listedforformaldisposal.Formaldisposaldidnotincludearighttoanoralhearing. The Claimant therefore requested an oral hearing to determine whether his claim shouldproceedonthebasisthatitwasnotpurelyacademicbutthatapplicationwas refused. thecourtdoesnotconsiderthatahearingwouldbeappropriate.
59. TheCourtagreedthattheCPRdidnotcontemplatefinalordersoncivilclaimsbeing made without the opportunity for an oral hearing. Rule 54.18 applied to a final decisiononaclaimforjudicialreview.Theruledealtspecificallyandexclusivelywith claimsforjudicialreviewandcoveredthepresentsituation.Wherepermissionhad beengranted,theclaimantwasentitledtoahearing.Theeffectoftherulewasthat, unlessallpartiesagreedthattheclaimforjudicialreviewmightbedecidedwithout ahearing,theentitlementexisted.LordJusticePillputitasfollowsat[28][29]: In my judgment, CPR 54.18 applies to the final decision on a claim for judicial review. The rule deals specifically and exclusively with claims for judicialreviewandcoversthepresentsituation.Wherepermissiontoapply hasbeengranted,theclaimantisentitledtoahearing. The effect of the rule is that, unless all parties agree that the claim for judicial review may be decided without a hearing, the entitlement exists. That accords with fundamental principle, which is not diluted by the rules. Forthispurpose,adecisionthattheclaimforjudicialreviewshouldnotbe decidedonitsmerits,whetherforlackofstandingoftheclaimant,orother reason,isneverthelessadecisionontheclaimforjudicialreviewwithinthe meaning of r 54.18. The decision has the effect of finally determining the claim.Idonotfindthatconstructionartificial. Appeals 60. InMedicalJusticevSSHD[2011]EWCACiv269thecharityMedicalJusticehadbeen successfulintheirapplicationforjudicialreview.TheSecretaryofStateappliedfor permissiontoappeal.Permissiontoappealwasgrantedbythejudgeontermsthat, whatevertheoutcomeoftheappeal,MedicalJusticehadthebenefitofaprotective costs order and the Secretary of State would pay Medical Justices costs of the appeal.TheSecretaryofStateappealedagainstthetermsuponwhichpermissionto appealwasgiven. 61. TheCourtofAppealsaidthatitwasnotopentotheSecretaryofStatetoappealthe conditionsattachedtothegrantofpermission.Therewerethreeoptionsopento
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the Secretary of State: (a) he could abandon the prospective appeal; (b) he could accept the terms; or (c) he could treat the conditional permission as a refusal of permissiontoappealandmakeafreshapplicationoftheappellatecourt.However, the appellant could not seek to improve his position by appealing the conditions attachedtothegrantofpermission.Iftheissueweretobebroughttotheappellate court it was appropriate that the court should be able to reconsider all aspects of theissueofpermissiontoappeal,notjusttheconditionsattached. 62. In MD (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ194theClaimant,afailedasylumseeker,appliedforpermissiontobringjudicial against the decision for his removal and for interim relief. The application for permission and interim relief was refused by the judge. The Claimant appealed against the decision to the Court of Appeal. The issue was whether the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to consider the refusal of permission to apply for judicial reviewaswellastherefusaltograntinterimrelief. 63. TheCourtfoundthatitwasgenerallyinappropriatefortheCourtofAppealtohear bothanappealagainsttherefusaloftheAdministrativeCourttograntinterimrelief and an appeal against the refusal on the papers to apply for judicial review. Lord JusticeStanleyBurntonstatedat[18][20]: Weconsideritimportanttomaintainthedistinctionbetweenarefusalof interimreliefandarefusalofpermissiontoapplyforjudicialreview.Interim relief may be refused although the Court has not decided to refuse permission to apply for judicial review, as where no sufficient case of urgency is made out. Conversely, it may be appropriate to grant interim reliefeventhoughnodecisionhasbeenmadetograntpermissiontoapply forjudicialreview. There are two interrelated reasons why, in our judgment, it is in general inappropriatefortheCourtofAppeal,inacasesuchasthepresent,tohear both an appeal against the refusal by the Administrative Court of interim reliefandanappealagainstitsrefusalonthepapersofpermissiontoapply
for judicial review. The first is that to do so converts the Court of Appeal, which is an appellate court, into a court of first instance. The Court of Appeal would have to determine the appeal without the benefit of any judgmentatfirstinstance.CPRPart52.15(4)makesexpressprovisionforthe Court of Appeal to act as a court of first instance, but even in such a case therewillbeajudgmentoftheAdministrativeCourtonthehearingofthe renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review, giving its reasonsforitsdecision. The second, and perhaps more important, reason is that for the Court of Appeal to act as a courtof first instance effectively deprives the parties of anyappealagainstthefirstjudicialdecisiononthesubstanceofthecase. 64. The Court found that it would contravene CPR r. 54.12(3) if the Court of Appeal consideredthejudicialreviewclaim.Onlyifanoralrenewalwasunsuccessfulcould theClaimantappealtotheCourtofAppeal. 65. HalligenvSSHD[2012]UKSC20concernedtherequirementsofanoticeofappeal. InMucellivAlbania[2009]UKHL2theHouseofLordsheldthattherequirementsin sections26(4)and103(9)oftheExtraditionAct2003meantthatanoticeofappeal hadtobebothfiledintheHighCourtandservedonallrespondentstotheappeal within the time limit. The Supreme Court did not depart from Mucelli but a generousviewshouldbetakenastowhatconstitutedgivingnoticeofappeal.
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Slide 1
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE UPDATE
Annabel Lee
alee@4-5.co.uk
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Slide 2
Standing
R (Williams) v Surrey CC [2012] EWHC 516: It is clear that there are a wide range of people who can legitimately claim to have an interest in the implementation in accordance with the Act of policies involving libraries, and that interest can extend, quite legitimately, way beyond those who live, work or pay local taxes within the Surrey County Council area.
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Slide 3
Delay (1)
CPR rule 54.5 Section 31 Senior Courts Act R (U & Partners (East Anglia) Ltd) v Broads Authority [2011] EWHC 1824 (Admin) R (Berky) v Newport City Council [2012] EWCA Civ 378 R (Macrae) v Herefordshire DC [2012] EWCA Civ 457
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Slide 4
Delay (2)
R (Offerton Park Parish Council) v Stockport MBC [2011] ACD 120 Allman v HM Coroner for West Sussex [2012] EWHC 534 (Admin) R (Williams) v Surrey CC [2012] EWHC 516 R (Kilroy) v Parrs Wood High School [2011] EWHC 3489 (Admin)
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Slide 5
Academic challenges
R (Kilroy) v Parrs Wood High School Governing Body [2011] EWHC 3489 (Admin) Submission that proceedings were academic must be approached with some circumspection Did not entitle the Defendant to avoid a finding of unlawfulness
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Slide 6
Protective Cost Orders (1)

Costs CPR 44 Corner House principles have been refined by subsequent case law:
Principles should be applied flexibly: Buglife As to issue of public importance or public interest, see Compton No private interest rule narrowly interpreted and best viewed as a relevant factor: Wilkinson v
Kitzinger
Medical Justice [2011] EWCA Civ 269: principles relevant to amount of reciprocal costs capping set out.
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100
101 Slide 7
Different principles now appear to apply to some environmental judicial reviews. Article 9 of the Aarhus Convention: review procedure before a court not prohibitively expensive. This formulation adopted in the EIA and IPPC Directives. R (Garner) v Elmbridge BC [2010] EWCA Civ 1006 R (Edwards) v Enviroment Agency (No.2) [2010] UKSC 57
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Slide 8
R (Young) v Oxford City Council [2012] EWCA Civ 46 Principles still essentially those in Corner House Garner did not apply here. Did not satisfy Corner House principles MoJ Consultation: Cost Protection for Litigants in Environmental Judicial Review Claims
Consultation ended 18 January 2012
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Slide 9

R (Simmons) v Bolton MBC [2011] EWHC 2729 (Admin) application to vary or set aside PCO.
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Slide 10
Costs in general
R (Bahta) v SSHD [2011] EWCA Civ 895 Settled for purely pragmatic reasons M v London Borough of Croydon [2012] EWCA Civ 595 Successful/partially successful Claimant AL (Albania) v SSHD [2012] EWCA Civ 710 Statutory asylum and immigration appeals
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Slide 11
Oral hearings
BP v Secretary of State [2011] EWCA Civ 276: Where permission to apply has been granted, the claimant is entitled to an oral hearing. The effect of the rule is that, unless all parties agree that the claim for judicial review may be decided without a hearing, the entitlement exists. That accords with fundamental principle, which is not diluted by rules.
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Slide 12
Appeals
Medical Justice v SSHD [2011] EWCA Civ 269 Appeal against conditions attached to permission MD (Afghanistan) v SSHD [2012] EWCA Civ 194 Appeal against interim relief and refusal of permission Halligen v SSHD [2012] UKSC 20 Requirements of a notice of appeal
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102
103
POLICIES:THEEXPANDINGROLEOFTHECOURTS
JonathanMoffett Introduction
1.
Public bodies frequently adopt policies setting out the approach that they will normallytakewhenexercisingdiscretionsentrustedtothem.Similarly,bodieswith overarchingresponsibilityforparticularfieldsofactivity(suchascentralgovernment departments)oftenissuepolicies(intheformofguidance,circulars,etc)statingthe approachthatotherpublicbodiesoperatingwiththosefieldsshouldusuallyadopt whenexercisingtheirdiscretions.
2.
The common thread linking such policies is that they set out how discretions will normally be exercised, albeit with varying degrees of specificity. The courts have long recognised that such policies have the twin benefits of ensuring consistency and guarding against arbitrariness in decisionmaking, 268 particularly where the exerciseofthediscretioninquestionisacomplextask. 269
3.
Accordingly,thecourtshavegenerallyheldthatpublicbodiesareentitledtoadopt policies as to how they will exercise their discretions, even if there is no express statutory mandate for them to do so. 270 However, the courts have been astute to ensure that the adoption of such policies does not trespass upon a public bodys overridingobligationtoensurethatitapproachesitsdiscretionswithanopenmind.
4.
Accordingly,itislongsettledthatpoliciesmustnotbeoverrigid,andmustallowfor exceptionstobemadeinparticularcases. 271 Similarly,althoughapublicbodymust
R v Hampshire County Council, ex p W [1994] ELR 460, QBD, 475 per Sedley J; R v Ministry for Agriculture, FisheriesandFood,expHamble(Offshore)FisheriesLtd[1995]2AllER714,QBD,722perSedleyJ;R(Alconbury DevelopmentsLtd)vSecretaryofStatefortheEnvironment,TransportandtheRegions[2001]UKHL23,[2003]2 AC295,para143perLordClyde(quotedinparagraph4below). 269 InreFindlay[1985]1AC318,HL,335perLordScarman. 270 CumingsvBirkenheadCorporation[1972]1Ch12,CA,37perLordDenningMR;StringervMinisterofHousing andLocalGovernment[1970]1WLR1281,QBD,12971298perCookeJ. 271 Stringer v Minister of Housing and Local Government [1970] 1 WLR 1281, QBD, 12971298 per Cooke J; Gransden & Co Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment (1985) 54 P&CR 86, QBD, 93 per Woolf J; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Venables [1998] AC 407, HL, 496497 per Lord Browne
268
consider each case before it in the light of any relevant policy and should only depart from such a policy for good reason, 272 it must not be overly rigid in its application of that policy and a policy should not be treated as automatically determiningtheoutcomeofaparticularcase. 273 Inparticular,apublicbodymustbe prepared to consider making exceptions to its policy. 274 As Lord Clyde said in R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport andtheRegions: 275 Theformulationofpoliciesisaperfectlypropercoursefortheprovisionof guidanceintheexerciseofanadministrativediscretion.Indeedpoliciesare an essential element in securing the coherent and consistent performance ofadministrativefunctions.Thereareadvantagesbothtothepublicandthe administrators in having such policies. Of course there are limits to be observed in the way policies are applied. Blanket decisions which leave no room for particular circumstances may be unreasonable. What is crucial is thatthepolicymustnotfettertheexerciseofthediscretion.Providedthat the policy is not regarded as binding and the authority still retains a free exercise of discretion the policy may serve the useful purpose of giving a reasonableguidancebothtoapplicantsanddecisionmakers.
5.
Policiesareusuallysusceptibletojudicialreviewand,ifunlawful,theyareliableto bequashed.Thisisdespitethefactthatpoliciesthemselvesrarelyhaveanydirect legalconsequencesforanindividual,butonlyimpactonanindividualindirectlyasa resultofadecisiontakenpursuanttothem.
6.
Indeed, the courts are increasingly prepared to countenance freestanding challengestopolicies,withouttheneedforsuchchallengestobetiedto claimsin respect of particular decisions taken pursuant to the relevant policy. 276 More recently, there has been a tendency on the part of the courts to consider more generalissuesconcerningpoliciesintheirownright,asdistinctfromtheimpactof
Wilkinson;R(AlconburyDevelopmentsLtd)vSecretaryofStatefortheEnvironment,TransportandtheRegions [2001]UKHL23,[2003]2AC295,para143perLordClyde. 272 R(Lumba)vSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment[2011]UKSC12,[2012]1AC245,para26perLord DysonJSC. 273 BritishOxygenCoLtdvMinisterofTechnology[1971]AC620,HL,625perLordReid;RvHampshireCounty Council,expW[1994]ELR460,QBD,475476perSedleyJ;RvMinistryforAgriculture,FisheriesandFood,exp Hamble(Offshore)FisheriesLtd[1995]2AllER714,QBD,722perSedleyJ. 274 RvPortofLondonAuthority,expKynochLtd[1919]1KB176,CA,184perBankesLJ;BritishOxygenCoLtdv MinisterofTechnology[1971]AC620,HL,625perLordReid;RvMinistryforAgriculture,FisheriesandFood,exp Hamble(Offshore)FisheriesLtd[1995]2AllER714,QBD,722723perSedleyJ. 275 [2001] UKHL 23, [2003] 2 AC 295, para 143 per Lord Clyde. See also R v Secretary of State for the Home Department,expVenables[1998]AC407,HL,496497perLordBrowneWilkinson. 276 AstrikingexampleofthisisR(EqualityandHumanRightsCommission)vPrimeMinister[2011]EWHC2401 (Admin),[2012]1WLR1389.
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policies on the exercise of specific decisionmaking functions. This tendency is discernableinthreemainareas:
(1) (2) (3)
theimpositionofadutytohavepoliciesincertaincircumstances; theimpositionofadutytopublishpolicies;and theroleofthecourtswheninterpretingpolicies.
7.
However, there remains at least one area where the courts remain reluctant to intervene:thatofthepowersofpublicbodiestochangetheirpoliciesovertime.
Adutytohaveapolicyincertaincircumstances
8.
Legislationmightprovidethatapublicbodyhasadutytoadoptapolicyastohowit willexercise adiscretion. Absentsuchastatutoryduty,however,itisunlikelythat the commonlawwillimposeadutyonapublicbodytohavea policy.Althoughit hasonoccasionbeensuggestedthatincertaincircumstancesitmaybeirrationalfor a public body not to have a policy as to how it will exercise a discretion, 277 the circumstanceswherethatwillbethecasearelikelytobeextremelyrare.
9.
However, in cases where a public authority 278 has a power, the exercise of which involves interference with an individuals Convention rights, usually it will only be abletojustifysuchaninterference(assumingtherelevantinterferenceiscapableof justificationundertheConvention)ifitisprescribedbylaworinaccordancewith thelaw. 279 Thisrequirementwillonlybemetifthelawastotherelevantpoweris sufficientlyaccessibletotheindividualandsufficientlyprecisetoenablehimorher tounderstanditsscopeandforeseetheconsequencesofhisorheractionssothat heorshecanregulatehisorherconductaccordingly. 280
RvNorthWestLancashireHealthAuthority,expA[2000]1WLR977,CA,991perAuldLJ(AuldLJscomments weremadeinthecontextofthedesirabilityofhealthauthoritieshavingpoliciesastohowtheywouldallocate funding for different types of medical treatment). See also In re Findlay [1985] 1 AC 318, HL, 335 per Lord Scarman, where in the context of the Secretary of States power to release longterm prisoners on parole, he commented that he had difficulty in understanding how a Secretary of State could properly manage the complexitiesofhisstatutorydutywithoutapolicy. 278 Asdefinedbys6oftheHumanRightsAct1998. 279 Astotheformerrequirement,seearts9(2),10(2),11(2)oftheConvention;astothelatter,seeart8(2)ofthe Convention.Bothphraseshavethesamemeaning:SilvervUnitedKingdom(1983)5EHRR347,ECtHR,para85. 280 SundayTimesvUnitedKingdom(1979)2EHRR245,ECtHR,para49;R(Purdy)vDirectorofPublicProsecutions [2009]UKHL45,[2010]1AC345,para40perLordHope.
277
10.
Whilst a law that confers a discretion is not necessarily inconsistent with this requirement, the scope of the discretion and the manner of its exercise must be indicated with sufficient clarity to give the individual protection against arbitrary interference. 281 When considering whether this is the case, the courts will have regardtoanypolicygoverningtheexerciseofthediscretion 282 and,incertaincases, a public authority will be required to have a policy as to how it will exercise its discretion.Forexample,inR(Purdy)vDirectorofPublicProsecutions, 283 theHouse ofLordsheldthattheDirectorofPublicProsecutionswasrequiredbyart8 ofthe Conventiontohaveapolicyonhowhewouldexercisehisdiscretiontoprosecutein casesofassistedsuicide.SimilarsentimentswereexpressedbyLordPhillipsPSCin therecentcaseofR(Lumba)vSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment: 284 itwasnecessaryfortheSecretaryofStatetohavepoliciesinrelationto the exercise of her powers of detention of immigrants and that those policies had to be published. This necessity springs from the standards of administrationthatpubliclawrequiresandbytherequirementofarticle5 that detention should be lawful and not arbitrary. Decisions as to the detentionofimmigrantshadtobetakenbyaverylargenumberofofficials inrelationtotensofthousandsofimmigrants.Unlesstherewereuniformly appliedpractices,decisionswouldbeinconsistentandarbitrary.
11.
Inthiscontext,itshouldbenotedthattheneedforapolicytoenvisageexceptionsis likely to be particularly acute in cases where Convention rights are at stake: if a policycontemplatesaninterferencewithaConventionrightregardlessofindividual circumstances,itmaybedifficulttojustifythatinterferenceincertaincases. 285 This isbecauseaninterferencewithaConventionrightcanusuallyonlybejustifiedifthe interference is proportionate, and if a blanket approach is applied regardless of
GoodwinvUnitedKingdom(1996)22EHRR123,ECtHR,para31;HasanandChaushvBulgaria(2000)34EHRR 1339, ECtHR, para 84; R (Gillan) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2006] UKHL 12, [2006] 2 AC 307, paras3133perLordBingham;R(Purdy)vDirectorofPublicProsecutions[2009]UKHL45,[2010]1AC345,paras 41,43perLordHope;GillanvUnitedKingdom(2010)50EHRR1105,ECtHR,para77. 282 See, for example, R (Munjaz) v Mersey Care NHS Trust [2005] UKHL 58, [2006] 2 AC 148, para 34 per Lord Bingham, paras 9194 per Lord Hope, where the combination of a nonstatutory policy adopted by the public authorityandstatutoryguidancetopublicauthoritiesissuedbytheSecretaryofStatewassufficienttocomply withrequirementsoftheConvention.SeealsoSvUnitedKingdom(2009)48EHRR50,ECtHR,para97,wherethe European Court of Human Rights appears to have treated guidelines issued by the Association of Chief Police Officers as forming part of the law governing the retention of biometric material by police forces; Gillan v United Kingdom (2010) 50 EHRR 1105, ECtHR, para 78, where the European Court of Human Rights seems to have accepted that a code of practice governing stop and search powers formed part of the law for the purposesofart8oftheConvention. 283 [2009]UKHL45,[2010]1AC345. 284 [2011]UKSC12,[2012]1AC245,para302 285 R(P)vSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment[2001]EWCACiv1151,[2001]1WLR2002,paras99106.
281
106
107
individualcircumstances,thenitwillbemoredifficulttopersuadeacourtthatthe interferenceisproportionate. 286 Adutytopublishpolicies
12.
Legislationmayrequirethatapolicybepublished.However,wherethereisnosuch requirement (such as where a policy is nonstatutory), the question arises of whetherthereisadutytopublishthepolicy(or,attheleast,tomakeitavailableto individuals who may be affected by the exercise of the relevant discretion). There has been a clear trend of the courts requiring the publication of policies, an approach that has recently been confirmed by the Supreme Court in R (Lumba) v SecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment. 287
13.
In Lumba, the Supreme Court considered a situation where the Home Office had applied an unpublished policy which involved a presumption against releasing certaincategoriesofindividualfromimmigrationdetention,contrarytoapublished policywhich statedthat theopposite presumption wouldbeapplied. TheCourtof Appealhadheldthatthereisnogeneralruleoflawthatapolicymustbepublished or,ifitisnot,thatthepolicycanbecategorisedasunlawfulforthatreasonalone, 288 and held that the only legal difficulty that arose from the nonpublication of the applicable policy was the fact that the Secretary of State acted inconsistently with her published policy. 289 The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeal were wrong.
14.
TheSupremeCourtheldthattheruleoflawcallsforatransparentstatementbythe executive of the circumstances in which it will exercise statutory discretions, particularly where they are broad discretions affecting individuals fundamental rights. 290 LordDysonJSC,whogavetheleadingjudgment,expresslyendorsed 291 the statementinR(Salih)vSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartmentthatforapublic body to withhold information about its policy as to how a statutory power will be
286 287
See,forexample,SvUnitedKingdom(2009)48EHRR50,ECtHR,paras101126. [2011]UKSC12,[2012]1AC245. 288 R(WL(Congo))vSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment[2010]EWCACiv111,[2010]1WLR2168,para 70. 289 Ibid,para79. 290 [2011]UKSC12,[2012]1AC245,para34perLordDysonJSC. 291 Ibid,para36perLordDysonJSC.
exercisedis,ingeneral,inconsistentwiththeconstitutionalimperativethatthelaw be open and accessible. 292 This is particularly likely to be so where the policy in effectdefinesthescopeofanentitlement,wherethesubjectmatteroftherelevant decisionisimportanttotheindividual,orwherehumanrightsareengaged. 293
15.
Inparticular,theSupremeCourtheldthatthefactthatanindividualhasarightto havehisorhercaseconsideredpursuanttoalawfulpolicygivesrisetoacorrelative right to know what that policy is so that he or she can make meaningful representationsinrelationtoitorchallengeadecisiontakenpursuanttoit. 294 This themethatfairnessmayrequirethatapolicybepublished,sothatanindividualhas the opportunity to know the basis on which a decision in his or her case will be reached and so that he or she can address the public body as to the policys applicationtohisorhercase,hasbeenrecognisedinearliercases. 295 InLumba,Lord DysonJSCheld 296 thatthecommentsofLordSteyninR(Anufrijeva)vSecretaryof StatefortheHomeDepartmentinrelationtonotificationofdecisionswereequally applicabletopolicies: 297 Notice of a decision is required before it can have the character of a determinationwithlegaleffectbecausetheindividualconcernedmustbein apositiontochallengethedecisioninthecourtsifheorshewishestodoso. Thisisnotatechnicalrule.Itissimplyanapplicationoftherightofaccessto justice.
16.
TherewereanumberoffeaturesaboutLumbawhichmadeitparticularlylikelythat thecourtswouldholdthattherewasadutytopublishtherelevantpolicy,notleast the fact that the policy related to the particularly sensitive issue of detention, an areawherethefundamentalrightsofindividualsareengaged,andthefactthatthe unpublishedpolicydirectlycontradictedapublishedpolicy.Further,thepointasto the publication of the policy was in fact conceded by the Secretary of State in the
R (Salih) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWHC 2273 (Admin), para 52 per Stanley BurntonJ. 293 As was the case in R (Salih) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWHC 2273 (Admin): see paras4951perStanleyBurntonJ.Inrelationtothepublicationofpoliciesaffectingindividualsentitlements,see alsoRvSecretaryofStateforEducationandEmployment,expBegbie[2000]1WLR1115,CA,1132perSedleyLJ. 294 R(Lumba)vSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment[2011]UKSC12,[2012]1AC245,para35perLord DysonJSC,para190perLordWalkerJSC,para302perLordPhillipsPSC. 295 See,forexample,RvCriminalInjuriesCompensationBoard,expInce[1973]1WLR1334,CA,1345perMegaw LJ;R(QuarkFishingLtd)vSecretaryofStateforForeignandCommonwealthAffairs[2002]EWCACiv1409,para 58perLawsLJ. 296 [2011]UKSC12,[2012]1AC245,para35perLordDysonJSC. 297 [2003]UKHL36,[2004]1AC604,para26perLordSteyn.
292
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109
SupremeCourt, 298 andthereforethejudgmentsonthispointare,strictlyspeaking, obiter.Despitethesepotentiallydistinguishingfeatures,itisnonethelesslikelythat Lumba will be taken as an authoritative statement of the law in this context. Accordingly,itmustbelikelythatthecourtswillrequirethepublicationofpolicies that govern the exercise of discretions affecting individuals, unless there are compellingreasonsnottopublish. 299
17.
In cases where an interference with a Convention right can only be justified if the interferenceisinaccordancewiththelaworprescribedbylaw, 300 thelawmust besufficientlyaccessibletotheindividual. 301 Accordingly,whereapolicyastohow anadministrativediscretionwillbeexercisedconstitutespartofthelawforthat purpose, the policy will be subject to the same requirement of accessibility. It is difficulttoseehowthisrequirementcouldbesatisfiedunlesstherelevantpolicyis published. 302
18.
InLumba,theSupremeCourtdidnotgosofarastoholdthat,whereapolicymust bepublished,everydetailofitmustbepublished. 303 Inparticular,itheldthatitwas not necessary to publish details which are irrelevant to the substance of decisions madepursuanttoapolicy. 304 However,itheldthatsufficientdetailsofapolicymust bepublishedsothatapersonwhoisaffectedbyitsoperationknowswhatheorshe need to know in order to make informed and meaningful representations to the publicbodybeforeadecisionismade. 305
Theroleadoptedbythecourtswheninterpretingpolicies
[2012]1AC245,para27perLordDysonJSC. InLumba,LordDysonJSCgaveasanexamplepolicieswherenationalsecurityissuesareinplay:ibid,para38. 300 Astotheformerrequirement,seearts9(2),10(2),11(2)oftheConvention;astothelatter,seeart8(2)ofthe Convention.Bothphraseshavethesamemeaning:SilvervUnitedKingdom(1983)5EHRR347,ECtHR,para85. 301 SundayTimesvUnitedKingdom(1979)2EHRR245,ECtHR,para49;R(Purdy)vDirectorofPublicProsecutions [2009]UKHL45,[2010]1AC345,para40perLordHope. 302 R(Nadarajah)vSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment[2003]EWCACiv1768,[2004]INLR139,paras54, paras6467.InR(Purdy)vDirectorofPublicProsecutions[2009]UKHL45,[2010]1AC345,itwasheldthatthe Directorwasrequirednotjusttoadoptapolicyastohowhewouldexercisehisdiscretiontoprosecuteincases ofassistedsuicide,buttopublishit:seepara16perLordPhillips,para56perLordHope. 303 [2011]UKSC12,[2012]1AC245,para38perLordDysonJSC. 304 Thisaccordswiththeunderlyingrationaleforrequiringpublication. 305 [2011]UKSC12,[2012]1AC245,para38perLordDysonJSC.
299
298
19.
It is trite law that a public body must properly interpret and understand a policy appliedbyit:ifitdoesnot,itwillnothavehadproperregardtothatpolicy. 306 This raisestheissueofhowthecourtsshouldapproachtheinterpretationofpolicies.
20.
Generally,ifaquestionarisesastowhetherapublicbodyhasproperlyinterpreteda policy, the court will itself determine the true meaning of that policy. This is sometimesknownastheRaissiapproach,afterR(Raissi)vSecretaryofStateforthe Home Department, 307 where the Court of Appeal adopted this approach to the terms of a scheme to pay ex gratia compensation to persons detained after a wrongfulconviction. 308
21.
The principled justification for this approach is that an objective rather than a subjective approach to interpretation produces greater consistency and transparencyintheapplicationofthepolicy,thepromotionofsuchconsistencyand transparency being one of the reasons for having a policy or guidance in the first place. 309 AsLordSteynhassaid: 310 inrespectofthemanykindsofsoftlawswithwhichwearenowfamiliar, one must bear in mind that citizens are led to believe that the carefully draftedandconsideredstatementstrulyrepresentgovernmentpolicywhich will be observed in decisionmaking unless there is good reason to depart from it. It is an integral part of the working of a mature process of public administration.Suchpolicystatementsareanimportantsourceofindividual rights and corresponding duties. In a fair and effective public law system such policy statements must be interpreted objectively in accordance with thelanguageemployedbytheminister.Thecitizenisentitledtorelyonthe language of the statement, seen as always in its proper context. The very reasonformakingthestatementistogiveguidancetothepublic.Thepublic body,hereaminister,maydepartfromthepolicybutuntilhehasdoneso, thecitizenisentitledtoaskinacourtoflawwhetherhefairlycomeswithin the language of the publicly announced policy. That question, like all questionsofinterpretation,isoneoflaw.Andonsuchaquestionoflawit necessarilyfollowsthatthecourtdoesnotdefertotheminister:thecourtis boundtodecidesuchaquestionforitself,paying,ofcourse,closeattention
Gransden&CoLtdvSecretaryofStatefortheEnvironment(1985)54P&CR86,QBD,94perWoolfJ;Horsham DistrictCouncilvSecretaryofStatefortheEnvironment[1992]1PLR81,CA,88perNolanLJ,92perMcCowanLJ. SeealsoTescoStoresLtdvDundeeCityCouncil[2012]UKSC13,para17perLordReedJSC. 307 [2008]EWCACiv72,[2008]QB836. 308 ThecompensationschemeunderconsiderationinRaissiwasnot,strictlyspeaking,apolicy.Rather,itwasa nonstatutory scheme introduced pursuant to the royal prerogative, and there are important differences betweensuchschemesandpolicies:seeR(Elias)vSecretaryofStateforDefence[2006]EWCACiv1293,[2006]1 WLR3213,paras191194perMummeryLJ. 309 RvSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment,expUrmaza[1996]COD479,QBD,484perSedleyJ. 310 InreMcFarland[2004]UKHL 17,[2004]1WLR1289,para24.NotethatInreMcFarland concernedanon statutoryschemeandthatLordSteynconsideredthathewasdepartingfromthemajorityviewinthiscontext.
306
110
111
tothereasonsadvancedforthecompetinginterpretations.Thisisnottosay that policy statements must be construed like primary or subordinate legislation. It seems sensible that a broader and wholly untechnical approach should prevail. But what is involved is still an interpretative process conducted by a court which must necessarily be approached objectively and without speculation about what a particular minister may havehadinmind.
22.
Thisapproachhasbeenadoptedinthecontextsofguidancetohealthauthoritieson familyplanningservices, 311 guidancetotheDirectorofPassengerRailFranchising, 312 thepolicyoftheSecretaryofStateastohowhewouldsetthepenalelementofa prison sentence, 313 and guidance as in the context of payments between police forces. 314
23.
However,untilveryrecently,anexceptiontothisgeneralrulewasthoughttoapply inthefieldoftownandcountryplanning.Inthatcontext,localplanningauthorities arerequiredtohaveregardtoanextensiverangeofpoliciesandguidancewhichare oftennotintendedtobelegallybindingdocumentsinthestrictsense,whichoften utilise concepts and expressions which are not susceptible to a hardedged interpretative approach, and which envisage exercises of value judgment. 315 FollowingthedecisionoftheCourtofAppealinRvDerbyshireCountyCouncil,exp Woods, 316 in cases arising in this field the courts had usually merely asked themselveswhetherthepublicbodyhadadoptedaninterpretationoftherelevant policyorguidancethatitwascapable,asamatteroflaw,ofbearing. 317
GillickvWestNorfolkandWisbechAreaHealthAuthority[1986]AC112,HL,181perLordScarman. R v Director of Passenger Rail Franchising, ex p Save Our Railways (1996) CLC 589, CA, 601 per Sir Thomas BinghamMR. 313 RvSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment,expPierson[1998]AC539,HL,569perLordGoff. 314 RvSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment,expLancashirePoliceAuthority[1992]COD161,QBD,162 perWebsterJ. 315 CranageParishCouncilvFirstSecretaryofState[2004]EWHC2949(Admin),[2005]2P&CR23(p390),para 49perDavisJ. 316 [1998]EnvLR277,CA. 317 R v Derbyshire County Council, ex p Woods [1998] Env LR 277, CA, 290291 per Brooke LJ. See also R (Springhall)vRichmonduponThamesLondonBoroughCouncil[2006]EWCACiv19,[2006]LGR419,paras7,29 per Auld LJ; South Cambridgeshire District Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2008] EWCA Civ 1010, [2009] PTSR 37, para 15 per Scott Baker LJ; and the review of relevant authorities in CranageParishCouncilvFirstSecretaryofState[2004]EWHC2949(Admin),[2005]2P&CR23(p390),paras44 48perDavisJ.Note,however,thatinTescoStoresLtdvDundeeCityCouncil[2012]UKSC13,para20perLord ReedJSC,theSupremeCourtappearedtodoubtthattheexpWoodscasenecessarilyhadtheeffectattributed toit.
312 311
24.
However,thisapproachwasnotuniversallyadopted, 318 andinMarchthisyear,the SupremeCourtheldthat,atleastinrelationtoapolicyorguidancewhichformspart ofastatutorydevelopmentplan,itsproperinterpretationisamatteroflawforthe court,andnottherelevantpublicbody.TheleadingjudgmentinTescoStoresLtdv DundeeCityCouncilwasgivenbyLordReedJSC,whosaid: 319 [17] Ithaslongbeenestablishedthataplanningauthoritymustproceed upon a proper understanding of the development plan... The need for a proper understanding follows, in the first place, from the fact that the planningauthorityisrequiredbystatutetohaveregardtotheprovisionsof thedevelopmentplan:itcannothaveregardtotheprovisionsoftheplanif itfailstounderstandthem.Italsofollowsfromthelegalstatusgiventothe developmentplanbys25ofthe1997Act[320] [18] Inthepresentcase,theplanningauthoritywasrequiredbys25to consider whether the proposed development was in accordance with the development plan and, if not, whether material considerations justified departing from the plan. In order to carry out that exercise, the planning authorityrequiredtoproceedonthebasisofwhatLordClydedescribedas a proper interpretation of the relevant provisions of the plan. We were howeverreferredbycounseltoanumberofjudicialdictawhichweresaidto support the proposition that the meaning of the development plan was a matter to be determined by the planning authority: the court, it was submitted, had no role in determining the meaning of the plan unless the viewtakenbytheplanningauthoritycouldbecharacterisedasperverseor irrational.Thatsubmission,ifcorrect,woulddeprivess25and37(2)[321]of the1997Actofmuchoftheireffect,andwoulddraintheneedforaproper interpretationoftheplanofmuchofitsmeaningandpurpose.Itwouldalso makelittlepracticalsense.Thedevelopmentplanisacarefullydraftedand considered statement of policy, published in order to inform the public of the approach which will be followed by planning authorities in decision makingunlessthereisgoodreasontodepartfromit.Itisintendedtoguide the behaviour of developers and planning authorities. As in other areas of administrative law, the policies which it sets out are designed to secure consistency and direction in the exercise of discretionary powers, while allowingameasureofflexibilitytoberetained.Thoseconsiderationspoint away from the view that the meaning of the plan is in principle a matter whicheachplanningauthorityisentitledtodeterminefromtimetotimeas it pleases, within the limits of rationality. On the contrary, these considerationssuggestthatinprinciple,inthisareaofpublicadministration asinothers(asdiscussed,forexample,inR(Raissi)vSecretaryofStatefor the Home Department), policy statements should be interpreted
See,forexample,Gransden&CoLtdvSecretaryofStatefortheEnvironment(1985)54P&CR86,QBD,93per Woolf J. In Carpets of Worth Ltd v Wye Forest DC (1991) 62 P&CR 334, CA, the court itself determined the meaningofacircularissuedbytheSecretaryofState.Further,attemptshadbeenmadetoconfinethescopeof RvDerbyshireCountyCouncil,expWoods[1998]EnvLR277,CA:see,forexample,R(SainsburysSupermarkets Ltd)vFirstSecretaryofState[2005]EWCACiv520,para16. 319 [2012]UKSC13,paras1721. 320 I.e. s 25 of the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1997, the Scottish equivalent to s 38(6) of the PlanningandCompulsoryPurchaseAct2004. 321 TheScottishequivalenttos70(2)oftheTownandCountryPlanningAct1990.
318
112
113
objectively in accordance with the language used, read as always in its propercontext. [19] [P]lanningauthoritiesdonotliveintheworldofHumptyDumpty: theycannotmakethedevelopmentplanmeanwhatevertheywouldlikeit tomean. [21] Aprovisioninthedevelopmentplanwhichrequiresanassessment ofwhetherasiteissuitableforaparticularpurposecallsforjudgmentinits application. But the question whether such a provision is concerned with suitability for one purpose or another is not a question of planning judgment: it is a question of textual interpretation, which can only be answered by construing the language used in its context. In the present case,inparticular,thequestionwhetherthewordsuitable,inthepolicies in question, means suitable for the development proposed by the Applicant,orsuitableformeetingidentifieddeficienciesinretailprovision in the area, is not a question which can be answered by the exercise of planning judgment: it is a logically prior question as to the issue to which planningjudgmentrequirestobedirected.
25.
Inreachingthisconclusion,LordReedJSCexpresslydisapprovedofthewayinwhich theCourtofAppealsdecisioninexpWoodshadbeenunderstoodandapplied. 322
26.
The only other reasoned judgment in Dundee City Council wasgiven by Lord Hope DPSC,whoagreedwithLordReedJSC: 323 Weareconcernedherewithaparticularprovisionintheplanningdocuments to which the Respondents are required to have regard by the statute. The meaningtobegiventothecrucialphraseisnotamatterthatcanbelefttothe judgment of the planning authority. Noris the interpretation of the policy which it sets out primarily a matter for the decisionmaker I agree with Lord Reed that the issue is one of law, reading the words used objectively in their propercontext.
27.
Although the Supreme Courts decision in Dundee City Council related only to policiesandguidanceformingpartofastatutorydevelopmentplan,itislikelythata similarapproachwillinthefuturebeadoptedtootherpoliciesandguidanceinthe town and country planning field. Much of the Supreme Courts reasoning for adopting the approach that it did applies equally to other types of policies and guidance, and in the light of the approach adopted by the courts to policies and
322 323
[2012]UKSC13,para20. Ibid,para35.
guidance more generally, it is unlikely that any exception to the general rule will surviveinthefieldoftownandcountryplanning.
28.
There is a line of authority in the immigration context suggesting the courts will adoptasubjectiveapproachtointerpretationsimilartothatpreviouslyadoptedin thetownandcountryplanningfield.Inparticular,ithasonoccasionbeenheldthat the courts will not themselves seek to determine the meaning of the Secretary of Statesextrastatutorypolicies, 324 butwillonlyinterferewiththeSecretaryofStates interpretationofsuchapolicyifthatinterpretationisnotonewhichtheSecretaryof Statecouldreasonablyadopt. 325 However,itisdifficulttoseethisexceptiontothe generalrulebeingappliedinthefuture, 326 astheprincipledjustificationforadopting an objective approach to the interpretation of policies applies just as much, if not more so, in the immigration context as in other contexts: 327 immigration decisions canbeofacuteimportancetoindividualsandimmigrationpoliciesmaybeapplied acrossverymanycases.
29.
Whenconsideringwhatapolicymeans,orisproperlycapableofmeaning,acourt willreaditasawholeandinaccordancewiththenaturalandordinarymeaningof the words used. 328 A policy will be fairly construed in the light of the context in whichitwaspublished, 329 havingregardtoitspurposeandunderlyingobjective. 330 Inparticular,thecourtswillnotadoptthesametechnicalapproachthattheyadopt
I.e.policiesandguidanceotherthantheImmigrationRules. See, for example, R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Ozminnos [1994] Imm AR 287, QBD,292293perAuldJ;GangadeenvSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment[1998]ImmAR106,CA,115 perHirstLJ;R(Gashi)vSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment[2003]EWHC1198(Admin),paras1315per MauriceKayJ.CfRvSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment,expUrmaza[1996]COD479,QBD,484485 perSedleyJ,whichwasdoubtedinGangadeenvSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment[1998]ImmAR106, CA,115perHirstLJ. 326 ThequestionastowhichapproachshouldbeappliedtoextrastatutoryimmigrationpoliceswasleftopeninR (SS)vSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment[2008]EWHC2069(Admin),paras1822perBlairJ.However, inR(Kambadzi)vSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment[2011]UKSC23,[2011]1WLR1299,LordHope commented(atpara36)thatitwasforthecourts,andnottheSecretaryofState,tointerpretstatementsinthe Secretary of States Operational Enforcement Manual regarding the detention of individuals liable to deportation. 327 TheadoptionofanobjectiveapproachinthiscontextmustbeevenmorelikelyinthelightoftheSupreme CourtsdecisioninDundeeCityCouncilthatsuchanapproachshouldbeadoptedinthefieldoftownandcountry planning. 328 MahadvEntryClearanceOfficer[2009]UKSC16,[2010]1WLR48,para10perLordBrownJSC. 329 Carpets of Worth Ltd v Wye Forest DC (1991) 62 P&CR 334, CA, 345 per Purchas LJ; R (Howard League for PenalReform)vSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment[2002]EWHC2497(Admin),[2003]1FLR484,para 158perMunbyJ. 330 CranageParishCouncilvFirstSecretaryofState[2004]EWHC2949(Admin),[2005]2P&CR23(p390),para 50perDavisJ.
325
324
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115
in relation to, for example, the interpretation of statutes or contracts. 331 For example,inthecaseofacircularissuedbytheSecretaryofStategivingguidanceas to payments between police forces, it was held that it had to be construed in the wayinwhichaneducatedperson,acquaintedwith thecontext,wouldconstrueit, by giving it a common sense meaning and not by applying the fine legal rules of constructionthatwouldbeappliedtoastatute. 332 Makingchangestopolicies
30.
The courts have long recognised the important principle that the executive is ordinarily entitled to change its policies. 333 As Lord Diplock said in Hughes v DepartmentofHealthandSocialSecurity: 334 Administrativepoliciesmaychangewithchangingcircumstances,including changes in the political complexion of governments. The liberty to make such changes is something that is inherent in our constitutional form of government.
31.
Accordingly,subjecttoanyparticularstatutoryrequirementsandsubjecttoitacting in accordance with its ordinary public law duties, a public body will usually be entitledtoalteranypolicyissuedbyit. 335
32.
Insofaraspubliclawdutiesareconcerned,themostlikelysourceofanimpediment to a public body changing its policy is the doctrine of legitimate expectation: in certaincasestheconsistentapplicationofapolicybyapublicbodywillgiverisetoa legitimate expectation on the part of an individual that, notwithstanding the fact
Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112, HL, 180 per Lord Scarman; R v SecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment,expPierson[1998]AC539,HL,576577perLordBrowneWilkinson (dissentingastotheresult);MahadvEntryClearanceOfficer[2009]UKSC16,[2010]1WLR48,para10perLord BrownJSC;TescoStoresLtdvDundeeCityCouncil[2012]UKSC13,para19perLordReedJSC. 332 RvSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment,expLancashirePoliceAuthority[1992]COD161,QBD,162 perWebsterJ. 333 See,forexample,InreFindlay[1985]AC318,HL,338perLordScarman;RvSecretaryofStatefortheHome Department, ex p Ruddock [1987] 1 WLR 1482, QBD, 1497 per Taylor J; R v Secretary of State for Health, ex p UnitedStatesTobaccoInternationalInc[1992]1QB353,DC,369,perTaylorLJ,372perMorlandJ;RvSecretary ofStateforTransport,expRichmonduponThamesLondonBoroughCouncil[1994]1WLR74,QBD,93perLaws J;RvMinistryofAgricultureFisheriesandFood,expHamble(Offshore)FisheriesLtd[1995]2AllER714,QBD, 718 per Sedley J; R (BAPIO Action Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWCA Civ 1139, [2008]ACD7,para43perSedleyLJ;R(BhattMurphy)vIndependentAssessor[2008]EWCACiv755,para41per LawsLJ. 334 [1985]AC776,HL,788perLordDiplock. 335 See,forexample,RvSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment,expHargreaves[1997]1AllER397,CA, 412perHirstLJ.
331
that the public body has purported to change its policy, the previous policy will continuetobeappliedinthatindividualscase.
33.
However, the mere fact that a public body adopts a particular policy will not, withoutmore, 336 giverisetoaprocedurallegitimateexpectationthatitwillconsult before changing that policy or a substantive legitimate expectation that it will not changethepolicyatall. 337 Thisisthecaseevenwherethepolicyisappliedoveran appreciableperiodoftimeorwhereitisnotexpressedtobetimelimited.Inlightof the important principle that the executive is ordinarily entitled to make and to change policy, if an individual asserts a legitimate expectation that is said to arise out of the application of a general policy, it will usually be in a context where the generalpolicyitselfmaychange. 338
34.
It is only if the relevant policy has had a pressing and focussed impact on the individual seeking to rely upon it that it will give rise to a procedural legitimate expectationthattheindividualwillbe consulted beforethe policyischanged.This will only arise in exceptional situations 339 and will at least require there to be an individual or group who in reason have substantial grounds to expect that the substanceoftherelevantpolicywillcontinuetooperatefortheirparticularbenefit, ifnotforeverthenatleastforareasonableperiodtocushionanychanges. 340
35.
Similarly,forapolicytogiverisetoasubstantivelegitimateexpectationthatitwill notbechanged,itmustamounttoapressingandfocussedassurance,directedat aparticularindividualorgroup,bywhichthepolicyscontinuanceisensured. 341
36.
Itislikelythatthetermpressinginthiscontextrelatestotheforcewithwhichthe representationismade:themoreforcefulthepromiseandthemoreitisrepeated or reinforced, the more likely it is that it will give rise to a substantive legitimate
The position may be different if the policy gives some assurance as to the public bodys future conduct, in whichcaseitmayamounttoanexpressrepresentation. 337 R(BhattMurphy)vIndependentAssessor[2008]EWCACiv755,paras3435,49perLawsLJ.CfRvSecretaryof StatefortheHomeDepartment,expAsifMahmoodKhan[1984]1WLR1337,CA. 338 RvMinistryofAgricultureFisheriesandFood,expHamble(Offshore)FisheriesLtd[1995]2AllER741,729; OdelolavSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment[2008]EWCACiv308,para2perBuxtonLJ. 339 R(BhattMurphy)vIndependentAssessor[2008]EWCACiv755,para41perLawsLJ. 340 Ibid,para49perLawsLJ. 341 Ibid,paras43,46perLawsLJ.
336
116
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expectation. 342 For a representation to be focussed, it must usually have been confinedtoonepersonorafewpeople,givingtherepresentationthecharacterofa contract. 343 Again,thiswillonlyariseinexceptionalcircumstances. 344
37.
Asanalternativetotheaboveanalysis,ithasbeensuggestedthatentitlementofthe executivetomakeandtochangepolicymeansthatthefactthataparticularpolicyis adopted by a public body cannot give rise to a substantive legitimate expectation thatsuchapolicywillnotbechanged. 345 Instead,themostthatcanlegitimatelybe expected as a matter of substance is that any change of policy will not be implemented in such a way that unfairly frustrates any reliance that an individual has legitimately placed on it. 346 Such a substantive legitimate expectation would focusonthemanner,ratherthanthefact,ofthechangeofpolicyanditmayrequire thepublicbodytotakestepssuchasgivingnoticeofthechange,makingtransitional provisions,orprovidingforexceptions. 347
38.
Whereapublicbodypromulgatesapolicytobeappliedbyotherpublicbodies(such ascentralgovernmentguidance),itishighlyunlikelythattheapplicationofsucha policybythoseotherpublicbodiescouldofitselfgiverisetolegitimateexpectations
AlthoughinBhattMurphy,LawsLJdidnotexplainwhathemeantbypressing,hecitedRvNorthandEast Devon Health Authority, ex p Coughlan [1999] EWCA Civ 1871, [2001] QB 213, para 86 (where the Court of Appealreferredtoapromisethatwasmadeonanumberofoccasionsinprecisetermsandwhichwasrepeated and confirmed in order to provide reassurance) as an illustration of the type of pressing and focussed representationthathehadinmind. 343 RvNorthandEastDevonHealthAuthority,expCoughlan[1999]EWCACiv1871,[2001]QB213,paras59,69; R(BhattMurphy)vIndependentAssessor[2008]EWCACiv755,para46perLawsLJ;R(Bancoult)vSecretaryof State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No 2) [2008] UKHL 61, [2008] 3 WLR 955, para 134 per Lord Carswell. This approach is consistent with references in earlier authorities to it being an abuse of power for a decisionmakertoactinamannerthatwasanalogoustoabreachofcontract:e.g.InrePreston[1985]AC835, HL, 852 per Lord Scarman, 866867 per Lord Templeman; R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex p MFK Underwriting Agents Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 1545, DC, 1569 per Bingham LJ; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department,expPatel[1991]ImmAR14,21.CfR(Wheeler)vOfficeofthePrimeMinister[2008]EWHC1409 (Admin),DC,para44.Foranexampleofacasewheretherepresentationwasnotconfinedtoonepersonora few people (albeit that it was made to a defined group), see R (HSMP Forum Ltd) v Secretary of State for the HomeDepartment[2008]EWHC644(Admin),para38. 344 R(BhattMurphy)vIndependentAssessor[2008]EWCACiv755,para41perLawsLJ. 345 Ibid,para68perSedleyLJ. 346 RvMinistryofAgricultureFisheriesandFood,expHamble(Offshore)FisheriesLtd[1995]2AllER714,729 731;R(BhattMurphy)vIndependentAssessor[2008]EWCACiv755,para68perSedleyLJ.SeealsoRvNorthand EastDevonHealthAuthority,expCoughlan[1999]EWCACiv1871,[2001]QB213,para82. 347 R(BhattMurphy)vIndependentAssessor[2008]EWCACiv755,para70perSedleyLJ.SeealsoR(BAPIOAction Ltd)vSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment[2007]EWCACiv1139,[2008]ACD7,para19perSedleyLJ andRvMinistryofAgricultureFisheriesandFood,expHamble(Offshore)FisheriesLtd[1995]2AllER714,735.
342
as against them that, where there is a change in guidance, they will nonetheless continuetofollowpreviousguidance. 348
39.
Where a public body changes its policy in circumstances where, for example, an individual has already made an application pursuant to the previous policy, the questionofwhetherthenewpolicyorthepreviouspolicyshouldbeappliedwhen reaching a decision will generally depend on the proper interpretation of the new policy. 349 However, in certain cases, the common law presumption against retrospectivity or analogous principles of fairness may import a presumption that thenewpolicyshouldbeinterpretedinawaythatrequiresthatthepreviouspolicy beapplied. 350
14June2012
348
R(WL(Congo))vSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment[2010]EWCACiv111,[2010]1WLR2168,para 58. 349 OdelolavSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment[2009]UKHL25,[2009]1WLR1230,para4perLord Hoffmann,para55perLordNeuberger(consideringtheImmigrationRules). 350 Ibid,paras3135and39perLordBrown,paras4855perLordNeuberger.
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119 Slide 1
Policies: the expanding role of the courts
20 June 2012
___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________
www.4-5.co.uk
Jonathan Moffett
Slide 2
Introduction
Generally public bodies are entitled to adopt policies. Key principle in relation to application of policies is
avoiding rigidity.
Courts have become more interventionist in certain

respects: (1) the duty to have policies, (2) the duty to publish policies, and (3) the interpretation of policies.
___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________
Slide 3
The duty to have a policy

A common law duty to have a policy will arise only
exceptionally.
The ECHR may necessitate a policy if it is necessary

to ensure: (1) that the law is sufficiently accessible, and (2) the scope of a discretion is sufficiently precise.
___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________
Slide 4
The duty to publish policies

R (Lumba) v Secretary of State for the Home
Department: recognition of a general duty to publish policies.
Rationale for requiring publication of policies. ECHR may also require publication of policies. Extent of publication required.
___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________
Slide 5
Interpretation of policies
Subjective v objective approach. General rule is that the objective approach applies. Former exception for planning policies has been
overturned: Tesco Stores Ltd v Dundee City Council.
Possible exception for non-statutory immigration

policies unlikely to survive.
___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________
Slide 6
Making changes to policies

Courts recognise important principle that the
executive should be entitled to change policy.
Legitimate expectation that policy will not be changed

will arise only rarely: policy must amount to a pressing and focussed assurance.
___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________
120
121 Slide 7
Conclusion
Common threads:
fairness, openness, and accessibility.
___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________
Jonathan Moffett 020 7404 5252 jmoffett@4-5.co.uk

122
123
JUDICIALREVIEWANDHUMANRIGHTS:ANUPDATE
SARAHHANNETT 351 Introduction 1. Theaimofthistalkistoprovideanoverviewofthekeydecisionsinthelast12 months. 2. It focuses, first, on recent judicial consideration of section 2 of the Human RightsAct1998(the1998Act). 3. The talk considers, second, decisions on individual rights contained in the EuropeanConventiononHumanRights(theECHR)handeddowninthelast twelve months. The main focus, for reasons of time, is on decisions of the Supreme Court and the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR) although some decisions of the Chamber, the Court of AppealandtheAdministrativeCourtareconsidered. 4. Itfollowsthatthistalkisfarfrombeingacomprehensiveaccountofallhuman rights case in the last twelve months: rather, it is aimed at picking out highlights. Section2ofthe1998Act 5. Section2(1)provides: Acourtortribunaldeterminingaquestionwhichhasarisenin connectionwithaConventionrightmusttakeintoaccountany... judgment...oftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights. In R (Alconbury) v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2001] UKHL 23; [2003] 2 AC 295 Lord Slynn articulated the mirror principle(at26): ...AlthoughtheHumanRightsAct1998doesnotprovidethata nationalcourtisboundbythesedecisionsitisobligedtotake
351
6.
ThistalkhasborrowedheavilyfromanunpublishedarticlebyRichardClaytonQCandanunpublishedbook chapterbyAndrewSharland.
accountofthemsofarastheyarerelevant.Intheabsenceofsome specialcircumstancesitseemstomethatthecourtshouldfollow anyclearandconstantjurisprudenceoftheEuropeanCourtof HumanRights.Ifitdoesnotdosothereisatleastapossibilitythat thecasewillgotothatcourt,whichislikelyintheordinarycaseto followitsownconstantjurisprudence.(emphasisadded) 7. Similarly, in R (Ullah) v. Special Adjudicator [2004] UKHL 26; [2004] 2 AC 323 Lord Bingham suggested that domestic courts should not, when interpreting the ECHR, go beyond Strasbourg jurisprudence as the meaning of the ECHR shouldbeuniformthroughoutthestatesthatarepartytoit. 8. The extent to which domestic courts are bound as a result of section 2 to follow decisions of the European Court of Human Rights has proved to be a difficultquestion.IndeedwhenLordPhillipsandLordJudgegaveevidenceto the Select Committee on the Constitution in October 2011, they expressed conflictingviews.Theformersuggestedthatdomesticcourtswereobligedto followtheStrasbourgcaselaw.Thelatterarguedthat,havingtakenaccountof thedecisionsoftheECtHR,ourcourtsarenotboundtofollowthem.Indeed,in Sugar v. BBC [2012] UKSC 4 Lord Wilson stated (at 59, Lord Mance agreed withtheobservationat113): Iwouldwelcomeanappeal,unlikethepresent,inwhichitwas appropriateforthecourttoconsiderwhether,ofcoursewithout actingextravagantly,itmightnowusefullydomorethantoshadow theECtHRinthemannerhithertosuggestednodoubtsometimes inaidofthefurtherdevelopmentofhumanrightsandsometimes inaidoftheircontainmentwithinproperbounds. 9. Therationaleforthemirrorprinciplehasbeenidentifiedasfollows: (i) the need to give practical recognition to the principles laid down by the ECtHR, it being the highest judicial authority on the interpretationoftheConventionrights,seeLordBinghaminKayv. LambethLondonBoroughCouncil[2006]2AC465(at28). (ii) thepurposeofthe1998Actisnottoenlargetherightsorremediesof thoseintheUKwhoseConventionrightshavebeenviolated,butto
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125 enable those rights and remedies to be asserted and enforced domestically and not only by recourse to Strasbourg, see Lord BinghaminR(SB)v.DenbighHighSchool[2007]1AC199(at29). 10. Thereareanumberofproblemsinapplyingthemirrorprinciple: (i) The case law of the European Court is not always clear: a recent example of this is the decision of the Supreme Court in Re McCaughey [2011] UKSC 20; [2012] AC 725. The Supreme Court held that a Grand Chamber decision prevailed over an earlier decision of the House of Lords. Lord Hope commented that only the most starry eyed admirer of the Strasbourg Court could describetheguidancetheGrandChamberofferedasclear(at73). BaronessHalesaidthattheGrandChamberjudgmentwasdifficult to understand (at 89), and Lord Dyson described it as extremely obscure (at 130132). Even more recently in Gale v. Serious Organised Crime Agency [2011] UKSC 49; [2012] 2 All ER 1. Lord PhilipsPandLordBrownsaidthatitwouldbehighlydesirablethat theissuestheappealraisedbeconsideredbytheGrandChamber to clarify and rationalise what Lord Brown called this whole confusingareaoftheCourtsjurisprudence(at117). (ii) The domestic courts have not been consistent about what kind of Strasbourgjudgmentsshould,onUllahprinciples,beappliedtothe 1998 Act. A judgment will be clear and constant if it has repeatedly been applied in subsequent cases (see Cadder v. Her Majestys Advocate [2010] 1 WLR 2601, per Lord Hope at 47) as will a unanimous or near unanimous Grand Chamber decision (R (Anderson)v.SecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment[2003]1 AC837perLordBinghamat18).Ontheotherhand,inanevolving field, it may be necessary to consider whether relatively elderly jurisprudencereflectstheresultthatthe[ECtHR]wouldstillreach
(see Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v. M [2006] AC 91, per Lord Mance at 131). But Lord Brown indicated in Horncastle [2009] 2 AC 373 (at 113121) that there is no need to apply a ChamberdecisionwhichwasduetoberearguedbeforetheGrand Chamber(especiallyinacasewherehequestioneditsreasoning). (iii) Nor is it clear whether a Grand Chamber decision must be followed. In Manchester City Council v. Pinnock [2011] 2 AC 104 Lord Neuberger contemplated the possibility of departing from a decisionoftheGrandChamber(at48)asdidBaronessHaleinRe Caughey [2011] 2 WLR 1279 (at 93). In Cadder v. Her Majestys Advocate [2010] 1 WLR 2601 the Supreme Court reiterated the obligationtofollowaGrandChamberdecision. 11. Further,themirrorprinciplehasnotbeenconsistentlyappliedbythedomestic courts. In R v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police, ex p. LS and Marper [2004]UKHL39LordSteynsuggestedthatwhilstArticle8(1)shouldreceivea uniform interpretation throughout the member states, when one moves to considerthequestionofobjectivejustificationunderArticle8(2),thecultural traditionsintheUnitedKingdomarerelevant(at27).InR(AnimalDefenders International)v.SecretaryofStateforCulture,MediaandSport[2008]UKHL15 Lord Scott suggested that section 2 of the 1998 Act contemplated the possibilityofadivergenceinviewbetweendomesticcourtsandtheEuropean CourtofHumanRights(at44).ThissuggestionwasexpresslyrejectedbyLord Bingham(at37)andbyBaronessHale(at14). 12. The House of Lords in Re G (Adoption: unmarried couple) [2008] UKHL 38; [2009] 1 AC 173 held that a domestic court can go beyond the protection affordedbytheexistingStrasbourgjurisprudenceintwosituations: (i) if the domestic court is of the view that although the jurisprudence does not currently provide protection, if the matter were to be
126
127 consideredbytheEuropeanCourt,suchprotectionwouldbelikely tobeprovided;and (ii) if the European Court would regard the matter as within a states marginofappreciationandthusconcludethatthereisnoviolation. 13. MorerecentlyinAmbrosevHarris[2011]1WLR2435theSupremeCourttook amorecautiousapproach.TheSupremeCourtdeclinedtoholdthatasuspect isentitledtoaccesstoalawyerbeforeheisplacedindetention;andtheCourt heldthattheStrasbourgcaselawdidnotrequiresuchaconclusion,expressing theviewthatanimpendingStrasbourgapplicationdealingwiththeverypoint made it wise to wait for the judgment. In re G was not cited to the Court or discussedintheopinions. 14. ThelastwordonthiswastherecentdecisionoftheSupremeCourtinRabone v. Pennine Care NHS Trust [2012] UKSC 2; [2012] 2 All ER 381 the Supreme Courtheldthatthedefendanthadanoperationalduty,underarticle2ofthe ECHR, to take reasonable steps to prevent the suicide of the claimants daughter, a voluntary patient at the defendant Trust. The ECtHR had not previously considered whether article 2 applied to a voluntary psychiatric patient. The ECtHR and domestic courts had, however, found that there was onoperationaldutyonthestatetotakereasonablestepstoprotectprisoners, those who were in administrative detention and those detained under the Mental Health Act 1983. In contrast, the ECtHR had held that there was no operationaldutyunderarticle2inthegeneralityofmedicalnegligencecases. 15. Lord Brown noted that the decision of the Supreme Court went further than theevolvingjurisprudenceoftheECtHRasnoStrasbourgdecisionhasequated thepositionofvoluntarypatientswiththatofdetainedpatientsinrelationto article 2 (at 111). Lord Brown stated, however, that he did not regard the SupremeCourtsdecisiontobecontrarytotheUllahprinciples.Heobserved (at112):
Nobodyhaseversuggestedthat,merelybecauseaparticular questionwhicharisesundertheconventionhasnotyetbeen specificallyresolvedbytheStrasbourgjurisprudence,domesticcourts cannotdetermineitinotherwordsinotherwordsthatitis necessarytoawaitanauthoritativedecisionoftheECtHRmoreorless directlyinpointbeforefindingaConventionviolation.Thatwouldbe absurd.RatherwhattheUllahprincipleimportantlyestablishesisthat thedomesticcourtshouldnotfeeldrivenonConventiongrounds unwillinglytodecideacaseagainstapublicauthority(whichcould notthenseekacorrectivejudgmentinStrasbourg)unlesstheexisting Strasbourgcaselawclearlycompelsthis.Indeed,themorereluctant thedomesticcourtmaybetorecogniseinthecircumstancesa violationoftheConvention,thereadieritshouldbetorejectthe complaintunlessthereexists...anauthoritativejudgmentofthe GrandChamberplainlydecisiveofthepointatissue.If,however,the domesticcourtiscontent(perhapsevenreadyandwilling)todecidea Conventionchallengeagainstapublicauthorityandbelievessucha conclusiontoflownaturallyfromexistingStrasbourgcaselaw(albeit thatitcouldberegardedascarryingthecaselawastepfurther),then inmyjudgmentitshouldtakethatfurtherstep.Andthat,indeed,isto mymindpreciselythepositioninthisverycase.Justas,Imayadd,it wasthepositioninLimbuela[treatmentofasylumseekers],InreG [discriminationprohibitingunmarriedparentsfromadoptingchildren] andEM[theimpactofArticle8ontherightsofamotherandchild facingexpulsion]. 16. It is plain from the case law that no coherent or consistent approach to the mirrorprinciplecanbediscerned.
128
129 Article3:freedomfromtorture,inhumanordegradingtreatmentorpunishment 17. Article 3 places a negative obligation on a State to refrain from torture or inhumanordegradingtreatmentorpunishment.Article3alsorequiresaState to take adequate steps to prevent individuals from suffering treatment that wouldviolateArticle3atthehandsofprivateindividuals.Itmayalsoextendto requiringtheStatetotakestepstopreventanindividualwithinitsjurisdiction fromsufferingtreatmentcontrarytoArticle3outsideitsjurisdiction. 18. InMSv.UnitedKingdom(2012)Times,14MaytheEuropeanCourtofHuman Rightsheldthatthedetentionofamentallyillmaninpolicecustodyformore than three days, without appropriate psychiatric treatment, amounted to a breachofArticle3.TheCourtacceptedthatthetreatmentarose,inessence, fromunintentionaldelayintheprovisionofservices.Thisdelaywaslessthan 31hours. 19. It is notable that the domestic courts had dismissed MSs claim on the basis thatitwasunrealistictosuggestthatadelayoflessthan31hoursinsomeway caused suffering of a severity sufficient to engage Article 3. But the ECtHR foundthat,eventhoughtherehadbeennointentiontohumiliateMS,thatthe conditions he had been required to endure had reached the threshold of degradingtreatmentforthepurposesofArticle3. 20. InVinterv.UnitedKingdom[2012]Times,8FebruarytheEuropeanCourtheld thatimprisonmentofaconvictedmurderedforlife,withnohopeofrelease, did not amount to inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to article 3 of the ECHR. The Court stated that although matters of appropriate sentencing largely fell outside the scope of the Convention, a grossly disproportionate sentence could amount to illtreatment, contrary to Article 3. But gross disproportionality was a strict test and it would only be on rare and unique occasionsthatthetestwouldbemet.Intheinstantcase,giventhegravityof
the murders for which the applicants had been convicted, the whole life sentences were not grossly disproportionate. Further, none of the applicants had demonstrated that their continued incarceration served no legitimate penologicalpurpose. 21. InMousav.SecretaryofStateforDefence[2011]EWCACiv1334theCourtof Appeal considered whether the Iraqi Historic Allegations Team (the IHAT), established by the Secretary of State for Defence on 1 March 2010, was sufficientlyindependenttocomplywithArticle3.TheIHATwasestablishedto investigate allegations of illtreatment by Iraqi citizens by members of the British Armed Forces during the period 2003 to 2009 with a view to the identification and punishment of any wrongdoers. The IHAD was led by a civilianwhoreporteddirectlytotheProvostMarshal(Army)whowasheadof the Royal Military Police (the RMP). The deputy head was a commissioned officer of the RMP. The command team also included a Deputy Provost Marshal,aRoyalNavyLegalAdviserandaRMPExecutiveOfficer. 22. TheCourtofAppealheldthatforanarticle3compliantinquiry,theIHAThad to be hierarchically, institutionally and practically independent. The key questionwaswhethertheinvolvementoftheProvostBranchinIraqwassuch astotransgressthoserequirements.TheCourtofAppealobservedthatunder the IHAT arrangements, Provost Branch members were investigating allegations which necessarily included the possibility of culpable acts or omissions on the part of Provost Branch members. The Court of Appeal concluded that the practical independence of the IHAT was, at least as a matterofreasonableperception,substantiallycompromised. Article5:righttolibertyandsecurity 23. The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR had cause to consider the legality of the policepracticeofkettling(whenprotestorsandothersaredetainedwithina police cordon). The House of Lords had, in Austin v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner[2009]UKHL5;[2009]AC564determinedthatthepracticewas
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131 lawful, despite article 5 containing no reference to the interests of public safetyortotheprotectionofpublicorderasbeingoneofthecasesinwhicha personmaybedeprivedofhisliberty. 24. The ECtHR reached the same conclusion as the House of Lords. It concluded that the cordon had been imposed to isolate and contain a large crowd in volatile and dangerous conditions. An absolute cordon had been the least intrusiveandmosteffectivemeanstobeapplied.Incircumstanceswherethe police had kept the situation constantly under close review, but where substantially the same dangerous conditions which had necessitated the imposition of the cordon at 2pm had continued to exist throughout the afternoonandearlyevening,thosewithinthecordoncouldnotbesaidtohave been deprived of their liberty within the meaning of article 5(1). Since there hadbeennodeprivationofliberty,itwasunnecessarytoexaminewhetherthe measureinquestionhadbeenjustified. Article6:fairtrialrights 25. Article6(1)provides: Inthedeterminationofhiscivilrightsandobligationsorofany criminalchargeagainsthim,everyoneisentitledtoafairandpublic hearingwithinareasonabletimebyanindependentandimpartial tribunalestablishedbylaw.Judgementshallbepronounced publiclybythepressandpublicmaybeexcludedfromallorpartof thetrialintheinterestofmorals,publicorderornationalsecurity inademocraticsociety,wheretheinterestsofjuvenilesorthe protectionoftheprivatelifeofthepartiessorequire,ortheextent strictlynecessaryintheopinionofthecourtinspecial circumstanceswherepublicitywouldprejudicetheinterestsof justice. 26. Article6(2)provides: Everyonechargedwithacriminaloffenceshallbepresumed innocentuntilprovedguiltyaccordingtolaw. 27. Article 6(3) applies to persons charged with a criminal offence and so is thereforebeyondthescopeofthistalk.
Article6(1):meaningofcivilrightsandobligations 28. Therehasbeensomejudicialconsiderationofthemeaningofcivilrights.InR (Maftah)v.SecretaryofStatefortheForeignOfficeandCommonwealthAffairs [2011]EWCACiv350thedefendantplacedtwoindividualsonalistmaintained bytheSanctionsCommitteeoftheUnitedNationalsSecurityCouncilofthose believedtobeassociatedwithAlQaida,UsamaBinLadenortheTaliban.The purpose and effect of the listing was to freeze all their assets and place the releaseofthefundsentirelyinthehandsoftheexecutive.TheCourtofAppeal heldthatthedecisionsdidnotinvolvethedeterminationofcivilrightsforthe purposesofarticle6oftheECHR. 29. InR(G)v.GovernorsofXSchool[2011]UKSC30;[2012]AC167G,ateaching assistant, was summarily dismissed from employment by the defendant, having been refused permission to have his solicitor present. The defendant referred the case to the Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families whohadthepower,atthetime,tomakeadirectionundersection142ofthe Education Act 2002 prohibiting a person from working with children in educational establishments. That statutory scheme was replaced by the SafeguardingVulnerableGroupsAct2006whichestablishedtheIndependent SafeguardingAuthority(ISA)whichmaintainsachildrensbarredlist.Gwas successful in judicial review proceedings claiming that the denial of legal representationinthedisciplinaryhearingbreachedhisarticle6rights. 30. The Supreme Court held that Gs civil right to practice his profession as a teaching assistant would be directly determined by a decision of the ISA to includeGonthechildrensbarredlist,thatSchooldisciplinaryproceedingsdid notdeterminethecivilrightatissuenordidtheydirectlydetermineorexerta substantial influence over the ISA proceedings and that accordingly the disciplinaryproceedingsdidnotengagearticle6(1).
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133 Article6(1):proportionality 31. In Tariq v. Home Office [2011] UKSC 35; [2012] AC 452 the claimant was employedbytheHomeOfficeasanimmigrationofficer.Followingthearrestof closefamilymembersforterrorismoffences,theclaimantssecurityclearance was withdrawn and he was suspended from work. He brought a claim in the Employment Tribunal for discrimination on the grounds of race and religious belief.TheHomeOfficeassertedthatitwasintheinterestsofnationalsecurity thatmuchoftheevidenceonwhichitintendedtorelyshouldnotbedisclosed to the claimant or his advisers and obtained orders under rule 54(2) of the EmploymentTribunalsRulesofProcedureRules2004fortheproceedingstobe conductedinprivateandfortheclaimantandhisadviserstobeexcludedfrom the proceedings when closed evidence was being given or closed documents considered. A special advocate was appointed to represent the claimants interestswhenheorhisadviserswereexcludedfromtheproceedings. 32. TheEmploymentTribunalrejectedasubmissionbytheclaimantthatahearing fromwhichhewasexcludedandatwhichclosedevidencewasadmittedwas incompatiblewithhisrightsunderArticle6oftheECHR.TheEATdismissedan appeal by the claimant, but made a declaration that he was entitled to be provided with sufficient detail of the allegations to enable him to make a challenge to them. The Home Office appealed against that declaration, contending that it was not obliged to disclose sensitive information where national security was in issue. The claimant crossappealed. The Court of Appealdismissedbothappeals. 33. TheSupremeCourtdismissedtheClaimantsappeal.Itheldthatthedemands of national security might justify the use of a closed material procedure, in which a party was not entitled to know material by reference to which his complaint was determined, so long as there were sufficient safeguards. In assessingwhethertheprocedureprovidedsufficientsafeguards,thecourthad to balance the conflicting interests of the individuals right to procedural
fairnessandtheneedtoprotectnationalsecurityinthecontextofthespecific case.Heretheclaimanthadthebenefitofaspecialadvocate,theEmployment Tribunal would keep the closed process under review throughout the proceedings.Further,theclaimant,asapersonwhohadchosenemployment which required national security vetting, was not a victim of state action depriving him of his fundamental rights whereas the state sought to defend itself from his claim and could not do so unless it deployed the national securitymaterial.Itfollowedthatthebalancehadbeenproperlystruck. 34. TheHomeOfficesappealagainsttheEATsgistingdeclarationwasallowed. TheSupremeCourtheldthatthiscasedidnotinvolvethelibertyofthesubject andtheuseoftheclosedmaterialdidnotimpairtheveryessenceoftheright toafairtrial. Article6(2):standardofproof 35. In Serious Organised Crime Agency v. Gale [2011] UKSC 49; [2012] 2 All ER 1 SOCAobtainedanorderunderPart5oftheProceedsofCrimeAct2002forthe recoveryofpropertytothevalueof2millionheldbyGandhisformerwife. TheHighCourtwassatisfiedonthebalanceofprobabilitiesthattheproperty was derived from criminal activity on the part of one or both of G and his formerwifeintheformofdrugtrafficking,moneylaunderingandtaxevasion. This was so notwithstanding that G had been acquitted of drug trafficking in Portugal and in Spain criminal proceedings against him for drug trafficking were discontinued. G and his wife argued that the proper standard of proof wasthecriminalstandard. 36. TheSupremeCourtdismissedGsappeal.Thecommissionbytheappellantsof criminalconductfromwhichthepropertythattheyheldwasderivedhadtobe established according to the civil and not the criminal standard of proof and that an English court was not precluded from considering evidence which formedthebasisofthechargesinPortugalgiventheabsenceofaprocedural
134
135 link between the Portuguese criminal proceedings and the English civil proceedings. 37. The Supreme Court had cause in the last 12 months to consider four cases arisingfromtheScottishCourtsconcernedwiththeapplicationofarticle6in thecriminalcourts.Anexaminationofthesecasesisbeyondthescopeofthis talkbutthecasesareasfollows:HMAdvocatev.P(Scotland)[2011]UKSC4; [2011] 1 WLR 2497; Ambrose v. Harris [2011] UKSC 43; [2011] 1 WLR 2435; Jude v. HM Advocate (Scotland) [2011] UKSC 55; and McGowan (Procurator Fiscal)v.B[2011]UKSC54. Article8:righttorespectforprivateandfamilylife 38. In R (Quila) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 45; [2011]3WLR836theclaimantswereforeignnationalsrefusedentryclearance underrule277oftheImmigrationRulestojointheirspouseswhowereBritish citizens. Rule 277 precludes entry clearance to a party to a marriage or civil partnership where one party was lawfully present or settled in the UK and eitherpartywasagedunder21yearsofage. 39. TheSupremeCourtheldthatrule277hadthelegitimateaimofprotectingthe rights and freedoms of those who might otherwise be forced into marriage however the Secretary of State had failed to establish that it was not more than was necessary to accomplish her objectives and that it struck a fair balance between the rights of the parties to unforced marriages and the interestsofthecommunityinpreventingforcedmarriagesandbyrefusingto grantthevisastoQandBshehadinfringedtheirrightsunderArticle8. 40. InR(McDonald)v.KensingtonandChelseaRoyalLondonBorough[2011]UKSC 33; [2012] LGR 107 the claimant,who had severely limitedmobility, suffered frombladderdifficultieswhichmeantthatsheneededtourinatesometwoto threetimesanight.Shehaddealtwiththisbyaccessingacommodewiththe
help of a carer provided by the Council. The Council proposed that incontinence pads could be provided which would afford M greater privacy and independence, reduce her risk of injury whilst she was assisted to the commodeandreducethecostofhercarebysome22,000perannum. 41. Margued,interalia,thattheCouncilsdecisionamountedtoaninterference with her right under article 8 of the ECHR. The Supreme Court held that it could not plausibly be argued that such respect had not been afforded. The Council had sought to respect as far as possible Ms personal feelings and desires,atthesametimetakingaccountofhersafety,herindependenceand theirownresponsibilitiestowardsalltheirotherclients. 42. Articles10(freedomofexpression)and11(freedomofassociation) The City of London Corporation (the City) brought claims in the High Court for possession of the highway and other open land in the churchyard of St PaulsCathedral,aswellasinjunctionsrequiringtheremovalofthetentsand otherstructurescomprisedinthecamp:seeMayor,CommonalityandCitizens ofLondonvSamede[2012]EWHC34.Themainissuesbeforethecourtwere(i) whethertheCityhadestablishedinprinciplethatitwasentitledtopossession of the highway land, subject to the courts consideration of the defendants rightsunderArticles10and11oftheconvention,(ii)whethertheCityshould succeed in its claim for injunctive relief in respect of the highway and open land,and(iii)whethertheinterferencewiththeDefendantsrightsentailedin grantingreliefwouldbelawful,necessaryandproportionate. 43. (i) TheCityofLondonhadtosucceedinitsclaimforanimmediateorder for possession of this land unless to grant such an order would unacceptably affect the defendants exercise of their rights under Articles10and11oftheECHR; (ii) The City of London had undoubtedly established a pressing social AllowingtheclaimsLindblomJheld,insummary,that:
136
137 need not to permit the protest camp to remain in St Pauls Churchyardandtopreventitbeinglocatedelsewhereonanyofthe land to which the proceedings related. Equally, it would not be disproportionatetogranttherelieftheCityofLondonclaimed; (iii)TheproposedinterferencewiththedefendantsrightsunderArticles 10 and 11 was the least intrusive way in which to meet the pressingsocialneedandstruckafairbalancebetweentheneeds of the community and the individuals concerned. The freedoms andrightsofothers,theinterestsofpublichealthandpublicsafety andthepreventionofdisorderandcrime,andtheneedtoprotect the environment of this part of the City of London all demanded theremedywhichthecourtsorderswouldbring.Thecourtwould exerciseitsdiscretiontograntthereliefrequested. 44. Both Lindblom J and the Court of Appeal [2012] EWCA Civ 160 refused permissiontoappeal,thelattercommentingthatthereisnochancethatany of the criticisms raised by each of the defendants, or even all of those criticismstakentogether,couldpersuadeanappellatecourtthathisdecision was wrong... in a very clear and careful judgment, Lindblom J reached a conclusionwhich,toputitatitsverylowest,hewasplainlyentitledtoreach. (at 61). The court also observed that this was not, on the facts or law, a marginal case and expressed the hope that any future cases of this sort wouldbedealtwithmoreexpeditiously. Article14:freedomfromdiscrimination 45. Therearetwoveryrecentdecisionsunderarticle14.InHumphreysv.Revenue andCustomsCommissioners[2012]UKSC18;[2012]1WLR1545theSupreme Courtconsideredwhethertherulewhichrequiredchildtaxcredittobepaidto one person only in respect of a child, when the care of the child was shared between separated parents, indirectly discriminated against fathers as
experienceshowedthattheywerefarmorelikelythanmotherstobelooking afterthechildforthesmallernumberofdaysintheweek. 46. LadyHale(withwhomtherestoftheCourtagreed)heldthatentitlementto childtaxcreditfellwithintheambitofArticle1ofProtocol1totheECHR.It was accepted that the rule was indirectly discriminatory. The only question was whether the discrimination was justified. The Supreme Court noted that the proper approach to justification in cases involving discrimination in state benefitswastobefoundinStecv.UnitedKingdom(2006)43EHRR1017from which it seemed clear that the normally strict test for justification of sex discrimination in the enjoyment of Convention rights gave way to the manifestly without reasonable foundation in the context of state benefits. TheSupremeCourtnotedthatiffundsweretargetedatonehouseholditwas likelythatthechildlivinginthehouseholdwouldbebetteroffthanheorshe wouldbeifthefundsweretobesplitbetweentwohouseholdswithmodest means. The state was entitled to conclude that it would deliver support for childreninthemosteffectivemanner,thatwas,totheonehouseholdwhere the child principally lived. This also happened to be a great deal simpler and lessexpensivetoadministerthusmaximisingthesupportavailabletofamilies. 47. InBurnipv.BirminghamCityCouncil[2012]EWCACiv629theclaimantswere severely disabled. They were assessed as needing the presence of carers throughout the night in the rented flats in which they lived. For that reason they needed a two bedroom flat. Om each case the claimant was entitled to housing benefit, but this was restricted by the local authority to the rate applicabletoaonebedroomflat.Theclaimantscontendedthatthisamounted tounlawfuldiscriminationunderArticle14oftheECHRwhenreadwitharticle 8. 48. The Court of Appeal allowed the claimants appeal. The claimants had establishedaprimafaciecaseofdiscriminationpursuanttoarticle14,subject tojustification. Thediscriminationcouldnotbejustifiedbytheavailabilityto theclaimantsofdiscretionarypaymentsunderotherregimes(suchasdisability
138
139 livingallowance).Neitherdidtheavailabilityofdiscretionaryhousingpayments justifythetreatment:theywerepurelydiscretionaryinnature;theirduration wasunpredictable;theywerepayablefromacappedfund;andtheiramount, iftheywerepaidatall,couldnotbereliedupontocovereventhedifference betweentheoneandtwobedroomratesofhousingbenefit. Article1ofProtocol1:peacefulenjoymentofpossessions 49. In AXA General Insurance Limited v. Lord Advocate [2011] UKHL 46; [2011] 3 WLR 871 the Supreme Court considered the Damages (Asbestosrelated Conditions) (Scotland) Act 2009. The 2009 Act provided, contrary to caselaw (Rothwell v. Chemical and Insulating co Ltd [2008] AC 281), that asbestos related pleural plaques were actionable in tort. A group of insurance companiesassertedthatthe2009Actwasnotcompatiblewiththeirproperty rights under Article 1 of Protocol 1. The terms of the 2009 Act were retrospective: the insurance policies called on to meet liability were written when the law was taken to be as stated in Rothwell and it followed that policiescalledontomeetliabilitywerewrittenwhenthelawwastakentobe as stated in Rothwell. Claims which then were bound to fail were now actionableunderthe2009Act. 50. The Supreme Court held that the claimants were entitled to bring the proceedingsasvictimsunderarticle34oftheconvention.Themoneyrequired tosatisfytheirobligationsundertheinsurancepolicieswasapossessionwithin themeaningofarticle1. 51. The2009Actpursuedalegitimateaim,namelythattheconsequencesofthe caselawwasviewedbytheScottishMinistersasundulyharshandasasocial injusticejustifyinglegislativeintention. 52. The2009Actwasheldtobeproportionate.TheSupremeCourtnotedthatthe Strasbourgjurisprudencedidnotprecludeinterferencewithexistingcontracts
but special justification was required. Here, two features showed that the balancewasnotdisproportionate: (i) claimsunderthe2009Actwouldonlysucceedifexposuretoasbestos wasshowntohavebeennegligentlycausedbytheemployer;and (ii) the insurers business was inextricably linked with risk. In long term policies, there was inevitably the risk of circumstances, unseen when they were written, occurring which would increase the burden of liability. The present interference within insurers possessionscouldbeseentobewithintheareaofriskwithwhich theyengagedwhentheyundertooktoindemnifytheconsequences oftheemployersnegligence. 53. InThomas&orsvBridgendCountyBoroughCouncil[2011]EWCACiv862the claimants all owned houses close to a new road, which had been built by a developer in connection with a housing development. The road was open to thepublicbut,owingtothefailureofthedevelopertoperformitsobligations under the relevant planning agreements, it was not accepted by the local authorityforadoptionuntilmorethanthreeyearslater.Theclaimantssought compensation under the Land Compensation Act 1973 for the alleged depreciation in the value of their homes attributable to the noise from the road.However,onanordinaryconstructionoftheAct,theclaimwasexcluded bys.19(3)whichimposedathreeyearlimitonclaims.
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141 54.
The Court of Appeal held that a breach of article 1 of the First Protocol was established by the operation of section 19(3) and that on a proper reading, employing section 3 of the 1998 Act, on the facts in the case the claimants wereentitledtocompensation.TheCourtnotedthatincircumstancessuchas thoseintheinstantcase,theoperationofs.19(3)oftheActwassoabsurdthat itunderminedthefairnessofthebalanceintendedbyParliament.Thediligent road builder who completed his project in time was penalised by liability for compensation,whereastheinefficientroadbuilderwasrewardedbyevading liability altogether. A breach of article 1 of the First Protocol was therefore established.TheCourtofAppealwasalsopreparedtoreads.19(3)inavery widewaysoastoallowtheclaimantstopursuetheirclaimforcompensation.
SarahHannett 20June2012

Slide 1
Judicial review and human rights: an update
20 June 2012
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www.4-5.co.uk
Sarah Hannett
Slide 2
Introduction: scope of the talk

section 2, HRA
Ambrose v. Harris (SC) Rabone v. Pennine Care NHS Trust (SC)
individual ECHR rights:

art. 3 ECHR art. 5 ECHR art. 6 ECHR art. 8 ECHR arts 10, 11 ECHR art. 14 ECHR art. 1 of Protocol 1
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Slide 3
Section 2 HRA: the context

Section 2(1) HRA provides:
a court of tribunal determining a question which has arisen in connection with a Convention right must take into account any... judgment... of the European Court of Human Rights
The mirror principle:

R (Alconbury) v. Secretary of State: in the absence of special circumstances the domestic courts should follow any clear and constant jurisprudence of the ECtHR R (Ullah) v. Special Adjudicator
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Resiling from the mirror principle?

Lord Phillips vs Lord Judge Sugar v. BBC [2012] UKSC 4, per Lord Wilson
142
143 Slide 4
Rationale for the mirror principle
The need to give practical recognition to the
principles laid down by the ECtHR, it being the highest judicial authority on the interpretation of the ECHR Kay v. Lambeth London Borough Council
Purpose of the 1998 Act is to enable rights and

remedies to be asserted domestically without recourse to Strasbourg R (SB) v. Denbigh High School
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Slide 5
The mirror principle: problems (1)

The case law of the ECtHR is not always clear:
Re McCaughey (SC) Gale v. Serious Organised Crime Agency (SC)
The domestic courts have not been consistent about

what kind of Strasbourg judgments should be applied to the HRA
meaning of clear and consistent evolving field and elderly ECtHR jurisprudence Chamber decision due to be reargued in Grand Chamber
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Should a Grand Chamber decision be followed?

Pinnock and Re Caughey (cf Cadder)
Slide 6
The mirror principle: problems (2)

Inconsistent application of the mirror principle by
domestic courts:
LS and Marper Animal Defenders International
Re G: domestic court can exceed Strasbourg

protection:
if matter to be considered by ECtHR protection would be provided if ECtHR would regard matter as within states margin of appreciation
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Cf Ambrose v. Harris (SC):

wise to wait for ECtHR decision on the point
Slide 7
Rabone v. Pennine Care NHS Trust

SC held that the Trust had an operational duty under
art 2 ECHR to take reasonable steps to prevent the suicide of Cs daughter, a voluntary patient duty re those detained (in prison, immigration detention or under Mental Health Act 1983) No duty in generality of medical negligence cases SC accepted that its decision went further than existing case law of ECtHR See Lord Brown at paragraph 112.
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Slide 8
Article 3
MS v. United Kingdom (ECtHR)
treatment arising from unintentional delay in provision of psychiatric services for less than 31 hours was a breach of art. 3 ECHR
Vinter v. United Kingdom (ECtHR)

whole life sentences could in principle infringe art. 3 ECHR but did not on the facts of the case
Mousa v. SS for Defence (CA)

IHAT team not hierarchically, institutionally or practically independent; breach of art. 3 ECHR
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Slide 9
Article 5
Austin v. United Kingdom (ECtHR, Grand Chamber)
considered the practice of kettling
House of Lords [2009] UKHL 5:

compliant with art. 5 ECHR despite art. 5 containing no ref to public safety or public order
Grand Chamber: practice was lawful

cordon imposed to isolate and contain a large crowd in volatile and dangerous conditions absolute cordon the least intrusive and most effective means to apply police had kept the situation under close review, but same conditions persisted
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No deprivation of liberty
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145 Slide 10
Article 6: civil rights and obligations
R (Maftah) v. Foreign Secretary (CA)
Placement on list maintained by UNSC Sanctions Committee did not involve the determination of civil rights under art. 6(1) ECHR
R (X) v. Governors of X School (HL)

G denied legal representation at disciplinary hearing art. 6(1) ECHR not engaged as placement on childrens barred list would be determined by ISA school disciplinary hearings did not determine the civil rights at issue or directly determine or influence the ISA proceedings
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Slide 11
Article 6(1): proportionality/standard of proof

Tariq v. Home Office (SC):
demands of national security may justify the use of a closed procedure as long as sufficient safeguards T had special advocate; ET would keep closed process under review; T had chosen his employment no need for gist where case did not involve liberty of subject and didnt impair essence of fair trial right
Gale v. SOCA (SC)

standard of proof for orders under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 was civil, and not criminal
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Slide 12
Article 8
R (Quila) v. SSHD (SC)
rule 277 of the Immigration Rules infringed art. 8 ECHR not proportionate to the legitimate aim of preventing forced marriages
R (McDonald) v, Kensington and Chelsea RLB (SC)

no interference with Ms art. 8 rights where LA required care user to wear continence pads overnight
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Slide 13
Articles 10 and 11
Mayor of London v. Samede (Admin Ct)
claims for possession of the highway and other open land in the churchyard of St Pauls Cathedral
Lindblom J held:
LA would succeed in application for injunction save for the art.10/11 rights of the protestors LA had established a pressing social need not to permit the protest camp to remain proposed interference with Ss rights under art.10/11 was the least intrusive way to meet the pressing social need and struck a fair balance between the needs of the community and the individuals concerned
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Permission to appeal refused(and by CA)
Slide 14
Article 14
Humphreys v. HMRC (SC)
rules on child tax credit indirectly discriminatory on grounds of sex under art. 14 with art. 8 ECHR indirect discrimination justified: approach meant child better off, would deliver support in most effective way, simpler and cheaper to administer
Burnip v. Birmingham City Council (CA)

B assessed as needing two bed flat to accommodate carer, but paid housing benefit for one bed flat only unlawful discrimination under art.14/8 ECHR discrimination not justified
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Slide 15
Article 1 of Protocol 1
AXA General Insurance v. Lord Advocate (SC)
Scottish statute reinstating liability in tort engaged A1P1 but had special justification claims under Act limited to negligence insurers business inextricably linked to risk
Thomas v. Bridgend CBC (CA)

T sought compensation under Land Compensation Act 1983; claim excluded by s.19(3) which imposed a 3 year time limit s.19(3) breached A1P1; applying s.3 HRA T entitled to compensation
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146
147 Slide 16
5th Annual Education Law Conference
Judicial review and human rights: an update
Name Tel
Sarah Hannett 020 7404 5252 srh@4-5.co.uk
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Irrationality
PaulGreatorex,Barrister
1. Irrationalityiswellestablishedasagroundofjudicialreview.Butwhatismeant bythisterm?InCouncilofCivilServiceUnionsvMinisterfortheCivilService [1985]1AC374,LordDiplockansweredthisasfollows(at410): By"irrationality"Imeanwhatcanbynowbesuccinctlyreferredtoas "Wednesburyunreasonableness"(AssociatedProvincialPictureHousesLtd. v.WednesburyCorporation[1948]1K.B.223).Itappliestoadecisionwhich issooutrageousinitsdefianceoflogicorofacceptedmoralstandardsthat nosensiblepersonwhohadappliedhismindtothequestiontobedecided couldhavearrivedatit.Whetheradecisionfallswithinthiscategoryisa questionthatjudgesbytheirtrainingandexperienceshouldbewell equippedtoanswer,orelsetherewouldbesomethingbadlywrongwithour judicialsystem. 2. TheWednesburycaseconcernedachallengetoalocalauthoritysdecisionto licencecinematographperformancesonSundays,subjecttothecondition thatnochildrenunder15beadmitted.At230,LordGreeneMRsaid: [I]fadecisiononacompetentmatterissounreasonablethatnoreasonable authoritycouldeverhavecometoit,thenthecourtscaninterfere[T]o proveacaseofthatkindwouldrequiresomethingoverwhelmingand,inthis case,thefactsdonotcomeanywherenearanythingofthatkindItisnot whatthecourtconsidersunreasonable,adifferentthingaltogether.Ifitis whatthecourtconsidersunreasonable,thecourtmayverywellhave differentviewstothatofalocalauthorityonmattersofhighpublicpolicyof thiskind.Somecourtsmightthinkthatnochildrenoughttobeadmittedon Sundaysatall,somecourtsmightthinkthereverse,andalloverthecountryI havenodoubtonathingofthatsorthonestandsincerepeoplehold differentviews.Theeffectofthelegislationisnottosetupthecourtasan arbiterofthecorrectnessofoneviewoveranother. 3. Thisapproachiseasybothtostateandtounderstand,andindeedthe persistenceofthisdoctrineinadministrativelawmaywellbeduetothis simplicityandthefactthatitcapturestheessenceofthecourtsfunction:itputs thereviewinjudicialreviewandmeasurestheconstitutionaldistance betweentheexecutiveandthejudiciary.
4. Thedifficultiesallcomeintheapplicationofthisapproach,whenthe deceptivenessofitssimplicitybecomesapparent.First,itsapparentlyall embracingnatureisliabletoconfusebecauseoftheoverlapwithothergrounds ofreview.ThiswasacknowledgedinWednesburyitselfwhereLordGreeneMR said(at229): [T]heremaybesomethingsoabsurdthatnosensiblepersoncouldever dreamthatitlaywithinthepowersoftheauthority.WarringtonL.J.inShort vPooleCorporation[1926]Ch.66gavetheexampleoftheredhaired teacher,dismissedbecauseshehadredhair.Thatisunreasonableinone sense.Inanothersenseitistakingintoconsiderationextraneousmatters.It issounreasonablethatitmightalmostbedescribedasbeingdoneinbad faith;and,infact,allthesethingsrunintooneanother. ThereferencetothecaseofShortleadsontotheseconddifficulty,whichisthe leewaywhichisatthecoreofthisprinciplecreatesuncertaintyandpermits eitherinadequatejudicialcontrolorunwarrantedjudicialinterference dependingupononesperspective.Compareandcontrast: (1) ShortvPooleCorporation[1926]Ch.66:Alocalauthoritydismissedthe claimantteacherinlinewithitspolicytodismissfemaleteachersoncethey married.Thereasonsforthispolicywere:(1)Thedutyofthemarried womanwasprimarilytolookafterherdomesticconcerns,anditwas regardedasimpossibleforhertodosoandtoacteffectivelyand satisfactorilyasateacheratthesametime,and(2)thatitwasunfairtothe largenumberofunmarriedteachersseekingemploymentthatthepositions shouldbeoccupiedbymarriedwomenwhopresumablyhadhusbands capableofmaintainingthem.Thedecisiontodismisswasupheld.
5.
(2) RobertsvHopwood[1925]AC578:TheHouseofLordsheldthatitwasnota
reasonableexerciseofalocalauthoritysdiscretiontopayitsemployeesand minimumwage,andmoreoveronethatwasthesameformenandwomen. LordAtkinsonappearstohavesuggestedthattheCouncilhadalloweditself tobeguidedinpreferencebysomeeccentricprinciplesofsocialistic philanthropy,orbyafeministambitiontosecuretheequalityofthesexesin thematterofwagesintheworldoflabour.
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6.
Andthisisallbeforewehavegotbeyondtheprehistoryofjudicialreview.So howtounderstandthisprinciple?Keepingtwothingsinmindthroughoutwill help:
(1) Itisfarmorenuancedandcomplicatedthanitssimpleformulationsuggests anditisdifficulttodescribesatisfactorilyitsscopeinprincipleandits applicationinpractice. (2) Whenconsideringaparticularcaseand/orauthority,rememberthat contextiseverything.Thisincludestheidentityoftheparties,thefactsof thecase,thenatureofthepowerbeingexercised,theeffectofthatonthe claimantand/orothers,whatissuesofprincipleareatstake,thevalue judgmentsinvolved,andeventheidentityofthejudge. 7. Withtheseinmindthen,thefirstmattertodealwith,ifonlytoputtooneside, istheissueofthewordusedtodescribethisgroundofreview.Irrationality hasbeencriticisedasgivingamisleadingimpressionbothastothenarrowness ofitsscopeand/orthementalcapacityofthedecisionmaker.Thesamemaybe saidofperversity.Unreasonablenessisthemostusualsynonymor substitute,althoughitisusuallyprefacedwithWednesburyandhasalso attractedcriticism.Thereasonthiscanbeputtoonesideisbecausewhat reallymattersisthecontentofthisgroundofreviewratherthanitslabel. 8. Ofalittlemoreusearetheothertermswhichhavebeencoinedatvarioustimes totryandcapturethevariationsintheprinciplesapplication.Theseinclude: heightenedscrutiny(alsoreferredtoasclose/rigorous/anxious/intense scrutiny),lighttouchreviewandextremeirrationality.Thesetermscanbe helpfulincategorisingcasesandunderstandingwhydifferentapproacheswere taken,whichcaninturnhelppredicttheirapplicabilitytoacaseyouhave and/ortheprospectsofsuccess.Butthisassistanceisultimatelylimitedand shouldnotobscurethetwokeypointsabove.
9.
Thenextstepistoseewhetherthisgroundtrulyapplies.Thisinvolvestwo considerations:
(1) ArerightsundertheECHRorEUlawareinissue?Ifso,irrationalityhasno parttoplaysinceproportionalityistherelevantprinciple. (2) Isthechallengereallybasedonothergroundssuchasreasons, relevant/irrelevantconsiderations,improperpurposeorevenbreachof somestatutoryduty,e.g.undertheEqualityAct2010? 10. Sofaras(2)isconcerned,thesubstanceofanirrationalitychallengeisusually theoutcomeofadecisionortheprocessbywhichitistaken.Sofarasthe formerisconcerned,irrationalitymaybefoundwherethisisabsurd,harsh, illogicalorevenjustarbitrary,inconsistentoruncertain.Asforthelatter,it encompassesflawedorinconsistentlogicorreasoning,thelackofarational connectionbetweeneithermeasuresandobjectiveorconsiderationsand conclusion,manifestlyinappropriateweightbeinggiventooneormore considerations,andadecisionbasedonnoorinadequatematerial.The potentialforoverlapisclearfromthislist. 11. Afterthis,itbecomesaquestionoftryingtoidentifytheelementsofthecase thatwillaffecttheapplicationoftheprinciple.Therearethosewhichindicatea heightenedlevelofreviewshouldbeappliedandthosewhichindicatealower orlesserlevelofreview. 12. Decisionswhichallegedlyinterferewithconstitutionalrightswillbemoreclosely scrutinised.Theseincludecasesconcerningprotectionfromdiscrimination, religiousfreedoms,enjoymentofoneshomeatnight,restrictionsonthe politicalactivitiesoflocalgovernmentofficersandaccesstopotentiallylife savingmedicaltreatment,aswellascaseswhereapersonslifemaybeatstake. 13. Ontheotherhand,therearecertaincaseswherethecourtsaremorereluctant tocharacterisedecisionsasunreasonable.Theseincludepolicyladenor polycentricdecisions,decisionsinvolvingpoliticaljudgments,decisionsinvolving
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allocationofscarceresourcesanddecisionsinvolvingspecialistortechnical expertise. 14. Otherfactorswhichcanaffecttheapproachtakeninclude:whetherthereisa democracticmandateforaparticulardecisionorpolicy,whetherthedecisionor ruleunderchallengehasParliamentaryapproval.Outsideofthecontextof judicialreview,considerabledeferenceisgivenbycourtshearingappealsfrom decisionsofspecialisttribunalstotheexpertiseofthosebodies. 15. Veryrecently,however,theSupremeCourthassaidthatincommunitycasesat least,theintensityofthereviewwilldependupontheprofundityoftheimpact ofthedetermination(R(KM)vCambridgeshireCC[2012]UKSC23at[36]). Thisisarguablyanobiterdictumsinceitwasnotdirectlyinissueandnotthe subjectoforalargumentandfurtherdoesnotrefertoRunaBegumvTower HamletsLBC[2003]2AC430wheretheHouseofLordsexplicitlyrejectedthe suggestionthatahomelessnessdecisionofimmenseimportancetothe claimantshouldforthisreasonbesubjecttoanxiousscrutiny(seeat[7]). 16. Inanyevent,evenwhere,aswehaveseen,itisclearthatthelevelofreviewis modifiedupordown,whatdoesthisactuallymeaninpractice?Whatdifference doesitmaketothepreparation,thehearingorthedecidingofacase,ifajudge isgoingtogiveclosescrutinyasopposedtoalighttouchreview?A claimantssubmissionthatadecisionshouldbesubjecttoanxiousscrutinyis oftennothingmorethanarhetoricaldeviceemployedtotryandemboldenthe courttoengagewithitsmeritsandcometoadifferentconclusion.Similarlya defendantmayargueforalesserstandardofreviewthannormalasameansof discouragingthecourtfromexercisinganysortofmeaningfulreviewatall. 17. InR(YH)vSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment[2010]EWHC(Admin), CarnwathLJ(ashethenwas)saidat[24]thefollowingaboutthephrase anxiousscrutiny [T]heexpressioninitselfisuninformative.Readliterally,thewordsare descriptivenotofalegalprinciplebutofastateofmind:indeed,onewhich mightbethoughtanaxiomaticpartofanyjudicialprocess,whetherornot
involvingasylumorhumanrights.However,ithasbyusageacquiredspecial significanceasunderliningtheveryspecialhumancontextinwhichsuch casesarebrought,andtheneedfordecisionstoshowbytheirreasoningthat everyfactorwhichmighttellinavourofanapplicanthasbeenproperly takenintoaccount.(emphasisadded) 18. Theunderlinedwordssuggestthatvariationsareasmuchamatterofformas substance,i.e.theymerelyrequiredecisionstobemoreorlesscarefullydrafted andexplained.Thisshouldbekeptinmindbypublicbodies,bothwhentaking decisionsand,moreimportantly,whendefendingthemintheAdministrative Court.Butgreatdifficultiesstillremain.GoingbacktoKM,referredtoabove, whatLordWilsonsaidinparagraph36includedthefollowing: [I]ncommunitycarecasestheintensityofreviewwilldependonthe profundityoftheimpactofthedetermination.Byreferencetothatyardstick, thenecessaryintensityofreviewinacaseofthissortishighOntheother handrespectmustbeaffordedtothedistancebetweenthefunctionsofthe decisionmakerandofthereviewingcourt;andsomeregardmustbehadto thecourtsignoranceoftheeffectupontheabilityofanauthoritytoperform itsotherfunctionsofanyexactingdemandsmadeinrelationtothemanner ofitspresentationofitsdeterminationinaparticulartypeofcase.Sothe courthastostrikeadifficult,judicious,balance. 19. Afortiori,itwouldseem,thebalancethathastobestruckbyapublicbodyboth whenitmakesthedecisionandhastodefenditincourt.Howmuchtimeand effortneeditputintomakingandexplainingitsdecisions?Howmuchtimeand effortneeditputintoexplainingittothecourt?Thisisparticularlydifficult wheretherearefactorssuchasthoseidentifiedabovewhichpullindifferent directions.Policydecisionsabouttheallocationofscarceresourceswhichhave aprofoundimpactonindividuals,forexample. 20. Theseuncertaintiescannotbeeliminatedbecausetheyrepresent,oratleast symbolise,theshiftingbordersbetweentheexecutiveandthejudiciary.They arenotexclusivetotheirrationalityprinciple,butreflectthemoregeneral principlethatgreaterorlesserdeferencewillbedueaccordingtowhetherthe subjectmatterliesmorereadilywithintheactualorpotentialexpertiseofthe democraticpowersorthecourts(InternationalTransportRothGmbHvSSHD [2003]QB728at[87]perLawsLJ).Ultimatelythisdependsuponhowthe courtsthemselvesmeasureboththeirpracticalcompetenceandtheir
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constitutionalfunction.Trendsmaybeobservedovertime,butthatdoesnot givethelegalpractitionerdealingwithcasesonadaytodaybasisthecertainty hewouldlike. 21. However,itmaywellbethat,sofarasirrationalityisconcernedatleast,these problemsarediminishingasothercontrolsonpublicbodiesgrow.Legislation suchastheHumanRightsAct1998andtheEqualityAct2010havehasgiven claimantsanumberofstatutorytoolswithwhichtochallengedecisionswhereas inthepasttheyhadtorelyuponWednesbury.Similarly,theincreaseinuseof specialisttribunalshasremovedmanytypesofcasesfromtheAdministrative Courtaltogether.Theeffectofthesechangesovertimemaybetodiminishthe numberofirrationalitychallengesaswellasjudicialwillingnesstoupholdthem unlessthemoreextremeformulationsoftheprinciplearesatisfied. PAULGREATOREX 14thJune2012
Slide 1
Irrationality
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Paul Greatorex
www.4-5.co.uk
Slide 2
Irrationality what does it mean?
a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it (Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] 1 AC 374 per Lord Diplock at 410 a decision on a competent matter [which] is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 K.B. 223)
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Slide 3
Irrational or not?
Sacking a teacher for having red hair Sacking a teacher for getting married Prohibiting children from going to the cinema on Sunday Introducing a minimum wage and making it the same for men and women Banning homosexuals from serving in the armed forces Excluding Gatwick airport from a consultation paper on expanding runway capacity Compensating soldiers injured in Bosnia differently from those compensated in Northern Ireland
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Terminology
Irrational Perverse Unreasonable Wednesbury unreasonable Heightened scrutiny Anxious scrutiny Close scrutiny Rigorous scrutiny Intense scrutiny Light touch review Extreme irrationality
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Slide 5
Applicability
Rights under ECHR or EU law Reasons challenges Relevant/irrelevant considerations Improper purpose Breach of statutory duty
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Substance
Outcome absurd harsh oppressive Illogical arbitrary inconsistent uncertain Process flawed or inconsistent logic or reasoning lack of rational connection between measures/objective or considerations/conclusion manifestly inappropriate weight decision based on no or inadequate material
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Variable standards of review
Heightened review life equality/discrimination religious freedoms enjoyment of home medical treatment profound impact Lower review policy-laden/polycentric decisions political judgments allocation of scarce resources specialist/technical expertise
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Effect of different level of review
[T]he expression [anxious scrutiny] in itself is uninformative. Read literally, the words are descriptive not of a legal principle but of a state of mind: indeed, one which might be thought an axiomatic part of any judicial process, whether or not involving asylum or human rights. However, it has by usage acquired special significance as underlining the very special human context in which such cases are brought, and the need for decisions to show by their reasoning that every factor which might tell in avour of an applicant has been properly taken into account. (R (YH) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWHC (Admin), per Carnwath LJ (as he then was) at [24])
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Slide 9
Conclusion
The irrationality principle is far more nuanced and complicated than its simple formulation suggests and it is difficult to describe satisfactorily its scope in principle and its application in practice. When considering a particular case and/or authority, remember that context is everything. This includes the identity of the parties, the facts of the case, the nature of the power being exercised, the effect of that on the claimant and/or others, what issues of principle are at stake, the value judgments involved, and even the identity of the judge.
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JudicialReviewConference

RichardClaytonQC JonathanMoffett AndrewSharland PaulGreatorex SarahHannett AnnabelLee 45GraysInnSquare,GraysInn,LondonWC1R5AH Tel:02074045252Fax:02072427803 Email:clerks@45.co.ukWebsite:www.45.co.uk

Bias Slides AndrewSharland

123 142 149 156 Irrationality Slides PaulGreatorex

AnnabelLeehasabroadrangeofexperienceinpubliclawincludinglocal government,education,communitycare,immigration,information rightsandhumanrights.Sheregularlyadvisespublicbodiesonboth proceduralandsubstantivematters.

TOP TEN PUBLIC LAW CASES OF LAST 12 MONTHS

[2011]EWCACiv682 [2012]UKSC23 5 (1997)LGR638

Disciplinary issues and Article 6

[2010]EWHC3324(Admin) [2010]EWCACiv1209 8 [2011]UKSC30

A/13)(197980)1E.H.R.R.455 (A/43)[1982]E.C.C.240 11 A/262)(1993)16E.H.R.R.505 12 17101/90)(1994)18E.H.R.R.393 13 [2011]EWHC1532(Admin) 14 2011]EWHC1528(Admin

[2003]EWCACiv473 [2008]EWACACiv755 20 [2010]EWCACiv1209

[2012]EWHC1460(Admin) [2012]EWHC1520(Admin) 23 [2011]EWCACiv1586

Locabail(UK)LtdvBayfieldPropertiesLtd[2000]1QB451,CA,para3. TJonesJudicialbiasanddisqualificationinthePinochetcase[1999]PL391,399,suggeststhattheruleshould bethoughtofasoneofautomaticdisclosureratherthandisqualification. 56 RvGough[1993]AC646,HL,673,perLordWoolf. 57 [2000]1AC119.

SeeGWilliamsvCaterLinkLtd[2009]UKEAT0393_08_2307,para20perMcMullenJ(TheEATindicatedthat iftheprofessionalrelationshipwasextensive,lengthy,recentand/orongoingdifferentconsiderationsmight apply).

thedecisionmakerhadpreviouslydoneanythingthatdirectlyor indirectlyindicatedwhatviewthedecisionmakertook,orwould ormighttake,inrelationtothematter,and

LocalismAct2011,s25(1). LocalismAct2011,s25(4). 240 LocalismAct2011,s25(3).

(2001)33EHRR13. SeeCivilProcedure(AmendmentNo2)Rules2007. 267 SeeHumanRightsAct1998,s4.

BIAS AND PREDETERMINATION

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Practical considerations Recent developments

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Proprietors of Grand Junction Canal

Group Ltd v Morrison

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Relevant observer a reasonable member of the public neither

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Greyhound Racing Club

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ex parte Kirkstall Valley

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The fair-minded and informed observer

Competition Commission v BAA Ltd Various other cases

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Belize Bank and the informed

Lord Brown (dissenting)

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Protective Cost Orders (1)

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Consultation ended 18 January 2012

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Protective Cost Orders (4)

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Accordingly,itislongsettledthatpoliciesmustnotbeoverrigid,andmustallowfor exceptionstobemadeinparticularcases. 271 Similarly,althoughapublicbodymust

Policiesareusuallysusceptibletojudicialreviewand,ifunlawful,theyareliableto bequashed.Thisisdespitethefactthatpoliciesthemselvesrarelyhaveanydirect legalconsequencesforanindividual,butonlyimpactonanindividualindirectlyasa resultofadecisiontakenpursuanttothem.

(1) (2) (3)

theimpositionofadutytohavepoliciesincertaincircumstances; theimpositionofadutytopublishpolicies;and theroleofthecourtswheninterpretingpolicies.

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