epiTeD BYCopyrighted materialDeliberative Democracy It is sometimes assumed that voting is the central mechanism for political decision making. How- ever, the contributors to this volume focus on an alternative mechanism - decision by discussion or deliberation. These original contributions include case studies based on historical and current in- stances of deliberative democracy, normative dis- cussion of the merits of deliberation compared with other models of collective decision making, and studies of the conditions under which delib- eration tends to improve the quality of decisions. This volume takes a realistic approach: rather than assuming that deliberative democracy is al- ways ideal, the authors critically probe its limits and weaknesses as well as its strengths. Jon Elster is Robert K, Merton Professor of Social Science at Columbia University. This One DERF-U23. -¥558Copyrighted materialCambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy Edited by Adam Przeworski New York University “It is not current politics but democracy as a form of government that I seek to describe,” James Bryce wrote in 1921. The goal of this series is to reinvigo- rate theoretical reflection about democracy by ex- posing it to the full range of historical experiences under which democracies have flourished or floun- dered. Our ambition is to understand what makes de- mocracies work and endure. How do they promote normatively desirable and politically desired objec- tives, and how do they peacefully handle crises that occur when such objectives are not being fulfilled? We intend to ignore artificial divisions among differ- ent approaches, by drawing simultaneously on clas- sical political theory, modern analytical methods, and comparative empirical research. We hope that our conclusions not only will offer some guidance for countries that are still in the process of developing democratic institutions, but also will provide a means of understanding the deficiencies of the well-estab- lished democratic systems.Copyrighted materialDeliberative Democracy Edited by Jon Elster BRIDGE oa by % { UNIVERSITY PRESSPUBLISHED BY THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS: The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK _ http: www.cup.cam.ac.uk 40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA http: /Avww.cup.org, 10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, Melbourne 3166, Australia © Jon Elster 1998 ‘This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 1998 Reprinted 1998, 1999 ‘Typeset in Centennial A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication data Deliberative democracy / edited by Jon Elster. p. cm. ~ (Cambridge studies in the theory of democracy) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Democracy. 2. Decision-making. 3. Representative government and representation. 1. Elster, Jon, 1940- . IL. Series. JCA23.D3892 1998 97-3211 321.8 - de2l cP ISBN 0 521 59296 8 hardback ISBN 0 521 59696 3 paperback ‘Transferred to digital printing 2002Contents List of Contributors page ix Preface and Acknowledgment xi Introduction 1 Jon Elster 1_“Claro!”: An Essay on Discursive Machismo 19 Diego Gambetta, 2 Deliherati Di James D. Fearon, 3_ All Men Are Liars: Is Democracy Meaningless? 69 Gerry Mackie 4 Deliberation and Constitution Making 97 Jon Elster 5__Pathologies of Deliberation 123 Susan C. Stokes 6 Deliberation and Ideological Domination 140 Adam Przeworski 7_ Arguing for Deliberation: Some Skeptical Considerations JT James Johnson 8 Democracy and Liberty 185. Joshua CohenContents 9 Health-Health Trade-offs 232 Cass R. Sunstein 10 Full Representation, Deliberation, and Impartiality 260 Roberto Gargarella Inder BT viiiContributors Joshua Cohen, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts In- stitute of Technology Jon Elster, Department of Political Science, Columbia University James D. Fearon, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago Diego Gambetta, All Souls College, Oxford Roberto Gargarella, Department of Law and Political Science, ‘Universidad di Tella, Buenos Aires James Johnson, Department of Political Science, University of Rochester Gerry Mackie, St. John's College, Oxford Adam Przeworski, Department of Politics, New York University Susan C. Stokes, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago Cass R. Sunstein, University of Chicago Law SchoolCopyrighted materialPreface and Acknowledgment Most of the essays in this volume were first presented at a con- ference at the University of Chicago in April 1995. One paper dis- cussed at the conference, “Modeling Deliberative Democracy” by David Austen-Smith, is not included in the volume because the au- thor preferred not to submit a revised version. As will be clear from several of the chapters, his paper had a considerable impact on the debates. I thank the University of Chicago for financial support of the conference. JE.Copyrighted materialJon Elster Introduction 1. Historical Background The idea of deliberative democracy, or decision making by dis- cussion among free and equal citizens, is having a revival. During the five months between the initial drafting of the present intro- duction and the completion of the final version, at least three new books were published on the topic in the United States alone.' Largely under the influence of Jiirgen Habermas, the idea that de- mocracy revolves around the transformation rather than simply the aggregation of preferences has become one of the major positions in democratic theory.” This development represents, to repeat, a revival rather than an innovation. The idea of deliberative democracy and its practical implementation are as old as democracy itself. Both came into be- ing in Athens in the fifth century B.C. Pericles, in his eulogy of Ath- ens, said: Our public men have, besides politics, their private affairs to attend to, and our ordinary citizens, though occupied with the pursuits of industry, are still fair judges of public matters; for, unlike any other nation, we regard the citizen who takes no part in these duties not as unambitious but as useless, and we are able to judge proposals even if we cannot originate them; instead of looking on discussion as a stumbling-block in the way of action, we think it an indispen- sable preliminary to any wise action at all. (Thucydides 11.40) Yet Athenian democracy was also the birthplace of the tendency to debunk discussion as sophistry or demagoguery. Aristotle’s Rket- oric is to some extent a handbook in political manipulation. Distrust of clever speakers was so widespread that orators found it useful 1Jon Elster to stress their own artlessness and the slickness of their opponents.* Thus, from the very beginning, democracy by deliberation was viewed both positively and negatively. Some argued that discussion would improve decision making, others that it would lead to bad decisions. More recently, as we shall see, the argument has been made that deliberation essentially makes no difference - for neither the good nor the bad. The Athenian government was based on direct democracy. Yet although anyone could speak and make proposals, not all could, because the assembly typically included several thousand citi- zens. In assemblies of this size, “deliberation” can at best mean discussion among a small number of speakers before an audience rather than discussion among all members of the assembly. The speakers, typically, try to persuade the audience rather than each other. They may talk about each other - to point out weaknesses in their opponents’ characters or arguments - but not to each other. This procedure obviously falls short of what many propo- nents of deliberative democracy have in mind. Nevertheless, it may to some extent mimic the process of genuine deliberation where the aim is to persuade the interlocutor rather than an au- dience. The procedure of debating one another before an audi- ence may be compared to adversarial proceedings in the courtroom, with the jury in the role of the audience, or to nega- tive advertising, with consumers in the same role. If the audience is also the ultimate arbiter, the interchanges that take place be- fore it can serve to weed out falsehoods and inconsistencies and thus enable it to make a good decision - assuming, of course, that it is not swept away by passion. Athenian democracy came to an end in 322 B.C. With the re- emergence of democratic government about two thousand years later - but now representative rather than direct - the nature of political deliberation changed.‘ In the Athenian assembly, the handful of orators who debated among themselves were con- strained by the need to appeal to the audience. The orators in an elected assembly, by contrast, are usually not subject to this con- straint. (But see my Chapter 4 in this volume for some exceptions.) The electorate, to be sure, exercises a constraining effect on the decisions reached by virtue of anticipation of retrospective control through voting. The representatives know that if they vote against the wishes of their constituents, they may not be reelected. Yet this control is obviously a very diluted one. The voting record of a pol- 2