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Jean-Luc Nancy, Ego sum Paris: Flammarion, 1979. 163 pages and Locke Peter M. Schouls, The Imposition theMethodin Descartes of Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980. 259 pages Nancy's and Schouls' books propose to examine two different but necessarily related problems: the question of the "subject," its epistemologicaland philosophical premises in Descartes, and the concept of "method,"its foundationand application in both Descartes and Locke. Whereas Nancy's project inquires into the nature of the Cartesian subject insofar as its pre-eminenceas "subject" defines it as the basis of modern philosophy,Schouls discusses how this new definitionof reason equating of man withthoughtleads to a redefinition procedures for thinking.He defines Cartesian method as both presupposing the nature of the object to be known and imposingsuch a nature on its object (252). Schouls' analysis of the method proceeds fromDescartes' rationalismto Locke's empiricism, and therebyprovides an unusual insightinto the relation of the French theircommon metaphysical and English philosophical traditions, premise discourse. Thus these analyses are vital,not distinctive philosophical yet only as regards theirtopical relationof subject and method,but in a more fundamental sense, as representativecontributionsof the French and English philosophical traditions. Jean-Luc Nancy's Ego sum examines the question of the subject in Descartes as represented by its emblem and most fundamental tenet "I think, therefore I am." This equation of thought and being, which is constitutesthe ground of modern metaphysics, itselfthe product of a search for certitudein order to assure futurephilosophical investigation. alter the verynature and Nancy notes thatthe epistemologicalconstraints content of thought, and consequently, change the very meaning of philosophical thought. He observes that thought is established by and concept, of anteriorto all distinctions intuition Descartes as an identity of thatis to say,thatit positsitselfas the intuition itsconcept. The formula "I think"establishesthe ground forall representation itsveryrefusalto by have content or to recognize itself as either self-consciousness, as (35). In other psychologicalor existential, "self"or "self-consciousness" words, Descartes absolutely refuses to introduce any kind of thought, of withinand upon thought,as reflexivity the cogito.Nancy stressesthis fundamentalparadox in the definitionof the Cartesian subject. He notes that its very foundation as a "subject" corresponds to the necessary of as exhaustion of all its possibilities essence: the constitution the subject provoques the collapse and destructionof its substance. Nancy's analysis thus becomes more than an assessmentof the nature and the statusof the subjectin Descartes. It servesas the starting point for of a more general inquiryand meditationon the heritageof thisdefinition the subject in modern thought. His conclusions, brieflyoutlined, are as

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substance of follow.To begin with,Descartes' definition man as a thinking whichis identicalwiththe universalsubjectof truth impliesat once thatthe subject cannot have any historical(psychologicalor existentialcontent), that it lacks all philosophical contentinsofaras it and more significantly, denies the very basis for critical thought. It is in this sense, that the Cartesian subject establishesthe concept of the "subject"in absolute terms as the substratum and condition of possibilityfor all representation, philosophical, scientificand literary.For Nancy, the question regarding and as the basis the subjectis alwaysposed in the contextof representation of representation.Hence his observationthatDescartes' subjectcannot be considered as "subjective" in modern terms, since it defines itself as freedom from every definition of content. As an extension of his challenging inquiry,Nancy finallyraises the question of the relation of of "man" and his "humanism" to thispurelyformaldefinition the classical

subject. This is the implicitquestion that underlies both Nancy's and Schouls' and Lockefocuses of analysis.Schouls' The Imposition theMethodin Descartes of on the evolutionof the concept of universalmethodas a reflection a new made possible by Descartes' definition of reason. Schouls mentality describes the method in terms of its two fundamental operations: resolution and composition. Resolution is, however, the most important operation of the two,involvingthe breakdown of complex itemsinto their in simplestconstituents order to meet the epistemologicalconstraintsof and certitude.For Locke, the method the method, those of universality ceases to operate in thisvirtualand absolute sense, since as an empiricist, he takes into account sensations as having both a foundational and a role. As Schouls notes, this involves a basic differencein the restrictive status of human mind's reasoning power which must be autonomous for for Descartes,and restricted Locke. Whereas, forrationalismthe materials of knowledge are given to the mind by the mind, for Locke ideas as "materials of knowledge" are given to the mind by objects through the senses. Thus Locke's empiricist principle evokes a causal theory of knowledge which rules out skepticism without reverting to Cartesian argumentsagainst skepticism. Schouls also touches on the question of the "subject" when he explores Locke's concept and use of the method in politicaltheory.He understands the evolution of the concept of man in Locke as an extension of the manner in which the method orders the world. The concept of "individual" emerges as a kind of indivisible simple of resolution and becomes the unit of measure applied to political theory. While he understands the epistemologicalbasis of the Cartesian method, he does of to its not question sufficiently applicability Locke's formulation political man as "individual." Although Schouls recognizes that this method of resolutionand compositionimposes its nature on the objects to be known, interests become identical thatis to say,thatthe objectsof a geometrician's

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to those of a political theorist,he leaves the nature of this influence unexamined. In other words, although Locke, as Schouls shows,does not consider skepticismby revertingto a causal principle, nonetheless, his method already presumes it in termsof the concept of rationality inherited from Descartes. Schouls' comprehensive analysis of the method in Descartes and Locke opens up the possibility for understanding the common ground shared by the French and the English philosophical traditions.However, his exclusive focus on the concept of method leaves open its possible transpositioninto the domain of political theory. As Schouls himselfshows, Locke's politicaldefinitionof man as "individual" depends on the rationalistformulationof the subject of the method. In other words, the indivisibility the "individual" as a political unit is of as contingenton his indivisibility thought.This leads us back to Nancy's question regarding the relation of thispurely formal-rational subject and the contentascribed to it, be it as "man," "humanism,"or "individuality." The reader is left to ponder this fundamental discrepancybetween the original definitionof the subject in Descartes, as freedom from content, and the content,nonetheless,ascribed to it, as if by accident.
University Pennsylvania of DALIA JUDOVITZ

Gerard Defaux, Moliere, lesmetamorphoses comique: la comedie ou du de morale au triomphe lafolie de Lexington, Kentucky:French Forum, 1980. 370 pages A new work of synthesis always welcome. When the aim of synthesis is is combined with a determinationto prove the existence of an evolution in the work by penetratingto the depths of the artist'smoral and creative consciousness, the effort commands respect. Add to these laudable purposes a nice talent for the well-turned rhetorical phrase: Defaux's Moliere is a seductive and entertaining creation, a portrayal of the as playwright "un artistequi pense" (p. 27). The termemployed in the titleis apt: the movementDefaux discernsin Moliere's work is a stunning metamorphosis. Relying heavily upon the Lettresur la comediede l'Imposteur and drawing parallels between the Defaux reasoning of contemporarymoralists and Moliere's raisonneurs, defines Moliere's initial vision as Counter-Reformationoptimism. "La com6die premiere maniere," the work betweenLes Precieuses ridicules and Le Misanthrope, flows from a comic moralistwho feels so completelyin harmonywithhis audience thattheycan act as his collaborators.Laughter is the expressionof reason and moral health,a meritedpunishmentmeted out to a clearly guiltyindividual. Vice is a recognizable aberration in a fundamentally good human nature. Virtue,just as clearlyrecognizable,is embodied in the values of society:the honnete homme and thehomme bien de