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China, Pakistan,
and the Bomb:
The Declassified File on
Excerpt from Document 18: "U.S. Interaction U.S. Policy, 1977-1997
with the PRC Concerning the PRC's Nuclear
Relationship with Pakistan," 28 November 1989 National Security Archive
Electronic Briefing Book No.
Read the press release 114
March 5, 2004
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China, Pakistan, and the Bomb Page 3 of 21
program and in restricting trade in sensitive nuclear technology. As
China's market economy developed greater complexity, central
authorities could not always control events, which is what may happened
when a Chinese firm sold ring magnets used for the production of highly
enriched uranium to Pakistan in 1995. (Note 5)
Exactly what the United States government knew (or believed it knew)
about Chinese nuclear sharing with Pakistan and when it knew it,
remains highly secret. So far no intelligence reports on the issues have
been declassified, although during the Clinton years Washington Times
correspondent Bill Gertz published highly damaging communications
intercepts on Chinese-Pakistan nuclear transactions in 1996. (Note 6) In
light of the sensitivities involved--U.S. relations with two highly
important partners, Pakistan and China--the relevant details may not be
declassified for many years. Moreover, the presidential records that
would shed light on how consecutive administrations tried to reconcile
the larger goal of engagement with Beijing with specific concerns about
nuclear proliferation issues remain secret. Within the limits imposed by
the secrecy system, this briefing book sheds light on how U.S.
government officials looked at the China-Pakistan nuclear relationship,
their persistent efforts to discourage it, the repeated denials by Chinese
diplomats, and the evolution of China's nuclear nonproliferation policy.
Among the disclosures are:
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z U.S. pressure on China in 1992 to impose full-scope safeguards on
the sale of a nuclear reactor to Pakistan because of proliferation
concerns
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Department, Record Group 59, Office of the Counselor,
1955-1977, box 3, Chron-Official April-June 1976
By the time that the Jimmy Carter administration had come to power in
early 1977, the U.S. had working relations with China and full
diplomatic relations would go into effect later in 1978. One of the major
issues that President Carter had campaigned on was the problem of
nuclear proliferation. After he came to power, the Pakistani nuclear
program remained worrisome, as indicated by Secretary of State Vance,
who supported initiatives to constrain Pakistan's access to nuclear fuel
fabrication services. In this way, Vance hoped to encourage Pakistan to
cancel or postpone its reprocessing project. As he noted, one problem
was a pending deal with the French for a reprocessing plant at Chashma;
the French wanted to disengage from the contract and were already
dragging their feet on it. Another complicating factor was China, which
was starting to offer fuel services and technical assistance to Pakistan's
KANUPP heavy water reactor (whose fuel would later be a source of
plutonium). China's assistance made it important, Vance observed, to
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share U.S. disquiet about nuclear proliferation with the Chinese. In any
event, when it was evident that the Pakistanis were pushing the French to
make good on the reprocessing contract, Carter and his advisers had
decided that Islamabad was going too far. In September 1977, without
invoking the Symington amendment, the administration cut off military
and economic aid to Pakistan. (Note 11)
Document 5: State Department cable to U.S. Embassy,
Austria, "Pakistan Nuclear Issue: Briefing of IAEA Director
General Eklund", 9 July 1979, Secret
Source: State Department FOIA Release
Later in 1978, when the French drastically slowed down work on the
Chashma plant, the Carter administration restored aid to Pakistan.
Nevertheless, the Pakistanis pursued alternative strategies for acquiring
nuclear fuels leading Carter to formally invoke the Symington
amendment in the spring of 1979 and cut off economic and military aid
for the second time. In June 1979, Carter's top diplomatic representative
on nuclear proliferation issues, Ambassador-at-Large Gerard C. Smith
(who had negotiated the SALT I agreement),briefed the director general
of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Sigvard Eklund, on the
latest evidence on Pakistan's efforts to develop reprocessing facilities and
acquire technology for centrifuge machines (for producing highly
enriched uranium). (Robert Galluci, then with the State Department
Policy Planning Staff, provided the detailed briefing, not included in the
text of this document). In a later meeting, Smith expressed some
optimism that there was "some time" to stop the Pakistani program but
Eklund was not so sanguine. Plainly a believer in peaceful nuclear
power, Eklund was most worried that "a Pakistani explosive capability
[was] a serious threat to nuclear power programs of the future."
Document 6: Friday Morning Session, September 14, 1979,
General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and
Disarmament, Secret, Excised Copy, Excerpt
Source: State Department FOIA Release
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veiled way of cautioning the Chinese not to assist Pakistan's nuclear
program.
Document 8: U.S. embassy China cable 17090 to State
Department, "Arms Control and Disarmament," 17
December 1982, Secret
Source: State Department FOIA release
By late 1982, and probably earlier, the Reagan administration had asked
Chinese diplomats if Beijing was aiding Pakistan's nuclear program but
it was not getting any answers. Haig's successor, George Shultz, was
gearing up for a trip to Beijing and nuclear proliferation was on his
agenda for the discussion. This cable, prepared for briefing Shultz,
shows that concern about unsafeguarded exports of uranium and heavy
water persisted even though the Chinese were privately arguing that they
had not, and would not, "assist any country in developing nuclear
weapons." According to Ambassador Arthur Hummel, Chinese officials
were unresponsive to U.S. pleas for "adequate safeguard" or other
specific cooperation on nuclear exports. Moreover, "The Chinese have
also refused to give us an unequivocal answer that they are not assisting
Pakistan's reported efforts to manufacture a nuclear explosive device."
Document 9: U.S. embassy China cable 17168 to State
Department, "U.S.-PRC Nuclear Cooperation -- Or the Lack
of It," 18 December 1982, Secret
Source: State Department FOIA Release
A cable sent by Hummel the next day gave some of the broad context for
U.S. concerns about China's policy on nuclear proliferation. On the one
hand, the Embassy was aware that Chinese economic development plans
required huge inputs of electrical energy and that Beijing was banking on
nuclear power to make development possible. In this connection, the
Embassy observed that there were billions of dollars in possible U.S.
contracts for the Chinese reactor market, for which U.S. companies like
Westinghouse were competing. On the other hand, the Chinese were
themselves getting involved in the nuclear export business as a way to
earn needed foreign currencies that could underwrite imports. As
indicated earlier, the U.S. government suspected Chinese nuclear sales to
Argentina and South Africa and held "suspicions" that Beijing was
providing "weapons-related know-how" to Pakistan. To get control of
this problem as well as meet the U.S.'s own nuclear export goals, the
Embassy recommended greater nuclear cooperation: "a U.S. nuclear
policy … that will encourage China to keep in close touch with us on
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nuclear issues, through channels established by cooperation and
understanding." This was part of the thinking that led to the eventual
U.S.-China negotiations on nuclear cooperation that was formalized by a
1985 agreement. To ensure that Beijing's and Washington's thinking on
nuclear proliferation was compatible, this was a major subject of
discussion in the negotiations on nuclear cooperation that began in July
1983.
Document 10: State Department cable 348835 to U.S.
Embassy Pakistan,
"Newsweek Article on Chinese Nuclear Cooperation with
Pakistan," 18 December 1982, Confidential
Source: State Department FOIA Release
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Lingering suspicions over the degree of China-Pakistan nuclear
cooperation encouraged the State Department's China Desk to raise the
problem in material prepared for President George H.W. Bush's visit to
China, where he would meet China's president, Yang Shangkun, among
other senior officials. Yang, an influential military man (who would soon
help orchestrate the crackdown at Tiananmen Square) played an
important role in military sales policy. (Note 18) For the State
Department, a discussion with Yang provided an opportunity to
emphasize the U.S. interest in the military dimension of U.S.-China
relations but also to convey "concerns over the global dangers of nuclear,
missile, and chemical weapons proliferation." By then Washington was
also worried about Chinese missile sales, for example, to Saudi Arabia,
and working to influence Beijing to comply with the nascent Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR). With respect to Pakistan, "our
concern focuses on reports over a number of years of Chinese assistance
to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program." Whether or how Bush or his
Secretary of State dealt with those issues in his talks with Yang is yet to
be disclosed.
Document 17: U.S. Embassy China Cable 14868 to State
Department, "Ranking MFA Official on PRC Nuclear
Matters: No Proliferation or Subs for Pakistan; Zip for
Pyongyang," 30 May 1989, Secret, excised copy
Source: State Department FOIA release
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The news that a major nuclear export from China to Pakistan--a 388
megawatt nuclear power plant--was in the works produced concerns that
the Chinese safeguards were not tough enough to prevent diversion of
nuclear resources to the Pakistani weapons program. Thus, the
Department instructed Embassy officials to express regret that the
Chinese were not treating "full-scope safeguards"--ensuring non-
diversion of resources from the Pakistani nuclear power program to the
non-safeguarded weapons program--as a condition for the sale. Such
safeguards had become a standard for the Nuclear Suppliers Group
which tried to provide international regulation for nuclear exports. On a
more positive note, the Department asked the Embassy to preface those
concerns by expressing satisfaction that China's National Peoples
Congress had made a decision that China would adhere to the NPT,
which became official in March 1992. With this move, China was
starting to join the world in a critically important area although Beijing's
adherence to new standards of nonproliferation policy would not occur
overnight.
Document 21: U.S. Embassy China cable 01109 to State
Department, "China's Nuclear Deal with Pakistan --
Demarche Delivered," 14 January 1992, Confidential
Source: State Department FOIA release
Not long after Beijing signed the NPT, the problem of treaty extension
was on the international agenda, with plans for a 1995 conference under
way. In November the Chinese hosted a conference on arms control
where relatively frank Chinese assessments of the NPT shed some light
on older internal debates, motivations for signing the treaty, and
reactions to U.S. pressure on the China-Pakistan nuclear connection.
Unfortunately, this cable was transmitted in somewhat garbled form (see
paragraph 6, first sentence), but the discussion in that paragraph suggests
why some Chinese officials may have thought it legitimate for Pakistan
to develop nuclear weapons. Some of the Chinese argued that the U.S.-
Soviet nuclear standoff had produced "a de facto political stability that
prevented direct conflict." If that was good enough for Moscow and
Washington should not "other rival states", such as India and Pakistan,
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have the "same chance to prevent conflict." This was a minority view at
the conference but it may have been close to the thinking of those
elements in the government that had supported nuclear assistance to
Pakistan.
Document 25: U.S. State Department Briefing Paper,
"China," circa December 1992, Secret, excised copy
Source: State Department FOIA Release
Twelve years after the U.S. and China signed the nuclear cooperation
agreement, a U.S. president certified that Beijing's nuclear policies
complied with Congressional nonproliferation requirements. Pressure
from the U.S. nuclear energy complex was an important element in the
decision but the Clinton administration argued that changes in Chinese
conduct justified the finding. An important section in this heavily
excised report (only one and a half secret paragraphs were declassified)
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was a discussion of the China-Pakistan relationship. While the Chinese
would never publicly declare that they had aided Pakistan, new charges
of illicit sales--of ring magnets and a special industrial furnace--were
surfacing, (Note 22) and further U.S. demarches produced a May 1996
public declaration that China would not assist unsafeguarded nuclear
facilities. Nevertheless, intelligence intercepts unwisely published by
Washington Times reporter Bill Gertz suggest that only months after that
declaration the Chinese, through the China Nuclear Energy Industry
Corporation, were still making deals with the Pakistanis although it
remains unclear whether the transactions were completed. (Note 23)
Whether the White House used this discovery to stimulate stronger
nonproliferation commitments from the Chinese is unclear. In any event,
the Clinton administration soon become that Chinese policies had
changed for the better and the following year reported so to Congress.
According to the 1997 certification, "we have no direct evidence that
China has transferred equipment or material to Pakistan's unsafeguarded
nuclear program since that time, and we have no basis for concluding
that China is not honoring its pledge." Although some Republican critics
would argue that China remained in defiance of the NPT, the Clinton
White House rested its case; the Republicans could not overturn the
certification. Thus, the huge Chinese market for U.S. nuclear reactor
technology was officially open. (Note 24)
President Clinton's decision did not mean that the China-Pakistan nuclear
issue had simply gone away. Months later, the Christian Science Monitor
reported that U.S. intelligence had picked up signs that Chinese
companies were trying to sell equipment for Iran's and Pakistan's nuclear
programs. Apparently, the U.S. government reported the information to
Beijing, which took steps to halt the transactions. (Note 25) Yet the
certification of Beijing's nonproliferation policy by no means dispelled
the nuclear problem in U.S.-China relations. During 1998, accusations of
Chinese espionage would fill front pages as would a flap over the U.S.
satellite technology to China. In more recent years, DCI Tenet's semi-
annual unclassified reports to Congress on weapons of mass destruction
proliferation show continuing wariness about the China. (Note 26)
That China's aid to Pakistan had the most negative consequences became
evident in May 1998, when both India and Pakistan held nuclear
weapons tests and more recently with more and more disclosures on
Pakistan's role as a super-proliferator. China expressed "deep regret"
over the former and the Foreign Ministry is now investigating the latter.
To what degree Beijing will disclose the background of its nuclear
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relationship with Pakistan remains to be seen.
Notes
*The FOIA requests and appeals that made this collection possible were
supported by the W. Alton Jones Foundation, whose untimely and
regrettable disbanding created a significant void in support for research
on nuclear nonproliferation policy.
11. For China as a military supplier and the Pakistani nuclear decision in
1974, see Kux, The United States and Pakistan, p. 223; Leonard Spector,
Nuclear Proliferation Today (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), pp. 80
and 212.
12. Ibid, pp. 85-86; Kux, The United States and Pakistan, p. 239.
13. See "A Tale of Nuclear Proliferation," New York Times, 12 February
2004.
19. Readers can decide for themselves how "backward" the Chinese
nuclear submarine program was by consulting China's Strategic
Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear War, by
John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1994), especially pp. 176-208.
24. "U.S. Says China Isn't Helping Others Build Bombs," New York
Times, 11 December 1997. For former Rep. Lee Hamilton's case for the
certification and discussion of the criticisms, see "We Mustn't Move the
Bar on China Now," Washington Post, 12 November 1997.
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