Aziza al Hibri , Fatima Mernissi, Leila Ahmed, Riffat Hassan

http://www.geocities.com/islamifeminist/
http://www.geocities.com/islamifeminist/feminismname.htm Islamic Feminism http://www.geocities.com/islamifeminist/ woman leading prayer http://www.hahmed.com/blog/?p=47

Islamic feminism: compromise or challenge to feminism?

Introduction
One of the most important questions for the sociology of gender and feminist research on Third World woman, is the relationship between Islam and womens situation in the Islamic countries. This question has become more acute after more than 20 years of Islamic revolution in Iran. Reflecting on the subordination of women in the Islamic countries, some feminist researchers hold that Islam could be defined as one of the worst sorts of patriarchal religion, oppressing women and legitimizing gender inequality (for example Espotio 1983, Nawol 1982). Other scholars argue that this picture results from Western ethnocentrism (for example Said 1993, Mohanty 1988). Several questions can be raised within the context of this debate. Is it possible to analyze womens situation in Islamic countries, such as Iran, with western feminist eyes? Is any feminist view of Islam possible? What is the relationship between Islam and patriarchy? What can the experience of the Islamic revolution in Iran after 20 years tell us about the relationship between a religious movement and womens situation? I suggest in this article to discuss the difficulties of the Islamic feminism in analyzing the conditions of women in Islamic societies.

Islam and patriarchy

Generally, religions have a patriarchal view of the relationship between the genders. The relationship between Adam and Eve symbolizes how many religions view women. As Al Hibri writes:

God was declared male, and man was declared to be created in His likeness. Eve became the symbol of temptation and sin. The woman was consequently judged as a less likely candidate for salvation and an everlasting life in heaven than man. (1981, p 176) But some scholars point out that, in comparison with other religions, the idea of patriarchy is even greater in Islam. They mean that there are in the Koran many verses, especially Surah 4 which clearly legitimizes gender inequality. Even hadith (stories from the, Prophets life) and Shariah (Islamic law) have the same tendency. Why? Rita Liljestrom, a Swedish sociologist, explains that there is a fundamental difference between Islam and Christianity in their attitudes to sexuality, which influences the view on women (1984, p. 10). She points out that the Christian Church attacks sexuality in itself. Sexuality is reduced to something profane and sinful, sexuality signifies the division of human beings into body and soul. Civilization represents the souls victory over the body, spirit over the flesh, and diligence over lust. Islam takes a different approach. It never repudiates sexuality as such. In fact sex is a taste of paradise. But Islam attacks women instead. As the living carrier of the danger of sexuality and its infinite social destructive forces, women have to be controlled. Sexuality itself is not dangerous since it is the foretaste of paradise that leads men to Allah (Sabbah, 1984). The different views on the nature of sexuality have resulted in separate strategies of control within Christianity and Islam. Since Islam regards women as an active sexual power, it is important to restrict womens sexual power over men. The result is isolating women and men in different worlds. A womans sexuality has to be concealed. Her looks and behavior must not reveal her sexual force since it will remind the man of his weakness. Fatima Mernessi, a famous Arab feminist, explained a long time ago that the Christian portrayal of the individual as tragically torn between two poles (good and evil, flesh and spirit, instinct and reason) is very different from that of Islam, which has a more sophisticated theory of the instincts, more akin to the Freudian concept of the libido. She writes: In western culture, sexual inequality is based on the belief in the biological inferiority of woman. In Islam, it is the contrary: the whole system is based on the assumption that woman is a powerful and dangerous being. All sexual institutions (polygamy, repudiation, sexual segregation, etc.) can be perceived as a strategy for constraining her power (Mernissi 1975, P 16). This explains why the Koran maintains mans superiority and domination over woman. It is mens responsibility and duty to keep women under their protection and control. The question is if every Muslim views gender relation with the same harshness as formulated in Islam. If not, could we infer that there is not necessarily any contradiction between believing in Islam and in gender equality? Muslim feminists point out that the picture of Islam as a hard patriarchal religion is based on the dominating view of Islam, which is not necessary original Islam. They mean that this picture is the result of western imagination, of Islams attitude to women, which is problematic (Afshar, 1998; Svensson, 1996).

Western views of women in Islamic countries

The image of women in the Third World generally, and of Muslim women in particular, in the West, is very schematic and prejudiced. Marred by racism and ethnocentrism, attitudes towards Muslims have become harsher in recent years. The Muslim woman has been portrayed as submissive, oppressed, and backward. Mass media and educational systems have played a major role in the construction of this representation. The popular book and movie Not Without My Daughter is a good example which profoundly established this image by over-emphasizing the significance of veiling as a China-wall which separates Muslims from non-Muslims. This fabricated image ignores the connection between the oppression of women in the West and East. Not Without My Daughter reflects more a Western view of Muslim women than the realities of womens lives in Islamic societies. It is this discourse which Edward Said (1993) calls Orientalism. In Orientalism, the Orient is created. The Orient is thus a linguistic, discursive creation, rather than a place to which one can travel or in which one can live. The Orient of Orientalism serves a dual function. It affirms the concept of the superiority of the West, and defines Wests normality by regulating the abnormal, forbidden, and dangerous to the Orient. Chandra Mohanty (1988, p. 81) makes a similar argument when she proposes that the universal image of the Third World woman is constructed by adding Third Worlds differences to gender relation. This image is predicted by the assumption of western woman as secular, liberated, and in control of her life, in contrast to the makeup of the Third World women. Yet not all women in the West are in fact secular and liberated, just as not all women in Islamic societies match the pre-made image of Muslim woman. Also, not all Muslim women have the same idea about Islam. Their ideas are influenced by their class status, cultural background, education, and position in society. Mohanty points out that many feminists write about Muslim women being powerless and oppressed, about their needs and problems. But there are few feminists who write about their choices, freedom, or power of action. Western feminists merely use images of Third World women as objects in defining themselves who are the real object of their studies. She means that in feminist theory, Asian, and particularly Muslim, women, are depicted as powerless individuals who need to be guided by Western feminism in order to become politically mature. It is unrealistic view all women or all Muslims as a homogenous group, ignoring the historical differences between them. A question rises here: can Islamic feminism be an alternative view of feminism, a view that can facilitate womens emancipation in Islamic counties?

Islamic feminism: compromise or challenge to feminism?

Muslims feminism is not a new movement. In the beginning of the nineteenth century a few great Islamic thinkers such as Sayyid Jamal-ad-Din Asadabadi (al-Afqani), Muhammad Abduh, Rashid Reza, and especially Qasim Amin and later the Sisters movement in the Arabic countries tried to give a modern, liberal, reformist and

feminist reinterpretation of Islam (Svensson, 1996). Theirs ideas never became dominating in any Islamic country. But during the 1980s and 1990s, a similar tendency to reinterpret Islam in a feminist context reappeared in several Islamic countries. Several secular feminist scholars (e.g., Fatima Merniss, Aziza Al-Hibri), who earlier criticized Islam, changed their position and tried to offer a feminist interpretation of Islam, making it quite difficult to place Muslim feminist into a neat category (Mernessi, 1996; Afshari, 1994) Jan Hjrpe (1995), a Swedish scholar of theology separates Islamic feminism from Muslim feminism. He points out four feminist trends in Islamic countries: Atheist feminism, Secular feminism, Muslim feminism, Islamic feminism. Atheist feminism proposes that religion is anti-women. They believe that womens movement cloud develop only by challenging the influence of religion in society. Secular feminism has a neutral view about religion. Secular feminists argue that the relationship between Islam and feminism depends first and foremost on wether liberal or patriarchal view of Islam is dominant in the society. They also hold that under a theocratic government or a religious movement womans emancipation is impossible. But they do not think that feminist movements necessarily have to attack religious beliefs. Muslim feminism has liberal view of Islam and tries to adapt it to modern time. Muslims feminism argues that for a long time, our imagination about Islam was dominated by a patriarchal vision of Islam, but that this is not necessarily an authentic Islam. They argue that we should primarily focus on the teachings of the Koran because much of hadith and shariah is a patriarchal reading of Islam. However, we know that even many Koran verses (for example surah Women) legitimize gender inequality. Muslims feminists suggest that the Koran has two sorts of verses. One addresses the practical aspects of Muslims everyday life in the primitive Arabian society. Other verses concern morality and are normative. Unlike the former group of verses whose interpretation must change to reflect the present conditions of any society, the latter do not depend on time. But even in normative verses (especially in the surah Women) one can find patriarchal ideas. Muslim feminists answer is that if you believe that Good is just and the Koran is Gods word, it is not reasonable to consider that any verse could legitimize gender inequality. They argue that the Koran introduces many powerful female figures who played important roles in Islam and in the Prophets life, something that many of his successors did not favour (Svensson, 1996; Sajidzade, 1996). Muslim feminists point out that a liberal and feminist review of the Koran could contribute to the development of womens emancipation in the Islamic country (Hassan, 1999). Islamic feminism is clearly state feminism, or a part of fundamentalist and religious movement, and according to this trend, womens identification with religious movements help Muslim womens emancipation. For example, Nesta Ramazani, an Iranian scholar (1993), points out that womens gathering in religious mourning, their presence in Friday prayers, and their participation in revolution and war eventually will lead to their emancipation. It is true that after the Islamic revolution in Iran, women have been more active in political and social life. However, Islamic women are usually active in officially sanctioned arenas such as religious rituals and campaigns in support of the

regime. In fact, women stand to lose the most after revolution in the Iran (Darvishpour, 1993). As an ideology, policy, and social movement feminism generally have been connected to secularism. It is not surprising that many secular feminists found Islam to be a major opponent for the feminist movement. For example, Shahrzad Mojab (1995) and Haiddeh Moghissi (1999), two Iranian feminists, belonging to the first type of feminist groups, argue that Islam is a challenge to feminism. Mojab argues that from an initial total rejection of Islam, feminism has moved towards a more sophisticated readjustment. She identifies five factors contributing to this development in feminism. First, a sizable modern middle-class of women has formed in the urban centers. The women are in professional occupations such as engineering, teaching, medicine, politics, business, etc. Second, women are elected as members of the parliament in at least a few Islamic countries. Third, the increasing participation of women in the expanding capitalist economy has contributed to further awareness of the inequalities between genders, both at work and at home. Fourth, knowledge about feminism and struggles in other countries is transmitted widely. Fifth, in many Islamic countries, womens organizations are active independent of the state. Under these conditions, Muslim leaders and ideologists must meet the challenge of the feminist movement. According to Mojab, Islamic feminism is not a serious challenge against patriarchy and it is still far from independence, secularism, and democracy. The Islamic feminist movement is more, a compromise with patriarchy than a realistic movement for the emancipation of women. A problem with Majabs argument is that she never asks herself if any theoretically feminist reinterpretation of Islam is possible. Another problem is that both Islamic feminists and atheists feminist have only an ideological approach to religion. One argues that without believing in religion, womens emancipation is impossible; the other proposes that it is only possible when you do not believe on religion. The question is, with these views, if any dialogue for women solidarity and equality between these groups is possible. But Muslims feminists and secular feminists can have a dialogue about gender equality. Maybe it can be claimed that a liberal and milder interpretation of Islam, which tries to distance itself from Islams misogynist rules and accepts gender equally, can improve the status of women in Islamic countries to a certain degree. But Question is to what degree a liberal review of Islam can improve womens rights. Why do womens rights have to be depending on any religious views? The experience of political Islam shows the difficulties of compromise between Islam and feminism (Nawol, 1982, Hjrpe, 1983). The experience of the Islamic revolution in Iran clearly shows the antifeminist and antidemocratic tendency of the fundamentalist and religious movement on which Islamic feminism depends.

The situation of Iranian women, Two decades after the Islamic revolution
Generally, womens share of rights and resources has deteriorated since the revolution in 1979. It is a result of the regressive policy of the Islamic regime. Compulsory veiling,

sex segregation, stoning women to death for adultery, were direct results of Islamic governments policy, which still continues, after more than 20 years. In particular, Iranian women suffer from the return to traditional laws of marriage and from reduced educational and occupational opportunities. Family Legislation After the Revolution, the family protection lawi[1] was reprieved and declared incompatible with the canon of Islamic laws. Consequently, the right to polygamous marriage was once again restored. The minimum age for women marriage fell from 18 to 13. The legal rights of women in application for divorce and custody of children were severely curtailed (Darvishpour 1993). Even though in recent years parts of the law have been revised, nothing has radically changed in the law. For example, Article 1043 of the civil law makes it clear that the marriage of a girl is dependent upon the consent of her father or grandfather. Articles 1117 and 54 declare that married women can only accept jobs that are not incompatible with her responsibilities as a wife. Otherwise, she needs permission from her husband. Article 1133, states that a man can divorce at any time he wishes, while a woman can request divorce only for exceptional reasons. Women and employment Under the Islamic Republic the proportion of employed women has drastically declined. Within a decade, it fell from twelve percent in 1976 to six percent in 1986, resulting in hundreds of thousands unemployed women (Darvishpour 1993). While the Islamic Republic of Iran introduced measures to demobilize the more secularized Iranian women, it encouraged the participation of thousands of religious women in the military, social, and political arenas. The new active women were mainly from the traditional middleclass who fought for the Islamic republic in the revolution. Although in recent years the percentage of employed women has increased from 6 in 1986 to 9 in1996, it is still less than womens employment immediately before the revolution. Women and education Generally, after the Islamic revolution education policy adapt to complete gender segregation in the preliminary schools. More than 100 fields of studies, out of a total 431, at universities were prohibited to women. The governments justification was that, in accordance with the shariah (Islamic law), those courses were appropriate only for men. It is notable that this policy did not change the proportion of female college students to their male classmates. When comparing 1977 with 1987, the percentage of women is almost unchanged: about 30% of all students at the university are women. Even if some courses were closed to women, percentage of female students remained almost the same because they attended other courses (Darvishpour 1993). But in recent year, after the initial bars on womens study in some majors were lifted, the number of female college students has increased. To day more than about 40% of all students at the university are women, which is first of all result of womens resistance (Darvishpour, 2001).

Womens Resistance As I pointed out earlier, womens situation cannot be explained only as subordination. They have power to act, too. Their resistance against discriminations in the educational system is a clear example. Another instance of womens resistance relates refusal to wear the Islamic veil, despite probable punishments. In1993, 113,000 women were arrested in Iran for not complying to the dress code. A third example is the new waves of the independent female magazines, books, and cinema. Despite all hindrances, great female writers, journalists, and film directors have called peoples attention to womens questions. While the fundamentalist government tried to limit independent art, literature, films, and magazines, many women have been more active in those arenas than under Shahs government. Examples above show just some aspects of womens active resistance. Despite the facts that a large group of Iranian intellectuals, middle class, and secular women were executed, imprisoned, or forced to run away from Iran, it is clear that women as an active group try to defend their rights.

Conclusion
The question is whether womens movements in Islamic societies such as Iran have found their way to challenge the establishment and to change the situation of women. Maybe not yet .We need more research on these questions. Perhaps it is not necessary for the feminist movement in Islamic countries to declare war on religion. However, the experience of the Islamic Republic of Iran shows how dangerous a religious movement could be for women. Secularism is an unavoidable prerequisite in womens battle for liberation. Therefore, I insist that we should encourage secular feminism! Mehrdad Darvishpour Dep of Sociology Stockholm University References Afshar, Haleh. 1998. Islam and Feminisms, An Iranian Case-study. London: Macmilan Press LTD. Afshari, Reza. 1994. Egalitarian Islam and Misogynist Islamic Tradition: A Critique of the Feminist Reinterpretation of Islamic History and Heritage. Critique: Journal of Critical Studies of Iran and the Middle East (4):13-33) Al-Hibri, Azizab. 1981. Capitalism is an Advanced Stage of Patriarchy. In Lydia Sargent (ed). Women and Revolution: A Discussion of the Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism. Boston: South End Press. Darvishpour, Mehrdad.1993. En bild av kvinnornas situation i Iran. Sociologisk forskning no. 3 Darvishpour, Mehrdad. 2001. Chaleshgari zanan aleje nagh mardan (women chalenge the roll of men). Stockholm: Baranfrlag. Espotio, John. 1982. Women in the Muslim Family. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

Hassan, Riffat. 1999. Feminism In Islam In Sharma, Arvind & Young, Katherine k. (editor), Feminism and world Religion, State University of New York press, Albany. Hjrpe, Jan. 1983. Politisk islam. Studier i muslimsk fundamentalism. Gteborg: Frlagshuset Gothia. Hrpe, Jan. 1995. Islamisk feminism, Kvinnor och fundamentalism, nr 10, 1995. Liljestrm, Rita. 1984. Skuggan av historiens mansvlde vilar tungt ver sexualitet. Invandrare & Minoriteter, nr 5-6. Sweden Mernessi, Fatima. 1975. Beyond the Veil. New York: John,Wiley and sons Mernessi, Fatima. 1993. Women and Islam, London: PRESS Mohanty, Chandra. 1988. Under Western Eyes. Feminist Review 30 Mojab, Shahrzad. 1995. Islamic Feminism: Alternative or Contradiction. Fireweed, no. 47 Nawol, Yasmina. 1982. Kvinnor under Islam. Stockholm: Rda rummet Ramazani, Nesta. 1993. Women in Iran. Middle East Journal 43, no. 3 Sabbah, Fatna A. 1984. Woman in the Muslim Unconscious. New York: Pergamon Press. Said, Edward. 1993 Orientalism. Stockholm: Ordfront. Sajidzade, Mohsen. 1996. Darbareje feminism va tatbigh an ba masael islami (Islam and Fminism), Bonjad phajoheshhaj zanan. USA. Svensson, Jonas. 1996. Muslimsk feminism ngra exempel. Teologiska institutionen, Lunds Universitet.

i[1]

In 1967 and 1975, the first and second Family Protection laws were enacted. They ensured women the right to divorce, restricted polygamy, and prohibited pre-mature marriages. The laws changed the status for women. Civil laws, predating the Islamic regime, restricted the discretionary power of men through the family protection law. Disputes concerning the undisputed rights of men in polygamous marriages, divorce, and custody of children were settled through court rulings. For example, a dispute arising from the custody of children was given to the court. The right to divorce was made conditional on the court ruling, and women obtained much more favorable terms and conditions for divorce. Having a second wife was made conditional on the consent of the first wife. Besides the inequality of treatment in civil rights, concerning adjudication, testimony, inheritance, employment, and education, the new civil laws extend inequality to the realm of marriage. They ensured women the right to divorce and restricted polygamy.

Theorizing the Politics of 'lslamic Feminism'

Shahrzad Mojab

Feminism, as the western, liberal idea and politics of gender equality, reached lslamic societies' (1) in the late nineteenth century. From the very beginning, the debate was centred on the compatibillty of the idea of women's emancipation with the principles of Islam. The first woman to offer a detailed reinterpretation of the texts in favour of women's rights was probably Nazira Zain al-Din, born in Lebanon in 1905. Her first book was an indictment of patriarchal oppression, which she declared to be against the principles of Islam. She said: 'The veil is an insult to men and women'. When the book was published in 1928 men of religion incited demonstrations against the book and threatened the owners of book shops who carried it. The conflict over women's rights involved, however, more than discursive engagements among contending interpreters of the scriptures. During the first half of the twentieth century, Islamic societies were changing both internally and externally through the impact of colonialism, modernism, nationalism and socialism. Upper- and middle-class urban women, long confined to the private domain of the household, were demanding participation in public life. Some rural women, too, had been drawn into the anticolonial struggles and land reform movements. Thus, women constituted a new social force, and their demand for rights, if granted and exercised, would have required a redistribution of power both in private and public spheres. A women's movement emerged during the Constitutional Revolution of Iran (1906-11). Social forces - nationalists, Islamists and communists - could not envision the assumption of power without an agenda for the mobilization and organization of women. Equally interested in the control of the nascent feminist movements was the institution of the state. Some of the newly established nation-States' such as Turkey and Iran appropriated the feminist movements by dissolving independent organizations and their press, and granting women certain rights. The colonial

powers, which ruled over many new countries created in the wake of World War I, were equally interested in checking the feminist movements. Today - early debates continue Today, women's movements and feminist theories are very diverse. Contemporary scholars such as Leila Ahmed, Aziza al-Hibri, Riffat Hassan and Fatima Mernissi have produced refined research, and initiated new efforts to reconcile feminism with Islam. Among the most significant developments in late twentieth century was the coming to power of a new theocratic state, the Islamic Republic if Iran, which has impacted the direction of the struggle for women's rights. The Islamic state declared the existing gender relations un-Islamic and western. The Islamization of gender relations was extensive, but met strong resistance from the very beginning. By the mid 1990s, the Islamic regime was experiencing a serious crisis; it had failed to control women, workers, dissident nationalities, students, the print media, artists and secular intellectuals. Women's spontaneous resistance was widespread. The crisis of the Islamic state have invited diverse responses from the ruling factions of the government, non-state actors and feminists. I will examine here the academic feminist response, which is sharply divided. 'Islamic feminism' - lobbying for legal reform A group of feminists, mostly secular academics living in the West, has in recent years used the term Islamic feminism' to refer to Islamic alternatives to western feminisms. They treat Islam as the only authentic, indigenous road to gender equality and justice. The term is used more specifically to refer to the activism of a relatively small number of Iranian women who seek the amelioration of the Islamized gender relations, mainly through lobbying for legal reform within the framework of the Islamic Republic. However, these Muslim acitvists themselves do not use the term. Some supporters of 'Islamic ferninism' equate it with liberation theology in the West. Other academics and feminist activists reject the compatibility thesis and argue that 'Islamic feminism' is an oxymoron, a contradiction in terms. If by feminism is meant easing patriarchal pressures on women, making patriarchy less appalling, 'Islamic feminism' is certainly a feminist trend. But if feminism is a movement to abolish patriarchy, to contribute towards a society in which individuals can fashion their lives free from economic, political, social, and cultural constraints, then 'lslamic feminism' proves considerably inadequate. The experience of the Islamic Republic has shown, as a matter of fact, that Islamic theocracy reinforces the traditional patriarchal systern. Thus Islamic feminism' justifies unequal gender relations.

Academic ferninists who authorize 'Islamic feminism' tend to treat Islam, though not other religions, as the engine of history, the builder of identity, and a constant presence in history, which is permanently inscribed in the mind and body of every Muslim. While treating Islam as the agent of history is problematic, the main problem is the underlying assumptions of academic feminists about patriarchy, the women's movement and feminism. They underestimate patriarchy and the role of consciousness, i.e. feminismn, in the struggle against patriarchy. I will elaborate my critique focussing on the reform of the legal system. Legal reform as a contested arena The Islamic state's first open conflict with the people of the country occurred when Khomeini, in early March 1979, invited female employees of the Government to observe the veil, called for the suspension of the Family Protection Law of the previous regime and ordered the dismissal of women judges. Secular women and men reacted immediately by, among other things, demonstrations on the occasion of 8 March, International Women's Day. This event proved that Islamization in Iran would by no means be an easy task. For one thing, Iranian society had, since the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11, undergone considerable transformation. Women constituted a vital political force, now organized into numerous leftist, socialist, nationalist and Islamic organizations. This was a sharp contrast with Afghanistan of the 1990s where religious leaders found it expedient to Islamize gender relations by decree and sheer use of force only. The Iranian state felt constrained by a vibrant public sphere. It consisted of numerous sites of debate and dissent including newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, leaflets, cassette tapes, xerox literature, street debates, wall newspapers, etc. Another limitation was the legal legacy of the huge state machinery. Under these conditions, law was an indispensable tool for implementing Islamic gender policies. The criticism of the juridico-legal structure resumed in the 1990s. The extremely disabling legislation together with the violence of the coercive forces against women in public spaces was resented even by some pro-government women. Since the opposition had been eliminated or silenced, the expression of dissidence over the legal system was limited primarily to those who accepted the Islamic regime. Two laws received considerable criticism in the media: the first - the discriminatory nature of custody laws - was changed as protests forced the Government to respond; so the Islamic Assembly passed, in 1988 a reform, withouth addressing the fundamental problem - the denial of mother's rights - and did not change the law in any significant way. The second reform concerned the right of women to judge. In less than a month after coming to power and without waiting for Legislation, the Islamic Republic dismissed all women judges. Once more pressure from outside and inside the country in 1995 forced the government to pass a single article, which allowed the

hiring of women at the rank of judiciary, albeit without the power of judging. The Islamic ferninist perspective The stories of legal reform may be interpreted in different ways: in a Islamic feminsit perspective and from a critical feminist position. Accepting the juridico-legal framework of the Islamic state, legal experts or academics are optimistic about prospects for women's rights in Iran. They believe that a reinterpretation of Islam, together with lobbying, will eventually pave the way for granting women equal rights with men. Some of the women's journals such as Farzaneh and Zanan act as lobbying organs. They demonstrate inconsistencies in the law, and argue that the present legal system conflicts with Islam's 'affectionate spirit' and its respect for women. Another way of convincing the clerics and the legislative establishment about the equality of women and men is to argue that laws which discriminate on the basis of gender are not rooted in the Islam but rather in tradition and history. As such, they can readily be changed. These critics uncover the misogynist or, in their cautious words, male-biased nature of the law, but do not question its religious roots. Instead, they deny the religious, Islamic, sources of the Legislation. The two cases of reforming the law do not challenge the exercise of male power. Even if 'feminist' interpretations of religious texts and traditions are allowed to play a role in the reform process, their incorporation into the law would entail a political process, i.e. one of conflicts and compromises on the redistribution and exercise of gender power. Since the laws were guided by an overtly religious patriarchal agenda, their reform would require either the radical revision or discarding of its theological bases. Feminists do not reject reform, which is a means of democratization of gender and social relations. The Iranlan 'Islamic feminist' agenda for reform is, however, patriarchal. Its boundaries are drawn by a state, which is not willing to move in the direction of democratization of gender relation, a process which depends on the separation of law and religion as well as state and religion. A critical feminist perspective Islamic feminists insist on the specificity or, even, uniqueness of the Muslim woman and her status in society. They argue that Islam treats women with dignity and respects and grants them equal rights. However, the regime of rights in general and women's rights in particular are products of the democratization struggles in western societies. The question of rights is inseparable from citizenship, the democratic state and civil society. Islamic ferninists and their cultural relativist supporters demand equality in law much in the same way that liberalism has advocated formal equality. Like their

liberal counterparts, they institute a separation between law and the exercise of political power. They look at law as a neutral Instrument which can serve diverse interests equally. This is a 'legal positivism', which understands law as an 'autonomous, selfcontained system' uninvolved in the production of power relations. However, several trends of critical legal thought argue that law, far from being a neutral means, legitimates, maintains, and serves the distribution and retention of power in society. Feminist legal theorists view rights analysis and liberal legalism' as patriarchal forms which may serve to mask patriarchal bias in law. Some critics not only question the value of rights theory but also the value of law itself as a means for achieving gains for women. They argue that law is fundamentally patriarchal, and articulating women's struggles in legal terms would inevitably reinforce patriarchy. Even when social movements win rights victories, it is the state that reinterprets their radical social goals in terms of rights; thus, by locating social power in the state rather than the people, the struggle for rights eventually leads to passivity, reinforces alienation and powerlessness and co-opts them into maintaining the status quo. Compared with the feminist struggles of the West, the project of Islamic feminists is extremely limited in both theory and practice. Unlike western liberalism, which has succeeded in instituting an extensive regime of rights guaranteeing legal equality, 'lslamic feminism' is not even ambitious enough to demand universal formal equality. This feminism has not, for instance, challenged the extremely oppressive laws by which the Muslim and non-Muslim women are not treated equally, the latter being punished more brutally. Whether in Iran or in the secularist' regimes, the separation of religion and politics continues to be a requirement for radical legal reform. In the case of Iran, such separation would entail not a reform but the dismantling of the Islamic state, which was consciously built on the unity of religion and state. Which side are you on? While many academic feminists continue to celebrate the birth of Islamic feminism, its uniqueness and authenticity, the widespread resistance of Iranians has questioned not only its system of gender apartheid but also the very foundations of the theocratic regime. By the late 1990s, as well Islamic intellectuals and leaders who themselves had played a role in the construction of this theocracy questioned the claim that the Islamic Republic represents Allah on earth. University students, pro-reform print media, dissident activists and some clergymen have argued in favour of the separation of state and religion. While the reformists in and outside the Government failed to displace the conservatives, the economic and political crisis of the country continued to fan the flames of dissent. Workers and salaried people have suffered most from economic hardships, and women, students and youth are subjected to social and

cultural pressures that they no longer tolerate. Although gender apartheld is still official policy, women have gone on the offensive, and refuse strictly to follow Islamic dress codes. That the legitimacy of Iranian theocracy has been questioned and women's resistance against gender apartheid is continuing, amounts to a serious crisis of the Islamic state. Western and Iranian feminists who have worked hard to construct 'Muslim woman idientities' and 'Islamic feminisms' lag behind developments in the gender conflict in Iran. While Islamic theocracy in Iran is falling apart, they continue to essentialize the women of Islamic countries into religious beings. Islamic theocracy and Islamic feminism in Iran have reached a dead-end. But there is another, even more serious, dead-end in feminist theory. Since the launching of women's studies programmes in the 1970s, academic feminism has made great strides in both theory and in methodology. Equally significant is the success of women's movements in many western countries to force the malecentred state into granting legal equality between the two genders. We know, however, that legal equality does not lead to equality in the extra-legal world (for instance gender inequalities based on class, religion, race or nationality). In fact, the latter seriously constraints whatever may be gained from the former. Here lies, I believe, the crisis of feminist theory. In the West, liberal feminism has realized its centuries-Iong project of legal reform. What is next? The various turns in social and feminist theory that are pre-fixed `post-' do not move beyond the claims of liberal feminism. No doubt, focusing on identity, culture, language, discourse, desire and body, these theoretical positions have made enormous contributions to our understanding of patriarchy. Politically, however, they lag behind liberal feminism: as liberal feminism generally advocates legal eqality and a regime of rights as universal conditions of gender; `post-feminism' denies the universality of rights such as equal pay, equal opportunity, child care and birth control. In this theorization, the women of the world are fragmented into religions, ethnicities, tribes, cultures, nations and traditions, which determine the agenda of women's and feminist movements. The political ramifications of this cultural relativism are clear. The cultural relativist fragmentation of women into religious entities and the particularization of women's demands according to the interests of religious patriarchy have helped the formation of alliances between the Holy See and Islamic states such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. By 1998, only eleven of the twentytwo members of the League of Arab States had ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Againt Women (CEDAW), and the rest had approved it with reservations. In all reservations Islam was the obstacle to the elimination of one or another form of discrimination.

The particularization of women, patriarchy and oppression in postmodernist feminist theory is also in conflict with the internationalization of women's and feminist movements. The globalization of capitalist economy has increased class and gender conflicts throughout the world, especially in developing countries. Violence against women is rampant throughout the Islamic world. 'Which side are you on?' is the question all feminists and feminist theories have to address. (1) I use, reluctantly, the terms 'Islamic society', 'Islamic country' or 'Muslim woman'. lt would be inappropriate to characterize individuals, societies, cultures or countries by their religion or, rather, the dominant religion practised. Shahrzad Mojab teaches at the Department of Adult Education, Community Development and Counselling Psychology at the University of Toronto, Canada.
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