Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No.

L-16922 April 30, 1963 IN RE: ADOPTION OF CHILD BAPTIZED UNDER THE NAME OF ROSE, MARVIN G. ELLIS and GLORIA C. ELLIS, petitioners-appellees, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant. Leonardo F. Lansangan for petitioners-appellees. Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor-appellant. CONCEPCION, J.: Appeal taken by the Government from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga granting the petition of Marvin G. Ellis and Gloria C. Ellis for the a doption of a Filipino baby girl named Rose. Petitioner Marvin G. Ellis, a native of San Fransisco, California, is 28 years o f age. On September 3, 1949, he married Gloria G. Ellis in Banger, Maine, United States. Both are citizens of the United States. Baby Rose was born on September 26, 1959, at the Caloocan Maternity Hospital. Four or five days later, the moth er of Rose left her with the Heart of Mary Villa an institution for unwed mother s and their babies stating that she (the mother) could not take of Rose without bringing disgrace upon her (the mother's family.). Being without issue, on November 22, 1959, Mr. and Mrs. Ellis filed a petition w ith the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for the adoption of the aforemention ed baby. At the time of the hearing of the petition on January 14,1960, petition er Marvin G. Ellis and his wife had been in the Philippines for three (3) years, he being assigned thereto as staff sergeant in the United States Air Force Base , in Angeles, Pampanga where both lived at that time. They had been in the Phili ppines before, or, to exact, in 1953. The only issue in this appeal is whether, not being permanent residents in the P hilippines, petitioners are qualified to adopt Baby Rose. Article 335 of the Civ il Code of the Philippines, provides that: "The following cannot adopt: x x x x x x x x x (4) Non-resident aliens;". x x x x x x x x x This legal provisions is too clear to require interpretation. No matter how much we sympathize with the plight of Baby Rose and with the good intentions of peti tioners herein, the law leaves us no choice but to apply its explicit terms, whi ch unqualified deny to petitioners the power to adopt anybody in the Philippines . In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no court may entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject mat ter of the case and over the parties, but also over the res, which is the person al status of Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Ar t. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural pers on is determined by the latters' nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we have j urisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines , but not over the status of the petitioners, who are foreigners. Under our poli tical law, which is patterned after the Anglo-American legal system, we have, li kewise, adopted the latter's view to the effect that personal status, in general , is determined by and/or subject to the jurisdiction of the domiciliary law (Re statement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, p. 86; The Conflict of Laws by Beale, Vol. I, p. 305, Vol. II, pp. 713-714). This, perhaps, is the reason why our Civi l Code does not permit adoption by non-resident aliens, and we have consistently refused to recognize the validity of foreign decrees of divorce regardless of t he grounds upon which the same are based involving citizens of the Philippines w ho are not bona fide residents of the forum, even when our laws authorized absol ute divorce in the Philippines (Ramirez v. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855; Gonayeb v. Hashim , 30 Phil. 22; Cousine Hix v. Fleumer, 55 Phil. 851; Barretto Gonzales v. Gonzal

es, 58 Phil. 67; Recto v. Harden, L-6897, Nov. 29, 1955)". Inasmuch as petitioners herein are not domiciled in the Philippines and, hence, non-resident aliens - we cannot assume and exercise jurisdiction over the status , under either the nationality theory or the domiciliary theory. In any event, w hether the above quoted provision of said Art. 335 is predicated upon lack of ju risdiction over the res or merely affects the cause of action, we have no author ity to grant the relief prayed for by petitioners herein, and it has been so hel d in Caraballo v. Republic, L-15080 (April 25, 1962) and Katansik v. Republic L15472 (June 30, 1962). WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and another one shall be entered denying the petition in this case. Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Ma kalintal, JJ., concur. Padilla and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., took no part. ----------------------------------------------EN BANC [G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004] MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. The COMMI SSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTOR INO X. FORNIER, respondents. [G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004] ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO PO E, JR., respondent. [G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004] VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD AL LAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE JR., respondents. D E C I S I O N VITUG, J.: Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are deserving of the privilege. It is a precious heritage, as well as an inestimable acquisition,[1]that cannot be taken lightly by anyone - either by those who enjo y it or by those who dispute it. Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single quest ion of profound importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is brought u p to challenge the qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the highes t office of the land. Our people are waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the main contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he not? The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American colo nial roots and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law and common law tradi tions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could be no less than distinctly Filipino. Antecedent Case Settings On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando P oe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakai sang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his certif icate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of th e Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Forn ier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe , also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC" ) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candi dacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certifica te of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth,

according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Po e, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two a ssertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulit a Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the b irth of respondent. In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004, peti tioner, in support of his claim, presented several documentary exhibits - 1) a c opy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, afte r discovering his bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English transl ation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of the Records Management and Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered th e Philippines before 1907, and 6) a certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives to the effect that no available i nformation could be found in the files of the National Archives regarding the bi rth of Allan F. Poe. On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, th e more significant ones being - a) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division of the National Archives that there appeared to be no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of bir ths for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the Officer-In-Char ge of the Archives Division of the National Archives that no available informati on about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a cer tificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of Title No. P-22 47 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Loren zo Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 234 78 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported marriage contract between Fernando Pou and Bessi e Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlo s City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said office during the period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during World War I I. On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Thr ee days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsiderati on. The motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 Fe bruary 2004, petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this Court c onformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil P rocedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a tempor ary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr .), and Victorino X. Fornier," and the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe,a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Arti cle VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Cour t had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case . Jurisdiction of the Court In G. R. No. 161824 In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC

deny due course to or cancel FPJs certificate of candidacy for alleged misreprese ntation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before th e COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. --- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate o f candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any materi al representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws re lative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize "any interested party" to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the certif icate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate. Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Suprem e Court per Rule 64[2] in an action for certiorari under Rule 65[3] of the Revis ed Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution al so reads "Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for d ecision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or res olution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provi ded by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commi ssion may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party w ithin thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof." Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that j udicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law which power includes the duty of the courts of justice to sett le actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforc eable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretio n amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instr umentality of the Government. It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was ap tly elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contra ry view could be a gross denial to our people of their fundamental right to be f ully informed, and to make a proper choice, on who could or should be elected to occupy the highest government post in the land. In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634 Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Const itution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads: "The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests rel ating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-Pres ident, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose." The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 19 35 and the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of p residential and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declar e, in Lopez vs. Roxas,[4] as not (being) justiciable controversies or disputes inv olving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, t o enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of t he President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Jus

tice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of the tr ibunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of governmen t under the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 17 93, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the pre sent Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution. Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election sc enario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo warran to which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e. , to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology i n Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Trib unal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests rel ating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-Pres ident of the Philippines. Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an el ection protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-Pres ident. An election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto. A pe tition for quo warranto shall not include an election protest. Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for V ice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as th e case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner. The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice -President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-P resident. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action aga inst a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a publ ic office.[5] In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a postelection scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have recei ved either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election pr otest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario. It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Se ction 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presid ency or vice-presidency before the elections are held. Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs. C ommission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Ve lez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poea.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismis sed for want of jurisdiction. The Citizenship Issue Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical b ackground on the concept of citizenship. Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the administration of justice and in the holding of an office.[6] Aris totle saw its significance if only to determine the constituency of the "State," which he described as being composed of such persons who would be adequate in n umber to achieve a self-sufficient existence.[7] The concept grew to include one who would both govern and be governed, for which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with right s and entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the ot her.[8] In its ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life and fundamenta lly willing to submit his private interests to the general interest of society. The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18t h century, the concept was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which es tablished the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to propert y, personal liberty and justice.[9] Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to include political citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in

the exercise of political power.[10] The 20th century saw the next stage of the development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right of the citi zen to economic well-being and social security.[11] The idea of citizenship has gained expression in the modern welfare state as it so developed in Western Euro pe. An ongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly shri nking global village, might well be the internationalization of citizenship.[12] The Local Setting - from Spanish Times to the Present There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but "s ubjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects."[13] In church records, the natives were called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly codified during the 19th century but their sheer number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to apply to the Philippin e Islands except for those explicitly extended by Royal Decrees.[14] Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion, promu lgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the law was extended to the Ph ilippines remained to be the subject of differing views among experts;[15] howev er, three royal decrees were undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the Ph ilippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841,[16]the Royal Decree of 2 3 August 1868 specifically defining the political status of children born in the Philippine Islands,[17] and finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870.[18] The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands be cause of the express mandate of its Article 89, according to which the provision s of the Ultramar among which this country was included, would be governed by sp ecial laws.[19] It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18 D ecember 1889, which came out with the first categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens. (a) Persons born in Spanish territory, (b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain, (c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers, (d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of a ny town of the Monarchy.[20] The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the s tate of decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to an upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted principle o f international law dictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all political laws then in force, would have no effect on civil l aws, which would remain virtually intact. The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the U nited States.[21] Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States would be determined by its Congress "Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over whic h Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain i n such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their ri ghts of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, com merce, and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are app licable to foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve t heir allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, withi n a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declar ation of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declara tion they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they reside. Thus

"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territor ies hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress."[22] Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United State s Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to b e Spanish subjects. Although they did not become American citizens, they, howev er, also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws and were thus issued passport s describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection o f the United States. The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Ac t of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United Sta tes on the Philippines ".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therei n, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and h eld to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protect ion of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their al legiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty o f peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eig hteen hundred and ninety eight."[23] Under the organic act, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The te rm inhabitant was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899.[24] Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 A pril 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential w riting at the time, that the common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also kn own as the principle of territoriality, operative in the United States and Engla nd, governed those born in the Philippine Archipelago within that period.[25] M ore about this later. In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following amendment to the Philippine Bill of 1902 "Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by la w for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippi ne Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possession of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the United States, under the la ws of the United States, if residing therein."[26] With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine cit izens" had for the first time crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by Wil liam H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the Philippines when he initia lly made mention of it in his slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1 916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act of Cong ress in 1912 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the e leventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provision s of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris De cember tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such others as have s ince become citizens of some other country; Provided, That the Philippine Legisl ature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands wh o are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United

States under the laws of the United States, if residing therein." Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to b e a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spa in on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country. While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli w as a mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to a ny such link with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or bl ood relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Phi lippines (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adopti on of this Constitution (2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the a doption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippin e Islands. (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship. (5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with exist ing civil law provisions at the time, which provided that women would automatica lly lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the women f rom transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and req uired illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizens hip upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correct this anomaly, as wel l as fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to me n, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Consti tution on citizenship to reflect such concerns Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the Phi lippines: (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of t his Constitution. (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines. (3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the C onstitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five. (4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that "A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law to have renounced her citizenship." The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the questionableproviso in the 1935 Constitution. Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides: The following are citizens of the Philippines: (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of t his Constitution. (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines. (3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippi ne citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and (4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. The Case Of FPJ Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses: "No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the P hilippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least t en years immediately preceding such election." The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens

of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or pe rfect their Philippine citizenship."[27] The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during th e regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization,jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis[28] had b een in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a perso n to being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, perRoa vs. Collec tor of Customs[29] (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Con stitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor[30] (1947) , jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citi zenship by birth. Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earli est established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou , married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in evidence, his death certificate, howev er, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 8 4 years old at the time of his death on 11 September 1954. The certificate of b irth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Espaol mother, Marta Reyes. Intro duced by petitioner was an uncertified copy of a supposed certificate of the alleg ed marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage cer tificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certi ficate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe , a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citize n, twenty-one years old and married. Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of h is parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certain ty from the documents would be that 1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; 2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939; 3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 Septemb er, 1940; 4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and 5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that F PJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of L orenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. T he documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during t he proceedings before the COMELEC. The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit " 3" for respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley wa s submitted as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo Po u was submitted by respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last two documents were submitted in evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof, particular ly in reference to the facts which they purported to show, i.e., the marriage ce rtificate in relation to the date of marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley a nd the death certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 19 54 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner, who had utilized those material statements in his argument. All three documents were certified t rue copies of the originals. Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the origi nal document itself, except in the following cases:

x x x x x x x x x (d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded in a public office. Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certi ficate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, cons titute prima facie proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides: Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the perfo rmance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facieevidence of the facts therein stated. The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) t he publicity of record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have occurred.[31] The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September 1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assu med that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in th e Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that th ere was no existing record about such fact in the Records Management and Archive s Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the same period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume , that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence before death. It would be extremely doubtful if the Records Managemen t and Archives Office would have had complete records of all residents of the Ph ilippines from 1898 to 1902. Proof of Paternity and Filiation Under Civil Law. Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil status of the child to the father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status of the father to the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evide ntly being an illegitimate son according to petitioner, the mandatory rules unde r civil law must be used. Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 Dec ember 1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the P hilippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or pa ternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicia l or compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in a record of b irth, a will, or a public document.[32] Complementary to the new code was Act No . 3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father ref uses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to giv e therein any information by which such father could be identified. In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary ac knowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be signe d or sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered the same useless as being an authoritative document of recognition.[33] In Mendoza vs. Me lla,[34] the Court ruled "Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the questio n here really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is mere ly a certified copy of the registry record, may be relied upon as sufficient pro of of his having been voluntarily recognized. No such reliance, in our judgment

, may be placed upon it. While it contains the names of both parents, there is no showing that they signed the original, let alone swore to its contents as req uired in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might have happened, it was no t even they or either of them who furnished the data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that in any event the birth certificate is in the nat ure of a public document wherein voluntary recognition of a natural child may al so be made, according to the same Article 131. True enough, but in such a case, there must be a clear statement in the document that the parent recognizes the c hild as his or her own." In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere i n the document was the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will app arently executed, or at least shown to have been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of voluntary recognition remained to be "some other pu blic document." In Pareja vs. Pareja,[35] this Court defined what could constit ute such a document as proof of voluntary acknowledgment: "Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents, those e xecuted by private individuals which must be authenticated by notaries, and thos e issued by competent public officials by reason of their office. The public do cument pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means by which recognition may b e made belongs to the first class." Let us leave it at that for the moment. The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimat e children into voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was requi red to be expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a co urt of record or in any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took place in f avor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recogni zed or judicially declared as natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could be deman ded generally in cases when the child had in his favor any evidence to prove fil iation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifeti me of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an acti on to claim acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during the lifetime o f the presumed parent. Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic writ ing," so as to be an authentic writing for purposes of voluntary recognition, si mply as being a genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The term would in clude a public instrument (one duly acknowledged before a notary public or other competent official) or a private writing admitted by the father to be his. The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and Article 175 provide: Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; o r (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private han dwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be prove d by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action. The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties. x x x x x x x x x. Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in th e same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children. The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, excep t when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case

the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code reads: "Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,[36] the Court has ruled: "We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be decided under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code provides that 'the voluntary recognition of a natural child shall tak e place according to this Code, even if the child was born before the effectivit y of this body of laws' or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be gi ven retroactive effect." It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the tradi tional idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships wi thin the family in favor of the greater interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to merely govern the private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate or illegitima te civil status of the individual would also affect his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on "citizensh ip" could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the conte xt of private relations, the domain of civil law; particularly "Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organizati on of the family and the regulation of property. It has thus [been] defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate the relations of assistance, a uthority and obedience among members of a family, and those which exist among me mbers of a society for the protection of private interests."[37] In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,[38] the Court has held: "In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws relatin g to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign country; that, in c onsequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such as those dealing with the val idity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as between them, the separation of their properties, the rules go verning property, marital authority, division of conjugal property, the classifi cation of their property, legal causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, th e authority to decree it, and, in general, the civil effects of marriage and div orce upon the persons and properties of the spouses, are questions that are gove rned exclusively by the national law of the husband and wife." The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that "Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and lega l capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad" that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitut ional provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships found in different parts of the Civil Code,[39] such as on succes sional rights and family relations.[40] In adoption, for instance, an adopted c hild would be considered the child of his adoptive parents and accorded the same rights as their legitimate child but such legal fiction extended only to define his rights under civil law[41] and not his political status. Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discri minatory attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and property laws, which, while defining proprietary and successional rights of members of the family, pro vided distinctions in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children. In th e monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines and the concern to keep these bloo dlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount. These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Span

ish Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code became the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction, howeve r, remains and should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impe de or impinge on the domain of political law. The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status should thus be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provision s on proof of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules o n evidence could well and should govern. For instance, the matter about pedigre e is not necessarily precluded from being applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions. Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to hi m by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word pedigree includes relationship, fa mily genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where thes e facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of fam ily history intimately connected with pedigree. For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is alr eady dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, ( c) the declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the r elationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question m ust be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bes sie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with F PJ, i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley and his children (including responde nt FPJ) in one house, and as one family "I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in Sto ckton, California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do hereby de clare that: 1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe. 2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr. 3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more po pularly known in the Philippines as Fernando Poe, Jr., or FPJ. 4. Ronald Allan Poe FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital, M agdalena Street, Manila. x x x x x x x x x 7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while they were students at the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also introduc ed to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year. 8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938. 9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizab eth, Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at our family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liber ation of Manila in 1945, except for some months between 1943-1944. 10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more c hildren after Ronald Allan Poe. x x x x x x x x x 18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronal d Allan Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of F ernando Poe, Sr. Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004. Ruby Kelley Mangahas Declarant DNA Testing

In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily esta blish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up fili ation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,[42] this Court has acknowle dged the strong weight of DNA testing "Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility an d expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The Uni versity of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Anal ysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a chil d/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the fat her. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of D NA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evide nce. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when compe tently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is t o deny progress." Petitioners Argument For Jurisprudential Conclusiveness Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he c ould not have transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie K elley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence introduced by no less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents s howed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an American m other who were married to each other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Bir th to unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate child. Petitioner conten ded that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship of his mother , Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this Cou rt in Morano vs. Vivo,[43] citingChiongbian vs. de Leon[44] and Serra vs. Republ ic.[45] On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ , is most convincing; he states "We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If the pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the pronoun cement would be a decision constituting doctrine under the rule of stare decisis . But if the pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis mota, the pronouncement wo uld not be a decision but a mere obiter dictum which did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to look closely into these cases. First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipi no father. It was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The issue was whether the stepson follo wed the naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing about jus sanguinis there. T he stepson did not have the blood of the naturalized stepfather. Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. It was about a legitimate son of a father who had become Fili pino by election to public office before the 1935 Constitution pursuant to Artic le IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. No one was illegitimate here. Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Fili pino father. Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. The issue was whether one who was already a Filipino because of his mo ther who still needed to be naturalized. There is nothing there about invidious jus sanguinis.

Finally, Paa vs. Chan.[46] This is a more complicated case. The case was about the citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan c laimed that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father an d a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued that he got his citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that there was no valid proof t hat Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina mother. The Court therefore concl uded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was hi s son Quintin. Quintin therefore was not only not a natural-born Filipino but w as not even a Filipino. The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter dict um. The Court said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were Filipino , Quintin would not be Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This statemen t about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact assumption, was absolutely unnecess ary for the case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simply repeatin g the obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo. x x x x x x x x x "Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual foundation in the Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection clause of the Co nstitution not once but twice. First, it would make an illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child, and second, it would make an illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino mother. The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago by People vs. Cayat.[47] I would grant that the distinction between legitimate children and illegitimate children rests on real differences. x x x But real di fferences alone do not justify invidious distinction. Real differences may just ify distinction for one purpose but not for another purpose. x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public serv ice? What possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an illegitimat e child from becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness of polit ical rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from h olding an important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his p arents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is neith er justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the distinction transgresses the equal protection clause and must be reprobated. The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this Cou rt), Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar views. The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail. Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizensh ip of its mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filip ino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the a ssumption that the mother had custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to p rejudice or discriminate against him. The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is that the 19 35 Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of bi rth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. There u tterly is no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided. In Sum (1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, posse sses jurisdiction over the petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion in d ismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed fo r the disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for the position of Presid

ent in the 10th May 2004 national elections on the contention that FPJ has commi tted material representation in his certificate of candidacy by representing him self to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. (2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly elev ated to this Court in the latters capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a pres idential and vice-presidential election contest under the Constitution. Evident ly, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked only after, no t before, the elections are held. (3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discr etion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter o f whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depen ded on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged ill egitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo P ou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippin es was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residen ce upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have bene fited from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1 902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to hi s son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during wh ich regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all perso ns whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are l egitimate or illegitimate. (4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusi vely that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evide nce on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before th e Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present t heir position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,[48] must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful. WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS 1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k. a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No. 16 1634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of jurisdiction. 2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Comm ission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. , for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commiss ion on Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA No. 04-003. No Costs. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., see separate opinion, concurring. Puno, J., on leave but was allowed to vote; see separate opinion. Panganiban, J., on official leave; allowed to vote but did not send his vote on the matter. Quisumbing, J., joins the dissent of Justices Tinga and Morales; case should hav e been remanded. Ynares-Santiago, J., concurs and also with J. Punos separate opinion. Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., concurs, please see separate opinion. Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion. Austria-Martinez, J., concurs, please see separate opinion. Corona, J., joins the dissenting opinion of Justice Morales.

Carpio-Morales, J., see dissenting opinion. Callejo, Sr., J., please see concurring opinion. Azcuna, J., concurs in a separate opinion. Tinga, J., dissents per separate opinion. ________________________________________ [1] Tan Chong vs. The Secretary of Labor, 45 O.G. No. 31, 1269. [2] Sec. 2. Mode of review. A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commi ssion on Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved p arty to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter pro vided. (Rule 64) [3] Sec. 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercis ing judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its o r his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or exces s of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate re medy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verifi ed petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying t hat judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal , board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the ju dgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documen ts relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shoppi ng as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (Rule 65) [4] 17 SCRA 761. [5] See Rule 66, Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. [6] The Politics of Aristotle, edited and translated by Ernest Barker, Oxford Un iversity Press, London, 1946. at p. 93. [7] Id., at 95. [8] Introduction, The Conditions of Citizenship, edited by Bart Van Steenbergen, Sage Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi (1994). [9] Ibid. [10] Ibid. [11] Ibid. [12] Ibid. [13] Under the codified Novisima Recopilacion promulgated in Spain in 1805, the following were considered denizens (vecinos) " all foreigners who obtained the p rivilege of naturalization, those who were born in these kingdoms, those who res iding therein may be converted to the holy Catholic faith; those, being self-sup porting, established their domicile therein; and in the case of a foreign woman who married a native man, she thereby becomes subject to the same laws and acqui res the same domicile as her husband; those who establish themselves in the coun try by acquiring real property; those who have trade or profession and go there to practice the same; also those who practice some mechanical trade therein or k eep a retail store;....those who reside for a period of ten years in a home of h is own; and also those foreigners who, in accordance with the common law, royal orders and other laws of the kingdoms, may have become naturalized or acquired r esidence therein. (Leon T. Garcia, The Problems of Citizenship in the Philippines , Rex Bookstore, 1949, at p. 4) [14] Garcia, supra., at p. 3. [15] Justices Malcolm, Recto and Florentino Torres believed that the law was eff ective in the Philippines. Those who entertained the contrary view were Justice s Imperial and Villareal. (Garcia, supra., at 4.). [16] Garcia, supra., pp. 5-6. [17] Under the Royal Decree of August 23, 1868, the following were considered fo reigners --- (1) The legitimate and recognized natural children of a father who belongs to another independent state, and the unrecognized and natural and other illegitimate children of a mother belonging to another State born outside of th e Spanish dominions, (2) The children specified in the preceding paragraph, bor

n in the Spanish dominions or on board Spanish vessels on the high seas if they do not, on attaining the age of majority fixed in the laws of the Kingdom, elect Spanish nationality, (3) Those being Spaniards, acquire another nationality, as well by renouncing the first as by accepting employment, from another governmen t without the authority of the sovereign and (4) The woman who contracts marriag e with a subject of another State. (Garcia, supra., pp. 6-7) [18] Under the law, the following were foreigners (a) All persons born of foreig n parents outside of the Spanish territory; (b) Those born outside of the Spanis h territory of foreign fathers and Spanish mothers while they do not claim Spani sh nationality, (3) Those born in Spanish territory of foreign parents or foreig n fathers and Spanish mothers while they do not make that claim, (4) Spaniards w ho may have lost their nationality, (5) Those born outside of the Spanish territ ory of parents who may have lost their Spanish nationality; and (6), the Spanish woman married to a foreigner. (Garcia, supra., p. 7) [19] Velayo, infra., p. 11. [20] Article 17, The Civil Code of Spain. [21] Garcia, supra, pp. 6-7. [22] Ramon M. Velayo, Philippine Citizenship And Naturalization, Central Book Supp ly, Manila (1965), pp. 22-23. [23] Ibid., p. 30. [24] Garcia, supra, at pp. 31-32. [25] Garcia, supra, pp. 23-26. [26] Velayo, supra, p. 31 [27] Section 2, Article IV, 1987 Constitution. [28] Per amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ. [29] 23 Phil 315 (1912). [30] Supra., which held that jus soli was never applied in the Philippines. [31] Antillon vs. Barcelon, 37 Phil 148. [32] Article 131 Old Civil Code. [33] Dayrit vs. Piccio, 92 Phil 729. [34] 17 SCRA 788. [35] 95 Phil 167. [36] 125 SCRA 835. [37] Vicente J. Fransisco, Civil Code of the Philippines, Bk I, 1953 at p. 5 [38] 29 Phil 606. [39] Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the l aw of the country where it is situated. However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect t o the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the in trinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by thenational l aw of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the na ture of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and othe r public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed. When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or cons ular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the sole mnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution. Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and tho se which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs, sha ll not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determin ations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. Article 815. When a Filipino is in a foreign country, he is authori zed to make a will in any of the forms established by the law of the country in which he may be. Such will may be probated in the Philippines. Article 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.

Article 817. A will made in the Philippines by a citizen or subject of another country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by t he law of his own country, shall have the same effect as if executed according t o the laws of the Philippines. Article 819. Wills, prohibited by the preceding article, executed b y Filipinos in a foreign country shall not be valid in the Philippines, even tho ugh authorized by the laws of the country where they may have been executed. Article 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nat ion of the decedent. [40] Article 10. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized b y a consul general, consul or vice-consul of the Republic of the Philippines. T he issuance of the marriage license and the duties of the local civil registrar and of the solemnizing officer with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by said consular official. Article 21. When either or both of the contracting parties are citi zens of a foreign country, it shall be necessary for them before a marriage lice nse can be obtained, to submit a certificate of legal capacity to contract marri age, issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials. Stateless persons or refugees from other countries shall, in lieu of the certificate of legal capacity herein required, submit an affidavit stating the circumstances showing such capacity to contract marriage. Article 26. x x x Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is valid ly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien s pouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacit y to remarry under Philippine law. Article 80. In the absence of a contrary stipulation in the marriag e settlements, the property relations of the spouses shall be governed by Philip pine laws, regardless of the place of the celebration of the marriage and their residence. This rule shall not apply: (1) Where both spouses are aliens; (2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting pr operty not situated in the Philippines and executed in the country where the pro perty is located; and (3) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered into in the Philippines but affecting property situated in a foreign country whose l aws require different formalities for their extrinsic validity. [41] See Ching Leng vs. Galang, L-11931, October 1958, unreported. [42] 354 SCRA 17. [43] 20 SCRA 562, Paa vs. Chan 21 SCRA 753. [44] 82 Phil. 771. [45] 91 Phil. 914, unreported. [46] 21 SCRA 753. [47] 68 Phil 12. [48] 248 SCRA 300 (1995)

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 160869 May 11, 2007 AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL TEACHERS AND ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER - HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as the Secretary of Ju stice,Respondent.

D E C I S I O N QUISUMBING, J.: This is an original action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rul es of Civil Procedure. Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent, then Secretary of Just ice Simeon Datumanong, the official tasked to implement laws governing citizensh ip.1 Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent fr om implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship o f Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for th e Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes." Petition er avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Ar ticle IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is i nimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." Rep. Act No. 9225, signed into law by President Gloria M. Arroyo on August 29, 2 003, reads: SECTION 1. Short Title.-This Act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention an d Reacquisition Act of 2003." SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.-It is hereby declared the policy of the State tha t all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act. SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.-Any provision of law to the contrar y notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreig n country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon takin g the following oath of allegiance to the Republic: "I ___________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support a nd defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippi nes; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of t he Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I i mpose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purp ose of evasion." Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illeg itimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who reacquire Phi lippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines. SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or reacqu ire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political r ights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under exi sting laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: (1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requiremen ts under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherw ise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws; (2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the quali fications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and exi sting laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath; (3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorit ies prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath; (4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; an d (5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Ph ilippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:

(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of whic h they are naturalized citizens; and/or (b) are in the active service as commissioned or noncommissioned officers in the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens. SEC. 6. Separability Clause. - If any section or provision of this Act is held u nconstitutional or invalid, any other section or provision not affected thereby shall remain valid and effective. SEC. 7. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations inc onsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accord ingly. SEC. 8. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or two (2) newspapers of gene ral circulation. In this petition for prohibition, the following issues have been raised: (1) Is Rep. Act No. 9225 unconstitutional? (2) Does this Court have jurisdiction to pas s upon the issue of dual allegiance? We shall discuss these issues jointly. Petitioner contends that Rep. Act No. 9225 cheapens Philippine citizenship. He a vers that Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, together, allow dual allegiance and not dual citizenship. Petitioner maintains that Section 2 allows all Filipi nos, either natural-born or naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship without losing their foreign citizenship. Section 3 permits dual allegiance because said law allows natural-born citizens of the Ph ilippines to regain their Philippine citizenship by simply taking an oath of all egiance without forfeiting their foreign allegiance.2 The Constitution, however, is categorical that dual allegiance is inimical to the national interest. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 merely declares as a state policy that "Philippine citizens who become citizens of another count ry shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship." The OSG furth er claims that the oath in Section 3 does not allow dual allegiance since the oa th taken by the former Filipino citizen is an effective renunciation and repudia tion of his foreign citizenship. The fact that the applicant taking the oath rec ognizes and accepts the supreme authority of the Philippines is an unmistakable and categorical affirmation of his undivided loyalty to the Republic.3 In resolving the aforecited issues in this case, resort to the deliberations of Congress is necessary to determine the intent of the legislative branch in draft ing the assailed law. During the deliberations, the issue of whether Rep. Act No . 9225 would allow dual allegiance had in fact been the subject of debate. The r ecord of the legislative deliberations reveals the following: x x x x Pursuing his point, Rep. Dilangalen noted that under the measure, two situations exist - - the retention of foreign citizenship, and the reacquisition of Philip pine citizenship. In this case, he observed that there are two citizenships and therefore, two allegiances. He pointed out that under the Constitution, dual all egiance is inimical to public interest. He thereafter asked whether with the cre ation of dual allegiance by reason of retention of foreign citizenship and the r eacquisition of Philippine citizenship, there will now be a violation of the Con stitution Rep. Locsin underscored that the measure does not seek to address the constituti onal injunction on dual allegiance as inimical to public interest. He said that the proposed law aims to facilitate the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by speedy means. However, he said that in one sense, it addresses the problem of dual citizenship by requiring the taking of an oath. He explained that the prob lem of dual citizenship is transferred from the Philippines to the foreign count ry because the latest oath that will be taken by the former Filipino is one of a llegiance to the Philippines and not to the United States, as the case may be. H e added that this is a matter which the Philippine government will have no conce rn and competence over. Rep. Dilangalen asked why this will no longer be the country's concern, when dua l allegiance is involved.

Rep. Locsin clarified that this was precisely his objection to the original vers ion of the bill, which did not require an oath of allegiance. Since the measure now requires this oath, the problem of dual allegiance is transferred from the P hilippines to the foreign country concerned, he explained. x x x x Rep. Dilangalen asked whether in the particular case, the person did not denounc e his foreign citizenship and therefore still owes allegiance to the foreign gov ernment, and at the same time, owes his allegiance to the Philippine government, such that there is now a case of dual citizenship and dual allegiance. Rep. Locsin clarified that by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. However, he said that this is not a matter that he wishes to address in Congress because he is not a m ember of a foreign parliament but a Member of the House. x x x x Rep. Locsin replied that it is imperative that those who have dual allegiance co ntrary to national interest should be dealt with by law. However, he said that t he dual allegiance problem is not addressed in the bill. He then cited the Decla ration of Policy in the bill which states that "It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of thi s Act." He stressed that what the bill does is recognize Philippine citizenship but says nothing about the other citizenship. Rep. Locsin further pointed out that the problem of dual allegiance is created w herein a natural-born citizen of the Philippines takes an oath of allegiance to another country and in that oath says that he abjures and absolutely renounces a ll allegiance to his country of origin and swears allegiance to that foreign cou ntry. The original Bill had left it at this stage, he explained. In the present measure, he clarified, a person is required to take an oath and the last he utte rs is one of allegiance to the country. He then said that the problem of dual al legiance is no longer the problem of the Philippines but of the other foreign co untry.4 (Emphasis supplied.) From the above excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the intent o f the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 635 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natura l-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. A ct No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swe aring to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign count ry. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225. Petitioner likewise advances the proposition that although Congress has not yet passed any law on the matter of dual allegiance, such absence of a law should no t be justification why this Court could not rule on the issue. He further conten ds that while it is true that there is no enabling law yet on dual allegiance, t he Supreme Court, through Mercado v. Manzano,6 already had drawn up the guidelin es on how to distinguish dual allegiance from dual citizenship.7 For its part, the OSG counters that pursuant to Section 5, Article IV of the 198 7 Constitution, dual allegiance shall be dealt with by law. Thus, until a law on dual allegiance is enacted by Congress, the Supreme Court is without any jurisd iction to entertain issues regarding dual allegiance.8 To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a p olicy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to ena ct the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the fra mers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of nat uralized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin eve n after their naturalization.9 Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that

would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance.10 Unti l this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department, including thi s Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance. Neither can we subscribe to the proposition of petitioner that a law is not need ed since the case of Mercado had already set the guidelines for determining dual allegiance. Petitioner misreads Mercado. That case did not set the parameters o f what constitutes dual allegiance but merely made a distinction between dual al legiance and dual citizenship. Moreover, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,11 we said that the courts must assume tha t the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powe rs, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of prom oting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence, in determi ning whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, w e must proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance.12 T he doctrine of separation of powers demands no less. We cannot arrogate the duty of setting the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance when the Constitu tion itself has clearly delegated the duty of determining what acts constitute d ual allegiance for study and legislation by Congress. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice WE CONCUR: REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Asscociate Justice ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice (On leave) MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Asscociate Justice (On leave) RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Asscociate Justice ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice DANTE O. TINGA Asscociate Justice MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice CANCIO C. GARCIA Asscociate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Asscociate Justice C E R T I F I C A T I O N Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the con clusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice Footnotes 1 Executive Order No. 292, also known as the "Administrative Code of 1987," Book IV, Title III, Chapter 1 (on the Department of Justice), states: x x x x SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. - To accomplish its mandate, the Department shall

have the following powers and functions: x x x x (6) Provide immigration and naturalization regulatory services and implement the laws governing citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens; x x x x 2 Rollo, p. 9. 3 Id. at 48. 4 11 Journal, House of Representatives (August 26, 2003). 5 An Act Providing for the Ways in which Philippine Citizenship may be Lost or R eacquired. (Approved on October 21, 1936.) x x x x SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost. - A Filipino citizen may lose his citize nship in any of the following ways and/or events: (1) By naturalization in a foreign country; x x x x 6 G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999, 307 SCRA 630. 7 Id. at 643. 8 Rollo, pp. 55-56. 9 Supra note 7. 10 Records, Constitutional Commission 365 (July 8, 1986). 11 G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001, 369 SCRA 394. 12 Id. at 431.