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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No.

L-32166 October 18, 1977 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. HON. MAXIMO A. MACEREN CFI, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, JOSE BUENAVENTURA, GODOFREDO REYES, BENJAMIN REYES, NAZARIO AQUINO and CARLO DEL ROSARIO, accused-appellees. Office of the Solicitor General for appellant. Rustics F. de los Reyes, Jr. for appellees. AQUINO, J.:t.hqw This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission. On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz by "using their own motor banca, equipped with motor; with a generator colored green with attached dynamo colored gray or somewhat white; and electrocuting device locally known as sensored with a somewhat webbed copper wire on the tip or other end of a bamboo pole with electric wire attachment which was attached to the dynamo direct and with the use of these devices or equipments catches fish thru electric current, which destroy any aquatic animals within its cuffed reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace" (Criminal Case No. 5429). Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court quashed the complaint. The prosecution appealed. The Court of First Instance of Laguna affirmed the order of dismissal (Civil Case No. SC-36). The case is now before this Court on appeal by the prosecution under Republic Act No. 5440. The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric current is not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in section I I of the Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by substances. The lower court further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful. As legal background, it should be stated that section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the use of any obnoxious or poisonous substance" in fishing. Section 76 of the same law punishes any person who uses an obnoxious or poisonous substance in fishing with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos nor more than five thousand, and by imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than five years. It is noteworthy that the Fisheries Law does not expressly punish .electro fishing." Notwithstanding the silence of the law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 (62 O.G. 1224), prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters. The order is quoted below: +.wph!1 SUBJECT: PROHIBITING ELECTRO FISHING IN ALL WATERS +.wph!1 OF THE PHILIPPINES. Pursuant to Section 4 of Act No. 4003, as amended, and Section 4 of R.A. No. 3512, the following rules and regulations regarding the prohibition of electro fishing in all waters of the Philippines are promulgated for the information and guidance of all concerned.+.wph!1 SECTION 1. Definition. Words and terms used in this Order 11 construed as follows: (a) Philippine waters or territorial waters of the Philippines' includes all waters of the Philippine Archipelago, as defined in the t between the United States and Spain, dated respectively the tenth of December, eighteen hundred ninety eight and the seventh of November, nineteen hundred. For the purpose of this order, rivers, lakes and other bodies of fresh waters are included. (b) Electro Fishing. Electro fishing is the catching of fish with the use of electric current. The equipment used are of many electrical devices which may be battery or generator-operated and from and available source of electric current. (c) 'Persons' includes firm, corporation, association, agent or employee. (d) 'Fish' includes other aquatic products.

SEC. 2. Prohibition. It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in electro fishing or to catch fish by the use of electric current in any portion of the Philippine waters except for research, educational and scientific purposes which must be covered by a permit issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources which shall be carried at all times. SEC. 3. Penalty. Any violation of the provisions of this Administrative Order shall subject the offender to a fine of not exceeding five hundred pesos (P500.00) or imprisonment of not extending six (6) months or both at the discretion of the Court. SEC. 4. Repealing Provisions. All administrative orders or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Administrative Order are hereby revoked. SEC. 5. Effectivity. This Administrative Order shall take effect six (60) days after its publication in the Office Gazette. On June 28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Fisheries Commission, issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1, amending section 2 of Administrative Order No. 84, by restricting the ban against electro fishing to fresh water fisheries (63 O.G. 9963). Thus, the phrase "in any portion of the Philippine waters" found in section 2, was changed by the amendatory order to read as follows: "in fresh water fisheries in the Philippines, such as rivers, lakes, swamps, dams, irrigation canals and other bodies of fresh water." The Court of First Instance and the prosecution (p. 11 of brief) assumed that electro fishing is punishable under section 83 of the Fisheries Law (not under section 76 thereof), which provides that any other violation of that law "or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall subject the offender to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos (P200), or in t for not more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court." That assumption is incorrect because 3 of the aforequoted Administrative Order No. 84 imposes a fm of not exceeding P500 on a person engaged in electro fishing, which amount the 83. It seems that the Department of Fisheries prescribed their own penalty for swift fishing which penalty is less than the severe penalty imposed in section 76 and which is not Identified to the at penalty imposed in section 83. Had Administrative Order No. 84 adopted the fighter penalty prescribed in on 83, then the crime of electro fishing would be within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior court (Sec. 44 [f], Judiciary Law; People vs. Ragasi, L-28663, September 22, We have discussed this pre point, not raised in the briefs, because it is obvious that the crime of electro fishing which is punishable with a sum up to P500, falls within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the inferior courts and the Court of First instance (People vs. Nazareno, L-40037, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 531 and the cases cited therein). And since the instant case was filed in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, a provincial capital, the order of d rendered by that municipal court was directly appealable to the Court, not to the Court of First Instance of Laguna (Sec. 45 and last par. of section 87 of the Judiciary Law; Esperat vs. Avila, L-25992, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 596). It results that the Court of First Instance of Laguna had no appellate jurisdiction over the case. Its order affirming the municipal court's order of dismissal is void for lack of motion. This appeal shall be treated as a direct appeal from the municipal court to this Court. (See People vs. Del Rosario, 97 Phil. 67). In this appeal, the prosecution argues that Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 were not issued under section 11 of the Fisheries Law which, as indicated above, punishes fishing by means of an obnoxious or poisonous substance. This contention is not well-taken because, as already stated, the Penal provision of Administrative Order No. 84 implies that electro fishing is penalized as a form of fishing by means of an obnoxious or poisonous substance under section 11. The prosecution cites as the legal sanctions for the prohibition against electro fishing in fresh water fisheries (1) the rule-making power of the Department Secretary under section 4 of the Fisheries Law; (2) the function of the Commissioner of Fisheries to enforce the provisions of the Fisheries Law and the regulations Promulgated thereunder and to execute the rules and regulations consistent with the purpose for the creation of the Fisheries Commission and for the development of fisheries (Sec. 4[c] and [h] Republic Act No. 3512; (3) the declared national policy to encourage, Promote and conserve our fishing resources (Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 3512), and (4) section 83 of the Fisheries Law which provides that "any other violation of" the Fisheries Law or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder "shall subject the offender to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos, or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court." As already pointed out above, the prosecution's reference to section 83 is out of place because the penalty for electro fishing under Administrative order No. 84 is not the same as the penalty fixed in section 83. We are of the opinion that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512. The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other violations.

Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative Order No. 84, in punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense fails within the category of "other violations" because, as already shown, the penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next lower to the penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed in section 76, and is not the same as the penalty for "other violations" of the law and regulations fixed in section 83 of the Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 11 25, citing 11 Am. Jur. 965 on p. 11 32). Originally, Administrative Order No. 84 punished electro fishing in all waters. Later, the ban against electro fishing was confined to fresh water fisheries. The amendment created the impression that electro fishing is not condemnable per se. It could be tolerated in marine waters. That circumstances strengthens the view that the old law does not eschew all forms of electro fishing. However, at present, there is no more doubt that electro fishing is punishable under the Fisheries Law and that it cannot be penalized merely by executive revolution because Presidential Decree No. 704, which is a revision and consolidation of all laws and decrees affecting fishing and fisheries and which was promulgated on May 16, 1975 (71 O.G. 4269), expressly punishes electro fishing in fresh water and salt water areas. That decree provides: +.wph!1 SEC. 33. Illegal fishing, dealing in illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic products. It shall he unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather or cause to be caught, taken or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity as defined in paragraphs (1), (m) and (d), respectively, of Section 3 hereof: ... The decree Act No. 4003, as amended, Republic Acts Nos. 428, 3048, 3512 and 3586, Presidential Decrees Nos. 43, 534 and 553, and all , Acts, Executive Orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with it (Sec. 49, P. D. No. 704). The inclusion in that decree of provisions defining and penalizing electro fishing is a clear recognition of the deficiency or silence on that point of the old Fisheries Law. It is an admission that a mere executive regulation is not legally adequate to penalize electro fishing. Note that the definition of electro fishing, which is found in section 1 (c) of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 and which is not provided for the old Fisheries Law, is now found in section 3(d) of the decree. Note further that the decree penalty electro fishing by "imprisonment from two (2) to four (4) years", a punishment which is more severe than the penalty of a time of not excluding P500 or imprisonment of not more than six months or both fixed in section 3 of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84. An examination of the rule-making power of executive officials and administrative agencies and, in particular, of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now Secretary of Natural Resources) under the Fisheries Law sustains the view that he ex his authority in penalizing electro fishing by means of an administrative order. Administrative agent are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it should conform to the standards that the law prescribes (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 1125; Director of Forestry vs. Mu;oz, L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183, 1198; Geukeko vs. Araneta, 102 Phil. 706, 712). The lawmaking body cannot possibly provide for all the details in the enforcement of a particular statute (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 125, citing U.S. vs. Grimaud 220 U.S. 506; Interprovincial Autobus Co., Inc. vs. Coll. of Internal Revenue, 98 Phil. 290, 295-6). The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the nondeleption of legislative, powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modem life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law" Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726; People vs. Rosenthal and Osme;a, 68 Phil. 328). Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, supra). An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress (Santos vs. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the d of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao vs. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350). The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it his been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (University of Santo Tomas vs. Board of Tax A 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-46. As to invalid regulations, see of Internal Revenue vs. Villaflor 69 Phil. 319, Wise & Co. vs. Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676; Del March vs. Phil. Veterans Administrative, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349). There is no question that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has rule-making powers. Section 4 of the Fisheries law provides that the Secretary "shall from time to time issue instructions, orders, and regulations consistent" with that law, "as may be and proper to carry into effect the provisions thereof." That power is now vested in the Secretary of Natural Resources by on 7 of the Revised Fisheries law, Presidential December No. 704.

Section 4(h) of Republic Act No. 3512 empower the Co of Fisheries "to prepare and execute upon the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, forms instructions, rules and regulations consistent with the purpose" of that enactment "and for the development of fisheries." Section 79(B) of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "the Department Head shall have the power to promulgate, whenever he may see fit do so, all rules, regulates, orders, memorandums, and other instructions, not contrary to law, to regulate the proper working and harmonious and efficient administration of each and all of the offices and dependencies of his Department, and for the strict enforcement and proper execution of the laws relative to matters under the jurisdiction of said Department; but none of said rules or orders shall prescribe penalties for the violation thereof, except as expressly authorized by law." Administrative regulations issued by a Department Head in conformity with law have the force of law (Valerie vs. Secretary of culture and Natural Resources, 117 Phil. 729, 733; Antique Sawmills, Inc. vs. Zayco, L- 20051, May 30, 1966, 17 SCRA 316). As he exercises the rule-making power by delegation of the lawmaking body, it is a requisite that he should not transcend the bound demarcated by the statute for the exercise of that power; otherwise, he would be improperly exercising legislative power in his own right and not as a surrogate of the lawmaking body. Article 7 of the Civil Code embodies the basic principle that administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution." As noted by Justice Fernando, "except for constitutional officials who can trace their competence to act to the fundamental law itself, a public office must be in the statute relied upon a grant of power before he can exercise it." "department zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute." (Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Santiago, L-29236, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 493, 496-8). "Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are oftentimes left to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law." The rule or regulation should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. (Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194, 197, cited in Victories Milling Co., Inc. vs. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555, 558). In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law (People vs. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091). This Court in its decision in the Lim case, supra, promulgated on July 26, 1960, called the attention of technical men in the executive departments, who draft rules and regulations, to the importance and necessity of closely following the legal provisions which they intend to implement so as to avoid any possible misunderstanding or confusion. The rule is that the violation of a regulation prescribed by an executive officer of the government in conformity with and based upon a statute authorizing such regulation constitutes an offense and renders the offender liable to punishment in accordance with the provisions of the law (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 124). In other words, a violation or infringement of a rule or regulation validly issued can constitute a crime punishable as provided in the authorizing statute and by virtue of the latter (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 1125, 1132). It has been held that "to declare what shall constitute a crime and how it shall be punished is a power vested exclusively in the legislature, and it may not be delegated to any other body or agency" (1 Am. Jur. 2nd, sec. 127, p. 938; Texas Co. vs. Montgomery, 73 F. Supp. 527). In the instant case the regulation penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in accordance with the Fisheries Law, under which the regulation was issued, because the law itself does not expressly punish electro fishing. The instant case is similar to People vs. Santos, 63 Phil. 300. The Santos case involves section 28 of Fish and Game Administrative Order No. 2 issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources pursuant to the aforementioned section 4 of the Fisheries Law. Section 28 contains the proviso that a fishing boat not licensed under the Fisheries Law and under the said administrative order may fish within three kilometers of the shoreline of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military reservations authorities of the United States only upon receiving written permission therefor, which permission may be granted by the Secretary upon recommendation of the military or naval authorities concerned. A violation of the proviso may be proceeded against under section 45 of the Federal Penal Code. Augusto A. Santos was prosecuted under that provision in the Court of First Instance of Cavite for having caused his two fishing boats to fish, loiter and anchor without permission from the Secretary within three kilometers from the shoreline of Corrigidor Island. This Court held that the Fisheries Law does not prohibit boats not subject to license from fishing within three kilometers of the shoreline of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of the United States, without permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources upon recommendation of the military and naval authorities concerned. As the said law does not penalize the act mentioned in section 28 of the administrative order, the promulgation of that provision by the Secretary "is equivalent to legislating on the matter, a power which has not been and cannot be delegated to him, it being expressly reserved" to the lawmaking body. "Such an act constitutes not only an excess of the regulatory power conferred upon the Secretary but also an exercise of a legislative power which he does not have, and therefore" the said provision "is null and void and without effect". Hence, the charge against Santos was dismiss.

A penal statute is strictly construed. While an administrative agency has the right to make ranks and regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted, that power should not be confused with the power to enact a criminal statute. An administrative agency can have only the administrative or policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it. (Glustrom vs. State, 206 Ga. 734, 58 Second 2d 534; See 2 Am. Jr. 2nd 129130). Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do not represent a valid precise of the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by an administrative body to legislate (State vs. Miles, Wash. 2nd 322, 105 Pac. 2nd 51). In a prosecution for a violation of an administrative order, it must clearly appear that the order is one which falls within the scope of the authority conferred upon the administrative body, and the order will be scrutinized with special care. (State vs. Miles supra). The Miles case involved a statute which authorized the State Game Commission "to adopt, promulgate, amend and/or repeal, and enforce reasonable rules and regulations governing and/or prohibiting the taking of the various classes of game. Under that statute, the Game Commission promulgated a rule that "it shall be unlawful to offer, pay or receive any reward, prize or compensation for the hunting, pursuing, taking, killing or displaying of any game animal, game bird or game fish or any part thereof." Beryl S. Miles, the owner of a sporting goods store, regularly offered a ten-down cash prize to the person displaying the largest deer in his store during the open for hunting such game animals. For that act, he was charged with a violation of the rule Promulgated by the State Game Commission. It was held that there was no statute penalizing the display of game. What the statute penalized was the taking of game. If the lawmaking body desired to prohibit the display of game, it could have readily said so. It was not lawful for the administrative board to extend or modify the statute. Hence, the indictment against Miles was quashed. The Miles case is similar to this case. WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision of June 9, 1970 is set aside for lack of appellate jurisdiction and the order of dismissal rendered by the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna in Criminal Case No. 5429 is affirmed. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED. Barredo, Concepcion, Jr., Santos and Guerrero, JJ., concur.1wph1.t Fernando and Antonio, JJ., took no part. Guerrero, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-16704 March 17, 1962 VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC., petitioner-appellant, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, respondent-appellee. Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner-appellant. Office of the Solicitor General and Ernesto T. Duran for respondent-appellee. BARRERA, J.: On October 15, 1958, the Social Security Commission issued its Circular No. 22 of the following tenor: . Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in computing the premiums due the System, will take into consideration and include in the Employee's remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration. All these will comprise the Employee's remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2-1/2% contributions will be based, up to a maximum of P500 for any one month. Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Social Security Commission in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7, dated October 7, 1957 expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers' and employees' respective monthly premium contributions, and submitting, "In order to assist your System in arriving at a proper interpretation of the term 'compensation' for the purposes of" such computation, their observations on Republic Act 1161 and its amendment and on the general interpretation of the words "compensation", "remuneration" and "wages". Counsel further questioned the validity of the circular for lack of

authority on the part of the Social Security Commission to promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette. Overruling these objections, the Social Security Commission ruled that Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the approval of the President and publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed. Not satisfied with this ruling, petitioner comes to this Court on appeal. The single issue involved in this appeal is whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation, as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission "to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval of the President such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act." There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law (Parker, Administrative Law, p. 197; Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194). Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law. (Davis, op. cit., p. 194.) . A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom (Davis, op. cit., 195-197). On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. Circular No. 22 in question was issued by the Social Security Commission, in view of the amendment of the provisions of the Social Security Law defining the term "compensation" contained in Section 8 (f) of Republic Act No. 1161 which, before its amendment, reads as follows: . (f) Compensation All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except (1) that part of the remuneration in excess of P500 received during the month; (2) bonuses, allowances or overtime pay; and (3) dismissal and all other payments which the employer may make, although not legally required to do so. Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of "compensation" to: (f) Compensation All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except that part of the remuneration in excess of P500.00 received during the month. It will thus be seen that whereas prior to the amendment, bonuses, allowances, and overtime pay given in addition to the regular or base pay were expressly excluded, or exempted from the definition of the term "compensation", such exemption or exclusion was deleted by the amendatory law. It thus became necessary for the Social Security Commission to interpret the effect of such deletion or elimination. Circular No. 22 was, therefore, issued to apprise those concerned of the interpretation or understanding of the Commission, of the law as amended, which it was its duty to enforce. It did not add any duty or detail that was not already in the law as amended. It merely stated and circularized the opinion of the Commission as to how the law should be construed. 1wph1.t The case of People v. Jolliffe (G.R. No. L-9553, promulgated on May 30, 1959) cited by appellant, does not support its contention that the circular in question is a rule or regulation. What was there said was merely that a regulation may be incorporated in the form of a circular. Such statement simply meant that the substance and not the form of a regulation is decisive in determining its nature. It does not lay down a general proposition of law that any circular, regardless of its substance and even if it is only interpretative, constitutes a rule or regulation which must be published in the Official Gazette before it could take effect. The case of People v. Que Po Lay (50 O.G. 2850) also cited by appellant is not applicable to the present case, because the penalty that may be incurred by employers and employees if they refuse to pay the corresponding premiums on bonus, overtime pay, etc. which the employer pays to his employees, is not by reason of non-compliance with Circular No. 22, but for violation of the specific legal provisions contained in Section 27(c) and (f) of Republic Act No. 1161. We find, therefore, that Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise employers-members of the System of what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in determining the monthly compensation of their employees upon which the social security contributions should be based, and that such circular did not require presidential approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity. It hardly need be said that the Commission's interpretation of the amendment embodied in its Circular No. 22, is correct. The express elimination among the exemptions excluded in the old law, of all bonuses, allowances and overtime pay in the determination of the "compensation" paid to employees makes it imperative that such bonuses and overtime pay must now be included in the employee's remuneration in pursuance of the amendatory law. It is true that in previous cases, this Court has held that bonus is not demandable because it is not part of the wage, salary, or compensation of the employee. But the question in the instant case is not whether bonus is demandable or not as part of compensation, but whether, after the employer does, in fact, give or pay bonus to his employees, such bonuses shall be considered compensation under the Social Security Act after they have been received by the employees. While it is true that terms or words are to be interpreted in accordance with their well-accepted meaning in law, nevertheless, when such term or word is specifically defined in a particular law, such interpretation must be adopted in enforcing that particular law, for it can not be gainsaid that a particular phrase or term may have one meaning for one purpose and another meaning for some other purpose. Such is the case that is

now before us. Republic Act 1161 specifically defined what "compensation" should mean "For the purposes of this Act". Republic Act 1792 amended such definition by deleting same exemptions authorized in the original Act. By virtue of this express substantial change in the phraseology of the law, whatever prior executive or judicial construction may have been given to the phrase in question should give way to the clear mandate of the new law. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered. Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon and De Leon, JJ., concur. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-64279 April 30, 1984 ANSELMO L. PESIGAN and MARCELINO L. PESIGAN, petitioners, vs. JUDGE DOMINGO MEDINA ANGELES, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City Branch 129, acting for REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of Camarines Norte, now presided over by JUDGE NICANOR ORIO, Daet Branch 40; DRA. BELLA S. MIRANDA, ARNULFO V. ZENAROSA, ET AL., respondents. Quiazon, De Guzman Makalintal and Barot for petitioners. The Solicitor General for respondents. AQUINO, J.:+.wph!1 At issue in this case is the enforceability, before publication in the Official Gazette of June 14, 1982, of Presidential Executive Order No. 626-A dated October 25, 1980, providing for the confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from one province to another. Anselmo L. Pesigan and Marcelo L. Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in an Isuzu ten-wheeler truck in the evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Sipocot, Camarines Sur with Padre Garcia, Batangas, as the destination. They were provided with (1) a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian of Camarines Sur, issued under the Revised Administrative Code and Presidential Decree No. 533, the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974; (2) a permit to transport large cattle issued under the authority of the provincial commander; and (3) three certificates of inspection, one from the Constabulary command attesting that the carabaos were not included in the list of lost, stolen and questionable animals; one from the LIvestock inspector, Bureau of Animal Industry of Libmanan, Camarines Sur and one from the mayor of Sipocot. In spite of the permit to transport and the said four certificates, the carabaos, while passing at Basud, Camarines Norte, were confiscated by Lieutenant Arnulfo V. Zenarosa, the town's police station commander, and by Doctor Bella S. Miranda, provincial veterinarian. The confiscation was basis on the aforementioned Executive Order No. 626-A which provides "that henceforth, no carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabaos or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government to be distributed ... to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos" (78 OG 3144). Doctor Miranda distributed the carabaos among twenty-five farmers of Basud, and to a farmer from the Vinzons municipal nursery (Annex 1). The Pesigans filed against Zenarosa and Doctor Miranda an action for replevin for the recovery of the carabaos allegedly valued at P70,000 and damages of P92,000. The replevin order could not be executed by the sheriff. In his order of April 25, 1983 Judge Domingo Medina Angeles, who heard the case at Daet and who was later transferred to Caloocan City, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action. The Pesigans appealed to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and section 25 of the Interim Rules and pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440, a 1968 law which superseded Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. We hold that the said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted, it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code. The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. (People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Lim Hoa Ting vs. Central Bank of the Phils., 104 Phil. 573; Balbuna vs. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil. 150.) The Spanish Supreme Court ruled that "bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordenes dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad (1 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., p. 146.)

Thus, in the Que Po Lay case, a person, convicted by the trial court of having violated Central Bank Circular No. 20 and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P1,000, was acquitted by this Court because the circular was published in the Official Gazette three months after his conviction. He was not bound by the circular. That ruling applies to a violation of Executive Order No. 626-A because its confiscation and forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. Justice and fairness dictate that the public must be informed of that provision by means of publication in the Gazette before violators of the executive order can be bound thereby. The cases of Police Commission vs. Bello, L-29960, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 230 and Philippine Blooming Mills vs. Social Security System, 124 Phil. 499, cited by the respondents, do not involve the enforcement of any penal regulation. Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all Presidential executive orders having general applicability should be published in the Official Gazette. It provides that "every order or document which shag prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to have general applicability and legal effect." Indeed, the practice has always been to publish executive orders in the Gazette. Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that even bureau "regulations and orders shall become effective only when approved by the Department Head and published in the Official Gazette or otherwise publicly promulgated". (See Commissioner of Civil Service vs. Cruz, 122 Phil. 1015.) In the instant case, the livestock inspector and the provincial veterinarian of Camarines Norte and the head of the Public Affairs Office of the Ministry of Agriculture were unaware of Executive Order No. 626-A. The Pesigans could not have been expected to be cognizant of such an executive order. It results that they have a cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. The summary confiscation was not in order. The recipients of the carabaos should return them to the Pesigans. However, they cannot transport the carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the said executive order. Neither can they recover damages. Doctor Miranda and Zenarosa acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos. WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal and the confiscation and dispersal of the carabaos are reversed and set aside. Respondents Miranda and Zenarosa are ordered to restore the carabaos, with the requisite documents, to the petitioners, who as owners are entitled to possess the same, with the right to dispose of them in Basud or Sipocot, Camarines Sur. No costs. SO ORDERED.1wph1.t Makasiar, (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, and Escolin, JJ., concur. De Castro, J., took no part. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-34526 August 9, 1988 HIJO PLANTATION INC., DAVAO FRUITS CORPORATION, TWIN RIVERS PLANTATION, INC. and MARSMAN & CO., INC., for themselves and in behalf of other persons and entities similarly situated, petitioners, vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. PARAS, J.: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition which seeks: (1) to declare Monetary Board Resolution No. 1995, series of 1971, as null and void; (2) to prohibit the Central Bank from collecting the stabilization tax on banana exports shipped during the period January 1, 1972 to June 30, 1982; and (3) a refund of the amount collected as stabilization tax from the Central Bank. The facts of this case as culled from the records are as follows: Hijo Plantation, Inc., Davao Fruits Corporation, Twin Rivers Plantation, Inc. and Marsman Plantation (Manifestation, Rollo, P. 18), collectively referred to herein as petitioners, are domestic corporations duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, all of which are engaged in the production and exportation of bananas in and from Mindanao. Owing to the difficulty of determining the exchange rate of the peso to the dollar because of the floating rate and the promulgation of Central Bank Circular No. 289 which imposes an 80% retention scheme on all dollar earners, Congress passed Republic Act No. 6125 entitled "an act imposing STABILIZATION TAX ON CONSIGNMENTS ABROAD TO ACCELERATE THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved and made effective on May 1, 1970 (Comment on Petition, Rollo, p, 32), to eliminate the necessity for said circular and to stabilize the peso. Among others, it provides as follows:

SECTION 1. There shall be imposed, assessed and collected a stabilization tax on the gross F.O.B. peso proceeds, based on the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of receipt of such proceeds, whether partial or total, of any exportation of the following products in accordance with the following schedule: a. In the case of logs, copra, centrifugal sugar, and copper ore and concentrates: Ten per centum of the F.O.B. peso proceeds of exports received on or after the date of effectivity of this Act to June thirty, nineteen hundred seventy one; Eight per centum of the F.O.B. peso proceeds of exports received from July first, nineteen hundred seventy-one to June thirty, nineteen hundred seventy-two; Six per centum of the F.O.B. peso proceeds of exports received from July first, nineteen hundred seventy two to June thirty, nineteen hundred seventy- three; and Four per centum of the F.O.B. peso proceeds of exports received from July first, nineteen hundred seventy-three to June thirty, nineteen hundred seventy-four. b. In the case of molasses, coconut oil, dessicated coconut, iron ore and concentrates, chromite ore and concentrates, copra meal or cake, unmanufactured abaca, unmanufactured tobacco, veneer core and sheets, plywood (including plywood panels faced with plastics), lumber, canned pineapples, and bunker fuel oil; Eight per centum of the F.O.B. peso proceeds of exports shipped on or after the date of effectivity of this Act to June thirty, nineteen hundred seventy-one; Six per centum of the F.O.B. peso proceeds of exports shipped from July first, nineteen hundred seventy one to June thirty nineteen hundred seventy- two; Four per centum of the F.O.B. peso proceeds of exports shipped from July first, nineteen hundred seventy-two to June thirty nineteen hundred seventy-three; and Two per centum of the F.O.B. peso proceeds of exports shipped from July first, nineteen hundred seventy three to June thirty nineteen hundred seventy-four. Any export product the aggregate annual F.O.B. value of which shall exceed five million United States dollars in any one calendar year during the effectivity of this Act shall likewise be subject to the rates of tax in force during the fiscal years following its reaching the said aggregate value. (Emphasis supplied). During the first nine (9) months of calendar year 1971, the total banana export amounted to an annual aggregate F.O.B. value of P8,949,000.00 (Answer, Rollo, p. 73) thus exceeding the aggregate F.O.B. value of five million United States Dollar, bringing it within the ambit of Republic Act No. 6125. Consequently, the banana industry was in a dilemma as to when the stabilization tax was to become due and collectible from it and under what schedule of Section 1 (b) of Republic Act 6125 should said tax be collected. Accordingly, petitioners through their counsel, by letter dated November 5, 1971, sought the authoritative pronouncement of the Central Bank (herein referred to as respondent), therein advancing the opinion that the stabilization tax does not become due and collectible from the petitioners until July 1, 1972 at the rate of 4% of the F.O.B. peso proceeds of the exports shipped from July 1, 1972 to June 30,1973. Replying by letter dated December 17,1971 (Rollo, p. 11), the Central Bank called attention to Monetary Board Resolution No. 1995 dated December 3, 1971 which clarified that: 1) For exports of bananas shipped during the period from January 1, 1972 to June 30, 1972; the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 6%; 2) For exports of bananas shipped during the period from July 1, 1972 to June 30, 1973, the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 4%; and 3) For exports of bananas shipped during the period from July 1, 1973, to June 30, 1974, the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 2%." Contending that said Board Resolution No. 1995 was manifestly contrary to the legislative intent, petitioners sought a reconsideration of said Board Resolution by letter dated December 27, 1971 (Rollo, p. 12) which request for reconsideration was denied by the respondent, also by letter dated January 20, 1972 (Rollo, p. 24). With the denial of petitioners' request for reconsideration, respondent thru its agent Bank, Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation has been collecting from the petitioners who have been forced to pay under protest, such stabilization tax. Petitioners view respondent's act as a clear violation of the provision of Republic Act No. 6125, and as an act in excess of its jurisdiction, hence, this petition. The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued Monetary Board Resolution No. 1995, series of 1971 which in effect reaffirmed Central Bank Circular No. 309, enacted pursuant to Monetary Board Resolution No. 1179.

There is here no dispute that the banana industry is liable to pay the stabilization tax prescribed under Republic Act No. 1995, it being the admission of both parties, that the Industry has indeed reached and for the first time in the calendar year 1971, a total banana export exceeding the aggregate annual F.O.B. value of five million United States dollars. The crux of the controversy, however, is the manner of implementation of Republic Act No. 6125. Section 1 of R.A. 6125 clearly provides as follows: An export product the aggregate annual F.O.B. value of which shall exceed five million US dollars in any one calendar year during the effectivity of the act shall likewise be subject to the rates of tax in force during the fiscal year following its reaching the said aggregate value." Petitioners contend that the stabilization tax to be collected from the banana industry does not become due and collectible until July 1, 1972 at the rate of 4% of the F.O.B. peso proceeds of the export shipped from July 1, 1972 to June 30,1973. They further contend that respondent gave retroactive effect to the law (RA 6125) by ruling in Monetary Board Resolution No. 1995 dated December 3, 1 971, that the export stabilization tax on banana industry would start to accrue on January 1, 1972 at the rate of 6% of the F.O.B. peso proceeds of export shipped from July 1, 1971 to June 30, 1972 (Rollo, pp. 3-4). Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the aforecited provision of RA 6125 merely prescribes the rates that may be imposed but does not provide when the tax shall be collected and makes no reference to any definite fixed period when the tax shall begin to be collected (Rollo, pp. 77-78). There is merit in this petition. In the very nature of things, in many cases it becomes impracticable for the legislative department of the Government to provide general regulations for the various and varying details for the management of a particular department of the Government. It therefore becomes convenient for the legislative department of the government, by law, in a most general way, to provide for the conduct, control, and management of the work of the particular department of the government; to authorize certain persons, in charge of the management and control of such department (United States v. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119 [19141). Such is the case in RA 6125, which provided in its Section 6, as follows: All rules and regulations for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the act shall be promulgated by the Central Bank of the Philippines and shall take effect fifteen days after publication in three newspapers of general circulation throughout the Philippines, one of which shall be in the national language. Such regulations have uniformly been held to have the force of law, whenever they are found to be in consonance and in harmony with the general purposes and objects of the law. Such regulations once established and found to be in conformity with the general purposes of the law, are just as binding upon all the parties, as if the regulation had been written in the original law itself (29 Phil. 119, Ibid). Upon the other hand, should the regulation conflict with the law, the validity of the regulation cannot be sustained (Director of Forestry vs. Muroz 23 SCRA 1183). Pursuant to the aforecited provision, the Monetary Board issued Resolution No. 1179 which contained the rules and regulations for the implementation of said provision which Board resolution was subsequently embodied in Central Bank Circular No. 309, dated August 10, 1970 (duly published in the Official Gazette, Vol. 66, No. 34, August 24, 1940, p. 7855 and in three newspapers of general circulation throughout the Philippines namely, the Manila Times, Manila Chronicle and Manila Daily Bulletin). Section 3 of Central Bank Circular No. 309, "provides that the stabilization tax shall begin to apply on January first following the calendar year during which such export products shall have reached the aggregate annual F.O.B. value of more than $5 million and the applicable tax rates shall be the rates prescribed in schedule (b) of Section 1 of RA No. 6125 for the fiscal year following the reaching of the said aggregate value." Central Bank Circular No. 309 was subsequently reaffirmed in Monetary Board Resolution No. 1995 herein assailed by petitioners for being null and void (Rollo, pp. 97- 98). In its comment (Rollo, p. 40), respondent argues that the request for authoritative pronouncement of petitioners was made because there was no express provision in Section 1 of RA 6125 which categorically states, when the stabilization tax shall begin to accrue on those aggregate annual F.O.B. values exceeding five (5) million United States dollars in any one calendar year during the effectivity of said act. For which reason, the law itself authorized it under Section 7 to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of said law. In petitioner's reply (Rollo, p. 154) they argue that since the Banana Exports reached the aggregate annual F.O.B. value of US $5 million in August 1971, the stabilization tax on banana should be imposed only on July 1, 1972, the fiscal year following the calendar year during which the industry attained the $5 million mark. Their argument finds support in the very language of the law and upon congressional record where a clarification on the applicability of the law was categorically made by the then Senator Aytona who stated that the tax shall be applicable only after the $5 million aggregate value is reached, making such tax prospective in application and for a period of one year- referring to the fiscal year (Annex 8, Comment of Respondent; Rollo, p. 60). Clearly such clarification was indicative of the legislative intent. Further, they argue that respondent bank through the Monetary Board clearly overstepped RA 6125 which empowered it to promulgate rules and regulations for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of said act, because while Section 1 of the law authorizes it to levy a stabilization tax on petitioners only in the fiscal year following their reaching the aggregate annual F.O.B. value of US $5 million, that is, the fiscal year July 1, 1972 to June 30, 1973, at a tax rate of 4% of the F.O.B. peso proceeds, respondent in gross violation of the law, instead issued Resolution No. 1995 which impose a 6% stabilization tax for the calendar year January 1, 1972 to June 30, 1972, which obviously is in excess of its jurisdiction. It was further argued that in directing its agent bank to collect the stabilization tax in accordance with Monetary Board Resolution No. 1995, it acted whimsically and capriciously. (Rollo, p. 155). It will be observed that while Monetary Board Resolution No. 1995 cannot be said to be the product of grave abuse of discretion but rather the result of respondent's overzealous desire to carry into effect the provisions of RA 6125, it is evident that the Board acted beyond its authority under the law and the Constitution. Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition in the case at bar, is proper.

Moreover, there is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law (People vs. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091). Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned (University of Sto. Tomas v. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376; Del Mar v. Phil. Veterans Administration, 51 SCRA 340). Except for constitutional officials who can trace their competence to act to the fundamental law itself, a public official must locate to the statute relied upon a grant of power before he can exercise it. Department zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute (Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. Santiago L-29236, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 493; cited in Tayug Rural Bank v. Central Bank, L-46158, November 28,1986,146 SCRA 120,130). PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is hereby GRANTED. SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Padilla and Sarmiento JJ., concur.

October 12, 1984 G.R. No. L-62243 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. REGINO VERIDIANO II, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City, Branch I, and BENITO GO BIO, JR., respondents. The Solicitor General for petitioner. Anacleto T. Lacanilao and Carmelino M. Roque for respondents. Relova, J.: Private respondent Benito Go Bio, Jr. was charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 in Criminal Case No. 5396 in the then Court of First Instance of Zambales, presided by respondent judge. The information reads: That on or about and during the second week of May 1979, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, guaranteeing the authenticity and genuineness of the same and with intent to defraud one Filipinas Tan by means of false pretenses and pretending to have sufficient funds deposited in the Bank of the Philippine Island, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make and issue Bank of Philippine Island Check No. D-357726 in the amount of P200,000.00 Philippine Currency, said accused well knowing that he has no sufficient funds at the Bank of the Philippine Island and upon presentation of the said check to the bank for encashment, the same was dishonored for the reason that the said accused has no sufficient funds with the said bank and despite repeated demands made by Filipinas Tan on the accused to redeem the said check or pay the amount of P200,000.00, said accused failed and continues to fail to redeem the said check or to pay the said amount, to the damage and prejudice of said Filipinas Tan in the aforementioned amount of P200,000.00 Philippine Currency. (pp. 23-24, Rollo) Before he could be arraigned respondent Go Bio, Jr. filed a Motion to Quash the information on the ground that the information did not charge an offense, pointing out that at the alleged commission of the offense, which was about the second week of May 1979, Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 has not yet taken effect. The prosecution opposed the motion contending, among others, that the date of the dishonor of the check, which is on September 26, 1979, is the date of the commission of the offense; and that assuming that the effectivity of the law Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is on June 29, 1979, considering that the offense was committed on September 26, 1979, the said law is applicable. In his reply, private respondent Go Bio, Jr. submits that what Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 penalizes is not the fact of the dishonor of the check but the act of making or drawing and issuing a check without sufficient funds or credit. Resolving the motion, respondent judge granted the same and cancelled the bail bond of the accused. In its order of August 23, 1982, respondent judge said: The Court finds merit to the contention that the accused cannot be held liable for bouncing checks prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 although the check may have matured after the effectivity of the said law. No less than the Minister of Justice decreed that the date of the drawing or making and issuance of the bouncing check is the date to reckon with and not on the date of the maturity of the check. (Resolution No. 67, S. 1981, Peoples Car vs. Eduardo N. Tan, Feb. 3, 1981; Resolution No. 192, S. 1981, Ricardo de Guia vs. Agapito Miranda, March 20, 1981). Hence, the Court believes that although the accused can be prosecuted for swindling (Estafa, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code), the Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 cannot be given a retroactive effect to apply to the above entitled case. (pp. 49- 50, Rollo) Hence, this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner submitting for review respondent judges dismissal of the criminal action against private respondent Go Bio, Jr. for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law. Petitioner contends that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was published in the April 9, 1979 issue of the Official Gazette. Fifteen (15) days therefrom would be April 24, 1979, or several days before respondent Go Bio, Jr. issued the questioned check around the second week of May 1979; and that respondent judge should not have taken into account the date of release of the Gazette for circulation because Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that for the purpose of ascertaining the date of effectivity of a law that needed publication, the Gazette is conclusively presumed to be published on the day indicated therein as the date of issue.

Private respondent Go Bio, Jr. argues that although Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was published in the Official Gazette issue of April 9, 1979, nevertheless, the same was released only on June 14, 1979 and, considering that the questioned check was issued about the second week of May 1979, then he could not have violated Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 because it was not yet released for circulation at the time. We uphold the dismissal by the respondent judge of the criminal action against the private respondent. The Solicitor General admitted the certification issued by Ms. Charito A. Mangubat, Copy Editor of the Official Gazette Section of the Government Printing Office, stating This is to certify that Volume 75, No. 15, of the April 9, 1979 issue of the Official Gazette was officially released for circulation on June 14, 1979. (p. 138, Rollo) It is therefore, certain that the penal statute in question was made public only on June 14, 1979 and not on the printed date April 9, 1979. Differently stated, June 14, 1979 was the date of publication of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Before the public may be bound by its contents especially its penal provisions, the law must be published and the people officially informed of its contents and/or its penalties. For, if a statute had not been published before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was no such law to be violated and, consequently, the accused could not have committed the alleged crime. The effectivity clause of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 specifically states that This Act shall take effect fifteen days after publication in the Official Gazette. The term publication in such clause should be given the ordinary accepted meaning, that is, to make known to the people in general. If the Batasang Pambansa had intended to make the printed date of issue of the Gazette as the point of reference in determining the effectivity of the statute in question, then it could have so stated in the special effectivity provision of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. When private respondent Go Bio, Jr. committed the act, complained of in the Information as criminal, in May 1979, there was then no law penalizing such act. Following the special provision of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, it became effective only on June 29, 1979. As a matter of fact, in May 1979, there was no law to be violated and, consequently, respondent Go Bio, Jr. did not commit any violation thereof. With respect to the allegation of petitioner that the offense was committed on September 26, 1979 when the check was presented for encashment and was dishonored by the bank, suffice it to say that the law penalizes the act of making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check and not only the fact of its dishonor. The title of the law itself states: AN ACT PENALIZING THE MAKING OR DRAWING AND ISSUANCE OF A CHECK WITHOUT SUFFICIENT FUNDS OR CREDIT AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. and, Sections 1 and 2 of said Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 provide: SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds shall be punished The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank. xxx xxx xxx SECTION 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds . (Emphasis supplied) ACCORDINGLY, the order of respondent judge dated August 23, 1982 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur. TEEHANKEE, Actg. C.J., concurring: I concur on the ground that actual publication of the penal law is indispensable for its effectivity (Pesigan vs. Angeles, 129 SCRA 174). Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-59234 September 30, 1982 TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC., FELICISIMO CABIGAO and ACE TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LAND TRANSPORTATION, respondents. MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

This Petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order" filed by the Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc., Felicisimo Cabigao and Ace Transportation, seeks to declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular No. 77-42, dated October 10, 1977, of the Board of Transportation, and Memorandum Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980, of the Bureau of Land Transportation. Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic. Petitioners Ace Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao are two of the members of TOMMI, each being an operator and grantee of such certificate of public convenience. On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which reads: SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis WHEREAS, it is the policy of the government to insure that only safe and comfortable units are used as public conveyances; WHEREAS, the riding public, particularly in Metro-Manila, has, time and again, complained against, and condemned, the continued operation of old and dilapidated taxis; WHEREAS, in order that the commuting public may be assured of comfort, convenience, and safety, a program of phasing out of old and dilapidated taxis should be adopted; WHEREAS, after studies and inquiries made by the Board of Transportation, the latter believes that in six years of operation, a taxi operator has not only covered the cost of his taxis, but has made reasonable profit for his investments; NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to this policy, the Board hereby declares that no car beyond six years shall be operated as taxi, and in implementation of the same hereby promulgates the following rules and regulations: 1. As of December 31, 1977, all taxis of Model 1971 and earlier are ordered withdrawn from public service and thereafter may no longer be registered and operated as taxis. In the registration of cards for 1978, only taxis of Model 1972 and later shall be accepted for registration and allowed for operation; 2. As of December 31, 1978, all taxis of Model 1972 are ordered withdrawn from public service and thereafter may no longer be registered and operated as taxis. In the registration of cars for 1979, only taxis of Model 1973 and later shall be accepted for registration and allowed for operation; and every year thereafter, there shall be a six-year lifetime of taxi, to wit: 1980 Model 1974 1981 Model 1975, etc. All taxis of earlier models than those provided above are hereby ordered withdrawn from public service as of the last day of registration of each particular year and their respective plates shall be surrendered directly to the Board of Transportation for subsequent turnover to the Land Transportation Commission. For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules herein shall immediately be effective in MetroManila. Its implementation outside Metro- Manila shall be carried out only after the project has been implemented in Metro-Manila and only after the date has been determined by the Board. 1 Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980, instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the National Capitol Region, to implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. To quote said Circular: Pursuant to BOT Memo-Circular No. 77-42, taxi units with year models over six (6) years old are now banned from operating as public utilities in Metro Manila. As such the units involved should be considered as automatically dropped as public utilities and, therefore, do not require any further dropping order from the BOT. Henceforth, taxi units within the National Capitol Region having year models over 6 years old shall be refused registration. The following schedule of phase-out is herewith prescribed for the guidance of all concerned:

Year Model

Automatic Phase-Out Year 1980

1974 1975 1976 1977 etc.

1981 1982 1983

etc. Strict compliance here is desired. 2

In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in registration year 1978; those of model 1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and those of model 1974, in 1981. On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation. On February 16, 1981, petitioners filed before the BOT a "Manifestation and Urgent Motion", praying for an early hearing of their petition. The case was heard on February 20, 1981. Petitioners presented testimonial and documentary evidence, offered the same, and manifested that they would submit additional documentary proofs. Said proofs were submitted on March 27, 1981 attached to petitioners' pleading entitled, "Manifestation, Presentation of Additional Evidence and Submission of the Case for Resolution." 3 On November 28, 1981, petitioners filed before the same Board a "Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Resolve or Decide Main Petition" praying that the case be resolved or decided not later than December 10, 1981 to enable them, in case of denial, to avail of whatever remedy they may have under the law for the protection of their interests before their 1975 model cabs are phased-out on January 1, 1982. Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups of the case, but was later informed that the records of the case could not be located. On December 29, 1981, the present Petition was instituted wherein the following queries were posed for consideration by this Court: A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord with the manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the petitioners' constitutional right to procedural due process? B. Granting, arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, would the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners' constitutional rights to. (1) Equal protection of the law; (2) Substantive due process; and (3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard? On Procedural and Substantive Due Process: Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power 4. To fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles. Section 2 of said Decree provides procedural guidelines for said agency to follow in the exercise of its powers: Sec. 2. Exercise of powers. In the exercise of the powers granted in the preceding section, the Board shag proceed promptly along the method of legislative inquiry. Apart from its own investigation and studies, the Board, in its discretion, may require the cooperation and assistance of the Bureau of Transportation, the Philippine Constabulary, particularly the Highway Patrol Group, the support agencies within the Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, or any other government office or agency that may be able to furnish useful information or data in the formulation of the Board of any policy, plan or program in the implementation of this Decree.

The Board may also can conferences, require the submission of position papers or other documents, information, or data by operators or other persons that may be affected by the implementation of this Decree, or employ any other suitable means of inquiry. In support of their submission that they were denied procedural due process, petitioners contend that they were not caged upon to submit their position papers, nor were they ever summoned to attend any conference prior to the issuance of the questioned BOT Circular. It is clear from the provision aforequoted, however, that the leeway accorded the Board gives it a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents from operators or persons who may be affected, this being only one of the options open to the Board, which is given wide discretionary authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim, therefore, that they were deprived of procedural due process. Neither can they state with certainty that public respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry prior to issuing the challenged Circulars. operators of public conveyances are not the only primary sources of the data and information that may be desired by the BOT. Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is neither violative of procedural due process. As held in Central Bank vs. Hon. Cloribel and Banco Filipino, 44 SCRA 307 (1972): Pevious notice and hearing as elements of due process, are constitutionally required for the protection of life or vested property rights, as well as of liberty, when its limitation or loss takes place in consequence of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, generally dependent upon a past act or event which has to be established or ascertained. It is not essential to the validity of general rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of a class or persons or enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise. (Emphasis supplied) Petitioners further take the position that fixing the ceiling at six (6) years is arbitrary and oppressive because the roadworthiness of taxicabs depends upon their kind of maintenance and the use to which they are subjected, and, therefore, their actual physical condition should be taken into consideration at the time of registration. As public contend, however, it is impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to an vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six years supplies that reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by that time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained. They are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public specially considering that they are in continuous operation practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift. With that standard of reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has been met. On Equal Protection of the Law: Petitioners alleged that the Circular in question violates their right to equal protection of the law because the same is being enforced in Metro Manila only and is directed solely towards the taxi industry. At the outset it should be pointed out that implementation outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in Memorandum Circular No. 77-42. To repeat the pertinent portion: For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules herein shall immediately be effective in Metro Manila. Its implementation outside Metro Manila shall be carried out only after the project has been implemented in Metro Manila and only after the date has been determined by the Board. 4 In fact, it is the understanding of the Court that implementation of the Circulars in Cebu City is already being effected, with the BOT in the process of conducting studies regarding the operation of taxicabs in other cities. The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. This is of common knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed. As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise, of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. 5 It may also regulate property rights. 6 In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded". 7 In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation services is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons Identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object or subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. 8 What is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under Identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. 9 The challenged Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria. Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. To declare a law unconstitutional, the infringement of constitutional right must be clear, categorical and undeniable. 10 WHEREFORE, the Writs prayed for are denied and this Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Fernando, CJ., Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Plana, Escolin, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur. Teehankee and Aquino, JJ., concur in the result. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-34674 October 26, 1931 MAURICIO CRUZ, petitioner-appellant, vs. STANTON YOUNGBERG, Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, respondent-appellee. Jose Yulo for appellant. Office of the Solicitor-General Reyes for appellee. OSTRAND, J.: This is a petition brought originally before the Court of First Instance of Manila for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the respondent, Stanton Youngberg, as Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, requiring him to issue a permit for the landing of ten large cattle imported by the petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. The petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which at present prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands. Among other things in the allegation of the petition, it is asserted that "Act No. 3155 of the Philippine Legislature was enacted for the sole purpose of preventing the introduction of cattle diseases into the Philippine Islands from foreign countries, as shown by an explanatory note and text of Senate Bill No. 328 as introduced in the Philippine Legislature, ... ." The Act in question reads as follows: SECTION 1. After March thirty-first, nineteen hundred and twenty-five existing contracts for the importation of cattle into this country to the contrary notwithstanding, it shall be strictly prohibited to import, bring or introduce into the Philippine Islands any cattle from foreign countries: Provided, however, That at any time after said date, the Governor-General, with the concurrence of the presiding officers of both Houses, may raise such prohibition entirely or in part if the conditions of the country make this advisable or if decease among foreign cattle has ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and live stock of the lands. SEC. 2. All acts or parts of acts inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed. SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect on its approval. Approved, March 8, 1924. The respondent demurred to the petition on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was based on two reasons, namely, (1) that if Act No. 3155 were declared unconstitutional and void, the petitioner would not be entitled to the relief demanded because Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective and would prohibit the respondent from giving the permit prayed for; and (2) that Act No. 3155 was constitutional and, therefore, valid. The court sustained the demurrer and the complaint was dismissed by reason of the failure of the petitioner to file another complaint. From that order of dismissal, the petitioner appealed to this court. The appellee contends that even if Act No. 3155 be declared unconstitutional by the fact alleged by the petitioner in his complaint, still the petitioner can not be allowed to import cattle from Australia for the reason that, while Act No. 3155 were declared unconstitutional, Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective. Act No. 3052 reads as follows: SECTION 1. Section seventeen hundred and sixty-two of Act Numbered Twenty-seven hundred and eleven, known as the Administrative Code, is hereby amended to read as follows: "SEC. 1762. Bringing of animals imported from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands. It shall be unlawful for any person or corporation to import, bring or introduce live cattle into the Philippine Islands from any foreign country. The Director of Agriculture may, with the approval of the head of the department first had, authorize the importation, bringing or introduction of various classes of thoroughbred cattle from foreign countries for breeding the same to the native cattle of these Islands, and such as may be necessary for the improvement of the breed, not to exceed five hundred head per annum: Provided, however, That the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit the importation, bringing or introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum: Provided, further, That all live cattle from foreign countries the importation, bringing or introduction of which into the Islands is authorized by this Act, shall be submitted to regulations issued by the Director of Agriculture, with the approval of the head of the department, prior to authorizing its transfer to other provinces.

"At the time of the approval of this Act, the Governor-General shall issue regulations and others to provide against a raising of the price of both fresh and refrigerated meat. The Governor-General also may, by executive order, suspend, this prohibition for a fixed period in case local conditions require it." SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect six months after approval. Approved, March 14, 1922. The petitioner does not present any allegations in regard to Act No. 3052 to show its nullity or unconstitutionality though it appears clearly that in the absence of Act No. 3155 the former act would make it impossible for the Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry to grant the petitioner a permit for the importation of the cattle without the approval of the head of the corresponding department. An unconstitutional statute can have no effect to repeal former laws or parts of laws by implication, since, being void, it is not inconsistent with such former laws. (I Lewis Sutherland, Statutory Construction 2nd ed., p. 458, citing McAllister vs. Hamlin, 83 Cal., 361; 23 Pac., 357; Orange Country vs. Harris, 97 Cal., 600; 32 Pac., 594; Carr vs. State, 127 Ind., 204; 11 L.R.A., 370, etc.) This court has several times declared that it will not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes unless it is necessary to do so (McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu, 30 Phil., 563, 568; Walter E. Olsen & Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad, 43 Phil., 259) but in this case it is not necessary to pass upon the validity of the statute attacked by the petitioner because even if it were declared unconstitutional, the petitioner would not be entitled to relief inasmuch as Act No. 3052 is not in issue. But aside from the provisions of Act No. 3052, we are of the opinion that Act No. 3155 is entirely valid. As shown in paragraph 8 of the amended petition, the Legislature passed Act No. 3155 to protect the cattle industry of the country and to prevent the introduction of cattle diseases through importation of foreign cattle. It is now generally recognized that the promotion of industries affecting the public welfare and the development of the resources of the country are objects within the scope of the police power (12 C.J., 927; 6 R.C.L., 203-206 and decisions cited therein; Reid vs. Colorado, 187 U.S., 137, 147, 152; Yeazel vs. Alexander, 58 Ill., 254). In this connection it is said in the case of Punzalan vs. Ferriols and Provincial Board of Batangas (19 Phil., 214), that the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, did not have the effect of denying to the Government of the Philippine Islands the right to the exercise of the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. The facts recited in paragraph 8 of the amended petition shows that at the time the Act No. 3155 was promulgated there was reasonable necessity therefor and it cannot be said that the Legislature exceeded its power in passing the Act. That being so, it is not for this court to avoid or vacate the Act upon constitutional grounds nor will it assume to determine whether the measures are wise or the best that might have been adopted. (6 R.C.L., 243 and decisions cited therein.)1awphil.net In his third assignment of error the petitioner claims that "The lower court erred in not holding that the power given by Act No. 3155 to the GovernorGeneral to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition provided in the act constitutes an unlawful delegation of the legislative powers." We do not think that such is the case; as Judge Ranney of the Ohio Supreme Court in Cincinnati, Wilmington and Zanesville Railroad Co. vs. Commissioners of Clinton County (1 Ohio St., 77, 88) said in such case: The true distinction, therefore, is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. Under his fourth assignment of error the appellant argues that Act No. 3155 amends section 3 of the Tariff Law, but it will be noted that Act No. 3155 is not an absolute prohibition of the importation of cattle and it does not add any provision to section 3 of the Tariff Law. As stated in the brief of the Attorney-General: "It is a complete statute in itself. It does not make any reference to the Tariff Law. It does not permit the importation of articles, whose importation is prohibited by the Tariff Law. It is not a tariff measure but a quarantine measure, a statute adopted under the police power of the Philippine Government. It is at most a `supplement' or an `addition' to the Tariff Law. (See MacLeary vs. Babcock, 82 N.E., 453, 455; 169 Ind., 228 for distinction between `supplemental' and `amendatory' and O'Pry vs. U.S., 249 U.S., 323; 63 Law. ed., 626, for distinction between `addition' and `amendment.')" The decision appealed from is affirmed with the costs against the appellant. So ordered. Avancea, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Romualdez, Villa-Real, and Imperial, JJ., concur. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 95832 August 10, 1992 MAYNARD R. PERALTA, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent. Tranquilino F. Meris Law Office for petitioner. PADILLA, J.:

Petitioner was appointed Trade-Specialist II on 25 September 1989 in the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). His appointment was classified as "Reinstatement/Permanent". Before said appointment, he was working at the Philippine Cotton Corporation, a government-owned and controlled corporation under the Department of Agriculture. On 8 December 1989, petitioner received his initial salary, covering the period from 25 September to 31 October 1989. Since he had no accumulated leave credits, DTI deducted from his salary the amount corresponding to his absences during the covered period, namely, 29 September 1989 and 20 October 1989, inclusive of Saturdays and Sundays. More specifically, the dates of said absences for which salary deductions were made, are as follows: 1. 29 September 1989 Friday 2. 30 September 1989 Saturday 3. 01 October 1989 Sunday 4. 20 October 1989 Friday 5. 21 October 1989 Saturday 6. 22 October 1989 Sunday Petitioner sent a memorandum to Amando T. Alvis (Chief, General Administrative Service) on 15 December 1989 inquiring as to the law on salary deductions, if the employee has no leave credits. Amando T. Alvis answered petitioner's query in a memorandum dated 30 January 1990 citing Chapter 5.49 of the Handbook of Information on the Philippine Civil Service which states that "when an employee is on leave without pay on a day before or on a day immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday or Holiday, such Saturday, Sunday, or Holiday shall also be without pay (CSC, 2nd Ind., February 12, 1965)." Petitioner then sent a latter dated 20 February 1990 addressed to Civil Service Commission (CSC) Chairman Patricia A. Sto. Tomas raising the following question: Is an employee who was on leave of absence without pay on a day before or on a day time immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday or Holiday, also considered on leave of absence without pay on such Saturday, Sunday or Holiday? 1 Petitioner in his said letter to the CSC Chairman argued that a reading of the General Leave Law as contained in the Revised Administrative Code, as well as the old Civil Service Law (Republic Act No. 2260), the Civil Service Decree (Presidential Decree No. 807), and the Civil Service Rules and Regulation fails to disclose a specific provision which supports the CSC rule at issue. That being the case, the petitioner contented that he cannot be deprived of his pay or salary corresponding to the intervening Saturdays, Sundays or Holidays (in the factual situation posed), and that the withholding (or deduction) of the same is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law. On 25 May 1990, respondent Commission promulgated Resolution No. 90-497, ruling that the action of the DTI in deducting from the salary of petitioner, a part thereof corresponding to six (6) days (September 29, 30, October 1, 20, 21, 22, 1989) is in order. 2 The CSC stated that: In a 2nd Indorsement dated February 12, 1965 of this Commission, which embodies the policy on leave of absence without pay incurred on a Friday and Monday, reads: Mrs. Rosalinda Gonzales is not entitled to payment of salary corresponding to January 23 and 24, 1965, Saturday and Sunday, respectively, it appearing that she was present on Friday, January 22, 1965 but was on leave without pay beginning January 25, the succeeding Monday. It is the view of this Office that an employee who has no more leave credit in his favor is not entitled to the payment of salary on Saturdays, Sundays or holidays unless such non-working days occur within the period of service actually rendered. (Emphasis supplied) The rationale for the above ruling which applies only to those employees who are being paid on monthly basis, rests on the assumption that having been absent on either Monday or Friday, one who has no leave credits, could not be favorably credited with intervening days had the same been working days. Hence, the above policy that for an employee on leave without pay to be entitled to salary on Saturdays, Sundays or holidays, the same must occur between the dates where the said employee actually renders service. To rule otherwise would allow an employee who is on leave of absent (sic) without pay for a long period of time to be entitled to payment of his salary corresponding to Saturdays, Sundays or holidays. It also discourages the employees who have exhausted their leave credits from absenting themselves on a Friday or Monday in order to have a prolonged weekend, resulting in the prejudice of the government and the public in general. 3 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and in Resolution No. 90-797, the respondent Commission denied said motion for lack of merit. The respondent Commission in explaining its action held: The Primer on the Civil Service dated February 21, 1978, embodies the Civil Service Commission rulings to be observed whenever an employee of the government who has no more leave credits, is absent on a Friday and/or a Monday is enough basis for the deduction of his salaries corresponding to the intervening Saturdays and Sundays. What the Commission perceived to be without basis is the demand of Peralta for the payment of his salaries corresponding to Saturdays and Sundays when he was in fact on

leave of absence without pay on a Friday prior to the said days. A reading of Republic Act No. 2260 (sic) does not show that a government employee who is on leave of absence without pay on a day before or immediately preceding Saturdays, Sunday or legal holiday is entitled to payment of his salary for said days. Further, a reading of Senate Journal No. 67 dated May 4, 1960 of House Bill No. 41 (Republic Act No. 2625) reveals that while the law excludes Saturdays, Sundays and holidays in the computation of leave credits, it does not, however, include a case where the leave of absence is without pay. Hence, applying the principle of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, the claim of Peralta has no merit. Moreover, to take a different posture would be in effect giving more premium to employees who are frequently on leave of absence without pay, instead of discouraging them from incurring further absence without pay. 4 Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present petition. What is primarily questioned by the petitioner is the validity of the respondent Commission's policy mandating salary deductions corresponding to the intervening Saturdays, Sundays or Holidays where an employee without leave credits was absent on the immediately preceding working day. During the pendency of this petition, the respondent Commission promulgated Resolution No. 91-540 dated 23 April 1991 amending the questioned policy, considering that employees paid on a monthly basis are not required to work on Saturdays, Sunday or Holidays. In said amendatory Resolution, the respondent Commission resolved "to adopt the policy that when an employee, regardless of whether he has leave credits or not, is absent without pay on day immediately preceding or succeeding Saturday, Sunday or holiday, he shall not be considered absent on those days." Memorandum Circular No. 16 Series of 1991 dated 26 April 1991, was also issued by CSC Chairman Sto. Tomas adopting and promulgating the new policy and directing the Heads of Departments, Bureaus and Agencies in the national and local governments, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, to oversee the strict implementation of the circular. Because of these developments, it would seem at first blush that this petition has become moot and academic since the very CSC policy being questioned has already been amended and, in effect, Resolutions No. 90-497 and 90-797, subject of this petition for certiorari, have already been set aside and superseded. But the issue of whether or not the policy that had been adopted and in force since 1965 is valid or not, remains unresolved. Thus, for reasons of public interest and public policy, it is the duty of the Court to make a formal ruling on the validity or invalidity of such questioned policy. The Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) conferred upon the Commissioner of Civil Service the following powers and duties: Sec. 16 (e) with the approval by the President to prescribe, amend and enforce suitable rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of this Civil Service Law, and the rules prescribed pursuant to the provisions of this law shall become effective thirty days after publication in the Official Gazette; xxx xxx xxx (k) To perform other functions that properly belong to a central personnel agency.
5

Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, the Commission promulgated the herein challenged policy. Said policy was embodied in a 2nd Indorsement dated 12 February 1965 of the respondent Commission involving the case of a Mrs. Rosalinda Gonzales. The respondent Commission ruled that an employee who has no leave credits in his favor is not entitled to the payment of salary on Saturdays, Sundays or Holidays unless such non-working days occur within the period of service actually rendered. The same policy is reiterated in the Handbook of Information on the Philippine Civil Service. 6 Chapter Five on leave of absence provides that: 5.51. When intervening Saturday, Sunday or holiday considered as leave without pay when an employee is on leave without pay on a day before or on a day immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday or holiday, such Saturday, Sunday or holiday shall also be without pay. (CSC, 2nd Ind., Feb. 12, 1965). It is likewise illustrated in the Primer on the Civil Service 7 in the section referring to Questions and Answers on Leave of Absences, which states the following: 27. How is leave of an employee who has no more leave credits computed if: (1) he is absent on a Friday and the following Monday? (2) if he is absent on Friday but reports to work the following Monday? (3) if he is absent on a Monday but present the preceding Friday? - (1) He is considered on leave without pay for 4 days covering Friday to Monday; - (2) He is considered on leave without pay for 3 days from Friday to Sunday; - (3) He is considered on leave without pay for 3 days from Saturday to Monday.

When an administrative or executive agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law; and the administrative interpretation of the law is at best advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. 8 It has also been held that interpretative regulations need not be published. 9 In promulgating as early as 12 February 1965 the questioned policy, the Civil Service Commission interpreted the provisions of Republic Act No. 2625 (which took effect on 17 June 1960) amending the Revised Administrative Code, and which stated as follows: Sec. 1. Sections two hundred eighty-four and two hundred eighty-five-A of the Administrative Code, as amended, are further amended to read as follows: Sec. 284. After at least six months' continues (sic) faithful, and satisfactory service, the President or proper head of department, or the chief of office in the case of municipal employees may, in his discretion, grant to an employee or laborer, whether permanent or temporary, of the national government, the provincial government, the government of a chartered city, of a municipality, of a municipal district or of government-owned or controlled corporations other than those mentioned in Section two hundred sixty-eight, two hundred seventyone and two hundred seventy-four hereof, fifteen days vacation leave of absence with full pay, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, for each calendar year of service. Sec. 285-A. In addition to the vacation leave provided in the two preceding sections each employee or laborer, whether permanent or temporary, of the national government, the provincial government, the government of a chartered city, of a municipality or municipal district in any regularly and specially organized province, other than those mentioned in Section two hundred sixty-eight, two hundred seventy-one and two hundred seventy-four hereof, shall be entitled to fifteen days of sick leave for each year of service with full pay, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and holidays: Provided, That such sick leave will be granted by the President, Head of Department or independent office concerned, or the chief of office in case of municipal employees, only on account of sickness on the part of the employee or laborer concerned or of any member of his immediate family. The Civil Service Commission in its here questioned Resolution No. 90-797 construed R.A. 2625 as referring only to government employees who have earned leave credits against which their absences may be charged with pay, as its letters speak only of leaves of absence with full pay. The respondent Commission ruled that a reading of R.A. 2625 does not show that a government employee who is on leave of absence without pay on a day before or immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday is entitled to payment of his salary for said days. Administrative construction, if we may repeat, is not necessarily binding upon the courts. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, or abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment. 10 We find this petition to be impressed with merit. As held in Hidalgo vs. Hidalgo: 11 . . . . where the true intent of the law is clear that calls for the application of the cardinal rule of statutory construction that such intent or spirit must prevail over the letter thereof, for whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, since adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute. The intention of the legislature in the enactment of R.A. 2625 may be gleaned from, among others, the sponsorship speech of Senator Arturo M. Tolentino during the second reading of House Bill No. 41 (which became R.A. 2625). He said: The law actually provides for sick leave and vacation leave of 15 days each year of service to be with full pay. But under the present law, in computing these periods of leaves, Saturday, Sunday and holidays are included in the computation so that if an employee should become sick and absent himself on a Friday and then he reports for work on a Tuesday, in the computation of the leave the Saturday and Sunday will be included, so that he will be considered as having had a leave of Friday, Saturday, Sunday and Monday, or four days. The purpose of the present bill is to exclude from the computation of the leave those days, Saturdays and Sundays, as well as holidays, because actually the employee is entitled not to go to office during those days. And it is unfair and unjust to him that those days should be counted in the computation of leaves. 12 With this in mind, the construction by the respondent Commission of R.A. 2625 is not in accordance with the legislative intent. R.A. 2625 specifically provides that government employees are entitled to fifteen (15) days vacation leave of absence with full pay and fifteen (15) days sick leave with full pay, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays in both cases. Thus, the law speaks of the granting of a right and the law does not provide for a distinction between those who have accumulated leave credits and those who have exhausted their leave credits in order to enjoy such right. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. The fact remains that government employees, whether or not they have accumulated leave credits, are not required by law to work on Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays and thus they can not be declared absent on such non-working days. They cannot be or are not considered absent on non-working days; they cannot and should not be deprived of their salary corresponding to said non-working days just because they were absent without pay on the day immediately prior to, or after said non-working days. A different rule would constitute a deprivation of property without due process.

Furthermore, before their amendment by R.A. 2625, Sections 284 and 285-A of the Revised Administrative Code applied to all government employee without any distinction. It follows that the effect of the amendment similarly applies to all employees enumerated in Sections 284 and 285-A, whether or not they have accumulated leave credits. As the questioned CSC policy is here declared invalid, we are next confronted with the question of what effect such invalidity will have. Will all government employees on a monthly salary basis, deprived of their salaries corresponding to Saturdays, Sundays or legal holidays (as herein petitioner was so deprived) since 12 February 1965, be entitled to recover the amounts corresponding to such non-working days? The general rule vis-a-vis legislation is that an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation as inoperative as though it had never been passed. 13 But, as held in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter State Bank: 14 . . . . It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such determination is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate; and particular conduct, private and official. To allow all the affected government employees, similarly situated as petitioner herein, to claim their deducted salaries resulting from the past enforcement of the herein invalidated CSC policy, would cause quite a heavy financial burden on the national and local governments considering the length of time that such policy has been effective. Also, administrative and practical considerations must be taken into account if this ruling will have a strict restrospective application. The Court, in this connection, calls upon the respondent Commission and the Congress of the Philippines, if necessary, to handle this problem with justice and equity to all affected government employees. It must be pointed out, however, that after CSC Memorandum Circular No. 16 Series of 1991 amending the herein invalidated policy was promulgated on 26 April 1991, deductions from salaries made after said date in contravention of the new CSC policy must be restored to the government employees concerned. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, CSC Resolutions No. 90-497 and 90-797 are declared NULL and VOID. The respondent Commission is directed to take the appropriate action so that petitioner shall be paid the amounts previously but unlawfully deducted from his monthly salary as above indicated. No costs. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur. Footnotes 1 Rollo, p. 32. 2 Rollo, p. 37. 3 Rollo, pp. 36-37. 4 Rollo, pp. 46-47. 5 P.D. No. 807, issued on 6 October 1975, in Article V, Section 9, specifically provides for the following powers and functions of the Civil Service Commission: Sec. 9 (b) Prescribe, amend and enforce suitable rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of this Decree. These rules and regulations shall become effective thirty days after publication in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation; (c) Promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for the Civil Service and adopt plans and programs to promote economical, efficient and effective personnel administration in the government; and prescribe all forms for publications, examinations, appointments, reports, records and such other forms as may be required under this Decree. 6 Published by the Personnel Officers Association of the Philippines, Inc. (POAP) and the Law Center of the University of the Philippines System, Revised Edition, 1978. 7 February 21, 1978. 8 Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555 (1962). 9 Taada vs. Tuvera, No. L-63915, December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 446.

10 Sagun vs. PHHC, G.R. No. L-44738, June 22, 1988, 162 SCRA 411. 11 G.R. No. L-25326, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 105. 12 Senate Journal No. 67, Vol. III, May 4, 1960, H. No. 41. 13 Municipality of Malabang, etc., et al. vs. Benito, et al., G.R. No. L-28113, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 533 citing Norton vs. Shelby Count, 118 U.S. 425 (1886). 14 308 U.S. 371 (1940) cited in Mun. of Malabang vs. Benito, supra.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-15138 July 31, 1961 BILL MILLER, petitioner-appellee, vs. ATANACIO A. MARDO, and MANUEL GONZALES, respondents-appellants. x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. L-15377 July 31, 1961 NUMERIANA RAGANAS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. SEN BEE TRADING COMPANY, MACARIO TAN, and SERGIO TAN, defendants-appellees. x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. L-16660 July 31, 1961 VICENTE ROMERO, petitioner-appellee, vs. ANGEL HERNANDO ETC., and SIA SENG, respondents-appellants. x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. L-16781 July 31, 1961 CHIN HUA TRADING COMPANY, and LAO KANG SUY, petitioners-appellees, vs. ATANACIO A. MARDO, JORGE BENEDICTO, and CRESENCIO ESTAO, respondents-appellants. x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. L-17056 July 31, 1961 FRED WILSON & CO., INC., petitioner-appellant, vs. MELITON C. PARDUCHO, ETC., and MARIANO PABILIARE, respondents-appellees. R. L. Resurreccion for petitioner-appellee. Paciano C. C. Villavieja for respondents-appellants. BARRERA, J.: These appeals, although originating from different Courts of First Instance, are here treated together in this single decision because they present but one identical question of law, namely, the validity of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, prepared and submitted by the Government Survey and Reorganization

Commission under the authority of Republic Act No. 997, as amended by Republic Act No. 1241, insofar as it confers jurisdiction to the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor created in said Plan to decide claims of laborers for wages, overtime and separation pay, etc. In G.R. No. L-15138, Manuel Gonzales filed with Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor, in Manila, a complaint (IS-1148) against Bill Miller (owner and manager of Miller Motors) claiming to be a driver of Miller from December 1, 1956 to October 31, 1957, on which latter date he was allegedly arbitrarily dismissed, without being paid separation pay. He prayed for judgement for the amount due him as separation pay plus damages. Upon receipt of said complaint, Chief Hearing Officer Atanacio Mardo of Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor required Miller to file an answer. Whereupon, Miller filed with the Court of First Instance of Baguio a petition (Civil Case No. 759) praying for judgment prohibiting the Hearing Officer from proceeding with the case, for the reason that said Hearing Officer had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the subject matter of the complaint. The court then required the Hearing Officer and Gonzales to answer and, as prayed for, issued a writ of preliminary injunction. The latter file their separate motions to dismiss the petition, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it being argued that pursuant to Republic Acts Nos. 997 and 1241, as implemented by Executive Order No. 218, series of 1956 and Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, regional offices of the Department of labor have exclusive and original jurisdiction over all cases affecting money claims arising from violations of labor standards or working conditions. Said motions to dismiss were denied by the court. Answers were then filed and the case was heard. Thereafter, the court rendered a decision holding that Republic Acts Nos. 997 and 1241, as well as Executive Order No. 218, series of 1956 and Reorganization Plan No. 20A issued pursuant thereto, did not repeal the provision of the Judiciary Act conferring on courts of first instance original jurisdiction to take cognizance of money claims arising from violations of labor standards. The question of venue was also dismissed for being moot, the same having been already raised and decided in a petition for certiorari and prohibition previously filed with this Court in G.R. No. L-14007 (Mardo, etc. v. De Veyra, etc.) which was dismissed for lack of merit in our resolution of July 7, 1958. From the decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio, respondents Hearing Officer and Gonzales interposed the present appeal now before us. In G.R. No. L-16781, Cresencio Estano filed with Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor, a complaint (RO 3 Ls. Case No. 874) against Chin Hua Trading Co. and/or Lao Kang Suy and Ke Bon Chiong, as Manager and Assistant Manager thereof, respectively, claiming to have been their driver from June 17, 1947 to June 4, 1955, for which service he was not paid overtime pay (for work in excess of 8 hours and for Sundays and legal holidays) and vacation leave pay. He prayed for judgment for the amount due him, plus attorney's fees. Chin Hua Trading, et al., filed their answer and, issues having been joined, hearing thereof was started before Chief Hearing Officer Atanacio Mardo and Hearing Officer Jorge Benedicto. Before trial of the case could be terminated, however, Chin Hua Trading, et al., filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction (Civil Case No. 26826)), to restrain the hearing officers from proceeding with the disposition of the case, on the ground that they have no jurisdiction to entertain the same, as Reorganization Plan No. 20-A and Executive Order No. 218, series of 1956, in relation to Republic Act No. 997, as amended by Republic Act No. 1241, empowering them to adjudicate the complaint, is invalid or unconstitutional. As prayed for, a preliminary injunction was issued by the court. After due hearing the court rendered a decision holding that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A is null and void and therefore, granted the writ of prohibition making permanent the preliminary injunction previously issued. From this decision, the claimant and the hearing officers appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to us, as it involves only questions of law. In G.R. No. L-15377, appellant Numeriana Raganas filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a complaint (Civil Case No. R-5535) against appellees Sen Bee Trading Company, Macario Tan and Sergio Tan, claiming that she was employed by appellees as a seamstress from June 5, 1952 to January 11, 1958, for which service she was underpaid and was not given overtime, as well as vacation and sick leave pay. She prayed for judgment on the amount due her for the same plus damages. To said complaint, appellees filed a motion to dismiss, on the ground that the trial court has no jurisdiction to hear the case as it involves a money claim and should, under Reorganization Plan No. 20-A be filed with the Regional Office of the Department of Labor; and there is pending before the regional office of the Department of Labor, a claim for separation vacation, sick and maternity leave pay filed by the same plaintiff (appellant) against the same defendants-appellees). Acting on said motion, the court dismissed the case, relying on the provision of Section 25, Article VI of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A and on our resolution in the case of NASSCO v. Arca, et al. (G.R. No. L-12249, May 6, 1957). From this order, appellant Raganas appealed to the Court of Appeals, but said court certified the case to us. In G.R. No. L-16660, Vicente B. Romero filed with Regional Officer No. 2 of the Department of Labor a complaint (Wage Case No. 196-W) against Sia Seng, for recovery of alleged unpaid wages, overtime and separation pay. Sia Seng, filed an answer. At the date set for hearing the latter did not appear despite due notice to him and counsel. Upon his petition, Romero was allowed to present his evidence. Thereafter, a decision was rendered by the Hearing Officer in favor of Romero. Upon the latter's motion for execution, the records of the case were referred to Regional Labor Administrator Angel Hernando for issuance of said writ of execution, being the officer charged with the duty of issuing the same. Hernando, believing that Sia Seng should be given a chance to present his evidence, refused to issue the writ of execution and ordered a re-hearing. As a consequence, Romero filed with the Court of First Instance of Isabela a petition for mandamus (Case No. Br. II-35) praying that an order be issued commanding respondent Regional Labor Administrator to immediately issue a writ of execution of the decision in Wage Case No. 196-W. To this petition, respondent Regional Labor Administrator filed a motion to dismiss, on the ground that it states no cause of action, but action thereon was deferred until the case is decided on the merits. Sia Seng filed his answer questioning the validity of the rules and regulations issued under the authority of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A. After hearing, the court rendered a decision ordering, inter alia, respondent Regional Labor Administrator to forthwith issue the corresponding writ of execution, as enjoined by Section 48, of the Rules and Regulations No. 1 of the Labor Standards Commission. From this decision of the Court of First Instance, Sia Seng and Regional Labor Administrator Hernando appealed to us. Appellant Sia Seng urges in his appeal that the trial court erred in not dismissing the petition, in spite of the fact that the decision sought to be enforced by appellee Romero was rendered by a hearing officer who had no authority to render the same, and in failing to hold that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A was not validly passed as a statute and is unconstitutional. In G.R. No. L-17056, Mariano Pabillare instituted in Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor a complaint (IS-2168) against petitioner Fred Wilson & Co., Inc., alleging that petitioner engaged his services as Chief Mechanic, Air conditioning Department, from October 1947 to February 19, 1959, when he was summarily dismissed without cause and without sufficient notice and separation pay. He also claimed that during his employment he was not paid for overtime rendered by him. He prayed for judgment for the amount due him for such overtime and separation pay. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint, on the ground that said regional office "being purely an administrative body, has no power, authority, nor jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim sought to be recovered in the action." Said motion to dismiss having been denied by respondent Hearing Officer Meliton Parducho, petitioner Fred Wilson & Co., Inc. filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction (Civil Case No. 41954) to restrain respondent hearing officer from proceeding with the case, and praying, among others, that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, insofar as it vests original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims (to the exclusion of regular courts of justice) on the Labor Standards Commission or the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor, be declared null and void and unconstitutional. As prayed for, the court granted a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents Hearing Officer and Pabillare filed answer and the case was heard. After hearing, the court rendered a decision declaring that "by the force of Section 6 of R.A. No. 997, as amended by R.A. 1241, Plan No. 20-A was deemed approved by Congress when it adjourned its session in 1956' (Res. of May 6, 1957 in National Shipyards Steel Corporation v. Vicente Area, G.R. No. L-12249). It follows that the questioned reorganization Plan No. 20-A is valid.".

Petitioner Fred Wilson & Co., Inc. appealed directly to us from this decision. The specific legal provision invoked for the authority of the regional offices to take cognizance of the subject matter involved in these cases is paragraph 25 of Article VI of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, which is hereunder quoted: 25 Each regional office shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases falling under the Workmen's Compensation law, and cases affecting all money claims arising from violations of labor standards on working conditions including but not restrictive to: unpaid wages, underpayment, overtime, separation pay and maternity leave of employees and laborers; and unpaid wages, overtime, separation pay, vacation pay and payment for medical services of domestic help. Under this provision, the regional offices have been given original and exclusive jurisdiction over: (a) all cases falling under the Workmen's Compensation law; (b) all cases affecting money claims arising from violations of labor standards on working conditions, unpaid wages, underpayment, overtime, separation pay and maternity leave of employees and laborers; and . (c) all cases for unpaid wages, overtime, separation pay, vacation pay and payment for medical services of domestic help. Before the effectivity of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, however, the Department of Labor, except the Workmen's Compensation Commission with respect to claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation law, had no compulsory power to settle cases under (b) and (c) above, the only authority it had being to mediate merely or arbitrate when the parties so agree in writing, In case of refusal by a party to submit to such settlement, the remedy is to file a complaint in the proper court.1 It is evident, therefore, that the jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases affecting money claims such as those sought to be enforced in these proceedings, is a new conferment of power to the Department of Labor not theretofore exercised by it. The question thus presented by these cases is whether this is valid under our Constitution and applicable statutes. It is true that in Republic Act No. 1241, amending Section 4 of Republic Act 997, which created the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission, the latter was empowered (2) To abolish departments, offices, agencies, or functions which may not be necessary, or create those which way be necessary for the efficient conduct of the government service, activities, and functions. (Emphasis supplied.) But these "functions" which could thus be created, obviously refer merely to administrative, not judicial functions. For the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission was created to carry out the reorganization of the Executive Branch of the National Government (See Section 3 of R.A. No. 997, as amended by R.A. No. 1241), which plainly did not include the creation of courts. And the Constitution expressly provides that "the Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law.(Sec. 1, Art. VII of the Constitution). Thus, judicial power rests exclusively in the judiciary. It may be conceded that the legislature may confer on administrative boards or bodies quasi-judicial powers involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, as incident to the performance of administrative functions. 2 But in so doing, the legislature must state its intention in express terms that would leave no doubt, as even such quasi-judicial prerogatives must be limited, if they are to be valid, only to those incidental to or in connection with the performance of jurisdiction over a matter exclusively vested in the courts. 3 If a statute itself actually passed by the Congress must be clear in its terms when clothing administrative bodies with quasi-judicial functions, then certainly such conferment can not be implied from a mere grant of power to a body such as the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission to create "functions" in connection with the reorganization of the Executive Branch of the Government. And so we held in Corominas et al. v. Labor Standards Commission, et al. (G.R. No. L-14837 and companion cases, June 30, 1961); . . . it was not the intention of Congress, in enacting Republic Act No. 997, to authorize the transfer of powers and jurisdiction granted to the courts of justice, from these to the officials to be appointed or offices to be created by the Reorganization Plan. Congress is well aware of the provisions of the Constitution that judicial powers are vested 'only in the Supreme Court and in such courts as the law may establish'. The Commission was not authorized to create courts of justice, or to take away from these their jurisdiction and transfer said jurisdiction to the officials appointed or offices created under the Reorganization Plan. The Legislature could not have intended to grant such powers to the Reorganization Commission, an executive body, as the Legislature may not and cannot delegate its power to legislate or create courts of justice any other agency of the Government. (Chinese Flour Importers Assoc. vs. Price Stabilization Board, G.R. No. L-4465, July 12, 1951; Surigao Consolidated vs. Collector of Internal Revenue G.R. No. L-5692, March 5, 1954; U.S. vs. Shreveport, 287 U.S. 77, 77 L. ed 175, and Johnson vs. San Diego, 42 P. 249, cited in 11 Am. Jur 921-922.) (Emphasis supplied.) But it is urged, in one of the cases, that the defect in the conferment of judicial or quasi-judicial functions to the Regional offices, emanating from the lack of authority of the Reorganization Commission has been cured by the non-disapproval of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A by Congress under the provisions of Section 6(a) of Republic Act No. 997, as amended. It is, in effect, argued that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A is not merely the creation of the Reorganization Commission, exercising its delegated powers, but is in fact an act of Congress itself, a regular statute directly and duly passed by Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers in the mode provided in the enabling act. The pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 997, as amended, invoked in favor of this argument reads as follows:

SEC. 6 (a) The provisions of the reorganization plan or plans submitted by the President during the Second Session of the Third Congress shall be deemed approved after the adjournment of the said session, and those of the plan or plans or modifications of any plan or plans to be submitted after the adjournment of the Second Session, shall be deemed approved after the expiration of the seventy session days of the Congress following the date on which the plan is transmitted to it, unless between the date of transmittal and the expiration of such period, either House by simple resolution disapproves the reorganization plan or any, modification thereof. The said plan of reorganization or any modification thereof may, likewise, be approved by Congress in a concurrent Resolution within such period. It is an established fact that the Reorganization Commission submitted Reorganization Plan No. 20-A to the President who, in turn, transmitted the same to Congress on February 14, 1956. Congress adjourned its sessions without passing a resolution disapproving or adopting the said reorganization plan. It is now contended that, independent of the matter of delegation of legislative authority (discussed earlier in this opinion), said plan, nevertheless became a law by non-action on the part of Congress, pursuant to the above-quoted provision. Such a procedure of enactment of law by legislative in action is not countenanced in this jurisdiction. By specific provision of the Constitution No bill shall be passed or become a law unless it shall have been printed and copies thereof in its final form furnished the Members at least three calendar clays prior to its passage by the National Assembly (Congress), except when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the question upon its final passage shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered on the Journal. (Sec. 21-[a], Art. VI). Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it, but if not, he shall return it with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large on its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members voting for and against shall be entered on its journal. If any bill shall not be returned by the President as herein provided within twenty days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall become a law in like manner as if he has signed it, unless the Congress by adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall become a law unless vetoed by the President within thirty days after adjournment. (Sec. 20[1]. Art. VI of the Constitution). A comparison between the procedure of enactment provided in section 6 (a) of the Reorganization Act and that prescribed by the Constitution will show that the former is in distinct contrast to the latter. Under the first, consent or approval is to be manifested by silence or adjournment or by "concurrent resolution." In either case, the contemplated procedure violates the constitutional provisions requiring positive and separate action by each House of Congress. It is contrary to the "settled and well-understood parliamentary law (which requires that the) two houses are to hold separate sessions for their deliberations, and the determination of the one upon a proposed law is to be submitted to the separate determination of the other," (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., p. 187). Furthermore, Section 6 (a) of the Act would dispense with the "passage" of any measure, as that word is commonly used and understood, and with the requirement presentation to the President. In a sense, the section, if given the effect suggested in counsel's argument, would be a reversal of the democratic processes required by the Constitution, for under it, the President would propose the legislative action by action taken by Congress. Such a procedure would constitute a very dangerous precedent opening the way, if Congress is so disposed, because of weakness or indifference, to eventual abdication of its legislative prerogatives to the Executive who, under our Constitution, is already one of the strongest among constitutional heads of state. To sanction such a procedure will be to strike at the very root of the tri-departmental scheme four democracy. Even in the United States (in whose Federal Constitution there is no counterpart to the specific method of passaging laws prescribed in Section 21[2] of our Constitution) and in England (under whose parliamentary system the Prime Minister, real head of the Government, is a member of Parliament), the procedure outlined in Section 6(a) herein before quoted, is but a technique adopted in the delegation of the rule-making power, to preserve the control of the legislature and its share in the responsibility for the adoption of proposed regulations. 4 The procedure has ever been intended or utilized or interpreted as another mode of passing or enacting any law or measure by the legislature, as seems to be the impression expressed in one these cases. On the basis of the foregoing considerations, we hold ad declare that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, insofar as confers judicial power to the Regional Offices over cases other than these falling under the Workmen's Compensation on Law, is invalid and of no effect. This ruling does not affect the resolution of this Court in the case of National Steel & Shipyards Corporation v. Arca et al., G.R. No. L-12249, dated May 6, 1957, considering that the said case refers to a claim before the Workmen's Compensation Commission, which exercised quasi-judicial powers even before the reorganization of the Department of Labor. WHEREFORE (a) The decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio involved in case G.R. No. L-15138 is hereby affirmed, without costs; (b) The decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila questioned in case G.R. No. L-16781 is hereby affirmed, without costs; (c) The order of dismissal issued by the Court of First Instance of Cebu appealed from in case G.R. No. L-15377 is set aside and the case remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, without costs; (d) In case G.R. No. L-16660, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, directing the Regional Labor Administrator to issue a writ of execution of the order of the Regional Office No. 2, is hereby reversed, without costs; and .

(e) In case G.R. No. L-17056, the decision rendered after hearing by the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing the complaint for annulment of the proceedings before the Regional office No. 3, is hereby reversed and the preliminary injunction at first issued by the trial court is revived and made permanents without costs. SO ORDERED. Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, De Leon and Natividad, JJ., concur. Bautista Angelo, J., on leave, took no part. Concepcion and Paredes JJ., took no part.

Footnotes
1

Potente v. Saulog, G.R. No. L-12300, April 24, 1959; Figueroa v. Saulog, G.R. No. L-12745, June 29, 1959; Santos v Caparas, G.R. No. L-11777, June 29, 1959; La Union Labor Union v. Philippine Tobacco Flue-Curing and Redrying Corporation, G.R. No. L14087, June 30, 1960.
2

16 CJS 866. Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 218 P. 563, 161 CA. 770. Landis, The Administrative Process (1938) p. 76, et seq. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990 HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner, vs. HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ, respondents. Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner. SARMIENTO, J.: This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment. The facts are as follows: xxx xxx xxx 1. On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza, Pasay City, in a sworn statement filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA for brevity) charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar, viz: 04. T: Ano ba ang dahilan at ikaw ngayon ay narito at nagbibigay ng salaysay. S: Upang ireklamo sa dahilan ang aking PECC Card ay ayaw ibigay sa akin ng dati kong manager. Horty Salazar 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Mla. 05. T: Kailan at saan naganap and ginawang panloloko sa iyo ng tao/mga taong inireklamo mo? S. Sa bahay ni Horty Salazar. 06. T: Paano naman naganap ang pangyayari? S. Pagkagaling ko sa Japan ipinatawag niya ako. Kinuha ang PECC Card ko at sinabing hahanapan ako ng booking sa Japan. Mag 9 month's na ako sa Phils. ay

hindi pa niya ako napa-alis. So lumipat ako ng ibang company pero ayaw niyang ibigay and PECC Card ko. 2. On November 3, 1987, public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to whom said complaint was assigned, sent to the petitioner the following telegram: YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPEAR BEFORE FERDIE MARQUEZ POEA ANTI ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT UNIT 6TH FLR. POEA BLDG. EDSA COR. ORTIGAS AVE. MANDALUYONG MM ON NOVEMBER 6, 1987 AT 10 AM RE CASE FILED AGAINST YOU. FAIL NOT UNDER PENALTY OF LAW. 4. On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205 which reads: HORTY SALAZAR No. 615 R.O. Santos St. Mandaluyong, Metro Manila Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have (1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code. This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws. Done in the City of Manila, this 3th day of November, 1987. 5. On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty. Estelita B. Espiritu issued an office order designating respondents Atty. Marquez, Atty. Jovencio Abara and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members of a team tasked to implement Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205. Doing so, the group assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen Lito Castillo of the People's Journal and Ernie Baluyot of News Today proceeded to the residence of the petitioner at 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.). However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar. 6. On January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with POEA the following letter: Gentlemen: On behalf of Ms. Horty Salazar of 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, we respectfully request that the personal properties seized at her residence last January 26, 1988 be immediately returned on the ground that said seizure was contrary to law and against the will of the owner thereof. Among our reasons are the following: 1. Our client has not been given any prior notice or hearing, hence the Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 dated November 3, 1987 violates "due process of law" guaranteed under Sec. 1, Art. III, of the Philippine Constitution. 2. Your acts also violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine Constitution which guarantees right of the people "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose." 3. The premises invaded by your Mr. Ferdi Marquez and five (5) others (including 2 policemen) are the private residence of the Salazar family, and the entry, search as well as the seizure of the personal properties belonging to our client were without her consent and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation, together with grave abuse of the color of authority, and constitute robbery and violation of domicile under Arts. 293 and 128 of the Revised Penal Code. Unless said personal properties worth around TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) in all (and which were already due for shipment to Japan) are returned within twenty-four (24) hours from your receipt hereof, we shall feel free to take all legal action, civil and criminal, to protect our client's interests.

We trust that you will give due attention to these important matters. 7. On February 2, 1988, before POEA could answer the letter, petitioner filed the instant petition; on even date, POEA filed a criminal complaint against her with the Pasig Provincial Fiscal, docketed as IS-88-836. 1 On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts sought to be barred are already fait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we consider the petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved. The Court finds that a lone issue confronts it: May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code? It is also an issue squarely raised by the petitioner for the Court's resolution. Under the new Constitution, which states: . . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 2 it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. 3 In one case, it was declared that mayors may not exercise this power: xxx xxx xxx But it must be emphasized here and now that what has just been described is the state of the law as it was in September, 1985. The law has since been altered. No longer does the mayor have at this time the power to conduct preliminary investigations, much less issue orders of arrest. Section 143 of the Local Government Code, conferring this power on the mayor has been abrogated, rendered functus officio by the 1987 Constitution which took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification by the Filipino people. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertinently provides that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized." The constitutional proscription has thereby been manifested that thenceforth, the function of determining probable cause and issuing, on the basis thereof, warrants of arrest or search warrants, may be validly exercised only by judges, this being evidenced by the elimination in the present Constitution of the phrase, "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" found in the counterpart provision of said 1973 Constitution, who, aside from judges, might conduct preliminary investigations and issue warrants of arrest or search warrants. 4 Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body: We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached "judge" to determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his case. Although his office "is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused," he stands, invariably, as the accused's adversary and his accuser. To permit him to issue search warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and jury in his own right, when he is neither. That makes, to our mind and to that extent, Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, unconstitutional. 5 Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an amendment by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the late President Ferdinand Marcos, to Presidential Decree No. 1693, in the exercise of his legislative powers under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. Under the latter, the then Minister of Labor merely exercised recommendatory powers: (c) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative shall have the power to recommend the arrest and detention of any person engaged in illegal recruitment. 6 On May 1, 1984, Mr. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 1920, with the avowed purpose of giving more teeth to the campaign against illegal recruitment. The Decree gave the Minister of Labor arrest and closure powers: (b) The Minister of Labor and Employment shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or nonholder of authority if after proper investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall order the closure of companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been licensed or authorized to do so. 7 On January 26, 1986, he, Mr. Marcos, promulgated Presidential Decree No. 2018, giving the Labor Minister search and seizure powers as well: (c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall order the search of the office or premises and seizure of documents, paraphernalia, properties and other implements used in illegal recruitment activities and the closure of companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been licensed or authorized to do so. 8 The above has now been etched as Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code.

The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its twilight moments. We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect. The Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Morano v. Vivo 9 is not well-taken. Vivo involved a deportation case, governed by Section 69 of the defunct Revised Administrative Code and by Section 37 of the Immigration Law. We have ruled that in deportation cases, an arrest (of an undesirable alien) ordered by the President or his duly authorized representatives, in order to carry out a final decision of deportation is valid. 10 It is valid, however, because of the recognized supremacy of the Executive in matters involving foreign affairs. We have held: 11 xxx xxx xxx The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That power may be exercised by the Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation." Justice Johnson's opinion is that when the Chief Executive finds that there are aliens whose continued presence in the country is injurious to the public interest, "he may, even in the absence of express law, deport them". (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil. 534, 568, 569; In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41). The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is detrimental to public welfare is absolute and unqualified (Tiu Chun Hai and Go Tam vs. Commissioner of Immigration and the Director of NBI, 104 Phil. 949, 956). 12 The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) can not be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts. Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant: Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have (1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code. This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws. 13 We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and void, thus: xxx xxx xxx Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise: 1) All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables, communications/ recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents/communications, letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper. 2) Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to promote the objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and 3) Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly, 1) Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892; 2) DATSUN, pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969; 3) A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542; 4) TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and

5) TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 472 with marking "Bagong Silang." In Stanford v. State of Texas, the search warrant which authorized the search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Parties of Texas, and the operations of the Community Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connection with the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes (the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy)" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question cannot be characterized differently. In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme court calls to mind a notable chapter in English history; the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan." Reference herein to such historical episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state security. 14 For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles: 1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search: 2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205. No costs. SO ORDERED. Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur. Footnotes 1 Rollo, 19-24; emphases in the original. 2 CONST., art. III, sec. 2. 3 See Ponsica v. Ignalaga, No. 72301, July 31, 1987, 152 SCRA 647; Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83578, March 16, 1989. 4 Ponsica, supra, 662-663. 5 Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force, supra, 21. 6 Pres. Decree No. 1693, "FURTHER AMENDING ARTICLE 38 OF THE LABOR CODE BY MAKING ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT A CRIME OF ECONOMIC SABOTAGE." 7 Supra, sec. 1. 8 Pres. Decree No. 2018, "FURTHER AMENDING ARTICLES 38 AND 39 OF THE LABOR CODE BY MAKING ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT A CRIME OF ECONOMIC SABOTAGE AND PUNISHABLE WITH IMPRISONMENT." 9 No. L-22196, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 562. 10 Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board, No. L-10280, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 27; Vivo v. Montesa, No. L-24576, 24 SCRA 155. 11 Go Tek v. Deportation Board, No. L-23846, September 9, 1977, 79 SCRA 17. 12 Supra, 21-22.13 Rollo, id., 15. 14 Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP No. 64261, December 26, 1984, 133 SCRA 800, 814-816.

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