Francis Gillerlain Russian Comprehensives There Is No Alternative?

: Russian Electoral Opposition in the 2012 Elections British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was well known for insisting that there was no alternativei to free-market capitalism, and that it was the only viable economic model.ii Echoes of this certainty are found today in Russias political system. Before the 2011 State Duma election, and before the re-election of Vladimir Putin to a third term as president of the Russian Federation,iii many claimed that there was no alternative to Putin and his party of United Russia. The New York Times Tyler Miksanek claimed late in 2011 that with no established opposition, Putin is the only possible outcome for the future of Russia.iv Putins campaign manager Vladimir Litvinenko is on the record stating that Purin is the only choice.v Even one of Putins 2012 presidential challengers, Mikhail Prokorov, was quoted in his blog saying Putin is so far the only figure who can manage this inefficient state machine.vi What of these claims? United Russia did maintain tenuous control of the State Duma in 2011,vii and Putin did win the 2012 Presidential Elections, albeit with widespread accusationsviii of voter fraudix in both cases. To a certain extent, this backs up the assertions of Putins inevitability when viewed in a certain light, but something is different about this round of elections. The claim that there is no opposition is beginning to change. Though they did not change the outcome, the turnouts of these elections have spawned humongous, spontaneous protests against Putin and his regime,x lasting from before the State Duma elections until today, in the aftermath of the Presidential Elections.xi New parties, opposition coalitions, and movements are forming, both within the electoral system and outside of it, uniting under the common goal of getting rid of Putin and United Russia.

Thesis To what degree, then, is the conception that there is no alternative to Putin actually true? What do the opposition parties themselves say, what are their programs for Russia, and how much do these parties represent a realistic and reasonable established opposition that has an actual chance of both meeting their shared goal and truly governing Russia? A. United Russia (ER) In order to understand the programs and goals of the opposition, one must first understand who and what they are up against. Founded in 2001, the contemporary United Russia party was a merger of Boris Yeltsins Unity Party and the Fatherland All Russia Bloc. These individual pieces, constituting the new Party, backed former PM Vladimir Putin for the presidency in the 2000 election, and formed the party shortly thereafter. With Putins continuing leadership, the Party has maintained dominance within Russias political system since that time. Putins ascension marked an end to the fierce competition raging in the 1990s, between parties that stood behind the newly founded capitalist systems, and opposition parties who wished for a return to the socialism of the Soviet Union. This argument was dropped in favor of addressing the immediate concerns of national stability. Putin both promised and supplied that stability,xii combatting the chaos of economic shock therapy with new economic programs, crushing some of the burgeoning corrupt oligarchy under the heel of the state, and returning some of that corporate power back to the state apparatus. The contemporary program of United Russia reflects that continuing focus on prosperity and stability at any cost. The modern Party promises a new modernization of economy, education, business climate, industry, infrastructure, innovation, productivity and safety regulations, new social welfare programs, combatting of continuing business and bureaucratic corruption, a re-

tooling of the judicial system, fighting both against illegal immigration and xenophobia, development of a new, inclusive political system, strengthening internal and external security, and a foreign policy focused specifically on the welfare of the people of Russia, as well as the creation of a new Eurasian political and economic Union.xiii In a sentence, everything, for everyone, at all times, centered around a gigantic modernization effort pushed forward by Putin and fueled by Russias immense hydrocarbon export profits. The strength of E.R. and Putins program comes primarily from its universality. E.R., as a centrist party, has largely subsumed the policies and planks of the opposition and diluted them into a palatable format for the average Russian voter. Combine that with a strong grasp on the media, and this allegedly wide-spread voter fraud, and one begins to get a handle on the iron grip Putin and United Russia have been able to maintain for so long. This control is seemingly beginning to slip, with United Russias loss of 77 seats in the latest round of elections, falling from 64.3% of the Duma vote in 2007 to 49.4% in 2011s elections.xiv Putins popularity has also dropped, earning only 63.60% of the popular vote,xv as opposed to the high 70% garnered both by Medvedev in 2008 and Putin himself in 2004.xvi Despite electoral setbacks, United Russia does still maintain a membership numbering around two million, according to their own statistics, remaining the largest party membership in the Russian Federation.xvii This suggests that, despite this widespread political ubiquity and dominance, Putin and United Russias popularity may be beginning to wane. B. The Opposition Russian opposition to Putin and United Russia is composed of two blocs: the officially registered political parties which compete in elections and thus operate within the system, and

those that have either been barred from registering, were banned outright, reject the political process wholesale, therefore operating entirely outside the system. i. System Opposition There are only six registered political parties in Russia aside from United Russia that compete in elections, four of which ran alternate presidential candidates, and three of which actually passed the 7% threshold to receive Duma representation. Within this small band, there is arguably one that represents a legitimate alternative political program, that has made any considerable progress in creating political momentum against E.R. a. Parties with Representation in State Duma 1. Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) The top system opposition party is the successor party to the banned Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which hold the sorts of views one would expect them to. In their party program, the Communist Party openly calls for the full and uncompromising restoration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The KPRF believes that nothing less than a total return to socialism, what they deem as an establishment of democratic workers power with maximum, and increasing worker participation in government, can solve what they see as capitalism inevitably giving rise to exploitation of man by man, leading to societal discord, or the deep split in Russias society. They expand this further, claiming that there will be a planet-wide catastrophe if capitalism remains the dominant system. They strongly reject Gorbachevian reform attempts, or a socialist democracy with a friendly face, and strongly defend the contributions of J.V. Stalin to Soviet socialism.xviii Party leaders have therefore called for a reStalinization of Russia.xix In a move in this direction, the KPRF takes a tough stance on

immigration, calling for entry quotas, supremacy of the Russian language, and return to Soviet era ethnic cataloguing in official documentation.xx Perhaps surprisingly to Americans, and yet maybe also unsurprising for some Russians, the KPRF has been steadily gaining in popularity. The KPRF gained 19% of the 2011 Duma vote,xxi up from 11% in the last elections,xxii and Presidential Candidate Zyuganov gained 17% of the 2012 vote,xxiii holding conspicuously steady from the previous cycles results.xxiv The Communist Party also reportedly had a membership of some 180,000 spread in some 80 regions as of 2007, though the number is likely higher today, corresponding with better success at the polls.xxv This membership number also does not account for support from allied non-KPRF socialist groups within Russia. These results suggest that the old question of capitalism vs. socialism the one moved away from with the end of the Cold War and the rise of United Russia may be coming back. Reuters recently suggested that the rise of the KPRF is accounted for mainly by KPRF votes against it all, or support from liberal fellow travelers whose vote was merely a count against United Russia and not for the KPRF.xxvi The rise of Melechon and the Front de Gauche in France,xxvii as well as the KKE in Greece,xxviii suggests that it may also be more complicated than that, and that the KPRF may also be attracting a real base due to economic instability, creating a loss of what little faith in the market existed in Russia. Nonetheless, the KPRF is both continually criticized from those farther Left for being a comprador or Kremlin-backed party, while simultaneously receiving criticism from the right for the simple fact of being self-described Communists. Despite such criticism, the Communist Party still receives wide-spanning support, and the electoral results also suggest that the KPRF is seen as the most credible of the approved opposition parties. This is enhanced by the KPRFs having of one of the more radical and truly distinguishable alternative programs. It remains

unclear how the KPRF would fare in such elections if other Leftist parties were allowed to register and participate, but for the time being, the KPRF remains the strong voice of the official left wing in Russia. 2. A Fair/Just Russia (SR) Originally formed with Kremlin backing in 2006 as a merger of the Rodina, Pensioners and Life parties, and later the Greens and other socialist parties, the Russian Social Democrats represent a more moderate, pseudo-Euro-socialist party.xxix A Just Russia calls for a vast political and economic liberalization (sans their call for a total renationalization of all natural resource monopolies), including the introduction of direct elections from local to Federal levels, strong public-access television, reduction of income and VAT taxes and new wealth taxes, subsidies for alternative energy production, and social welfare.xxx They, too, openly wish for a Eurasian Union, and the protection of ethnic Slavs within post-Soviet space. The SR terms this program a New Socialism, () implementing universal and national values in a real social practice. They also criticize United Russia as not interested in change, the KPRF as stuck in the distant Soviet past, the LDPR as loudly criticizing, but quietly cooperating with the government, and the Just Cause as a convenient oligarchic sparring partner for United Russia, making the SR out to be the only legitimate alternative choice, of course outside of the merely outdated KPRF. A Fair/Just Russia boasts an impressive 400,000 members, though this does not necessarily translate into equally impressive electoral results.xxxi The SR is the third most popular political party, up 4% from the 2007 Duma Elections to 13% in 2011.xxxii Presidential candidate Mironov is slightly less popular than his party, only winning 3.8% of the popular vote in the 2012 Presidential Elections.xxxiii Mironov himself predicted a Putin win in 2012 and promised himself to back Communist candidate Zyuganov,xxxiv as well as Putin in

2004,xxxv seemingly never believing in his own ability to run. As it stands right now, the SR is Kremlin pocket opposition in the hands of Mironov. It lines up with United Russia or the other registered political parties in most of its policies, and does not represent a true alternative political force. The SR seems also to believe that it will not move forward with Mironov at the helm, and may be gearing up for a merger with the KPRF and other leftist parties.xxxvi There are also rumors that the SR may boot Mironov in favor of a total revamp, including an alliance with other, currently unregistered political forces.xxxvii If the merger or revamp go through, it is possible that the SR could revitalize itself and its program, and become a political force to be reckoned with. 3. Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) Another allegedly Kremlin-backed project, the LDPR was formed in 1991 with leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky at the helm. Zhirinovsky still leads the party to this day, and represents the greatest draw of the LDPR: crazy Vlads own personality. He has been called both a fascistxxxviii and the Russian Hitler on multiple occasions, not helped by the fact that he has allied his party with other Russian ultranationalists as well as German far-right extremist parties, threatening to close the borders of Russia as well as encourage Russian ethnic separatism in European states.xxxix The party program itself is not much different, showing itself to be far more aggressive than United Russia or the KPRF. The LDPR suggests re-nationalization of the energy sector, restoration of a planned economy, and priority of the military-industrial complex within the Russian economy. They are also unabashedly anti-immigration, stating that the country is in need of defense () from migrants. The LDPR, like the KPRF, also calls for Russian linguistic and ethnic centralism. The Liberal Democrats then represent a third step of extremism after the KPRF and United Russia, in that they essentially want the Soviet economy

back without the Marxist-Leninist overtures to labor, with some social welfare windowdressing, and a huge focus on the military. The LDPR also take a very hard line in foreign policy. They state that the sole source of aggression in international politics () is the United States, and that the main goals of the LDPR are to contain and combat the United States and strengthen Russian power. They aim to do this through what is ostensibly a forced economic and political integration of the Slavic world [and] former Soviet republics. They also seek to cool relations with China and strongly protect the Russian Far East, force the EU through economic warfare to abandon NATO and the Baltic states, and reach out to form stronger military and economic partnerships with Iran, India, Pakistan, () and Venezuela.xl This extreme party boasted a membership count of 185,000 in 2010, although it has been known to puff up membership numbers in the past.xli The LDPR is the fourth largest party within the Duma, winning 11% of the vote in 2011, up from 8% previously. Candidate Zhirinovsky only managed to collect 6% of the popular vote in 2012, down from 9% in 2008, again suggesting a rising party and a falling leader, marred with continual accusations of cooperation with, and respect of Putin.xlii This suggests that, even though the SR itself is considered to be a Kremlin-backed artificial party, the criticisms of the SRs party program may, in fact, be entirely truthful. b. Parties with No Representation in State Duma 4. Patriots of Russia (PR) Founded in 2005 from the dregs of the KPRF, the Patriots of Russia are a bizarrely unspecific Euro-socialist party, if it is not indeed an elaborate Kremlin-produced joke. Adorned with a beautiful rainbow right below the very serious subtitle Political Party, the Patriots of Russia online program, like that of many an impressionable first-year university student, loudly proclaims the partys anti-political patriotic ideology, consisting mainly of platitudes about

loving ones country, not seeing divisions of left and right, or splits based on nationality, religion, sex and social status () only seeking to unite all citizens interested in the prosperity of our country, only seeing the gloriously ambiguous Russian Patriot. Their social policy is summed up simply as a happy man makes a happy country. What the party stands for, outside of these platitudes, or what is already being done by United Russia or has been said by A Fair/Just Russia, is not elaborated in the party program. The PR also promises a doubling of income, strong demographic growth, social welfare for all, and the complete elimination of mass unemployment.xliii One then begins to wonder why the PR left out the very important bring back unicorns and cake for everybody policies, as they fit in with the level of political maturity. Such political infantilism is reflected in their unimpressive garnering of a mere .97% in the 2011 elections, and their Kremlin links are illuminated in their failure to run their own party leader Gennady Semigin, instead backing Putin in the 2012 elections.xliv Nonetheless, the party still managed to retain some 86,000 official members as of 2011.xlv The Patriots of Russia may be on the way out, but like the Just Cause party, they simply desperately hang on year after year. 5. Just Cause (PD) Formed in 2008 as a merged of the Union of Right Forces, Civil Force and the Democratic Party of Russia, the PD is an openly Kremlin-sponsored, pro-oligarch, right-wing liberal party, again correctly noted by the SR political platform. The PD political platform is mainly centered on liberation of entrepreneurship and economic growth, primarily through liberalization and privatization in the political and economic spheres, combined with maintenance of some of the old Soviet-style social welfare systems. This program was made manifest in the choice of billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov to run for president he is the owner of the New Jersey Jets and one of Russias wealthiest oligarchs. This presidential choice also

caused a split within the PD leadership, where candidate Prokhorov quit the party to run as an independent after calling the PD a puppet Kremlin party, and railing against the electoral system as an elaborate sham orchestrated by a puppet master () Vladislav Surkov, deputy head of the administration. Despite this, Prokhorov, who managed to win 7% of the popular vote in 2012, failed to criticize Putin or United Russia, and as noted earlier in fact praised Putin as being the only capable leader. PD itself has fared much worse, being a pro-oligarch party in a sea of anti-oligarch public sentiment, and is now left without a semi-popular leader. The party still retains 60,000 members,xlvi but the PD is holding at just .6% of the Duma vote, and it is likely that Just Cause will cease to exist in the next election, barring Prokhorov making an unlikely return, or the party undertaking significant revamp. 6. Russian United Democratic Party (Yabloko) Formed in 1993 from the pro-US and EU-oriented western integration electoral grouping of Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin,xlvii the last registered, non-represented party is the RODP: Yabloko, which holds many of the same views as its prior electoral bloc. Current leader Sergei Mitrokhin proposed to build a modern state of the European type in Russia, with people capitalism replacing oligarchic capitalism, including all of the guaranteed constitutional freedoms and privatizations that would entail. Despite the fact that they are approved to participate in elections by the Kremlin, the partys opposition candidate Grigory Yavlinsky was barred from running in the 2012 Presidential Elections. Yavlinsky criticized this move, but himself admits that only 20% of Russians have turned out to march against [these unfair] parliamentary elections opposed to 80% in the 1990s, and that the opposition lacks any real goal or leader, again suggesting a lack of confidence in his own partys ability to effect change as well as in his own ability as a leader. The party currently has 55,000 members,xlviii and has

fared as well as is possible given the restrictive elections. The Yabloko recently made small progress in the Duma, doubling from 1.59% in 2007 to 3.43% in 2011, but they remain hobbled due to policy absorption by A Fair/Just Russia and United Russia itself. This assimilation of policies led the Yabloko leadership to claim that this was a deliberate attempt by the Kremlin at splitting their voting bloc.xlix This splitting and poor performance has led Yabloko mainly to act as electoral observersl in the recent voting cycles. In doing so, they have uncovered vast cases of fraud, but it is unknown if this will translate into better success at the polls. With only three effective, strongly represented registered opposition parties in the running, two of which are difficult to distinguish from United Russia, disillusion is no surprise. The masses of people who went out on the streets to protest against allegedly fraudulent elections were not only fed up with United Russia, but with the lack of officially sanctioned alternative choices. The system opposition has responded, through occasional attempts to unite the various personalities and parties that make up the opposition, though typically with littleli to no success, without cooperation from parties on the outside. It is certainly no surprise, then, that people are increasingly turninglii to such parties outside the system to vent their frustration and focus their efforts at real political change. ii. Non-System Opposition The Russian non-system opposition is comprised of political parties that have either failed to meet registration requirements or have refused to participate in the electoral process. Broadly categorized, they either fall into coalitions of the political Left or coalitions on the Right. The following list of the opposition is not exhaustive and only covers the largest coalitions and their constituent members in the immediate aftermath of the 2011 and 2012 elections.

a. The Left 1. The Left Front The non-system Russian Left has mainly organized itself into a loose coalition of farleftist parties, organizations, and yet more coalitions, in order to strengthen its position and increase its political clout. This coalition includes not only hard-line Marxist-Leninists, but also allied Trotskyists, Maoists, Anarchists, Stalinists, and essentially anyone and everyone involved in Left politics that is willing to join them.liii The Left Front does have decent ties with the KPRF, whom they backed in the 2012 Presidential Elections,liv although many members openly criticize the Communist Party for their Kremlin approval as well as many different iterations of what each Leftist party deems ideological revisionism. This also led the Front to seek registration as an official party, which was denied due to their extremist tendencies.lv Despite this unity in voting, the Left Front is hardly a cohesive faction, and the differing tendencies with divergent within it each organize and act in accordance with their own goals, more closely resembling the Unity Frontslvi of the early Comintern than an actual political party. The three main tendencies are centered around the so-called anti-revisionist Marxist-Leninsts, the Trotskyites, and associated Anarchists. i. United Labor Front (ROTF) Rot Front Founded in 2010, the United Labor Front represents the anti-revisionist hard-line Tankie wing of the Russian far-left. This groups leadership has claimed that the Communist Party of Gennady Zyuganov is in many ways not communist: it combines nostalgic 'Sovietism' with Russian nationalism and religious aspirations, [Russian] Orthodoxy, and represents a more bourgeois than revolutionary force in politics.lvii Instead of a simple homage to the Soviet past in nostalgic calls for re-Stalinization with Russian nationalist overtones, the ROTFs

member parties are more committed to a complete revitalization of Soviet power in the legacy of Stalin, Enver Hoxha, or Yuri Andropov. This is evidenced in the party program of Rot Front member party Revolutionary Communist Workers Party Revolutionary Party of Communists (RKRP-RPK), who blast Gorbachev as leading Russia to degeneration and opportunism, and call the nomenklatura of the old Russian Communist Party disguised social democrats.lviii This specific party within the larger ROTF claimed 55,000 members as of 2006, suggesting even larger numbers for the entirety of the Rot Front,lix easily on par with Yabloko or Just Cause. The Rot Front openly calls for yet another Russian Revolution and has participated in several protest actions against the Putin regime, reaching out to organize for revolt against the regime with like-minded trade unions and political organizations in the Front. Simultaneously, the ROTF pledges in its party manifesto that it will operate within the law,lx and has also attempted to stand for registration as a legitimate political party on its own, although owing to its extreme radicalism, it has also been denied again and again.lxi These hardline neo-Soviets are the largest participants in the Front, but they are not alone. ii. The Russian Socialist Movement (RSD)/CWI There also exists a large coalition of Russian Trotskyite organizations allied with the Left Front, known as the Russian Socialist Movement, as well as several separate Russian Trotskyite parties, such as branches of the Committee for a Workers Internationallxii and the International Committee of the Fourth International.lxiii These groups split due to various disagreements on policy, especially the position on the 2008 South Ossetian War, though all of them take active roles in protests and actively defend Russias LGBTQ communities.lxiv Within the Trotskyites alone, there is a tremendous amount of infighting about which Workers International is the best representative of the true Fourth International, with groups slinging

around accusations of opportunism and comprador tendencies at one another freely, without getting into numerous jabs at the Rot Front.lxv RSD is the only cohesive Trotskyite group actively participating within the Left Front, though it is also possible the other groups participate in some respect. Regardless, these groups do not represent as powerful or cohesive a grouping as the orthodox Marxist-Leninist groups, and gain traction only through associations in the Left Front. iii. Anarchist Organizations Even more fractured than the Trotskyites are the Anarchists. One of the largest loose anarchist/libertarian groupings, Autonomous Action, is the only group openly associating with the Left Front.lxvi Other groups, such as the Confederation of Revolutionary AnarchoSyndicalistslxvii may also participate, but very little is published and known about such groupings and their activities outside of reports of the normal anarchist fare of squatting, setting up autonomous communes, vandalism, and corporate sabotage. b. The Center 1. Other Russia (DR) The Other Russia coalition represents an interesting intermeshing of very different political parties of all stripes into a singular oppositional coalition and is the reason for the quotes around Center in this heading. It includes such personalities as Gary Kasparov, former Chess Master and president of the United Civil Front liberal party, Eduard You Know I Love the Taste of Bloodlxviii Limonov, formerly of the National Bolshevik semi-ironic left-wing Nazi party, as well as their supporters, some members of the Rot Front, and other various liberal and leftist parties and leaders. Collectively, the Other Russia states in its party program that it wants nationalization of key mineral export sectors, a secular state, wealth taxes, a new capitol, new

infrastructural and agricultural focuses, nationalism, a new Union State, independent judiciary, Islamic religious self-determination in the Caucasus, extensive social welfare programs, and abolishing of conscription in favor of volunteer forces.lxix This more closely resembles the later Comintern policy of creating a politically broad Popular Frontlxx of opposition forces, as opposed to a smaller, ideologically similar Unity Front. The Other Russia has also been extensively involved with protests against United Russia, being a major force behind the Russia Without Putin and March of the Dissenters protest movements.lxxi Despite being an odd mashup, the Other Russia nonetheless has a dedicated cadre of respected opposition leaders and calls on the aid of numerous supporters, representing a potent organizing force within the antisystemic movement. 2. Peoples Freedom Party (Parnas) Founded in 2010 as a merger of the Russian Peoples Democratic Union, Republican Party, Democratic Choice and the non-Kasparov segments of United Civil Front, the Parnas Party represents a grassroots attempt at the political program espoused partially by both the Yabloko and Just Cause parties, including liberalization and democratization.lxxii Much like the Yabloko and PD, the Parnas party program calls for Russia to become part of the allEuropean civilization.lxxiii The union currently holds 46,000 members, and is gaining more members at a rapid pace. The Parnas Party has attempted to register for both Duma and Presidential elections, but has been rejected due to application inconsistencies.lxxiv This led party leader Boris Nemtsov to call for a mobilization for a struggle. From now on, there will be mass street protests all across the country,lxxv a call which was indeed heeded. Individual Parnas members have participated in these protests and have also been arrested teaching others how to invalidate their ballots as a protest measure.lxxvi Parnas, then, represents an interesting,

new, and truly moderate or reasonable grassroots political force, with some potential to become a registered anti-Kremlin party. b. The Right 1. Nationalists and Neo-Nazism While difficult to distinguish, the Russian right is composed primarily of ethnicsupremacist nationalists, fascists, and neo-Nazi groupings. Nationalist organizations include the semi-self-explanatory Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI), in fact more broadly an anti-immigration and pro-Russian ultranationalist organization,lxxvii and the similarly-oriented Slavic Union and Russian Public Movement. All of these organizations call openly for the expulsion of migrant workers, make claims of Russian ethnic superiority, and increasingly hold anti-Semitic views, though claim not to be Nazis themselves. Many of these groups are themselves banned, and have therefore occasionally supported the LDPR, whom they believe hold similar views to their own.lxxviii These nationalist organizations only represent the public face of nationalism and fascism in Russia. Although very murky, there definitively exist several Neo-Nazi or Fascist groups within the Russian Federation. This runs the gamut from Neo-Nazi organizations responsible for murders of immigrants and ethnic minorities, such as the Russian National Socialist Party,lxxix to the ultra-nationalist/fascist goose-stepping and uniform-wearing Russian National Unity Party.lxxx Both hold to a National-Socialist ideology of anti-Semitism and ethnic and nationalist supremacism, and exist as paramilitary organizations, combined in the Russian context with Russian Orthodox Christianity. Despite not representing a large, united force, these organizations nonetheless exist and carry out terrorist acts on Russian soil and can represent a future threat in the event of further unrest. This is evidenced by Greeces Neo-Nazi Golden Dawn Party, very

similar to the Russian National Unity Party, possibly reaching thresholds necessary to enter into the Greek parliament.lxxxi All of the non-systemic opposition parties, no matter the external projected unity in protest, face an internal split on political tactics. Strife arises over the choice between five major political tactics, outside of the direct use of violence reserved for the fascists, anarchists, and ultra-leftist communists. These tactics include the passive boycott of avoiding the ballot and also protesting, spoiling ballots by invalidating them, removing or destroying ballots, Limonovs Option of publicly demanding to be removed from the voter rolls, or Navalnys Option (named after a prominent activist) of voting for any party other than United Russia, such as KPRF. The differences over such tactics, as well as individual political ideologies, keep the opposition relatively fractured and weak despite the large protests. c. Reforms and Effects: Chaos and the Parties of Kind People and Beer Lovers United Russia has noticed the rise of the KPRF and the insurgent strength of the fractured non-system opposition in its protests. The Kremlin under Medvedev began reaching out to the non-system opposition to brainstorm political reform, in an attempt to seemingly subsume the opposition in talks, while stalling real reforms and further protests.lxxxii Surprisingly, within two months, the Kremlin eased party registration requirements, such as lowering signature requirements for registration from 40,000 to 500. This has led to a massive surge of registration attempts, including return registrations of the old joke Parties of the Party of Beer Lovers and Party of Love, as well as attempts from new parties like the Ten Commandments Party, Party of Subtropical Russia, and Party of Social Networking Sites.lxxxiii There are also new coalitions forming, including a new union of the ultranationalist anti-immigration/semi-fascist parties into the National Democratic Party,lxxxiv a new Swedish-styled pro-IP-infringement Pirate Party,lxxxv a

freshly revitalized Gorbachev-backed Social-Democratic party, and new attempts to register parties in the Left Front. This reform and political restructuring has led to massive unrest in the opposition, with new political unions forming and breaking apart at light-speed based on the ever-changing political calculus introduced through these reforms.lxxxvi In all, 68 new parties have expressed interest in becoming established and registered. This move is simultaneously a concession from the Kremlin as well as a possible political masterstroke. There are rumblings that this is an attempt at a smooth transition from soft authoritarianism to expanded political competition in Russialxxxvii in order to further fracture opposition while appearing to stimulate and embrace it, thus extend Putin and United Russias lifespan. Opening up the field to multitudes of new players may shatter the unity that was beginning to show in the 2011-2012 protests, scattering the opposition due to their new political conflicts. The steady gains made by the KPRF may also be undercut by the official registration of fresh grassroots leftist and liberal political formations. B. Conclusions: The Future of Russian Political Opposition It is very likely in the short term that the political reforms initiated by the Kremlin will succeed in stalling oppositional unity and organization efforts, but the question becomes for how long? The cracks in Putins political empire are already becoming visible, evidenced by a near-Ceausescu moment of deputies walking out his address to the Duma in 2012.lxxxviii It is impossible to predict whether this reform strategy will succeed in maintaining the political status quo, or whether the KPRF will be undercut, leading the political arena to implode for a time. Either situation could eventually result in a re-coalescence of opposition political parties, whether with stronger coalitions behind the old registered parties, or with new, stronger, more legitimate opposition. If such fake reform attempts or a true political fracturing cant be

dragged out until the next elections in 2018, E.R. may be voted out by a theoretical new oppositional juggernaut. If E.R. can drag it out, then Putin and United Russia will have prevented the opposition from succeeding at the ballot box. This stifling of oppostition may still lead to a popular revolt dragging them out of the Kremlin, especially if Russias economic situation worsens again. This set of political dynamics therefore makes the short-run chances of regime change low, with longer-run prospects within the next six to ten years moderate to high. As far as the ideological substance of a possible replacement, statistics, general trends, and historical inertia tend to indicate that (barring a sudden explosion of popularity for Yabloko or Parnas) whoever replaces United Russia and Putin will likely be more ideologically extreme. Whether the stated views of any party that manages to displace United Russia will actually translate into governance is unknown, but nobody truly expected Hitler or Stalin to act in the ways that they did either. Only time will tell.

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