News and Journalism in the UK

Fifth Edition

Brian McNair

4] Routledoe rayto,arranci,oup
fr\
LONDON AND NEW YORK

Why iournalism matters

This chapter contains:

o An outline of the organisational

strucrure of the British news media,

including details of currcnt ownership patterns, trcnds ir-r ne'lvspaper and periodical circul,rtion, TV and radio ratings and online usage.
the twenty-first cer"rtury the production of news, and journalism of all kinds, is big business, and getting bigger all the time. Thc supply of information (whether as jourtralism or as rawer forrns of data) occupies ar.r industry of major economic importance, employing vast humrn and financial resources, 'llorld Association and enjoying high status. According to a 2007 rep()rt by the of Newspapers ('fAN), there are more than 10,000 ncwspapcr titlcs in cxistence, employing some two million people and gencrating US$180 billion of revenue. Notwithstanding concerns about the irnpact of the internet on print journalism (see below, Chapters.l and 7), for'WAN these figures indicate that the global print ir.rdustry is'healthy and vigorous'.1 Across the world, to.r newsreaders, anchormen and wornen, bloggers and newspaper colurnnists acquire the glamour of movie stars and cxert the influence of politicians. Mcdia cornpanics such ls thc BBC, CNN, Sky and Rcuters judge thernselves, and rrc judgcd, by thc pcrccivcd quality of thcir news brands in an increasingly competitive and globalised rnarketplace. Joumalism is also an expanding business. At the begiming of thc 1980s there were just two organisations supplying televisecl news and current affeirs to thc UK: the British Broadcasting Corporatior.r and Independer.rt Television Ncws. Each providcd rround two hours of news per day. Now there :rre three
L'r

UK-brsed providers

of tclcvision journalism acccssiblc to the British audience (BBC, ITN, Sky), transrnitting on five free-to-air tcrrestrial channcls, and several

satellitc and cablc chnnels operated by these and other providers. The nLrtnber of hours of television news available to the dedicated viewcr has incrersed exponentirlly as 24-hour services have come on air, and the established frce-to-air chrnnels have steadily over the years rLrgmentcd thcir serviccs with breakfast ncws, round-the-clock bulletir-rs anc'l coverage of Parlimcnt. A

'V/hy journaLism mtttters

'Wby journalism

matters

2002 Broadcasting Standards Ciomr.r.rission/Independent Television Ciommission (BSC/lTC)-commissioneci study found that the provision of TV ncws had expanded by 800 per ccnt betwecn 1986 and 2001, from rn .lverrgc of.10 hours per week to 243 hours, includir.rg 24-hour channels (Hargreaves nd Thotnas,
2002).

Radio journalism is also cxpanding as more nationrl and local channels have been set up, benefiting from the expausion of spectrurn provided by digitisation. Radio jor.rrr.relism remrins principally thc prescrvc of the BBC, and its Rrdio 4 arrd Five Live channels in particular. Thesc compctc with talkSport and othcr commercial channels, wl-rich provide varying amounts of news, lnostly supplied in bulletin form by Independent Radio News ar.rd Sky News
Radio.

Bcfore that, however, and as a preludc to the more detailed cliscussiorr of trends and issues which makc up Chapters .5-9, wc bcgin with a description of the British jourr.ralisrn industry as it was at the time of writing: thc typcs ar-rd structures of organisation that providc us with journalistic ir.rformation; who owns thcrni the extent of their reach and the sizc of their audiencc. In this way, we can draw a news map of the tlK (Figurc 1.1), bcginnirrg with what remair-ls for now at least, despite the migration of rcaders to llew platforms such as the intenret ancl the mobilc phonc, one of thc most popular and pervasive of our news media, as wcll as the oldest - the press.

The national press

In the LIK, as of June 2008 thcre were 12 national 'paid-for' daily ncwspapers (including the Daily Sporl urnd rhe Morning Srar) with a combirred circulation of around ten million (Tablc 1.1). The largest circulations were achicved
Table 1.1. Circulrtion of British national newspapers, 1988-2008

In print, there are, if one counts such upstarts as the DaiLy Sport, Sunday
Sport and Sunday S/ar (laur.rched in Septembcr 2002), more nationrl ncwspapers available in the UI( than there werc 20 years ago. At locrl and rcgional lcvel, a lar1e'frec sheet'sector exists alongsidc the'paid-fors'. Last, but certainly not least, Britain has seen an explosion of onlinc ncws and joumalism-based websites. S<mc of thcse are produccd in thc UK, many others ovcrseas. The poir-rt about thc intcrnet - to which wc will rcturrr below - is that regardless of where they are produced, online media are global by nature ir.rsofar as they are accessible to anyone, anywhere on the
planet, who has access to a networked computer (state censorship cxists in some countrics but becomes ever nlore dif6cult to sustain as populations become more skilled at evading it). Thus the Guardian, which had a print circulation in the UK of around 310,000 as this cdition of N/UK went to press, had r.nore than 2.5 million regular users of its guardian.co.uk online site globally. Many established news organisations, in thc UK and elsewhere, have 'gone global' in this sense, a fact with significant implications for how they produce and mrrkct their content. Sirce the late 1990s, when the nurnbcr of journalism-based websites was numbcrccl in thc hundreds worldwide, onlinc journalism has emerged as a major news platform in the UK, accesscd on persoual c()mputers ancl mobile phones. lfe will examine both trcnds - what we might call the globalisation and mobilisation of news, rcspcctively - and their irnplications for thc future of print and broadcast journalism in detail
below.

Daily

Daily Express Daily Mail Daily Mirrorl Daily Record

'lhe Daily Telegrdph

-[he Financial 'f imes The Guardidn

The Sun

1,679,438 7,792,701 3,850,579 4,146,641

1,138,673

1,133,000 2,312,000 3,006,000 3,701,000

1,067,00i)

694,260 2,042,1s3 1,715,130 2,884,987

813,.146

286,774 470,023
150,626
37

The'fimes
The IndePendent

362,000 400,000 770,000

22.5,000
66,+,000

131,807 302,636

576,444
176,785 606,33 I

s,317

Daily Star
DaiLy Str.trt

1,013,688

82,920
t

Morning Star Total

Sunday

5,204,463

13,640,000

10,027,099

Mail on Sunday
Netus of the'World Sundtty Express Sunday Mirror
Peoplt: The Independent on Sunday

1,,932,799 5,213,901

2,192,000
,+,165,000

2,t43,374
2,778,435 2,749,246 749,644 716,041
1,,362,743

1,033,000
1

,971,000
2.56,000

1,947,444 2,908,392 625,193 1,243,042

.5B0,948

A news map of the UK

Producing

t,772,000
403,000 834,000
1,320,000

162,832
386,1"10

all this journalisrn for print

broadcast and onlinc platforms,

'[he ()bseruer

rcspectively, is an industry cmploying some 50,000 journalists in the UK, generatini billions in revenue fron various sollrces, including sales and subscriptions, eldvertising, syndicatior-r rlnd othcr services. The next chapter examit.tcs current thir.rking on how these proliferating journalistic rnedia might affect ir-rdividuals and social processes. Most of us asslrne that joumalism matters: but does it really, and if so, in what ways?

The Sunday Telegraph

The Sunday Tines Suntlay Star Sunday Sport

598,493

983,767
304,927

78,576 17,616,186
13,886,000 9,819,7 54

Total
Source: Atclit Bureau

of Circulation.

"Aver:rge figures for J:rnu:rry June in each year

'V/hy journaLism

mdtters

to be knorvn as the talrloids, with the Szn enjoying e significant leacl crvcr rhe Daily NlirrorlDaily Record, and the Daily Nlail tn
by' what usccl
second placc.
Online journalism

Blogs. aggregalors lDrudqe Rpo,t lnstapundtt, holfi1tv..t.k)

t\

J\
News.

/sF
BAC N-"v/s

A J rzeera

Until quite reccntly, 'tabloid' in the LIK context referred both to a particular size and layotrt of ncwsp:rper, and also to a particular type or style of popular journalisrn on cither print or broaclcrst platforms (Engel, 1996; Cor.rboy,2000). There werc 'red-top' tablciids such irs rhe Sun and the Daily Star, read largely

Engl

f-k
Netuorked

.I
fV news

Sky News

BBC

BBCI ABC2

lKrtw I {r'?l
-I

suo. l,z.g,,

.4L [i**:'*"'#'*;l \ r \r { \lil/

F* rC

l{-

I)I

T
C yde, Vkg n, etc

f\l

rnn sry na'o

ruews

8BC

16

Nations & Regions)

TV companies (Scotl,sh, U sier, etc )

Natonal press

(22

daily and Sunday titles)

by socio-economic groups C2DE arrc.l notorious for their sensational, oftelr salrcious contcllt; and 'mid-market' tlbloids such as thc Dailt, Mil and thc Dailv Expres-s, reaching higlrer socio-cconornic cltcllorics (ABCI - generllly more afflile nt, better cc'lucate d sectors of the reading pulrlic, cstinratecl to number just over -10 per cent of the population). All other newspapers wcre clelined as 'broldsheets', bcing larger in size and containing morc demanclir.rg contcnt. In 2003 the fourth most porul:rr daily ncwspaper irr rhe UK rvas a brordsheet title - thc Dtily Telegrdph - at that timc thc onl' claily broaclsheet with r circrrlation above onc million. In Januarv-Junc 2008 the Daily TeLegraph ueraged over 800,000 daily sales, and was still the fourth most popular newspaper title. By theu, not only rvrrs it the r-nost -ropular broadshcet in the UK, it rvas the ch, broaclsheet titlc remaining on thc nrarket, all other ex-broadsheets having r-noved for economic and compctitive reasons to a srnaller print fonnat (the familiar tabloid as in tl.re case of 'fhe Tintes and the Independent or, in the crse of the Gurdian, thc Berliner format). The collapsc of the trclitional tabloid/broadshecr distinction is reflcctecl in the British Newspapers Online rvebsitc (wu'rv.britishpapers.co.uk), rvhich divides newspapers ir.rto 'hcavy-weight', 'mid-mrrrket' and 'red-top'. I have previously uscd 'elite', 'rnid-rnarket' and 'mass' circulation categories t<r clescribe the thrce sectors oi the UK ne\,r,spaper m:rrket (McNair.2000). Red-to.rs and mid-merket titles alsri domir.ratccl the Sundy market in 2008. Of 11 national Sunday l1e\\spepers vrilable to the British readcr (inclucling the Sunday.S/ar, launchccl in Septernber 2002), four of the five rnost popular in tcrms of sales u,crc in these catcgories.
The 2008 figures pror,ide only a snrrpshot rf thc national ncwspaper nrarket six-r.r.ronth period of Ji,uruary June that ycar, and thus tell us nothing about longer-term trends. C)ver the 20-year period between 1988 lrrd 2008, therc hrs been consistcnt clecline in thc circulation of many British newspalrers, plrticularly thosc populrrr titles, likc the Sr ancJ thc l)ailt St,tr, which operatc at the more sensationelist end of thc mrrket, although thc latter -fhe was showing signs of resiliencc as this edition wcnt t() press (Tablc 1.1). rrrid-nrarket Daily Muil hes bucked the trcnd of trrbloid declinc. and is onc of the few titles rrctually pLrcting on daill, sllcs (some 200,000 extr:r by 2008) over

Ellte (9) (The lelegph, The Surday leleqr.ph, fhe Tmes.fhe Sunday Tm--s,Ihe Fnancal Ttmes, The cuardln. fhe Obseruer,Ihe lndependent fhe lndependent On Sunrlay)
l

Owners News lnternational Tr n[y M tror Group. Associated Newspapers. Guardian Med a Group, eic

s it was durir-rg the

d-ratkel

14)

l'aly

Mail .

Mal On Sunday xpress Surday Express)

Fed top (9) llh,o Sun, tuews af the Wadd Iie trlroilRecard.Ihe gn)der L4ror, Ihe People. Da4'Slar, Surdy Sar Daily Spart,Sunday Spo1\

pard lor dall es. weekls. Sundays:

fee newspapers and Metos

Owers

Johnston Pre:s, Newsquesl, Associaled. elc

Figurtt 1.1 A news nlrp ()f the LJK.

the periocl. The elite titlcs, or heavy-weights, have done bettcr olr the whole, with'lbe 'I-imes ttp by rnore than 20 per ccnt over the pcriocl. the FinanciL Tins shows circulatiorr incrcase of 6-3 per cent in two decades, when orre includes over .100,000 ()\'crse.ls sales (not shown in fblc 1.1, rvhich is UK only).

CNN, Fox News, Ai Jazeer Engllsh. eic

BBC (6 Nat ons & Regrons)

ry

companies (Scoitish, Uister, elc

National press (22 daily and Sunday titles)

te (9) flhe re]egraph. fhe Sunday Ielegraph. The Tines, fhe Sunday Times, Ihe Fnancai Tmes. The Guardlar. The Obsetuer,fhe lndependent Ihe lndependenl On Sunday)
El

Owners: News lnterational fr nity Mhror Group, Associated Newspapers Guard an Medra Group, eic

MLd market (4)

(Dalt Mail. Mait On Sunday. Express. Sunday Express)

Fed top (9) flhe Sur. News of the Wald. Ihe MrrolRecord. lhe Sunday Mrrar,Ihe Peaple. Daly Star, Surrlay Star. Da|y Sport. Sunday Spaftl

pa

d lor da i es. weekl es, Sundys; free nevr'spapers and Metos

Owners

Johnslon Press, Newsquest Associated. etc

Why journalisnt mdtters

-V/ln,

journalism matters

While total UK.cwspaper sales h:r'e felle' by rrrourd onc-rhird o'cr rwo decacles, ancl urany cclmrnentators have identificd a circuiirtion crisis (see Chapter 6), this has not affccted trll newspapers, nor all equally. \il/hat emergcs, lookir-re at 20 leers of circulation figures, is that clecllnc- of newspaper circulrtion in the UK has lvcragcd aronnd three per cent pcr ycirr fol ten years and morc, :rncl that combined daily circulations in 2008 are around 66 pcr cent of what thev wcre in 1988. Thc circulrtion of Sunday ritles is argund .56 per cetrt of l9U8 levcls. This is bad ne'rvs for sourc titles, such as the l),rlf, Mirror, which hrs slipped r. hel.rv te Duily ,&f,il, a'd t|rc Daily E.rprcss, which lost more rhan half of its circulation in that pcriod. But decline should be seen in the cor-rtext of broacler trends in thc mcdia e'virrnment. NewsPapcrs llow compete rvith nranl' nrore inforrnirtion cutlets thnn wes the casc 20 years ego, irnd just as the big free-to-air terrestrial TV channeis have seen their audiences whittlcd away by the proliferation of new crble ar-rcl satellite channels as'uvell as thc growth.f ,nline sen'ices (see chaptcrs 7 ancl 8), the tlK press, like that of other cornrtries, has hd to deal lvith a rcc.rced shrre of the ovcrall rnedia market. Against this backgrouncl, it ',vould havc been surprising had they not cxperienced some l.ss .f auclience share. what nratrers for the LIK press ir the corning years, es we shall see, is h.r.v they mcet the challcnge to old-establishecl busincss moclcls that is posed bl' the rise of online urd realtime 24-hour journalism, and if they can rctain their traditional prcscncc i

Tdble 1.2 Ownershir of thc British National l)rcss, 2002!)3

C(,mpttny Daily News International the Sun, the Nc.,-s of tbe 'V/orld, 7'he Times, The Sunday Times
32 20()2

2008

Sunclay Dailv

Suntlar

]9.6

Mirror Group
D a i 11, NI i r r o r I D a
iI

/1
gr' r r, r rt,
I'
e

27

17

i 8.-5

op

a, S unduy

Mirrcr
Associated Newspapers

l7
l2

20

22

Daily Mitil. Mail On \tnday

Northern

I)aily
Stdr

& Shell Exprcss, Sundn Express,

t.l

Stu, Sunday
8.5

Hollinger thc Telegrtplt, the ,Szn,/,r1' Telegraplt Guardian Media Group the ()udrdittt, the ()bsen,er Financial Times Ltd rbe Finncil Times Indepependent Group
the Indept'ndent, the Intlependent

1.3 1.2

()n Sunday

t.7

1.6

that world.
F-or

rnany LIK rewsprpurs rcm.ril-l Profitatrlc, as busilress ma.agers have exploited nerv technolclgics to clrt c()sts anli irnprove margins (regignal newspapers werc working to .30 per cent profit margirls ol1 titles as recently as 2008, wher.r the 'crcclit crunch' and global finlncial crisis of that year bega' to affect botto'r lines cvcryu'herc), and fe*'obscr'crs belier,,c rhat the ne\r,spaper in prilrt fonn is doomcd to extinctiol-r any time soon, given its uniquely userfricndiy properties as a pli,rtforrn for the distribution of journalism. For all that, i'rucliences for rews are migrating t. PC a'd rnobile platforms, especielly

n'w,

Sourcc: Autlit Bureau of Circulatlr>n.

- thc convenience and tactilir)'of print, rolled trp and in o'e's pocket on the underground or thc b.s, or sprcad out on thc coffee table on a Su'day m'rning, will not easily be matched by laptops, e-readers cr rnobile clevices, at lcast not ill the profcssional lifetirne of mtlst journllsts working today (nor indeed oi readers cf this book).
yoLmger audiences
placecl

Ownership of the British press

Ownership of thc British niltional prcss continucs to be concentrated i the hands of a few publishing orga'isations (Table 1.2). The largesr, News Intern:rtional, is owncd bv Rupert l\{urdoch's News Corporation, u,hosc two clrrily and tl-rree sunclav l)cwsprrpc'rs rccountecl in 2008 for .l4 ancl .39.6 per ccnt o[ total UK circulatiorr, respectively. The Trinity Mirror (iroup, formerly owncd bv the late Roberr Maxwell and :rdministered by a c.ns.rti.m of banks 'ow aucl other fir-rar-rciel jtrstittttions, rlee()unts for a furrher'17 rnd 18.5 per cclrt of

daily and Sunc'lay circulation, rcspectively (substantially dowrr on thc 2002 figures usecl in the previous eclition of this l-rook). Other major owncr:s incluclc l{icharcl f)esmoncl's Northcrn & Shcll, n'hich in 2000 rurchased the Erpress ancT Star titles for d12-5 rnillion; thc Barclay brothers, who bought the Ddily ancl Sunddy Telegraph from thc disgraced Conrad Black's Hollinger gronr in 20061 ancl Associrtcd Nervspapers (the Daily NIail a.nd lv'til on Suntldy). The Guardiaz and the Obseruer remrin 'irrdeperrdent' insofr as they are owned b,"* sh:rreholclers orgar"rised in such a way - through the non-profitnraking Guardian ,\{edia Group and the Scott Trust - as to guarlntee tl-}c cditoriel integrity and financiirl indepenclence of thc paper 'in perpetuit,v'. In 1991 the Independent and its sister publication, the Independent on Sunday, having struggled sir.rce the 1980s to retain the ir.rdepencicnce that inspired their l.rrrnch, found themsclr,cs in such financial clifficulties that thel'rvere required to modiiy their constitutiorrs and allorv foreign itrvestors to purchasc substantial stakes in the papcrs. In 1998 the Indepenclent titles rasscd into the
control of Irish cntrcprenelrr Tonv O'Reillr, and his lnriependent Ncws & Media llroup, rvlrcre thcy crnrir.r:rs of this rvriting. The NTorning S/,rr (iorn-rerly, the paper of the Conrrnunist Party of Grerrt Britain) struggles on in the postcomnlunlst world, owned by its reedcrs lncl rclying on them, rather thatr on advertising revenlle, for funds to sustain its print run of about l-1,000 copitrlt.

8 tXlh journalisnt

ntdttets as Bob Franklin puts

Why journalism

nutters

By comparison with figures for orvnership cited in previous cclitions of this irr.ok, there has been no fundamentel change in the degrec of cot-tccntretiorr that has historically existed in the LTK. Rupert Murdoch's News Corpor.rtion rentair.rs the (marginally nrorc) clomitrnt force rrtnong five big playcrs and a fcw smaller, but still substantial o\\'ners such as the Guardiart Media Group, ancl with roughly thc samc share oi circulttiou :rs its f<tur titlcs had in the 1990s. Some big owners - Conrad Black, rnost notablv - have gor-re (in his case, to a LIS prison, convictcd of fraud), to bc rcrlaced by others (the Barclal' brotlrers who, having sold thc Scotstnn titlcs to Johnstorr Prcss in 200-5, pnrchased Black's Teleg,ratb titles for f,700 million). Their share of national circulation, three per ccnt, r(nl:rilrs.ts it w's in 2002. Associatccl's shlre has
gone up, as l.ras that of Northcrn

it, it has been'booming'(Frrrnkli,2006: xvii), rvitlr 84 per cent of UK adults reading a regional newsprrper (comparcd with 70 per ..r-,t -h., reacl national titles). Northern lreland, with a populatio of 1.6 rnillion people, suppofrs 18 dlily pxpers. Scotland's five million pcople support

some 80 titles. Thcse data u'ere gathered some time ago' bef()re the 'credit crunch' arcl thc lssoci:tted recession, since rvhen the ecotromic climatc for all meclia organisations has worsened, and the tcchologicrrl challengc posed b,v

thc internet arrd other emerging platforrns intensified. Circulations

have

ciecliecl, rs with the natitxtrrl prcss, but the regional/locel prcss rerrreins ;'trr important feature of the UK llews map. Like thc national press, ownership ancl control of t[e rcgionll neu'spaper industry in Britain is concentrted in the hands of a srall umber of conrpanies. prcclominllnt alll()ng them thc Trinit.v Mirror Group, thc LTS-based Ncn'squcst Nledia Group, and Johnston Press (which purchased the Scttstnn titles from

&

Shell.

The regional press

For the regional press in Britrrirr, the rast twt:r dec.les lravc seen,'r period of expansior.r, particularlv in thc mrrket for small, community-bascd papers -['here are now funded entirely from atlvertising revenue - the 'frcc sheets'. dozens of companics publishirrg hundrecls of thcsc newspapers across thc country (nearly 600 in 2006). Although their mrin functior"r is to advertise local businesses ancl services, most cont.un ,r certain rlmount of locl nervs witl-r which to attract tl.re attentiorr of potential readcrs. and so car.r lcgitimately be included in any cliscussion of British journrrlism. Local ncrvspapers are also e major enrployer of the UK's journalists.

In the late 1990s, a network of N4etro rublications, orvned bv Associatecl Newsparers,2 rvas esttrblishcd in several British cities, including London, Glasgow and Mar.rchestcr. By 2008 therc were Metros in 16 LIK citics, reaching millions of rvhat malkcting experts call 'yourrg urbrnites' goir.rg to work betwecn the hours of 6:30 and 9:30 am. Their success has inspired the laur.rch of competing free titles by companics such as News Corpr\rati(n (thelondonpaper). L'r August 200(r Associatcd laurrched another free title, London Lite, tct run alongside Metro. I discuss the implications of this trcnd bclow. Here, we uote that tl're gron'th of the free uewspaper has addecl further to the chalienges facir.rg the traditional print journalism industry in thc UK, rnd is ccrtinlv factor in thc declining circulatiorr of paid-for newspilpcrs, esreciallv those in the regions (scc Chapter 9). In addition t() thc free sheets, of course. there :rre hundrecls of paid-for
newspepers being produced outsidc London, ranging fronr the large-circulation Scottish :rrrd regional titles strch as thc D"lily Rt'cord and Swddy NIail, to srnaller-circulation titles targetcd on smrll towlls and rural colntnunitics thc length and breadth of the UK. To the Scots thc aforementiot'lccl newspapers are not 'regional' but 'national', as is \Ydles on Swday to the \7elsh, and the
Ile

the Barclay brothers in 2005 or f,216 million, and in the summer rlf 200f1 owcc1 some 284 regional titlcs ,rcross thc UK). Sotttc tratit>nal proprittors arc also significant owners at regional level, such as Associrted Newspapers and thc Guarcliarr Media Group.a Llntil 1995, Thomson Regiolral Nervspapcrs was a major regional proprietor. ln July that ycar, however, the parent Thomson Corporatior.r auttoultcc.l that it was selling its British newspaper interests irr order to raise investntent capital. Thc English and Irish TRN titlcs were raken 6n by Triity International Holdings, the Scottish titles by the enigmatic Brclay brothers (the Scof,s,,lar) lnd Associatcd Neu'spapcrs (the Aberdeen l,ress dnd Journal). To this extent thc ownership structurc of the regioal press hrrs changec'l significantly in tl-rc lifctirne of this book, as forrnerly ,rr"o, piop.iet'rs like Thou.rsor.r h,rve bcen rcplaced by companics, such as
publishing'5 Johnston Press tnd Ncwsquest, dedicated to regional

The periodical press

No overview of the British print media would be completc without some referencc to the perioclical scctor - tl.rosc wcekll" fortnightly trnd monthll' publications that straddle thc troundaries bctween journalism, leisurc,

lfdst TeLegrapb to tl.re Northcrn Irish. The British rcgional press, including thet of the netiorr-regions, has
ir-r rvhrt or.lc

r-rntil

quitc recerrtly been

comllrcntator calls'boistcrous hcalth'.r lndeecl,

.nt.rt"ir1-"r-rt, and business. Srmc periodicals, such as Prittate Eye rrnd the l.L.tnotist i[r11 e1g the lllnst sucecssl'ul prrltlicatit,rts in thc e,,trlltr)" if measurecl by circulation and advertising rever.rue), hrrve a clearly iournalistic enrrhasis. The setiricel Priuate Eye, in pxrticular, h:rs invcstigated rnd Llncov.r.d -"ny political and busincss scar.rdals in its fir'e-decaclc history, wlrich have sr-rbseqrrcrrtly golte on to nt,rkc thc maillstreal-n news agerlda. The Econcrltsf, as its uate suggests, providcs background, zrnalysis eud cot'umelltary on the domestic and ir-rternltionrl econornic siturtiorr. As a UK periodical with a globel reach, ir sclls or,cr 180,000 in the LJK encl lrcund 460'000 rvorlclu'idc, as conrpared with Prospect's cilculatior of 27,700. Thc great rnrjority of tlK perioclicals operatc itr whrrt the Audit Bureatt of Circulatiotr clssifics as the 'specialist consumer ,rnd business t-nerkets'.

10

-V/ln journalism mdtters

\Yln journalisnt matters

Broadcast iournalism in the UK: television

.l

This includcs such tirles ts Ext'hturge (v Mart nd.'Whttt (J,;ri, cleclicated to providing practical informatior-l for buyers ,l-rd sellcrs of goods and scrviccs;
Garden and Good Housekeeping, contaitriug ideas for DIY ar.rd home clecoration ellthusiasts; i-D and Dazed 6 Confused, which covcr st1'le trends ancl fashion irt clothes, tnusic and popullr culture; listir-rgs ancl rcview magazincs such :rs Rdio T'imcs and ,Srgbt Sr>und; Cosnrrttolitan -\X/omdn's and Oun, addressing tl.re femalc auclience; FHM and Loaded, ctr nren; and Managentt'nt Today, u,hich attempts to kcep professional rnrnagers informed of issues rclevant to thctn. There rre sonre 3000 periocliccl titlcs published in the Uli, with ncrv titles l,runched regularly, indicating that periodicals comprise a rclativcly hcalthy segment of the print indr-rstry rs a whole. h.rdeed, as the print sector gencrally suffcrs rr slow declinc ir-r circulaticlrr, the magezine scctor hls been buoy'arrt. A sarnple of the leading ritlcs by circulation at the tirnc of going to prcss is shor'vn in Table 1..1, and ilrcluclcs TV listings rnagazincs such as Rddio Times, celebrity culturc titles such as Glrtmour and Closer, atrd current affairs rnagazines such as the Economlsr (thcsc are not the top ten as listed by the Audit Bureau of Circulation (ABC), which include give-away magrrzines distributcd by meclia comprnies such as Sky ancl chain stores such rs Asda, Tesco and Sainsbury). Men's magazines sr.rch as Lodderl, which flourished in the 1990s and early noughties with circulations approaching the half-rnillion figure, have declined to rround 100,000, suggesting that the heyday of the 'lad's mag'
magazirres such as Hruse

The earliest provider of rclevision iourrralism in the UK, the British Bro:r.lcesrin! corporarion, began life in 1922 as the Broadcxstillg company. originallv

of raclio manufacturcrs, the Brortclcasting Company was firranced by a licencc fce, and by a sblrc of the rovltics on thc salc rf radio receivers. Thc
a cartel Broadcastir.rg Compauy \\rrls nati()naliscd rnd becanlc the British Broadcasting Corporation rt 1,926, from which timc it has bccn licesed to serve 1s '1 cultural, mgral ancl educetive forcc for thc inrprovcrnent of kntlr,vlcdge, taste atrd urantrers' (Scannell :rn.l Clrcliff, 199 l: 8). Operating undcr the rrovisions of a Royal Charter, the BBC \\rrs collstittlted as a public servicc, fur.rded by public taxation. It u'ill cotinue to play this role for the foresecablc future, subject to pcriodic charter rencwrl (tl.re ncxt is due in 2017). From the outsetr thc BBC interpreted its .rr-rblic service role to meatr

thar

has passecl.

Orvrrership of periodicals is concentratcd, like that of nrrtional and rcgional

newspapcrs, in large compirnies such as IPC and Bauer, but the sector is one in

sirould bc a major providcr of journalistic irrformatiorr to the British people, devotiug a large proportiol-t of its resources to news ancl current affairs broadcasting, first on r:rclio, and the on tclcvisio, thc lattcr of which has' oyer timc, cxpanded to 61'c char.rnels rvith journalistic output, including BBC News (fgrmerly BBC Ncrvs 24; the channel nas re,rrarned in Mey 2008 ls part of a largcr rebranding cxercise for the c()rporltiolt's news outptlt.6 In 2001, ()7, accordirrg to the BBC's annual reporr for that ycar, the main frcc-to-.rir terrestrial channel BBC One devoted 1149 hours t() news rnd cltrrent affairs. For BBC Two tl-re cquivalent figurc wls 831 hours, rvhile the digitll channels BBC Three and BBC l-our also transmittecl journalism. Thc Directoratc of News ar.rd Currcnt Affairs - the deparrmcnt responsible for BBC journalism -

it

which many relatively srnall, indcpendent companies arc thrivir.rg. Somc, like Pressdrern, which publishes Priuate Eve, are wcll establishccl. Others are rccent entrants who hrvc exploited thc chirnging technologl' and econonrics of publishing ushered in by the'tX/apping rcvolution'and subscquent waves of
changing fashion.

lrad a budger itt 1991 of rl30 million (:rbout 24 per cent of totrl TV costs). Journalism ar rhe corporation hrcl rrr rrnnual budgct in 2006 of {350 million
,rnd employcd 2000 journalists.

Independent Television News

Table f itle

1..J

Top ten UK periodicals [.r' circulation, f uly

200tt

CircuLation
1,+0-1,_r12

TY

Choit'

Wht's on TV

1,385,8.+i)

Rddio'l-imes
Tke d Break OK! Magazine Reader's Digest Sagt N'Iagazine Tbe Economist Clldmour Oloscr
Sonrce: Auclir Burcnu

t,051,746 988,056 608,638 619,737 649,400

190,762

J97 9)9,
_s36.1 86

oi Circulation.

had,r ntonopoly ou British telo,isiorr news. That year network 'nvas launched. producing its t-rwll nc\\'s rlnd currellt commercirl rrffrirs. The independent television (ITV) cornpanies sharcd out the making of crlrrent affairs and documentary programmes, while their news was providecl b1'Independerrr Television News (lTN). ITN was ro be owncd collectively b1' ll rhe ITV conrpanies, ed run on ,t nott-profit-makirlg basis to supply therrr with ncws bullctins such as thc flagship Ne,s Af Ten. This it did very succcssfully, wining the contfrct to provide Chanr.rel 4 with news whcn it cemc orl rhe air in tc)81. By 1988, ITN cmplol'ed more than 1000 people to produce ovcr 2-5 horrrs of nc\\s pcl wcck (Durnett, 1990: 132)' In 1997, Il'N won thc f'6 million contract to pro.luce news fgr the new Chrrrr.rel 5. In 2001, dcspite vigorous coltrpetition from Rupert Murdoch's BSkyB, it wot1 the contract to continue pro.lr-rcing ncws for the ITV ttetwork, aucl in 2002 its long-stancling (lh:rnnel 4 neu,s contract n'ts rcttewed,:rt:r valtte of f20 rnilliotr tcr ettt-tuttr ft'r
Llntil
ther BBC
r

.19-5.5,

l2

Why journalism mdtters

'V/htr journalism

matters

13

6ve years. ln 2007 ITN renerved its contract to supply news to ITV, rvorth {250 million. ln January 2005, however, ITN lost the Channel 5 news contract to Sky, which thereby rnoved for the 6rst time fronr the production of rolling news only (see belor,r,) to mainstream, free-to-air terrestrial TV journalism.

Sixty-three per celtt of TV-ant's airtinte al-rd 7.5 per cent of its programtlrc
budget ws dcvoted to news altd currcnt affairs, supplied by forcign bureeux irr

Regional TV news
The bulk of the BBC's news atrcl crlrrcnt effairs, ancl rrll of ITN's, is produced in London and nenvorked throughout the UK. But both thc BBC and ITV also provide regional nervs scrvices. Since the merger of Yorkshire TV and Tyne Tees TV in 1992 there rrc 15 ITV companies covering the country, most r.l'ith tl'reil: olvn locall,v -rroduced nr:tgazines, news trulletins ancl current :rffairs output. As we will sce below, the 13 clistinct commercial regional TV l"rews services are under consiclerable pressure as a result of the move to digital broadcasting in the LIK, rnd in 2008 ITV chief exccutive lMichael Gracle describecl current levels of invcstment in regional news as 'unsustainablc'. The BBC has six 'Nations and Regions' (Scotlancl, \flales, Northern Ireland, and North, Midland ar.rd South in Englancl) and 13 regional departments (such
as BBC Lonclon, BBC-- South East) producing television news and current aff:rirs

at local levcl.

Breakfast TV
Breakfast television services, all of which include sorne news, wcre established in Britail.r in 1985, reflecting the trend throughout the 1980s towards more l.rours of news progrlmmir.rg on tclevision. The BBC was rhe first to provide a full three-hour breakfast progrllnme, now known as Bredkf'ast Nars, trncl was quickly followed by TV-arn or.r ITV, owned by a cor.rsortiurn t>f banking and fir.rancial interests led by the Australian Bruce Gyngell, who had previor-rsly bcen chief executive of Australir's (lhannel 9. TV-am thus becrme the first

'Vlashington, Moscorv, Cyprus and Hong Kong, with local ncws coming from eight regional centrcs. Video rneterial was sr-rpplied by Visncws. TV-am was a highly popular service, achieving some 70 per cent of thc natioual audience and rnaking substanti:rl prgfits ior its owlrers. The conlpay's finlnces were grcatly helped by the successflrl outcolne of its disrute rvith the broadcasting unicns in 1988, mlking possible rr rerllocciorr of resources from the technical side of the productir)n pr()ccss to journalisnr. Jeff Bcrliner, TV-am's head of news, explained in 1991 that 'before thc dispute we lrad 82 iournalists. \X/c've noq' got 120. Twcnty-f6ur per cent of TV-arn's workforcc are jourttalists. l\,Iost peorle t TV-atu rvork on llews atld ctlrrellt affairs programming. Not finance, or mallagement, or anything else.' In this respect, TV-anl was a pioneer and a moulcl-breaker in British television news. And having 'resolve.l the issue of who m:rnagcs the industry' with the unior]s, the company looked set to go into the 1990s providing n'hat Jcff Berlier called 'a fasr, accurate, credible and creditablc news scrvice, within a sensible financial base'. Unforttrnately fgr TV-am, and to thc sttrprise of nrany irr the iclusrry, thc company ws c{estinecl to becot-t"tc the urost prottritrctrt victim of the changes to the prr>cedures fcr allocating frartchises introduced by the 1990 Broadcasting Act. The ITV breakfast-time licetrce was alrvays goirrg to be mucl-r sought after,

new provider
established

of national telcvision journalisrn in the UK

since

ITN

was

From the outset) 'fV-am, like the BBC, built its service around news ,rnd current afflirs, although r,vith a markedlv 'lightcr' tcuch than the lrrter's more anarlytical, in-depth coveraac. Parallcling the distinuion berlvecn the BBC's Birtirn approach and thrt of ITN (scc Chapter 6), TV-arn arrempred to con, struct a clistinctive brand image for its pro.luct, which iaid much lnorc stress on human interest and lifcstyle coveralie than or-l 'harcl' ncrvs. The TV-an-r formula, as described in its 1991 application for the ITV breakfast-rime licence, w:rs a 'live, fast-moving mixture of news, information and entert,rinnrent in short self-contlined segnrents which viewers car-r dip in and out of, listen to as well :rs watch, ls they strrt the day'. Its style rvas 'warr-n and friendly', with a 'human facc', combinir.rg regional, nrtional ilnd international news feeds with cosv studio chats betwcen casually dressed presenters irnd guests from the entcrtrinment :rncl political rv<rlds.

in

19.55.

it hatl gcnerated for TV-am, urcl when invittions to tencler were issucd (competitive tendering was introduced for thc first time by the 1990 Act), TV-am found itself compcting with two rival consortia: Daybreak Teievision, cor.rsistig of ITN, Carltorr Cotnmunicatiot.ts, the Daily Telegrapb ancl NBC, among others; rnd Sunrisc (now GMTV), the r.I]jority oi which was owned by the Guardian and Mauchester Eveniug News Group, Scgttish Television, London Weekerrd Tclcvision arrd the !elt Disney Company. Both f)lybreak ad Sunrise lased thcir bicls on thc llleged u'eakness of TVam's scrvice. 'Sflhat to TV-am was 'wartt] and friedly' with 'a human face' was t1; Daybreak 'trite'. TV-am's 'soft approach' to ncws and currcnt effairs would, it warned, lerd in thc future to a loss of ITV's breakfast audiencc and thus its advertising evenue. Sunrise criticisecl TV-an.r f1lr its poor regional service. Although TV-am took pride in having eight 'regional ccntres' feecling material into a national package, critics suggested rhat the centrcs - in reality remote-controlled sttr.lios on the prelnises of the regional compattics - were 'c()smctic invcstncnts', with little input into the finished TV-arn product. Sunrise proposed to farm out its regional ncws ro tlre cstablishcd region:rl compaies, who would provide T regular opt-out segnlellts for vie,uvers in clifferent parts of the country, rvhile nltional the resources of LWT and Visr-rews rt''otld bc employed to troduce and international coverage. When rhe IT(l allocared the ITV breakfast licence in October 1991, Sunrise
give rhe profits crerged ,rs

its fevoured can.lidetc to provide c,rrll' Inortritrg

televisi<lu

14

.\Ylty

journalisnt mdtters

.V/hy

journalism

mtters

15

ioumalism in the 1990s. TV-rm's application wrs deerned ir.rferior ro that of the Sunrise consorrium, which began broadcasting on 1.fan'ary 199-l under the name Goocl M.rni'g TV (GMTV). In 2008, GMTV conrinues to be the t-nain fi'ee-to-air cor-npetitor to thc BBC's Bre,rftfast Nen's. It also conrperes u'itlr Sky News's Sunrise brcrkfrst show r.r'hich, likc othcr chlnnels on satcllitc and cable, has stcldily grown in irnportancc as a UK ncrvs provider.

Rolling news
1989, Rupert Murcloch's Ncws Corporlti.n launchcd Sky News, Britain,s first ?4-hour television news channel, as part of its Sky Television service, transn.ritting from the Astrr satellite. For a brief period of some six nronths therc rvas another satellite provicler of news - British Sarellite Broadcasting r.vhich launchecl 14 monrhs rfrer sky on rhe dircct broadcasting by satellire (DBS) system. Berween April rnd October 1990, BSB and Sky fought an expensive battle for subscribers to thcir two complctely incornpatible systerns, losirrg an cstimared f1 .25 billion bctween them. Neither Rupert Murd.ch nor the consortium rhat or.vned BSB coulcl sustain such losses for very lor-rg, and at the end of october 1990 tt \\,rs announced that thc tw. sateliitc networks woulcl merge to form BSkyB, 50 per cenr of which would be owned by News oorporation, 16 per cent by Pearson, 12 pcr cent by Granrda Television, and 3.7 pcr cent by Rcecl Inrernatio'I.8 Today, BSkyB is one-third owrecl by

In

u'ith its coveragc of such cvents as thc 1991 Gulf Wr and the Sertember 1l attack on the World Trade Ccnter, its audience in the UK rcmains smrll. The BBC hes also firmly establishcd itself in thc 24-hour television news market. In Nover.nber 1991, after years of planning, the '$forlcl Service launched a glohal satellite tclcvision service - Worlcl Service Tclevision Ner'vs (WSTN) - which aimed to do for the global TV audicnce what thc World Service hrs trac'litior"tally done for radio listeners. Moreover, the BBC hoped to r.nake this servjce the base for its own 2-l-hour domestic TV news channel, lr'hich u'ould compcte with Sky Ncws ar.rd CNN for the British audience. This plan came to iruition ir.r Novembcr 1997 with the lrunch of BBC News 24 on cable (the scrvice was also made available to terrestrial TV viewers on BBC
C)ne during the night). By that time, too, BBC's global television news servicc, BBC llorld, wrs transmittir.rs to more than 100 countries.By 2002, BBC News )4 was reaching audicnces of scven million viewers pcr week, irr-rcl -13 million tuned ir-r to the channel's covcrage of the Septembcr l1 events, attracted by what werc claimed by managcrs to be the BBC's 'hallmarks of authority, classic reporting and responsibility'. Benefitting from access to thc substantial r.rews-gathering rcsources of the BBC, Ner.r,s 24 clainred by 2002 to have overtaken Skv News, its nr:rin comperiror, on the quality of, for exarnple, its overseas and regional covcrage, coveriug some 80-90 original stories on an average day.rO Neither BBC News 24 nor Sky Ncws achicved audicnces anything like those enjoyed by terrestrial TV news (less than one per cent of the lnulti-channel audicncel ol1 ver;.lge), cxcept in times of crisis such as thc Scptember 1l attacks and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Thirty-three million people in Britain watched BIIC News 24's coverage of the September 11 attacks. When the Iraq war began in March 2003, BBC News 24 saw its audience rise b,v.500 per cent to 3.2 per ccnt rrnd Sky Ne*'s by 820 per cent to 8.3 per cent.ll ln 2000, anxious not to bc left behincl in thc UK rolling news rnarket, ITV launched a 24-hour service of its own, ITV News Chitnt.rel, although a lack of rcsources meant that it never matched either the reputatiot] or the audiences of BBC News 24 and Sky Ner,r's. On 11 Septembcr 2001, of the three LlK-based rolling nervs servces Sky News had mcst vier.vers, u'ith 5.9 pcr cent of the nrulti-channel audience. BBC News 24 got 2.5 per ccnt and ITN's News Clhannel only 0.6 per cent. ITV closed the service at the end of 2005. C)ne further new service is worth notilrg - Al Jazeera English, which launchecl in Novernber 2006 on the strength of the inrpact of Al Jazeera's maitt Arab-language service. Although intenc'led as a compctitor to CNN and BBC World for the global news market, it has been availrrble to subscribers in the tJK, and fcaturcd promir.rent British journalists slnong its prcscnrers, including Drvid Frost ancl Rageh Onrirr. By 2008 it had become establishcd irs a global 24-hour ncr.r's playcr, although reports of mauagernent problems alrcl cultnroideological clashes betwcen Arab ancl r-ron-Arab st,rff were common, with rnatry staff leaving the organization.12 Taking all the abovc together, and nonvithstanding tl.re significalrt challenges urd issues to be cxplorec'l later in this book, we can rc'asonably artue that the

Nen,s Corporrtion. Although Sky News has bee. a crirical s'ccess (perhap5 surprisinglv, given the widespread cr'rrempr in which the media establishment has traditionally held Rupert Murd.ch's tabloid rrewspapers), its profitabiliry was hampered for nlany vears by thc relatively slorv initial take-ur of satellite television by rhe British public, and thc failure of cable se^,ices to penerrare the British media rnarket to any significant degree until the encl of the 1990s. Had it not been for the safety net provided by Murdoch's immensely profitablc newspaper inrerests in thc LIK, Sky News's o.going l.sses woulcl, in the vicrv .f ma'y inclustry obsc^'ers, ha'e bee. ursusrainble. By the nrid-1990s, howevcr, BSkvB had entered a healthier phase, and lvith it sky News. At the beginning of 1992, the ()bseruer reported that tl.re conrpany was olr the verge of profitability, with 100,000 dishes per monrh bcing sold, and 2.8 million ho'res by ther being reachccl in the UK.e By 1998, BSkvB was availablc through satellire in 3.g nlilli.n homes, and through cable in urorher 2.4 million, ge'erati'g profits substantial enough to make a significant contributior.r to such audacious moves as the amempted f,620 million purchase of Manchester united football club in September 1998 (rejccted by the British govenrmenr or.r comretition grods). In e:rrly' )008, more than 8 million British households had acccss to sky' TV. sky News was Britai''s 6rst domesticalll'-produced 24-hour televisio. news service, although the uS-produced cable Network Ncws, owned by American entrepreneur Tcd Turner, had lreen available since 198.5 to those with the approprite receivir.rs tecl.rnologv. Despite the global impact rnade by cNN

16

'Why journalism mdtters Table 1.1 Average audienccs for UK radio channels"
Station

Why jottrnaLism

matters

17

channels 3 and 4, while Sky News scrviccd channel -5. Viewers hrcl access to another hour or so of local coverage on ITV, while thosc with satellite disl-res or
cable could watch Sky News, BBC News 24 (u,'hich in 2008, bccame sirnply BBC News), cNN rncl ()rhers for 24 hours per day, every clay, if they wishcd. Audiences for individLral television services were declining as rnore platforn.rs for news dclivery lrecarne established, but as is also rrue for print, this was to be expected in the face of growing competition from inrernet sites such as www.bbc.c..uk.

television joun.ralisrn ir.rdustry in the uK is in a state of rclatively good health. News, current affairs and rclated information services havc cxpancled both latituclinally, with ncw providers such as Sky News and cNN corning into thc markcr, ancl longitudinally, with the timc devoted to journalisrn on telcvisiol increasirg relentlessly. orr an average weekday in 2008, the BBC produced some five hours of TV ncws and current affairs on its two tcrrestrial channels, ITN about thc samc across

Reach Rech Auerage

(000s)

(%)
90
68

hours

Auerage

per

head

bours per listener

Tc:ttl hrurs (000s)

Listening
share in total suruey dred

(TSA) (%)

All

radio
1

AII BBC
BBC Radio
BtsC Radio 2

45,397 31,219 11,067 13,632

20.5
11.7

22.8 17.2

1,033,308 100

587,0.57

BBC Radio 3 BBC Radio 4 BBC Radio 5 Live All commercial talkSPORT All local commercial

22 27 1,795 4
79 12
5

2.2 3.4 0.2

2.5

9.9
12..5

109,824 170,097 125,863 424,396

5.4
13.2

9,567 6,022

9,761

56.8 10.6 16.5

0.9
12.2

0.9
8.4

7.9
13.7
8

17,655

4.6
41,.1

.11,019 62

2,470

24,847

49

0.4 6.2

12.6

19,725 r.9 31-1,4,+U 30.3

Teletext
Bcfore leaving tclevision, we should note the collrinuing irnporr.rrce
electronic news and informarion scrvices cecfax (produced by the BBC) a'd Teletext (its commercial rival, owned by Associated Newspapers). These services enable thc owners of tclevisiorr receivers to access elcctronic dlta about everythin! from current cvenfs ro transporr timetablcs and recipes. Although the view of some observcrs that teletext services functioned as,clectronic newspapers' and would evcntually rnake rcdunclanr the more farniliar paperand-ink variety has been overraken by the ernergence of rhe inrerner, th"y h"u" remaincd irnportant as information sources, uot least to the journalism industry itself, right up ro the present timc. As of 2004, ir was esrimated by the BBC that somc 20 million people still used ceefax each week. cecfax and Teletext will be fully digitized with the e'd of analogue broadcastir.rg in 2012.

of

Source: RAJAR. "Figr.rres calcul:rted as avereges for December 2007-March 2008. I'}opulation = .5,033,,[00.

the some 30 per cent of its total radio output.la In addition, rcgional stations such as Radio Scotlar.rd and Radio Ulster broadcast substantial quar.rtities of their own news and current affairs output. Thc BBC also produces radio journalism, through the '\)lorld Service, for an estimated global auclience of 120 million

people (see Chapter 7).15 At home, the BBC management in "1992 announced its intention to establish a 24-hour rolling news service on network radio.16 Radio -5 Live is now firmly establishecl in the UK journalisrn landscape, with a weekly reach of over six

million peoplc.
The supply of r.rews to the commercial radio stations has traclitionally bcen undertaken by Independent Radio News (lRN), the major part of which was until October 1992 owned by the Crown Communications Group. That month IRN merged with ITN and moved into the latter's headquarters in London's Gray's Inn Road. From here, a networked service of hourly news bulletins is transmitted to commcrcial companies across the country. As a result of the 1990 Broadcasting Act, dozens of small community stntions on the one hand, ar-rd several new national channels on the other, came irrto bcirrg, broadcasting news services as psrt of their programming. IRN continues to supply these stations, but has now been joined by rival providers such as National Network News and Europe FM. Sky Radio News supplies about 20 per cent of the UK's commercial stations. The larger (and richer) krcal stations, such as Radio Clyde in Glasgow, produce a large proportion of their own news and current affairs.

Radio
Despite the expansion of television and other platforrns in recenr years, the oldest broadcast mcdium, radi., has retained a hcalthy share of the British audience

and, in thc commercial sector, of aclvertising revenues.l.r Dcspite recurring predictions of the imrninenr dearh of the medium, journalistic output o radio has bcen in a pcriod of expansior.r since the early r990s. In the ten years from 1992to 2002, audiences for radio increased from 88 to 90 pcr cent ofthe population, with listeners tuning in for an average of 21.5 hours per week. comrnercial radio's share of uK advertisilrg reven'e increased fr<m z to 6.4 pcr cent by 2002. Radio Joint Audiencc Research (RAJAR) figurcs for the first half of 200g (Table 1.4) showed commercial radio taking 41.1 pcr cent of the total market. Thc domina't f.rce in uK radi. journalisn.r rcmair.rs by far the BBC, which rcachcd 68 per cenr of the adr-rlt populatio' i' early 200g ancl achicvecl a 56.g per cent audience share. The BBC broadcasts some.1000 hours per annurn of national news' cllrrent affairs and docurnentary features across its 6ve charrnels -

Online journalism
\While
rcccss to teletext services is lir-nited to conventional TV sets, computer and mobile rhone users now hrve eccess to practically unlimited qulntities of

18

'Why journalism mLttters

Vlhy jounulisnt

mdtters

19

print-originated journalism, as well as audiovisual material and origir.ral news content distributed on the internet. This incluclcs nraferial made availrble on thc online sitcs of established print and broadcst r.rcws orglr.risxrions, such as the Guardian and the BBC; bulletin boarcls, gossip pagcs such as the Drudge Report (which farnously placed the Monica Lewinsky scandal in thc public domriu early in 1998, trnd more rcccnfly broke the story that HRH Prince Harry was on active servicc in Afghanistan), and blogs, of which therc are literally millions. \lhile the majority of blogs ere amareur sites of little journalistic value (see chapter 8), a small numtrcr - the visible tip of the inrcmct iceberg - have becone influcntial arcl widely used platforms for distributing and acccssitrg llews, analysis and commentary. The blogosphcrc has become the site of what has been crlled r 'new comlnentariat' - a iroup of online writers who increasingly rival rhc trrditional scnse-making and ncws-filtering rolc of the press pundir (McNair, 2008b). The precise number of online joumalisrn sites is clificult to cstablish, but their growth has been exponenrial. whcn thc first edition of this book was published there were none (although the intcrnct was already bcing uscd to distribute informatior.r, including news). By 1998, and publication of my book <n The SocioLogy ctf Journalism (McNair, 1998b), the number of inrerner news sites, although rising rapidly, numbcred ir.r the hunclreds. Today wc can talk of millions, fr.m the well rcsourced sites of long-esrablished print brands such as thc Nep York Times ar.rd the Gudrdin, to the i'flucntial blogs of well known freelancers such as Al.rdrew sullivan, and the myriad morc *rugh-and-ready blogs, social networking profiles and aggregzrtor sitcs rhat collec and distribute news and news-based material. The emergcnce of the interner, like televisio' beforc it, has provokcd speculation about the irnpcndi'g dcath of print, a'd one can easily see why onlir.re channels posc a threat to the traditional print and broadcast means of disseminrtion of news and journalisrn. The speed, interactivity and comprehensiveness of thc interrlet rs au information sourcc are unprececlented in thc history of commur.ricati.r.r media, and the implications of its introducrion ro the mass market (a developn'rent unforesecn two dccades ago, and now unstoppable) are impossible to prcdict with certainty. In drawing our contemporary news map, however, it remains the case that onlinc news media represent for the time being a complement to, rather than replacement for, traditional sources of broadcast and print journalism, accessed mainly by business, academic and journalistic users. Ncarly all broadcrst and print news organisations in thc UK now have online versions, and some, such as FT.com, are able to charge for access to their specialist data and information services. As of May 2008, some 18 million people were recordcd as 'unique monthly users'of the guardianco.zA wcbsite (Table 1.5). The BBC has,ne of the world's leading news sites, with ovcr 50 rniilion users, cornpeting for global dominatio' with cNN, Yahoo! Ncws, Fox.com and others seeki'g to establish thernselves as online proviciers of choice for the disccrning news junkie. But while virtually every()ne in a counrry like the UK has a TV set, fewer as

Tle
'V/

1.5 Leading online journalisrn sites,

May

2008'!

ebsite

Unique nonthly trsr:rs

50,358,061
18,712,.53.1

BBC

MiL Online 'l'elegrapb.co.uk Times ()nline Thc San FT.crnt

() udrtlid

18,197,944
18,.12.1,82'+

Ll

nl

ntited

l5 ,877 ,693 1,+,9,+8,080

'fhe Indeltendent
Source: AB(le.

7,113,r32
6,.5-t.1,792

yet havc casy, Lurrestrictecl acce ss to a computcr termirral (:rlthough that numbcr is iucreasing all the time, and computer acccss will soon bc es corllmonplircc within the average household as the TV and mobile phone). For that rc1sor1, enlonl ()thers, broadcast and print c()ntinLle to be thc mrin sources of news, in thc UK ancl comp:rrable countrics. Rescarch cor-rducted in 2006 showcd that TV remrinccl the most importarrt sourcc of news f.rr 55 per cent of thc British population, followed by newspapers at 19 per cent, r:rclio at 12, u-rcl the intcrnct xt 8 pcr ccnt.lT Since then, the import:rnce of thc intcrnet rs
r

news sourcc has undoubtcdly increased, irs has the cconomic chirllcngc posed

by internct cornpetition for advcrtising rcvcnuc, although thc most

rcccnt rcscarch conductcd by Ofcorn and othcrs (scc (ihaptcr 8 below) corrfirms thrt TV and newspapers remair-r the main sources of news and journalism.

Conclusions
The journalisrr industry, taken as :r whole, is a dynanric, growing scctor of thc cconony in llritain, as elsewhere in the world. For that reasoll akxre, it would bc worthy of close study. But journalisrn is not just of economic importencc, ir is arguably one of thc kcy social and cultural forccs irr our socicty. In Britain, 67 per cent of adults rcad at lcast one national newspaper, while 84 per ccnt read a regional title. A 1990 survcy cstablishcd that TV arrd r.rewspapers c()rne aheacl of friends, farnily, politiciar-rs or othe sourccs of inforrnation when it comes to influcncing opinion, and that television joumalism ir.r particul:rr is the main sourcc of pcoplc's information about the world. Tweuty-four crtegories of public issue were nlentioncd to rcspondents, ar-rd 'televisiou ncws was shown to hrve the grertest influence among thc largcst number of people. And wherr it wAsrl't first:rs an influence it came sccond or third'.18'On average',

wrote Barrie Gunter

ir.r the 1980s,'around two-thirds of the mass public of modcrn industrialised societies cl:rir-r-r that television is their main source of national and intcrnationel news' ((iuntcr, 1987 7). This remrins broadl,v the crse. I:u-r Hargreaves and the late Jarncs Thomas's N'r, Nezs, ()ld Neuts study (Hargreaves rnd Thomas, 2002) found that TV

20

'Why journaLism matters

was the main source of news for 65 per cent of the British audience (against 16 per cent for radio, 15 per ccnt for r-rewspapers, arrd only two pcr ccltt for the intcrnct). More recent research, conductcd in 2006 by the LIK broadcirsting regulator Ofcom, clcmonstrated that vicwers place high value on the contir-ruing trvailerbility of TV news and current affairs, at both netional and rcgionrl levels (Ofcorn,2007).1 cited above a 2006 global sr-rrvey of news consumcrs conducted for thc BBC, Rcuters and the Meclia Centre, which found that thc most importalrt sources of inforrnatior-r for LIK citizens were tclcvision, followcd by newspapers, radio and the intcrnet. The same research furthcr for-urcl that the n-rost trusted ncws source in thc UK was'IV (citcd by 86 per ccnt), followed by friends and family (78 pcr cent), newspapers (76 per celtt) and radio (67 per cent). This wrs cor.rsisrcr.rr with rcsearch cor.rductcd by the YouGov pollirrg organisation irr 2003, showing thirt broadcast jourrrtrlists arc rrustcd 'a grcar deal' by 8l pcr cent of thosc survcycd, compared with 6-5 pcr cent who trust broadsheet journalists, 36 pcr cent mid-rnarket tabloid journalists, and 14 per cent red-top journalists.re

Journalism's social role

This chapter reviews the mrin approaches to the inlpacts and influences of joumalism in society, irrcluding:

Further reading To keep up-to-date on the ever-changing srrte of the British news media, see the irrclustry perioclicals Press Gazette, Broadcast and British Jour-

o o o

thc surveillance fulrction of journalism

gencla-setting

social reproduction journalisrn ancl the social construction of risk.

ndlism Reuiew. Reports by thc BBC and Ofcom, usually available online, are useful sources of up-to-the-minute rcsearch data. Most broadsheet llewspapers havc weekly media pages, which cover ABC figurcs and current debates in the industry. The ABC now h:rs figures for online usagc, irs well as print sales. Journttlism Prdctice publishes recent scholarly research on the industry.

Of wicler importirncc than the relative efficacy of inclividual media as informatiorl sourccs is thc issue of thc cffects of mcdi,r communications on individuals and or.r socicty. What is thc rclationship bctwccn thc products of joun.ralisrn and wider social processes? If modern journalism's purpose is to supply information to a mass audience or, as Niklas Luhmann and the systems theorists put it, 'tht: production and supply of topics for public communication' (Loffelholz, 2008: 20) - whrt social role does this infornation
lrave?

Journalism as surveillance

At thc simplcst levcl, journalism presents us with ar.r ongoit.rg narrative about the world bcyond our immcdi,rtc expcrience. This narrative is rsserted to bc 'tnre'. The stories told to us by journalists arc understood by their audiences to be factual, rather than fictional. For this reason, joumalism perfort-us a unique and csscntial socirl function. For most of us, most of thc tinrc, journalists are thc rnain sourcc of our informatior-r abor-rt the world beyond our own ir-nrncdiate environment. 'We may, on occasion, be participarrts in cvcnts
that becornc the subject matter of joumalism - in which case we rnay be better inforrned than any journalist about the cvcnt concerned - but this is exccptional (and nrost peoplc would rathcr not bc so close to a newsw()rthy cvcnt if they cirn avoid it)..[oumalisn.r, conscquently, is often seid to be orir'window on thc worlcl', ollr fireans of contact with an external environnrcnt which, although shrinking bccirusc of evolving cornmunicatior-r tcchnologies such irs

22

JournttLism's sccial rrle

JourndLisnt's social rcLe 23

still largely beyond our direct, personal experience. It provides thc information from which we draw our 'cognitive maps' of reality. Beyond this basic social function, journirlism is expected to perform atr important political role in liberal piuralisr societies, fceding ancl sustaining the democratic process by supplying citizcns lr'ith the information they require to makc rational electortrl and economic choices. Journalism, :rccorcling to this vicwpoint, unclcrpins democratic institutions by kccping voters informed about the things thcy necd to know. The task of journalism is 'to make inforrrerion publicly availrble' (Bruhr.r-Jcnsen, 1986: 31), this bcing 'one basic ingredient of the public sphcrc... required for public plrticipation in discussion and decisions' (McNair, 2000; Bamett rnd Grbor, 2001; Conboy, 2004; Lewis et al., 2005; Auclcrson and Warcl, 2007). C)fcom's Nez Netus, Future Neus study reaffinned this view with thc observation that 'news is important because it inforrns and educatcs citizens, helping thcrn takc part in the democratic process' (Ofcom, 2007:12). As we shall see in Chaptcrs 3--5, many of the criticisms that have bccn directed towards British journalism in recenr times have been insrired by thc perception that it does not pcrform these functions
tl.re internet, is

More recent UK research on the iink between media coverage of a story and public knowledge and understandir.rg of it was conducted by Hargrcavcs et al. at Cardiff University. 'Iheir large-scalc study of 'the public's knowledge, opiniorr and ur.rderstanding of science-related issucs rcported in the rnedia' founcl that:
\X/hat people know [about scieuce] usually corresponcled with those aspects of the science st()ry that rcccivcd m()st persistent coverage. The details or subtlcties of media coveragc are, in this respect, much less inportant than thc gcneral themes of that covcrage, iu which certairr idcas are repeated and lssociated with one anothcr. \X/hilc this does mean some infomratior-l is comtnunicated effectively to most people, it can aiso result in widesprcad misunderstanding - cven if the reporting is gcncrally accurate.

(Hargreaves et dl., 2002: 2)

This

adequately.

The view of journalisrn's social role as cssentially benevolent is underpinned

by the 'uses and gratiflcations' approach ro medir effecrs, which asserts that the rnedia in general have only a limited impact on rhc auclicncc, who 'use' their contcnt to 'gratify' particul1r needs, such as 'surveillance of the cnvironment'. News is used for informtion purposcs, but does nof havc significant lrower to tell w wbat to think. A more cornplcx arralysis, but one that shares the basic optimism of the 'uses rnd gratifications' approach, is provided by thc aclvocates of journalisrn's 'agenda-setting' role. In thc worcls of one of thc founders of this approach,

with a period of intcnsive media coverage of the mLrnps, (MMR) issuc, which spread to the general public thc suggcstion, subsequerrtly discredited, that the risc of aurism diagrroscd in childrcn in rcccut yerrs was rttribut:rble in part to the cffecrs of thc triple-jab vaccinc for MMR. This issue rose high on the public and political agenda in 2001-02, with parcntal concerns ieading to a fall in take-up of the vaccine to a record low of
rcscrrch coincided

mcasics and rubella

81 per ccnt. Then Prime Mir.rister Tony Blair came under pressure to cleclare that

'a direct, causal relationship between thc ljournnlistic] content of the media agenda and subsequent pr.rblic perception of what the important issues of the day are. This is an assertion of direct lcanring by mcmbers of the public frorn the media agcnda' (McCornbs, 1981: 211). The basic hypothesis of this approach is that 'through their routine srrucurini of socirl and political reality, the ncws n'redia ir.rflucnce rhe agenda of public issues around which political campaigns and voter decisions are organised' (bid.).In the agenda-setting hypothesis, journalistic news values acr as a cue for the audience, alcrtirrg thel-n to the importance of an issue, and encourlging thcm to place it on thcir personal agcncias of in-rportant issues.l The empirical evidence for this thesis is arnbiguous, but since this is rhc casc for all effects hypotheses, that is no reason to dismiss it. Denis McQuail notcs that agenda-setting has thc srarus of 'a plausible bur unprovcn idea' (McQuail, 1987: 276). lyengar and Kindcr are more confident, expressing strong support for agerrd:r-setting on the basis of rheir own audience research (which applies only to Americnn TV news). Tl'rcy assert that'the verdict is clear:rnd unequivocal. ... By attending to sorle problcms and ignoring othcrs, television ncws sl.rirpes the American public's political priorities' (ibid.: 33).
agenda-settin! asserts

his own ncwborn son had been vaccinated with MMR (although he refused to do so otr thc grounds of his family's personal privacy). Hargrcaves et al. argued that media coverage of the MMR story had failed comprehcnsivcly or systematically to challenge the MMR-calrses-autism theory, or to highlight thc wcaknesses of the scicntific cvidencc underpinning it. As a result, rnembers of thc pr-rblic who relicd on ncws for thcir information formed a misleading imprcssion of thc risks associatccl with MMR, which then shaped the agenda confronting politictrl and public health authoritics. Here, and in many other cases, the presencc of a story in the news agcnda signals its importance to the audience, and initiates public and political debate based on the content of the news coverage. That the agenda-setting hypothesis is taken seriously by policy-rlakcrs rnd

other social actors is illustrated by thc growth of public rclatior.rs and news management as communicativc precticcs in rcccnt dccades (McNair, 2007). Political parties, pressure gr()ups and others with an interest in winning public opinion for their cause now routinely seek to shape the news agenda by headlinegrabbing and other news nrJnsgement irctivities, frorn news conferences to
spectacular demonstrations and thc staging of pseudo-cvents. Fllection carnpaigrrs are built around cfforts to shape the news agcnda in ways that will fvour e particular p1rty or candidate, or to damage the opponent.

Journalism as social reproduction

Approaches that rssert an essentially benevolent, or at least neutral, socirl role for journalisrn, such as the theory of agerrda-sctting, arc challcnged by 'critical'

24

JournaLism's scciaL role reaclings

Jcturnalism's social

role

25

theorists, who draw on Marxist and other analytical frameworks to argue that journalism's function is essentially one of social reproduction, in thc scrvicc not of society as a whole, but of its don-rinant groups and classes. From this perspective, tl-re information media are vicwed, like other cultural institutions in r cllss society, as producers of dominant ideology, representing the intcrcsrs of an elite minority to the subordinrre majority. There are 'strong' and 'weak' variants of the social reproductior-r thesis, correspondir.rg to widcr clisputes in materialist theory about the nature of ideology, the audience rnd the communicarion process. The structuralists, for example, inspired by thc work of Jtrcques Lrcau, Louis Althusser and others, would argue that the linguistic strlrcture of journalism 'positions' the audience in a subordinate position uis--uis thc dominant class of capittrlisrn. This 'interpellation of the subject' operates at the level of the unconscious so that thc individual member of the audience is, practically speakirrg, powerlcss to resist the ideological messagc. As Van Dijk puts it, 'the structures of news reports at many levels condition thc readers to dcvelop [dorr-rin:u.rt] interprctative frrmeworks rather than altcrnative oncs' (Van Diik, 1988: 182). Idcology, t() put it another way, is 'produced' in language, at thc lcvel of the unconscious. The 'dominant ideology' thesis, as cxprcssed in thesc tcrms, has come under some attack in rcccnt years. On thc onc hand, it is argued that the hypothcsis is prirnitive, underpinned by a mechanistic model of cffccts that has long bcen discredited. Another position rsserts that there is no such thing as a 'dominant ideology' or a 'ruling clirss', but rather a constantly shifting alliance of classcs ancl social strata, which struggle to dominate idcologically but do not neccssrrily succeed. Even if there is r dominant ideology, those such as Umberto H,co in Italy and Stuart Hall in thc UK draw or.r the theorctical concepts of semiotics al.rd the political sociology of Antonio Gramsci to emphasise the possibility of oppositional and abcrrant decodings of joumalistic messages on the part of the audience. They would accept that there can be a dominant ideokrgical message present in journalism, but that r.ro inevitability attaches to its being transmitted successfully to the audience. For this group of theorists, ideological srruggle is likc a process of cultural negotiation, to which journalisrn contributes by 'rcproducing consensus about social ordcr' (Ericson et al., 1990: 19). News organisatiorrs arc said to play a strategic role in hegcrnonic struggle, funcrioning as 'a sitc of contest betwccn competing social forces rather than as a conduit for ruling class ideas' (Curran, 1990: 142). For Johrr Fiske, jounralism functions 'as discourse, thlt is, as a sef of convcntions that strivc to control and lirnit the meanings of the events it conveys' (Fiske, 1987: 282) . Starting from the assumption thar news, likc all rcxts, is polysemic - comprises a plurirlity of meanings - Fiske argues rhar the news text'is cngaged in a constant struggle to contain the muitifarious events and their polysen.ric potential within irs own convenrions' (ibid.:286). Journalists selcct aspccts of thc real world, then prescnt them in a narrarive form thrt allows ther-n to be rnlde sense <;f, bur also prevents potentially disruptivc

auclier-rce. Journalisn-r can thus be ana'strltegics of ccntainment' which it deploys. More recently, Stuart Allan argues that 'news discortrses help K) ndturdlise a cultural politics of legitimacy so as to lcnd justification to modern society's distribution of power and influcnce' (Allan and Zclizer,2004:77, his emphasis), arrd that they 'effectively depoliticise the dominant meanings, values and beliefs associated with thcse incqunlitics'. Regardless of the sophisticrtion with which the social reproduction thesis is put, it is nearly always brscd on the rssertion that membcrs of the audience obtain from iournirlisrn information that will tend to support trr.r ideologically loaclecl view of thc world; ot're that will contribute r() rhe rcproduction of arr unequal and fundamentally antagonistic social systcm without dysfur-rctional conflict. Given the immensc rnethodological difficultics attached to such a projccr, it is perhaps no surprise that attempts to demonsrrate ernpirically such 'icleological effects' havc been few. Those studies that have been undertrken rre cor.rtradictory and inconclusive. Guy Cumberbatch's study of audicr.rcc perceptior.rs of telcvision news c()verage of the 1984-85 mincrs' strikc appcarcd to show that viewers were generally apathetic or resistant to the 'domirrant' message of the news, insofar as that mcssage could be deduced from content irnalysis (Cumbcrbatch et al., 1986). Grcg Philo's auclicnce research has clairned to demonstrate the opposite: that 'whilc diffcrcuccs in political culture

lysed

in tcrms of the

of events bcing made by the

and class expcricnce have important influences on the interprctation of

events ... thc mcdia are providing a major input of ir.rformation which secrns to relate very dircctly to the beliefs of some people' (Philo, 1990: 56). The socirl rcproduction thesis can at times veer close to the conspiratorial presuppositions of earlier 'mass society' theorists, who assigned to all media a

direct and powerful rolc

in the

subjugation

of the

subordinate classes of

capitalism. Paddy Scannell observcs that 'for all its seerning sophistication the Theory of Ideology says something very simple indeed; something not very different from what Leavis was saying ir.r the 1930s: the media are harmful and

the function of theoretical critique is to expose them in that light' (Scannell, 1989: 158). The Frankfurt School's most important idca, as Richard Collins puts it, wes to vicw the mass mcdia - and journalism - as 'a "consciousness irrdustry" propagating a "or.re-dimensional", "affirmative" culture in which the contradictior.rs and barbarisms of capitalism are prel.naturely and falsely harnronised' (Collins, 1976:49).ln this form, with its view of news and joumalism as instruments of thought control over passive mass audiences, it is clearly overly simplistic for conternp()rary purposes. The twenty-first ccntury, as I u-rd ()thers havc argued, is characterised by'cultural chaos'rathcr thrn ideological

thought control (McNair, 2006a); by what Tumber and 'Wcbstcr terrn the 'globalisation of consciousness' as the nun-rber and ideological diversity of news sources cxplodes on thc internet (Tumber and Webstcr, 2007), contributing 'to what is now a remarkably rich and differentirtcd inforntion environment' (ibid.:72). Sarah Maltby:rrgucs sinrilarly that storics such as the

26

Journalisru's sccial rcle

Journalism's socidl

role

27

Abu Ghraib tortlrre scrndai show how 'thc rnultiple ar.rd diverse means of dissemir.ratir.rg ir-rformation in thc public spherc hrve undermincd the rneans by which strtes are able to control what is revcalcd, or concerled, about their activitics... Thc ability to procluce informrtiol-r for mass disseminrtion is no longer restricted to those in power, nor limited to those who owr-r thc mcans of rnedia production' (Maltby rnd Keeblc,2007: 3). Rupert Murclocb hirnsclf, at the errd of a long career providing much raw rnlterirl for the critical thcorists, has supportcd this asscssrnent, by declaring thrt the lge of thc mcdia baron is derd. In a speech given to the rlorshipful Comprny of Statiorrcrs arrd Newspapcr Makcrs in London ilr March 2006, he dcclared that 'powcr is moving away from the old clitc in our industry - thc editors, the chief cxccutivcs irncl, let's f:rce it, the proprictors. A new laeneration of medir consi,lmcrs has riscn clen-randiug content clcliverecl wherr they wurt it, how they w1nt it, ancl vcry much as they u'ant it.'Journalism docs
have a socially reproductive function, comprising whrt thc German sociologist Niklas Luhmann dcscribed as onc of a society's 'rccursively stabilised functional mechanisn-rs' (Luhmann, 2000: 1), an 'autopoctic, self-reproducing system' for mirking scnsc of the world. This function is no longer realised - if it ever was - at thc bcck and call of ruling classes or powcr clites, but in cor.rditions of fierce ideological rivalry and contestation, fuelled by thc proliferation of onlinc ancl user-generrted media to be examinecl later in this book. That saicl, vriauts of the social reprocluction hypothesis remain inflrrential, not ot.rly among Marxists, but feminists and othcrs concemed with thc socitilogy of culture, and the role of ncws and journalism in maintaining what they

'cleviant', or 'militant' versus 'moderatc', which arc then uscd to police socicty,
and to excludc or nrarginalisc certritr types of socirl actor. Ar-r early but still relevrnt

study (irr the era of perceivecl crimc wavcs involving young people c.rnyir.rg knivcs, guns and clrugs) informed by this perspcctive is Hall et dl.'s Policing the Crisis (1978), whicl.r argucs that ncws organisarions do not merely report
events, but are active agents in constructing thc sociopoliticel cnvironment that framcs those events in the public ir-nagirration. Journalists, as rcporters of news,

rre at the sane time social actors, with r key role to pliry in shaping our pcrcepti()n of lvhat news is, ar-rd how to rc1ct to it. If a large proportion of news tnay be said

to

cornprise the reporting

of

problematic social reality, then

journalists contribute sr.rbstantially to the process whereby'problems' rrc defincd. Another exponent of this approach, rn'hich rnay be viewccl :rs a vlrirnt of l gcncla -setting, sr ggests that j or-rrnal i sr-r-r :

can create social problems, can present thcm dramatically arrcl ovcrwhelnrir-rgly, and most inrportant, can do it sr-rdder-rly. Thc nreclia c1n very
quickly
arrcl

effectiveh' fan public indigrration ancl enginccr what one might

c:rll a 'moral panic' about a certair.r type of deviarrcy. Indeecl, there is institutionalised into the redia thc nccd to creltc rloral par-rics and issues wl"rich will seize the imaginatior.r of the public.
(Young, 1971: 37) flohcn's scminal stucly of thc n-rcdia sociology of moral panics was published in a new edition in 2004, indicating how relevant the concept remains to rrt.r understandir.rg of journalism's social effects (see also Critcher, 2003; Jewkes,
2004). A recent example of moral panic irr the British media would be the 2002 'VIorLd 'rr:rnring ancl sl.rarning' of paedopl-riles by the Ne,s of the and other tabloids in the rvake of a high-profile child murder case. In one infamous

pcrceive

to be structurally unequirl societies. Chomsky and Herman's propa-

ganda moclel, for example, still a prominent featurc of many journalisrn stuclies courscs in the UK and elsewhere, characterises the cffccts of westcrn journalism in such terms as 'brainwashing urrcicr freedom' (Chomsky ancl Hcrm:rn, 1979). The n.roclcl - onc varirnt of what I havc termed eiservhere the dontinance cr control pdradigm (McNair, 1998b,2006a) - remains influerrtial, as in 1 rccent essay by Oliver Boyd-Barretr, which asserts balclly that 'news medir

arc framed within an all-encompassing project of propagarrda ' (Boyd-Barrett, 2007:99):rnd thtrt, by way of exanrple, audienccs are'positionccl'correspondirrg to the 'idcaliscd role of the femininc in patriarchal socicty, whose featurcs includc passivity, trust rnd nurturing support for male authority'. Hcrc, ,rs in rrost such articulations of the propaganda modcl ,urd its variants, thc qtrcsrior-rs of who exactly does the positioning, and how, if at all, it is effcctive in duping the passive masses, arc lcft unanswered.2

Journalism and the social construction of reality

cliffcrent approach to thc social role of journalism asserts that ir is nr.'r sirnply 'a vehicle for objcctive facts about rcnlote events', but tells us 'something about thc structure of the world' (Davies, 1990: 160).In particular, it c()nstrllcts the world for us in terms rf crtelories, such as 'norl'nal' versus

example of how the public cur be led into mob rule by recl-top talrloid journ:rlisrl, a ferr.rale paediatriciarr living in Bristol was chasecl from hcr homc by an angry mob who thought that she was a child molester, as opposed to ir cloctor. Although the vast rlajority of child murders are cotnurittecl by parents or fanrily mcmbers and othcr clrcrs, this wave of coverage createcl a morrl panic about the prevalence of random child-killcrs and pacclophiles in Britain that was cntirely unrelrted to the actllal incidence of thcse crimcs. This approach, used in conjunction witl.r what is knowtr as thc 'dcviancy amplification rnodcl' developed by sociologists, views iournalisrn as au rctive, if not necessariiy clircctcd social institution, workir"rg alongside other institlrtions such as the legal system and judiciary to rcgr-rlate ar.rd r.regotiate morality. Exarnples of how journalism can lead to c'lcviancy arnplification have included the celcbrrted battles bctween mocls and rockcrs that took place irr the soutl'r of England in thc 1960s; the n.ruggir.rg scare of the 1970s; and, in the 1980s football hooliganism, 'acid house' prrties, and satanic child abuse. Lr all these cascs, the media did not sirnply rcport evcnts, but contrilruted to their crncrgence as problctns in the public arena.

28

.lournaLisnt's socidl

rc,le

Journalism's sccial rcLe 29

Journalism and the social construction of risk

If l-rews media hrve the capacity to amplify deviance , they can have an analogor-rs impact on pr"rblic perceptions of risk. \)e looked earlier at the MMR cesc, ln which rncclir covr:rale of the alleged link bctween autism and MMR produced a substantirl fell in vaccination rates, leading to the hcightcned possibility of epidernic. Othcr exem.rles of this effect includc the succession of hcalth scarcs ud foocl panics that charcterised the 1990s il Britrirr. Typically, following news coverage of rn inciclent (or scries of incidcnts) involving a foocl product or a medicine, it woulcl become associated in the public irnagir.ratiorr with thrcats to healtl-r out of proportion to the acturl risks involved. Cor.rsumption of tlrc offendir.rg substance wor.rlcl plummet, leadin! to n.rajor problcnrs for rnanufacturers, rnd sometirncs Llnexpected negative corlseclucnccs. For cxample, a 1997 BP'C rrclio news report ()n the increased risk of thrornbosis rssociatcd with a ncw coutraceptive pill for w()men led, through a suddcn dcclinc in use of the pill, to an incrcesecl number of unwanted pregnirncies. Whilc the degrce of risk associated with thc contr'f,ccptivc wrrs, irr sttistical tem.rs, r.ninnscule, the
health problems caused to at least some women by the reportagc and its effect on their behaviour were substantial. It is estimated that several hur.rdrccl womcn clied in childbirth who would not have otherwise, simrly becausc thcy wcrc cliscouragecl fron.r taking the pill by exaggerated media coverage of its h,rrmful effects.

In 2008 the world was engulfed by economic anxicty - the sub-prime mortgage crisis, which begar.r in the USA ar.rd therr rippled ourwarcls, and the ensuing 'credit crunch'. This global economic crisis was viewed by nrany as the worst since the Great Dcpressiorr, fuelled nor leasr by the speed of information flows ancl the resulting heightencd proper.rsity for panic rrnong financial treders and over-hasty clccision-makir"rg arnong policy-nrakers. As this cdition wcnt to press, no rescarch had been done on the link, if eny, betweerr mcclia coverage of the crcdit crunch and public percepti(xrs of the statc of the economy. It is, however, reasontrtrlc to assert tl-rat the hyperactivc rnedir of the twerrty-first century playecl r rolc in the speed and ir-rtcnsity with which thc crisis emcrgcd.
Conclusions

The effects issue rcmains one of the rnost difficult and corrtentious in
stuclies, clespite

medir

Tun.rber lnd '$flebster consider the impact of what thcy call a 'chrotic ir-rformatior.r environmcnt' on the gkrbal public's perccrtior.rs of the risk of ternrrism post-9/11. The innocelrt cleaths that come from tcrrorist attecks are minor contpared to the grert inter-stirte wars of the past ... Nonetheless, therc appcxrs to be an increased public perception of the thrcat of war ... This owcs much to the ilrcreased awreness of wrs lround the world, particularly those 'Western irrvolvir-rg forccs, as well as to the drarnatic and cliscor-rcerting character of terrorist attacks that come without waming and aim at n.raximising civilian crsualties. (Turnbcr and rlebster, 2008: 60)
Orr a day of terrorist'spectirculars'srch as 9l11 in New York,7/7 in London, cr ll.l3 in Madrid, the ncws media's recelrtly acquircd capacity to provide reirltime, round-thc-clock coverage of events that, although horrifying, lrc in

thc vast rcs()urces and energies thrt have been erpended irr trying to resolvc it. This is no less true for journalisrn thar.r for any other category of mcdia output. Lr the end, it can be statccl with certair.rty only that journalisr-n mattcrs because we belicvc that it does. \)lhether ()r not the news ar.rd information media do indeed hrve the power to set agenclas for the rublic at l:rrge, to reproducc ideology, to creatc morirl panics, to spark runs oll banks, or to inftluence what we think, the fact that politicians, prcssurc group :rctivists, trade unionists, tcrrorists ancl other social actors think that thcy do sornc or all of these things mcns that they increasingly tailor their 'performances' to suit rvhat their public rclations ar-rd mcclia rdvisers tell them are the requirenrents of the journalists (Davies, 2002,2007). Lr today's world, public figures and organisations actively seek out thc meciia, evelr if they cannot always guarantce that thcir covcragc will bc favourable. For Rochey Tiffen, iu .rn observrtion that rctrir.rs its insightfulncss two decades later, this is the only thing about journalisrn thlt rclly metters. In his view, 'the impact of news [ancl journalism in gcncral] rnust bc sought in its effects on how political life is conducted, how news practiccs interact with politic:rl processes and outcomes' (Tiffen, 1989 6). From tl.ris perspective, the irnportant thing is not the effect of journalistic output on inclividual attitudes and ideas, but the effect of the wiclcspread pcrccptiorl of jourr.rirlism's importancc on thc social proccss as a
whole. The increasing in'rportatrce of information medir in the political process wirs

by comparison with, for cxample, the '\)far Second World in Europc or the atomic borlbing of Japan, generrtes hcightcned and probably unwrrranted collective anxieties about the risks of Islrrnic tcrrorism. There are risks, of course (the author's own locality, Glasgow, was subject to an attcmpted car bomb attack by Islamist tcrrorisrs in Jr-rly 2007 - fortluratcly, no one but the terrorist himself died as a result of the ir.rcicient), but thc nredia may arnplify ancl distort thcir scale, with real consequcnces for policy.
terms
crsurlties sn-rall-scalc

of thcir

illustrated during the Gulf War, when the leaders of the opposir.rg sides r.rsed the news nrcdia, rrrd thc ,rcccss it lave fhem to each other's populations, trr communicatc thcir diplomatic rnd military mcssagcs. Thc Americ:r.n news chltrnel CNN functioned as slrrr()grte diplomacy for Allicd and lracli lcaders in a conflict that was lived as it happened, not only by pcoplc in thc firing lincs in Israel, Baghdrcl ancl Bahrain, but by millions irr Europe, Asia and America, through thc meclium of televisiorr. CNN, BBC Slorld nd thc Arab uetu'ork Al Jazcera l-rave playecl important functi,,rrs in nrrnrging public opinion rbout Septernber 1 l and its afternrath. The inv:rsions of Afgh:rnistan ncl

,i0

.lottrndlism's

sctt'itl

role

Irnq were exanrrles of information war'(Maltby and Keeble, 2007) - corflicts fr-,ught in and thrrugh thc ncws media, with joun.relists positior.red rrot merely as objective rcporters, but as conduits for competing propagancla messagcs. All conflicts in the mc.len-r worlcl, whethcr violent or nc'n-violent, arc increasiltlly
focuscd on cfforts to shape public opiniorr through the globalised mcrlie of news and jourrralism. lr-r clomestic rolitics, too, the alriliry to use xnd l]taltipulrrte ncws nteclia - to set alendas ancl sl-rape clcbatcs with the aid of photo-opportunities, sor-rnd-bites ancl professional image consultants - is now gcucrllly acccptecl rrs r prercqtrisite of succcss. Govcrnmerrts, political partics rrncl pressure groups compete rvith equal vigoLrr to manage rhc nervs, bccirlrse rhey belicve tht, for the nrajority of the audiencc, ne\\.s and currcnt rffairs is thc key point of contact

rvith the politicrrl process. For this reasour if for no othcr,

undoubtedly matters.

ior.rrr-ralisrn

Further reading The most rccent acrdemic research ancl writirr on joumalisnr cn bc founcl in such jourrrals as Journalism Studies, Mcdi, Cultttre (t Society,

JournaLism: Theory, I'ractice

(y Criticism, ancl the European .lournal of Communicatkn. A full list of :rcademic sourccs Lrsecl ir.r tl.ris ancl otl.rer chaltcrs is contrinecl in the Bibliogrlphy.