On Socrates and Alcibiades

WAYNE AMBLER

Abstract: Robert Faulker locates the core of his book in his chapters on Aristotle, Plato, and Xenophon. The most difcult of these discusses Alcibiades and Socrates relationship with him: in particular, what distinguished Alcibiades ambition, why did Socrates pursue him, and what effect did Socrates have on this ambitious leader? The following remarks examine and support Faulkners case that Socratic philosophy did indeed moderate considerably [Alcibiades] ambition to rule the world and thus that ancient political thought is essential for rendering towering ambition safe for democracy. Keywords: Socrates, Alcibiades, tyranny, philosophy, ambition rofessor Robert Faulkners Case for Greatness argues that a full appreciation of the admirable and hugely important statesmanship of leaders such as Churchill, Lincoln, and Mandela is currently impeded because the theories dominant in modern political science are challenged by such adjectives as great and good; thus these theories even have trouble distinguishing statesmanlike ambition from its opposites, such as the evil Idi Amin or the confused Neville Chamberlain. Aggravating the problem are democratic tastes that are suspicious or envious of evidence of towering superiority. Faulkner adds in conclusion that Nietzsche is on hand to exploit this confusion or exacerbated relativism, for in the absence of a measured case for greatness, Nietzsche has come forward to defend his blond beast who rejects common decency and takes delight in cruelty (2402). It is with an eye on this threat from the right, a threat made real in the last century, that Faulkner concludes his study and encourages further efforts to see whether honorable ambition might be put on more secure foundations. His immediate goal, of course, is more intellectual than political:

Wayne Ambler is at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Copyright 2010 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
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How can we understand great when good is already a mere matter of opinion? In hoping to encourage at least the effort to recover a superior understanding of great statesmanship, Faulkner proposes doing so by trying to learn how pre-modern thinkers took account of it. He returns to the great thinkers of ancient Greece to see whether there is a better way to understand and ground responsible statesmanship, and thus he states that his three chapters on Aristotle, Plato, and Xenophon are the most important in the book. I am persuaded by his illuminating analysis of the problems posed unwittingly by modern theory, and I share his view that relativism is a problem of enormous proportions, both in practice and in theory. If we can no longer use the phrase great books without putting it in quotation marks, the notion of the great statesman faces triple jeopardy, for it appears to be value-laden, elitist, and sexist as well. Faulkners project fails, however, if the ancients do not live up to their billing; and it is almost inevitable that they will seem not to, for they offer no easy answers. We might like or even expect a classication of statesmen into good and bad, like Aristotles simple schema of three good and three deviant regimes (Politics III.7): statesmen that further the common good are honorable; those that do not are not. But like Aristotles treatment of this very same schema of regimes, the ancients treatment of statesmen also becomes much more complicated, and Faulkner does not disguise this fact. Although useful, the concept of the common good is not a sufcient guide for understanding great statesmen. Nor does Faulkner advance either Platos Alcibiades or Xenophons Cyrus as models for emulation, even though he devotes long chapters to their investigation. The hope for a simple solution to a massive problem is bound to be disappointed, but of course the hope itself is a nave one. Faulkners goal is an improved understanding of the great statesman, not a simple litmus test for detecting one or another recipe for producing one. Indeed, his very last sentence summons us to continue looking for such principles as would defend moderate ambition against the Nietzschean variety. Guided by this more rational but more limited hope, Faulkner takes a deep dive into ancient philosophy to see

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how the great statesman was understood by thinkers not at all shaped by the modern theories he nds noxious to normative investigation. For the purpose of this short statement, I shall try to follow his lead and focus on the chapter on Plato on Alcibiades. I do so for several reasons: It is one of the three chapters he says are most important. It is among the longest. It is his most difcult chapter, the one most difcult to understand on rst reading. And I was drawn in by his account of this man he called a notorious whirlwind of insolence, daring deeds, and ability (82). THE PHILOSOPHER SOCRATES MEETS THE AMBITIOUS ALCIBIADES I will review Faulkners chapter on the Alcibiades looking for evidence on these three issues: 1. What is Alcibiades like? 2. What is Socrates trying to accomplish in these two conversations? 3. What are the effects of Socrates efforts (intended or otherwise)? What I must sacricereluctantlyare Faulkners analyses of the logical merits of each and every argument, his consideration of Socratic tactics in argument (111), his careful attention to the text, and his eloquence. I will mostly be asking questions in the hope of keeping key issues alive; it is beyond me to answer them. 1. What is Alcibiades like? What are his chief characteristics? Does he, for example, display as advertised the soul of grand ambition? A caution to readers who have not read these two Platonic dialogues: their circumstances are not what we might expect for the display of such a soul. There are no prancing steeds, no beautiful armor, and no crowds to address. There is just a young man and a not-yet-old Socrates, but Faulkner is correct: the conversations are telling nevertheless. Here is a list of the qualities Faulkner detects in Alcibiades: pride, ambition, a concern for justice deeper than he was aware of, the intelligence to see a good bit of what he does not understand (when it is shown to him), and the capacity to faceat least to some extentthe consequences of his own ignorance on important matters. Some of these qualities are in tension with one another, so one might say in general that the main characteristic of Alcibiades is self-contradiction. A further point is that Faulkner sees a terrible side of grand ambition in Alcibiades. This appears to be related to a proneness to evil deeds and evilly harsh retribution, and Faulkner links this to the poets harsh stories of the ancient pagan gods and heroes. With regard to his ambition alone, Faulkner shows that Alcibiades has it in abundance. He also shows that Alcibiades considers the desire for tyranny to be as natural as the desire to have children. Weaklings have no chance of satisfying this ambition, so they put it aside, but as for those with the requisite capacities, who would not want to see it satised? The power of this ambition gave Socrates an easy way to show or pretend that he could be of supreme use to Alcibiadessurely without Socrates help he could never

conquer the world!but this same ambition makes it hard for Socrates to test Alcibiades assessment of this end or goal; he thinks it needs no test: it is as natural as the solid rock on which Hobbes thought to build his political philosophy. If the question of the human good is important for Socratic philosophy, Socrates faced the problem that the answer to the question seemed too obvious to Alcibiades to warrant investigation. But what may seem obvious in itself seems less so when Socrates shows it to be in uneasy relation with other important aspects of the soul. Faulkner stresses that Alcibiades towering pride conicts with his ambition: the former makes him pleased with himself just as he is; the latter makes him hunger for what he lacks. Does grand ambition inevitably come with towering pride? And does towering pride tend to produce a sort of inertia stemming from self-satisfaction? Is this also a problem or apparent problem of the magnanimous man described by Aristotle? Faulkner shows that Socrates brings out a second contradiction within Alcibiades by teasing out evidence that Alcibiades is in fact moved by an attraction to justice or to a justice-like courage (1025). After implying that politics may safely be guided by advantage, that in fact justice need not complicate political decision-making, even if its appearance is important, Alcibiades indicates that he is prepared to be courageous even at the expense of his life. Alcibiades had seemed at rst to value himself above all, but later he is seen to value courage as much as his life. I am persuaded and impressed by Faulkners detection of this tension or contradiction within Alcibiades, but I am not sure to what extent he sees it as part of the psychology of a type: is confusion about the extent of even their own devotion to justice typical of great statesmen as such? Do they wafe between worldly-wise or cynical dismissals of justice and more noble moments in which they embrace it passionately? Does this sort of confusion exist in diluted form in the rest of us as well? (The subtitle of the Alcibiades I is On Human Nature, though it is not clear that the subtitle is Platos own.) But the point on which I am still less clear is this one: Faulkner shows that Socrates tries to purge or purify the poets myths about the gods and heroes. He fears these myths would encourage in Alcibiades a terrible tendency toward retribution. They may even be linked to moral furies of selfhatred. But if these furies come from Greek myths, can they constitute today the darker side of grand ambition now that these myths have lost their formative power? Is there still a need for a Socratic reformation of religious beliefs that are no longer taken seriously? I note in passing that Faulkners book has by my count only three brief references to Christ or Christianity, when one might expect this to have had a powerful effect on the way statesmanship has been viewed and practiced in the last 2,000 years, as Machiavelli and Churchill both indicated. In stressing the importance of the then prevailing view of the gods, does the Alcibiades II suggest that a modern Socrates would have a very different task in a world in which these vindictive gods and heroes have been replaced, replaced at least for a time by a Prince of Peace and model of forgiveness?

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2. What is Socrates trying to accomplish in these two conversations? Faulkner rightly attempts to understand Socrates as well as Alcibiades, perhaps because he too has a claim to possess the soul animated by the grandest ambition. Perhaps, in fact, the philosopher Socrates has a claim to being the highest representative of this type. Surely Socrates conduct in stalking the young Alcibiades is at least as strange to readers as it was to Alcibiades, for it is not easy to see what the older wise man had to gain from conversations with this proud young man. Indeed, this may have been Socrates rst reported conversation with a young man, the coming out of a philosopher who thought it important to talk to the young men of Athens, and became notorious for doing so, so it raises with special force the question of what motivated and guided Socrates in these conversations. That Socrates spoke to this issue at his trial hardly settles the question, since what he had to say there was enigmatic and contradictory (Plato, Apology of Socrates 23b4c1, 28d1029a1, 29d230a4, 30a7b4, 30e132a1, 32b15, 32e233a6, 36c2d1, 38a18).

Finally, I did not notice any suggestion that Socrates might have sought out these conversations for some theoretical purpose of his own. If he could learn nothing directly from this boy, might he learn something about human beings by speaking to him? Are Alcibiades contradictory hopes illustrative of more general human confusions, and might these be linked to problems the rst political philosopher thought he had to solve? 3. What are the effects of Socrates efforts? This question gains force from the fact that it may well have been especially because of his association with Alcibiades that Socrates was found guilty of corrupting the young. It is true that Alcibiades is never mentioned in Platos Apology of Socrates, but the very rst line of this dialogue joins its title in making it plain that Plato lets us hear only Socrates defense; the case of the prosecutors that made a defense speech necessary is entirely omitted. And when Xenophon reports on the trial, he does mention Alcibiades and Critias as important parts of the reason Socrates was convicted. So two questions arise: Did Socrates get into trouble with Athens because of his association with Alcibiades? And, did he deserve to? (i.e., Did he have a benecial or corrupting effect on Alcibiades? In what senses?) Faulkner draws especially on the Protagoras and the Symposium to credit Socrates philosophic statesmanship with having enjoyed a good measure of success in the limited goal of making Alcibiades more friendly toward philosophy. I am persuaded and impressed. Next question: did he make him more philosophic, more moral, or less threatening to Athens? In Faulkners estimation, Alcibiades becomes more philosophic only in a very diluted sense. That is, Socrates makes him more attractive, amusing, and urbane, and more independent of Athenian religious names and custom (90, 95); Alcibiades becomes urbane, one who resembles some charmingly ironic member of Socrates philosophic circle (101). This is impressive, but Faulkner makes it plain that there was for Alcibiades nothing like the durable transformations there were in the cases of Xenophon and Plato. There are more than a few lines in which Faulkner implies that Socrates makes Alcibiades less of a threat to Athens. He says that Socrates moderates considerably the passion to rule the world (126) and that he moderates his tyrannical desire by challenging his evasion of thinking (114). Perhaps his emphasis also on the way Doctor Socrates cures Alcibiades indignation implies that this is good for Athens (107). In another passage, however, when discussing the way Socrates elicits in Alcibiades a strong attachment to justice, Faulkner says, the difculties of any Alcibiades the Just are exacerbated by the Socratic bath he has taken. Alcibiades has lost much of his native patriotism. He has lost much of his faith in the rule of the people and in free politics. Indeed, the very premise of his new docility is reverence for the spectacular trappings of (Spartan and Persian) monarchy (113). And elsewhere Faulkner seems to imply that Socrates has the effect of raising Alcibiades above free politics and turning him toward a rather effeminate despotism (111). If Socrates

Read with this question in mind, Faulkners chapter mentions these possibilities: Socrates is in love, or he wants to recruit Alcibiades as a philosopher, or he wants to reform him so he will become morally better, or he wants to reform him so he will be less likely to harm Athens, or he wants to reform him so he will be less likely to harm Socrates and/or philosophic activity in generalperhaps, that is, he wants to turn him into a sort of guardian of philosophy. Faulkners most striking suggestion is that Socrates anticipates the political success of the young Alcibiades and wants to make him friendly to the activity that eventually cost Socrates his lifewhether one sees this death as unavoidable punishment or as a chosen means to make the world more safe for philosophy. Socrates may need to pose as a lover and as one who can help Alcibiades conquer the world, but his own underlying goal, perhaps, is to make a future world-leader more respectful of his own vulnerable activity. By publishing such an encounter, Plato would help make its lessons available to others: what is it that suddenly makes Socrates so deeply important to a boy who has so much and yet wants everything else (except philosophy)? I am taken by this notion, which Faulkner shows to be compatible with an initial hope to help Alcibiades become a rigorous thinker in his own right. So if Alcibiades enthusiasm for conversations with Socrates proves short-lived, why not at least win an ally if you cannot win a friend? Here we see Socrates as statesman for philosophy. What is the relationship between this attractive suggestion, which has the support of evidence I cannot detail here, and passing implications that Socrates is moved also by the goals of moral reform, presumably for Alcibiades own good, and of reform or moderation of his enthusiasm for tyranny, presumably for the good of Athens? Since Faulkner launched his investigation into ancient thought with political issues primarily in mind, it seems especially important to know whether and how Socrates helps to make Alcibiades a better statesman for Athens.

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moderates Alcibiades devotion to Athens by appealing to superiority far above what free Athens can bestow, should we call this moderation or corruption? Now Faulkner has already made an effort to rescue Socrates from the charge I imply by pointing out that Alcibiades ambition might well have led him in this direction anyway, and yet I cannot help but wonder whether Socrates amusing discussion of the Persian Empire doesnt have a lasting effect on the young man. Does it not matter that a man of Socrates intellectual power passes lightly over appeals to democratic justice and patriotism while painting a picture of imperial splendor? Let me enlist the aid of the Alcibiades II in order to raise a distinct but parallel question. As Faulkner notes well, this text includes a wonderful dramatic sequence: at the very beginning, Alcibiades is heading off to pray, not to party, and instead of being accompanied by ute girls and wearing ribbons, as he is in his most visually striking appearance in Plato, he is solemn and wearing or carrying a wreath suitable for a man offering sacrice to the gods. After a fteen-minute conversation with Socrates, he takes the wreath that he was taking to the gods and puts it on Socrates instead. What does it show that, in the short term at least, devotion to Socrates has supplemented or replaced that to a god? CONCLUSION As the foregoing has indicated, Faulkner presents a patient reading of his ancient sources: he does not comb them to pick points that might support a predetermined solution to the modern dilemma as he sees it. The principal fruits of his efforts are thus in the details of his interpretations; as I have tried to suggest, they are considerable. But what do they teach with regard to his main theme? My rst point in conclusion is best put in the negative: Faulkner does not call for an Alcibiades or a Cyrus to solve our problems, nor does he think they were unproblematic leaders in their own day. To the contrary: Alcibiades is improved by his conversations with Socrates, but he nonetheless emerges as a visibly awed character. Whatever may be the case with Plutarchs presentation, Platos text does not leave the reader with the ambition of emulating Alcibiades or with the hope that another Alcibiades might emerge on the world scene. So too with Cyrus: as even the title of Faulkners chapter begins to indicate, he is hollow. Cyrus is a model, but he is a model that is questioned and found wanting (128, 13940, 144, 176). Members of Lincolns family of the lion or tribe of

the eagle they are, but Faulkner brings Cyrus and Alcibiades into the pages of his book to see how Plato and Xenophon analyze them, not to promote them as models for emulation. Second, Faulkner shows in his treatment of Alcibiades that reason is the authoritative principle of analysis. Socrates cunning questions elicit and test the previously unacknowledged longings in Alcibiades heart of hearts. This does make it evident that the oracles command that we know ourselves is not one easily obeyed; but difcult though it is, such knowledge is presented as possible, and thus it stands as an attractive alternative to the exacerbated relativism that bedevils contemporary analysis. Third, [Socratic] philosophy can help. By his clever engaging of the ambitious Alcibiades, Socrates wins his respect. As noted, he gets the crown that Alcibiades had intended for the god, and Alcibiades speech in the Symposium testies to the enduring power of his encounter with Socrates. This encounter did not turn Alcibiades from politics to philosophy, but Faulkner argues forcefully that it did moderate considerably his ambition to rule the world (126). If modern political institutions can serve as one barrier against immoderate ambition, and the political religion Lincoln advocated in his Lyceum Address as another, we also know that experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. Faulkners chapter on Platos Alcibiades makes a strong case for the unfamiliar thesis that philosophy as embodied by Socrates can itself make a major contribution toward moderating and redirecting the ambition of extraordinary characters who through circumstances and ability may otherwise wreak havoc on the body politic. Faulkners book makes enormous demands on the reader. In ranging from Arendt, Rawls, and Nietzsche to Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle, Faulkner challenges one at every turnrst because of the difculty of the texts he interprets and, second, because he often interprets them in ways unfriendly to our democratic and relativistic sensibilities. Certainly he sustains his main case: ambition and political greatness are always fraught with moral ambiguity and hence are singularly difcult to understand. Moreover, they are especially difcult for us to understand because of the sensibilities just mentioned. Add the tremendous inuence that great men and women have had in shaping the destiny of nations, and the result is a theme easily worthy of the further looking Faulkner calls for on his last page. But the best case for the greatness of the book, I think, lies especially in its probing analyses of the ancient texts that are at its core.

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