IS THERE A DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION?

Ali Akaytay, Fatih Burak Gm Sakarya University, Turkey Yasin Kerem Gm London Schools of Economics, UK
Abstract The question which political and intellectual debates focus on have been whether the EU is democratically legitimate, in other word, there is a democratic deficit in the European Union. The question has been debated within political and academic areas widely. While most politicians, scholarly commentators and members of the European public agree that the EU experiences democratic deficit. There are some such as Giandomenico Major and Andrew Moravscik who argues that the European Union is legitimate and there is increasingly democracy at European level as to party competition and party organization in the European Parliament. The aim of this essay is to analyzes the arguments against and fort he allegation of democratic deficit. The arguments of Majone, Moravscik, Follesdal and Hix are mainly employed in the essay. Keywords: European Union, Democratic Deficit Introduction Over two decades, we have witnessed almost continual debates about appropriate constitutional structure for Europe (Moravscik, 2002;604). The allegations of democratic deficit appeared first in discussion of European Parliament draft treaty for the European Union in the early 1980 resulted in 1986 Single European Act whose one of the main aims was to rectify the democratic deficit in the community decision making process (Zweifel, 2002;812). Following Amsterdam and Nice treaties which were unsuccessful to change European Constitutional structure (Moravscik, 2002,603) were two treaties incited the debates over democratic deficit. It seems as if recent French and Dutch referendums have prompted further attention to the subject. The question which political and intellectual debates focus on have been whether the EU is democratically legitimate, in other word, there is a democratic deficit in the European Union. The question has been debated within political and academic areas widely. While most politicians, scholarly commentators and members of the European public agree that the EU experiences democratic deficit (Moravscik,2002;604). There are some such as Giandomenico Major and Andrew Moravscik who argues that the European Union is legitimate and there is increasingly democracy at European level as to party competition and party organization in the European Parliament. The aim of this essay is to analyzes the arguments against

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and fort he allegation of democratic deficit. The arguments of Majone, Moravscik, Follesdal and Hix are mainly employed in the essay. Democratic deficit argument could be defined under five main sets (Follesdal and Hix, 2006;534); Lack of Legitimacy Weak European Parliament Lack of European Election Distance from Voters; Lack of Reflection of Voters Preferences

1. Lack Of Legitimacy European integration has meant an increase in executives power and a decline in a national parliamentary control (Raunio, 1999). The design of the EU policy making system is dominated by executive actors: national ministers in the Council and government appointees in the Commission. The problem is that actions of these executive agents at the European level are out of control of national parliaments. Therefore, governments can ignore their parliament in the process of policy making at European level (Follesdal and Hix, 2006,534). The temporary EU constitution is simply a system of contracts between member states and the dominant Council of Ministers European politics derived from intergovernmental compromises (Zweifel, 2002;817). In contrast to this argument, Major argues that the problem for the EU is not democratic deficit. Instead, the problem is credibility crisis (Majone, 2000). According to Majone, the EU is a regulatory state (Majone, 1994, 1996).He thinks that the term regulation focuses on market failures and is about creating pareto efficient policy outcomes which some benefit and no one loses rather than redistributive policy outcomes which there are both winners and losers. European integration means that EU governments have transferred regulatory policy competences to the EU level to separate the policies such as the creation of the single market or health and safety rules from national majoritarian government. From Majone points of view, EU policies were made by majoritarian institutions, in other word, The EU was dominated by the European Parliament or a directly elected Commission, it would result in a politicization of regulatory policy making which would result in redistributive outcomes instead of pareto efficient outcomes (Majone, 2000, 2002). Because, political majority would choose EU policy outcomes which were closer to its policy preferences. So, According to Majone, the problem is a credibility crisis more than a democratic. And, the solution does not need far reaching change. He argues that all EU need is more transparent decision making, rules protect the rights of minority interests, better control by media and parliamentarians. Similar to Majone, Moravscik is against the allegation that power has shifted to the executive and EU lacks any type of democratic participation and accountability at all. Nevertheless, he thinks that EU has two strong mechanism; direct accountability via the EP and indirect accountability via elected national officials (Moravscik, 2002,611).

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In Moravscik view: For over a decade, the EP has been progressively usurping the role of the Commission as the primary agenda setter vis--vis the Council in the EU legislative process. It is now the EP that, late in the legislative process, accepts, rejects or amends legislation in a manner more difficult for the Council to reject than to accept- a prerogative traditionally accorded the Commission. Still, If European elections were the only form of democratic accountability to which the EU was subject, skepticism would surely be warranted. Yet, a more important channel lies in the democratically elected governments of the Member States which dominate the still largely territorial and intergovernmental structure of the EU (2002,612). He also argues that supranational officials in Brussels work under intense public scrutiny by national parliaments and national media and democratically controlled national executives role in the European Union increases gradually. 2. Weak European Parliament The follower of the allegation of democratic deficit argue that the European Parliament is too weak vis--vis the Council and the Commission. Though European Parliament has equal legislative power with the Council by the co-decision procedure, a majority of the EU legislation is still passed under consultation procedure which the EP has limited power to defer. In addition to this, though the EP holds the power to veto the government the governments choices to structure the Commission, the governments are still responsible agenda setter in the appointment of the Commission. Also, any EU executive is elected by the European Parliament (Follesdal and Hix, 2002; 535). Against the allegations of weak European Parliament, Moravscik argue that the European Parliament power in the selection of the Commission and in the legislative process has increased gradually. According to Moravscik, the European Commission is no longer dominant in determining the outcomes of agenda setting process as a result of co-decision procedure and qualified majority voting in the Council. Moreover, the EP has the power of veto over the selection of the Commission and legislation can not be passed without majority support in both the Council and the European Parliament (Moravscik, 2002). 3. Lack Of European Election The follower of the allegation of the lack of European election argue that neither national election nor the European Parliament election is really European election. Since, they are not about personalities and parties at European level or the direction of the EU policy agenda. National elections are held on the basis of domestic issues rather than European issues and parties tend to keep the European issues out of the domestic agenda (Follesdal and Hix, 2006, 536). It means that preferences of the EU citizens about the EU policies are very finite effect on the EU policy outcomes.

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According to Moravscik, the EU elections will not be real European contest for some time. It is due to the lack of salience of European issues in the mind of voters (Moravscik, 2002; 615). Because, main issues which citizens care about such as taxation, social security policy, education, health care provision and law and order are under responsibility of rational governments. So, it is very normal for European voters to treat European elections as mostly irrelevant contest. Also Moravscik support the idea of Majone that regulatory policy-makers are isolated from democratic majorities. He backs the argument with three main justifications (Moravscik,2002, 614); -The need for greater attention, efficiency and expertise in areas where most citizens remain rationally ignorant or non-participatory, - The need impartially to dispense justice, equality and rights for individuals and minatory groups, - The need to provide majorities with unbiased representation. With his justifications, Moravscik argues that, particularist interest can more easily capture majoritarian electoral process than isolated regulators or courts. For Majone, the technocrats in the Commission, the Council and the EU agencies are more likely to protect citizens interests rather than the majority in the European Parliament (Majone, 2002). Opposed to Majone and Moravscik, Follesdal and Hix argue that; Independent regulators are highly prone to capture, primarily because they are heavily lobbied by the producers who are the subjects of the regulation. Furthermore, constitutions with multiple checks-and-balances (or veto-points), as opposed to more majoritarian decision-making rules, allow concentrated (singleissue) interests to block policy outcomes that are in the interests of the majority (Follesdal and Hix, 2006; 546). In support of the argument of lack of European election, Follesdal and Hix think also there is no electoral contest for political leadership at the European level. According to Follesdal and Hix; European Parliament elections are not in fact about Europe, but are second-order national contests. They are fought by national parties on the performance of national governments, with lower turnout than national elections, and hence won by opposition and protest parties. At no point, then, do voters have the opportunity to choose between rival candidates for executive office at the European level, or to choose between rival policy agendas for EU action, or to throw out elected representatives for their policy positions or actions at the EU level (Follesdal and Hix, 2006;552).

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4. Distance From Voters Another issue which follower of the allegation of democratic deficit is that the EU is too distant from voters. It can be argued from institutional and psychological points of view (Follesdal and Hix, 2006; 536). Institutionally, the control of the Commission and the Council by election is removed. From psychological point of view, the EU is not understandable easily given the fact that the EU is different from the domestic institutions. For illustrate, the Commission is neither a government nor a bureaucracy, and is appointed by an obscure procedure rather than elected by one electorate directly or indirectly (Magnette, 2001, cited in Follesdal and Hix, 2006;536). Opposed to the view that the EU is too distant from voters, Moravscik argues that the EU policy-making process is more transparent than most domestic governments. According to Moravscik, first of all, public can access documents of the EU policy making process and reach information easier than before thanks to growing concern inside the EU institution about their isolation from citizens. Secondly the European Parliament and national parliaments have increased scrutiny powers over the Commission and the Council, as discussed above. Moreover, both the European Court of Justice and national courts apply far-reaching judicial review of the EU actions. 5. Lack Of Reflection Of Voters Preferences; Connected to previous factors, due to the fact that private interest groups such as business interests an multinational firms do not have to compete with democratic party politics as a result of weak position of the European Parliament in the EU governance, the EU policy is pluralist rather than corporatist, and concentrated interests have bigger motive to organize at the European level, Governments are able to undertake policies at European level which they can not follow at the domestic level owing to the constraints by parliament, courts and corporatist interest groups. Scharpf argues that this policy drift critique is usually employed by social democrat scholars (Scharpf, 1999). According to the supporters of social democrat critique, the EU policies are in support of centre-right median voter. Against the social democratic critique, Moravscik argue that far-reaching check-andbalances such as unanimity for the reform of treaties, majority in the Commission, qualified majority in the Council, absolute majority in the European Parliament and judicial review by national court and the European Court of Justice provide that consensus is required to be agreed for any policies. So, according to Moravscik, the EU policy outcomes are centrists. In support of Moravscik, Follesdal and Hix argue that social democratic critique is quite possibly incorrect although it is insufficiently debated and defended (Follesdal, 2006;545). Because indirect control by national governments and improved power of the European Parliament definitely provide some control over the EU policy outcomes.

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Conclusions As a result, there is an ongoing debate over the democratic deficit in the European Union and there is no consensus on the subject. While some argue that the EU experience democratic deficit as a result of lack of party competition, less responsiveness of the EU institutions to voters preferences, others such as Moravscik and Majone argue that the EU is legitimate and there is increasingly democracy at European Level as to party competition and party organizations in the European Parliament. It is clear that the European Union has not a pure democratic structure and it is hard to say that there is no cause for concern. However, I believe that increasing power of the Parliament and concerns about the democratic deficit within the EU institutions and public push the EU to be more careful on the subject. References Follesdal, A. and Hix, Simon., (2006), Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravscik, JCMS, 44/3, 533-62. Moravscik, A., (2002), In the Defence of the Democratic Deficit: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union, JCMS, 40/4, 603-24. Majone, G. (1994), The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe, West European Politics, Vol. 17, No. 3, 78102. Majone, G. (2000), The Credibility Crisis of Community Regulation, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 38, No. 2, 273302. Majone, G. (2002a), The European Commission: The Limits of Centralization and the Perils of Parliamentarization, Governance, Vol. 15, No. 3, 37592. Majone, G. (2002b), Delegation of Regulatory Powers in a Mixed Polity, European Law Journal, Vol. 8, No. 3, 31939. Raunio, T., (1999), Always One Step Behind? National Legislatures and the European Union, Government and Opposition, 34/2, 180-202. Scharpf, F.W., (1999), Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic, Oxford University Press. Zweifel, T., (2002), Who is without Sin Cast the First Stone: the EU, Democratic Deficit in Comparison, Journal of European Public Policy, 9/5, 812-40.

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