Umil vs.

Ramos Facts: Facts: [GR 81567] On 1 February 1988, the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon verification, it was found that the wounded person, who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM soldiers the day before, or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In view of this verification, Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988, Dural was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the 2 CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Manligot. As a consequence of this positive identification, Dural was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in Authority. (Criminal Case C-30112; no bail recommended). On 15 February 1988, the information was amended to include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing of the original information, was still unidentified. Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with the Supreme Court on behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus on 9 February 1988 and Fidel V. Ramos, Maj. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montano, and Brig. Gen. Alexander Aguirre filed a Return of the Writ on 12 February 1988. Thereafter, the parties were heard on 15 February 1988. On 26 February 1988, however, Umil and Villanueva posted bail before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act had been filed against them, and they were accordingly released.

Sec5. Arrest without Warrant: When lawful A peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committees, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement or another. Thus, pursuant to the RRC, warrantless arrest is justified when a person arrested is caught in flagranti delicto or in the act of committing an offense; or when an offense has just been committed and the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it. The rational behind the concept o warrantless arrest is laid down in the PPI vs. Malasugui, that to sustain that arresting a person without warrant illegal would leave the society, into a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances. In the case at bar, the petitioners had freshly committed or were actually committing an offense. In the case of the petitioners who were charged of rebellion and inciting to sedition, the court held that they are lawfully detained and the informations filed against them are valid. This is since the crime in which they are arrested are continuous crime which is against the State, thus, the continued possession of subversive materials and unlicensed firearms and ammunitions, even without preliminary investigation and without warrant, as long as the authorities have confiscated such prohibited materials under their possession and that in the case of Enrile vs. Lim, they had actually done what is prohibited by law as long as they are positively identified by a witness having a personal knowledge of the committed crime, their arrest are lawful. This is justified since under the doctrine of Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, persons arrested of rebellion does not need to follow strict procedures, since their crimes committed are violence against the State, which concerns the very survival of the society and government. In the case of Nazareno vs. station Commander, the warrantless arrest is justified since there was a prior information filed against the petitioner for the same offense, and that he was positively identified by a witness who has a personal knowledge about the crime he committed. He was arrested while he was at large. Umil vs Ramos the SC held that rebellion is a continuing offense. Accordingly, a rebel may be arrested at any time, with or without a warrant, as he is deemed to be in the act of committing the offense at any time of day or night.

Issue: Was warrantless arrest in the case at bar illegal, as the arrest was not made pursuant to the constitutional and statutory guidelines for the issuance of warrantless arrest? Held: Warrantless arrest conducted in the case at bar is lawful. Pursuant to 5 Rule 113 of RRC, arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint is recognized by law. The instances where a valid warrantless arrest may be effected are the following.

People vs. Sucro [GR 93239, 18 March 1991] Third Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 4 concur Facts: On 21 March 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. (Station Commander of the INP Kalibo, Aklan) to monitor the activities of Edison Sucro, because of information gathered by Seraspi that Sucro was selling marijuana. As planned, at about 5:00 P.M. on said date, Pat. Fulgencio positioned himself under the house of a certain Arlie Regalado at C. Quimpo Street. Adjacent to the house of Regalado, about 2 meters away, was a chapel. Thereafter, Pat. Fulgencio saw Sucro enter the chapel, taking something which turned out later to be marijuana from the compartment of a cart found inside the chapel, and then return to the street where he handed the same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. After a while Sucro went back to the chapel and again came out with marijuana which he gave to a group of persons. It was at this instance that Pat. Fulgencio radioed P/Lt. Seraspi and reported the activity going on P/Lt. Seraspi instructed Pat. Fulgencio to continue monitoring developments. At about 6:30 P.M., Pat. Fulgencio again called up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later identified as Ronnie Macabante, was transacting with Sucro. At that point, the team of P/Lt Seraspi proceeded to the area and while the police officers were at the Youth Hostel at Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept Macabante and Sucro. P/ Lt. Seraspi and his team caught up with Macabante at the crossing of Mabini and Maagma Sts. in front of the Aklan Medical Center. Upon seeing the police, Macabante threw something to the ground which turned out to be a tea bag of marijuana. When confronted, Macabante readily admitted that he bought the same from Sucro in front of the chapel. The police team was able to overtake and arrest Sucro at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans Sts. The police recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante. The teabags of marijuana were sent to the PC-INP Crime Laboratory Service, at Camp Delgado, Iloilo City for analysis. The specimens were all found positive of marijuana. Sucro was charged with violation of Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Upon arraignment, Sucro, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged. Trial ensued and a judgment of conviction was rendered, finding Sucro guilty of the sale of prohibited drug and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and pay a fine of P20,000, and costs. Sucro appealed. Issue: Whether the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful and consequently, whether the evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible. Held: Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances where arrest without warrant is considered lawful. The rule states that A peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge acquired from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. What is paramount is that probable cause existed. Still, that searches and seizures

must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. Among the exceptions granted by law is a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. Herein, police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime when it had earlier conducted surveillance activities of the accused. Under the circumstances (monitoring of transactions) there existed probable cause for the arresting officers, to arrest Sucro who was in fact selling marijuana and to seize the contraband. Thus, as there is nothing unlawful about the arrest considering its compliance with the requirements of a warrantless arrest; ergo, the fruits obtained from such lawful arrest are admissible in evidence.

People vs Sucro held that when a police officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene thereof, he may effect an arrest without warrant. The offense is deemed committed in the presence of or within the view of the officer.

People vs Recepcion

The Version of the Prosecution -

Marie Flamiano was a waitress at Sabungan Fastfood and Videoke Pub, located along Samson Road, in Caloocan City. At about one-thirty on the morning of 28 July 1999, she was attending to customers when seven men, she identified to be Diosdado Recepcion, Alfredo Baracas, Joemari delos Reyes, Bernardo Ranara, Dominador Recepcion, Robert Alfonso and Audie Dona, entered the pub while one was tailing behind at the entrance. The men occupied table 12 and ordered beer from waitress Eliza Bautista. A few minutes later, three men from the group transferred to table 10. Just as Marie was approaching table 13 to get the microphone from a customer, one of the men stood up and fired his gun at another customer. Marie identified this gunman to be Alfredo Baracas. Eliza Bautista, the waitress who served the group, among them Diosdado Recepcion, Robert Alfonso, Audie Dona, Alfredo Baracas, Eduardo Palacpac, Joemari delos Reyes and Dominador Recepcion, saw another man pull out a gun and shot a customer, Rodolfo Ortega, while on his knees. The women later identified the gunman to be Diosdado Recepcion. Rosalia Juanica, a co-waitress who had meanwhile dashed out and hid at the nearby St. Joseph Store, saw Rodolfo Ortega, kneeling with both hands raised in plea, but one of the men, she likewise identified to be Diosdado Recepcion, fired his gun at pointblank range. Jojo Paraiso was with his co-security guards having a drinking spree when a group of armed men, started shooting. Some of the men shouted, dapa, but Jojos companion, Benjamin Valdez, unfortunately took a bullet shot before he could get the chance to heed the

warning. Jojo identified the person who fired at Valdez to be Robert Alfonso. He hid under the table and could only watch the men gone berserk. The last of the gunmen who left the pub, still firing his gun, was Joemari delos Reyes. Jhosa Reyes, a waitress at the A & E Kitchenette just across the Sabungan, saw the gunmen and their cohorts scamper away after the shooting incident. She recognized three of the gunmen, Robert Alfonso, Joemari delos Reyes and Eduardo Palacpac, as being regular customers at the A & E Kitchenette. Shortly before the shooting, Alfonso, delos Reyes, Palacpac and another companion were drinking at the kitchenette but soon headed towards the alley near the pub. Found sprawled on the floor, when the shooting finally stopped, were the lifeless bodies of five men - Benjamin Valdez, Augusto Billodo, Renato Cleofas, Rodolfo Ortega and Ruperto San Juan. Ruben Labjata, a jeepney driver, was waiting for passengers at Dagohoy Street, Caloocan City, when he heard gunshots. He was about to leave with only a few passengers when, unexpectedly, three men arrived and ordered all the passengers to get off the vehicle. The men menacingly pointed their guns at Labjata and ordered him to drive. Moments later, five more men boarded his jeepney. Three of the men stayed with the driver at the front seat while the other five sat at the rear. The group directed Labjata to drive towards Monumento and then to EDSA. After stopping briefly at Petron Station to refuel, the group proceeded to Quezon City. At a 7-11 convenience store in Tandang Sora, some of the men alighted from the vehicle. More gunshots were fired. Boarding once again the jeepney, the men told Labjata to go north until they finally reached, hours later, Paniqui, Tarlac. At Paniqui, the men debated on the drivers fate. After hearing one suggest that he should be killed (tumba), Labjata panicked and begged the group to spare him -maawa po kayo, may pamilya po ako. One of the men allowed him to go home with a warning that he should not report the incident to the police. In open court, he identified the malefactors to be Audie Dona, Alfredo Baracas, Diosdado Recepcion, Bernardo Ranara, Eduardo Palacpac, Dominador Recepcion, Joemari delos Reyes and Robert Alfonso. Conrado Marquez, a tricycle driver, was waiting for passengers along the highway of Paniqui, Tarlac, when he saw a group of men alight from a dirty jeepney. Four of the men rode in his tricycle, while the other four took two more tricycles. Marquez brought the group to Brgy. Coral, Ramos, Tarlac. Around lunchtime on 29 July 1999, the Bulacan Police invited Ruben Labjata for questioning. Taken by police authorities to Tarlac, he pointed to the exact place where the armed men got off from his vehicle. Conrado Marquez, likewise invited by the police for interrogation, readily informed the police of the place where he brought the men who hired his tricycle. The police promptly cordoned the area and the group, along with FO1 Felipe dela Cruz, surrendered after several calls by the police. Taken into custody were Felipe dela Cruz, Joemari delos Reyes, Audie Dona, Alfredo Baracas, Eduardo Palacpac, Bernardo Ranara, Robert Alfonso, and Dominador Recepcion. Diosdado Recepcion, then a special agent of the Narcotics Command, was intercepted at the national highway of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, on board a tricycle. At the Tarlac Police Station, Labjata identified his passengers, namely, Audie Dona, Alfredo Baracas, Diosdado Recepcion, Bernardo Ranara, Eduardo Palacpac, Dominador Recepcion, Joemari delos Reyes and Robert Alfonso.

Diosdado Recepcion, Felipe dela Cruz, Audie Dona, Alfredo Baracas, Eduardo Palacpac, Bernardo Ranara, Joemari delos Reyes, Dominador Recepcion, and Roberto Alfonso were charged with multiple murder, violation of P.D. No. 1866, and robbery in band before the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch 129, Caloocan City. The incident that occurred at the 7-11 convenience store also spawned several separate criminal informations (not involved in the instant cases under review). During the trial, Diosdado Recepcion died in an escape attempt, while accused Bernardo Ranara escaped and remained at large.

The Version of the Defense

The defense interposed alibi. According to Dominador Recepcion, he was, at the time of the reported shooting incident, fast asleep at Greenwoods Subdivision in Cainta, Rizal, where he was a construction worker. His co-workers were Eduardo Palacpac and Robert Alfonso. On the evening of 27 July 1999, the trio went to Pansi, Paniqui, Tarlac, to help Dominador Recepcions nephew, Joemari delos Reyes, find a job. It was after one oclock in the afternoon when Joemari brought them to the house of his cousin FO1 Felipe dela Cruz. Joemari delos Reyes testified that, on the afternoon of 28 July 1999, he was at home when his uncle Dominador Recepcion arrived with Robert Alfonso and Eduardo Palacpac. He brought his guests to the house of Felipe dela Cruz where they partook of beer. Felipe dela Cruz stated that on 28 July 1999, about one oclock in the afternoon, his father fetched him from a cousins house. When he arrived home, he was met by Joemari delos Reyes along with the latters companions, namely, Eduardo Palacpac, Robert Alfonso, and Dominador Recepcion. In the evening of the same day, about eight oclock, he invited his visitors to join him in attending a wake just a few meters away, and they stayed there until dawn. The following morning of 29 July 1999, policemen arrived and cordoned his house. He was arrested together with Joemari delos Reyes, Audie Dona and Alfredo Baracas. During a series of questioning at the Caloocan Police Station, dela Cruz insisted that he was attending a wake at the time the shooting incident occurred in Caloocan City. Audie Dona said that on 28 July 1999, he and his friend Alfredo Baracas, went to Pansi, Ramos, Tarlac, to visit his cousin Joemari delos Reyes and to get some fresh fish and vegetables. When he did not find Joemari at his house, he and Baracas proceeded to the place of dela Cruz where they were invited to join the group of Felipe dela Cruz, Joemari delos Reyes, Eduardo Palacpac, and Dominador Recepcion in a drinking spree. Dona and Baracas stayed until nine oclock in the evening when they repaired to the house of Joemari to spend the night. On 29 July 1999, he and Baracas went back to see dela Cruz but found Joemari still sleeping. The two dozed off while waiting for Joemari to wake up until they all found themselves surrounded by the police. When the trial was over and weighing the evidence before it, the court a quo found the several accused guilty in Criminal Case No. C-57208 for multiple murder but acquitted them

in Criminal Case No. C-57209 for the charge of illegal possession of firearm and Criminal Case No. 57210 for robbery in band because of insufficiency of evidence The eyewitnesses categorically identified the malefactors. The alleged discrepancies in the testimony of the witnesses could easily be explained by the fact that they saw the incident from different angles of the shooting. The impact of events, as well as the unconscious working of the mind, it is said, could readily warp the human perception in varying ways and degrees. Empiric data is yet to be found in order to accurately measure the value of testimony of a witness other than its conformity to human behavior and the 14 common experience of mankind. The defense of alibi proffered by appellants is much too weak against the positive identification made by the eyewitnesses. It is not enough for an alibi to prosper to prove that the person raising it has been somewhere else when the crime is committed; it must likewise be demonstrated that it would have been physically impossible for him to be at the scene of 15 the crime. Where there is the least chance to be present at the locus criminis, alibi will not 16 hold much water. The bare evidence given by appellants to vouch their individual claims and establish alibi is far from being iron-clad against the possibility of their having been at the crime scene. Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, makes a person guilty of murder if the killing is attended by, among other circumstances (but not here appurtenant), treachery or evident premeditation. An essence of treachery is not only the swiftness and the surprise in the attack upon an unsuspecting victim but also the attendance of two concurring conditions, i.e., that the malefactor must have employed means, method or manner of execution that would insure his safety from the retaliatory act of the victim, and such means, method or form of execution are consciously and deliberately adopted by the malefactor. The qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation, on the other hand, requires that the execution of the criminal act be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon a resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time 18 sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. Evident premeditation needs proof of the time when the intent to commit the crime is engendered in the mind of the accused, the motive which gives rise to it, and the means which are beforehand selected to carry out that intent. All such facts and antecedents which make notorious the pre-existing design to accomplish 19 the criminal purpose must be proven to the satisfaction of the court. A scrutiny of the facts in evidence would indicate a scanty showing of the requirements to qualify the senseless killing of the five victims, either by treachery or by evident premeditation, to murder. While the attack upon the victims could be described as being unexpected, somehow voiding any risk to the perpetrators thereof, there, is, however, insufficient evidence to indicate that the means adopted by the appellants have consciously been adopted. Mere suddenness of the attack is not enough to show treachery; it should also be shown that the mode of attack has knowingly been intended to accomplish the wicked 20 intent. Neither would evident premeditation qualify the offense to murder in the absence of clear substantiation that the appellants have definitely resolved to commit the offense and have reflected on the means to bring about the execution following an appreciable length of time. The trial court, however, correctly appreciated conspiracy. The presence of conspiracy could be revealed by the acts done before, during and after the commission of the crime that
17

made evident a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. The several acts of appellants during and after the shooting rampage disclosed a unison of objectives. Not one tried to stop the other in the perpetration of the crime. All were clearly in it together, performing specific acts with such closeness and coordination as would unmistakably show a common scheme. The attendance of treachery would thus render it unnecessary for the prosecution to show who among the conspirators actually hit and killed their victims, each of them being equally liable with the other in the perpetration of the crime. Without proof of any circumstance that would qualify it, the killing could not amount to murder. Appellants should thus be held liable only for homicide for the death of each of the victims. It was alleged in the accusatory information and shown in evidence that the crimes were indeed perpetrated with the use of unlicensed firearms. Pursuant to Republic 22 Act 8294 (amending Presidential Decree No. 1866), which was already in effect when the killing spree occurred, if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. The trial court has convicted FOl Felipe dela Cruz as an accessory. This Court, however, finds no evidence to convict him as such accessory. Under Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, the actual knowledge of the commission of the crime is an important element to being an encubridor, and the records are bereft of sound proof that dela Cruz has had knowledge of any or all of the nefarious deeds earlier committed by his guests. The arrest of appellants has been made in hot pursuit, an exception from the rule that warrantless arrests are illegal. In any event, appellants can no longer assail the illegality of their arrest since such a claim has not been brought up before or during the arraignment. The failure to timely move for the quashal of the Information on this basis operates as a 23 waiver of the right to question the supposed irregularity of the arrest. The crime of homicide is punishable under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code by reclusion temporal with a duration of 12 years and 1 day to 20 years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellants may be held to suffer imprisonment, as minimum, of anywhere within the full range of prision mayor of from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years and, as maximum, to anywhere within the range of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, considering the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm, of from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years.

21

People vs Recepcion the arrest of the accused inside his house following hot pursuit of the person who committed the offense in flagrante was held valid.

People vs. Rodrigueza [GR 95902, 4 February 1992] Second Division, Regalado (J): 4 concur Facts: [Prosecution] At around 5:00 p.m. of 1 July 1987, CIC Ciriaco Taduran was in their headquarters at the Office of the Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Bagong Ibalon, Legaspi City, together with S/Sgt. Elpidio Molinawe, CIC Leonardo B. Galutan and their commanding officer, Major Crisostomo M. Zeidem, when a confidential informer arrived and told them that there was an ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Daraga, Albay. Major Zeidem formed a team to conduct a buybust operation, which team was given P200.00 in different denominations to buy marijuana. These bills were treated with ultraviolet powder at the Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory (PCCL). Sgt. Molinawe gave the money to Taduran who acted as the poseur buyer. He was told to look for a certain Don, the alleged seller of prohibited drugs. Taduran went to Tagas alone and, while along the road, he met Samuel Segovia. He asked Segovia where he could find Don and where he could buy marijuana. Segovia left for a while and when he returned, he was accompanied by a man who was later on introduced to him as Don Rodrigueza. After agreeing on the price of P200.00 for 100 grams of marijuana, Don halted a passing tricycle driven by Antonio Lonceras. He boarded it and left Taduran and Segovia. When he came back, Don gave Taduran a certain object wrapped in a plastic which was later identified as marijuana, and received payment therefor. Thereafter, Taduran returned to the headquarters and made a report regarding his said purchase of marijuana. Based on that information, Major Zeidem ordered a team to conduct an operation to apprehend the suspects. In the evening of the same date, CIC Galutan and S/Sgt. Molinawe proceeded to Regidor Street, Daraga, Albay and arrested Rodrigueza, Antonio Lonceras and Samuel Segovia. The constables were not, however, armed with a warrant of arrest when they apprehended the three accused. The arrests were brought to the headquarters for investigation. Thereafter, agents of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) conducted a raid in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza, Dons father. Taduran did not go with them. During the raid, they were able to confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe, among others. The search, however, was not authorized by any search warrant. The next day, Jovencio Rodrigueza was released from detention but Don Rodrigueza was detained. [Defense] Don Rodrigueza, on the other hand, claimed that on said date he was in the house of his aunt in San Roque, Legaspi City. He stayed there overnight and did not leave the place until the next day when his brother arrived and told him that their father was taken by some military men the preceding night. Rodrigueza went to Camp Bagong Ibalon and arrived there at around 8:00 a.m. of 2 July 1987. When he arrived, he was asked if he knew anything about the marijuana incident, to which question he answered in the negative. Like Segovia, he was made to hold a P10.00 bill and was brought to the crime laboratory for examination. From that time on, he was not allowed to go home and was detained inside the camp. He was also tortured in order to make him admit his complicity in the alleged sale of marijuana. On 10 July 1987, Don Rodrigueza, Samuel Segovia and Antonio Lonceras, for possession of 100 grams of marijuana leaves and for selling, in a buy-bust operation, said 100 grams of dried marijuana leaves for a consideration of P200.00. During the arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge against them. The Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, Branch 10, found Don Rodrigueza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act 6425, as amended) and sentenced

him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and costs. The court, however, acquitted Segovia and Lonceres. Rodrigueza appealed. Issue: Whether the time of Don Rodriguezas arrest is material in determining his culpability in the crime charged. Held: As provided in the present Constitution, a search, to be valid, must generally be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by the proper government authority. True, in some instances, the Court has allowed government authorities to conduct searches and seizures even without a search warrant. Thus, when the owner of the premises waives his right against such incursion; when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest; when it is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws; when it is made on automobiles for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws; when it involves prohibited articles in plain view; or in cases of inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations, a search may be validly made even without a search warrant. Herein, however, the raid conducted by the NARCOM agents in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza was not authorized by any search warrant. It does not appear, either, that the situation falls under any of the aforementioned cases. Hence, Rodriguezas right against unreasonable search and seizure was clearly violated. The NARCOM agents could not have justified their act by invoking the urgency and necessity of the situation because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had already been put under surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their intention to conduct the raid, then they should, because they easily could, have first secured a search warrant during that time. Further, the inconsistencies made by prosecution witnesses give more credibility to the testimony of Don Rodrigueza. While it is true that Rodriguezas defense amounts to an alibi, and as such is the weakest defense in a criminal prosecution, there are, nonetheless, some evidentiary aspects pointing to the truth in his testimony. Firstly, the Joint Affidavit of Arrest corroborates his testimony that he was not among those who were arrested on the night of 1 July 1987. His co-accused Segovia also testified that Rodrigueza was not with them when they were apprehended by the NARCOM agents. Hence, Rodrigueza is acquitted of the crime charged, due to the failure of the prosecution to establish its cause.

People vs Rodrigueza the police officer, acting as poseur-buyer in a buy-bust operation, instead of arresting the suspect and taking him into custody after the sale, returned to police headquarters & filed his report. It was only in the evening of the same day that the police officer, without a warrant, arrested the suspect at the latters house where dried marijuana leaves were found and confiscated. It was held that the arrest & the seizure were unlawful.

People vs Molina To sanction disrespect and disregard for the Constitution in the name of protecting the society from lawbreakers is to make the government itself lawless and to subvert those 1 values upon which our ultimate freedom and liberty depend. That on or about August 8, 1996, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in conspiracy with each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously was found in their possession 946.9 grants of dried marijuana which are prohibited. Upon arraignment on September 4, 1996, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the 6 accusation against them. Trial ensued, wherein the prosecution presented Police Superintendent Eriel Mallorca, SPO1 Leonardo Y. Pamplona, Jr., and SPO1 Marino S. Paguidopon, Jr. as witnesses. The antecedent facts are as follows: Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member of the Philippine National Police detailed at Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, received an information regarding the 7 presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City. The first time he came to see the said marijuana pusher in person was during the first week of July 1996. SPO1 Paguidopon was then with his informer when a motorcycle passed by. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver, accused-appellant Mula, as the pusher. As to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him before the arrest. Moreover, the names and addresses of the accused- appellants came to the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after 8 they were arrested. At about 7:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information that the alleged pusher will be passing at NHA, Ma- a, Davao City any time that 9 morning. Consequently, at around 8:00 A.M. of the same day, he called for assistance at the PNP, Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, which immediately dispatched the team of SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2 Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and SPO1 Pamplona, to proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they would 10 wait for the alleged pusher to pass by. At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, while the team were positioned in the house of SPO1 Paguidopon, a "trisikad" carrying the accused-appellants passed by. At that instance, SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to the accused-appellants as the pushers. Thereupon, 11 the team boarded their, vehicle and overtook the "trisikad." SPO1 Paguidopon was left in 12 his house, thirty meters from where the accused-appellants were accosted. The police officers then ordered the "trisikad" to stop. At that point, accused-appellant Mula who was holding a black bag handed the same to accused-appellant Molina. Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked accused-appellant Molina to 13 14 open the bag. Molina replied, "Boss, if possible we will settle this." SPO1 Pamplona

insisted on opening the bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter; 15 accused-appellants Mula and Molina were handcuffed by the police officers. On December 6, 1996, accused-appellants, through counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to Evidence, contending that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence for having been obtained in violation of their constitutional right against 16 17 unreasonable searches and seizures. The demurrer was denied by the trial court. A motion for reconsideration was filed by accused-appellants, but this was likewise denied. Accusedappellants waived presentation of evidence and opted to file a joint memorandum. Ruling: The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be carried out in a reasonable fashion, that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search warrant predicated upon the existence of a probable cause. The pertinent provision of the Constitution provides: SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons 21 or things to be seized. Complementary to the foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined under Article III, Section 3, paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidifies the protection against unreasonable 22 searches and seizures. Thus: Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Without this rule, the right to privacy would be a form of words, valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties; so too, without this rule, the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to 23 merit this Court's high regard as a freedom implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. The foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is not without exceptions. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and 24 25 seizures; and (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search). The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede the search. In

this instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made 26 --- the process cannot be reversed. As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with .a valid warrant of arrest. The Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense (arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit); and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from 27 one confinement to another ( arrest of escaped prisoners ). In the case at bar, the court a quo anchored its judgment of conviction on a finding that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellants, and the subsequent search conducted by the peace officers, are valid because accused-appellants were caught in flagrante delicto in possession 28 of prohibited drugs. This brings us to the issue of whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure in the present case fall within the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. In People v. Chua Ho San, the Court held that in cases of in flagrante delicto arrests, a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must have personal knowledge of such fact or, as recent case law adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly 30 indicative or constitutive of probable cause. As discussed in People v. Doria, probable cause means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, are not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in 31 flagrante delicto arrest. Thus, in People v. Aminnudin, it was held that "the accusedappellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the MNWilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension." Likewise, in People v. Mengote, the Court did not consider "eyes... darting from side to side :.. [while] holding ... [one's] abdomen", in a crowded street at 11:30 in the morning, as overt acts and circumstances sufficient to arouse suspicion and indicative of probable cause.
32 29

According to the Court, "[b]y no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed or was at least being attempted in [the arresting officers'] presence." So also, in People v. 33 Encinada, the Court ruled that no probable cause is gleanable from the act of riding a motorela while holding two plastic baby chairs.1wphi1.nt Then, too, in Malacat v. Court of Appeals, the trial court concluded that petitioner was attempting to commit a crime as he was "`standing at the comer of Plaza Miranda and Quezon Boulevard' with his eyes 'moving very fast' and 'looking at every person that come 35 (sic) nearer (sic) to them.'" In declaring the warrantless arrest therein illegal, the Court said: Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto ... arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of V u, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime 36 had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed. It went on to state that Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" - an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at the comer and were not creating any commotion or trouble... Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered" "inside the front waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible 37 to Yu. Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the 38 presence or within the view of the arresting officer. In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to be committing, attempting to commit or have committed a crime. It matters not that accusedappellant Molina responded "Boss, if possible we will settle this" to the request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. Such response which allegedly reinforced the "suspicion" of the arresting officers that accused-appellants were committing a crime, is an equivocal statement which standing alone will not constitute probable cause to effect an inflagrante delicto arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon (who did not participate in the arrest but merely pointed accused-appellants to the arresting officers), accusedappellants could not be the subject of any suspicion, reasonable or otherwisPPpeop
34

PEOPLE VS. SY CHUA [396 SCRA 657; G.R. No.136066-67; 4 Feb 2003] Issues: Facts: Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of Ammunitions and Illegal Possession of Drugs in two separate Informations. SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag received a report from their confidential informant that accused-appellant was about to deliver drugs that night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. So, the PNP Chief formed a team of operatives. The group positioned themselves across McArthur Highway near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting the hotel. The other group acted as their back up. Afterwards, their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant which just arrived and parked near the entrance of the hotel. After accused-appellant alighted from the car carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him and introduced themselves as police officers. As accused-appellant pulled out his wallet, a small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded from his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud subjected him to a body search which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from his left back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of the Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated the small transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets and the car used by accused-appellant. SPO2 Nulud and the other police operatives who arrived at the scene brought the confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez at the PNP Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles City. Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and narrated a different version of the incident. Accused-appellant alleged that he was driving the car of his wife to follow her and his son to Manila. He felt sleepy, so he decided to take the old route along McArthur Highway. He stopped in front of a small store near Thunder Inn Hotel to buy cigarettes and candies. While at the store, he noticed a man approaches and examines the inside of his car. When he called the attention of the onlooker, the man immediately pulled out a .45 caliber gun and made him face his car with raised hands. The man later on identified himself as a policeman. During the course of the arrest, the policeman took out his wallet and instructed him to open his car. He refused, so the policeman took his car keys and proceeded to search his car. At this time, the police officers companions arrived at the scene in two cars. PO2 Nulud, who just arrived at the scene, pulled him away from his car in a nearby bank, while the others searched his car. Thereafter, he was brought to a police station and was held inside a bathroom for about fifteen minutes until Col. Guttierez arrived, who ordered his men to call the media. In the presence of reporters, Col. Guttierez opened the box and accused-appellant was made to hold the box while pictures were being taken. The lower court acquitted Sy Chua for the Illegal Possession of Ammunitions, yet convicted him for Illegal Possession of 1,955.815 grams of shabu. Hence, this appeal to the Court. (1) Whether or Not the arrest of accused-appellant was lawful; and (2) WON the search of his person and the subsequent confiscation of shabu allegedly found on him were conducted in a lawful and valid manner.

Held: The lower court believed that since the police received information that the accused will distribute illegal drugs that evening at the Thunder Inn Hotel and its vicinities. The police officer had to act quickly and there was no more time to secure a search warrant. The search is valid being akin to a stop and frisk. The trial court confused the concepts of a stop-and-frisk and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be arrest before a search can be madethe process cannot be reversed. Accordingly, for this exception to apply, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. Accused-appellant did not act in a suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there was no overt manifestation that accused-appellant has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime. Reliable information alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. With regard to the concept of stop-and frisk: mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a stop-and-frisk. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a stop-and-frisk serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the interest of safety and selfpreservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop acitizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. It should also be emphasized that a search and seizureshould precede the arrest for this principle to apply. The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. To reiterate, accused-appellant was first arrested before the search and seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his possession.

The apprehending police operative failed to make any initial inquiry into accusedappellants business in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he was carrying. The apprehending police officers only introduced themselves when they already had custody of accused-appellant. In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the stop and frisk principles is applicable to justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the police operatives on accused-appellant. Wherefore, accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is hereby Acquitted. ***SC said that for a stop-and-frisk situation, the police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct in order to check the latters outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police officers experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons or contraband concealed about him. It should, therefore, be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for the principle to apply. (NACHURA)

Facts: After the robbers snatched the bag of a woman and killed her, they boarded the tricycle of accused that 6:00 p.m. They fled using the tricycle, went to the accused house. Another tricycle driver named Alonzo chase the robbers but unsuccessful.. recognized accused and reported to the police. Before lunch the following day, accused was arrested. Questioned the legality of arrest. Contention threatened the family.. Issue: Was the arrest valid? Held: No. Under Sec. 5(b), Rule 113, of the Rules of Court, a warrantless arrest can be effected when: 1) an offense had just been committed; and 2) the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed it. Hence, there must be a large measure of immediacy between the time the offense was committed and the time of the arrest. Aside from the sense of immediacy, it is also mandatory that the person making the arrest must have personal knowledge of certain facts indicating that the person to be taken into custody had committed the crime. In this case, the arrest of the accused did not comply with these requirements since the arrest came a day after the consummation of the crime. Likewise, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense since they were not actual witnesses to the crime. GO vs CA Go vs. Court of Appeals [GR 101837, 11 February 1992] En Banc, Feliciano (J): 5 concur Facts: On 2 July 1991, Eldon Maguan was driving his car along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila, heading towards P. Guevarra St. Rolito Go y Tambunting entered Wilson St., where it is a one-way street and started traveling in the opposite or wrong direction. At the corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts., Gos and Maguans cars nearly bumped each other. Go alighted from his car, walked over and shot Maguan inside his car. Go then boarded his car and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take down Gos car plate number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting and there retrieved an empty shell and one round of live ammunition for a 9mm caliber pistol. Verification at the Land Transportation Office showed that the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go. The following day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting to find out where the suspect had come from; they were informed that Go had dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly before the shooting. The police obtained a facsimile or impression of the credit card used by Go from the cashier of the bake shop. The security guard of the bake shop was shown a picture of Go and he positively identified him as the same person who had shot Maguan. Having established that the assailant was probably Go, the police launched a manhunt for Go. On 8 July 1991, Go presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at that time, positively identified Go as the gunman. That same day, the police

People vs Del Rosario Facts: Accused was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession and sale of drugs, particularly methamphetamine or shabu. After the issuance of the search warrant, which authorized the search and seizure of an undetermined quantity of methamphetamine and its paraphernalias, an entrapment was planned that led to the arrest of del Rosario and to the seizure of the shabu, its paraphernalias and of a .22 caliber pistol with 3 live ammunition.

Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the firearms was proper.

Held: No. Sec 2 art. III of the constitution specifically provides that a search warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized. In herein case, the only objects to be seized that the warrant determined was the methamphetamine and the paraphernalias therein. Theseizure of the firearms was unconstitutional. Wherefore the decision is reversed and the accused is acquitted. People v. del Rosario 305 SCRA 740 April 14, 1999 En Banc: Bellosillo, J.

promptly filed a complaint for frustrated homicide against Go with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio (Prosecutor) informed Go, in the Presence of his lawyers. that he could avail himself of his right to preliminary investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Go refused to execute any such waiver. On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before an information could be filed in court, the victim, Eldon Maguan, died of his gunshot wound(s). Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information for frustrated homicide, filed an information for murder before the Regional Trial Court. No bail was recommended. At the bottom of the information, the Prosecutor certified that no preliminary investigation had been conducted because the accused did not execute and sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. In the afternoon of 11 July 1991, Gos counsel filed with the prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and proper preliminary investigation, alleging that the warrantless arrest of Go was unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been conducted before the information was filed. On 12 July 1991, Go filed an urgent ex-parte motion for special raffle in order to expedite action on the Prosecutors bail recommendation. The case was raffled to the sala of Judge Benjamin V. Pelayo (Branch 168, RTC of Pasig City), who, on the same date, approved the cash bond posted by Go and ordered his release. Go was in fact released that same day. On 16 July 1991, the Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for leave to conduct preliminary investigation and prayed that in the meantime all proceedings in the court be suspended. On the said date, the trial court issued an Order 9 granting leave to conduct preliminary investigation and cancelling the arraignment set for 15 August 1991 until after the prosecution shall have concluded its preliminary investigation. On 17 July 1991, however, the Judge motu proprio issued an Order, (1) recalling the 12 July 1991 Order which granted bail: petitioner was given 48 hours from receipt of the Order to surrender himself: (2) recalling and cancelling the 16 July 1991 Order which granted leave to the Prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation: (3) treating Gos omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation dated 11 July 1991 as a petition for bail and set for hearing on 23 July 1991. On 19 July 1991, Go filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme Court assailing the 17 July 1991 Order. Go also moved for suspension of all proceedings in the case pending resolution by the Supreme Court of his petition: this motion was, however, denied by Judge Pelayo. On 23 July 1991, Go surrendered to the police. By a Resolution dated 24 July 1991, the Supreme Court remanded the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to the Court of Appeals. On 16 August 1991, Judge Pelayo issued an order in open court setting Gos arraignment on 23 August 1991. On 19 August 1991, Go filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to restrain his arraignment. On 23 August 1991, Judge Pelayo issued a Commitment Order directing the Provincial Warden of Rizal to admit Go into his custody at the Rizal Provincial Jail. On the same date, Go was arraigned. In view, however, of his refusal to enter a plea, the trial court entered for him a plea of not guilty. The trial court then set the criminal case for continuous hearings on 19, 24 and 26 September; on 2, 3, 11 and 17 October; and on 7, 8, 14, 15, 21 and 22 November 1991. On 27 August 1991. Go filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals. On 30 August 1991, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of habeas corpus. The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, on the one hand, and the petition for habeas corpus, upon the other, were subsequently consolidated in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, on 2 September 1991, issued a resolution denying Gos motion to restrain his arraignment on the ground that motion had become moot and academic. On 19 September 1991, trial of the criminal case commenced. On 23 September 1991, the Court of Appeals

rendered a consolidated decision dismissing the 2 petitions on the grounds that Gos warrantless arrest was valid and Gos act of posting bail constituted waiver of any irregularity attending his arrest, among others. On 3 October 1991, the prosecution presented three (3) more witnesses at the trial. Gos Counsel also filed a Withdrawal of Appearance with the trial court, with Gos conformity. On 4 October 1991, Go filed the present petition for Review on Certiorari. On 14 October 1991, the Court issued a Resolution directing Judge Pelayo to held in abeyance the hearing of the criminal case below until further orders from the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether Go was arrested legally without warrant for the killing of Maguan, and is thus not entitled to be released pending the conduct of a preliminary investigation. Held: Gos warrantless arrest or detention does not fall within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides that A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be created has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. Gos arrest took place 6 days after the shooting of Maguan. The arresting officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time Go had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the arrest effected 6 days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected when *the shooting had+ in fact just been committed within the meaning of Section 5 (b). Moreover, none of the arresting officers had any personal knowledge of facts indicating that Go was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting one stated that Go was the gunman another was able to take down the alleged gunmans cars plate number which turned out to be registered in Gos wifes name. That information did not, however, constitute personal knowledge. It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of Go within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too that Section 7 of Rule 112 is also not applicable. Indeed, Go was not arrested at all. When he walked into the San Juan Police Station, accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the police authorities. He did not state that he was surrendering himself, in all probability to avoid the implication he was admitting that he had slain Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a crime. When the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine whether there was probable cause for charging Go in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan. Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceeded under the erroneous supposition that Section 7 of Rule 112 was applicable and required Go to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. This was substantive error, for Go was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should have been

accorded him without any conditions. Moreover, since Go had not been arrested; with or without a warrant, he was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his appearing at the preliminary investigation.

In Go vs. CA, 206 SCRA 138 *1992+, petitioners arrest took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The arresting officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a) at the time petitioner had already shot Maguan. Neither could the arrest effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected when (the shooting had) in fact jjust been committed within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the arresting officers had any personal knowledge of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunmans cars plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioner wifes name. It has been held that that information did not constitute personal knowledgfe. It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113

companions proceeded to the scene of the mauling and there they were informed by the witness that she saw the killing and pointed to Gabriel Gerente, as one of the three men who killed Blace. The policemen went to the house of Gerente who was then sleeping, asked the latter to come out, and when he did, he was placed under arrest. He was frisked, the police finding in his pocket a coin purse containing dried leaves wrapped in a foil. The dried leaves turned out to be marijuana after laboratory examination.

PEOPLE vs. GERENTE 219 SCRA 756

ISSUE #1: Was the warrantless arrest of Gerente lawful? 36

FACTS: A witness testified that at 7 oclock in the morning, she saw three persons started drinking liquor and smoking marijuana and overheard them killing Clarito Blace. Nine hours after, or at 4 P.M., the police received a report of a mauling incident. So a police investigator went to the hospital where the victim was brought and was told that the victim died on arrival. The police investigator and his

HELD: YES! The eye witness Edna Edwina Reyes reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor Gerente as one of the killers. Since the policemen have personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace, and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others are guilty. Were going back to Rule 113 what do you mean by personal knowledge or probable causethey could lawfully

arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled like his companions.

ISSUE #2: May the marijuana be validly used as evidence in a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs? Was the marijuana validly seized?

HELD: YES. The search conducted on Gerentes person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest. It was in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126, citing the case of Adams vs. Williams, an American case: It was ruled that the individual being arrested may be frisked for concealed weapons that may be used against the arresting officer, and all unlawful articles found in his person or within his immediate control may be seized.

People vs. Gerente [GR 95847-48, 10 March 1993] First Division, Grino-Aquino (J): 3 concur Facts: At about 7:00 a.m. of 30 April 1990, Gabriel Gerente, together with Fredo Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren, allegedly started drinking

liquor and smoking marijuana in Gerentes house which is about 6 meters away from the house of Edna Edwina Reyes who was in her house on that day. She overheard the three men talking about their intention to kill Clarito Blace. She testified that she heard Fredo Echigoren saying, Gabriel, papatayin natin si Clarito Blace. Fredo and Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace at about 2:00 p.m. of the same day. Reyes allegedly witnessed the killing. Fredo Echigoren struck the first blow against Clarito Blace, followed by Totoy Echigoren and Gabriel Gerente who hit him twice with a piece of wood in the head and when he fell, Totoy Echigoren dropped a hollow block on the victims head. Thereafter, the three men dragged Blace to a place behind the house of Gerente. At about 4:00 p.m. of the same day, Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received a report from the Palo Police Detachment about a mauling incident. He went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was brought. He was informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival. The cause of death was massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard and heavy object. Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, together with Police Corporal Romeo Lima and Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling incident took place. There they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana. They were informed by Reyes that she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the three men who killed Clarito. The policemen proceeded to the house of Gerente, who was then sleeping. They told him to come out of the house and they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked Gerente and found a coin purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. The dried leaves were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination. The Forensic Chemist found them to be marijuana. Only Gerente was apprehended by the police. The other suspects, Fredo and Totoy Echigoren, are still at large. On 2 May 1990, two separate informations were filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Benjamin Caraig against him for Violation of Section 8, Art. II, of RA 6425, and for Murder. When arraigned on 16 May 1990, Gerente pleaded not guilty to both charges. A joint trial of the two cases was held. On 24 September 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, found Gerente guilty of Violation of Section 8 of Republic Act 6425 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of

imprisonment for a term of 12 years and 1 day, as minimum, to 20 years, as maximum; and also found him guilty of Murder for which crime he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. . Gerente appealed. Issue: Whether the police officers have the personal knowledge of the killing of Blace to allow them to arrest, and the subsequent searchly Gerentes person, without the necessary warrant. Held: The search of Gerentes person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in his possession were valid because they were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. Paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court provide that A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; The policemen arrested Gerente only some 3 hours after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did. The search conducted on Gerentes person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. The frisk and search of Gerentes person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, for

the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them unless he is first disarmed.

Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 402 [1997] Petitioner Robin Padilla figured in a hit-and-run accident with a Mitsubishi pajero. The incident was witnessed by Manarang, a member of a civic group. Manarang rode his motorcycle and chased the petitioner and was able to make out the plate number PMA 777. He called the Viper through the radio, which flashed the message to all PNP units of Angeles City. PNP mobile patrols respondend to the call. At the Abacan bridge, Manarang found Mobile No. 3 with SPO2 Borja and Miranda. He informed them about the hit-and-run incident. He returned to where he came from until he saw the vehicle that figured in the incident and he followed it. Soon the vehicle was within sight of Borja and Miranda of Mobile No. 3. They rode their mobile car and cut into the path of the vehicle forcing it to stop. The police officers requested petitioner to alight the vehicle. When he alighted with his hands raised, a gun tucked on the left of his waist was revealed. The gun was confiscated and his car was searched for weapons which turned out to contain firearms and ammunitions of assorted calibre.

Petitioner insisted that his arrest was illegal arguing that the policemen who actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run. The Supreme Court held: x x x We beg to disagree. That Manarang decided to seek the aid of the policemen (who admittedly were nowhere in the vicinity of the hit and run) in effecting the petitioners arrest, did not in any way affect the propriety of the apprehension. It was in fact the most prudent action Manarang could have taken rather than collaring the petitioner himself, inasmuch as policemen are unquestionably better trained and well-equipped in effecting an arrest of a suspect (like herein petitioner) who, in all probability, could have put up a degree of resistance which an untrained civilian may not be able to contain without endangering his own life. X x x
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals [GR 121917, 12 March 1997] Third Division, Francisco (J): 4 concur Facts: At about 8:00 p.m. of 26 October 1992, Enrique Manarang and his compadre Danny Perez were inside the Manukan sa Highway Restaurant in Sto. Kristo, Angeles City where they took shelter from the heavy downpour that had interrupted their ride on motorcycles along Mac Arthur Highway. While inside the restaurant, Manarang noticed a vehicle, a Mitsubishi Pajero, running fast down the highway prompting him to remark that the vehicle might get into an

accident considering the inclement weather. Immediately after the vehicle had passed the restaurant, Manarang and Perez heard a screeching sound produced by the sudden and hard braking of a vehicle running very fast, followed by a sickening sound of the vehicle hitting something. Manarang and Cruz went out to investigate and immediately saw the vehicle occupying the edge or shoulder of the highway giving it a slight tilt to its side. Manarang, being a member of both the Spectrum, a civic group and the Barangay Disaster Coordinating Council, decided to report the incident to the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Angeles City. He took out his radio and called the Viper, the radio controller of the PNP of Angeles City. By the time Manarang completed the call, the vehicle had started to leave the place of the accident taking the general direction to the north. Manarang went to the location of the accident and found out that the vehicle had hit somebody. Manarang asked Cruz to look after the victim while he went back to the restaurant, rode on his motorcycle and chased the vehicle. During the chase he was able to make out the plate number of the vehicle as PMA 777. He called the Viper through the radio once again reporting that a vehicle heading north with plate number PMA 777 was involved in a hit and run accident. SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda of Mobile 3 were able to intercept the vehicle by cutting into the latters path forcing it to stop. SPO2 Miranda went to the vehicle with plate number PMA 777 and instructed its driver to alight. The driver rolled down the window and put his head out while raising both his hands. They recognized the driver as Robin C. Padilla. SPO2 Miranda told Padilla to alight to which Padilla complied. Padilla was wearing a short leather jacket such that when he alighted with both his hands raised, a gun tucked on the left side of his waist was revealed, its butt protruding. SPO2 Borja made the move to confiscate the gun but Padilla held the formers hand alleging that the gun was covered by legal papers. SPO2 Borja disarmed Padilla and told the latter about the hit and run incident. Padilla, however, arrogantly denied his misdeed and, instead, played with the crowd by holding their hands with one hand and pointing to SPO2 Borja with his right hand saying iyan, kinuha ang baril ko. Because Padillas jacket was short, his gesture exposed a long magazine of an armalite rifle tucked in his back right pocket. SPO Mercado saw this and so when Padilla turned around as he was talking and proceeding to his vehicle, Mercado confiscated the magazine from

Padilla. Suspecting that Padilla could also be carrying a rifle inside the vehicle since he had a magazine, SPO2 Mercado prevented Padilla from going back to his vehicle by opening himself the door of Padillas vehicle. He saw a baby armalite rifle lying horizontally at the front by the drivers seat. It had a long magazine filled with live bullets in a semi-automatic mode. He asked Padilla for the papers covering the rifle and Padilla answered angrily that they were at his home. SPO Mercado modified the arrest of Padilla by including as its ground illegal possession of firearms. SPO Mercado then read to appellant his constitutional rights. The police officers brought Padilla to the Traffic Division at Jake Gonzales Boulevard where Padilla voluntarily surrendered a third firearm, a pietro berreta pistol with a single round in its chamber and a magazine loaded with 7 other live bullets. Padilla also voluntarily surrendered a black bag containing two additional long magazines and one short magazine. Padilla was correspondingly charged on 3 December 1992, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions ([1] One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with 6 live ammunitions; [2] one M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with 4 long and 1 short magazine with ammunitions; [3] one .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and 8 ammunitions; and [4] Six additional live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver. ) under PD 1866. The lower court then ordered the arrest of Padilla, but granted his application for bail. During the arraignment on 20 January 1993, a plea of not guilty was entered for Padilla after he refused, upon advice of counsel, to make any plea. Padilla waived in writing his right to be present in any and all stages of the case. After trial, Angeles City RTC Judge David Rosete rendered judgment dated 25 April 1994 convicting Padilla of the crime charged and sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum. Padilla filed his notice of appeal on 28 April 1994. Pending the appeal in the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor-General, convinced that the conviction shows strong evidence of guilt, filed on 2 December 1994 a motion to cancel Padillas bail bond. The resolution of this motion was incorporated in the appellate courts decision sustaining Padillas conviction. Padilla received a copy of this decision on 26 July 1995. On 9 August 1995 he filed a motion for reconsideration (and to recall the warrant of arrest) but the same was

denied by the appellate court in its 20 September 1995 Resolution. On 28 September 1995, Padilla filed the petition for review on certiorari with application for bail followed by two supplemental petitions filed by different counsels, a second supplemental petition and an urgent motion for the separate resolution of his application for bail. Issue: Whether the firearms and ammunition confiscated during a warrantless search and seizure, especially the baby armalite, are admissible as evidence against Robin Padilla. Held: The 5 well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of property is valid, are as follows: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search; (3) Search of a moving vehicle. 49 Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity; (4) consented warrantless search; and (5) customs search. In conformity with the trial courts observation, it indeed appears that the authorities stumbled upon Padillas firearms and ammunitions without even undertaking any active search which, as it is commonly understood, is a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed. The seizure of the Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for they came within plain view of the policemen who inadvertently discovered the revolver and magazine tucked in Padillas waist and back pocket respectively, when he raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies to the confiscation of the M16 armalite rifle which was immediately apparent to the policemen as they took a casual glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying horizontally near the drivers seat. Thus it has been held that When in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense,

the police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any person, they are not precluded from performing their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of the corpus delicti. Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain view are subject to seizure even without a warrant. With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted magazines, Padilla voluntarily surrendered them to the police. This latter gesture of Padilla indicated a waiver of his right against the alleged search and seizure, and that his failure to quash the information estopped him from assailing any purported defect. Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an active search done by the authorities on the person and vehicle of Padilla, their seizure without a search warrant nonetheless can still be justified under a search incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance). Once the lawful arrest was effected, the police may undertake a protective search of the passenger compartment and containers in the vehicle which are within Padillas grabbing distance regardless of the nature of the offense. This satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental search: (i) the item to be searched (vehicle) was within the arrestees custody or area of immediate control and (ii) the search was contemporaneous with the arrest. The products of that search are admissible evidence not excluded by the exclusionary rule. Another justification is a search of a moving vehicle (third instance). In connection therewith, a warrantless search is constitutionally permissible when, as in this case, the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender (like Padilla with respect to the hit and run) or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PO2 ALBERT ABRIOL
[G.R. NO. 123137, October 17, 2001]

FACTS:

Appellants PO2 Albert Abriol of the Philippine National Police (PNP), Macario Astellero, Januario Dosdos, and PNP P/Chief Inspector Gaudioso Navales were charged with and convicted, of murder for having shot one Alejandro Flores, and of Illegal Possession of Firearms for the handguns that they were armed with. On appeal, one of their contentions against their conviction for murder is that the PNP cannot be presumed to have done their work regularly due to the errors and blunders they committed in transferring the possession and custody of the physical evidence and in having failed to issue acknowledgment receipts thereof. They further contend, as against their conviction for Illegal Possession of Firearms, that the handguns and ammunition taken from them by the police officers were illegally seized in the absence of a warrant.

ISSUES: Whether or not the handguns and ammunitions used in the killing
were illegally seized from appellants in the absence of a warrant.

HELD: NO. There are eight (8) instances where a warrantless search and
seizure is valid. They are: (1) consented searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful arrest; (3) searches of vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug laws; (4) searches of moving vehicles; (5) searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders; (6) where the prohibited articles are in "plain view;" (7) searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and building regulations; and (8) "stop and frisk" operations. In this case, the warrantless search and seizure of the subject handguns and ammunition is valid for two reasons. It was a search incidental to a lawful arrest. It was made after a fatal shooting, and pursuit of a fast-moving vehicle seeking to elude pursuing police officers, and a more than reasonable belief on the part of the police officers that the fleeing suspects aboard said vehicle had just engaged in criminal activity. The urgent need of the police to take immediate action in the light of the foregoing exigencies clearly satisfies the requirements for warrantless arrests under the Rules of Court. Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with firearms and ammunition which they were not authorized to carry, appellants were actually violating P.D. No. 1866, another ground for valid arrest under the Rules.

QUISUMBING, J:

Case Digest: Gaudencio Demaisip v. The Court of Appeals

25 September 1959 :: G.R. No. L-13000 FACTS: The late Geronimo Destacamento filed his application for a fishpond permit on 01 April 1927. Before his death, Destacamento, without the knowledge and consent of the Director of Forestry, executed a deed of sale covering the lots in question in gavor of Seragin Villanueva an act which was illegal and contrary to the rules of the permit granted him. Nevertheless, the Director of Forestry requested Villanueva to apply for a fishpond permit over the same lots, but the latter neglected and failed to do so. Gaudencio Demaisip then filed with the Fish and Game Administration a fishpond permit application for the same lots. He complied with all the prerequisites necessary for the issuance of a fishpond permit, namely, payment of annual rental of P21 and posting a surety bond in the sum of P350. When said fishpond permit was ready to be issued to Demaisip, Villanueva executed a deed of sale covering the lots in question in favour of Luis Buenaflor who started to occupy the land and introduced improvements thereon consisting of a big dam. The Director of Fish and Game Administration decided that Demaisip be given due course upon payment of an additional rental of P16 which is 1% of the value of improvements assessed at P1,600. However, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources reversed the said decision. Demaisip then appealed to the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction over the said case, due to the fact that Demaisip had not exhausted all administrative remedies before approaching the judiciary. HELD: It is true that plaintiff did not appeal from the decision of the Secretary of Agreculture and Natural Resources to the President, but such failure cannot preclude the plaintiff from taking court action in view of the theory that the

Secretary of a department is merely an alter-ego of the President. The presumption is that the action of the Secretary bears the implied sanction of the President, unless disapproved by the latter. It is therefore incorrect to say that plaintiffs action should not be entertained. Furthermore, it cannot be said that there is interference of the courts with the acts of executive officers for such defense might only be valid in special civil actions this is not one wherein the petitioner must allege and prove that he has no other speedy and adequate remedy.

In People v. Diaz (2011) 51 C.4th 84, 119 C.R.3d 105, 244 P.3d 501, a law enforcement officer arrested defendant, who had a cell phone on his person, for conspiring to sell drugs. The officer transported defendant to a sheriffs station, where a detective seized the cell phone and gave it to the officer. About 90 minutes after the arrest, the officer conducted a warrantless search of the text message folder of the cell phone. Held, under United States Supreme Court precedent, the search was a valid search incident to arrest.