Class is the basis of British party politics. All else is embellishment and detail (Pulzer, 1963).

This was a comment of the political basis of party support in Britain more than a generation ago. Explain this thesis from and use the British Election Study data set to examine the relationship between class as measured by occupational status and voting support in the 2001 general election. Does this quote still apply, and if not, why not?

Introduction
The aim of this essay is to examine the class cleavages in Britain and construct a thesis about the importance of the division between classes as occupational status in the general elections. According to the past several decades, the social class has a significant account on the choice of political party, but considering the near past and present situation we can no longer evaluate the political scene as it was before. It is argued by many critics that the information on the declining turnout importance of social class is quite extensive. To evaluate the class importance we must have a clear idea of what is the distinction between class politics and class voting. A proper explanation of class voting is when we clearly see how a single social class is voting for a party, whether class politics refers to the extent to which these social groups persist in a period of time. When making this difference we can observe several phenomena: the ruining of the original alignment between working class and left voting; the born of new coalitions and social groups; the diminishing results of examining a one social group to vote for a party. [Han Dorussen; 2002; p.266-268]

Step into the thesis

It can be stated that if a decline emerge in class voting, the social class divisions are losing its expressive power in the total variation for voter turnout, or simply is no longer a core factor for prediction of voting. It is argued that there is a significant decline over the traditional working class voting for the Labour party for decades, but this is not a single problem because there is also a decrease in the relationship between social group and voter turnout for a specific party. There are new core elements of examining the political situation and voting. On the one hand, they are linked to the new, modern shape of the social structure of Western societies. On the other hand, there are issues for the persistence of class politics over the past and recent decades. The first component is

changing of the social bases of classes. There are new, more organized postindustrial societies and the conflict between pitted bourgeois and working class emerged. A modern class occupied the scene the wide middle class which is based on professionalized sectors in working class, managers and supervisors in the public administration. The demographic identities of social classes are also undermined because of the economic development and intergenerational mobility. The new born educated electorate is more educated and there is a wider system of welfare which is working for it. The higher income led to undercutting the number of questions for the economic condition and stability like it was in the past traditional class-polarized system. [Han Dorussen; p. 266-270] Nieuwebeerta and Ultee derived from their research that the social class voting is declined in societies with more religious and linguistic heterogeneity, whether the income distribution and mobility imply no impact: It can be hypothesized that declines in class voting levels [] were caused by the fact that left-wing and right-wing political parties became more similar in their policy preferences and images. Consequently, members of the different classes can be assumed to have become less able to draw clear distinctions between the parties, and level of class voting decreased. [Nieuwebeerta and Ultee, 1999: 149] . [Butler, 1969; p.196] The education increased rapidly after the change of government in 1964 and 1970, and in searching the searching of solutions to problems of economic growth, national creditworthiness, inflation and industrial turbulence, the ministers of both Labour and Conservative parties has turned to similar reactions. Following the aforementioned idea, it can easily be stated that the gap between parties is closing over the decades. [Butler, 1969; p.196]

How the social class voting changed over the time?

The sociological approach To begin with, we must state that the social class was a core explanatory element of voting until the 1960s, but it started to decrease gradually until now. This in turns mean that the sociological approach is a keyless factor now than it was in the 1960. In the BES for 1983-2001 it is revealed that the working class shifted their voting to the right and the party issues become closer to the electorate. This has a significant impact on the predictions for the Labours success in both 19972001. Assuming that the leader evaluation is a proxy for more general observation of the party competence we can conclude that competence itself played major role in the electorates decision making. [Clarke et al; 2004; 39-40]

We must say that the class cleavage was a departure point for considering whether to vote left or right. It was argued that the British electoral politics were significantly dependent on class divisions with a large proportion of voters recognizing themselves as manual or non-manual workers (working class or middle class). On the one side, the Labour party was mostly based on the idea to redistribute wealth by implying taxations and other economic tools, they are also trying to produce welfare state. On the other side, the Conservatives commit to prevent property rights, business development, and free enterprise which is a strong shield on the defender class. Furthermore, both Conservatives and Labourers strongly identify themselves to one of the parties and thus they choose their preferences and vote left or right for a continuous amount of time. [Political Choice in Britain; 2004; p.40-41] Another point to make is that in the last four decades we are observing statistically great decline on the importance of class voting. We can use the Alfords index to contribute people who are from a traditional social class and do not vote for the party that most of their origin voted.
Social Class 2001 Worki ng Class Party Voted For ative % Labour 61.3 % % 38.3 Conserv 19.8 % 34.0 le Class Midd

Social Class 1964 Wor king Class Mi ddle Class

62 28% %

22 64% %

[Political Choice in Britain; 2004; p.42; Table 3.1] Comparing the results from both years, we can conclude that a significant decline has emerged during the last four decades. In 2001 elections, those who identify themselves as a right wing voters (people with non-manual occupations), chose to vote 34% for the Conservatives whether in the 1964 62% voted for them. That is a significant drop of nearly 30% which thoroughly explains that the current sociological approach is not a core factor in decision making and choosing which party to support. On the other side, we do not observe such a sharp decline in the side of the Labourers, but considering that they were the incumbent party in office for 1997, and they did pretty well with the political issues, it can be stated that in 2001 the working class (people with manual occupations) was satisfied from the years before and voted again for them. It is also clear to see that in the 1964 part of the table there is a diagonal strength, whether in the 2001 part there is not. It is argued that the decreasing class voting do no affect parties equally. Until 1987, those of the

middle class mostly supported Conservatives and those from the working class voted supported the Labour party, but during the years the voter turnout for the Conservatives drop dramatically, whether there is an increase in supporting the Labourers. Therefore, we can conclude that the Conservatives made a bigger loss of class supporters. It is argued that a half of the British people do not identify themselves as a party of a socio-originated group, so that a full and clear measurement of the class politics cannot be measured. During the decades of innovations, institutionalizations, social improvement and economic development, the British people become less tribal and the era of class cleavage is coming to its end. An important point to make is that there are two indexes that examine the class voting: Alfred and Thomsen. Furthermore, they both measured a decline in the sociological approach. When Thomsen index used we can state that there is a level of 0.74 decreases from 1.64 in 1945 to 0.90 in 1990. When we use the measurement of Alford we can observe that it declined from 37.3 in 1945 to 23.4 in 1990. [Evans; 1999; p.32-33] There is another interesting method of testing the decline in class-based politics. It is the subjective and objective approach. The subjective approach is when people identify themselves as a party of one group, whether the objective method is when people identify themselves according to the income level and job occupation. Firstly, I will test the subjective model by cross tabulating the dependent variable Party voted for and the variable social class.
Member of Social

BES 2001 Subjective Approach

Class Mid dle class ng class 150 35.0 % 160 37.3 % % % 382 67.0 82 14.4 Worki

Party Voted For ative

Conserv

Count % within Member of Social Class

Labour

Count % within Member of Social Class

We can clearly see that the amount of middle class voted for Conservative party is significantly lower that the amount of working class voted for Labour. Secondly, I will examine the objective method by cross tabulating the dependent variable Party voted for and Social Class [bclass].

Social Class E - semi-skilled and unskilled manual 38 14.9% 161 63.1% 31 15.7% 134 68.0%

Aprofessionals Conservative 27 42.9% Labour 19 30.2%

B - managers 182 40.3% 142 31.4%

C1- clerical, C2 - foremen administrative and supervisors 208 29.2% 309 43.3% 96 25.2% 216 56.7%

D - skilled manual

As our question is involving two main parties the table was reduced and simplified. We do not need an eagle eye to see that A-professionals, B-managers and C1-clerical administrative identifying themselves as a middle class and tend to vote for the Conservative party , whether C2foreman and supervisors, D-skilled manual and E-semi-skilled and unskilled manual are mostly voting for Labour party. Another method of testing the relationship between the variables Party voted for and social class is the relative and absolute approach. The absolute methodology tends to measure the whole bunch of people that belong to a certain class and also voted for the party that defend their interests. On the other side, the relative approach is linked to the virtual strength of a party in the social classes. Year Middle-class Conservative plus Workingclass Labour as % of all voters 1964 1970 February 1974 October 1974 1979 1983 1987 [Heath et al; 1991; p.65; table 5.1] As we clearly see on the table the results in absolute class voting declined over two decades with more 10%. It cannot be argued that fewer people of a certain traditional class voted for the party that prevent their interests. We can conclude that the British class cleavages are now less important for defining a political orientation. [Heath et al; 1991; p.62-66] 64.0 60.2 55.5 57.4 56.7 51.7 51.6

The valence model (A model of performance) Here I would like to induce the valence politics model and its implication. It is a politics of performance and argues that the new British electorate is mostly concerned about the performance of the government and the implications of its politics in areas that people care most. It is also an approach that has a purpose to achieve and desire the most general goals. It is argued that the performance of a party can be crystallized in peoples minds through the leader of the specific party, even it is not the thing that matters the most, it have more significant impacts than we actually think. While testing different variables it is examined that the most valuable and accurate prediction of party choice are leadership and partnership. Moreover, it can be stated that, ceteris paribus, a person who has a negative or neutral opinion for the leader of a party is less likely to vote for it, whether when he has a positive view the chance to vote for him significantly increases. This findings do not keep into the boundaries of the voters turnout in 2001, they would rather been used in terms of the past election researches. The most significant change in the past decades is the ruining of the impact of class voting. Furthermore, a considerable decrease of social class voting emerged in the 1970s, but this is not he end, thereafter it continued to drop and the sharpest decline was after Tony Blairs election as the face of Labour party in 1994. The class-voting problem was a major change in the past decade but the most considerable nexus has been the fall of the support of Conservatives among the nonmanual workers. [Clarke et al; 2004; p. 58; p. 315-318]

An important point to make is when we compare the results between leadership and class voting (only Conservative and Labour) we can measure that there is a tendency for leadership to have bigger effect, excluding 1970 when the results were equal. Furthermore, by examining these two variables we can conclude that if class voting declined, the efficacy of the leadership did not drop. Moreover, these strong leadership efficacy proposed that, at least since 1960s the voters view was impacted significantly by those factor. The above statements proposed that the leader of a party is playing a dramatic role for voters to chose a party, and that the valence model made a strong leverage for evaluating and examining the politics of the past decade. [Clarke et al; 2004; p.58-59 p. 63-64] Another classical example of valence issue is the economic condition. Economic conditions are vital for every individual, everybody wants a vigorous rate of growth and low level of unemployment and inflation. Moreover, everybody is seeking for a peaceful society, without terrorist attacks, violent crimes, personal and property threats and threats for the national security.

Most people who belong to an adequate society wants an array of benefits that can insure their education, transport, environment and health. [Clarke et al; 2009; p.152-154]
Most Important Issue-Summary Economy NHS Education Unemployment Taxation Inflation general Crime EURO, Europe Transportation Environment 147 29 1 39 2 18 25 162 4 7 25.3% Labour 351 35.7% 5.0% 148 15.1% .2% 9 .9% 6.7% 18 1.8% .3% 5 .5% 3.1% 63 6.4% 4.3% 29 3.0% 27.8% 69 7.0% .7% 13 1.3% 1.2% 6 .6%

Conservative

I have reduced the table and eliminated the other parties because the main battle on the political scene is between Conservative and Labour parties. I have also cut some of the issues and left those with higher percentage of importance. According to this table we can examine which issues are valued the most by the voter. As it is clearly shown we can conclude that the entering of the Euro and the European Union problems, along with NHS are the most valuable criteria if it is according to the electorate, whereas the Transportation and the environmental health are the least concerned. As we are observing the table we must have a clear distinction between those political factors. If we can divide those variables into social and economic ones, on the one hand we can state that those which are including economic issues (taxation, inflation, EURO) are tied to the Conservatives, whether on the other hand the social factors (NHS, education, transportation) are more benefited by the Labour party. [Clarke et al; 2009; p.153-155] The main proposition in this case is that the electorate casts their vote for the party which could deal in a most competent way with the issues of the day. It is originally assumed that issues that involve social, health, educational and welfare problems are connected with a left-wing voting, whether issues as violent crime, national defence, economic problems and specifically taxation and inflation are linked to right-wing voting. . [Clarke et al; 2004; p.58] Economic evaluation When arguing about economic perceptions, it is stated that past and future economic evaluations are really important for a research on the political economy voting. Downs stated that, when it is talking about retrospective-prospective diversification, we must assume it like past performance versus future promises. Assuming that the individual is rational, we must conclude that using this model he would make his future expectations for his utility based on the former performance of the government and the utility he already received. If electorate think that the only reliable base, on which they make their evaluations, concerning actual government politics, then they must rely on information about the economic performance of the party when it was an

incumbent in the office. A rational voter is considered as a voter who is not trying to be harmful for a party but is trying to maximise utility, so that he must be a forecaster of the economic conditions and must have a correct evaluation of what is going to emerge if a party leader is elected. It is assumed that people must rely on the party identification and leaders, they must also generate a strategic decisions about the utility they get from the economy. Under different circumstances the electorate could show different emotional phases (anxiety, confidence, angriness). The economic evaluation of the voter have a significant impact over the valence model of politics, it can change the dynamics and performance of a party. [Clarke; 2004; 26-27] Another point to make, is that most of the time people do not judge the government for their own real income levels. Furthermore, it is argued that rational voter can be affected by the economic conditions as an universal factor (unemployment, inflation). Kiewiet stated that: In contrast, according to proponents of the national assessments hypothesis, most people readily perceive trends in the nations economy to be a product of the policies pursued by those in power. [] In short, trends in nations economy in most peoples minds, reflect directly upon the performance and policies of the government party. Their own personal economic fortunes, in contrast, generally do not. [Heath; 1991; p.138-139]
Economic Evaluation-Self, Past Year Lot worse Conservative 45 44.1% Labour 37 36.3% Little worse 178 51.1% 95 27.3% Stayed same 258 27.7% 431 46.2% Little better 83 15.3% 332 61.3% Lot better 14 11.2% 81 64.8% Don't know 2 18.2% 5 45.5% Total 580 28.1% 981 47.6%

The table is reduced due to be in relation with the title and now it is clearly observable that people that think the economy is better voted mostly for Labour party, whether the part of the electorate that has an opinion of declining economy cast their votes for the right-wing party.

The decline of class alignment There are various good reasons to explain the declining of class identifying and class voting in Britain. The electorate has become less motivated to reply politics in terms of class cleavage.

Furthermore, the electorates inclination to join politics according to their class belonging is the improvement of their economic condition. Following this idea, the income levels of the postwar electorate have risen progressively to far much higher levels, than those of the prewar period. Moreover, this revolution in the economic conditions in Britain did not brought the embourgeoisement of the manual workers in the impression of identifying themselves as middle class. With the rise of disposable income the gap (living standards and social benefits) between the mass of working class and the mass of middle class become smaller. The zero-sum game, in which somebody is gaining from the others losses, has declined in Britain as in many other countries. [Butler, 1969; 193-194] Another aspect that reducing the length of the bridge between working class and middle class is the development of suburban owner-occupancy. Moreover it destroyed the relationship between many long lived local communities. The more lenient structure of post war period and the pop-culture broke many traditional frameworks and loosened moral and loyalty of social class and family values. Broad opened horizons revealed in front of the proletariat, and in the same time the bourgeois became self-conscious, this factors both together make it much harder for the class superiority to emerge in terms of political party orientation. [Butler, 1969; p.194-195]

Conclusion
To conclude, the class cleavages in Britain do not explain a big percent from the variation and do not account to be very important during the last decades. Although, the social class division was a significant factor in the beginning of the postwar period, but according to modern researches, the importance of the class cleavages decreased significantly. In the new modern and industrial society world, where both the left-wing and the right-wing parties approach more centralist ideology, new variables (economic condition, performance of the incumbent, NHS, Transportation, European Union politics) are needed for the research to be concrete, new issues are valued the most from the electorate, so we must finally sum up that the era of class politics is near to its end.

Appendix
Case Processing Summary Cases Valid N Party Voted For * Social Class 2061 Percent 68.1% Missing N 963.779 Percent 31.9% Total N 3024.779 Percent 100.0%

Social Class Working Class Middle Class 165 418 19.8% 511 61.3% 118 14.2% 19 2.3% 8 1.0% 3 .4% 9 1.1% 833 100.0% 34.0% 470 38.3% 283 23.0% 17 1.4% 4 .3% 18 1.5% 18 1.5% 1228 100.0% Total 583 28.3% 981 47.6% 401 19.5% 36 1.7% 12 .6% 21 1.0% 27 1.3% 2061 100.0%

Party Voted For

Conservative

Count % within Social Class

Labour

Count % within Social Class

Liberal Democrat

Count % within Social Class

SNP

Count % within Social Class

Plaid Cymru

Count % within Social Class

Greens

Count % within Social Class

Other [SPECIFY]

Count % within Social Class

Total

Count % within Social Class

Chi-Square Tests Value 123.386 a 125.435 .333 2061 df Asymp. Sig. (2sided) 6 .000 6 1 .000 .564

Pearson Chi-Square Likelihood Ratio Linear-by-Linear Association N of Valid Cases

Case Processing Summary Cases Valid N Party Voted For * Member of Social Class 2056 Percent 68.0% Missing N 968.779 Percent 32.0% Total N 3024.779 Percent 100.0%

Member of Social Class Middle class Working class 150 82 35.0% 160 37.3% 96 22.4% 6 1.4% 1 .2% 9 2.1% 7 1.6% 429 100.0% 14.4% 382 67.0% 72 12.6% 13 2.3% 6 1.1% 1 .2% 14 2.5% 570 100.0% Other class 10 45.5% 6 27.3% 5 22.7% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 1 4.5% 22 100.0% No 320 32.8% 409 41.9% 212 21.7% 17 1.7% 5 .5% 10 1.0% 2 .2% 975 100.0% Other[SPECIFY] 12 38.7% 8 25.8% 10 32.3% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 1 3.2% 31 100.0% Don't know 8 27.6% 16 55.2% 4 13.8% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 1 3.4% 29 100.0% Total 582 28.3% 981 47.7% 399 19.4% 36 1.8% 12 .6% 20 1.0% 26 1.3% 2056 100.0%

Party Voted For

Conservative

Count % within Member of Social Class Count % within Member of Social Class Count % within Member of Social Class Count % within Member of Social Class Count % within Member of Social Class Count % within Member of Social Class Count % within Member of Social Class Count % within Member of Social Class

Labour

Liberal Democrat

SNP

Plaid Cymru

Greens

Other [SPECIFY]

Total

Chi-Square Tests Value a 179.913 190.595 4.841 2056 df Asymp. Sig. (2sided) 30 .000 30 1 .000 .028

Pearson Chi-Square Likelihood Ratio Linear-by-Linear Association N of Valid Cases

Cases Valid N Party Voted For * Social Class 2061 Percent 68.1% Missing N 963.779 Percent 31.9% Total N 3024.779 Percent 100.0%

Social Class E - semi-skilled and unskilled manual 38 31 15.7% 134 68.0% 26 13.2% 2 1.0% 2 1.0% 0 .0% 2 1.0% 197 100.0%

Party Voted For

Conservative

Count % within Social Class

AC1- clerical, C2 - foremen professionals B - managers administrative and supervisors 27 182 208 96 42.9% 19 30.2% 16 25.4% 0 .0% 0 .0% 1 1.6% 0 .0% 63 100.0% 40.3% 142 31.4% 111 24.6% 5 1.1% 1 .2% 4 .9% 7 1.5% 452 100.0% 29.2% 309 43.3% 156 21.9% 12 1.7% 4 .6% 13 1.8% 11 1.5% 713 100.0% 25.2% 216 56.7% 51 13.4% 10 2.6% 3 .8% 1 .3% 4 1.0% 381 100.0%

D - skilled manual

Total 582 28.2% 981 47.6% 401 19.5% 36 1.7% 13 .6% 21 1.0% 27 1.3% 2061 100.0%

14.9% 161 63.1% 41 16.1% 7 2.7% 3 1.2% 2 .8% 3 1.2% 255 100.0%

Labour

Count % within Social Class

Liberal Democrat

Count % within Social Class

SNP

Count % within Social Class

Plaid Cymru

Count % within Social Class

Greens

Count % within Social Class

Other [SPECIFY]

Count % within Social Class

Total

Count % within Social Class

Chi-Square Tests Value a 166.958 174.675 2.999 2061 df Asymp. Sig. (2sided) 30 .000 30 1 .000 .083

Pearson Chi-Square Likelihood Ratio Linear-by-Linear Association N of Valid Cases

Conservative

NHS 147 25.3%

Education Unemployment 29 1 5.0% 148 15.1% .2% 9 .9%

Most Important Issue-Summary Economy Taxation Inflation general 39 2 18 6.7% 18 1.8% .3% 5 .5% 3.1% 63 6.4%

Crime 25 4.3% 29 3.0%

EURO, Europe Transportation 162 4 27.8% 69 7.0% .7% 13 1.3%

Labour

351 35.7%

Conservative

Most Important Issue-Summary Economy NHS Education Unemployment Taxation Inflation general Crime EURO, Europe Transportation Environment 147 29 1 39 2 18 25 162 4 7 25.3% 5.0% 148 15.1% .2% 9 .9% 6.7% 18 1.8% .3% 5 .5% 3.1% 63 6.4% 4.3% 29 3.0% 27.8% 69 7.0% .7% 13 1.3% 1.2% 6 .6%

Labour

351 35.7%

Case Processing Summary Cases Valid Party Voted For * Economic Evaluation-Self, Past Year N 2061 Percent 68.1% Missing N 963.779 Percent 31.9% Total N 3024.779 Percent 100.0%

Party Voted For * Economic Evaluation-Self, Past Year Crosstabulation Economic Evaluation-Self, Past Year Party Voted For Conservative Lot worse Little worse 45 178 44.1% Labour 37 36.3% Liberal Democrat 12 11.8% SNP 3 2.9% Plaid Cymru 1 1.0% Greens 3 2.9% Other [SPECIFY] 1 1.0% Total 102 100.0% 51.1% 95 27.3% 53 15.2% 8 2.3% 2 .6% 5 1.4% 7 2.0% 348 100.0% Stayed same 258 27.7% 431 46.2% 197 21.1% 18 1.9% 5 .5% 12 1.3% 12 1.3% 933 100.0% Little better 83 15.3% 332 61.3% 108 19.9% 8 1.5% 4 .7% 1 .2% 6 1.1% 542 100.0% Lot better 14 11.2% 81 64.8% 28 22.4% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 2 1.6% 125 100.0% Don't know 2 18.2% 5 45.5% 4 36.4% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 11 100.0% Total 580 28.1% 981 47.6% 402 19.5% 37 1.8% 12 .6% 21 1.0% 28 1.4% 2061 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests Value 208.861a 213.409 15.292 2061 df Asymp. Sig. (2sided) 30 .000 30 1 .000 .000

Pearson Chi-Square Likelihood Ratio Linear-by-Linear Association N of Valid Cases

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