LETICIA A. CADENA (petitioner) v.

CSC (respondent), GR 191412, January 17, 2012 Before us is a Petition for Review filed by petitioner Leticia A. Cadena (Cadena) following the issuance by the Court of Appeals (CA) of its Decision[1] dated June 30, 2009 and Resolution[2] dated January 4, 2010 in the case docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 103646, entitled Leticia A. Cadena v. Civil Service Commission. The Factual Antecedents Cadena, then a State Auditing Examiner II, Commission on Audit, assigned at the National Power Corporation, was charged with grave misconduct by the Civil Service Commission-National Capital Region (CSC-NCR) following an incident that occurred during the Career Service Professional Examination held on June 29, 1997. Records indicate that while all examinees were instructed at the start of the examination to clear their desks of things other than their examination booklets, scratch papers and answer sheets, Cadena kept her Notice of Assignment. In the course of the examination, the examiner caught Cadena with the said notice of assignment where some questions from the examination were reproduced. In her answer to the formal charge, Cadena averred that she failed to fully comprehend the instructions to examinees because she arrived late for the examinations. She did not know that she was prohibited from keeping her notice of assignment while the examinations were ongoing. She further alleged that what she copied from the examination booklet and wrote on the notice of assignment were terms she encountered for the first time, and that she only intended to look up in the dictionary the meaning of those words once she arrived home. While Cadena manifested her desire to file a position paper during the investigations, no such pleading was filed by her counsel. A decision was then rendered by the CSC-NCR based on available records. The Ruling of the CSC-NCR The CSC-NCR found Cadena guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty. The CSC-NCR rejected her defense that she was not aware of the instructions given to examinees considering that the test booklets already contained a prohibition from making copies of the examination questions. Further, she failed to satisfactorily explain her reason for writing her answer sheet number and the venue of her examination on her notice of assignment. The CSC-NCR ruled that her act does not only amount to Grave Misconduct but also connotes untrustworthiness and lack of integrity, a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, betray which is tantamount to dishonesty.[3] It further declared: Further, Item no. 1 of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 8, s. 1990 states that: Any act which includes the fraudulent procurement and/or use of fake/spurious civil service eligibility, the giving of assistance to ensure the commission or procurement of the same, or any other act which amounts to violation of the integrity of the Civil Service examinations, possession of fake Civil Service eligibility and other similar acts shall be categorized as a grave offense of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, as the case may be, and shall be penalized in accordance with the approved schedule of penalties. [4] The dispositive portion of CSC-NCR's Decision[5] dated June 14, 2005 then reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Office finds Leticia A. Cadena guilty of Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty. Cadena is hereby meted out the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service with the accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits, disqualification from re-employment in the government service and bar from taking any civil service examination in the future.SO ORDERED.[6] The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CSC-NCR via a decision[7] dated September 1, 2006, prompting the filing of an appeal with the CSC. The Ruling of the CSC On March 24, 2008, the CSC, through Commissioner Mary Ann Z. Fernandez-Mendoza, issued Resolution No. 080430[8] dismissing the petitioner's appeal for having been filed out of time. It emphasized that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and failure to perfect an appeal as legally required has the effect of rendering final and executory [the] judgment of the court below and deprives the appellate court [of] jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.[9] Dissatisfied with the CSC's ruling, the petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review raising the following issues: 1. Whether or not the Commission-NCR erred in denying the Appeal on its Resolution of March 24, 2008 filed by Petitioner for being arbitrary and not supported by the evidence on record and therefore errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the Petitioner; and

2. Whether or not the failure of her counsel to submit the position paper could be considered as fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which would warrant the reinvestigation of the case to afford Petitioner the chance to explain her side in the first instance.[10] The Ruling of the CA On June 30, 2009, the CA rendered its decision,[11] declaring that the CSC properly dismissed the appeal from the CSC-NCR's decision since the same had already become final and executory. On the other matters raised in the petition, the CA ruled as follows: Having resolved in the affirmative the issue of the propriety of the dismissal of petitioner's appeal to the CSC, we no longer find it necessary to resolve the other issue.[12] A motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner was denied by the CA via a resolution[13] dated January 4, 2010. Hence, this petition. The Present Petition The present petition includes a statement that it is appealing from the resolution of the CA. However, this Court observes that the issues being raised by the petitioner pertain to the rulings of the CSC-NCR and CSC rather than of the CA, to wit: 1. Whether or not the Commission-NCR erred in denying the Appeal on its Resolution of March 24, 2008 filed by Petitioner for being arbitrary and not supported by the evidence on record and therefore errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the Petitioner; and 2. Whether or not the failure of her counsel to submit the position paper could be considered as fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which would warrant the reinvestigation of the case to afford Petitioner the chance to explain her side in the first instance.[14] Further, the petitioner's prayer seeks a reversal or setting aside of the rulings of the CSC instead of the CA, as it reads: WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this Honorable Court shall set aside and/or reverse the Resolution dated March 24, 2008 by Commissioner MARY ANN Z. FERNANDEZ[-]MENDOZA and a new one entered dismissing the above-mentioned Administrative Case for utter lack of merit or in the alternative, remand the case to the Civil Service Commission-National Capital Region for further proceedings where the Petitioner shall be afforded the chance to adduce evidence in her behalf, in the interest of substantial justice.[15] We have earlier denied this petition via a Resolution[16] dated October 5, 2010, in view of the petitioner's failure to comply with a lawful order of the Court when her counsel failed to file a reply as required under this Court's Resolution[17] dated June 29, 2010. The petition's reinstatement was only allowed following the counsel for the petitioner's explanation in a motion for reconsideration dated November 17, 2010 that the belated filing of the reply occurred due to the fault of their office personnel who inadvertently misplaced a copy of this Court's resolution requiring the filing of a reply. This Court's Ruling We deny the petition. The present petition does not comply with the requirements of Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. At the outset, it should be stressed that the petition is dismissible for non-compliance with substantial requirements under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. First, we cite that on March 16, 2010, this Court issued a resolution in relation to the petitioner's failure to include a statement of material dates in her petition as required under Rule 45, Sections 4 (b) and 5, the pertinent portions of which read: Section 4. Contents of the petition. The petition shall be filed in eighteen (18) copies, with the original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall x x x (b) indicate the material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received; x x x.

Section 5. Dismissal or denial of petition. - The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. The Supreme Court may on its own initiative deny the petition on the ground that the appeal is without merit, or is prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration. Given the foregoing, this Court's resolution of March 16, 2010 required compliance from the petitioner and thus reads in part: Acting on the Petition for Review on Certiorari, the Court Resolved, without giving due course to the petition, to xxx (b) REQUIRE the petitioner to COMPLY, within five (5) days from notice hereof, with Rule 45, Sections 4 (b) and 5, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides that the petition shall indicate the material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received.[18] A perusal of the case records, however, reveals that despite due notice of said resolution by the counsel for the petitioner on March 24, 2010,[19] no compliance therewith has been filed with this Court. We reiterate that Rule 45, Section 5 provides that the failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the contents of and the documents which should accompany a petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. Notably, the material dates appear crucial in this case, given that this petition was filed more than two months after the promulgation by the CA of its resolution denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 103646. It has to be sufficiently established that the petition was timely filed within 15 days from the petitioner's notice of the CA's denial of her motion for reconsideration. This Court, instead of dismissing the petition outright, granted the petitioner a reasonable opportunity to correct the deficiency on the material dates by issuing the March 16, 2010 resolution. Regrettably, the petitioner continued to defy this lawful order of the Court, thereby giving us all the more reason to deny the present petition. In addition to the foregoing, the matters pertained to in the present petition are not proper subjects of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. As earlier mentioned, the petitioner assails rulings made by the CSC instead of the CA. The issues brought before us pertain to matters that were neither ruled upon nor discussed by the CA in its June 30, 2009 decision and January 4, 2010 resolution. The appellate court only discussed the timeliness of the appeal to the CSC. After ruling that the CSC made no error in dismissing the appeal from the CSC-NCR, the CA held that it was no longer necessary for it to resolve the other issues brought before it. Further, the CA ruling on the validity of the appeal's dismissal was not even made an issue in this case. In fact, the issues in this petition are exactly the same issues raised before the CA. This petition and the inclusion of issues on matters that were solely decided upon by the CSC then appear to be a scheme resorted to by the petitioner, merely to avert the adverse effects of the petitioner's and/or counsel's previous errors or lapses. We emphasize that under Rule 45, Section 1[20] of the Rules of Court, a petition for review on certiorari is the remedy that may be resorted to by a party to appeal only a judgment or final order or resolution of the CA, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court and other courts whenever authorized by law. With the foregoing infirmities, this Court has sufficient grounds to deny the present petition, barring the need to further rule on the issues now brought before us. In any case, we rule that both the CSC and the CA have correctly held that the rulings of the CSC-NCR had become final and executory when the petitioner failed to make a timely appeal before the CSC. As held by the CSC in its decision denying the appeal: For her failure to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the adverse decision, herein appellant lost her right to appeal. Technically, there is nothing more to appeal as the decision sought to be appealed had already attained finality. It is well settled that judgments or orders become final and executory by operation of law and not by judicial declaration. Thus, finality of judgment becomes an established fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal, if no appeal is perfected or motion for reconsideration or new trial is filed. This jurisprudential rule must be read together with Section 72 Rule V (B) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service

(URACCS), which provides that the prescriptive period to appeal the decision of the Regional Offices of the Commission is fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof by the party adversely affected.[21] (citation omitted) Settled is the rule that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, but is merely a statutory privilege that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by law. The right is unavoidably forfeited by the litigant who does not comply with the manner thus prescribed.[22] This Court has, on several occasions, ruled that the emerging trend in our jurisprudence is to afford every partylitigant the amplest opportunity for the determination and just determination of his cause free from the constraints of technicalities.[23] However, failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed period is not a mere technicality but jurisdictional, and failure to perfect an appeal renders the judgment final and executory.[24] In addition, the liberal application of rules of procedure for perfecting appeals is still the exception, and not the rule; and it is only allowed in exceptional circumstances to better serve the interest of justice.[25] This exceptional situation does not obtain in this case as in fact, both the rulings of the CSC and CA are supported by evidence on record. While the petitioner argues that she was denied the opportunity to fully present her defenses, she was able to give her answer to the charges, and even moved for a reconsideration of the decision of the CSC-NCR. Her arguments and defenses were already reviewed and considered by the agency when it discussed its rulings. As held by this Court in the case of Autencio v. Manara,[26] the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is simply the opportunity to explain one's side or to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Furthermore, the counsel's actions and mistakes on procedural matters bind the client.[27] Where the party has the opportunity to appeal or seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of, defects in procedural due process may be cured.[28] WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR (complainant) v. RODELIO E. MARCELO and MA. CORAZON D. ESPAOLA, MTCC, SAN JOSE DEL MONTE CITY, BULACAN (respondents), A.M. No. P-06-2221 (Formerly A.M. No. 06-7-215-MTCC), October 5, 2010 We resolve in this Decision the administrative matter involving Clerk of Court Rodelio E. Marcelo and Ma. Corazon D. Espaola, Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Clerk of Court, arising from the financial audit conducted at the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), San Jose del Monte City, Bulacan. THE ANTECEDENTS The financial audit was conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on the MTCC books of accounts for the period May 1991 to April 30, 2005, which covered the terms of several clerks of court. The report, dated June 28, 2006, of the OCA audit team[1] showed that Marcelo and Espaola incurred shortages in their collections, pertaining to the courts funds, in the total amount of Seven Hundred Ninety-Two Thousand Two Hundred Thirteen Pesos (P792,213.00), broken down as follows:

NAME OF FUND Clerk of Court General Fund Special Allowance for the Judiciary Judiciary Development Fund Fiduciary Fund Marriage Solemnization fees TOTAL SHORTAGES

AMOUNT OF SHORTAGE P 75,553.00 69,006.00 214,929.00 418,325.00 14,400.00 P792,213.00

Espaola, a former clerk of court/officer-in-charge, had a shortage in her collection for the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF), for the period January 18, 1996 to November 8, 1996 amounting to P11,647.00.[2] The shortage was due to the absence of deposit slips evidencing the remittance of the collection. There was also a shortage in Espaolas collection of marriage solemnization fees in the amount of P200.00. Espaola was directed to immediately deposit the P11,647.00 to the JDF and the P200.00 to the marriage solemnization fund.

In a letter, dated June 2, 2005,[3] to Dindo Sevilla (the OCA audit team leader), Espaola complied with the directive by depositing the amounts covering the shortages.[4] At the recommendation of the OCA, the Court resolved, on August 7, 2006,[5] to: (1) docket the audit teams report as a regular administrative matter; (2) direct Marcelo to pay the amount of P792,213.00, and immediately deposit the payment according to its fund allocations; (3) direct Marcelo and Espaola to explain, in writing, their failure to deposit the collections on time and why no disciplinary action should be taken against them for the shortages; and (4) refer the matter to Judge Pelagia Dalmacio-Joaquin, MTCC, San Jose del Monte City, Bulacan, for investigation. Marcelo explained his side through a letter to the MTCC on October 20, 2006.[6] He strongly denied the charge of malversing/pocketing the courts collections. He claimed that he had been frequently on leave of absence starting late 2003 as he has a heart ailment due to stress, anxiety and fear caused by threats to his life and that of his family; sometime in March 2004, he expressed to Judge Joaquin his intention to return to work, but was advised to continue his leave of absence or to report but not as clerk of court, and to perform some other tasks, pending Judge Joaquins request for the revocation of his designation as acting clerk of court; and he opted to remain on leave instead of doing other tasks. Marcelo claimed that had Judge Joaquin allowed him to return to work for at least a week, he could have done his work and deposited the courts collections. Marcelo admitted that he entrusted the undeposited court collections to Bernadette Alconiza, supervising stenographer and his mothers secretary, who kept the cash in the vault of the City Prosecutors Office. The cash were in several bundles, each bundle marked with the amount it contained. While he admitted that he had been remiss in the performance of his duties as clerk of court, he blamed his poor health for his shortcomings. Judge Joaquins investigation was cut short as she inhibited herself from the case[7] upon the motion for inhibition filed by Marcelos mother and counsel, Atty. Lucita E. Marcelo (who claimed she had retired as City Prosecutor of San Jose del Monte City on April 18, 2006).[8] In a Resolution dated February 28, 2007, the Court referred the case to Judge Mario B. Capellan of the MTCC, Branch 1, Malolos City, Bulacan, whose Report and Recommendation, submitted on October 9, 2007,[9] provides: The salient features of the said financial audit report revealed the following shortages: COC General Fund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P 75,553.00 Special Allowance for the Judiciary (SAJ) 69,006.00 Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) 214,923.00 Fiduciary Fund (FF) 418,325.00 Marriage Solemnization Fees 14,400.00 P792,213.00 These shortages were incurred greatly in part, during the terms of office of Rodelio E. Marcelo. x x x x Respondent Marcelo, through counsel, admitted that the collections for the different funds of the MTCC, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan during his incumbency as OIC of the said court were not deposited with the Land Bank, Sta. Maria, Bulacan branch; that when he was about to make the said deposit, he was informed of the change in the authorized signatories. Following his mother/counsels advi[c]e, the latter being then still in active government service (City Prosecutors Office), respondent Marcelo brought the money to her, which in turn was given to a certain Bernadette Alconiza for safekeeping in the offices vault. Thereafter, all the withdrawals of deposits made during Marcelos incumbency as OIC were effected through respondents mother/counsel. x x x x Respondent Marcelos shortages were incurred during his incumbency pertaining to the five (5) accounts of the said court, namely: I. II. III. Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) P214,929.00 (period of collection August 6, 2002 to December 31, 2004) Fiduciary Fund (FF) P418,325.00 (period of collection March 5, 2002 to December 31, 2004) General Fund (GF) P75,553.00 (period of collection August 6, 2002 to November 10, 2002)

IV. V.

Special Allowance for the Judiciary (SAJ) P69,006.00 (period of collection November 11, 2002 to December 3, 2004) Marriage Solemnization Fee[s] P14,400.00 (period [of collection] August 13, 2002 to November 23, 2004 or a total of 48 uncollected marriage solemnization fees). The shortages for accounts, numbers I to IV, were incurred in the absence of the requisite deposit slips. For Account No. V, the total of P14,400.00 represents uncollected fees for the forty-eight (48) marriages solemnized during the said period. Respondent Marcelos total unexplained accountabilities aggregate to P792,213.00. The explanation advanced by respondent Marcelo is simple that he failed to deposit the collections with the proper depository bank; that around two (2) years, his collections had accumulated and when he decided to make the deposits, there was already a change in the signatories authorized to make such deposits. What puzzles the mind of the court is why did it take him that long to make the deposits? Admittedly, he kept the money, which he later on turned-over to his mother (his counsel). x x x x In the case at bar[,] respondent Marcelo having been on AWOL, was already dropped from the rolls effective June 1, 2005. His position was already declared vacant (SC Resolution in case No. AM-064-135 dated May 29, 2006). Be that as it may, respondent Marcelos severance from the government service should not be as simple as that. Although respondents declaration of AWOL and eventual severance from the office is in effect a dismissal, however, his ouster merits a more severe penalty for a grave offense of dishonesty. There should be a clear categorical and concise pronouncement of his guilt meriting the aforesaid extreme penalty. Such pronouncement will definitely deter similarly minded accountable officers from following respondents footsteps. The gross dishonesty, if not per se malversation of public funds, deserves not only severance from service not only from the judiciary but the entire government service.

Judge Capellan recommended Marcelos dismissal, the cancellation of his eligibilities, the forfeiture of all his benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding any public office, and the payment or restitution of the total amount of P792,213.00. He also recommended that Marcelos case be indorsed to the Office of the Ombudsman for proper action. In a Resolution dated November 26, 2007,[10] the Court referred Judge Capellans report to the OCA for evaluation. THE OCA REPORT In a memorandum submitted on October 9, 2008,[11] the OCA advised the Court of its concurrence with the findings of facts, conclusions of law and recommendations of Judge Capellan. Like Judge Capellan, it found the evidence sufficient to hold Marcelo liable for the irregularities he committed during his term as clerk of court of the MTCC, San Jose del Monte City, Bulacan. Accordingly, it recommended that: (1) Marcelo be found guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty and gross neglect of duty, and be dismissed from the service; (2) Marcelos retirement and/or separation benefits be forfeited, except accrued leave credits, and that he be disqualified from re-employment in the government; (3) Marcelo be directed to pay P792,213.00; (4) the OCA be directed to process Marcelos terminal leave pay, dispensing with the usual documentary requirements, and to apply the proceeds to the shortages; (5) the matter be referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for proper action; and (6) Espaola be warned that the commission of any similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. THE COURTS RULING Without doubt, Marcelo deserves to be sanctioned for the grave transgressions he committed while in office. As clerk of court, he was in charge of the courts funds and was responsible for their collection and safekeeping. He was an accountable officer, a position which carries a degree of trust of the highest order,[12] as Judge Capellan aptly noted. Marcelo violated that trust several times over for a period covering more than two years. He made collections for the courts several funds (JDF, Fiduciary Fund, General Fund, Special Allowance for the Judiciary, between March 5, 2002 and December 31, 2004) and never bothered to deposit these collections in the official court depository bank, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) a violation of the rule that all clerks of court are required to deposit all collections with the LBP within twenty-four (24) hours upon receipt of the collections.[13] Marcelo also held on to his collections, thus committing another violation. Clerks of court may not keep funds in their custody.[14] When he could not make the deposit anymore because he was no longer the authorized signatory, he handed upon the advice of his mother the collections to a member of his mothers staff who allegedly kept the funds in

the vault of the City Prosecutors Office. This action, if true, however, made matters worse; it was a classic case of righting a wrong with another wrong. Again, as Judge Capellan noted, Marcelos mother/counsel is not the courts depository bank. Oddly, Marcelo likewise failed to collect the marriage solemnization fees for 48 marriages, for which he is also accountable. His accountability totaled P792,213.00. Marcelo tried to explain away his failure to deposit his collections with the claim that he had a heart condition and had threats to his life and to those of the members of his family.[15] Judge Capellan, however, correctly observed that [N]o amount of explanation can hide the fact that respondent Marcelo for so many years had at his disposal the huge amount of money which if deposited in the bank could have redounded to the benefit of the government. Malversation of these funds was not therefore remote. It cannot be discounted that respondent benefited from it.[16] The OCA audit team had the same impression. Its report disclosed that [R]ecords show that Mr. Marcelo was malversing/pocketing the collections of the court when collections in the Fiduciary Fund x x x amounting to P418,325.00 were not deposited by him. It is a willful and a deliberate act on Mr. Marcelo to defraud the court.[17] While it had not been established that Marcelo malversed court funds, it cannot be disputed that his acts and omissions constitute a betrayal of the trust and confidence the Court reposes on a senior officer. In Re: Report on the Judicial and Financial Audit in RTC, Branch 4, Panabo, Davao del Norte,[18] we stressed The Clerk of Court may not keep funds in his custody as the same should be deposited immediately upon receipt thereof with the City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer where his court is located should there be no branch of the LBP in the locality. Thus, the failure of Atty. Ginete to remit the funds to the Municipal Treasurer of Panabo, Davao, constitutes gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. A public servant, like the Clerk of Court, must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity. By Atty. Ginetes failure to properly remit the cash collections that are public funds he transgressed the trust reposed in him as cashier and disbursement officer of the court. Marcelo is no different from Atty. Ginete, who was cited in the above ruling. Like Atty. Ginete, Marcelo is liable for gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Under Civil Service Rules, these offenses, even if committed by a public servant for the first time, are punishable with dismissal.[19] We, therefore, find the OCAs recommendation that Marcelo be dismissed from the service to be appropriate. We agree with the OCAs observation that Marcelos dismissal from the service for cause should remain a part of his records. Espaola, on the other hand, after being apprised of her shortages amounting to a total of P11,847.00 (P11,647.00 for the JDF and P200.00 solemnization of marriage fees), immediately complied with the OCA audit teams directive to deposit the amount covering the shortages. In recognition of her ready compliance, the OCA recommended that she be merely warned that the commission of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. The restitution does not, however, fully exonerate Espaola who still failed to deposit her collections at the time she was supposed to. For this infraction, we hold that the penalty of reprimand is the appropriate penalty. WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: (1) Respondent Rodelio E. Marcelo, former Clerk of Court/Officer-in-Charge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, San Jose del Monte City, Bulacan, is found GUILTY of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty and Gross Neglect of Duty; and is hereby ordered DISMISSED from the service. (2) Marcelos retirement and/or separation benefits are FORFEITED except for accrued leave credits, and he is disqualified from re-employment in the government service. (3) Marcelo is directed to pay P792,213.00, representing the shortages in public funds he incurred during his accountable period. (4) The OCA is directed to process Marcelos terminal leave pay, dispensing with the usual documentary requirements, and to apply the proceeds to the shortages. (5) A copy of this Decision is hereby referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate criminal action, if warranted. (6) Respondent Ma. Corazon D. Espaola, former Officer-in-Charge of the same court, is REPRIMANDED and warned that the commission of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Ombudsman for whatever action it may deem appropriate on the possible criminal aspect of this matter. SO ORDERED. [19] Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides:

Section 52. Classification of Offenses. Administrative offenses with corresponding penalties are classified into grave, less grave or light, depending on their gravity or depravity and effects on the government service. A. The following are grave offenses with their corresponding penalties: 1. Dishonesty 1st Offense Dismissal 2. 3. Gross Neglect of Duty 1st Offense Dismissal Grave Misconduct 1st Offense Dismissal

SPOUSES DEMOCRITO and OLIVIA LAGO (complainants) v. JUDGE GODOFREDO B. ABUL, JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Gingoog City (respondent), AM No. RTJ-10-2255, February 8, 2012 Subject of this disposition is the motion for reconsideration of the Courts January 17, 2011 Decision, filed by respondent Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr. (Judge Abul), Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 4,Butuan City, finding him guilty of gross ignorance of the law and imposing upon him a fine in the amount of P25,000.00. Disciplinary action was meted on him for (1) assuming jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 2009-905 without the mandated raffle and notification and service of summons to the adverse party and issuing a temporary restraining order (TRO); (2) setting the case for summary hearing beyond the 72-hour required by the law in order to determine whether the TRO could be extended; and (3) issuing a writ of preliminary injunction without prior notice to the complainants and without hearing. Judge Abul stresses that contrary to the allegations of the complainants, the Clerk of Court conducted a raffle of the case in question. In support thereof, he attached the Letter[1] dated July 3, 2009 of Atty. Rhodora N. Restituto, Clerk of Court VI, RTC, Misamis Oriental, to prove that the case was indeed raffled on June 9, 2009 to RTC, Branch 43, Gingoog City. He explained that he issued the 72-hour TRO pursuant to the 2ndparagraph of Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules in order to avoid injustice and irreparable damage on the part of the plaintiff. He pointed out, however, that the 72hour TRO was issued only on July 7, 2009 because he was not physically present in the RTC, Branch 43, from July 2, 2009 to July 6, 2009. Judge Abul admits not conducting a summary hearing before the expiration of the 72 hours from the issuance of the ex parte TRO to determine whether it could be extended to twenty (20) days. He, however, explained that the holding of the summary hearing within 72 hours from the issuance of the TRO was simply not possible and was scheduled only on July 14, 2009 because the law office of the plaintiffs counsel was 144 kilometers away from Gingoog City and under that situation, the service of the notice could only be made on the following day, July 8, 2009. Hence, it would be impractical to set the hearing on July 8, 2009. In addition, on July 9, 10 and 13, 2009, he was conducting hearings in his permanent station, RTC, Branch 4, Butuan City. As to the charge that he failed to cause the service of summons on the complainants and that no hearing was conducted prior to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, Judge Abul belies the same by submitting (1) a certified true copy of the Sheriffs Return of Service[2] dated July 9, 2009 stating that he actually served the summons on the complainants on July 8, 2009 together with the copy of the 72-hour TRO; and (2) a certified machine copy of the summons[3] bearing the signature of complainant Democrito Lago that he personally received the same. Judge Abul likewise attached to his motion for reconsideration a certified true copy of the Order[4] dated July 29, 2009 and the Transcript of Stenographic Notes[5] to show that he conducted a hearing on July 21 and 29, 2009 and that the parties had a lengthy argument during the hearing and thereafter agreed to submit the application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction for resolution. The Court finds merit in the motion for reconsideration. With respect to the issues regarding the raffle, the lack of notice and hearing prior to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, the Court is satisfied with the explanation of Judge Abul as it is substantiated by the official records on file. As to the issue on the delay in conducting the summary hearing for purposes of extending the 72-hour TRO, the Court finds the reasons advanced by Judge Abul to be well-taken. Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules permits the executive judge to issue a TRO ex parte, effective for 72 hours, in case of extreme urgency to avoid grave injustice and irreparable injury. Then, after the lapse of the 72 hours, the Presiding Judge to whom the case was raffled shall then conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the TRO can be extended for another period. Under the circumstances, Judge Abul should not be penalized for failing to conduct the required summary hearing within 72 hours from the issuance of the original TRO. Though the Rules require the presiding judge to conduct a

summary hearing before the expiration of the 72 hours, it could not, however, be complied with because of the remoteness and inaccessibility of the trial court from the parties addresses. The importance of notice to all parties concerned is so basic that it could not be dispensed with. The trial court cannot proceed with the summary hearing without giving all parties the opportunity to be heard. It is a settled doctrine that judges are not administratively responsible for what they may do in the exercise of their judicial functions when acting within their legal powers and jurisdiction.[6] Not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of his duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice.[7] To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.[8] To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the subject decision, order or actuation of the respondent judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.[9] In this case, complainants failed to show that Judge Abul was motivated by bad faith, ill will or malicious motive when he granted the TRO and preliminary injunction. Complainants did not adduce any proof to show that impropriety and bias attended the actions of the respondent judge. WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 17, 2011 is SET ASIDE. The administrative complaint filed against Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr. is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR (complainant) v. EDWIN LATAYAN, Sheriff IV, RTC Branch 107, Quezon City, AM No. P-01-1665, September 13, 2006 Respondent Edwin N. Latayan (respondent) is the Sheriff of Branch 107 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC-Branch 107) while Judge Rosalina L. Pison (Judge Pison) is that courts presiding judge. On 13 May 2002, Judge Pison ordered the issuance of a writ of execution against Summit Guaranty and Insurance Company, Inc. (SGIC) in Criminal Case No. 01-103713[1] for the full payment of a P30,000 bond. On 2 July 2002, Judge Pison ordered the issuance of another writ of execution against SGIC in Criminal Case No. 01-105257[2] for the full payment of a P50,000 bond. Accordingly, Atty. Maria Zoraida Zabat Tuazon (Atty. Tuazon), the Branch Clerk of Court, issued the corresponding writs of execution. On 15 July 2002, respondent telephoned Jennifer Baldueza (Baldueza), the Marketing Officer of SGIC, and informed her that the trial court issued a writ of execution for P50,000 against SGIC. Respondent allegedly said that he could conceal the writ of execution if SGIC would give him P25,000. Baldueza replied that SGIC did not have that much money. On 12 August 2002, respondent again telephoned Baldueza to ask if SGIC already had the money, otherwise he would enforce the writ of execution. Respondent told Baldueza that he would be at the SGIC office on21 August 2002 at 2:30 p.m. to pick up from Baldueza the P4,000 and he would get the balance some other time. On 20 August 2002, Baldueza and SGIC Clerk Maria Victoria D. Lim (Lim) went to the Anti-Organized Crime Unit of the Office for Business Concerns, PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG-AOCBCD) and lodged a complaint against respondent. The Chief of the Intelligence Branch of the CIDG-AOCBCD prepared two P1,000 bills for powder dusting mixed with four undusted P500 bills for use in the entrapment operation. Lim was assigned to give the money to respondent. On 21 August 2002, at around 9:00 a.m., joint elements of CIDG-AOCBCD-Intelligence Branch and AFP-ACTAF led by PS1 Arnold Palomo (PS1 Palomo) and D/Sgt. Noel C. Camada were dispatched to conduct the entrapment operation in Room 306, Aurelio Building, 9th Avenue, Grace Park, Kalookan City. Upon arrival of the team, PS1 Palomo coordinated with the employees of the insurance company while the rest of the team positioned themselves in strategic places within the vicinity and waited for respondent. At around 3:00 p.m., respondent arrived and talked directly to Lim in a room with its door left open. A few seconds later, Lim handed over the marked money to respondent. The police operatives approached respondent and, then and there, placed him under arrest. When asked for the marked money, respondent reached for his right back pocket, took the marked money and surrendered the amount of P4,000 which included the powder-dusted P1,000-bills. Respondent was detained and charged in an Information for robbery-extortion. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. C-66090 (2002). The recommended bail was P100,000 and respondent was eventually released on bail.

During the last week of August 2002, Judge Pison noticed that respondent had not been reporting for work. Judge Pisons clerk of court informed her that respondent was caught in an entrapment operation in KalookanCity and was detained. Later, on a Saturday, Judge Pison received a telephone call in her house from respondent. When Judge Pison asked respondent about the entrapment, respondent allegedly admitted he was involved in an entrapment in Kalookan City and was detained. Judge Pison told respondent to see her at her office on Monday but respondent failed to do so. Thus, Judge Pison requested her clerk of court to tell respondent to tender his resignation.[3] Meanwhile, in a letter dated 27 August 2002, Judge Pison wrote the Court Administrator recommending that respondent be suspended from the service. In her letter dated 10 September 2002, Judge Pison attached a certified true copy of the Information and requested the detail of respondent at the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC). On 31 August 2002, respondent submitted his letter of resignation but on 2 September 2002, Judge Pison received a letter from respondent withdrawing this letter of resignation. Acting on the letter of Judge Pison, the Court issued a Resolution dated 16 December 2002 docketing the case as a regular administrative matter and directing respondent to comment on the documents relative to the robbery and extortion charges against him. The Court suspended respondent pending the final outcome of the criminal case against him considering that the evidence against him was prima facie strong. In his Comment dated 8 April 2003, respondent denies that he demanded money from SGIC in exchange for the non-service of the writ of execution. Respondent claims that the P4,000 he received on 21 August 2002was part of the initial payment of P6,000 for collection pursuant to the order of Judge Pison. He further claims he called Baldueza of SGIC to remind her that SGICs pending obligation was due. Respondent prays for the dismissal of this administrative case.[4] On 29 April 2003, Judge Pison wrote a letter to the Court Administrator requesting that, whatever might be the outcome of the criminal case, respondent should not be detailed anymore in her sala as she could not allow respondent to work in her court because respondent admitted to her the entrapment. In the Resolution dated 13 August 2003, the Court resolved to refer this case to Executive Judge Natividad A. GironDizon (Investigating Judge Giron-Dizon) of the RTC-Quezon City for investigation, report and recommendation. At the initial investigation, Judge Pison, Baldueza, Lim and respondent appeared. As prayed for, they were given 15 days within which to submit their respective affidavits and counter-affidavits. Judge Pison, Baldueza and respondent submitted their respective affidavits. On 22 January 2004, Investigating Judge Giron-Dizon submitted her report finding respondent guilty of dishonesty in the performance of his duties. She recommended that respondent be dismissed from the service with perpetual disqualification from re-employment in government service. Investigating Judge Giron-Dizon noted that if respondents contention that he was just collecting SGICs obligation on forfeited bonds were true, he should have issued the corresponding receipt immediately after receiving the money. According to Investigating Judge Giron-Dizon, execution of forfeited bonds is paid directly to the OCC which issues clearances. It is not the practice of the sheriff to enforce a writ on forfeited bonds. The bonding company settles its obligation with the OCC and the court does not allow staggered payments on forfeited bonds. Investigating Judge GironDizon stated that respondent had no authority to collect partial payment since respondent was not an accountable officer. Investigating Judge Giron-Dizon further noted that if respondent really believed he was innocent, he should have immediately called the branch clerk of Judge Pison during the entrapment instead of allowing himself to be detained and charged. On 1 March 2004, the Court referred this case to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and recommendation. The OCA adopted the findings and recommendation of Investigating Judge Giron-Dizon and stated that persons involved in the dispensation of justice must live up to the strictest standards of integrity, probity, uprightness, honesty and diligence in the public service. Sheriffs, as frontline representatives of the justice system, should be imbued with a sense of professionalism in the performance of their duties. Thus, the OCA found respondent guilty of dishonesty and recommended his dismissal from the service, with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from re-employment in the government service. We find the reports and recommendations of Investigating Judge Giron-Dizon and the OCA well-taken.

Respondent admitted having received the P4,000 allegedly as partial payment of the SGIC obligation, but claimed he was surprised when PNP-CIDG operatives accosted and apprehended him. Respondent denied extorting money from SGIC or violating his duties as sheriff. He admitted calling SGIC on 21 August 2003 to remind them of the courts order directing SGIC to pay, in staggered basis. He then went to the SGIC office to receive the P4,000. As he further admitted in his Affidavit, respondent informed Judge Pison on 24 August 2002 of his plight and relayed to her the circumstances pertaining to his arrest.[5] It took respondent some time to inform his superiors of his whereabouts. As correctly pointed out by Investigating Judge Giron-Dizon, if respondent believed himself to be innocent, he could have called his superiors or Judge Pison for assistance.[6] Under a situation where respondents honesty, credibility and integrity are at stake, respondent should have exerted his best effort to prove his innocence. As it stands, respondent simply allowed himself to be arrested and detained. As pointed out by Investigating Judge Giron-Dizon, it is not the practice of a sheriff to enforce the writ on forfeited bonds. The bonding company simply settles its obligation with the Office of the Clerk of Court. Moreover, courts do not allow staggered payments on forfeited bonds and respondent had no authority to collect partial payment because he is not an accountable officer.[7] Even if respondent had such an authority, still he did not issue a receipt immediately after receiving the money. In the implementation of a writ of execution, only the payment of sheriffs fees may be received by sheriffs. Sheriffs are not allowed to receive voluntary payments from parties in the course of the performance of their duties. To do so would be inimical to the best interest of the service because even assuming arguendo such payments were indeed given and received in good faith, this fact alone would not dispel the suspicion that such payments were made for less than noble purposes. Corollary, a sheriff cannot just unilaterally demand sums of money from a party-litigant without observing the proper steps; otherwise, it would amount to extortion.[8] High standards are expected of sheriffs, who play an important role in the administration of justice.[9] At the grassroots of our judicial machinery, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are indispensably in close contact with litigants. Hence, their conduct should be geared towards maintaining the prestige and integrity of the court.[10] The Court condemns and would never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary.[11] Under Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty is a grave offense which carries with it the penalty of dismissal, even if committed for the first time. Under Section 58 of the same rule, the penalty of dismissal carries with it the cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification from re-employment in the government service. WHEREFORE, we find respondent Edwin N. Latayan, Sheriff IV of Branch 107 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, GUILTY of DISHONESTY. Accordingly, we DISMISS respondent from the service, with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from re-employment in the government service. Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondents records with this Court. SO ORDERED. AIDA R. CAMPOS, ALISTAIR R. CAMPOS, and CHARMAINE R. CAMPOS (complainants) v. JUDGE ELISEO M. CAMPOS, Municipal Trial Court, Bayugan, Agusan del Sur (respondent), AM No.MTJ-10-1761, February 8, 2012 The Case Before the Court is a complaint for serious misconduct, immorality and dishonesty filed by Aida R. Campos, Alistair R. Campos, and Charmaine R. Campos (complainants) against Eliseo M. Campos (respondent), former Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur. The Antecedent Facts Complainant Aida and respondent were married on 9 September 1981. They had two children, complainants Alistair and Charmaine. On 16 July 2008, respondent filed a petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 1118, raffled before the Regional Trial Court of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, Branch 7. Respondent alleged that he and Aida were both psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. For his part, respondent alleged that he is a homosexual who could not be intimate with his wife unless he imagined he was with another man. Respondent alleged that as a result of his homosexuality, his wife had affairs with other menwhich he did not bother to stop or question. Aida denied the allegations in respondents petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage and alleged that respondent wanted their marriage annulled so that he could marry another woman with whom he was having a relationship. Aida opposed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and filed instead a petition for legal separation.

Aida further alleged that soon after filing the petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage, respondent executed an affidavit of loss claiming that the title covering Lot No. 4747-A, Csd-13-002130-D, a parcel of registered land evidenced by OCT No. P-28258 under the name of Alistair, was lost in his possession. Respondent requested the Register of Deeds of the Province of Agusan del Sur to annotate the affidavit of loss on the title. Aida alleged that at the time of respondents execution of the affidavit of loss, the title was in Alistairs possession. Aida alleged that respondent wanted the property back in the event his petition for declaration of nullity of marriage would be granted by the court. Aida alleged that respondent claimed before the Register of Deeds that he was the real owner of the property and it was only wrongly registered in the name of Alistair. Respondent denied the allegations of Aida and alleged that he admitted to his children that the cause of the filing of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage was his homosexuality and Aidas infidelity. Respondent further alleged that his children already abandoned him and he had to transfer to the basement of their house to avoid them. Respondent admitted executing the affidavit of loss of the title of OCT No. P-28258 but only to protect his interest. Respondent alleged that right after the filing of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, he learned that Aida and Alistair wanted to use the property as a collateral for a loan. In its 2 July 2010 Resolution, the Court referred the case to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Agusan del Sur for investigation, report and recommendation. The Report of the Investigating Judge In his report dated 16 February 2011, Executive Judge Hector B. Salise stated that respondents admission of homosexuality does not make him automatically immoral. The investigating judge also found no evidence of respondent having a relationship with another woman as claimed by Aida. The investigating judge also found that respondent was not guilty of dishonesty. The investigating judge stated that the fact that respondent had children with Aida was not a proof that he was not a homosexual and thus he was lying in his petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. The investigating judge also stated that as far as respondent was concerned, the title to the property was lost and that he was only trying to protect his right as the true owner of the land. The investigating judge further stated that the complainants did not controvert respondents allegation that while the property was in the name of Alistair, respondent was the real owner of the property. However, the investigating judge found respondent guilty of misconduct in causing the registration of the land in the name of Alistair despite the fact that Alistair was still a minor at the time of the registration. According to the investigating judge, respondent manipulated the transaction in such a way that the title ended up with Alistair despite his lack of legal capacity to enter into the transaction. The investigating judge noted that Aida conspired with respondent in causing the registration of the title in the name of Alistair because at that time, there was a pending case against respondent. Respondent and Aida were afraid that if respondent lose the case, the property would be taken from them. The investigating judge stated that the action was clearly intended to defraud a possible judgment-obligee. The investigating judge did not submit a recommendation and left it to the discretion of this Court to impose the proper penalty on respondent. In its 8 June 2011 Resolution, this Court referred the report of the investigating judge to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and recommendation. The Report and Recommendation of the OCA In a Memorandum dated 12 October 2011, the OCA agreed with the report of the investigating judge. The OCA stated that the burden of proving the charge of immorality rests with the complainants. Complainants failed to prove their allegation that respondent had a relationship with another woman. Neither was the charge of respondents immorality on account of his being a homosexual proven by complainants. The OCA likewise found that respondent was not guilty of dishonesty. According to the OCA, respondents allegation of homosexuality in his petition for declaration of nullity of marriage could only be proven in the proceeding before the trial court. Thus, the OCA cannot rule on whether respondent is falsely claiming that he is a homosexual. As regards the affidavit of loss, the OCA noted that even Alistair admitted that respondent is the real owner of the property although it was registered in his name. The OCA further noted that the perjury case filed against respondent because of his execution of the affidavit of loss was dismissed because the prosecutor found that respondent was acting in good faith to protect his right.

However, the OCA found respondent guilty of simple misconduct in allowing the title of the property to be registered in the name of then minor Alistair. The OCA agreed with the investigating judge that respondent manipulated the transaction to avoid losing the property should he lose in the case filed against him. The OCA recommended the dismissal of the complaints for immorality and dishonesty. The OCA further recommended that respondent should be held administratively liable for misconduct and should be imposed a fine equivalent to three months salary at the time of his resignation from service on 1 July 2009. The Issue The only issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of simple misconduct. The Ruling of this Court Complainants failed to present any proof of respondents alleged relationship with another woman, so as to justify a charge for immorality. There was no evidence that respondent engaged in scandalous conduct that would warrant the imposition of disciplinary action against him. We take this occasion to remind respondent, however, that the New Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary1 provides that, as a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. In particular, judges must conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.2 Occupying as he does an exalted position in the administration of justice, a judge must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him. Thus, the judge must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice.3 With respect to respondents alleged homosexuality, such issue is for the determination of the trial court wherein the petition for declaration of nullity is pending. Thus, we also agree with the investigating judge and the OCA in absolving respondent from the charge of dishonesty. The fact that respondent got married and had children is not proof against his claim of homosexuality. As pointed out by the investigating judge, it is possible that respondent was only suppressing or hiding his true sexuality. We also agree with the investigating judge and the OCAs findings that respondent was not guilty of dishonesty as regards the declaration of loss of title covered by OCT No. P-28258. As found by the investigating judge, the title was kept by respondent in his drawer. When respondent could not find the title in his usual place for safekeeping, he sought the advice of the Register of Deeds who told him to execute the affidavit of loss. In addition, while the property was registered in Alistairs name, he did not controvert his fathers claim that he was the real owner of the land and that his father kept the title in his possession. Thus, respondent did not appear to have acted in bad faith or committed dishonesty in executing the affidavit of loss of the title to the property. We agree with the investigating judge and the OCA in finding respondent guilty of simple misconduct in causing the registration of the title over OCT No. P-28258 in his sons name with the intention of defrauding a possible judgmentobligee. The Court defined simple misconduct as follows: Simple misconduct has been defined as an unacceptable behavior that transgresses the established rules of conduct for public officers. It is an unlawful behavior. Misconduct in office is any unlawful behavior by a public officer in relation to the duties of his office, willful in character. It generally means wrongful, improper, unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate, or intentional purpose although it may not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent.4 Simple misconduct is a transgression of some established rule of action, an unlawful behavior, or negligence committed by a public officer.5 In this case, respondent knew at that time of the registration of the property that he had a pending case and that he could possibly lose the case. In order to manipulate the situation and taking advantage of his knowledge of the law, respondent caused the registration of the property in Alistairs name with the intention of defrauding a possible judgment-obligee. Clearly, it was an improper behavior which warrants a disciplinary sanction by this Court. Under Section 9 in relation to Section 11(B), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, simple misconduct is a less serious offense punishable by suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one month nor more than three months or a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.6 Since respondent has already tendered his resignation from the judiciary effective 1 July 2009, his suspension is no longer possible. However, we modify the recommendation of the OCA that in lieu of suspension, a fine equivalent to three months salary at the time of his resignation should be imposed on respondent. Pursuant to the imposable penalty in accordance with the Rules of Court, a fine of P20,000 is in order.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Eliseo M. Campos GUILTY of simple misconduct and FINE him Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000) to be deducted from whatever benefits, if any, that he is still entitled to after his resignation from the judiciary. If there is none, respondent is ORDERED to pay directly the fine of P20,000. SO ORDERED. ATTY. RAFAEL T. MARTINEZ, and SPOUSES DAN and EDNA REYES, Complainants, vs. JUDGE GRACE GLICERIA F. DE VERA, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, San Carlos City, Pangasinan, Respondent, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1718, March 16, 2011 Atty. Rafael T. Martinez (Atty. Martinez) and spouses Dan and Edna Reyes (spouses Reyes) (collectively, complainants) filed the present administrative complaint against Judge Grace Gliceria F. De Vera (Judge De Vera), Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), San Carlos City, Pangasinan, for Gross Ignorance of the Law, relative to Civil Case No. MTCC-1613 entitled "Letecia Samera v. Sps. Dan Reyes and Edna Reyes." The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that Judge De Vera be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be fined P10,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same offense shall be dealt with more severely. The Facts The memorandum from the OCA narrated the facts as follows: The following were filed with the Office of the Court Administrator: 1. VERIFIED COMPLAINT dated January 18, 2008 (with enclosures) of Atty. Rafael T. Martinez and Dan and Edna Reyes charging Judge Grace Gliceria F. De Vera, [Presiding Judge of] MTCC, San Carlos City, Pangasinan with Gross Ignorance of the Law relative to Civil Case No. MTCC-1613 entitled "Letecia Samera vs. Sps. Dan Reyes and Edna Reyes." Complainants narrated that they are defendants in Civil Case No. MTCC-1613 for ejectment with damages heard before the sala of the respondent judge. Complainant Atty. Rafael T. Martinez was their counsel of record. After the termination of the preliminary conference, the complainant averred that respondent issued a pretrial order directing the parties to submit their position paper within ten (10) days from receipt of the pre-trial order. The pre-trial order was received by complainant Atty. Rafael T. Martinez on November 21, 2007. Hence, they have until December 1, 2007 within which to file their position paper. However, since the last day of filing falls on Saturday, the complainants filed their position paper together with their evidence by registered mail on December 3, 2007. Complainant Martinez narrated that on December 28, 2007, his attention was called by Ms. Yolanda Basa, the Clerk of Court of the MTCC, San Carlos City, Pangasinan about the order promulgated by the respondent denying the admission of the position paper of the complainants on the ground that the same was filed out of time. On the same day, his wife informed him that a certain "JR" of the MTCC delivered the order of the court dated December 12, 2007. On January 2, 2008, complainant Martinez filed, by registered mail, a motion for reconsideration. On January 6, 2008, complainant Martinez received the adverse decision dated December 28, 2007 in favor of the plaintiff therein. The complainants claimed that the respondent judge, in denying the admission of their position paper and the evidence attached to it, is obviously ignorant of the basic and elementary provision of the rules. They also abhorred the hastily [sic] rendition of decision of the respondent judge. The said decision of the respondent judge is unjust because it was rendered in violation of the complainants substantive right to be heard and to present evidence. Finally, the complainants contended that the respondent judge, who has shown her inability to observe a very simple and elementary provision of the rules and her disposition to trample upon the rights of litigants, should not be allowed to stay in her lofty position which requires competence, impartiality and probity. 2. COMMENT dated April 23, 2008 (with enclosure) of respondent Judge Grace Gliceria F. De Vera. In her Comment dated April 23, 2008, the respondent judge contended that the administrative complaint lodged against her is devoid of merit and is meant to harass her when she rendered an adverse Decision dated December 28, 2007 against the complainant[s] Dan & Edna Reyes in Civil Case No. MTCC-1613. She denied that she gave instructions to serve the extra copy of the Order dated December 12, 2007 at the residence of complainant Atty. Martinez. She averred that she does not even know the residence of the latter. This was later corroborated by Mr. Austria Jr., when he admitted in front of his other officemates on March 4, 2008, that it was his own idea to serve the extra copy of the Order dated December 12, 2007 at the house of the complainant Atty. Martinez. The respondent asserted that the copy of the Order dated December 12, 2007 was sent to the complainant Atty. Martinez on December 17, 2007 as evidenced by Registry Receipts [sic] No. 893 dated December 17, 2007 and not on December 28, 2007 as claimed by the complainants. Anent the early resolution of the MTCC Case No. 1613, the respondent judge contended that it is in compliance with her duty to promptly decide a case within the period required by law. She claimed that there is nothing wrong if a judge renders judgment on the day after the case is submitted for resolution.

The respondent argued that the complainants position paper dated December 3, 2007 is a mere rehash of the Answer with Counterclaim dated July 18, 2007. Assuming that she committed a mistake in the computation of the period, the respondent claimed that said error was made in good faith and done without any malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations since the complainants submitted their position paper on the twelfth (12) day, not the tenth (10) day. OTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION: The respondent assails the conduct of the complainant Atty. Martinez in filing what she claims as unfounded administrative complaint and prayed that complainant Atty. Martinez be held responsible, as member of the BAR, for violating his oath and the Canons of Professional Responsibility. 3. REPLY TO THE COMMENT dated May 8, 2008 The complainants, in their reply to the comment of the respondent judge, disagreed with the contention of the respondent judge that she should not be subject to disciplinary action for the error she allegedly commits in the absence of malice, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. They asserted that the respondent judge failed to consider the basic and elementary provision of Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court. The complainants continued to cite several instances to show that the respondent judge has a continuing pattern of committing legal error. Lastly the complainants averred that the explanation proffered by the respondent judge should never be allowed.1 Complainants filed their Complaint2 dated 18 January 2008 before the OCA. Then Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao (CA Elepao) directed Judge De Vera to file her comment within ten days from receipt of the indorsement from OCA.3 Atty. Martinez moved for the preventive suspension of Judge De Vera.4 Atty. Martinez filed a motion for inhibition of Judge De Vera in all cases where Atty. Martinez is counsel of record in Judge De Veras court, and cited the present administrative complaint as the ground for inhibition. Judge De Vera then issued orders in three cases directing Atty. Martinez to show cause why he should not be cited for indirect contempt because the allegations in the motion for inhibition undermine the integrity of Judge De Veras court. Atty. Martinez thus moved for Judge De Veras preventive suspension pending the resolution of the present administrative complaint. Judge De Vera moved to extend the filing of her comment twice.5 She finally filed her comment on 24 April 2008, one day after the due date, with heavy workload as her excuse.6 Complainants filed their reply on 27 May 2008.7 The OCAs Ruling On 11 July 2008, the OCA, under then Court Administrator Jose P. Perez8 and Assistant Court Administrator Reuben P. Dela Cruz, issued its Evaluation and Recommendation on the present complaint. The OCA underscored that the issue in the instant case is whether or not respondent Judge De Vera could be held administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law in denying the admission of the position paper and the evidence attached to it in Civil Case No. MTCC No. 1613 entitled "Letecia Samera vs. Sps. Dan Reyes and Edna Reyes." The OCA stated that ordinarily, before the judge can be held liable, the subject decision, order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties should be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, and the judge must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. Although there is absence of bad faith or malice in the present case, the OCA opined that respondent Judge De Vera cannot be excused from applying a basic law. When the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it also constitutes gross ignorance of the law. The OCAs recommendation reads as follows: RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court is our recommendation that the instant complaint against Judge Grace Gliceria F. De Vera [of] MTCC, San Carlos City, Pangasinan be REDOCKETED as a regular administrative matter; and that the respondent judge be found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and be FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand (PHP10,000.00) Pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same offense shall be dealt with more severely.9 This Court, in a Resolution10 dated 11 August 2008, re-docketed administrative complaint OCA-IPI No. 08-1969-MTJ as regular administrative matter A.M. No. MTJ-08-1718. Judge De Vera filed a Rejoinder11 on 4 September 2008. In a Resolution12 dated 15 October 2008, this Court required the parties to manifest, within ten days from notice, if they were willing to submit the administrative matter for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed. Both parties filed their respective manifestations that they were willing to have the case so decided. Atty. Martinez stated his willingness to resolve the present administrative matter based on the pleadings after the submission of the envelope showing that the position paper was indeed sent via registered mail on 3 December 2007.13 Judge De Vera stated her willingness to submit the case for resolution after the submission of her supplemental rejoinder.14Judge De Vera submitted her Supplemental Rejoinder15 on 12 January 2009. Issue The sole issue is whether respondent Judge De Vera should be held administratively liable for issuing the Order dated 12 December 2007 denying the admission of the position paper of the complainants on the ground that the same was filed out of time. Both parties raise other issues and detail other facts which, to our mind, deviate from the proper subject matter. The Courts Ruling We reverse and set aside the recommendation of the OCA.

Relevant portions of Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court read: Section 9. How to compute time. x x x If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day. From the OCAs recommendation, we glean the following pertinent facts: (1) After the pre-trial conference, Judge De Vera issued a pre-trial order directing the parties to submit their position paper within ten days from receipt. Atty. Martinez received the order on 21 November 2007. Hence, he had until 1 December 2007 to submit his position paper. (2) Atty. Martinez filed, via registered mail, his position paper on 3 December 2007 as 1 December 2007 fell on a Saturday; and (3) Judge De Vera denied, in an order dated 12 December 2007, Atty. Martinezs position paper for being filed out of time. From Judge De Veras Supplemental Rejoinder, we learn that "the envelope showing that the position paper was sent through registered mail on December 3, 2007 was not stitched to the Record and was in fact found in the drawer of Verna Galvez (Galvez), a court personnel, on October 27, 2008."16Judge De Veras explanation continues: Thus, respondent thought all along that the Position Paper was filed personally by complainants on December 6, 2007 [date of receipt of the Position Paper by the trial court], or on the 15th day from receipt of the complainants of the Order dated November 5, 2007 on November 21, 2007. The record, when forwarded to the undersigned, prior to the release of the interlocutory order dated December 12, 2007 denying the Position Paper of the complainants shows only Registry Receipt No. 8677, showing that the complainants have sent Atty. Juvy F. Valdez, counsel for the plaintiffs, through registered mail on December 3, 2007 the said position paper. For this reason, the respondent, in good faith, denied the said Position Paper for being filed out of time. Good faith is a defense in a charge of gross ignorance of the law.17 Despite the existence of Registry Receipt No. 8677 showing that the position paper sent to the counsel of the adverse party was served through registered mail on 3 December 2007, which was well within the allowed period, Judge De Vera presumed that complainants position paper was filed late, on 6 December 2007, and through personal filing with the Court. Given this presumption, it was correct for Judge De Vera to deny complainants position paper for being filed out of time. Judge De Vera prepared the questioned order between 6 December and 12 December 2007. However, Judge De Vera failed to effectively verify whether the presumption in her 12 December 2007 order was correct. Eight months later, Judge De Vera found herself saying that she would conduct an investigation as to whether complainants position paper was sent via registered mail.18 Judge De Vera issued a Memorandum19 dated 10 October 2008, ten months after the 12 December 2007 order, and required Julie Soriano (Soriano), clerk responsible for the receipt of pleadings filed by litigants20 before Judge De Veras court, to file a comment as to whether complainants position paper was sent via registered mail. In her Comment21 dated 15 October 2008, Soriano explained that she indeed received complainants position paper through registered mail on 6 December 2007 at 2:05 in the afternoon.1avvphi1 Soriano stated that she attached all pleadings received that day, with their respective envelopes, to the records of the cases concerned and submitted them to Mrs. Yolanda Basa, the Clerk of Court. In a Memorandum22 dated 27 October 2008, Judge De Vera asked Soriano to explain why there was no envelope attached to the record. In her Comment23 dated 5 November 2008, Soriano stated that the envelope was stapled on top of the record of Civil Case MTCC-1613. However, the envelope was found in the drawer of Galvez on 27 October 2008, and might have been inadvertently detached from the position paper. Judge De Vera reprimanded Soriano in a Memorandum24 dated 5 January 2008. You should be more circumspect in the performance of your duties. Your failure to attach the mailing envelope in the record shows that you failed to apply appropriate measure[s] to ensure that all pertinent documents are securely attached thereto to the record of MTCC No. 1613. This led to the filing of the administrative case against the undersigned when the Position Paper was denied as the undersigned thought that the said pleading was filed personally by the complainants on the 15th day, not on the 10th day as mandated. You are, likewise expected to discharge your duty of keeping court records with care, efficiency and professionalism. Proper and efficient court management is a judges responsibility. But while I have supervision over you, I cannot be expected to constantly check on your performance of your duties. As your superior, I have a right to expect that all mailing envelopes are stitched to the record. You are hereby reprimanded for this negligence. A repetition of the same will be dealt with more severely.25 Subsequently, in a motion26 filed on 19 November 2008, Atty. Martinez alleged that Judge De Vera is suppressing evidence because the envelope which proves that the complainants position paper was sent via registered mail is in Judge De Veras possession. Portions of Atty. Martinezs motion read: 2. In the said rejoinder, the respondent asseverated among others that no envelope showing that the position paper the complainants filed in Civil Case No. 1613 was sent by registered mail on December 3, 2007; 3. Recently, an employee of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, the court being presided by the respondent handed to the undersigned a xerox copy of the envelope of the said position paper, the said xerox copy of the said envelope is hereto attached as Annex "A"; 4. Today, the undersigned went to the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of San Carlos City, Pangasinan for the purpose of securing a certified xerox copy of the said envelope;

5. The undersigned was able to talk with Mrs. Yolanda Basa, the Clerk of Court of the MTCC, San Carlos City, Pangasinan. In the course of the said conversation, the undersigned informed Mrs. Basa of his intention to secure a certified xerox copy of the envelope; 6. Mrs. Basa informed the undersigned that the said envelope is in the possession of the respondent judge; 7. The said envelope is a vital piece of evidence considering that the respondent is claiming in her rejoinder that the complainants are lying when they stated in their complaint that their position paper was filed in December 3, 2007; 8. The said envelope would clearly show that the position paper was mailed in Dagupan City on December 3, 2007; 9. There is a need for the Honorable Court to safeguard the integrity of the present proceedings by not allowing any of the parties to suppress a vital piece of evidence. Hence, the Honorable Supreme Court should order the respondent to surrender the envelope to the Honorable Court and once the envelope is surrendered, the same be considered as part of the evidence for the complainants; 10. The undersigned complainant, due to oversight, failed to attach to the copy of the position paper submitted as an annex to the complaint the original copy of the registry receipt of the said position paper; 11. He is submitting herewith the original copy of the said registry receipt bearing the number 8679[.]27 The circumstances related above were not yet known when the OCA made its recommendation. It is for this reason that we modify the OCAs findings. Contrary to Atty. Martinezs allegations, the circumstances surrounding the loss and subsequent discovery of the envelope point to Judge De Veras good faith. We acknowledge that compared to the present administrative proceedings, it would have been far simpler for Judge De Vera to immediately verify the submission of complainants position paper to the court at the time of her preparation of the questioned order. Albeit belated, Judge De Vera exerted reasonable efforts to rectify the errors of her staff. The inconvenience caused by the present administrative case could be considered as sufficient penalty against Judge De Vera, and should serve as a reminder to her to "diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, [and to] maintain professional competence in court management x x x."28 To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the subject decision, order or actuation of respondent judge in the performance of her official duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, she must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge.29 Judge De Vera would do well to keep in mind that "[a] judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity."30 A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement by court personnel. Proper and efficient court management is as much her responsibility. She is the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of her official functions.31 Complainants should also bear in mind that an administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari. Disciplinary proceedings against a judge are not complementary or suppletory to, nor a substitute for these judicial remedies whether ordinary or extraordinary. For, obviously, if subsequent developments prove the judges challenged act to be correct, there would be no occasion to proceed against her at all. Besides, to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision rendered, assuming she has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make her position doubly unbearable.32 WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint against respondent Judge Grace Gliceria F. De Vera, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, San Carlos City, Pangasinan, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. All the other charges and countercharges between the parties are also dismissed. SO ORDERED.