Beck 1

How Domestic Politics Fills in the Gaps of Realism in Explaining Foreign Policy

By: Sarah Beck

Beck 2 The international political system is extremely complex, and at times, can be extremely difficult to explain. Theoretical frameworks like realism and domestic politics aim to explain patterns of behavior in the worlds sometimes convoluted system of international relations. Realism believes that states are inherently competitive and self-interested in the international system (Walt 1998, 31). Domestic politics focuses on and recognizes the different levels of domestic governments, like advocacy groups, public opinion, institutions responsible for policy, leaders views on policy (Wittkopf and McCormick 2004, 6). While realism can explain parts international conflicts, many times it does not tell the whole story behind a states behavior and fails to acknowledge the many restraints and effects domestic politics has on forming and implementing foreign policy. Realism has been a dominant theory in foreign policy, especially in United States foreign policy, throughout and since the Cold War. Realism assumes that the world is comprised of sovereign nation states that are rational, unitary actors with fixed preferences in an anarchical international system. Furthermore, states are fundamentally competitive, and are only interested in their states survival, and are continually in the pursuit of security and power (Legro and Moravcsik 1999, 14). Realism argues that what happens domestically within states has no effect on how the state conducts foreign policy, because their preferences are fixed (Legro and Moravcsik 1999, 18). Domestic politics attempts to explain states behavior by looking at the state, not as a whole as in realism, but as in pieces to examine how each part influences the actions of the whole. Domestic politics examines the institutional and political incentives that shape the policies leaders choose (Mesquita 2002, 8). Some of the institution influences can be structure of the

Beck 3 states government, and agencies. Leaders can also be influenced my political incentives, like staying in office, or campaign donations from interest groups. One way that domestic politics influences foreign policy is through domestic advocacy groups or interest groups. These groups are sets of voters who have similar social or demographic characteristics, or similar beliefs, interests and policy preferences, or can also be considered as membership organizations that engage in political activities on behalf of their members (Grossman and Helpman 2001, 1). Advocacy groups have grown in number and in size dramatically in the past 40 years in the United States, are involved in almost every facet of government to gain political support for their cause, and they do all of this by persuading and educating lawmakers, help write legislation, set lawmakers policy agendas, strategizing with legislatures, campaign donations etc. (Grossman and Helpman 2001, 5). Additionally, advocacy groups educate the general public, as well as their own membership on the issues important to the advocacy group, and (less frequently) conduct protests to bring awareness to their cause by using the going public approach (Grossman and Helpman 2001, 7). Many times, lawmakers actually depend on advocacy groups as a source of information because legislators and their staffs cannot be experts on every issue (Grossman and Helpman 2001, 5). An example of how domestic advocacy effected international affairs is the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act. The amendment limits the United States trade relations with countries that have nonmarket economies and inhibit free emigration, among other human rights (Dresen and Pomeranz 2010, 1). This amendment was the first time that United States foreign policy was being driven by human rights motivations, rather than other incentives like security. The amendment was aimed at USSR polices that imposed high taxes on citizens who held collegiate degrees (who in large numbers were Jews) wanting to immigrate out of the USSR

Beck 4 (Dresen and Pomeranz 2010, 1). The USSR policy was born out of anti-Semitism, which became the state policy after World War II (Dresen and Pomeranz 2010, 20). A diverse set of advocacy groups in the United States and Europe, like trade unions under the AFLI-CIO and various human rights organizations, began picketing at Soviet consulates and departments, marches, lobbying the government, and talking to the media, and this pressure influenced American diplomats (Dresen and Pomeranz 2010, 21). By advocacy groups using a going public approach, they raised awareness and informed the public, as well as lawmakers to the human rights issues in the USSR. The former Chief of Staff of Senator Henry Jackson (who co-authored the amendment with Representative Charles Vanik), Mark Talisman, remarked that, [o]ne-third of the members literally were talked into it. The phenomenon that arose here was that there was a public movement that seemed to have grown out of nowhere and the amendment later passed unanimously in Congress (Dresen and Pomeranz 2010, 18). Talismans remarks show that the reasons behind the United States adopting the Jackson-Vanik amendment were not based reasons realism would suggest, like security or balancing power against the USSR in the Cold War era. Rather, this amendment was born out of the impact that advocacy groups had on legislators by going public and taking to the streets with their concerns to gain lawmakers attention, and later their support. Another example of domestic advocacy influencing foreign policy is in the movement to remove the United States near-total embargo on Cuba that has prevented the United States from participating in large-scale agricultural trade, as well as open tourism with Cuba for almost half a century. The agricultural and tourism lobbies, seemingly unrelated advocacy groups to international relations, have huge stakes in lifting this embargo, and have been working to do so. In 2010, the House of Representatives introduce H.R. 4645, The Travel Restriction Reform and

Beck 5 Export Enhancement Act, which would remove the cash-in-advance provision required for trade with Cuba, and end travel restrictions on Americans traveling Cuba. Because Cuba is on the brink of a food shortage, farmers in the United States see a new, easily accessible, market to sell their agriculture (Pulliam 2012). Now former House Agricultural Committee Chairman, Collin Peterson introduced the bill and said, [i]t isnt just Farm Bureau pushing for this. The poultry, dairy, corn, soybean, apple industries all want this. We sent a letter to Capitol Hill with about 30 different agriculture organizations and agribusinesses that are in support of this (Bennett 2010). Like agricultural lobbies, tourism lobbies are attracted to Cuba because it is a close market and travel destination for the United States. In turn, tourism lobbies like the National Tourism Association have sent costly signals to legislators, in one way by organizing a summit in March of 2010 to discuss what the future of tourism in Cuba would look like (Perales 2010, 7). Easing trade relations and tourism regulations with Cuba would not harm the security of the United States, and would be supported by realists. However, realism does not tell the whole story of why this decision would be made. The United States Congress has been pursuing this policy because, as the former Chairman said, many agricultural industries are in favor of this. Agricultural and tourism lobbies are poised to seek huge gain in their industries if trade relations are eased, leading them to send costly signals to lawmakers that have come in the form of letter writing campaigns and holding events. Legislatures have taken these costly signals into consideration, and have translated them into legislation. If these interests groups were not around to advocate for this issue and place it on lawmakers agenda, its unlikely that this bill would have been proposed and gained support. Another way that elected officials are influenced is through public opinion. Public opinion is opinions held by private persons which governments find it prudent to heed, and is important

Beck 6 to elected officials because it can affect their voting on legislation, expectations of staying in office, and can give leaders political capitol (Key 1961). Public opinion can influence at various levels of decision-making, from getting an issue on the agenda, options for carrying the policy out, and policy implementation (Grahman 1994, 194). It sets limits and rules out alternatives, and indicates when to change course. Public opinion restrains elected officials in many ways because generally, their main goal is to stay in office as long as possible. If they act outside the boundaries of public opinion, leaders risk being voted out of office. Public opinion becomes especially important before an election because voters generally have very short memories, so leaders have to take this into account when making policy around this time. For foreign policy making, getting into wars is not a popular electoral strategy (Gaubatz 1991, 230). This translates into fewer wars in the end of an election cycle, and more wars in the beginning periods of the cycle. Societys power relative to the government is hypothesized to be lowest after elections, and during this time, democracies are more likely to start wars and become the targets of wars (Gaubatz 1991, 213). Societys power relative to the government is hypothesized to be the greatest before elections, and at this time, democratic states are less likely to engage in international conflict, and also prevent other states from engaging in war with them (Gaubatz 1991, 213). There are several ambiguities in this research, but there is still a large relationship between election cycles and war entries (Gaubatz 1991, 239). While there remains some uncertainty about the research done in regards to investigations into research surrounding election cycles and war, there is still a large enough positive relationship to call into question realisms reasons for international conflict. Because elected officials have goals of reelection, based on this evidence, it might be difficult to do successfully if war is initiated close to an election because of voter short-term memory. This leads leaders who are up for election to try to defuse international conflict, not for the sake of international security or

Beck 7 ensuring their states power on the international scale, but to obtain and secure their power domestically. Another way domestic politics affects foreign policy in the kind of domestic institutions a state has, as well as the values of the leader in power. An example of how institutions and values of leaders play a role in foreign policy is the role of caveats in NATOs International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan. Caveats are limits placed on soldiers permissible activities, locations, or conduct while deployed on a mission and can be restrictions on where operations can take place, or only allowing soldiers to fire in self-defense (Saideman and Auerswald 2012, 68). They are generally used to lower the risk of casualties, but in the process can undermine the effectiveness of the operation by putting restraints on the militarys flexibility and discretion (Saideman and Auerswald 2012, 68). Caveats also show how high stakes the country sees the mission; low stakes missions have more caveats, high stakes missions have fewer caveats (Saideman and Auerswald 2012, 68). One would expect that countries that have been vulnerable to terrorism would have fewer caveats, which in the case of the United States and Britain is true (Saideman and Auerswald 2012, 79). However, a cross-national comparison fails to demonstrate a pattern between terrorist violence at home and the level of restrictions placed on deployed troops suggesting that there are other factors, like the kinds of institution and values of leaders at work influencing policy decisions (Saideman and Auerswald 2012, 79). Germany is an ISAF participating country and has a coalition parliamentary form of government, which leads them to have to broker compromise for military interventions, and place more caveats on an operation compared to presidential and single-party majority parliamentary systems (Saideman and Auerswald 2012, 76-7). Adding to the institutional restraints, Germanys constitution and German court decisions have made it so the German armed forces must receive

Beck 8 legislative approval in order to operation outside of NATO designated territory, and legislative approval is also needed to alter numbers of soldiers deployed and these restrictions must be revisited every year (Saideman and Auerswald 2012, 77). Furthermore, Germany has not suffered any acts of terrorism and is not directly facing a threat in the ISAF mission. Realism would explain Germanys behavior as a part of the balance of threat notion, which suggests when a country is directly facing a threat, they will allow their military to do whatever is needed to ensure success, but if another state is directly facing a threat, they could join in the conflict, but if they did do, it would be motivated by pleasing an ally or to honor agreements in treaties (Saideman and Auerswald 2012, 79). Furthermore, these states would be more likely to restrict their forces from anything that endangers troops and puts the state at risk of drawing itself into deeper into conflict (Saideman and Auerswald 2012, 79). While it seems that realism has explained Germanys actions, realism again fails to explain all of the factors at work for Germanys policy. Due to Germanys history in military conflicts, they have limited their military force, making it extremely difficult to commit troops, and when they are committed, they are heavily restricted. While Germany does not face a direct threat with terrorism, their caveats are being motivated by domestic institutional restraints, and not entirely to balance threats. Canada is a single-party parliamentary government, which allows for leaders to have more discretion in foreign policy making. In 2004, Brigadier General Jocelyn Lacriox was in charge of NATO forces in Kabul, but needed approval from the Canadian government before Canadian forces could engage in any operation that could lead to collateral damage (Saideman and Auerswald 2012, 73). Former overall ISAF Commander, Rick Hiller saw this as inefficient, and problematic to conducting military operations (Saideman and Auerswald 2012, 73). Hiller was later promoted to Canadas Chief of the Defense Staff in 2005, and his experience with caveats

Beck 9 lead him to give a new directive, that allowed the military to act immediately to conflict, and explain later (Saideman and Auerswald 2012, 74). Like Germany, Canada has not been directly threatened by terrorism, but overtime, they have loosened their caveats, even though they still have not been directly threatened. Canadas choice to decrease caveats was not due to wanting to please allies as realism would suggest. Rather, the policy change was motivated by a new leader with different values and beliefs about the use of caveats because they had directly experienced the problems associated with them and wished to elevate them to make the Canadian force more efficient. France has a Premier-Presidential system, where the Premier is selected by parliament and has some influence over domestic issues, but the President is directly elected and has power over foreign policy (Saideman and Auerswald 2012, 78). Throughout 2005 to 2006, NATO was leaving Kabul to expand across Afghanistan, yet, France stayed in Kabul where they saw very little violence compared to the rest of NATO forces in Afghanistan (Saideman and Auerswald 2012, 78). However, in 2007 through 2008, France began to move troops out of Kabul into eastern Afghanistan and this change in policy directly overlaps with a change in presidents in France from Jacques Chirac to Nicolas Sarkozy (Saideman and Auerswald 2012, 79). Chiracs policies were influence by a poor relationship with the Bush Administration and wanting to increase Frances role in the European Union, while Sarkozy wanted France to have a stronger role in NATO, and realized that for this to occur, he must move soldiers from Kabul to eastern Afghanistan (Saideman and Auerswald 2012, 79). France, too, has not been directly threatened by terrorism, but went from medium levels of caveats to loose levels. This change in policy was largely due to a change in political leadership, which was due to the domestic political restraint of elections, however, Sarkozys reasons for increased involvement in NATO was due to realisms balance of power notion. Sarkozy knew that

Beck 10 the only way he could ever achieve his goal of having a stronger French role in NATO, he would be willing to commit more troops to other areas in Afghanistan. But, the reason for France support the balance of power theory was caused by a change in leadership, showing that states preferences are not always entirely fixed and can change with new elected leadership. While realism can help explain states pursuits for security, there are many times more reasons for perusing policies like this besides states being fundamentally competitive (Legro and Moravcsik 1999, 14). Sometimes, as domestic politics explains, there are other factors at work on the home front to explain states actions. Domestic politics acknowledges that states decisions are restrained and influenced by the power of domestic advocacy, seen in the domestic push for the Jackson-Vanik amendment, as well as the support from agricultural and tourism interest groups to open trade relations and tourism with Cuba. Public opinion also restrains elected leaders, especially during election time, so much so that there is evidence of democracies staying out of international conflict before elections. Additionally, the kinds of institutions and the values of leaders can affect how military conflicts are carried out, as seen with the amount and types of caveats from Canada, France, and Germany in ISAF missions.

Beck 11 Works Cited Bennett, D. (2010, March 3). Farm Bureau supports Cuba trade bill . Retrieved November 20, 2012, from Delta Fam Press : http://deltafarmpress.com/government/farm-bureausupports-cuba-trade-bill Dresen, F. J., & Pomeranz, W. E. (2010). The Legacy and Consequences of Jackson-Vanik. Reassessing Human Rights in 21st Century Russia Conference (pp. 1-80). Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Gaubatz, K. T. (1991). Election Cycles and War . Journal of Conflict Resolution, 212-244. Grahman, T. W. (1994). Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy Decision Making . In D. A. Deese, The New Politics of American Foreign Policy (pp. 194-215). New York: St. Martin's Press. Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (2001). Special Interest Politics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Key, V. O. (1961). Public Opinion and American Democracy. New York. Legro, J. W., & Moravcsik, A. (1999, Fall). Is Anyone Still a Realist? . International Security , 555. Mesquita, B. B. (2002). Domestic Politics and International Relations . International Studies Quarterly, 1-9. Perales, J. R. (2010). The United States and Cuba: Implications of an Economic Relationship . Latin American Program. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars. Pulliam, J. R. (2012, July 8). Farmers want Cuban embargo lifted. The Register-Mail. Saideman, S. M., & Auerswald, D. P. (2012, March). Comparing Caveats: Understanding the Sources of National Restrictions upon NATO's Mission in Afghanistan. International Studies Quarterly, 67-84. Walt, S. M. (1998, Spring). International Relations: One World, Many Theories. Foreign Policy (110), 29-32+34-46. Wittkopf, E. R., & McCormick, J. M. (2004). The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.