SCIR Issue 4

VOL.
2 ISSUE 2, FALL 2012

THE USC UNDERGRADUATE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW
SoU1uiv C.iiiovi.
I1iv.1io.i Riviiw
Volume 2, Number 2 - Fall 2012
Dedicated to the memory of a beloved teacher and respected leader:
Robert L. Friedheim
Professor of International Relations, 1976-2001
Director of the School of International Relations, 1992-1993
Te Southern California International Review (SCIR) is a bi-annual interdis-
ciplinary print and online journal of scholarship in the eld of international
studies generously funded by the School of International Relations at the
University of Southern California (USC). In particular, SCIR would like
to thank the Robert L. Friedheim Fund and the USC SIR Alumni Fund.
Founded in 2011, the journal seeks to foster and enhance discussion between
theoretical and policy-oriented research regarding signicant global issues.
SCIR also serves as an opportunity for undergraduate students at USC to
publish their work. SCIR is managed completely by students and also pro-
vides undergraduates valuable experience in the elds of editing and graphic
design.
Copyright 2012 Southern California International Review.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any
form without the express written consent of the Southern California International
Review.
Views expressed in this journal are solely those of the authors themselves and do not necessarily
represent those of the editorial board, faculty advisors, or the University of Southern California.
SoU1uiv C.iiiovi. I1iv.1io.i Riviiw
scinternationalreview.org
Sta
Editor-in-Chief
Samir Kumar
Assistant Editor-in-Chief:
Andrew Ju
Editors:
Natalie Tecimer
Matthew Prusak
Taline Gettas
Rebecca Braun
Cover Design: Samir Kumar
Layout: Rebecca Braun
e capability and dedication of our authors and editors are what make this issue strong,
but USC's faith in our abilities is just as valuable. SCIR would not exist without the generous
funding provided by the Robert L. Freidheim Memorial Endowment, and the support of the
School of International Relations. Signicant appreciation goes to the Director, Dr. Robert
English, and the wonderful faculty and sta that have assisted us over the past three years. I
would particularly like to thank Linda Cole for her constant presence and her willingness to
see us succeed at our current endeavors and lay the groundwork to aim even higher.
Finally, please do not underestimate our receptivity to your comments! We would love
to hear your feedback on this issue. Please send us your comments, questions, and sugges-
tions at scinternationalreview,gmail.com, and we will do our best to take these into account
or oer a thoughtful reply.
Sincerely,
Samir Kumar
Editor-in-Chief
Dear Reader,
It is with great pleasure that I introduce the fourth issue of the Southern California
International Review (SCIR). is bi-annual undergraduate journal based at the University
of Southern California seeks to create a unique opportunity for students to publish their
research and other academic work in order to spread their ideas to a wider audience. By
fostering such dialogue between students of international relations and related elds both
on campus and throughout the country, SCIR seeks to promote a better understanding of
the global challenges facing our world today. As our world becomes increasingly intercon-
nected through technology, trade, and diplomacy, it is evident that events occurring any-
where on the globe have worldwide eects. e need to not only study, but also interrogate,
international relations and related disciplines, has never been more important. us, this
journal desires to contribute unique and innovative ideas to this fascinating and essential
eld of study.
I am happy to write that this is the second issue in which SCIR accepted article submis-
sions from students at universities other than USC. e pieces contained in the journal are
written by undergraduate students and were chosen by our six member editorial board. e
graphics, templates, and formatting was also designed by our editorial board. In an eort
to not restrict students in their submissions, SCIR welcomed submissions on a wide variety
of topics in the realm of international studies, thereby emphasizing our commitment to
interdisciplinary learning.
From a discussion of an emerging threat to international security in the Arctic to an
examination of identity manipulation in Rwanda, the content of this issue should engage
you and prompt further inquiry into these particular realms of study. As you read, ask your-
self, Why is this article important:" My hope is that your question is answered, and you
nd yourself with a host of more incisive questions that would incite enthralling answers.
Additionally, in the future, please keep an eye out for the authors published herein, for they
might soon be in a position to inuence the very issues that they have examined!
A letter from the editor:
e capability and dedication of our authors and editors are what make this issue strong,
but USC's faith in our abilities is just as valuable. SCIR would not exist without the generous
funding provided by the Robert L. Freidheim Memorial Endowment, and the support of the
School of International Relations. Signicant appreciation goes to the Director, Dr. Robert
English, and the wonderful faculty and sta that have assisted us over the past three years. I
would particularly like to thank Linda Cole for her constant presence and her willingness to
see us succeed at our current endeavors and lay the groundwork to aim even higher.
Finally, please do not underestimate our receptivity to your comments! We would love
to hear your feedback on this issue. Please send us your comments, questions, and sugges-
tions at scinternationalreview,gmail.com, and we will do our best to take these into account
or oer a thoughtful reply.
Sincerely,
Samir Kumar
Editor-in-Chief
Dear Reader,
It is with great pleasure that I introduce the fourth issue of the Southern California
International Review (SCIR). is bi-annual undergraduate journal based at the University
of Southern California seeks to create a unique opportunity for students to publish their
research and other academic work in order to spread their ideas to a wider audience. By
fostering such dialogue between students of international relations and related elds both
on campus and throughout the country, SCIR seeks to promote a better understanding of
the global challenges facing our world today. As our world becomes increasingly intercon-
nected through technology, trade, and diplomacy, it is evident that events occurring any-
where on the globe have worldwide eects. e need to not only study, but also interrogate,
international relations and related disciplines, has never been more important. us, this
journal desires to contribute unique and innovative ideas to this fascinating and essential
eld of study.
I am happy to write that this is the second issue in which SCIR accepted article submis-
sions from students at universities other than USC. e pieces contained in the journal are
written by undergraduate students and were chosen by our six member editorial board. e
graphics, templates, and formatting was also designed by our editorial board. In an eort
to not restrict students in their submissions, SCIR welcomed submissions on a wide variety
of topics in the realm of international studies, thereby emphasizing our commitment to
interdisciplinary learning.
From a discussion of an emerging threat to international security in the Arctic to an
examination of identity manipulation in Rwanda, the content of this issue should engage
you and prompt further inquiry into these particular realms of study. As you read, ask your-
self, Why is this article important:" My hope is that your question is answered, and you
nd yourself with a host of more incisive questions that would incite enthralling answers.
Additionally, in the future, please keep an eye out for the authors published herein, for they
might soon be in a position to inuence the very issues that they have examined!
A letter from the editor:
Contents
1. e 16 Years Crisis
Security, Geopolitics, and Conict in the Arctic
Kelsey Bradshaw, Jason Finkelstein, Nicholas Kosturos
9
2. Expressions of Nationalism
An Exploration of Russian Gemeinscha
Tyler D. Tyburski
29
3. e Ethnic Korean Population in Japan
e Last Frontier?
Alyssa Min
43
4. Genocide, Identity, and the State
e Dire Potential for Conict in Colonial Identities
Erik Peterson
37
Contents
1. e 16 Years Crisis
9
2. Expressions of Nationalism
Tyler D. Tyburski
29
3. e Ethnic Korean Population in Japan
e Last Frontier?
Alyssa Min
43
4. Genocide, Identity, and the State
Erik Peterson
37
The 16 Years Crisis
We dont talk about conict or else it might happen
Jyrki Terva, Finnish Consul General to St. Petersburg, Russian Federation
Due to a changing global climate, the Arctic region of our globe is shiing from being ice-
capped to ice-free. ough the Arctic region is not regularly on the forefront of most Ameri-
cans minds, the untapped resources at the bottom of Arctic Ocean in conjunction with the
potential for drastically cheaper shipping options makes the Arctic a region of utmost economic
and geostrategic signicance for many nations across the globe. Claims on critical natural
resources and shipping routes are tenuous at best, which should lead diplomats and leaders to
be wary of possible disputes. is research paper nds a startling dissonance between regional
states behavior and state ocials statements and positions with regards to the status quo of
aairs in the Arctic. In addition to a telling denial by diplomats of any potential for conict,
a number of factors indicate a high risk of potential interstate conict. ese security risks in-
clude an evident military buildup in the Arctic region; lack of eective governing institutions;
post-Cold War tensions and the resulting realist-driven operational codes; internal domestic
political pressures; and the uncertainty of the Artic Councils future leadership role. While this
report does not seek to be alarmist about a looming world war, it suggests that Arctic conict
management has become increasingly critical to preventing the Arctic from transforming from
a zone of peace into a zone of conict.
Introduction
e Arctic is hot" is the fashion in which Russian diplomat Aleksi Ivanov recently
described the growing signicance of the Arctic to the world.
1
e depletion of worldwide
1 Aleksi Ivanov, interview held with University of Southern California researchers, Stockholm, Sweden, May 23, 2012.
K B is a junior at the University of Southern California
majoring in International Relations.
J F is a sophomore at the University of Southern California
N K is a junior at the University of Southern California
The 16 Years Crisis
We dont talk about conict or else it might happen
Jyrki Terva, Finnish Consul General to St. Petersburg, Russian Federation
Due to a changing global climate, the Arctic region of our globe is shiing from being ice-
capped to ice-free. ough the Arctic region is not regularly on the forefront of most Ameri-
cans minds, the untapped resources at the bottom of Arctic Ocean in conjunction with the
potential for drastically cheaper shipping options makes the Arctic a region of utmost economic
and geostrategic signicance for many nations across the globe. Claims on critical natural
resources and shipping routes are tenuous at best, which should lead diplomats and leaders to
be wary of possible disputes. is research paper nds a startling dissonance between regional
states behavior and state ocials statements and positions with regards to the status quo of
aairs in the Arctic. In addition to a telling denial by diplomats of any potential for conict,
a number of factors indicate a high risk of potential interstate conict. ese security risks in-
clude an evident military buildup in the Arctic region; lack of eective governing institutions;
post-Cold War tensions and the resulting realist-driven operational codes; internal domestic
political pressures; and the uncertainty of the Artic Councils future leadership role. While this
report does not seek to be alarmist about a looming world war, it suggests that Arctic conict
management has become increasingly critical to preventing the Arctic from transforming from
a zone of peace into a zone of conict.
Introduction
e Arctic is hot" is the fashion in which Russian diplomat Aleksi Ivanov recently
described the growing signicance of the Arctic to the world.
1
e depletion of worldwide
1 Aleksi Ivanov, interview held with University of Southern California researchers, Stockholm, Sweden, May 23, 2012.
K B is a junior at the University of Southern California
J F is a sophomore at the University of Southern California
N K is a junior at the University of Southern California
10
S C I R - Vol. 2 No. 2
11
e 16 Years Crisis Kelsey Bradshaw, Jason Finkelstein, Nicholas Kosturos
oil and gas resources has caused many states around the world to pay increased attention
to the Arctic region, which holds 23 of the world's natural gas
2
, 13 of its oil
3
, and 20 of
its technologically important rare-earth elements.
4
In addition to containing critical natu-
ral resources, the Arctic's melting ice has allowed for new shipping routes to become more
accessible, such as the Northwest and Northeast passages.
3
e successful navigation of
these passages could result in an up to 40 decrease in shipping costs when compared to
conventional shipping routes.
6
ese new estimates of rich natural resource reserves and
increased shipping eciency possibilities in the Arctic have resulted in the applications of
states including China, India, Italy, the European Union (EU), and South Korea to obtain
Permanent Observer status in the Arctic Council. With high stakes and numerous states
vying for position in the region, the Arctic certainly seems to be growing hot."
In 1939, Edward Hallet Carr published e Twenty Years Crisis, a work central to the
canon of modern day international relations theory. Carr advanced the argument that ex-
cessively idealistic thinking following the World War I acted as the primary cause for World
War II. Carr postulated that world leaders of the period were subject to a crisis of idealism,"
where they fell prey to the dangerous and glaring defect of nearly all thinking: neglect of
power." In Carr's eyes, these leaders placed excessive trust in liberal internationalism and the
role of international organizations, and therefore were victim to the classical realist motiva-
tions for human behavior. What some may term wishful thinking" failed to prevent the rise
of fascism and subsequently World War II.
We see this could be considered analogous to the situation developing in both the of-
cial positions and the thought processes of the vast majority of Arctic diplomats. As will
be shown in this paper, there is near universal denial among diplomatic ocials of any pos-
sibility of interstate conict in the Arctic. While this paper does not intend to be alarmist
about a looming World War III, diplomats and researchers who grapple with Arctic issues
appear to dangerously disregard the prospect of interstate conict. is research paper seeks
to evaluate the signicant security challenges that exist in the Arctic region, specically
the possibility of interstate conict, and to identify problem areas that, if le unaddressed,
could lead the Arctic to become a center of strife in this century. is paper will also propose
recommendations to improve multilateral negotiation in the realm of security in order to
prevent the possibility of a large-scale armed conict.
2 Ekaterina Klimenko, Ambitious Plans and Domestic Policies for the Arctic in Russia," Stockholm International Peace Re-
search Institute Meeting with University of Southern California researchers (Stockholm, Sweden), May 21, 2012.
3 90 billion Barrels of Oil and 1670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas Assessed in the Arctic," U.S. Geological Survey, ac-
cessed June 6, 2012, http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp:ID=1980#.T89KA-068UU.
4 Matteo Rongione, Role of Resources in the Arctic- Rare Earth Elements," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(Stockholm, Sweden), May 21, 2012.
3 Tom Arnbom, Arctic is Hot," World Wildlife Fund (Stockholm, Sweden) May 22, 2012.
6 Alun Anderson, Aer the Ice, (Washington DC: Smithsonian, 2009).
Background Information
Before exploring current politics and security concerns in the region, it is prudent to
discuss how the history of the region informs the present day. Many explorers have at-
tempted to conquer the Arctic and the northern passages, most to no avail. In 1843, Sir John
Franklin and two British Navy ships set out to explore the Northwest Passage and never
returned. More than forty search expeditions were sent to look for the explorers, but it was
not until 1981 that evidence, such as graves and bodies that explained the ship's demise, were
found near King Williams Island, 70 degrees latitude.
7
On April 6th, 1909 another team of
explorers, made up of Americans and Inuits, arrived at the North Pole. ey had made the
long journey from Cape Columbia on Ellesmere Island by dogsled.
8
Cold-weather capabili-
ties have expanded drastically since that time. Today, explorers investigate the Arctic via
icebreaker ships and oating scientic stations and venture o the semi-permanent struc-
tures using use aircra, dog sleds, skis, and snowmobiles to learn more about the region.
While there has been interest in the Arctic as an unexplored region for centuries, it was
not until recently that ecological and environmental factors began to capture the awareness
a broader audience than explorers. Sea ice coverage uctuates throughout the year, with the
high in March and the low in September. is trend has only increased in its intensity in
recent times. Research shows that a sharp decline in summer sea ice occurred in September
of 2007, shrinking the total ice-covered area down down to 4.28 million square kilometers,
a record low.
9
is dramatic decline in summer sea ice opened coastlines throughout north-
ern Russia and the northern Canadian islands, making the possibility of using northern
sea routes for shipping and tourism more plausible. Furthermore, New deposits for oil and
natural gas drilling were discovered because of the shrinking sea ice, and many Arctic states,
including Russia, the United States, and Norway, have began researching possible deposits
and drilling sites.
However, increased possibilities within the region have not been without their price.
e nation-states with Arctic coastlines remain at odds over how to divide up the region,"
perhaps more so than ever before.
10
Both Canada and Russia claim the territory connected
to the Lomonosov ridge and have appealed to the Arctic Council with scientic evidence
that purportedly shows the ridge extending from their shoreline. Although no decision has
7 Fitzpatrick, Kathleen, 'Franklin, Sir John (1786-1847)', Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography,
Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/franklin-sir-john-2066/text2373, accessed 20 October 2012.
8 Robert Peary: To the Top of the World." PBS. PBS, 1999. Web. 20 Oct. 2012. <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/ice/sfeature/
peary.html>.
9 Stephanie Renfrow, Arctic Sea Ice Shatters All Previous Record Lows." NSIDC Arctic Sea Ice News Fall 2007. National Snow
and Ice Data Center, 1 Oct. 2007. Web. 20 Oct. 2012. <http://nsidc.org/news/press/2007_seaiceminimum/20071001_pressrelease.
html>
10 Jody R. Bennett, Vying for Power in the High North." International Relations Security Network. ISN Security Watch, 6 Sept.
2012. Web. 13 Oct. 2012.
10
11
oil and gas resources has caused many states around the world to pay increased attention
to the Arctic region, which holds 23 of the world's natural gas
2
, 13 of its oil
3
, and 20 of
its technologically important rare-earth elements.
4
In addition to containing critical natu-
ral resources, the Arctic's melting ice has allowed for new shipping routes to become more
accessible, such as the Northwest and Northeast passages.
3
e successful navigation of
these passages could result in an up to 40 decrease in shipping costs when compared to
conventional shipping routes.
6
ese new estimates of rich natural resource reserves and
increased shipping eciency possibilities in the Arctic have resulted in the applications of
states including China, India, Italy, the European Union (EU), and South Korea to obtain
Permanent Observer status in the Arctic Council. With high stakes and numerous states
vying for position in the region, the Arctic certainly seems to be growing hot."
In 1939, Edward Hallet Carr published e Twenty Years Crisis, a work central to the
canon of modern day international relations theory. Carr advanced the argument that ex-
cessively idealistic thinking following the World War I acted as the primary cause for World
War II. Carr postulated that world leaders of the period were subject to a crisis of idealism,"
where they fell prey to the dangerous and glaring defect of nearly all thinking: neglect of
power." In Carr's eyes, these leaders placed excessive trust in liberal internationalism and the
role of international organizations, and therefore were victim to the classical realist motiva-
tions for human behavior. What some may term wishful thinking" failed to prevent the rise
of fascism and subsequently World War II.
We see this could be considered analogous to the situation developing in both the of-
cial positions and the thought processes of the vast majority of Arctic diplomats. As will
be shown in this paper, there is near universal denial among diplomatic ocials of any pos-
sibility of interstate conict in the Arctic. While this paper does not intend to be alarmist
about a looming World War III, diplomats and researchers who grapple with Arctic issues
appear to dangerously disregard the prospect of interstate conict. is research paper seeks
to evaluate the signicant security challenges that exist in the Arctic region, specically
the possibility of interstate conict, and to identify problem areas that, if le unaddressed,
could lead the Arctic to become a center of strife in this century. is paper will also propose
recommendations to improve multilateral negotiation in the realm of security in order to
prevent the possibility of a large-scale armed conict.
2 Ekaterina Klimenko, Ambitious Plans and Domestic Policies for the Arctic in Russia," Stockholm International Peace Re-
search Institute Meeting with University of Southern California researchers (Stockholm, Sweden), May 21, 2012.
3 90 billion Barrels of Oil and 1670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas Assessed in the Arctic," U.S. Geological Survey, ac-
cessed June 6, 2012, http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp:ID=1980#.T89KA-068UU.
4 Matteo Rongione, Role of Resources in the Arctic- Rare Earth Elements," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(Stockholm, Sweden), May 21, 2012.
3 Tom Arnbom, Arctic is Hot," World Wildlife Fund (Stockholm, Sweden) May 22, 2012.
6 Alun Anderson, Aer the Ice, (Washington DC: Smithsonian, 2009).
Background Information
Before exploring current politics and security concerns in the region, it is prudent to
discuss how the history of the region informs the present day. Many explorers have at-
tempted to conquer the Arctic and the northern passages, most to no avail. In 1843, Sir John
Franklin and two British Navy ships set out to explore the Northwest Passage and never
returned. More than forty search expeditions were sent to look for the explorers, but it was
not until 1981 that evidence, such as graves and bodies that explained the ship's demise, were
found near King Williams Island, 70 degrees latitude.
7
On April 6th, 1909 another team of
explorers, made up of Americans and Inuits, arrived at the North Pole. ey had made the
long journey from Cape Columbia on Ellesmere Island by dogsled.
8
Cold-weather capabili-
ties have expanded drastically since that time. Today, explorers investigate the Arctic via
icebreaker ships and oating scientic stations and venture o the semi-permanent struc-
tures using use aircra, dog sleds, skis, and snowmobiles to learn more about the region.
While there has been interest in the Arctic as an unexplored region for centuries, it was
not until recently that ecological and environmental factors began to capture the awareness
a broader audience than explorers. Sea ice coverage uctuates throughout the year, with the
high in March and the low in September. is trend has only increased in its intensity in
recent times. Research shows that a sharp decline in summer sea ice occurred in September
of 2007, shrinking the total ice-covered area down down to 4.28 million square kilometers,
a record low.
9
is dramatic decline in summer sea ice opened coastlines throughout north-
ern Russia and the northern Canadian islands, making the possibility of using northern
sea routes for shipping and tourism more plausible. Furthermore, New deposits for oil and
natural gas drilling were discovered because of the shrinking sea ice, and many Arctic states,
including Russia, the United States, and Norway, have began researching possible deposits
and drilling sites.
However, increased possibilities within the region have not been without their price.
e nation-states with Arctic coastlines remain at odds over how to divide up the region,"
perhaps more so than ever before.
10
Both Canada and Russia claim the territory connected
to the Lomonosov ridge and have appealed to the Arctic Council with scientic evidence
that purportedly shows the ridge extending from their shoreline. Although no decision has
7 Fitzpatrick, Kathleen, 'Franklin, Sir John (1786-1847)', Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography,
Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/franklin-sir-john-2066/text2373, accessed 20 October 2012.
8 Robert Peary: To the Top of the World." PBS. PBS, 1999. Web. 20 Oct. 2012. <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/ice/sfeature/
peary.html>.
9 Stephanie Renfrow, Arctic Sea Ice Shatters All Previous Record Lows." NSIDC Arctic Sea Ice News Fall 2007. National Snow
and Ice Data Center, 1 Oct. 2007. Web. 20 Oct. 2012. <http://nsidc.org/news/press/2007_seaiceminimum/20071001_pressrelease.
html>
10 Jody R. Bennett, Vying for Power in the High North." International Relations Security Network. ISN Security Watch, 6 Sept.
2012. Web. 13 Oct. 2012.
12
13
been made, and none will be made in the near future, both countries are scouring the ridge
to nd the natural resources required to bolster their cases for an extension of their Exclusive
Economic Zone.
Between other nation-states in the region, a renewal of historical antipathy has occurred.
e United States and Russia, the two nation-states at the center of the Cold War,,both main-
tain a signicant presence in the Artic and have considerable interest in projecting power
within the region. Russia has already sought to strengthen its Arctic presence by announc-
ing plans to build naval infrastructure hubs along the Northern Sea Route to act as rescue
centers and military bases.
11
In turn, other states are also ramping up their Arctic military
capabilities in order to protect borders, conduct training exercises, and provide search and
rescue assistance. is military buildup appears borne out of a desire to project power rather
than to conduct routine patrolling or search and rescue operations. e nature of this arms
race will be addressed further in the Security Concerns" section of this paper.
Since 2007, the Arctic has once again been identied as a new hot spot for exploration.
A renewed eort to conduct scientic studies and to map the region has brought the world's
attention to the tantalizing prospects of a resource-rich Arctic. Arctic states are aware of the
economic and geopolitical signicance of the region and are putting forth a great eort to
secure their national interests.
National Interests
Each Arctic state has signicant national interests in the region. As mentioned previ-
ously, the economic factors including oil, natural gas, and shing stock are major motiva-
tions for Arctic states. In addition, strategic interests such as control of crucial shipping
territory also play a prominent role. In addition to these incentives, other areas of interest
fuel the behavior of the Arctic states. Each Arctic state has outlined their priorities for the
Arctic as the region gains greater attention. By looking at these motivations, greater clarity
about the overall situation can be attained.
United States
e United States denes itself as an Arctic state due to Alaska's location within the
Arctic. e United States has publicly identied its Arctic priorities as homeland security,
economic security, international governance, extended continental shelf and boundary -
nalization, promotion of international scientic cooperation, maritime transport, and en-
vironmental protection. e United States also has publicly stated its desire to strengthen
cooperation among the eight Arctic states.
12
11 Bennett.
12 Lassi Heininen, Arctic Strategies and Policies: Inventory and Comparative Study," e Northern Research Forum and the
University of Lapland (2012) 33-37, 68-69, 69, 70-71, 78.
Russian Federation
Russia's self-proclaimed Arctic strategy revolves around maintaining their role as a lead-
ing power within the Arctic, as roughly half the coastal area of the Arctic Ocean lies within
their territory. Besides Russia's obvious energy interests in the region, the nation-state has
ten strategic priorities relating to the Arctic: interacting actively with sub-Arctic states to
delimit maritime areas with international law; fostering the creation of Arctic search and
rescue regimes; strengthening bilateral relationships within regional organizations; assist-
ing in the management of cross polar air and sea routes; contributing to international arctic
forums; delimiting maritime spaces in the Arctic and maintaining a mutually advantageous
presence in Spitsbergen Archipelago, improving state management of social and economic
development; improving the quality of life for indigenous peoples; developing an arctic re-
source base through technological capabilities; modernizing and developing the infrastruc-
ture of transportation and sheries. Russia plans to contribute to international cooperation
by strengthening bilateral relationships with regional organizations and participating in
international forums.
13

Norway
Norway has various national interests in the Arctic, including state security, economic
development, and regional cooperation. Its declared priorities are helping to promote knowl-
edge about climate change and environmental security, improving monitoring, emergency
response, and maritime safety systems, promoting sustainable use of oshore petroleum and
renewable resources, promoting onshore business development, further developing infra-
structure, continuing to strengthen cooperation with Russia, and safeguarding the cultures
and livelihoods of the indigenous peoples. It should be noted, however, that Norway's fore-
most diplomatic priority is to maintain stable diplomatic relations with Russia.
14
Denmark (Greenland)
Denmark's stake in the Arctic and seat on the Arctic Council is driven by its national
interests in Greenland. Denmark and Greenland's joint arctic strategy identies their priori-
ties as supporting and strengthening Greenland's development toward autonomy and main-
taining the commonwealth's position as a major player in the arctic. Denmark's plan has four
separate priorities: creating a peaceful, secure, and safe arctic; fostering self-sustaining growth
and development; developing with respect for the Arctic's fragile climate, environment,
and nature; and cooperating closely with international partners. Denmark and Greenland
also believe that the role of the Arctic Council should be emphasized and extended, and
13 Heininen, 42-49, 68, 69, 70, 78.
14 Heininen, 33-42, 68, 69, 70, 77-78.
12
13
been made, and none will be made in the near future, both countries are scouring the ridge
to nd the natural resources required to bolster their cases for an extension of their Exclusive
Economic Zone.
Between other nation-states in the region, a renewal of historical antipathy has occurred.
e United States and Russia, the two nation-states at the center of the Cold War,,both main-
tain a signicant presence in the Artic and have considerable interest in projecting power
within the region. Russia has already sought to strengthen its Arctic presence by announc-
ing plans to build naval infrastructure hubs along the Northern Sea Route to act as rescue
centers and military bases.
11
In turn, other states are also ramping up their Arctic military
capabilities in order to protect borders, conduct training exercises, and provide search and
rescue assistance. is military buildup appears borne out of a desire to project power rather
than to conduct routine patrolling or search and rescue operations. e nature of this arms
race will be addressed further in the Security Concerns" section of this paper.
Since 2007, the Arctic has once again been identied as a new hot spot for exploration.
A renewed eort to conduct scientic studies and to map the region has brought the world's
attention to the tantalizing prospects of a resource-rich Arctic. Arctic states are aware of the
economic and geopolitical signicance of the region and are putting forth a great eort to
secure their national interests.
National Interests
Each Arctic state has signicant national interests in the region. As mentioned previ-
ously, the economic factors including oil, natural gas, and shing stock are major motiva-
tions for Arctic states. In addition, strategic interests such as control of crucial shipping
territory also play a prominent role. In addition to these incentives, other areas of interest
fuel the behavior of the Arctic states. Each Arctic state has outlined their priorities for the
Arctic as the region gains greater attention. By looking at these motivations, greater clarity
about the overall situation can be attained.
United States
e United States denes itself as an Arctic state due to Alaska's location within the
Arctic. e United States has publicly identied its Arctic priorities as homeland security,
economic security, international governance, extended continental shelf and boundary -
nalization, promotion of international scientic cooperation, maritime transport, and en-
vironmental protection. e United States also has publicly stated its desire to strengthen
cooperation among the eight Arctic states.
12
11 Bennett.
12 Lassi Heininen, Arctic Strategies and Policies: Inventory and Comparative Study," e Northern Research Forum and the
University of Lapland (2012) 33-37, 68-69, 69, 70-71, 78.
Russian Federation
Russia's self-proclaimed Arctic strategy revolves around maintaining their role as a lead-
ing power within the Arctic, as roughly half the coastal area of the Arctic Ocean lies within
their territory. Besides Russia's obvious energy interests in the region, the nation-state has
ten strategic priorities relating to the Arctic: interacting actively with sub-Arctic states to
delimit maritime areas with international law; fostering the creation of Arctic search and
rescue regimes; strengthening bilateral relationships within regional organizations; assist-
ing in the management of cross polar air and sea routes; contributing to international arctic
forums; delimiting maritime spaces in the Arctic and maintaining a mutually advantageous
presence in Spitsbergen Archipelago, improving state management of social and economic
development; improving the quality of life for indigenous peoples; developing an arctic re-
source base through technological capabilities; modernizing and developing the infrastruc-
ture of transportation and sheries. Russia plans to contribute to international cooperation
by strengthening bilateral relationships with regional organizations and participating in
international forums.
13

Norway
Norway has various national interests in the Arctic, including state security, economic
development, and regional cooperation. Its declared priorities are helping to promote knowl-
edge about climate change and environmental security, improving monitoring, emergency
response, and maritime safety systems, promoting sustainable use of oshore petroleum and
renewable resources, promoting onshore business development, further developing infra-
structure, continuing to strengthen cooperation with Russia, and safeguarding the cultures
and livelihoods of the indigenous peoples. It should be noted, however, that Norway's fore-
most diplomatic priority is to maintain stable diplomatic relations with Russia.
14
Denmark (Greenland)
Denmark's stake in the Arctic and seat on the Arctic Council is driven by its national
interests in Greenland. Denmark and Greenland's joint arctic strategy identies their priori-
ties as supporting and strengthening Greenland's development toward autonomy and main-
taining the commonwealth's position as a major player in the arctic. Denmark's plan has four
separate priorities: creating a peaceful, secure, and safe arctic; fostering self-sustaining growth
and development; developing with respect for the Arctic's fragile climate, environment,
and nature; and cooperating closely with international partners. Denmark and Greenland
also believe that the role of the Arctic Council should be emphasized and extended, and
13 Heininen, 42-49, 68, 69, 70, 78.
14 Heininen, 33-42, 68, 69, 70, 77-78.
14
13
that international organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
should be included in international cooperation discussions.
13
Finland
Finland asserts itself as a natural Arctic power with both a Northern and Arctic identity.
e Finnish government seeks to emerge as a major power in Northern Europe as well. Its
priorities in the Arctic are the environment, economic activities such as shing, transpor-
tation and infrastructure advancements, and the protection of indigenous peoples. ey
see international cooperation as a way to lay the groundwork for Finland's activities in the
Arctic and promote intergovernmental organization.
16
Sweden
Sweden emphasizes the historic, geopolitical, economic, environmental, scientic, and
cultural ties connecting them to the Arctic. e priorities of their strategy are climate and
environmental protection and economic development. Sweden seeks well functioning mul-
tilateral cooperation within the Arctic states.
17
Canada
Canada asserts that being a Northern Country" is central to the Canadian National
Identity, and it declares itself a global leader in Arctic science. Canada's priorities are exercis-
ing arctic sovereignty, promoting social and economic development, protecting the North's
environmental heritage, and improving and evolving northern governance. Canada places
a strong emphasis on international cooperation at dierent levels and wants to cooperate
with international organizations and partners.
18
Iceland
Iceland is the only country that claims to be located entirely within the Arctic. As a mar-
itime nation, it depends on resources from the surrounding seas, including a large supply
of sh. Iceland prioritizes international cooperation, security, resource development, en-
vironmental protection, transportation, peoples and cultures, and research and monitor-
ing. Another of Iceland's top Arctic priorities is international cooperation, specically with
Nordic states.
19
13 Heininen, 17-23, 68, 69, 77.
16 Heininen, 23-28, 68, 69, 77.
17 Heininen, 49-33, 68, 69, 70, 78.
18 Heininen, 13-17, 68, 69, 76-77.
19 Heininen, 29-34, 68, 69, 70, 77.
European Union
e European Union also wants a stake in the energy-rich Arctic. It places a high pri-
ority on protecting the Arctic environment and population, promoting sustainable use of
resources, and contributing to enhanced multilateral governance. e governing body pro-
motes international cooperation and is seeking Permanent Observer status.
20
ese Arctic states and regional bodies share similar priorities in the region. Each state
declares a peaceful desire to foster environmental responsibility and multilateral gover-
nance, among other noble priorities. However, each state also has momentous economic and
political interests in the region, such as the natural resource deposits and shipping routes
available in the Arctic. An examination of current Arctic security issues reveals that the po-
litical and economic interests in the region seem to overshadow other appealing priorities,
including the promotion of global governance and ecological security. Indeed, the actions
of these states even seem to contradict their ocial priorities. Geopolitical and economic
interests have driven states to sacrice cooperation in favor of national interests, a shi
that has led to serious security concerns in the region, including the possibility of heavy
militarization.
Security Concerns
Strong evidence of a military build-up exists in the Arctic on the part of every nation-
state within the Arctic Circle. A report published by the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI) entitled Military Capabilities in the Arctic" reveals enlightening
information regarding this militarization.
21
Canada is increasing Arctic troop levels and set-
ting up new bases in the Arctic region facing Greenland. Denmark adopted a special Arctic
strategy in 2011 and has since developed a military Arctic Response Force comprised of
aircra and naval vessels adapted for the Arctic climate. Norway, a member of NATO, has di-
rected its Arctic defense policy towards Russia, according to SIPRI. Norway seems more in-
terested in maintaining a formidable military presence in the Arctic Circle. It has completed
ve military training exercises with NATO in the Arctic since 2006 and hasmoved its armed
forces headquarters nearer to the Arctic Circle in 2009. Russia has also increased military
presence in the Arctic region by regularly deploying bomber aircra and reconnaissance
missions over the Arctic aer a 13-year hiatus. In 2011, the U.S. also conducted in a subma-
rine warfare exercise, and the U.S. Coast Guard has been deploying more National Security
cutters to the Arctic region. Climate Change and International Security: e Arctic as a
Bellwether," an article published by the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, asserts that
20 Heininen, 37-64, 71, 78-79.
21 Siemon Wezeman, Military Capabilities in the Arctic," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Background Papers
2012: 13-14.
14
13
that international organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
should be included in international cooperation discussions.
13
Finland
Finland asserts itself as a natural Arctic power with both a Northern and Arctic identity.
e Finnish government seeks to emerge as a major power in Northern Europe as well. Its
priorities in the Arctic are the environment, economic activities such as shing, transpor-
tation and infrastructure advancements, and the protection of indigenous peoples. ey
see international cooperation as a way to lay the groundwork for Finland's activities in the
Arctic and promote intergovernmental organization.
16
Sweden
Sweden emphasizes the historic, geopolitical, economic, environmental, scientic, and
cultural ties connecting them to the Arctic. e priorities of their strategy are climate and
environmental protection and economic development. Sweden seeks well functioning mul-
tilateral cooperation within the Arctic states.
17
Canada
Canada asserts that being a Northern Country" is central to the Canadian National
Identity, and it declares itself a global leader in Arctic science. Canada's priorities are exercis-
ing arctic sovereignty, promoting social and economic development, protecting the North's
environmental heritage, and improving and evolving northern governance. Canada places
a strong emphasis on international cooperation at dierent levels and wants to cooperate
with international organizations and partners.
18
Iceland
Iceland is the only country that claims to be located entirely within the Arctic. As a mar-
itime nation, it depends on resources from the surrounding seas, including a large supply
of sh. Iceland prioritizes international cooperation, security, resource development, en-
vironmental protection, transportation, peoples and cultures, and research and monitor-
ing. Another of Iceland's top Arctic priorities is international cooperation, specically with
Nordic states.
19
13 Heininen, 17-23, 68, 69, 77.
16 Heininen, 23-28, 68, 69, 77.
17 Heininen, 49-33, 68, 69, 70, 78.
18 Heininen, 13-17, 68, 69, 76-77.
19 Heininen, 29-34, 68, 69, 70, 77.
European Union
e European Union also wants a stake in the energy-rich Arctic. It places a high pri-
ority on protecting the Arctic environment and population, promoting sustainable use of
resources, and contributing to enhanced multilateral governance. e governing body pro-
motes international cooperation and is seeking Permanent Observer status.
20
ese Arctic states and regional bodies share similar priorities in the region. Each state
declares a peaceful desire to foster environmental responsibility and multilateral gover-
nance, among other noble priorities. However, each state also has momentous economic and
political interests in the region, such as the natural resource deposits and shipping routes
available in the Arctic. An examination of current Arctic security issues reveals that the po-
litical and economic interests in the region seem to overshadow other appealing priorities,
including the promotion of global governance and ecological security. Indeed, the actions
of these states even seem to contradict their ocial priorities. Geopolitical and economic
interests have driven states to sacrice cooperation in favor of national interests, a shi
that has led to serious security concerns in the region, including the possibility of heavy
militarization.
Security Concerns
Strong evidence of a military build-up exists in the Arctic on the part of every nation-
state within the Arctic Circle. A report published by the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI) entitled Military Capabilities in the Arctic" reveals enlightening
information regarding this militarization.
21
Canada is increasing Arctic troop levels and set-
ting up new bases in the Arctic region facing Greenland. Denmark adopted a special Arctic
strategy in 2011 and has since developed a military Arctic Response Force comprised of
aircra and naval vessels adapted for the Arctic climate. Norway, a member of NATO, has di-
rected its Arctic defense policy towards Russia, according to SIPRI. Norway seems more in-
terested in maintaining a formidable military presence in the Arctic Circle. It has completed
ve military training exercises with NATO in the Arctic since 2006 and hasmoved its armed
forces headquarters nearer to the Arctic Circle in 2009. Russia has also increased military
presence in the Arctic region by regularly deploying bomber aircra and reconnaissance
missions over the Arctic aer a 13-year hiatus. In 2011, the U.S. also conducted in a subma-
rine warfare exercise, and the U.S. Coast Guard has been deploying more National Security
cutters to the Arctic region. Climate Change and International Security: e Arctic as a
Bellwether," an article published by the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, asserts that
20 Heininen, 37-64, 71, 78-79.
21 Siemon Wezeman, Military Capabilities in the Arctic," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Background Papers
2012: 13-14.
16
17
e[se] new military programs have been geared towards combat capabilities that exceed
mere constabulary capacity."
22
is information suggests that Arctic states may be bolster-
ing their militaries to prepare for conict between state actors, not just for routine oshore
patrolling purposes.
is militarization brings about a security dilemma, where a perceived or actual mili-
tary build-up in one state instills insecurity in another, causing an escalating arms race to
ensue. ere exists a high potential for this security dilemma to become a reality among
Arctic states if high-intensity militarization continues. e build up itself seems contradic-
tory to the hopes for a state of continued peace. If no one thinks about Arctic as a mili-
tary zone," such an emphasis on preparing national armed forces for an Arctic engagement
would not be occurring. Militarization in conjunction with diplomats downplaying any
security threats is certainly dangerous. ese non-transparent and security maximizing at-
titudes on behalf of states are a threat to peacehowever natural" this process may be.
Despite the grim indications of the continued regional militarization, the possibility for
armed interstate conict is vigorously denied or downplayed by diplomats and researchers.
Beyond cursory nods, Dr. Siemon T. Wezeman of SIPRI places little emphasis on the threat
of interstate conict despite a notable military build-up. Dr. Wezeman writes the changes
have little or nothing to do with power projection," and may instead be aimed at the patrol-
ling and protecting of recognized national territories that are becoming accessible, includ-
ing for criminal activities," or towards supporting civilian research."
23
When questioned
further about his report, Dr. Wezeman stated, no one is planning to go to war."
24
Kristopher
Bergh, another SIPRI researcher, stated, Security is not a concern to the U.S. when it comes
to the Arctic."
23
On April 12th and 13th, a meeting of the Arctic Chiefs of Defense Sta-a
grouping of Arctic nations' military commanders for the region-occurred at what is known
as the Goose Bay Conference. However, this conference did not discuss issues of hard se-
curity," dened by Professor Lomagin of St. Petersburg State University as security issues
relating to defense against state actors.
26
Instead, the discussed security issues focused
solely on search and rescue, northern environmental challenges and militaryaboriginal
22 Rob Huebert, et al., Climate Change and International Security: e Arctic as a Bellwether," Center for Climate and Energy
Solutions, May 2012: 23.
23 Wezeman, Military Capabilities in the Arctic," 13-14.
24 Wezeman, Discussion of Military Capabilities in the Arctic."
23 Kristopher Berg, Domestic Drivers for Canadian and U.S. Arctic Policy," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Meeting with University of Southern California researchers (Stockholm, Sweden), May 21, 2012.
26 Nikita Lomagin, Russia's Perception of the Arctic and International Cooperation," Lecture with University of Southern
California Researchers (St. Petersburg, Russia), May 28, 2012.
relations."
27
Ambassador Gustav Lind, the Swedish chair of the Arctic Council, recently
opened an informational presentation with a proclamation that any rumors of conict were
simply media exaggeration. In regards to a possible military build-up in the Arctic region,
Ambassador Lind stated, Military resources are only being used to support civilians."
28

Russian Ambassador to Sweden Igor Neverov was adamant about the impossibility of mili-
tarization when he said, No one thinks about militarization of the Arctic."
29
e Russian
Ambassador's top political adviser, Aleksi Ivanov, added, e Arctic is a zone of peace," and,
No one thinks about the Arctic as a military zone."
30
When discussing a possible resurgence
of a 20th century great power rivalry between the U.S. and Russia, Mr. Ivanov noted how
the two nations are totally in sync" and have aligned interests."
31
Dr. Ekaterina Klimenko,
a Russia expert at SIPRI, added that there is nothing to be scared of " in the Arctic.
32
ese
statements seem to suggest that there exists no possibility whatsoever of any interstate con-
ict occurring in the Arctic. Perhaps, as the Finnish Consul General to St. Petersburg, Jyrki
Terva suggested, simply talking about conict is the rst step to bringing it about.
33
With this
principle in mind, any talk regarding conict is avoided and vigorously denied by ocial
representatives of each Arctic state.
Some scholars and diplomats, however, acknowledge that there is high tension in the
region. Consul General Aasheim took a less optimistic view about current interstate re-
lations in the Arctic. He stated, in response to questioning on security and cooperation
in the Arctic, ere is a ght . there is a battle."
34
Especially prominent is a Cold War
legacy resulting from the East-West divide that dominated the region for forty years. As Dr.
Wezeman stated, e Cold War is not over."
33
Tom Arnbom of the World Wildlife Fund
Sweden is wary that, Canada is going to be very nationalistic" when it takes the chairman-
ship of the Arctic Council.
36
SIPRI expert Dr. Neil Melvin believes that Greenland is one
27 Olin Strader, Arctic Chiefs of Defence Sta Conference- An Opportunity to Formalize Arctic Security, e Arctic Institute:
Center for Circumpolar Security Studies, http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2012/04/arctic-chiefs-of-defence-sta.html:m=1,
April 6, 2012.
28 Gustav Lind, Interview held during meeting with University of Southern California researchers, Stockholm, Sweden, May
23, 2012.
29 Igor Neverov, Interview held during meeting with University of Southern California researchers, Stockholm, Sweden, May
23, 2012.
30 Ivanov, Interview with University of Southern California Researchers, May 23, 2012.
31 Ivanov.
32 Klimenko, Ambitious Plans and Domestic Policies for the Arctic in Russia."
33 Jyrki Terva, Meeting with University of Southern California Researchers, St. Petersburg, Russia, May 28, 2012.
34 Terva.
36 Arnbom.
16
17
e[se] new military programs have been geared towards combat capabilities that exceed
mere constabulary capacity."
22
is information suggests that Arctic states may be bolster-
ing their militaries to prepare for conict between state actors, not just for routine oshore
patrolling purposes.
is militarization brings about a security dilemma, where a perceived or actual mili-
tary build-up in one state instills insecurity in another, causing an escalating arms race to
ensue. ere exists a high potential for this security dilemma to become a reality among
Arctic states if high-intensity militarization continues. e build up itself seems contradic-
tory to the hopes for a state of continued peace. If no one thinks about Arctic as a mili-
tary zone," such an emphasis on preparing national armed forces for an Arctic engagement
would not be occurring. Militarization in conjunction with diplomats downplaying any
security threats is certainly dangerous. ese non-transparent and security maximizing at-
titudes on behalf of states are a threat to peacehowever natural" this process may be.
Despite the grim indications of the continued regional militarization, the possibility for
armed interstate conict is vigorously denied or downplayed by diplomats and researchers.
Beyond cursory nods, Dr. Siemon T. Wezeman of SIPRI places little emphasis on the threat
of interstate conict despite a notable military build-up. Dr. Wezeman writes the changes
have little or nothing to do with power projection," and may instead be aimed at the patrol-
ling and protecting of recognized national territories that are becoming accessible, includ-
ing for criminal activities," or towards supporting civilian research."
23
When questioned
further about his report, Dr. Wezeman stated, no one is planning to go to war."
24
Kristopher
Bergh, another SIPRI researcher, stated, Security is not a concern to the U.S. when it comes
to the Arctic."
23
On April 12th and 13th, a meeting of the Arctic Chiefs of Defense Sta-a
grouping of Arctic nations' military commanders for the region-occurred at what is known
as the Goose Bay Conference. However, this conference did not discuss issues of hard se-
curity," dened by Professor Lomagin of St. Petersburg State University as security issues
relating to defense against state actors.
26
Instead, the discussed security issues focused
solely on search and rescue, northern environmental challenges and militaryaboriginal
22 Rob Huebert, et al., Climate Change and International Security: e Arctic as a Bellwether," Center for Climate and Energy
Solutions, May 2012: 23.
23 Wezeman, Military Capabilities in the Arctic," 13-14.
23 Kristopher Berg, Domestic Drivers for Canadian and U.S. Arctic Policy," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Meeting with University of Southern California researchers (Stockholm, Sweden), May 21, 2012.
26 Nikita Lomagin, Russia's Perception of the Arctic and International Cooperation," Lecture with University of Southern
California Researchers (St. Petersburg, Russia), May 28, 2012.
relations."
27
Ambassador Gustav Lind, the Swedish chair of the Arctic Council, recently
opened an informational presentation with a proclamation that any rumors of conict were
simply media exaggeration. In regards to a possible military build-up in the Arctic region,
Ambassador Lind stated, Military resources are only being used to support civilians."
28

Russian Ambassador to Sweden Igor Neverov was adamant about the impossibility of mili-
tarization when he said, No one thinks about militarization of the Arctic."
29
e Russian
Ambassador's top political adviser, Aleksi Ivanov, added, e Arctic is a zone of peace," and,
No one thinks about the Arctic as a military zone."
30
When discussing a possible resurgence
of a 20th century great power rivalry between the U.S. and Russia, Mr. Ivanov noted how
the two nations are totally in sync" and have aligned interests."
31
Dr. Ekaterina Klimenko,
a Russia expert at SIPRI, added that there is nothing to be scared of " in the Arctic.
32
ese
statements seem to suggest that there exists no possibility whatsoever of any interstate con-
ict occurring in the Arctic. Perhaps, as the Finnish Consul General to St. Petersburg, Jyrki
Terva suggested, simply talking about conict is the rst step to bringing it about.
33
With this
principle in mind, any talk regarding conict is avoided and vigorously denied by ocial
representatives of each Arctic state.
Some scholars and diplomats, however, acknowledge that there is high tension in the
region. Consul General Aasheim took a less optimistic view about current interstate re-
lations in the Arctic. He stated, in response to questioning on security and cooperation
in the Arctic, ere is a ght . there is a battle."
34
Especially prominent is a Cold War
legacy resulting from the East-West divide that dominated the region for forty years. As Dr.
Wezeman stated, e Cold War is not over."
33
Tom Arnbom of the World Wildlife Fund
Sweden is wary that, Canada is going to be very nationalistic" when it takes the chairman-
ship of the Arctic Council.
36
SIPRI expert Dr. Neil Melvin believes that Greenland is one
27 Olin Strader, Arctic Chiefs of Defence Sta Conference- An Opportunity to Formalize Arctic Security, e Arctic Institute:
Center for Circumpolar Security Studies, http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2012/04/arctic-chiefs-of-defence-sta.html:m=1,
April 6, 2012.
28 Gustav Lind, Interview held during meeting with University of Southern California researchers, Stockholm, Sweden, May
23, 2012.
29 Igor Neverov, Interview held during meeting with University of Southern California researchers, Stockholm, Sweden, May
23, 2012.
30 Ivanov, Interview with University of Southern California Researchers, May 23, 2012.
31 Ivanov.
33 Jyrki Terva, Meeting with University of Southern California Researchers, St. Petersburg, Russia, May 28, 2012.
34 Terva.
36 Arnbom.
18
19
oil strike away from independence."
37
ese numerous pressures create stark divisions be-
tween Arctic states and heighten tensions that are continuously denied by diplomats. e
acknowledgement of certain conict potential and the denial of overall security challenges
show a certain dissonance that deserves further exploration.
e current militarization of the Arctic seems obvious, but many ocials counter that
the buildup is necessary for combating so security issues such as illegal shing. However,
a closer look at the nature of the preparations show them to be more geared toward the
possibility of interstate conict rather than routine oshore patrolling. Indeed, no serious
threat of transnational crime exists in the Arctic and there has been no evidence to suggest
that transnational crime has increased in recent years in the region. While some states and
researchers declare the Arctic to be an undisputed zone of peace," other researchers seem
to doubt such an optimistic assessment and comment on the areas of tension. ough in-
terstate-armed conict on a grand scale does not seem likely, diplomatic rows and military
skirmishes are possible, which could lead to increasingly volatile circumstances. ese cir-
cumstances could in turn cause these newly reinforced military forces to engage in conict
and turn the Arctic into a zone of instability.
Cold War Politics
A major obstacle to cooperation and coordination between Arctic states is the result of
a post-Cold War tension that exists between North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
member-states and the weakened Russian Federation. e conclusion of the Cold War has
resulted in a great power rivalry between Russia and the United States. is rivalry is a major
contributing factor to the lack of communication and mistrust on hard security issues in the
region. Indeed, as Dr. Nikita Lomagin of St. Petersburg State University noted, We are still
hostage to the Cold War."
38
e recent developments of Russia's general distrust of NATO
forces, especially the United States, is driven by the presence of NATO forces in former
Soviet territory. is already existing wariness of NATO was exacerbated when U.S. forces
broke an agreement made with Russia over the reunication of East and West Germany by
subsequently including former Soviet satellites in the NATO coalition.
39
Because of the dis-
mantling of the USSR's military forces at the conclusion of the Cold War, Russia's apparent
top priority is showing to the world that it can match the United States in broadly dened
power capabilities and projections. is Russian mindset, referred to as an inferiority com-
plex" by Dr. Lomagin hampers communication eorts between Russia and NATO states in
37 Neil Melvin, Conict and Cooperation," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Meeting with University of
Southern California Researchers, Stockholm, Sweden, , May 22, 2012.
38 Lomagin, Russia's Perception of the Arctic and International Cooperation."
39 Robert English, German Reunication," Meeting with University of Southern California researchers (Los Angeles, CA),
May 16, 2012.
regards to its behavior in the Arctic.
40
e legacy of the Cold War is still very prevalent in
the region and has led to a divide between Russia and Western states.
e extant Cold War tensions continue to dominate foreign policy decisions made on
behalf of NATO-aliated states and Russia. Russian energy security researcher, Konstantin
Leschenko of St. Petersburg State University, noted that this presence of NATO missiles and
strategic commands in central Europe is a key factor in promoting distrust between Russia
and NATO states.
41
is lack of trust is reected in Russia's decision to bolster its military
forces in the Arctic. As noted in SIPRI's report, Military Capabilities in the Arctic," Russia's
decision to increase its military presence is driven by a desire to 'balance the situation' with
NATO forces in the Arctic."
42
Russian Diplomat Aleksi Ivanov called this military bolstering
a natural response" to protect Russian sovereignty.
43
It is no surprise Russia would want
to project power in the region since NATO forces have carried out military exercises in the
region that have excluded Russia.
44
While this storied tension may seem obvious, it is important to recognize the inhibitory
eect it is having on military coordination and cooperation in the Arctic region. If Russia
continues to feel that it is marginalized or that it needs to prove its power, the Arctic could
transform into an area of heightened tension and result in, at the very least, intense diplo-
matic conict reminiscent of Soviet and American tensions during the Cold War.
Structural Obstacles to Multilateral Security Cooperation
While many countries claim to be working multilaterally on all issues related to the
Arctic, there remains no ocial forum for security cooperation. e only ocial forum,
the Arctic Council, is ill-suited to mediating security concerns in the region. e institu-
tional structure lacks the critical decision-making or communicative bodies pertaining to
military action. e Ottawa Declaration, which established the Arctic Council, included
a clause stating that the Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to military
security."
43
erefore, no forum currently exists for the Arctic states to address these critical
issues. As of now, the Arctic Council functions more as a chat shop" rather than a decision
making body; when it comes to producing diplomatic accords, it has passed only a single
legally binding agreement.
46
Indeed, because of the Ottawa Declaration's footnote, this chat
shop" is prohibited from even discussing security matters. Even though Ambassador Lind
40 Nikita Lomagin, interview with University of Southern California researchers, St. Petersburg, Russia, June 1, 2012.
41 Konstantine Leschenko, interview with University of Southern California researchers, St. Petersburg, Russia, May 31, 2012.
42 Wezeman, Military Capabilities in the Arctic," 9.
43 Ivanov, interview with University of Southern California Researchers, May 23, 2012.
43 Declaration on Establishment of the Arctic Council: e Ottawa Declaration - 1996, Ottawa: Arctic Council, 1996, 2.
46 erese Jakobsen, Meeting with University of Southern California researchers, Stockholm, Sweden, May 24, 2012.
18
19
oil strike away from independence."
37
ese numerous pressures create stark divisions be-
tween Arctic states and heighten tensions that are continuously denied by diplomats. e
acknowledgement of certain conict potential and the denial of overall security challenges
show a certain dissonance that deserves further exploration.
e current militarization of the Arctic seems obvious, but many ocials counter that
the buildup is necessary for combating so security issues such as illegal shing. However,
a closer look at the nature of the preparations show them to be more geared toward the
possibility of interstate conict rather than routine oshore patrolling. Indeed, no serious
threat of transnational crime exists in the Arctic and there has been no evidence to suggest
that transnational crime has increased in recent years in the region. While some states and
researchers declare the Arctic to be an undisputed zone of peace," other researchers seem
to doubt such an optimistic assessment and comment on the areas of tension. ough in-
terstate-armed conict on a grand scale does not seem likely, diplomatic rows and military
skirmishes are possible, which could lead to increasingly volatile circumstances. ese cir-
cumstances could in turn cause these newly reinforced military forces to engage in conict
and turn the Arctic into a zone of instability.
Cold War Politics
A major obstacle to cooperation and coordination between Arctic states is the result of
a post-Cold War tension that exists between North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
member-states and the weakened Russian Federation. e conclusion of the Cold War has
resulted in a great power rivalry between Russia and the United States. is rivalry is a major
contributing factor to the lack of communication and mistrust on hard security issues in the
region. Indeed, as Dr. Nikita Lomagin of St. Petersburg State University noted, We are still
hostage to the Cold War."
38
e recent developments of Russia's general distrust of NATO
forces, especially the United States, is driven by the presence of NATO forces in former
Soviet territory. is already existing wariness of NATO was exacerbated when U.S. forces
broke an agreement made with Russia over the reunication of East and West Germany by
subsequently including former Soviet satellites in the NATO coalition.
39
Because of the dis-
mantling of the USSR's military forces at the conclusion of the Cold War, Russia's apparent
top priority is showing to the world that it can match the United States in broadly dened
power capabilities and projections. is Russian mindset, referred to as an inferiority com-
plex" by Dr. Lomagin hampers communication eorts between Russia and NATO states in
37 Neil Melvin, Conict and Cooperation," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Meeting with University of
Southern California Researchers, Stockholm, Sweden, , May 22, 2012.
38 Lomagin, Russia's Perception of the Arctic and International Cooperation."
39 Robert English, German Reunication," Meeting with University of Southern California researchers (Los Angeles, CA),
May 16, 2012.
regards to its behavior in the Arctic.
40
e legacy of the Cold War is still very prevalent in
the region and has led to a divide between Russia and Western states.
e extant Cold War tensions continue to dominate foreign policy decisions made on
behalf of NATO-aliated states and Russia. Russian energy security researcher, Konstantin
Leschenko of St. Petersburg State University, noted that this presence of NATO missiles and
strategic commands in central Europe is a key factor in promoting distrust between Russia
and NATO states.
41
is lack of trust is reected in Russia's decision to bolster its military
forces in the Arctic. As noted in SIPRI's report, Military Capabilities in the Arctic," Russia's
decision to increase its military presence is driven by a desire to 'balance the situation' with
NATO forces in the Arctic."
42
Russian Diplomat Aleksi Ivanov called this military bolstering
a natural response" to protect Russian sovereignty.
43
It is no surprise Russia would want
to project power in the region since NATO forces have carried out military exercises in the
region that have excluded Russia.
44
While this storied tension may seem obvious, it is important to recognize the inhibitory
eect it is having on military coordination and cooperation in the Arctic region. If Russia
continues to feel that it is marginalized or that it needs to prove its power, the Arctic could
transform into an area of heightened tension and result in, at the very least, intense diplo-
matic conict reminiscent of Soviet and American tensions during the Cold War.
Structural Obstacles to Multilateral Security Cooperation
While many countries claim to be working multilaterally on all issues related to the
Arctic, there remains no ocial forum for security cooperation. e only ocial forum,
the Arctic Council, is ill-suited to mediating security concerns in the region. e institu-
tional structure lacks the critical decision-making or communicative bodies pertaining to
military action. e Ottawa Declaration, which established the Arctic Council, included
a clause stating that the Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to military
security."
43
erefore, no forum currently exists for the Arctic states to address these critical
issues. As of now, the Arctic Council functions more as a chat shop" rather than a decision
making body; when it comes to producing diplomatic accords, it has passed only a single
legally binding agreement.
46
Indeed, because of the Ottawa Declaration's footnote, this chat
shop" is prohibited from even discussing security matters. Even though Ambassador Lind
40 Nikita Lomagin, interview with University of Southern California researchers, St. Petersburg, Russia, June 1, 2012.
41 Konstantine Leschenko, interview with University of Southern California researchers, St. Petersburg, Russia, May 31, 2012.
43 Ivanov, interview with University of Southern California Researchers, May 23, 2012.
43 Declaration on Establishment of the Arctic Council: e Ottawa Declaration - 1996, Ottawa: Arctic Council, 1996, 2.
46 erese Jakobsen, Meeting with University of Southern California researchers, Stockholm, Sweden, May 24, 2012.
20
21
hasstated the Arctic Council is a decision shaper" but is evolving" into a decision-maker,
the region still lacks a decision-making body and a forum for addressing security challeng-
es.
47
Dr. Neil Melvin explained that the Arctic states need to choose whether or not they
are willing to have the Arctic Council as a union with decision-making power and legally
binding agreements, since if a decision is le unmade, the nation-states of the Arctic risk
predicating security challenges for decades to come.
48
Conict of Ideologies
One key determinant in shaping the future of the region rests in the philosophies of
the involved nation-states: the dominant realist philosophy these countries follow may pose
a threat to continued peace. e bolstering of armed forces occurring in the Arctic region
is partly a result of a realist operation code that emphasizes military power projection as
a means of protecting sovereignty. ough a potential security dilemma has already been
mentioned, an examination of its underlying theoretical and philosophical issues is war-
ranted in order to understand the motivations behind the status quo.
As briey mentioned, realism became the world's dominant philosophy following
World War II. Political theorists such as E. H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau, and Reinhold
Niebuhr pushed a renaissance of realism to the forefront of international relations theory.
ese writers looked critically at the causes of the second World War, and settled largely on
several fundamental mistakes made by thought-shapers and policy makers in the interlude
following World War I. Concisely, this new strain of thought emphasized the ubiquity of
power and the competitive nature of politics among nations."
49
Carr looked at institutions
and diplomatic proclamations and saw that rather than ameliorating conict, they were in
fact impeding the goal of peace. ese conditions were dangerous because they created a
false belief that exceedingly complex interstate conicts could be smoothly dealt with by the
creation of a community of states that held shared interests and goals.
30

A solid realist identity is held by states such as the Russian Federation, United States,
and Canada when it comes to Arctic policy. rough actions across the world, both recently
and historically, the U.S. and Russia have repeatedly demonstrated these tendencies. ere
are few that would argue that the operational code of realism does not dominate U.S. or
Russian decision makers.
For Russia, their vast stake in the Arctic region fuels this realist mindset. Russia has the
longest coastline of any Arctic state; in fact, this coastline encompasses nearly half of the
land surrounding the Arctic Ocean. is heightens security concerns: a lack of ice provides
47 Lind, interview held during meeting with University of Southern California researchers, May 23, 2012.
48 Melvin, Conict and Cooperation."
49 John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, e Globalization of World Politics," 81.
30 Edward Hallet Carr, e Twenty Years Crisis."
easy access to Russia's coastal borders. Since maintaining state security and sovereignty is
a chief concern of Russia, potential access to its borders could open up a Pandora's box of
security concerns. Russia's stake in the Arctic is further motivated by its economic interests,
which is severely dependent on natural resources. Russia is the world's chief producer and
exporter of oil, and ranks second in natural gas output. Despite government attempts to
decrease dependence on the energy sector, Russia's economy continues be held hostage to
global energy prices. With a decreasing population, rampant corruption, poor infrastruc-
ture, and lack of capital beyond the energy sector, Russia's economic diversication attempts
have not yielded signicant results and the current economic outlook in this area appears
bleak.
31
According to estimates of Russia's currently tapped oil and gas reserves, projections
show that energy output is headed for a dramatic decrease over the next twenty years. In
order to salvage its economy, Russia increasingly looks northwards to exploit new resources,
where, as mentioned previously in this paper, a large portion of the world's untapped oil
and gas reserves lie. With such vital economic and security concerns in the Arctic, Russia is
acting and is expected to act with a realist mindset.
In comparison, Canada is generally thought of as a more moderate state, but under the
leadership of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, it has chosen the Arctic as an area in which to
heavily pursue its national interests. Harper has proven himself capable of inducing people
to rally 'round the ag," forcing a hardline policy towards the Arctic. Canada's realist op-
erational code is illustrated through a territorial dispute over the Northwest Passage, a new
potential shipping route along Canada's north rim. is route could dramatically reduce
transcontinental shipping costs and be very protable to the state that controls the waterway.
e U.S. and Canada currently have an unresolved conict over this passageway. e U.S.
and Canada share one of the most amicable international borders in the world, and for the
two states to publicly disagree about this issue reveals how important this waterway would
serve each of their national interests. Canada believes its sovereignty is directly threatened
by the current territorial disputes in the Arctic, and will therefore work to defend its per-
ceived borders and retain as much territory as possible.
e remaining littoral Arctic stakeholders of Sweden, Finland, Denmark (Greenland),
Iceland, and Norway fall into somewhat more murky territory concerning their governing
philosophies. Many consider these social democracies to be more in favor of liberal insti-
tutionalism. However, these states remain under the realist umbrella, albeit in a dierent
form. Realism is primarily concerned with great powers -- aer all, John Mearsheimer, one
of the chief realist thinkers of the 20
th
century, entitled his seminal work on realism e
Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Acts of power projection by minor states tend to be ignored,
so they band together in order to have their positions heard on the international scale. In
31 e World Factbook, Economy ::: Russia, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html
20
21
hasstated the Arctic Council is a decision shaper" but is evolving" into a decision-maker,
the region still lacks a decision-making body and a forum for addressing security challeng-
es.
47
Dr. Neil Melvin explained that the Arctic states need to choose whether or not they
are willing to have the Arctic Council as a union with decision-making power and legally
binding agreements, since if a decision is le unmade, the nation-states of the Arctic risk
predicating security challenges for decades to come.
48
Conict of Ideologies
One key determinant in shaping the future of the region rests in the philosophies of
the involved nation-states: the dominant realist philosophy these countries follow may pose
a threat to continued peace. e bolstering of armed forces occurring in the Arctic region
is partly a result of a realist operation code that emphasizes military power projection as
a means of protecting sovereignty. ough a potential security dilemma has already been
mentioned, an examination of its underlying theoretical and philosophical issues is war-
ranted in order to understand the motivations behind the status quo.
As briey mentioned, realism became the world's dominant philosophy following
World War II. Political theorists such as E. H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau, and Reinhold
Niebuhr pushed a renaissance of realism to the forefront of international relations theory.
ese writers looked critically at the causes of the second World War, and settled largely on
several fundamental mistakes made by thought-shapers and policy makers in the interlude
following World War I. Concisely, this new strain of thought emphasized the ubiquity of
power and the competitive nature of politics among nations."
49
Carr looked at institutions
and diplomatic proclamations and saw that rather than ameliorating conict, they were in
fact impeding the goal of peace. ese conditions were dangerous because they created a
false belief that exceedingly complex interstate conicts could be smoothly dealt with by the
creation of a community of states that held shared interests and goals.
30

A solid realist identity is held by states such as the Russian Federation, United States,
and Canada when it comes to Arctic policy. rough actions across the world, both recently
and historically, the U.S. and Russia have repeatedly demonstrated these tendencies. ere
are few that would argue that the operational code of realism does not dominate U.S. or
Russian decision makers.
For Russia, their vast stake in the Arctic region fuels this realist mindset. Russia has the
longest coastline of any Arctic state; in fact, this coastline encompasses nearly half of the
land surrounding the Arctic Ocean. is heightens security concerns: a lack of ice provides
47 Lind, interview held during meeting with University of Southern California researchers, May 23, 2012.
48 Melvin, Conict and Cooperation."
49 John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, e Globalization of World Politics," 81.
30 Edward Hallet Carr, e Twenty Years Crisis."
easy access to Russia's coastal borders. Since maintaining state security and sovereignty is
a chief concern of Russia, potential access to its borders could open up a Pandora's box of
security concerns. Russia's stake in the Arctic is further motivated by its economic interests,
which is severely dependent on natural resources. Russia is the world's chief producer and
exporter of oil, and ranks second in natural gas output. Despite government attempts to
decrease dependence on the energy sector, Russia's economy continues be held hostage to
global energy prices. With a decreasing population, rampant corruption, poor infrastruc-
ture, and lack of capital beyond the energy sector, Russia's economic diversication attempts
have not yielded signicant results and the current economic outlook in this area appears
bleak.
31
According to estimates of Russia's currently tapped oil and gas reserves, projections
show that energy output is headed for a dramatic decrease over the next twenty years. In
order to salvage its economy, Russia increasingly looks northwards to exploit new resources,
where, as mentioned previously in this paper, a large portion of the world's untapped oil
and gas reserves lie. With such vital economic and security concerns in the Arctic, Russia is
acting and is expected to act with a realist mindset.
In comparison, Canada is generally thought of as a more moderate state, but under the
leadership of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, it has chosen the Arctic as an area in which to
heavily pursue its national interests. Harper has proven himself capable of inducing people
to rally 'round the ag," forcing a hardline policy towards the Arctic. Canada's realist op-
erational code is illustrated through a territorial dispute over the Northwest Passage, a new
potential shipping route along Canada's north rim. is route could dramatically reduce
transcontinental shipping costs and be very protable to the state that controls the waterway.
e U.S. and Canada currently have an unresolved conict over this passageway. e U.S.
and Canada share one of the most amicable international borders in the world, and for the
two states to publicly disagree about this issue reveals how important this waterway would
serve each of their national interests. Canada believes its sovereignty is directly threatened
by the current territorial disputes in the Arctic, and will therefore work to defend its per-
ceived borders and retain as much territory as possible.
e remaining littoral Arctic stakeholders of Sweden, Finland, Denmark (Greenland),
Iceland, and Norway fall into somewhat more murky territory concerning their governing
philosophies. Many consider these social democracies to be more in favor of liberal insti-
tutionalism. However, these states remain under the realist umbrella, albeit in a dierent
form. Realism is primarily concerned with great powers -- aer all, John Mearsheimer, one
of the chief realist thinkers of the 20
th
century, entitled his seminal work on realism e
Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Acts of power projection by minor states tend to be ignored,
so they band together in order to have their positions heard on the international scale. In
31 e World Factbook, Economy ::: Russia, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html
22
23
pursuing realist goals, these weaker states have no choice but to embrace liberal interna-
tionalist policies.
ese Nordic states have also shown themselves willing and able to pursue their na-
tional interests through means other than traditional realist power projection. Norway, for
example, has a long-standing and historical dispute with Russia over shing territory. With
much to gain from a stake in Arctic oil, Norway is oering the technological expertise of
its parastatal oil company Statoil (formerly StatoilHydro) to Russian Gazprom concerning
the Shtokman drilling project. In this way, Norway advances its national interests without
directly challenging a great military power.
Another example of a non-great power using other sources of leverage besides military
might is Greenland, Denmark's land within the region. Greenland is endowed with the
second largest amount of rare earth minerals in the world. Since these minerals are crucial
to technology and therefore the trappings of modern life, Greenland's deposits are extremely
valuable commodities in the Arctic. ese resources are not currently being tapped due to
a lack of technological expertise, among other reasons. According to rare earth minerals
expert Dr. Matteo Rongione, the only way for Greenland, a 38,000-person state that lacks
full independence from Denmark, to mine these minerals would be to use outside help. One
source it is currently considering is China; reports indicate that Greenland may be reaching
out to China to assist in the mining of these rare-earth elements, a state eager to increase
its stake in the Arctic region. By allowing great powers such as the EU and China to bid for
its rare earth minerals, Greenland is increasing its relative power and wealth. Even if they
bypass traditional realist tactics to reach their goals, smaller states continue to hold the same
end goal of increasing power and inuence in the Arctic.
Despite the evidence that realist theory dominates decision-making among Arctic
states, diplomats and leaders continue to make statements that imply otherwise. Arctic
rhetoric continues to tend toward a more liberal internationalist viewpoint. e chairman
of the Arctic Council, Ambassador Gustav Lind, is documented to believe the ecacy of
the Arctic Council is increasing. His belief that the Arctic Council will move towards more
binding decisions goes against the tenets of the dominant realist thought in the region and
world. It is well known that states are very hesitant to sacrice sovereignty, so his assertion
seems to be overly optimistic under a realist paradigm. In addition to Ambassador Lind,
diplomats including state ocials of Russia, Finland and Norway say they would a more
powerful Arctic Council. Indeed, many state priorities, as shown earlier in this paper, sug-
gest a desire to increase cooperation with the Arctic Council.
However, Arctic state actions show that the rhetoric may be more wishful thinking
than serious policy changes. Despite the call for more binding agreements, only one has
been passed regarding search and rescue. ough the argument can be made that such
low politics issues can encourage more proper integration, the dominant realist mindsets
that are apparent in these Arctic states, especially the U.S. and Russia, indicate that fruit-
ful, legally binding agreements do not seem likely. To a realist, these agreements in very
low politics areas- those that do not relate to security- represent a willful attempt to placate
diplomats and liberal internationalist observers without sacricing any state sovereignty.
Perhaps the footnote in the Ottawa Declaration excluding military issues from the Arctic
Council's agenda is the best indicator of a dominant, state-centric realist attitude towards
security issues. In preventing security from being discussed at this regional institution, real-
ist powers made sure that they would not sacrice any state sovereignty. Based on this, the
Arctic nation-states' unwillingness to move beyond realist operational codes may in fact be
doomed to repeat the same mistakes of their post-WWI counterparts.
Domestic Factors and Diplomatic Challenges
International relations are not the only area running the risk of destabilizing the Arctic;
domestic concerns also pose a threat to Arctic peace and stability. e connection between
domestic factors and international politics comes to light when examining state behav-
ior using two-level games" theory, a concept coined by Dr. Robert Putnam of Harvard
University. ese two-level games occur when leaders bargain on one level with their own
citizens and on the second with other foreign leaders.
32
ese are dangerous games to play
when the fate of the Arctic Circle is at stake. In Canada, the issue is already at the forefront
of the Canadian psyche. As Dr. Michael Byers suggests, the Arctic is dear to the Canadian
people. Discussing the Arctic is a personal, even emotional experience, because the Arctic
gets into [Canadians'] hearts and minds and becomes part of who [they] are."
33
Dr. Byers
also remarks that, Conceptions of sovereignty are oen wrapped up in national identities,
and nowhere is this more true than with Canada's North," for even the national anthem em-
phasizes e True North Strong and Free."
34
Dr. Byers introduces the concept of Harper's
politicization of the Arctic, stating that Mr. Harper has made Arctic sovereignty part of his
successful election campaigns."
33
Harper told the National Post on May 16 that, nothing
comes before [Arctic sovereignty]."
36
In 2010, Harper proclaimed to CBC that, e rst
and highest priority of our northern strategy is the protection of our Arctic sovereignty.
And as I have said many times before, the rst principle of sovereignty is to use it or lose
it."
37
Harper seminally adds that Canada's Arctic sovereignty is non-negotiable." ese and
32 Robert Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: e Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization 42 1988,
427-460.
33 Michael Byers, Who Owns the Arctic, Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre 2010, 19.
34 Byers, 20.
33 Byers, 23.
36 John Ivison, Stephen Harpers Arctic Sovereignty Legacy Starting to Cool O.
37 Peter Sheldon and Terry Mileweski, Arctic Sovereignty a Priority: Harper, CBCNews, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/
story/2010/08/23/harper-north.html, August 23, 2010.
22
23
pursuing realist goals, these weaker states have no choice but to embrace liberal interna-
tionalist policies.
ese Nordic states have also shown themselves willing and able to pursue their na-
tional interests through means other than traditional realist power projection. Norway, for
example, has a long-standing and historical dispute with Russia over shing territory. With
much to gain from a stake in Arctic oil, Norway is oering the technological expertise of
its parastatal oil company Statoil (formerly StatoilHydro) to Russian Gazprom concerning
the Shtokman drilling project. In this way, Norway advances its national interests without
directly challenging a great military power.
Another example of a non-great power using other sources of leverage besides military
might is Greenland, Denmark's land within the region. Greenland is endowed with the
second largest amount of rare earth minerals in the world. Since these minerals are crucial
to technology and therefore the trappings of modern life, Greenland's deposits are extremely
valuable commodities in the Arctic. ese resources are not currently being tapped due to
a lack of technological expertise, among other reasons. According to rare earth minerals
expert Dr. Matteo Rongione, the only way for Greenland, a 38,000-person state that lacks
full independence from Denmark, to mine these minerals would be to use outside help. One
source it is currently considering is China; reports indicate that Greenland may be reaching
out to China to assist in the mining of these rare-earth elements, a state eager to increase
its stake in the Arctic region. By allowing great powers such as the EU and China to bid for
its rare earth minerals, Greenland is increasing its relative power and wealth. Even if they
bypass traditional realist tactics to reach their goals, smaller states continue to hold the same
end goal of increasing power and inuence in the Arctic.
Despite the evidence that realist theory dominates decision-making among Arctic
states, diplomats and leaders continue to make statements that imply otherwise. Arctic
rhetoric continues to tend toward a more liberal internationalist viewpoint. e chairman
of the Arctic Council, Ambassador Gustav Lind, is documented to believe the ecacy of
the Arctic Council is increasing. His belief that the Arctic Council will move towards more
binding decisions goes against the tenets of the dominant realist thought in the region and
world. It is well known that states are very hesitant to sacrice sovereignty, so his assertion
seems to be overly optimistic under a realist paradigm. In addition to Ambassador Lind,
diplomats including state ocials of Russia, Finland and Norway say they would a more
powerful Arctic Council. Indeed, many state priorities, as shown earlier in this paper, sug-
gest a desire to increase cooperation with the Arctic Council.
However, Arctic state actions show that the rhetoric may be more wishful thinking
than serious policy changes. Despite the call for more binding agreements, only one has
been passed regarding search and rescue. ough the argument can be made that such
low politics issues can encourage more proper integration, the dominant realist mindsets
that are apparent in these Arctic states, especially the U.S. and Russia, indicate that fruit-
ful, legally binding agreements do not seem likely. To a realist, these agreements in very
low politics areas- those that do not relate to security- represent a willful attempt to placate
diplomats and liberal internationalist observers without sacricing any state sovereignty.
Perhaps the footnote in the Ottawa Declaration excluding military issues from the Arctic
Council's agenda is the best indicator of a dominant, state-centric realist attitude towards
security issues. In preventing security from being discussed at this regional institution, real-
ist powers made sure that they would not sacrice any state sovereignty. Based on this, the
Arctic nation-states' unwillingness to move beyond realist operational codes may in fact be
doomed to repeat the same mistakes of their post-WWI counterparts.
Domestic Factors and Diplomatic Challenges
International relations are not the only area running the risk of destabilizing the Arctic;
domestic concerns also pose a threat to Arctic peace and stability. e connection between
domestic factors and international politics comes to light when examining state behav-
ior using two-level games" theory, a concept coined by Dr. Robert Putnam of Harvard
University. ese two-level games occur when leaders bargain on one level with their own
citizens and on the second with other foreign leaders.
32
ese are dangerous games to play
when the fate of the Arctic Circle is at stake. In Canada, the issue is already at the forefront
of the Canadian psyche. As Dr. Michael Byers suggests, the Arctic is dear to the Canadian
people. Discussing the Arctic is a personal, even emotional experience, because the Arctic
gets into [Canadians'] hearts and minds and becomes part of who [they] are."
33
Dr. Byers
also remarks that, Conceptions of sovereignty are oen wrapped up in national identities,
and nowhere is this more true than with Canada's North," for even the national anthem em-
phasizes e True North Strong and Free."
34
Dr. Byers introduces the concept of Harper's
politicization of the Arctic, stating that Mr. Harper has made Arctic sovereignty part of his
successful election campaigns."
33
Harper told the National Post on May 16 that, nothing
comes before [Arctic sovereignty]."
36
In 2010, Harper proclaimed to CBC that, e rst
and highest priority of our northern strategy is the protection of our Arctic sovereignty.
And as I have said many times before, the rst principle of sovereignty is to use it or lose
it."
37
Harper seminally adds that Canada's Arctic sovereignty is non-negotiable." ese and
32 Robert Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: e Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization 42 1988,
427-460.
33 Michael Byers, Who Owns the Arctic, Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre 2010, 19.
34 Byers, 20.
33 Byers, 23.
36 John Ivison, Stephen Harpers Arctic Sovereignty Legacy Starting to Cool O.
37 Peter Sheldon and Terry Mileweski, Arctic Sovereignty a Priority: Harper, CBCNews, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/
story/2010/08/23/harper-north.html, August 23, 2010.
24
23
other statements by Mr. Harper show a dangerous politicization of Arctic security, in which
the Canadian people could be clamoring for hardline solutions for the slightest of Arctic
problems or territorial infringements.
While Canada has an extremely strong Northern identity, Russia expert Dr. Robert
English of the University of Southern California raises the point that Russia may have a
claim even more intrinsic to its national identity. With 18 of their territory, 20,000 kilo-
meters of border, and 93 of their oil and gas reserves in the north, the Russian Federation's
fate is tied closely to that of the Arctic.
38
Russian President Vladimir Putin has also taken
a similar political tack. Harper and Putin have both put themselves in quite complicated
positions when it comes to international bargaining. In the event that some small security
issue does arise in the Arctic, we may see Canadian and Russian citizens pushing for more
aggressive action, domestic pressures which could complicate multilateral cooperation at
the international level. Indeed, when Canada assumes the chair of the Council in 2013, its
nationalistic behavior and policy may reverse Sweden's previous gains setting the stage for
multilateral cooperation. Also, a change in U.S. leadership following the 2012 presidential
election could have similar eects either immediately or when the U.S takes the helm of
the Arctic Council in 2013. Without leadership advocating for cooperation, the Arctic will
inevitably become a zone of increased tension.
Conclusion
In analyzing the behavior of Arctic states, this report nds that the Arctic region has
a high likelihood of future instability. Each Arctic state involved has strong economic and
geopolitical interests in the region; to defend their interests, these states have contributed
signicant resources to building up their Arctic military forces and improving regional de-
ployment capabilities - only further compounding the issue. In spite of this clear military
buildup, state ocials have continuously denied any possibility for interstate conict. e
singular comprehensive governing body in the region, the Arctic Council, is insuciently
structured to mediate security disputes if a conict should arise. Moreover, the strong ten-
sions and great power rivalry vestiges of Cold War, especially between Russia and NATO
countries, also represent a threat to international cooperation. A dominant realist mindset
seems to frame the decision making of leaders in all involved states, causing national inter-
est to triumph over liberal institutionalism cooperation. Applying two-level games theory
to each Arctic state can reveal how harsh political rhetoric can hurt state ocials' ability to
negotiate with each other and mitigate disputes. In addition, the Arctic Council is due for
changes in leadership that will lead to greater uncertainty. A combination of these factors
may result in diplomatic crises and small-scale armed disputes among involved states, which
could potentially result in a large-scale armed conict. Because of the core risk involved in
ignoring these serious security risks, dialogue between Arctic states is critical.
With this dire scenario in mind, it is critical to posit ways to reduce the prospect of
future instability. e two important factors to avoiding conict are open communication
and acknowledgement of risk. Since the Ottawa Declaration prohibits the Arctic Council
from addressing any security issues, an additional forum for hard and so security mat-
ters should be established. is forum must dedicate itself to addressing security concerns
and must include representatives from the civilian and military leadership of each Arctic
state. Since another semi-legislative regional organization seems implausible due to the re-
alist philosophies dominating each state's behavior, a conference or summit that includes
all Arctic states would be a more likely multilateral channel in which to open dialogue on
security matters. e goal of this much-needed security summit would be to build positive
relations and lay the groundwork for further cooperation.
is research paper does not assert that major interstate conict will necessarily occur;
it does suggest, however, that small skirmishes and diplomatic tensions between state actors
are possible. ese, in turn, could spark Arctic nations to engage in armed or diplomatic
conict due to lack of coordination and communication. Arctic states need to increase their
eorts in seeking consensus in the realm of hard and so security matters in order to pre-
vent tensions from rising in the region. If this recommendation is not met, an Arctic crisis
of alarming magnitude could result, and the world may face a war that is very cold indeed.
Works Cited
90 billion Barrels of Oil and 1670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas Assessed in the Arc-
tic," U.S. Geological Survey, accessed June 6, 2012, http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/
article.asp:ID=1980#.T89KA-068UU.
Anderson, Alun, Aer the Ice. Washington DC: Smithsonian, 2009.
Arnbom, Tom, Arctic is Hot," World Wildlife Fund, Stockholm, Sweden, May 22, 2012.
Bennett, Jody R. Vying for Power in the High North." International Relations Security Net-
work. ISN Security Watch, 6 Sept. 2012. Web. 13 Oct. 2012.
Berg, Kristopher, Domestic Drivers for Canadian and U.S. Arctic Policy," Stockholm In-
ternational Peace Research Institute Meeting with University of Southern California
researchers, Stockholm, Sweden, May 21, 2012.
Byers, Michael, Who Owns the Arctic. Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre, 2010.
Carr, Edward Hallet, e Twenty Years Crisis: 1919-1939. New York: Perennial, 2001.
24
23
other statements by Mr. Harper show a dangerous politicization of Arctic security, in which
the Canadian people could be clamoring for hardline solutions for the slightest of Arctic
problems or territorial infringements.
While Canada has an extremely strong Northern identity, Russia expert Dr. Robert
English of the University of Southern California raises the point that Russia may have a
claim even more intrinsic to its national identity. With 18 of their territory, 20,000 kilo-
meters of border, and 93 of their oil and gas reserves in the north, the Russian Federation's
fate is tied closely to that of the Arctic.
38
Russian President Vladimir Putin has also taken
a similar political tack. Harper and Putin have both put themselves in quite complicated
positions when it comes to international bargaining. In the event that some small security
issue does arise in the Arctic, we may see Canadian and Russian citizens pushing for more
aggressive action, domestic pressures which could complicate multilateral cooperation at
the international level. Indeed, when Canada assumes the chair of the Council in 2013, its
nationalistic behavior and policy may reverse Sweden's previous gains setting the stage for
multilateral cooperation. Also, a change in U.S. leadership following the 2012 presidential
election could have similar eects either immediately or when the U.S takes the helm of
the Arctic Council in 2013. Without leadership advocating for cooperation, the Arctic will
inevitably become a zone of increased tension.
Conclusion
In analyzing the behavior of Arctic states, this report nds that the Arctic region has
a high likelihood of future instability. Each Arctic state involved has strong economic and
geopolitical interests in the region; to defend their interests, these states have contributed
signicant resources to building up their Arctic military forces and improving regional de-
ployment capabilities - only further compounding the issue. In spite of this clear military
buildup, state ocials have continuously denied any possibility for interstate conict. e
singular comprehensive governing body in the region, the Arctic Council, is insuciently
structured to mediate security disputes if a conict should arise. Moreover, the strong ten-
sions and great power rivalry vestiges of Cold War, especially between Russia and NATO
countries, also represent a threat to international cooperation. A dominant realist mindset
seems to frame the decision making of leaders in all involved states, causing national inter-
est to triumph over liberal institutionalism cooperation. Applying two-level games theory
to each Arctic state can reveal how harsh political rhetoric can hurt state ocials' ability to
negotiate with each other and mitigate disputes. In addition, the Arctic Council is due for
changes in leadership that will lead to greater uncertainty. A combination of these factors
may result in diplomatic crises and small-scale armed disputes among involved states, which
could potentially result in a large-scale armed conict. Because of the core risk involved in
ignoring these serious security risks, dialogue between Arctic states is critical.
With this dire scenario in mind, it is critical to posit ways to reduce the prospect of
future instability. e two important factors to avoiding conict are open communication
and acknowledgement of risk. Since the Ottawa Declaration prohibits the Arctic Council
from addressing any security issues, an additional forum for hard and so security mat-
ters should be established. is forum must dedicate itself to addressing security concerns
and must include representatives from the civilian and military leadership of each Arctic
state. Since another semi-legislative regional organization seems implausible due to the re-
alist philosophies dominating each state's behavior, a conference or summit that includes
all Arctic states would be a more likely multilateral channel in which to open dialogue on
security matters. e goal of this much-needed security summit would be to build positive
relations and lay the groundwork for further cooperation.
is research paper does not assert that major interstate conict will necessarily occur;
it does suggest, however, that small skirmishes and diplomatic tensions between state actors
are possible. ese, in turn, could spark Arctic nations to engage in armed or diplomatic
conict due to lack of coordination and communication. Arctic states need to increase their
eorts in seeking consensus in the realm of hard and so security matters in order to pre-
vent tensions from rising in the region. If this recommendation is not met, an Arctic crisis
of alarming magnitude could result, and the world may face a war that is very cold indeed.
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wether," Center for Climate and Energy Solutions. May 2012.
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Jakobsen, erese, Meeting with University of Southern California researchers. Stockholm,
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Petersburg, Russia. May 31, 2012.
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Lomagin, Nikita, Russia's Perception of the Arctic and International Cooperation," Lecture
with University of Southern California Researchers. St. Petersburg, Russia. May 28,
2012.
Lomagin, Nikita, Interview with University of Southern California Researchers. St. Peters-
burg, Russia. June 1, 2012.
Melvin, Neil, Conict and Cooperation," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Meeting with University of Southern California Researchers. Stockholm, Sweden. May
22, 2012.
Neverov, Igor, Interview held during meeting with University of Southern California re-
Putnam, Robert Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: e Logic of Two-Level Games," Inter-
national Organization 42, 1988. 427-460.
Renfrow, Stephanie. Arctic Sea Ice Shatters All Previous Record Lows." NSIDC Arctic Sea
Ice News Fall 2007. National Snow and Ice Data Center, 1 Oct. 2007. Web. 20 Oct. 2012.
http://nsidc.org/news/press/2007_seaiceminimum/20071001_pressrelease.html
Robert Peary: To the Top of the World." PBS. PBS, 1999. Web. 20 Oct. 2012. <http://www.
pbs.org/wgbh/amex/ice/sfeature/peary.html>.
Rongione, Matteo, Role of Resources in the Arctic- Rare Earth Elements," Stockholm In-
ternational Peace Research Institute. Stockholm, Sweden. May 21, 2012.
Sheldon, Peter and Mileweski, Terry, Arctic Sovereignty a Priority: Harper, CBCNews, http://
www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2010/08/23/harper-north.html. August 23, 2010.
Strader, Olin, Arctic Chiefs of Defence Sta Conference- An Opportunity to Formalize Arctic
Security, e Arctic Institute: Center for Circumpolar Security Studies, http://www.
thearcticinstitute.org/2012/04/arctic-chiefs-of-defence-sta.html:m=1. April 6, 2012.
Terva, Jyrki, Meeting with University of Southern California Researchers, St. Petersburg,
Russia, May 28, 2012.
e World Factbook, Economy ::: Russia, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/rs.html
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search Institute Background Papers 2012: 13-14.
Wezeman, Siemon, Discussion of Military Capabilities in the Arctic," Stockholm Inter-
national Peace Research Institute Meeting with University of Southern California re-
Expressions of Nationalism
Tyler D. Tyburski
Nations, nationalism and national identity are complex forces in the contemporary inter-
national system. is study seeks to explore the phenomenon of nationalism as it has occurred
within one of the most notoriously nationalist states of modernity: Russia. Toward this end,
the rst order of business will be to construct the conceptual edice of nationalism that is
necessary for pursuing such process tracing. Following this introductory section, the paper will
sketch the history of Russias primordial nationalism. is historical look at Russias utiliza-
tion of nationalism as a tool will be cast over the broad sweep of time extending from the pre-
communist period up to the yet unraveling years of the Putin era. e discussion will highlight
what will be termed the critical periods of Russian nationalism. Interlocking these elements
will bind tightly the theoretical principles of nationalism and their real-world implications for
Russia. is will provide a conceptually durable basis for preliminary conclusions and future
research. Ultimately, it will be contended that outbraks of Russian nationalist fervor occur at
times when the rule of strong, autocratic leaders intersect with a weak economy; and further,
that in almost every such instance, an outside other is blamed to absorb populist backlash
that would otherwise thrash the Russian state itself. e paper closes with a brief reection on
contemporary Russian nationalism, the signicance of this study and what is at stake for those
pursuing continued research.
Conceptualizing the Notion of Nationalism: An Introduction
The discourse of nations and nationalism is necessarily rooted in that of the modern
state. In the fow oI history Iollowing Irom the 1648 Peace oI Westphalia, the state has come
to assert itselI as the most eIfcient organizer oI power in the international system. Today,
almost every inhabited area on earth is assigned to a state. But what, exactly, is the state?
Max Weber, in his 1919 work Politics as a Vocation, dubbed the state, in its most minimalist
sense, 'the monopoly oI legitimate physical violence within a particular territory.
1
This,
defnitionwhich has garnered great consensus across academia since its conceptionwill
be employed hereaIter. In accepting Weber`s conclusion, one comes to view nationalism as
neither natural nor essential, but as a product manuIactured by state authority. OIten times,
it is so skillIully produced that it ensures its continued reproduction by taking emotional
1 Max Weber, e Vocation Lectures. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2004, 33.
T D. T is a senior at the University of Southern California major-
ing in Political Science and International Relations.
Tyler D. Tyburski
Nations, nationalism and national identity are complex forces in the contemporary inter-
national system. is study seeks to explore the phenomenon of nationalism as it has occurred
within one of the most notoriously nationalist states of modernity: Russia. Toward this end,
the rst order of business will be to construct the conceptual edice of nationalism that is
necessary for pursuing such process tracing. Following this introductory section, the paper will
sketch the history of Russias primordial nationalism. is historical look at Russias utiliza-
tion of nationalism as a tool will be cast over the broad sweep of time extending from the pre-
communist period up to the yet unraveling years of the Putin era. e discussion will highlight
what will be termed the critical periods of Russian nationalism. Interlocking these elements
will bind tightly the theoretical principles of nationalism and their real-world implications for
Russia. is will provide a conceptually durable basis for preliminary conclusions and future
research. Ultimately, it will be contended that outbraks of Russian nationalist fervor occur at
times when the rule of strong, autocratic leaders intersect with a weak economy; and further,
that in almost every such instance, an outside other is blamed to absorb populist backlash
that would otherwise thrash the Russian state itself. e paper closes with a brief reection on
contemporary Russian nationalism, the signicance of this study and what is at stake for those
pursuing continued research.
Conceptualizing the Notion of Nationalism: An Introduction
The discourse of nations and nationalism is necessarily rooted in that of the modern
state. In the fow oI history Iollowing Irom the 1648 Peace oI Westphalia, the state has come
to assert itselI as the most eIfcient organizer oI power in the international system. Today,
almost every inhabited area on earth is assigned to a state. But what, exactly, is the state?
Max Weber, in his 1919 work Politics as a Vocation, dubbed the state, in its most minimalist
sense, 'the monopoly oI legitimate physical violence within a particular territory.
1
This,
defnitionwhich has garnered great consensus across academia since its conceptionwill
be employed hereaIter. In accepting Weber`s conclusion, one comes to view nationalism as
neither natural nor essential, but as a product manuIactured by state authority. OIten times,
it is so skillIully produced that it ensures its continued reproduction by taking emotional
1 Max Weber, e Vocation Lectures. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2004, 33.
T D. T is a senior at the University of Southern California major-
ing in Political Science and International Relations.
30
Tyler D. Tyburski 31
possession oI the peoples to which it is peddled. An esteemed pioneer oI nationalist thought,
E. J. Hobsbawm, argued that it is almost always the case that a state will Iorge its nation.
2
A state`s ability to do so, however, is bound by its authoritative capacity. States that
only achieve Weber`s defnitional threshold might be thought oI as weak states,` whereas
those well surpassing it can be called strong states.` Some characteristics oI state weak-
ness include 'low tax revenues, |fagrant| corruption, and a lack oI law and order.
3
Others
include a weak military, a low gross domestic product, and high debt. The opposite qualities
are perceived as natural indicators oI state strength. This is not to say that strong states`
are entirely without any oI the characteristics oI weak ones; they simply counterbalance
their weaknesses with other points oI exceptional strength. Especially in strong states, the
notion oI the nation is a concept with which all peoplesthinkers and tinkerers alikefnd
themselves intimately Iamiliar. This speaks to the underlying desire oI state-based power
structures to expand and deepen their infuence. Indeed, leaders in weak states share this
same goal, but are without comparable resources and infuence. ThereIore, it could be sug-
gested that an engrained sense oI national identity ought to be counted among the qualities
oI a strong state, and vice versa Ior weak states.
e concept of nationalism, however, remains in its relative infancy. In fact, Hobsbawm
indicates that the notion of gobierno (government) was not specically united with the con-
cept of the nacin (nation) until 1884, more than two centuries aer the forging of the
Westphalian Peace.
4
Moreover, this association did not develop similarly or simultaneously
all throughout the international system. Nor has it since developed regularly even within
the borders of particular states. To be sure, there is little consensus among Americans about
what it means 'to be American.' Nationalism, therefore, cannot be envisaged as a homog-
enous construct. Rather, it must be considered a multifaceted abstraction. Indeed, it emerges
dierently in dierent places, and it has the ability to express itself in a variety of unique
ways.
Primarily, nationalism presents itself in two forms, both of which were rst explored
and explained in 1887 by the German sociologist Ferdinand Tnnies. Gemeinscha, the
base and primordial face of nationalism, stems from the notion that every person within a
nation carries with them attachments, which are both tangible and real. Blood bonds, shared
linguistic roots, adherence to common cultural customs, hereditary territorialism and the
defense of an essential community are the essence of this primal theory of nationalism.
Contrarily, gesellscha oers a more civic design of nationalism-one that is constructed
2 E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 44.
3 Neil Englehart, State Capacity, State Failure, and Human Rights," in Journal of Peace Research, 2009, 163.
4 Hobsbawm, 13.
though common education and is constituted by both legality and shared virtues
3
. Although
united by common objectives, these two theories of nationalism are deeply divergent with
regard to the means that they suggest to best achieve these objectives. is is to say that,
while gemeinscha and gesellscha are similarly employed toward the authorship of a grand
myth, intended to unite disparate peoples into 'a people,' or 'the people,' they approach
this task with fundamentally dierent tactics. In his 1992 inquiry into French and German
citizenship, Rogers Brubaker, a Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Los
Angeles, characterized those of the former as strong-armed government policies and the im-
plementation of programs for divisive ethno-national citizenship. ose of the latter, he said,
are tied to state-based assimilation into in a philosophically-rooted political community
6
.
Provided these understandings, one might come to better grasp the canonized deni-
tion of nationalism that was rst proposed by the late French philosopher, Ernest Gellner.
In his Nations and Nationalism, a work that inspired the subsequent writings of Hobsbawm,
it was oered that nationalism is primarily a principle which holds that the political and
national units should be congruent."
7
is denition which, to be sure, is rst and foremost
a political denition, carries with it truly great implications. It insinuates that the political
duty of a given people is, rst and foremost, to its polity, and that this duty to the polity nec-
essarily supersedes all other national obligations.
8
Indeed, it is this degree of intensity that
distinguishes nationalism as an extreme form of group identity that is capable of command-
ing the radical power of mass mobilization towards state-centric endgames.
In harnessing the forces of social construction, strong states masterfully produce and
manipulate the raw power of nationalism vis--vis goals relating to self-preservation, secu-
rity, economy and international prowess. In doing so, they most usually come to rely on the
existence of-or the invention of-a distinctive 'other.' e sociological principle underly-
ing this trend is the essential relativity inherent within every notion of the self. Indeed, as
was famously noted by Benedict Anderson, Professor Emeritus of International Studies at
Cornell University, the existence of an 'us' is essentially contingent upon the notion of a
'them.'
9
When conceptualizing this abstract notion, it can be useful to think of how people
oen dene their associations to sports teams. In many cases, one will dene their athletic
allegiances by making reference to the teams they denounce rather than those that they sup-
port. Love of the 'us' thereby becomes conated with hatred of the 'them.'
3 Vladimir Tismaneanu, Fantasies of Salvation: Varieties of Nationalism in Postcommunist Eastern Europe," in Envisioning
Eastern Europe, 1994, 118.
6 Rogers Brubacker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992, 33.
7 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983, 1.
8 Hobsbawm, 9.
9 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London, UK: Versa, 2006,
23.
30
possession oI the peoples to which it is peddled. An esteemed pioneer oI nationalist thought,
E. J. Hobsbawm, argued that it is almost always the case that a state will Iorge its nation.
2
A state`s ability to do so, however, is bound by its authoritative capacity. States that
only achieve Weber`s defnitional threshold might be thought oI as weak states,` whereas
those well surpassing it can be called strong states.` Some characteristics oI state weak-
ness include 'low tax revenues, |fagrant| corruption, and a lack oI law and order.
3
Others
include a weak military, a low gross domestic product, and high debt. The opposite qualities
are perceived as natural indicators oI state strength. This is not to say that strong states`
are entirely without any oI the characteristics oI weak ones; they simply counterbalance
their weaknesses with other points oI exceptional strength. Especially in strong states, the
notion oI the nation is a concept with which all peoplesthinkers and tinkerers alikefnd
themselves intimately Iamiliar. This speaks to the underlying desire oI state-based power
structures to expand and deepen their infuence. Indeed, leaders in weak states share this
same goal, but are without comparable resources and infuence. ThereIore, it could be sug-
gested that an engrained sense oI national identity ought to be counted among the qualities
oI a strong state, and vice versa Ior weak states.
e concept of nationalism, however, remains in its relative infancy. In fact, Hobsbawm
indicates that the notion of gobierno (government) was not specically united with the con-
cept of the nacin (nation) until 1884, more than two centuries aer the forging of the
Westphalian Peace.
4
Moreover, this association did not develop similarly or simultaneously
all throughout the international system. Nor has it since developed regularly even within
the borders of particular states. To be sure, there is little consensus among Americans about
what it means 'to be American.' Nationalism, therefore, cannot be envisaged as a homog-
enous construct. Rather, it must be considered a multifaceted abstraction. Indeed, it emerges
dierently in dierent places, and it has the ability to express itself in a variety of unique
ways.
Primarily, nationalism presents itself in two forms, both of which were rst explored
and explained in 1887 by the German sociologist Ferdinand Tnnies. Gemeinscha, the
base and primordial face of nationalism, stems from the notion that every person within a
nation carries with them attachments, which are both tangible and real. Blood bonds, shared
linguistic roots, adherence to common cultural customs, hereditary territorialism and the
defense of an essential community are the essence of this primal theory of nationalism.
Contrarily, gesellscha oers a more civic design of nationalism-one that is constructed
2 E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 44.
3 Neil Englehart, State Capacity, State Failure, and Human Rights," in Journal of Peace Research, 2009, 163.
4 Hobsbawm, 13.
though common education and is constituted by both legality and shared virtues
3
. Although
united by common objectives, these two theories of nationalism are deeply divergent with
regard to the means that they suggest to best achieve these objectives. is is to say that,
while gemeinscha and gesellscha are similarly employed toward the authorship of a grand
myth, intended to unite disparate peoples into 'a people,' or 'the people,' they approach
this task with fundamentally dierent tactics. In his 1992 inquiry into French and German
citizenship, Rogers Brubaker, a Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Los
Angeles, characterized those of the former as strong-armed government policies and the im-
plementation of programs for divisive ethno-national citizenship. ose of the latter, he said,
are tied to state-based assimilation into in a philosophically-rooted political community
6
.
Provided these understandings, one might come to better grasp the canonized deni-
tion of nationalism that was rst proposed by the late French philosopher, Ernest Gellner.
In his Nations and Nationalism, a work that inspired the subsequent writings of Hobsbawm,
it was oered that nationalism is primarily a principle which holds that the political and
national units should be congruent."
7
is denition which, to be sure, is rst and foremost
a political denition, carries with it truly great implications. It insinuates that the political
duty of a given people is, rst and foremost, to its polity, and that this duty to the polity nec-
essarily supersedes all other national obligations.
8
Indeed, it is this degree of intensity that
distinguishes nationalism as an extreme form of group identity that is capable of command-
ing the radical power of mass mobilization towards state-centric endgames.
In harnessing the forces of social construction, strong states masterfully produce and
manipulate the raw power of nationalism vis--vis goals relating to self-preservation, secu-
rity, economy and international prowess. In doing so, they most usually come to rely on the
existence of-or the invention of-a distinctive 'other.' e sociological principle underly-
ing this trend is the essential relativity inherent within every notion of the self. Indeed, as
was famously noted by Benedict Anderson, Professor Emeritus of International Studies at
Cornell University, the existence of an 'us' is essentially contingent upon the notion of a
'them.'
9
When conceptualizing this abstract notion, it can be useful to think of how people
oen dene their associations to sports teams. In many cases, one will dene their athletic
allegiances by making reference to the teams they denounce rather than those that they sup-
port. Love of the 'us' thereby becomes conated with hatred of the 'them.'
3 Vladimir Tismaneanu, Fantasies of Salvation: Varieties of Nationalism in Postcommunist Eastern Europe," in Envisioning
Eastern Europe, 1994, 118.
6 Rogers Brubacker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992, 33.
7 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983, 1.
8 Hobsbawm, 9.
9 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London, UK: Versa, 2006,
23.
32
Some theorists, such as Henk Dekker, Darina Malova, and Sander Hoogendoorn, be-
lieve that there exists a particular set of variables" that can be examined to explain a broader
trends of nationalism within particular states and individuals.
10
is claim is contentious
because it attempts to model a complex relationship by applying a single, simple formula.
Such a broad attempt to understand nationalism makes use of too wide a scope. As Brubaker
suggests, nationalism in France is not at all analogous to nationalism in Germanynor is
nationalism in the United States an analog for nationalism in Iraq. is being the case, it
is sensible to a rene this broad-based approach by tracing the historical development of
nationalism within the context of only a single state. Cross-examination between such case
studies could then provide a truly durable basis for comparative analysis. Abiding by this
logic, from here onward, Russia
11
will become this paper's sole frame of study.
e Russian state has uctuated in its authoritative capacity over time, reaching its
height as a 'Great Power' during the Cold War years (roughly 1947-1991). Having since de-
clined in stature following the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
there is today an ongoing debate about whether Russia's status is that of a strong or weak
state. However, when it comes to Russia's ambitions of self-strengthening, there is no debate.
is aspect of the Russian identity has remained a constant since the Russo-Turkish War
(1787-1792) to win control over Ottoman-controlled, warm-water ports in the Black Sea.
Indeed, Russia has developed into one of history's most uniquely nationalist states, and, as
such, has long been subjected to a great degree of truly transformative political processes.
Nevertheless, Russian nationalism has not been painted in even coats; rather, layers of vary-
ing thicknesses and composition have colored the national identity dierently over time.
Certain 'critical periods', however, do seem to stand out as clear checkpoints in the devel-
opment of Russian nationalism. e following will examine the forces at play during three
such time periods: (1) the 'Tsarist Era' (1721-1917), (2) the 'Stalinist Era' (1924-1933) and
(3) the 'Putinist Era' (2000-present).
Considering the Russian Context
However, despite its fractures, in many ways the development of Russian nationalism
can be viewed as a single, coherent phenomenon. Trends from the distant past seem to be
echoed in both recent times as well as the present. erefore, to understand the contempo-
rary dynamics of Russia's identity-driven politics, one must rst indulge in an examination
of the historical development of Russian nationalism. is rhetorical framework necessi-
tates that special attention be paid to the role of ideology. Oen conceived of as 'secular
10 Henk Dekker, Darina Malova and Sander Hoogendoorn, Nationalism and Its Explanations," Political Psychology, 2003,
349.
11 For the purposes of this essay, Russian" will refer to whatever lands fell under the central authority of the Kremlin during
the particular time that is being discussed.
religion,' and famously referred to by Karl Marx as false consciousness," ideology has always
been a central tool of the state in manufacturing the formal constructs implemented towards
the mass production of Russian identity.
12
To be sure, historically, it has always been a well-
bred faith in, and of, the state-even more so than the doctrines of Orthodox Christianity-
that controls Russian culture. It is no coincidence, therefore, that Russia has branded its own
denomination of orthodoxy that is headed by the Church in Moscow: Russian Orthodoxy.
Channeling Hobsbawm, one is compelled to conceive of Russians as true inventions
of the Russian state. Historically, there was never a denite and recognized Russian home-
land, culture, or essence. Rather, Russia began as collection of cities belonging to various
kingdoms which gradually coalesced into something like a state around the time of Ivan the
Terrible.
13
Russian history was imbued with an abbreviated and fractured nature due to its
turbulent experiences with regime changes, revolutions and invasions. is unstable politi-
cal environment only exacerbated preexisting societal splintering which had already spelled
diculty for the cohesion of a unied people.
Considering the intense forces of discontinuity that have been so long at work, stand-
ing governments were led to pursue more overt and deliberate methods of social unication
to overcome them. Especially in the early phases of Russication-the process by which
Russian identity was (and is) created-the tactics of gesellscha were simply not viable.
Given the lack of a binding social contract, a strong civil society and stable borders, these
more civic approaches would have been dicult to implement and unlikely to succeed. e
realities of Russian political history, combined with the centralizing tendencies of uctuat-
ing governments, prompted the adoption of the more primordial methods of gemeinscha-
based nationalism. Once steadily in place, and proven to be eective (at some point roughly
between 1868-1873), these programs began to propagate themselves, even across shiing
regimes.
14
In fact, although these rotating governments were dierent structurally as well
as ideologically, the precedent of gemeinscha-based nationalism received their universal
adherence.
Gemeinsha Begins: e Tsarist Era
e two centuries preceding the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 were dominated by the
rule of the Russian Tsars. ese autocrats, seeking to expand their inuence and unify their
peoples, began the tradition of Russian gemeinscha. In so doing, their primary goal was
to dierentiate between those groups which they thought could and could not be easily
Russied. us, they set themselves to the task of developing a certain pan-Russian identity
12 Robert Tucker, e Marx-Engels Reader, New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978, 111.
13 Vilhelm omsen, e Relations Between Ancient Russia and Scandonavia And the Origin of the Russian State, New York,
NY: Burt Franklin, 1877, 12.
14 Richard Pipes, e Formation of the Soviet Union, Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997, 4.
32
Some theorists, such as Henk Dekker, Darina Malova, and Sander Hoogendoorn, be-
lieve that there exists a particular set of variables" that can be examined to explain a broader
trends of nationalism within particular states and individuals.
10
is claim is contentious
because it attempts to model a complex relationship by applying a single, simple formula.
Such a broad attempt to understand nationalism makes use of too wide a scope. As Brubaker
suggests, nationalism in France is not at all analogous to nationalism in Germanynor is
nationalism in the United States an analog for nationalism in Iraq. is being the case, it
is sensible to a rene this broad-based approach by tracing the historical development of
nationalism within the context of only a single state. Cross-examination between such case
studies could then provide a truly durable basis for comparative analysis. Abiding by this
logic, from here onward, Russia
11
will become this paper's sole frame of study.
e Russian state has uctuated in its authoritative capacity over time, reaching its
height as a 'Great Power' during the Cold War years (roughly 1947-1991). Having since de-
clined in stature following the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
there is today an ongoing debate about whether Russia's status is that of a strong or weak
state. However, when it comes to Russia's ambitions of self-strengthening, there is no debate.
is aspect of the Russian identity has remained a constant since the Russo-Turkish War
(1787-1792) to win control over Ottoman-controlled, warm-water ports in the Black Sea.
Indeed, Russia has developed into one of history's most uniquely nationalist states, and, as
such, has long been subjected to a great degree of truly transformative political processes.
Nevertheless, Russian nationalism has not been painted in even coats; rather, layers of vary-
ing thicknesses and composition have colored the national identity dierently over time.
Certain 'critical periods', however, do seem to stand out as clear checkpoints in the devel-
opment of Russian nationalism. e following will examine the forces at play during three
such time periods: (1) the 'Tsarist Era' (1721-1917), (2) the 'Stalinist Era' (1924-1933) and
(3) the 'Putinist Era' (2000-present).
Considering the Russian Context
However, despite its fractures, in many ways the development of Russian nationalism
can be viewed as a single, coherent phenomenon. Trends from the distant past seem to be
echoed in both recent times as well as the present. erefore, to understand the contempo-
rary dynamics of Russia's identity-driven politics, one must rst indulge in an examination
of the historical development of Russian nationalism. is rhetorical framework necessi-
tates that special attention be paid to the role of ideology. Oen conceived of as 'secular
10 Henk Dekker, Darina Malova and Sander Hoogendoorn, Nationalism and Its Explanations," Political Psychology, 2003,
349.
11 For the purposes of this essay, Russian" will refer to whatever lands fell under the central authority of the Kremlin during
the particular time that is being discussed.
religion,' and famously referred to by Karl Marx as false consciousness," ideology has always
been a central tool of the state in manufacturing the formal constructs implemented towards
the mass production of Russian identity.
12
To be sure, historically, it has always been a well-
bred faith in, and of, the state-even more so than the doctrines of Orthodox Christianity-
that controls Russian culture. It is no coincidence, therefore, that Russia has branded its own
denomination of orthodoxy that is headed by the Church in Moscow: Russian Orthodoxy.
Channeling Hobsbawm, one is compelled to conceive of Russians as true inventions
of the Russian state. Historically, there was never a denite and recognized Russian home-
land, culture, or essence. Rather, Russia began as collection of cities belonging to various
kingdoms which gradually coalesced into something like a state around the time of Ivan the
Terrible.
13
Russian history was imbued with an abbreviated and fractured nature due to its
turbulent experiences with regime changes, revolutions and invasions. is unstable politi-
cal environment only exacerbated preexisting societal splintering which had already spelled
diculty for the cohesion of a unied people.
Considering the intense forces of discontinuity that have been so long at work, stand-
ing governments were led to pursue more overt and deliberate methods of social unication
to overcome them. Especially in the early phases of Russication-the process by which
Russian identity was (and is) created-the tactics of gesellscha were simply not viable.
Given the lack of a binding social contract, a strong civil society and stable borders, these
more civic approaches would have been dicult to implement and unlikely to succeed. e
realities of Russian political history, combined with the centralizing tendencies of uctuat-
ing governments, prompted the adoption of the more primordial methods of gemeinscha-
based nationalism. Once steadily in place, and proven to be eective (at some point roughly
between 1868-1873), these programs began to propagate themselves, even across shiing
regimes.
14
In fact, although these rotating governments were dierent structurally as well
as ideologically, the precedent of gemeinscha-based nationalism received their universal
adherence.
Gemeinsha Begins: e Tsarist Era
e two centuries preceding the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 were dominated by the
rule of the Russian Tsars. ese autocrats, seeking to expand their inuence and unify their
peoples, began the tradition of Russian gemeinscha. In so doing, their primary goal was
to dierentiate between those groups which they thought could and could not be easily
Russied. us, they set themselves to the task of developing a certain pan-Russian identity
12 Robert Tucker, e Marx-Engels Reader, New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978, 111.
13 Vilhelm omsen, e Relations Between Ancient Russia and Scandonavia And the Origin of the Russian State, New York,
NY: Burt Franklin, 1877, 12.
14 Richard Pipes, e Formation of the Soviet Union, Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997, 4.
34
that these groups would then be given the opportunity to either accept or reject. By doing
so, the autocrats hoped to be able to dierentiate members of the Russian 'us' from those
who would be relegated to association with the contemptible 'them.' e rationale behind
creating this stark divide was twofold: (1) it provided a baseline population for the Russian
nation and (2) it satised the 'us'-'them' that dynamic that is critical to identity formation.
Indeed, had the Tsars simply pursued a totalistic policy of forced Russication, the resulting
national identity-devoid of a clear 'other' with which to contrast itself-would have likely
collapsed under the weight of its own ambiguity.
e identity that the Tsars chose to create was designed to unite the Russian people
(the 'us') under two overarching criteria: (1) an unqualied submission to the [Orthodox]
Church" and (2) the same devotion and obedience to the ruler [(the Tsar)]."
13
By anchoring
Russian identity to an already formalized and well- respected institution-the Church-the
Tsars endowed it with a certain degree of intrinsic legitimacy. Moreover, this divine con-
nection provided a sort of moral imperative for individuals to associate themselves with
the Russian identity. is group-based system of identication established the process of
Russication and a means for induction into an imagined community that has been emu-
lated-in Russia and elsewhere-across the generations.
Interestingly, this system of social sorting seemed to accelerate itself as Russia pro-
gressed into the later phases of Tsarist rule.
16
In fact, by the time that Russia transitioned
from Tsarist domination to Bolshevik domination, the formulation of the 'us'-'them' di-
chotomy had reached a crescendo. is is almost certainly linked to the fact that, at that
very time, the country found itself plunging into relative chaos. In fact, in 1917, Russia was
in the throes of not only World War I, but also a severe economic downturn and a bloody
revolution. ese troubles were all interconnected and when mixed spelled out the perfect
recipe for intensied Russication. e Tsar spun the situation as a national hardship that
required a national solution.
In so doing, Nicholas II (1868-1918)-the last Tsar of the Russian Empire-kept with
the imperial traditions of his 18
th
Century predecessors by labeling his great war, World War
I, an expansionist conict."
17
e Tzar expressed his unyielding determination to ght on,
at all costs, toward the goal of expanding Russian territory, population and regional inu-
ence. Stalwart commitment to the same quickly became the hallmark of a 'good' Russian.
us, the nation was mobilized under the idea of the state, carrying with it some religious
undertones, dictated directly by the ruler. is theme was to be echoed in generations to
come. Indeed, the very forces that came to replace the Russian Tsars later employed similar
13 Nicholas Riasanovsky, Nationality in the State Ideology During the Reign of Nicholas I," in e Russian Review, 1960, 39.
16 Andrey Sinyavsky and Dale Peterson. Russian Nationalism," in e Massachusetts Review, 1990, 477.
17 Peter Gatrell, Russias First World War: A Social and Economic History, New York, NY: Pearson Longman, 2003, 2.
directives to produce still greater centripetal forces of nationalism. Moreover, their wars of
conquest would continue to organize themselves around the notion of the nation combating
'others' under the banners of state leaders and the Russian Orthodox Church. In fact, these
patterns would only come to strengthen themselves as the state's powers and capabilities
evolved. e Tsars, although they were the founders of Russian gemeinscha, never expe-
rienced the power of their invention to the same extent that later generations of Russian
leaders would. Indeed, the Tsars were, in a sense, bound by an inability to reject their own
traditions. e Soviets, having had ousted the Tsars, were not.
Gemeinscha in Action: An Examination of Stalinist Era Nationalism
Joseph Stalin replaced Vladimir Lenin (1870-1924)-the famed leader of the Bolshevik
Revolution-in 1924. A native Georgian, he ruled the Russia-based Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (U.S.S.R.) between 1924 and his death in 1933. His tenure was one marked by
bitter brutality. To mask and soen the violence, Stalin relied on the forces of primordi-
al nationalism, Soviet Great Power status and the popular eects of substantial economic
advancements. Assuming power in the wake of Bolshevik rule, Stalin sought to rebrand
Russians in his own image. To do so, he made use of a variety of classic tools and tactics. For
instance, as noted in David Rowley's Russian Nationalism and the Cold War, Stalin master-
fully leveraged the idea of the 'other' by repeatedly portraying the West,
18
specically the
United States, as an enemy to be feared and hated.
19
Undeniably, his onslaughts of rhetoric
and paraphernalia were eective hypnotizers for a society already inundated by fear ow-
ing from the Kremlin's oppressive and sadistic policies. However, beyond simply drawing
on the politics of fear, he relied heavily upon bold ideological claims and promises of eco-
nomic growth to further his nationalist program. us, the Soviet people were met with an
impossible choice: work toward Soviet success, either out of love or fear. Death was the only
alternative. Moreover, if opting to work, their personal motive had always to appear genuine
and trustworthy.
Indeed, these tactics-although reprehensible and corrupt-were well tailored to the
contexts in which Stalin was operating. For instance, the interbellum period between 1918
and 1939 was ripe for the extreme exploitation of emotion and the practice of intense 'other-
ing'. Just as Hitler in Germany was condemning the Jews, Stalin in Russia cursed the capital-
ists of the West. Moreover, being that the Soviet economy had signicantly retracted in the
post-World War I years, Stalin's radical collectivization plans came across not as frightening,
but as hopeful. Indeed, at least immediately, his infamous ve-year plans were gazed upon
with great appeal as retail prices in Moscow [had] doubled in the rst two years of the war
18 For the purposes of this essay, the West" will be limited to the United States and the democracies of Western Europe.
19 David Rowley, Russian Nationalism and the Cold War," e American Historical Review, 1994, 136.
34
that these groups would then be given the opportunity to either accept or reject. By doing
so, the autocrats hoped to be able to dierentiate members of the Russian 'us' from those
who would be relegated to association with the contemptible 'them.' e rationale behind
creating this stark divide was twofold: (1) it provided a baseline population for the Russian
nation and (2) it satised the 'us'-'them' that dynamic that is critical to identity formation.
Indeed, had the Tsars simply pursued a totalistic policy of forced Russication, the resulting
national identity-devoid of a clear 'other' with which to contrast itself-would have likely
collapsed under the weight of its own ambiguity.
e identity that the Tsars chose to create was designed to unite the Russian people
(the 'us') under two overarching criteria: (1) an unqualied submission to the [Orthodox]
Church" and (2) the same devotion and obedience to the ruler [(the Tsar)]."
13
By anchoring
Russian identity to an already formalized and well- respected institution-the Church-the
Tsars endowed it with a certain degree of intrinsic legitimacy. Moreover, this divine con-
nection provided a sort of moral imperative for individuals to associate themselves with
the Russian identity. is group-based system of identication established the process of
Russication and a means for induction into an imagined community that has been emu-
lated-in Russia and elsewhere-across the generations.
Interestingly, this system of social sorting seemed to accelerate itself as Russia pro-
gressed into the later phases of Tsarist rule.
16
In fact, by the time that Russia transitioned
from Tsarist domination to Bolshevik domination, the formulation of the 'us'-'them' di-
chotomy had reached a crescendo. is is almost certainly linked to the fact that, at that
very time, the country found itself plunging into relative chaos. In fact, in 1917, Russia was
in the throes of not only World War I, but also a severe economic downturn and a bloody
revolution. ese troubles were all interconnected and when mixed spelled out the perfect
recipe for intensied Russication. e Tsar spun the situation as a national hardship that
required a national solution.
In so doing, Nicholas II (1868-1918)-the last Tsar of the Russian Empire-kept with
the imperial traditions of his 18
th
Century predecessors by labeling his great war, World War
I, an expansionist conict."
17
e Tzar expressed his unyielding determination to ght on,
at all costs, toward the goal of expanding Russian territory, population and regional inu-
ence. Stalwart commitment to the same quickly became the hallmark of a 'good' Russian.
us, the nation was mobilized under the idea of the state, carrying with it some religious
undertones, dictated directly by the ruler. is theme was to be echoed in generations to
come. Indeed, the very forces that came to replace the Russian Tsars later employed similar
13 Nicholas Riasanovsky, Nationality in the State Ideology During the Reign of Nicholas I," in e Russian Review, 1960, 39.
16 Andrey Sinyavsky and Dale Peterson. Russian Nationalism," in e Massachusetts Review, 1990, 477.
17 Peter Gatrell, Russias First World War: A Social and Economic History, New York, NY: Pearson Longman, 2003, 2.
directives to produce still greater centripetal forces of nationalism. Moreover, their wars of
conquest would continue to organize themselves around the notion of the nation combating
'others' under the banners of state leaders and the Russian Orthodox Church. In fact, these
patterns would only come to strengthen themselves as the state's powers and capabilities
evolved. e Tsars, although they were the founders of Russian gemeinscha, never expe-
rienced the power of their invention to the same extent that later generations of Russian
leaders would. Indeed, the Tsars were, in a sense, bound by an inability to reject their own
traditions. e Soviets, having had ousted the Tsars, were not.
Gemeinscha in Action: An Examination of Stalinist Era Nationalism
Joseph Stalin replaced Vladimir Lenin (1870-1924)-the famed leader of the Bolshevik
Revolution-in 1924. A native Georgian, he ruled the Russia-based Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (U.S.S.R.) between 1924 and his death in 1933. His tenure was one marked by
bitter brutality. To mask and soen the violence, Stalin relied on the forces of primordi-
al nationalism, Soviet Great Power status and the popular eects of substantial economic
advancements. Assuming power in the wake of Bolshevik rule, Stalin sought to rebrand
Russians in his own image. To do so, he made use of a variety of classic tools and tactics. For
instance, as noted in David Rowley's Russian Nationalism and the Cold War, Stalin master-
fully leveraged the idea of the 'other' by repeatedly portraying the West,
18
specically the
United States, as an enemy to be feared and hated.
19
Undeniably, his onslaughts of rhetoric
and paraphernalia were eective hypnotizers for a society already inundated by fear ow-
ing from the Kremlin's oppressive and sadistic policies. However, beyond simply drawing
on the politics of fear, he relied heavily upon bold ideological claims and promises of eco-
nomic growth to further his nationalist program. us, the Soviet people were met with an
impossible choice: work toward Soviet success, either out of love or fear. Death was the only
alternative. Moreover, if opting to work, their personal motive had always to appear genuine
and trustworthy.
Indeed, these tactics-although reprehensible and corrupt-were well tailored to the
contexts in which Stalin was operating. For instance, the interbellum period between 1918
and 1939 was ripe for the extreme exploitation of emotion and the practice of intense 'other-
ing'. Just as Hitler in Germany was condemning the Jews, Stalin in Russia cursed the capital-
ists of the West. Moreover, being that the Soviet economy had signicantly retracted in the
post-World War I years, Stalin's radical collectivization plans came across not as frightening,
but as hopeful. Indeed, at least immediately, his infamous ve-year plans were gazed upon
with great appeal as retail prices in Moscow [had] doubled in the rst two years of the war
18 For the purposes of this essay, the West" will be limited to the United States and the democracies of Western Europe.
19 David Rowley, Russian Nationalism and the Cold War," e American Historical Review, 1994, 136.
36
and then accelerated dramatically in 1916 and early 1917."
20
Indeed, Stalin's scare tactics
seized upon the melancholy zeitgeist of interwar Russia. Later, he adapted them to inspire
mobilization during the Second World War.
In the throes of World War II, Joseph Stalin, an atheist, invigorated a campaign of anti-
German gemeinscha by allowing a resurgence of the Russian Orthodox Church. is ma-
neuver, however, was not a move towards liberalism. Rather, it was a coy political ploy aimed
at exploiting the nationalist feelings of the religious Russian peasantry-and it worked.
21

What one sees here is an impressive display of state power. Indeed, the Kremlin, a body that
had ruthlessly pushed a program of non-religion, was able to forcibly shape Orthodoxy, a
holy faith, into a facet of the secular ideology of nationalism. Ultimately, this resulted not in
a Russian religious revival, but in a spike of nationalist sentiments, rooted in a shared reli-
gious aliation, and a dramatic increase in the enlistment rate of the Russian Red Army. A
testament to the power of the state's gemeinscha, in Russia, World War II came to be known
as 'e Great Patriotic War.' In fact, Daniel Chirot, an esteemed sociologist and Professor of
International Studies at the University of Washington, has suggested that, even until 1973,
the only remaining old-fashioned European empire.was the Russian one."
22
e term
'old-fashioned,' it seems, is quite apt when describing the character of Russian nationalism.
Indeed, the complexities of gesellscha, which were not viable at the outset of the Russian
experiment with statehood, never developed parallel to the Russian state-gemeinscha was
always reinforced.
Stalin's tactics of gemeinscha were exceptionally base. ey might well be conceived
of more simply as the ruthless promotion of a particularly volatile cult of personality. Stalin
was far more than merely a powerful autocrat; he was, in fact, what Dr. Richard Hrair
Dekmejian, of the University of Southern California's Political Science Department, calls a
malignant narcissist." is form of narcissism, Dekmejian says, is an extreme pathology by
which one is convinced that they had been specially selected, by some providence, to impose
their rightly-guided will upon those less perfect than themselves.
23
True to form, Stalin-
the self-titled Man of Steel"-conceived of himself as more than just the Soviet General
Secretary, but as the very embodiment of the Russian nation. Rather skillfully, he combined
conicting messages of fear and hope to bind tightly the idea of collective progress with that
of individual punishment. e ultimate result was the formation of a society shocked into
productivity, toward a single end, and against a common 'other', not out of true devotion
20 Gatrell, 23.
21 Phillip Walters, Religion and the State: e Struggle for Legitimacy and Power," in Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, 1986, 133.
22 Daniel Chirot, National Liberations and Nationalist Nightmares: e Consequences of the End of Empires in the Twenti-
eth Century," in Markets States and Democracy, 1993, 44.
23 Hrair Dekmejian, Spectrum of Terror. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2007, 161.
to the Soviet interest, but out of the human interest of self-preservation. To a large extent,
it is this same instinct toward self-preservation-the struggle to remain relevant-that has
guided the politics of the post-Soviet Russian state.
Gemeinscha in Action: An Examination of Putinist Era Russian Nationalism
Most of the history of post-Soviet Russia has been a continued narrative of the late-
Soviet decline. e nation's gross domestic product contracted steadily up to the late 1990s"
and the state itself splintered as its various republics and regions took as much sovereignty
as they could swallow."
24
ese deteriorated conditions, analogous to those that were pres-
ent at the outset of Stalin's reign, seemed to have induced conditions that were favorable to
the rise of Vladimir Putin, an ex-Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB) nationalist.
is is no insignicant coincidence. To be sure, Putin's current power play is colored with
shades of Stalinism. Putin appealed to the yearning of the Russian people to restore lost
Soviet prowess and has subsumed factional identities under that of an overarching nation-
alist vision. e people have responded favorably. Indeed, despite whatever election frauds
might be contended, Putin has certainly proven himself to be 'the people's choice' with a
support base that [is] remarkably close to a cross-section of the entire society."
25
Spurred by
his reinsertion of Russian national interests into its dealings with the international commu-
nity, talk of unilateral action and a reinvigorated military, the Russian people have clung to
the hope he has provided for an upswing in national esteem.
e face of contemporary Russian nationalism bears striking resemblance to that of
yesteryear. Undoubtedly, the tactics employed under Putin have been much the same as
those put forth under Stalin. Shiing the national dialogue away from that of the early 1990s,
a time when the discourse of Russia 'rejoining Western civilization' was paramount," Putin
has adopted a traditional style of gemeinscha-based nationalism to reign in the disparate
elements of the Russian geopolitical spectrum.
26
is task, although weighty, has been made
more manageable through Putin's skillful application of the 'other' as a fulcrum in gaining
leverage over the opinions of the Russian masses. Not surprisingly, Putin has targeted the
United States - Russia's Cold War nemesis - as the object of contempt in popular Russian
culture.
Indeed it is true-and most especially in Russia's case -that there is a denite dif-
ference between 'history' and the 'past.' History, in fact, is oen no more than a distorted
version of the past that is oered, through education, as truth. Historical interpretations,
which are intended to be taken as facts about the past, are integral in supporting the myth
24 Stephen White and Ian McAllister. Putin and His Supporters," in Europe-Asia Studies, 2003, 383.
23 White and McAllister, 384.
26 John O'Laughlin, Gerald Toal, and Vladimir Kolossovt. Russian Geopolitical Culture and Public Opinion: the Masks of
Proteus Revisited," in Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 2003, 322.
36
and then accelerated dramatically in 1916 and early 1917."
20
Indeed, Stalin's scare tactics
seized upon the melancholy zeitgeist of interwar Russia. Later, he adapted them to inspire
mobilization during the Second World War.
In the throes of World War II, Joseph Stalin, an atheist, invigorated a campaign of anti-
German gemeinscha by allowing a resurgence of the Russian Orthodox Church. is ma-
neuver, however, was not a move towards liberalism. Rather, it was a coy political ploy aimed
at exploiting the nationalist feelings of the religious Russian peasantry-and it worked.
21

What one sees here is an impressive display of state power. Indeed, the Kremlin, a body that
had ruthlessly pushed a program of non-religion, was able to forcibly shape Orthodoxy, a
holy faith, into a facet of the secular ideology of nationalism. Ultimately, this resulted not in
a Russian religious revival, but in a spike of nationalist sentiments, rooted in a shared reli-
gious aliation, and a dramatic increase in the enlistment rate of the Russian Red Army. A
testament to the power of the state's gemeinscha, in Russia, World War II came to be known
as 'e Great Patriotic War.' In fact, Daniel Chirot, an esteemed sociologist and Professor of
International Studies at the University of Washington, has suggested that, even until 1973,
the only remaining old-fashioned European empire.was the Russian one."
22
e term
'old-fashioned,' it seems, is quite apt when describing the character of Russian nationalism.
Indeed, the complexities of gesellscha, which were not viable at the outset of the Russian
experiment with statehood, never developed parallel to the Russian state-gemeinscha was
always reinforced.
Stalin's tactics of gemeinscha were exceptionally base. ey might well be conceived
of more simply as the ruthless promotion of a particularly volatile cult of personality. Stalin
was far more than merely a powerful autocrat; he was, in fact, what Dr. Richard Hrair
Dekmejian, of the University of Southern California's Political Science Department, calls a
malignant narcissist." is form of narcissism, Dekmejian says, is an extreme pathology by
which one is convinced that they had been specially selected, by some providence, to impose
their rightly-guided will upon those less perfect than themselves.
23
True to form, Stalin-
the self-titled Man of Steel"-conceived of himself as more than just the Soviet General
Secretary, but as the very embodiment of the Russian nation. Rather skillfully, he combined
conicting messages of fear and hope to bind tightly the idea of collective progress with that
of individual punishment. e ultimate result was the formation of a society shocked into
productivity, toward a single end, and against a common 'other', not out of true devotion
20 Gatrell, 23.
21 Phillip Walters, Religion and the State: e Struggle for Legitimacy and Power," in Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, 1986, 133.
22 Daniel Chirot, National Liberations and Nationalist Nightmares: e Consequences of the End of Empires in the Twenti-
eth Century," in Markets States and Democracy, 1993, 44.
23 Hrair Dekmejian, Spectrum of Terror. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2007, 161.
to the Soviet interest, but out of the human interest of self-preservation. To a large extent,
it is this same instinct toward self-preservation-the struggle to remain relevant-that has
guided the politics of the post-Soviet Russian state.
Gemeinscha in Action: An Examination of Putinist Era Russian Nationalism
Most of the history of post-Soviet Russia has been a continued narrative of the late-
Soviet decline. e nation's gross domestic product contracted steadily up to the late 1990s"
and the state itself splintered as its various republics and regions took as much sovereignty
as they could swallow."
24
ese deteriorated conditions, analogous to those that were pres-
ent at the outset of Stalin's reign, seemed to have induced conditions that were favorable to
the rise of Vladimir Putin, an ex-Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB) nationalist.
is is no insignicant coincidence. To be sure, Putin's current power play is colored with
shades of Stalinism. Putin appealed to the yearning of the Russian people to restore lost
Soviet prowess and has subsumed factional identities under that of an overarching nation-
alist vision. e people have responded favorably. Indeed, despite whatever election frauds
might be contended, Putin has certainly proven himself to be 'the people's choice' with a
support base that [is] remarkably close to a cross-section of the entire society."
25
Spurred by
his reinsertion of Russian national interests into its dealings with the international commu-
nity, talk of unilateral action and a reinvigorated military, the Russian people have clung to
the hope he has provided for an upswing in national esteem.
e face of contemporary Russian nationalism bears striking resemblance to that of
yesteryear. Undoubtedly, the tactics employed under Putin have been much the same as
those put forth under Stalin. Shiing the national dialogue away from that of the early 1990s,
a time when the discourse of Russia 'rejoining Western civilization' was paramount," Putin
has adopted a traditional style of gemeinscha-based nationalism to reign in the disparate
elements of the Russian geopolitical spectrum.
26
is task, although weighty, has been made
more manageable through Putin's skillful application of the 'other' as a fulcrum in gaining
leverage over the opinions of the Russian masses. Not surprisingly, Putin has targeted the
United States - Russia's Cold War nemesis - as the object of contempt in popular Russian
culture.
Indeed it is true-and most especially in Russia's case -that there is a denite dif-
ference between 'history' and the 'past.' History, in fact, is oen no more than a distorted
version of the past that is oered, through education, as truth. Historical interpretations,
which are intended to be taken as facts about the past, are integral in supporting the myth
24 Stephen White and Ian McAllister. Putin and His Supporters," in Europe-Asia Studies, 2003, 383.
23 White and McAllister, 384.
26 John O'Laughlin, Gerald Toal, and Vladimir Kolossovt. Russian Geopolitical Culture and Public Opinion: the Masks of
Proteus Revisited," in Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 2003, 322.
38
of the state: nationalism. Putin, to be sure, has construed signicant events of the recent
past through a fundamentally anti-American lens. ereby, he has masterfully transferred
blame for the failures of post-Soviet Russia away from the Russian state and has placed it
squarely on the shoulders of the United States. is strong-armed tactic of power politics
oers a clear demonstration the totality of forces encapsulated within the political capabili-
ties of modern states.
To Russians, this message is rather reassuring. Indeed, it is this aspect of Putin's program
that allows the Russian people to experience the program not as the raw power of the state
being exercised on or through them, but as a collective buildup of hope within society writ
large. us, one nds truth in Chirot's 1993 contention that Nationalism, which has been
a force of liberalization in the west will not necessarily be such a force in the east."
27
Putin's
program's central mission is to reinforce traditional cycles of nation-building toward the
ends of furthering his own personality and restoring Russia to its past place of prominence
as a leading actor on the global stage. e envisioned end state driving these objectives is
hardly the quality of life of the Russian people, but simply the pure material benet of an
ever-centralizing, and perhaps re-Sovietizing Russia.
e end of the Cold War was truly the end of an era. e early 1990s were characterized
by great uncertainty about what was to become of the faded Soviet state in the new, unipo-
lar world. Nevertheless, there were grand expectations-in both the West and the East-for
the reincarnation of the Soviet command economy in the form of a Westernized, privatized
market economy. Great uncertainty remains as to why the West held such great hopes for
the prospects of economic restructuring and growth in post-Soviet Russia. Indeed, this
discrepancy has become a weapon against the West in Putin's arsenal of nationalistic rheto-
ric. Where there is no consensus, Putin has claimed clarity in his knowledge of the truth.
In Russia, Putin says, expectations for Post-Soviet growth had been fueled by a sense of
rejuvenation associated with the emergence from the political brutality of communism and
the economic instability of socialism. More substantially, though, he claims that they were
furthered by optimistic estimates for potential growth that had been condently oated by
Western organizations like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
28

Indeed, these organizations had proposed ambitious plans designed to bring about mass
liberalization virtually overnight. Putin says that these numbers, which had emerged from
the West, had been deviously fabricated to induce Russian participation in plans that had
been engineered to crush its economy.
Many economists, including the famed American economist and Professor of eco-
nomics at Columbia University, Joseph Stiglitz, have stated that these predictions are as
27 Chirot, 44.
28 Janine Wedle, Collision and Collusion: e Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe, New York, NY: Palgrave, 2001, 43.
impossible as pipe dreams. Stiglitz contends that these 'shock-therapy' approaches, which
were fundamentally weak to begin with, were also predisposed to fail on the basis that
they simply did not allow for any sort of transitional period to occur. is is to say that the
IMF recommendations demanded too great of a rollover in too brief of a time period.
29

e World Bank and the IMF, however, never reported these concerns in their pitches to
the Russian government. Not recognizing the hazards themselves, the Russians bought in.
When implemented, however, the stresses of the World Bank and IMF programs over-
whelmed the system they were acting on and plunged the state into dire economic straits.
Perhaps this failure resulted as an unintended consequence of a well-meaning plan, but
perhaps it came about because it was engineered to do so. Nevertheless, as Stiglitz says, the
ultimate irony" lies in the fact that many of the states who opted for gradual approaches
to economic restructuring (i.e. Poland and China) ended up reforming more rapidly than
those that followed the prescribed program of shock-therapy.
30
Indeed, the mere presence of
this unexplained fact has created the political space necessary for Putin to spin a convincing
tale of American betrayal.
In this instance it is not the truth (the past) that is of paramount signicance, only what
is perceived to be the truth (history). Whether the yet unresolved source of enthusiasm in
the West was the result of sheer benevolence or of veiled deviance, it does not matter. All that
is of importance is the manner in which Putin has painted history. His colorful commentary
on the matter has rendered Russians more likely to become believers in this well-craed
myth of the state. Many Russians believed that the United States had willfully destroyed
the Russian economy through the advice that it administered and so absolved the Russian
state of any blame for the creation of the problems they now face. ey have instead been
trained to loathe, and to mobilize against, the contemptible 'other.' As part of Putin's plans
for Russian reemergence, this energy is now being channeled not only into the economy, but
also-in sizeable amounts-into the Russian military.
Substantiating Claims & Expanding Frames: A Conclusion
Historically, up-ticks in Russian nationalism seem to be positively correlated with the
presence of three key variables: (1) the presence of an easily identiable 'other,' (2) a com-
manding political cadre and (3) a destabilized economy. ese conditions existed during
all three critical periods, and they are readily apparent in Russia today. Perhaps then, these
factors could be used as central variables in some sort of predictive model for forecasting
upswings in this abstract phenomenon that has been tied to so much conict and loss of life.
29 Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002, 181.
30 Stiglitz, 183.
38
of the state: nationalism. Putin, to be sure, has construed signicant events of the recent
past through a fundamentally anti-American lens. ereby, he has masterfully transferred
blame for the failures of post-Soviet Russia away from the Russian state and has placed it
squarely on the shoulders of the United States. is strong-armed tactic of power politics
oers a clear demonstration the totality of forces encapsulated within the political capabili-
ties of modern states.
To Russians, this message is rather reassuring. Indeed, it is this aspect of Putin's program
that allows the Russian people to experience the program not as the raw power of the state
being exercised on or through them, but as a collective buildup of hope within society writ
large. us, one nds truth in Chirot's 1993 contention that Nationalism, which has been
a force of liberalization in the west will not necessarily be such a force in the east."
27
Putin's
program's central mission is to reinforce traditional cycles of nation-building toward the
ends of furthering his own personality and restoring Russia to its past place of prominence
as a leading actor on the global stage. e envisioned end state driving these objectives is
hardly the quality of life of the Russian people, but simply the pure material benet of an
ever-centralizing, and perhaps re-Sovietizing Russia.
e end of the Cold War was truly the end of an era. e early 1990s were characterized
by great uncertainty about what was to become of the faded Soviet state in the new, unipo-
lar world. Nevertheless, there were grand expectations-in both the West and the East-for
the reincarnation of the Soviet command economy in the form of a Westernized, privatized
market economy. Great uncertainty remains as to why the West held such great hopes for
the prospects of economic restructuring and growth in post-Soviet Russia. Indeed, this
discrepancy has become a weapon against the West in Putin's arsenal of nationalistic rheto-
ric. Where there is no consensus, Putin has claimed clarity in his knowledge of the truth.
In Russia, Putin says, expectations for Post-Soviet growth had been fueled by a sense of
rejuvenation associated with the emergence from the political brutality of communism and
the economic instability of socialism. More substantially, though, he claims that they were
furthered by optimistic estimates for potential growth that had been condently oated by
Western organizations like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
28

Indeed, these organizations had proposed ambitious plans designed to bring about mass
liberalization virtually overnight. Putin says that these numbers, which had emerged from
the West, had been deviously fabricated to induce Russian participation in plans that had
been engineered to crush its economy.
Many economists, including the famed American economist and Professor of eco-
nomics at Columbia University, Joseph Stiglitz, have stated that these predictions are as
27 Chirot, 44.
28 Janine Wedle, Collision and Collusion: e Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe, New York, NY: Palgrave, 2001, 43.
impossible as pipe dreams. Stiglitz contends that these 'shock-therapy' approaches, which
were fundamentally weak to begin with, were also predisposed to fail on the basis that
they simply did not allow for any sort of transitional period to occur. is is to say that the
IMF recommendations demanded too great of a rollover in too brief of a time period.
29

e World Bank and the IMF, however, never reported these concerns in their pitches to
the Russian government. Not recognizing the hazards themselves, the Russians bought in.
When implemented, however, the stresses of the World Bank and IMF programs over-
whelmed the system they were acting on and plunged the state into dire economic straits.
Perhaps this failure resulted as an unintended consequence of a well-meaning plan, but
perhaps it came about because it was engineered to do so. Nevertheless, as Stiglitz says, the
ultimate irony" lies in the fact that many of the states who opted for gradual approaches
to economic restructuring (i.e. Poland and China) ended up reforming more rapidly than
those that followed the prescribed program of shock-therapy.
30
Indeed, the mere presence of
this unexplained fact has created the political space necessary for Putin to spin a convincing
tale of American betrayal.
In this instance it is not the truth (the past) that is of paramount signicance, only what
is perceived to be the truth (history). Whether the yet unresolved source of enthusiasm in
the West was the result of sheer benevolence or of veiled deviance, it does not matter. All that
is of importance is the manner in which Putin has painted history. His colorful commentary
on the matter has rendered Russians more likely to become believers in this well-craed
myth of the state. Many Russians believed that the United States had willfully destroyed
the Russian economy through the advice that it administered and so absolved the Russian
state of any blame for the creation of the problems they now face. ey have instead been
trained to loathe, and to mobilize against, the contemptible 'other.' As part of Putin's plans
for Russian reemergence, this energy is now being channeled not only into the economy, but
also-in sizeable amounts-into the Russian military.
Substantiating Claims & Expanding Frames: A Conclusion
Historically, up-ticks in Russian nationalism seem to be positively correlated with the
presence of three key variables: (1) the presence of an easily identiable 'other,' (2) a com-
manding political cadre and (3) a destabilized economy. ese conditions existed during
all three critical periods, and they are readily apparent in Russia today. Perhaps then, these
factors could be used as central variables in some sort of predictive model for forecasting
upswings in this abstract phenomenon that has been tied to so much conict and loss of life.
29 Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002, 181.
30 Stiglitz, 183.
40
Without a true national history or historical sense of self, Russia seems to have always
needed a strong 'other,' usually in the form of an enemy, to sustain Russia's constructed
identity. Taken from this perspective, Russia's wars of conquest and Cold War enlargements
seem natural. By constantly pitting the nation against clearly dened 'others,' especially in
the context of pitched battle or stark ideological struggle, she greatly reinforced her own
self-image. Indeed, Russia has always sought 'others,' and, in their absence, she has tried to
create them. is is because they complete her; Russia requires the presence of an 'other' to
sustain herself.
Yet, the mere presence of an 'other'-even a hated other-is not enough to forge a uni-
ed self-identity out of such an incoherent mosaic. Strong, oen ruthless, leaders oen had
to apply the full force of the Russian state to make this fusion possible. Brutal campaigns of
terror, rigid cults of personality and omnipresent propaganda campaigns have been staples
in the regimes of such rulers. Furthermore, it seems as if there may be a certain regenerative
cycle at play, whereby the reign of one dictator legitimizes the rise of another. So goes the
creation of tradition in a state so ardently adherent to the principles of gemeinscha-based
nationalism. However, not all of Russia's rulers have t this autocratic mold. erefore, while
it is arguable that, to some extent, Russian leaders have always tried to expand and project
Russia's regional and global inuence, it is only extreme leaders-those whom might be con-
sidered malignant narcissists-that seem to indulge in the truly gross campaigns of nation-
alism that characterize the three critical periods. Indeed, one will surely recall, that amidst
all of the economic troubles plaguing Mikhail Gorbachev's 1989 Soviet Union, he refrained
from such a brutal program of gemeinscha.
is phenomenon, however, speaks to more than just the importance of strong, auto-
cratic leaders in spurring Russian nationalism. It also suggests something about the relative
value of the third variable, a destabilized economy. Specically, it unequivocally strips it of
its potentiality of causality. Nevertheless, one is still compelled to include it as a primary
factor contributing to spikes in Russian nationalism because of the clear correlation that
can be found in each of the three critical periods. Although not a necessary condition, a
down-turned economic climate has proven conducive to brutal campaigns of Russian ge-
meinscha. To be sure, a poor economy is a path of low resistance to implementing an ef-
fective program of nationalism. By exploiting the fact that the economy impacts the entire
nation, leaders bolster nationalism by rhetorically linking national solidarity to universal
economic gain. erefore, while this might be the least signicant of the three aforemen-
tioned variables, it ought not to be disregarded. Indeed, in Russia, no such variable deserves
to be completely abandoned. Toward the end of continually reinforcing and reasserting the
myth of the nation, one should assume that the state will exploit any means available.
With an eye toward the future, the true value of this study lies in what new informa-
tion might be mined from continued research. To be sure, the above conclusions are strictly
preliminary. ey are the products of a relatively limited investigation and would certainly
benet from deeper academic inquiry. e stakes, however, seem to be quite high for those
willing to take on this task of continued research. Indeed, to trace nationalism is, in some
ways at least, to trace the likelihood of conict. Especially in the context of Putin's exception-
ally military-minded programs of gemeinscha, the correlation between nationalism and
the potentiality for international conict seems uncomfortably high. us, those progress-
ing with this study should be warned that nations and nationalism are not static concepts-
diligent researchers must be ready to take aim at moving targets. e necessity of hitting
these targets, however, is absolutely paramount.
Understanding the extent to which nationalism permeates all levels of the modern
state-not just in Russia, but in all states-is important to truly understanding nationalism
itself. e central hope is that improved knowledge of this obscure abstraction could help
states create an international climate of mutual respect and political benet. Such an envi-
ronment might foster peaceful increases in every nation's sense of self-esteem. In the event
of a less-than-ideal future, this knowledge could be repurposed and used to aid in develop-
ing tactical and strategic countermeasures to be taken against states moving towards more
violent expressions of nationalism. Regardless of what may come, however, one thing seems
clear: it will come of nations and through nationalism.
Works Cited
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reections on the Origin and Spread of Nation-
alism. London: Versa, 2006.
Brubacker, Rogers. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press, 1992.
Chirot, Daniel. National Liberations and Nationalist Nightmares: e Consequences of
the End of Empires in the Twentieth Century," in Markets, States, and Democracy: e
Political Economy of Post-Communist Transformation, Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1993. 43-68.
Dekmejian, Hrair. Spectrum of Terror. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2007.
Dekker, Henk, Darina Malova, Sander Hoogendoorn. Nationalism and Its Explanations,"
in Political Psychology 2003. 343-376.
Englehart, Neil. State Capacity, State Failure, and Human Rights," in Journal of Peace Re-
search 2009.163-180.
Gatrell, Peter. Russias First World War: A Social and Economic History. New York: Pearson
Longman, 2003.
40
Without a true national history or historical sense of self, Russia seems to have always
needed a strong 'other,' usually in the form of an enemy, to sustain Russia's constructed
identity. Taken from this perspective, Russia's wars of conquest and Cold War enlargements
seem natural. By constantly pitting the nation against clearly dened 'others,' especially in
the context of pitched battle or stark ideological struggle, she greatly reinforced her own
self-image. Indeed, Russia has always sought 'others,' and, in their absence, she has tried to
create them. is is because they complete her; Russia requires the presence of an 'other' to
sustain herself.
Yet, the mere presence of an 'other'-even a hated other-is not enough to forge a uni-
ed self-identity out of such an incoherent mosaic. Strong, oen ruthless, leaders oen had
to apply the full force of the Russian state to make this fusion possible. Brutal campaigns of
terror, rigid cults of personality and omnipresent propaganda campaigns have been staples
in the regimes of such rulers. Furthermore, it seems as if there may be a certain regenerative
cycle at play, whereby the reign of one dictator legitimizes the rise of another. So goes the
creation of tradition in a state so ardently adherent to the principles of gemeinscha-based
nationalism. However, not all of Russia's rulers have t this autocratic mold. erefore, while
it is arguable that, to some extent, Russian leaders have always tried to expand and project
Russia's regional and global inuence, it is only extreme leaders-those whom might be con-
sidered malignant narcissists-that seem to indulge in the truly gross campaigns of nation-
alism that characterize the three critical periods. Indeed, one will surely recall, that amidst
all of the economic troubles plaguing Mikhail Gorbachev's 1989 Soviet Union, he refrained
from such a brutal program of gemeinscha.
is phenomenon, however, speaks to more than just the importance of strong, auto-
cratic leaders in spurring Russian nationalism. It also suggests something about the relative
value of the third variable, a destabilized economy. Specically, it unequivocally strips it of
its potentiality of causality. Nevertheless, one is still compelled to include it as a primary
factor contributing to spikes in Russian nationalism because of the clear correlation that
can be found in each of the three critical periods. Although not a necessary condition, a
down-turned economic climate has proven conducive to brutal campaigns of Russian ge-
meinscha. To be sure, a poor economy is a path of low resistance to implementing an ef-
fective program of nationalism. By exploiting the fact that the economy impacts the entire
nation, leaders bolster nationalism by rhetorically linking national solidarity to universal
economic gain. erefore, while this might be the least signicant of the three aforemen-
tioned variables, it ought not to be disregarded. Indeed, in Russia, no such variable deserves
to be completely abandoned. Toward the end of continually reinforcing and reasserting the
myth of the nation, one should assume that the state will exploit any means available.
With an eye toward the future, the true value of this study lies in what new informa-
tion might be mined from continued research. To be sure, the above conclusions are strictly
preliminary. ey are the products of a relatively limited investigation and would certainly
benet from deeper academic inquiry. e stakes, however, seem to be quite high for those
willing to take on this task of continued research. Indeed, to trace nationalism is, in some
ways at least, to trace the likelihood of conict. Especially in the context of Putin's exception-
ally military-minded programs of gemeinscha, the correlation between nationalism and
the potentiality for international conict seems uncomfortably high. us, those progress-
ing with this study should be warned that nations and nationalism are not static concepts-
diligent researchers must be ready to take aim at moving targets. e necessity of hitting
these targets, however, is absolutely paramount.
Understanding the extent to which nationalism permeates all levels of the modern
state-not just in Russia, but in all states-is important to truly understanding nationalism
itself. e central hope is that improved knowledge of this obscure abstraction could help
states create an international climate of mutual respect and political benet. Such an envi-
ronment might foster peaceful increases in every nation's sense of self-esteem. In the event
of a less-than-ideal future, this knowledge could be repurposed and used to aid in develop-
ing tactical and strategic countermeasures to be taken against states moving towards more
violent expressions of nationalism. Regardless of what may come, however, one thing seems
clear: it will come of nations and through nationalism.
Works Cited
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reections on the Origin and Spread of Nation-
alism. London: Versa, 2006.
Brubacker, Rogers. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press, 1992.
Chirot, Daniel. National Liberations and Nationalist Nightmares: e Consequences of
the End of Empires in the Twentieth Century," in Markets, States, and Democracy: e
Political Economy of Post-Communist Transformation, Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1993. 43-68.
Dekmejian, Hrair. Spectrum of Terror. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2007.
Dekker, Henk, Darina Malova, Sander Hoogendoorn. Nationalism and Its Explanations,"
in Political Psychology 2003. 343-376.
Englehart, Neil. State Capacity, State Failure, and Human Rights," in Journal of Peace Re-
search 2009.163-180.
Gatrell, Peter. Russias First World War: A Social and Economic History. New York: Pearson
Longman, 2003.
42
Tyler D. Tyburski
Gellner, Ernest. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.
Hobsbawm, E.J. Nations and Nationalism Since 1780. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1990.
O'Laughlin, John, Gerald Toal, and Vladimir Kolossovt. Russian Geopolitical Culture and
Public Opinion: the Masks of Proteus Revisited," in Transactions of the Institute of Brit-
ish Geographers, 2003. 322-333.
Pipes, Richard. e Formation of the Soviet Union. Boston: Harvard University Press, 1997.
Riasanovsky, Nicholas. Nationality in the State Ideology During the Reign of Nicholas I,"
in e Russian Review. 1960. 38-46.
Rowley, David. Russian Nationalism and the Cold War," in e American Historical Re-
view, 1994. 133-171.
Stiglitz, Joseph. Globalization and its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton & Company,
2002.
Sinyavsky, Andrey, and Dale Peterson. Russian Nationalism," in e Massachusetts, Re-
view, 1990. 473-494.
omsen, Vilhelm. e Relations Between Ancient Russia and Scandonavia And the Origin
of the Russian State. New York: Burt Franklin, 1877.
Tismaneanu, Vladimir. Fantasies of Salvation: Varieties of Nationalism in Postcommunist
Eastern Europe," in Envisioning Eastern Europe, 1994. 102-123.
Tucker, Robert. e Marx-Engels Reader. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978.
Walters, Phillip. Religion and the State: e Struggle for Legitimacy and Power," in Annals
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 1986. 133-143.
Weber, Max. e Vocation Lectures. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2004. Print.
Wedle, Janine. Collision and Collusion: e Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe.
New York: Palgrave, 2001.
White, Stephen, and Ian McAllister. Putin and His Supporters," in Europe-Asia Studies,
2003. 338-399.
The Ethnic Korean Population in Japan
e Last Frontier?
Alyssa Min
e sustained maintenance of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea and the Republic
of Korea, more commonly known as North Korea and South Korea, respectively, is the last
remaining remnant of the Cold War struggle. While direct interaction between the two states
has been subject to much scrutiny and analysis, this paper examines how political contestation
between North and South Korea has played a role in the formation of identity and loyalties of
the Zainichi ethnic Korean population in Japan, who trace their roots to the period of Japa-
nese colonialism in Korea. is paper argues that the opportunity to inuence this small but
signicant population has been utilized as an alternative channel through which both states
can vie for its own modern diaspora community and advance its own version of the Korean
identity. is paper also highlights the complexities of modern identity for the Zainichi Kore-
ans, who live in tight-knit communities and have retained a strong sense of Korean nationality,
despite their acclimation to Japanese society. To embrace their Korean heritage and identity,
they have largely aligned themselves with one of two prominent alliance organizations: the
pro-North Chongryon or the South-aliated Mindan. rough their representative groups,
each state has sought to create a nostalgic memory for itself, one that has been deliberately
constructed through various movements and campaigns, which this paper outlines. Yet in the
last decade, South and North involvement in the Zainichi population has waned since the two
states have begun engaging in formal, inter-Korean dialogue; the creation of a new, evolving
identity, straddling the Korean duality of Mindan and Chongryon and the Japanese features of
societal upbringing, is also explored in the conclusion.
e Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), more commonly known as North
Korea, made headlines all around the world this past summer when it qualied for the 2010
FIFA World Cup in South Africa for the rst time since 1966. North Korea's rst game was
against ve-time champion Brazil and the team's performance impressed even the most
doubtful of soccer insiders. Its 1-2 loss was characterized as an impressive loss and regarded
as one of the big surprises early on in the tournament. e star of the team was undoubt-
edly Jong Tae Se, hailed in the football circle as the People's Rooney."
1
Born and raised in an
ethnic Korean enclave in Japan, Jong was educated in North Korean state-sponsored schools
1 John Duerden, Jong Tae-se Is North Korea's Answer to Wayne Rooney," e Guardian, London, May 30, 2010. http://www.
guardian.co.uk/football/2010/may/30/jong-tae-se-north-korea-wayne-rooney, Accessed April 16, 2011.
A M is a senior at the University of Southern California majoring in
International Relations.
42
Tyler D. Tyburski
Gellner, Ernest. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.
Hobsbawm, E.J. Nations and Nationalism Since 1780. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1990.
O'Laughlin, John, Gerald Toal, and Vladimir Kolossovt. Russian Geopolitical Culture and
Public Opinion: the Masks of Proteus Revisited," in Transactions of the Institute of Brit-
ish Geographers, 2003. 322-333.
Pipes, Richard. e Formation of the Soviet Union. Boston: Harvard University Press, 1997.
Riasanovsky, Nicholas. Nationality in the State Ideology During the Reign of Nicholas I,"
in e Russian Review. 1960. 38-46.
Rowley, David. Russian Nationalism and the Cold War," in e American Historical Re-
view, 1994. 133-171.
Stiglitz, Joseph. Globalization and its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton & Company,
2002.
Sinyavsky, Andrey, and Dale Peterson. Russian Nationalism," in e Massachusetts, Re-
view, 1990. 473-494.
omsen, Vilhelm. e Relations Between Ancient Russia and Scandonavia And the Origin
of the Russian State. New York: Burt Franklin, 1877.
Tismaneanu, Vladimir. Fantasies of Salvation: Varieties of Nationalism in Postcommunist
Eastern Europe," in Envisioning Eastern Europe, 1994. 102-123.
Tucker, Robert. e Marx-Engels Reader. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978.
Walters, Phillip. Religion and the State: e Struggle for Legitimacy and Power," in Annals
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 1986. 133-143.
Weber, Max. e Vocation Lectures. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2004. Print.
Wedle, Janine. Collision and Collusion: e Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe.
New York: Palgrave, 2001.
White, Stephen, and Ian McAllister. Putin and His Supporters," in Europe-Asia Studies,
2003. 338-399.
The Ethnic Korean Population in Japan
e Last Frontier?
Alyssa Min
e sustained maintenance of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea and the Republic
of Korea, more commonly known as North Korea and South Korea, respectively, is the last
remaining remnant of the Cold War struggle. While direct interaction between the two states
has been subject to much scrutiny and analysis, this paper examines how political contestation
between North and South Korea has played a role in the formation of identity and loyalties of
the Zainichi ethnic Korean population in Japan, who trace their roots to the period of Japa-
nese colonialism in Korea. is paper argues that the opportunity to inuence this small but
signicant population has been utilized as an alternative channel through which both states
can vie for its own modern diaspora community and advance its own version of the Korean
identity. is paper also highlights the complexities of modern identity for the Zainichi Kore-
ans, who live in tight-knit communities and have retained a strong sense of Korean nationality,
despite their acclimation to Japanese society. To embrace their Korean heritage and identity,
they have largely aligned themselves with one of two prominent alliance organizations: the
pro-North Chongryon or the South-aliated Mindan. rough their representative groups,
each state has sought to create a nostalgic memory for itself, one that has been deliberately
constructed through various movements and campaigns, which this paper outlines. Yet in the
last decade, South and North involvement in the Zainichi population has waned since the two
states have begun engaging in formal, inter-Korean dialogue; the creation of a new, evolving
identity, straddling the Korean duality of Mindan and Chongryon and the Japanese features of
societal upbringing, is also explored in the conclusion.
e Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), more commonly known as North
Korea, made headlines all around the world this past summer when it qualied for the 2010
FIFA World Cup in South Africa for the rst time since 1966. North Korea's rst game was
against ve-time champion Brazil and the team's performance impressed even the most
doubtful of soccer insiders. Its 1-2 loss was characterized as an impressive loss and regarded
as one of the big surprises early on in the tournament. e star of the team was undoubt-
edly Jong Tae Se, hailed in the football circle as the People's Rooney."
1
Born and raised in an
ethnic Korean enclave in Japan, Jong was educated in North Korean state-sponsored schools
1 John Duerden, Jong Tae-se Is North Korea's Answer to Wayne Rooney," e Guardian, London, May 30, 2010. http://www.
guardian.co.uk/football/2010/may/30/jong-tae-se-north-korea-wayne-rooney, Accessed April 16, 2011.
A M is a senior at the University of Southern California majoring in
44
43
e Ethnic Korean Population in Japan Alyssa Min
that fostered a pro-North Korean mentality, one that ultimately prevailed over the technical
South Korean citizenship that he inherited from his parents in his decision to represent the
North in the World Cup. North Korea, seizing the opportunity to acquire one of the up-and-
coming footballers in Asia, provided Jong with a North Korean passport. According to FIFA
dual-citizenship rules, Jong was deemed eligible to participate on the side of the North.
2

Jong is an example of the complexities in modern Korean identity, muddled by the tech-
nicalities of citizenship and sharp distinctions between a North and South Korean identity.
Aligning oneself with one state or another has very distinct signicance not only in terms
of separate nationalities, but also in terms of ideology and values - nowhere else in the
world is that more visible than with the Zainichis Koreans," the ethnic Korean population
in Japan who trace their roots back to the period of Japanese colonialism in Korea. In light
of this population, it is important to answer the question: how has political contestation
between North and South Korea played a role in the formation of identity and loyalties of
the Zainichi Koreans in Japan: In addressing this question, the historical backdrop of the
political contestation in the Korean peninsula will rst be established to provide an overview
of the origins of the ethnic Korean population in Japan. is paper argues that the oppor-
tunity to inuence this small but signicant population has been utilized as an alternative
channel through which both states can vie for a modern diasporic community and advance
its own version of the Korean identity, a by-product of the political contestation between the
two states. is paper will also evaluate the response of the Zainichis, especially within the
context of their social standing and circumstances in Japan. e concluding remarks will
briey discuss the future prospects of the Zainichi population.
e identity issue of the Zainichi Korean population can best be viewed through the
lens that academic C. Davis provides. C. Davis provides a comprehensive look at national
identity. Traditional denitions rely on the concept of imagined communities" or bind-
ing socio-historical features such as dress, language or customs, but Davis argues that the
individual-group identication is central to the concept of national identity: the essence
of national identity [...] is the self view of one's group, rather than the tangible characteris-
tics, that is of essence in determining the existence or non-existence of a nation"
3
. Rather
than characteristics that contribute to the construction of a particular identity, elements
such as belonging and self view have a greater role in determining the concept of nation-
al identity. Such is the case for the Zainichi Korean population, whose latter generations
speak uent Japanese, celebrate Japanese holidays, and pursue higher education and work
in the Japanese system. Yet, despite their cultural acclimation, Zainichi populations live in
extremely tight-knit communities and have retained a strong sense of Korean nationality,
2 Duerden.
3 omas Davis, Revisiting Group Attachment: Ethnic and National Identity," Political Psychology 20.1 1999, 23-47. http://
www.jstor.org/, Accessed November 23, 2011.
which has contributed to the tension with Japanese ethnics in the region. While existing
ethnic divisions [between the Zainichi Koreans and ethnic Japanese] are built upon visible
biological dierences among populations or rest upon invisible cultural and ideological
distinctions," Davis points out that the boundaries around the meanings attached to ethnic
groups are pure social constructions."
4

Accordingly, it is necessary to examine the historical backdrop and the social construc-
tions in which the Zainichi Korean population exists in Japanese society. In particular, the
mass diaspora of Korean ethnics to Japan began during the Japanese colonization of the
Korean peninsula in the early 1900s. As Japan's dominance in the Pacic Rim materialized
with its victory over China in the Sino-Japanese war, it colonized the Korean peninsula in
the early 1900s. Among the implemented measures was the forced immigration of as many
as 2.3 million Koreans to Japan, many of whom had no choice but to relocate as cheap
labor. While most Koreans chose to return to their homeland at the end of World War II,
postwar political and economic circumstances discouraged an estimated 600,000 Koreans
from returning
3
. e delay of Korean independence, as determined by the Allied Powers,
complicated the issue of repatriation further, as many did not want to return to a land that
would not oer a semblance of the lives they had built since crossing over. Many [...] who
returned to the Korean peninsula arrived with little, if any, economic, social, or even cultural
foundation upon which to start new lives."
6
e lack of a domestic governmental authority
to handle such issues thoroughly in the Korean peninsula solidied the presence of a per-
manent diaspora community in Japan.
e ensuing conicts in the Korean peninsula which resulted in the Korean War in
1933 complicated the technical and legal status of the Korean residents in Japan. e by-
product was the creation of two separate states, the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south
and Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the north. e Korean War ended in
an armistice agreement in 1933, which called for a cessation of violence and the establish-
ment of a border at the 38th parallel; much else, however, has been le up to the judgment
of the two sides. e political contestation referred to throughout this paper is the result of
the open-ended, unclear agreement that has been le to the devices of the two vastly dif-
ferent states.
Accordingly, the legal status of Korean residents in Japan has changed over the years
to reect the establishment and development of the two separate Koreas. While they were
eectively considered Japanese nationals during the period of colonization, they lost this
Japanese nationality with Japan's defeat in World War II. In 1963, the Zainichi Koreans who
identied themselves as South Korean nationals qualied for permanent residency status
4 Davis.
3 World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples - Japan : Koreans," Minority Rights Group International.
6 Sonia Ryang and John Lie, Diaspora without Homeland: Being Korean in Japan, Berkeley, Berkeley, 2009.
44
43
that fostered a pro-North Korean mentality, one that ultimately prevailed over the technical
South Korean citizenship that he inherited from his parents in his decision to represent the
North in the World Cup. North Korea, seizing the opportunity to acquire one of the up-and-
coming footballers in Asia, provided Jong with a North Korean passport. According to FIFA
dual-citizenship rules, Jong was deemed eligible to participate on the side of the North.
2

Jong is an example of the complexities in modern Korean identity, muddled by the tech-
nicalities of citizenship and sharp distinctions between a North and South Korean identity.
Aligning oneself with one state or another has very distinct signicance not only in terms
of separate nationalities, but also in terms of ideology and values - nowhere else in the
world is that more visible than with the Zainichis Koreans," the ethnic Korean population
in Japan who trace their roots back to the period of Japanese colonialism in Korea. In light
of this population, it is important to answer the question: how has political contestation
between North and South Korea played a role in the formation of identity and loyalties of
the Zainichi Koreans in Japan: In addressing this question, the historical backdrop of the
political contestation in the Korean peninsula will rst be established to provide an overview
of the origins of the ethnic Korean population in Japan. is paper argues that the oppor-
tunity to inuence this small but signicant population has been utilized as an alternative
channel through which both states can vie for a modern diasporic community and advance
its own version of the Korean identity, a by-product of the political contestation between the
two states. is paper will also evaluate the response of the Zainichis, especially within the
context of their social standing and circumstances in Japan. e concluding remarks will
briey discuss the future prospects of the Zainichi population.
e identity issue of the Zainichi Korean population can best be viewed through the
lens that academic C. Davis provides. C. Davis provides a comprehensive look at national
identity. Traditional denitions rely on the concept of imagined communities" or bind-
ing socio-historical features such as dress, language or customs, but Davis argues that the
individual-group identication is central to the concept of national identity: the essence
of national identity [...] is the self view of one's group, rather than the tangible characteris-
tics, that is of essence in determining the existence or non-existence of a nation"
3
. Rather
than characteristics that contribute to the construction of a particular identity, elements
such as belonging and self view have a greater role in determining the concept of nation-
al identity. Such is the case for the Zainichi Korean population, whose latter generations
speak uent Japanese, celebrate Japanese holidays, and pursue higher education and work
in the Japanese system. Yet, despite their cultural acclimation, Zainichi populations live in
extremely tight-knit communities and have retained a strong sense of Korean nationality,
2 Duerden.
3 omas Davis, Revisiting Group Attachment: Ethnic and National Identity," Political Psychology 20.1 1999, 23-47. http://
www.jstor.org/, Accessed November 23, 2011.
which has contributed to the tension with Japanese ethnics in the region. While existing
ethnic divisions [between the Zainichi Koreans and ethnic Japanese] are built upon visible
biological dierences among populations or rest upon invisible cultural and ideological
distinctions," Davis points out that the boundaries around the meanings attached to ethnic
groups are pure social constructions."
4

Accordingly, it is necessary to examine the historical backdrop and the social construc-
tions in which the Zainichi Korean population exists in Japanese society. In particular, the
mass diaspora of Korean ethnics to Japan began during the Japanese colonization of the
Korean peninsula in the early 1900s. As Japan's dominance in the Pacic Rim materialized
with its victory over China in the Sino-Japanese war, it colonized the Korean peninsula in
the early 1900s. Among the implemented measures was the forced immigration of as many
as 2.3 million Koreans to Japan, many of whom had no choice but to relocate as cheap
labor. While most Koreans chose to return to their homeland at the end of World War II,
postwar political and economic circumstances discouraged an estimated 600,000 Koreans
from returning
3
. e delay of Korean independence, as determined by the Allied Powers,
complicated the issue of repatriation further, as many did not want to return to a land that
would not oer a semblance of the lives they had built since crossing over. Many [...] who
returned to the Korean peninsula arrived with little, if any, economic, social, or even cultural
foundation upon which to start new lives."
6
e lack of a domestic governmental authority
to handle such issues thoroughly in the Korean peninsula solidied the presence of a per-
manent diaspora community in Japan.
e ensuing conicts in the Korean peninsula which resulted in the Korean War in
1933 complicated the technical and legal status of the Korean residents in Japan. e by-
product was the creation of two separate states, the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south
and Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the north. e Korean War ended in
an armistice agreement in 1933, which called for a cessation of violence and the establish-
ment of a border at the 38th parallel; much else, however, has been le up to the judgment
of the two sides. e political contestation referred to throughout this paper is the result of
the open-ended, unclear agreement that has been le to the devices of the two vastly dif-
ferent states.
Accordingly, the legal status of Korean residents in Japan has changed over the years
to reect the establishment and development of the two separate Koreas. While they were
eectively considered Japanese nationals during the period of colonization, they lost this
Japanese nationality with Japan's defeat in World War II. In 1963, the Zainichi Koreans who
identied themselves as South Korean nationals qualied for permanent residency status
4 Davis.
3 World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples - Japan : Koreans," Minority Rights Group International.
6 Sonia Ryang and John Lie, Diaspora without Homeland: Being Korean in Japan, Berkeley, Berkeley, 2009.
46
47
aer Japan normalized relations with South Korea. e legal status for those who identied
with North Korea remained ambiguous until 1982, when they were nally granted perma-
nent residency by the Japanese Ministry of Justice.
7
Because Japan's concept of nationality
is based on the principal of ancestry rather than territoriality, subsequent generations of
Zainichi Koreans have not been automatically naturalized. In fact, the number of foreign
nationals who are granted Japanese citizenship is very small. By the 1980s, there was an
estimated two million people of Korean heritage living in Japan; only about 100,000 of them
had been naturalized as Japanese citizens.
8
Legal status and technicalities aside, more important to the formation of the Zainichi
identity is the social context and circumstances under which ethnic Koreans live in Japan.
According to Watts and Ofer, there is a sense of Japanese nativism that is prevalent within
the culture, meaning that however well a non-native is adjusted to the society, speaks the
language, and understands the culture, he or she can never be fully assimilated into the
Japanese people."
9
is is clearly the case with ethnic Koreans in Japan. A CIA report entitled
Aliens in Japan," presented an assessment of Japan's foreign population. e relationship
between the ethnic Korean population and ethnic Japanese nationals was characterized as
such:
e Koreans, with few exceptions, are a distinct minority group, with a low social posi-
tion. . . ose who go to Japan are, in the main, very poor, uneducated, and unskilled,
even by low Korean standards. Koreans do not possess the Japanese fever for hard work,
and to the energetic Japanese Koreans appear to be slow moving and lazy. . . It is also said
that Koreans are not as conscious of cleanliness as the Japanese and that the Koreans
live under miserable conditions in Japan because they know nothing better in Korea.
10
With this background, perhaps it is not surprising that despite their assimilation into
Japanese society, Zainichi Koreans have been discriminated against in employment in na-
tional and local public service, as well as in large corporations and news media. ey have
been excluded from receiving basic benets, such as social welfare, national health insur-
ance, pension programs and unemployment benets.
11
e Japanese Constitution bans in-
stitutionalized racial discrimination - yet, because of the perpetual outsider status that has
7 Yoko Motani, Towards a More Just Educational Policy for Minorities in Japan: the Case of Korean Ethnic Schools," Com-
parative Education 38, no. 2 2002, 223-237. www.jstor.org, Accessed November 23, 2011.
8 Apichia W. Shipper, Nationalisms of and Against Zainichi Koreans in Japan," Asian Politics and Policy, 33-73.
9 Meredith W. Watts and Ofer Feldman, Are Nativists Dierent Kind of Democrat: Democratic Values and Outsiders" in
Japan," Political Psychology 22.4 2001, 639-663.
10 Watts and Feldman.
11 Kiyoteru Tsutsi and Hwa Ji Shin, Global Norms, Local Activism, and Social Movement Outcomes: Global Human Rights
and Resident Koreans in Japan," Social Problems, 2008, 291-418. www.jstor.org, Accessed November 23, 2011.
carried over from generation to generation, Zainichi Koreans have faced discrimination
within Japanese society. is conict between formal democratization and xenophobic
tendencies" has created an environment generally hostile to those deemed foreigners and
has consequently put the Zainichi Koreans in a disadvantaged position within society.
12

However, it is important to recognize that many Zainichi Koreans themselves do not
want to become naturalized, especially because the process can be quite oppressive for non-
Japanese."
13
e granting of citizenship is a symbol of total assimilation and acceptance of
Japanese culture and customs, and is dicult when marginalization and discrimination are
central components of living in Japan. e director of the Japanese National Department
of Civil Aairs of the Ministry of Justice expressed that naturalization would be permit-
ted for those who have acquired the Japanese lifestyle and who have succeeded in reducing
their original traits, as it is a matter of course that naturalization requires assimilation of
the applicant."
14
As perpetual outsiders who have oen been shunned in Japanese society,
Zainichi Koreans have taken to arm their Korean heritage in the few opportunities and
ways that is available to them. us, when taking the social context of the Zainichi Koreans
into account, they have retained a rather compelling sense of Korean identity that has sepa-
rated them, not necessarily by choice, from the rest of Japanese society. e backlash to the
limits of naturalization has been a resistance to assimilation, and in turn, an embrace of the
Korean identity. As academic Shipper writes: Living in a country with no active policies to
fully incorporate foreigners into its society, Koreans [...] inevitably feel vulnerable as outsid-
ers and turn to building closer ties with their co-ethnics and their own countries. erefore,
they focus their activities mainly around the politics of long-distance nationalism."
13
us if the concept of identity is revisited, the social construct of the Japanese nativism
coupled with the perpetual outsider status has advanced a strong Korean nationalism within
the Zainichi Korean population, despite a way of life and behavior that might reect Japanese
tendencies. At issue are feelings of membership, inclusion and commitment, where the
bonds between individuals and nations are rightly regarded as essential components in
the development and maintenance of ethnic and national communities;"increasingly the
Zainichi Korean population has looked toward the two states in the Korean peninsula to
provide this sense of membership, inclusion, and commitment.
16

e sense of inclusion and membership can be found through two organizations for
Zainichi Koreans: Chongryon and Mindan. Although ethnic Koreans in Japan are not situ-
ated physically in either of the two Koreas, the ability to form an identity around one or the
13 Motani.
14 Motani.
13 Shipper.
16 Davis.
46
47
aer Japan normalized relations with South Korea. e legal status for those who identied
with North Korea remained ambiguous until 1982, when they were nally granted perma-
nent residency by the Japanese Ministry of Justice.
7
Because Japan's concept of nationality
is based on the principal of ancestry rather than territoriality, subsequent generations of
Zainichi Koreans have not been automatically naturalized. In fact, the number of foreign
nationals who are granted Japanese citizenship is very small. By the 1980s, there was an
estimated two million people of Korean heritage living in Japan; only about 100,000 of them
had been naturalized as Japanese citizens.
8
Legal status and technicalities aside, more important to the formation of the Zainichi
identity is the social context and circumstances under which ethnic Koreans live in Japan.
According to Watts and Ofer, there is a sense of Japanese nativism that is prevalent within
the culture, meaning that however well a non-native is adjusted to the society, speaks the
language, and understands the culture, he or she can never be fully assimilated into the
Japanese people."
9
is is clearly the case with ethnic Koreans in Japan. A CIA report entitled
Aliens in Japan," presented an assessment of Japan's foreign population. e relationship
between the ethnic Korean population and ethnic Japanese nationals was characterized as
such:
e Koreans, with few exceptions, are a distinct minority group, with a low social posi-
tion. . . ose who go to Japan are, in the main, very poor, uneducated, and unskilled,
even by low Korean standards. Koreans do not possess the Japanese fever for hard work,
and to the energetic Japanese Koreans appear to be slow moving and lazy. . . It is also said
that Koreans are not as conscious of cleanliness as the Japanese and that the Koreans
live under miserable conditions in Japan because they know nothing better in Korea.
10
With this background, perhaps it is not surprising that despite their assimilation into
Japanese society, Zainichi Koreans have been discriminated against in employment in na-
tional and local public service, as well as in large corporations and news media. ey have
been excluded from receiving basic benets, such as social welfare, national health insur-
ance, pension programs and unemployment benets.
11
e Japanese Constitution bans in-
stitutionalized racial discrimination - yet, because of the perpetual outsider status that has
7 Yoko Motani, Towards a More Just Educational Policy for Minorities in Japan: the Case of Korean Ethnic Schools," Com-
parative Education 38, no. 2 2002, 223-237. www.jstor.org, Accessed November 23, 2011.
8 Apichia W. Shipper, Nationalisms of and Against Zainichi Koreans in Japan," Asian Politics and Policy, 33-73.
9 Meredith W. Watts and Ofer Feldman, Are Nativists Dierent Kind of Democrat: Democratic Values and Outsiders" in
Japan," Political Psychology 22.4 2001, 639-663.
and Resident Koreans in Japan," Social Problems, 2008, 291-418. www.jstor.org, Accessed November 23, 2011.
carried over from generation to generation, Zainichi Koreans have faced discrimination
within Japanese society. is conict between formal democratization and xenophobic
tendencies" has created an environment generally hostile to those deemed foreigners and
has consequently put the Zainichi Koreans in a disadvantaged position within society.
12

However, it is important to recognize that many Zainichi Koreans themselves do not
want to become naturalized, especially because the process can be quite oppressive for non-
Japanese."
13
e granting of citizenship is a symbol of total assimilation and acceptance of
Japanese culture and customs, and is dicult when marginalization and discrimination are
central components of living in Japan. e director of the Japanese National Department
of Civil Aairs of the Ministry of Justice expressed that naturalization would be permit-
ted for those who have acquired the Japanese lifestyle and who have succeeded in reducing
their original traits, as it is a matter of course that naturalization requires assimilation of
the applicant."
14
As perpetual outsiders who have oen been shunned in Japanese society,
Zainichi Koreans have taken to arm their Korean heritage in the few opportunities and
ways that is available to them. us, when taking the social context of the Zainichi Koreans
into account, they have retained a rather compelling sense of Korean identity that has sepa-
rated them, not necessarily by choice, from the rest of Japanese society. e backlash to the
limits of naturalization has been a resistance to assimilation, and in turn, an embrace of the
Korean identity. As academic Shipper writes: Living in a country with no active policies to
fully incorporate foreigners into its society, Koreans [...] inevitably feel vulnerable as outsid-
ers and turn to building closer ties with their co-ethnics and their own countries. erefore,
they focus their activities mainly around the politics of long-distance nationalism."
13
us if the concept of identity is revisited, the social construct of the Japanese nativism
coupled with the perpetual outsider status has advanced a strong Korean nationalism within
the Zainichi Korean population, despite a way of life and behavior that might reect Japanese
tendencies. At issue are feelings of membership, inclusion and commitment, where the
bonds between individuals and nations are rightly regarded as essential components in
the development and maintenance of ethnic and national communities;"increasingly the
Zainichi Korean population has looked toward the two states in the Korean peninsula to
provide this sense of membership, inclusion, and commitment.
16

e sense of inclusion and membership can be found through two organizations for
Zainichi Koreans: Chongryon and Mindan. Although ethnic Koreans in Japan are not situ-
ated physically in either of the two Koreas, the ability to form an identity around one or the
13 Motani.
14 Motani.
13 Shipper.
16 Davis.
48
49
other has led to the emergence of the two starkly dierent alliance groups. Formed in the
aermath of World War II, these expatriate organizations make their allegiances clear.
Approximately 23 percent of Zainichi Koreans belong to the pro-North Chongryon,
which was established in 1933 amidst North Korean leader Kim Il Sung's calls for closer
ties with the ethnic Korean population in Japan. So close are the ties, in fact, that the cur-
rent Chongryon leader Seo Man Sul, as well as other senior ocials, are members of North
Korea's parliament, the Supreme People's Assembly. Because there are no formal diplomatic
ties between Japan and North Korea, it has functioned as North Korea's de facto embassy
in Japan."
17
Chongryon members primarily consist of those who identify their nationality
as Chosun, a nationality developed by the Japanese government in the aermath of World
War II when the Korean peninsula was in an undetermined state. ey profess a love of the
Kim Jong Il regime and accept the ideologies of the Communist state. Although politically
aliated, the organization is also associated with numerous business enterprises in Japan
and operates about 60 Korean schools and a University.
18

Mindan, the South Korean-aliated organization, claims another 63 percent of the
Zainichi Koreans as members. It was established in 1946 to foster close ties between the
Zainichi population and South Korea, much like Chongryon. Normalization of diplomatic
relations between Japan and South Korea in 1963 allowed Mindan to become more active by
acting as an overseas agency for South Korea."
19
Today, it has a vast network, with 23 local
headquarters and 336 branches in total.
e rivalry that has resulted from the polarity of the two groups has produced bouts
of hostility and clashes in the Zainichi Korean population. Each group accuses the other of
being a puppet organization with the sole agenda of advancing the objectives of the home
government.
20
Ironically, the very fact that both organizations were established with such
agendas make them guilty of the accusations of the other.
It is understandable that inclusion in either one of these groups would be attractive to
the Zainichi Koreans and would rouse a strong sense of loyalty, especially within the social
context examined previously in the paper. However, the question arises as to why South and
North Korea direct so much attention to the formation of nationalism in this diaspora com-
munity; more simply, why do they care so much: A strictly realist approach would disre-
gard this population altogether, because engaging with, much less winning over, a minority
population will not do much in the power game that the two states are perpetually locked
17 Agence France-Presse, Stage Set for Japan to Seize North Korea's 'embassy,'" e Inquirer, Manila, June 18, 2007, http://
newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/world/view/20070618-71942/Stage_set_for_Japan_to_seize_North_Korea's_'embassy', Ac-
cessed April 14, 2011.
18 Ryang and Lie.
19 Melvin Ember, Carol R. Ember, and Ian A. Skoggard, Encyclopedia of Diasporas: Immigrant and Refugee Cultures around
the World, New York, Springer, 2003.
20 Ember, Ember, and Skoggard.
in. e money and eort spent on this population, deemed unremarkable by the eyes of the
Japanese, could very well be channeled into another avenue to gain a competitive advantage
over the other. ere are no economic or military benets to be had, and investment in this
population may not be the wisest. Yet, historical evidence illustrates that both states have
steadily maintained close contact with the Zainichi community, insofar as developing and
implementing campaigns directed at this group.
In a report entitled Engaging Diaspora Communities in Peace Processes," the Public
International Law & Policy Group explores the role of states in engaging with a diaspora
community. e report conveys that many states participate in these communities in order
to build internal and external political support for a peace process, but that the opposite
can also be true: post-conict political and economic development endeavors are a useful
tool to engage the diaspora when the conict is too contentious [...] to directly address
its root causes."
21
In the case of South and North Korea, the political contestations on the
peninsula are too sensitive to address directly, if the military security dilemmas and reli-
ance on foreign alliances are any indication of the shaky relations. In fact, inter-Korean
dialogue only formally began with the 1991 Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression
and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North," otherwise known as
the Basic Agreement," which acknowledged that reunication was the goal of both govern-
ments, and the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."
22

Before then, communication was indirect; the phrase 'actions speak louder than words'
rang quite literally in South-North Korea relations. e opportunity to inuence this small
but signicant population, then, has been utilized as an alternative channel through which
both states can vie for a modern diaspora community and advance its own version of the
Korean identity.
e competition between the two states in vying for the loyalties of a modern diasporic
community, though not as risky or consequential as issues on the peninsula, can be a source
of competition that validates one over the other. ough Zainichi Koreans may not adhere
to the traditional standards of identity, memory is something constructed, and the home-
land can become more real in the construction of imagined communities of memory by
nostalgic [...] communal identities."
23
Each state has sought to create a nostalgic memory
for itself, one that is deliberately constructed. From Chongryon's inception, North Korea has
promoted itself as the authentic national government, typecasting South Korea as a puppet
government of the US. As a result, Chongryon was very successful initially; a 1933 Japanese
intelligence report claimed that 90 of Koreans in Japan support the North Korean regime.
21 Public International Law & Policy Group, Engaging Diaspora Communities in Peace Processes," PILPG: Global Pro Bono
Law Firm 1 2009, 3.
22 South Korea," U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm, Accessed November 23, 2012.
23 Gerard Delanty, Cosmopolitan Community," Community, London, November 23, 2010.
48
49
other has led to the emergence of the two starkly dierent alliance groups. Formed in the
aermath of World War II, these expatriate organizations make their allegiances clear.
Approximately 23 percent of Zainichi Koreans belong to the pro-North Chongryon,
which was established in 1933 amidst North Korean leader Kim Il Sung's calls for closer
ties with the ethnic Korean population in Japan. So close are the ties, in fact, that the cur-
rent Chongryon leader Seo Man Sul, as well as other senior ocials, are members of North
Korea's parliament, the Supreme People's Assembly. Because there are no formal diplomatic
ties between Japan and North Korea, it has functioned as North Korea's de facto embassy
in Japan."
17
Chongryon members primarily consist of those who identify their nationality
as Chosun, a nationality developed by the Japanese government in the aermath of World
War II when the Korean peninsula was in an undetermined state. ey profess a love of the
Kim Jong Il regime and accept the ideologies of the Communist state. Although politically
aliated, the organization is also associated with numerous business enterprises in Japan
and operates about 60 Korean schools and a University.
18

Mindan, the South Korean-aliated organization, claims another 63 percent of the
Zainichi Koreans as members. It was established in 1946 to foster close ties between the
Zainichi population and South Korea, much like Chongryon. Normalization of diplomatic
relations between Japan and South Korea in 1963 allowed Mindan to become more active by
acting as an overseas agency for South Korea."
19
Today, it has a vast network, with 23 local
headquarters and 336 branches in total.
e rivalry that has resulted from the polarity of the two groups has produced bouts
of hostility and clashes in the Zainichi Korean population. Each group accuses the other of
being a puppet organization with the sole agenda of advancing the objectives of the home
government.
20
Ironically, the very fact that both organizations were established with such
agendas make them guilty of the accusations of the other.
It is understandable that inclusion in either one of these groups would be attractive to
the Zainichi Koreans and would rouse a strong sense of loyalty, especially within the social
context examined previously in the paper. However, the question arises as to why South and
North Korea direct so much attention to the formation of nationalism in this diaspora com-
munity; more simply, why do they care so much: A strictly realist approach would disre-
gard this population altogether, because engaging with, much less winning over, a minority
population will not do much in the power game that the two states are perpetually locked
17 Agence France-Presse, Stage Set for Japan to Seize North Korea's 'embassy,'" e Inquirer, Manila, June 18, 2007, http://
newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/world/view/20070618-71942/Stage_set_for_Japan_to_seize_North_Korea's_'embassy', Ac-
18 Ryang and Lie.
19 Melvin Ember, Carol R. Ember, and Ian A. Skoggard, Encyclopedia of Diasporas: Immigrant and Refugee Cultures around
the World, New York, Springer, 2003.
in. e money and eort spent on this population, deemed unremarkable by the eyes of the
Japanese, could very well be channeled into another avenue to gain a competitive advantage
over the other. ere are no economic or military benets to be had, and investment in this
population may not be the wisest. Yet, historical evidence illustrates that both states have
steadily maintained close contact with the Zainichi community, insofar as developing and
implementing campaigns directed at this group.
In a report entitled Engaging Diaspora Communities in Peace Processes," the Public
International Law & Policy Group explores the role of states in engaging with a diaspora
community. e report conveys that many states participate in these communities in order
to build internal and external political support for a peace process, but that the opposite
can also be true: post-conict political and economic development endeavors are a useful
tool to engage the diaspora when the conict is too contentious [...] to directly address
its root causes."
21
In the case of South and North Korea, the political contestations on the
peninsula are too sensitive to address directly, if the military security dilemmas and reli-
ance on foreign alliances are any indication of the shaky relations. In fact, inter-Korean
dialogue only formally began with the 1991 Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression
and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North," otherwise known as
the Basic Agreement," which acknowledged that reunication was the goal of both govern-
ments, and the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."
22

Before then, communication was indirect; the phrase 'actions speak louder than words'
rang quite literally in South-North Korea relations. e opportunity to inuence this small
but signicant population, then, has been utilized as an alternative channel through which
both states can vie for a modern diaspora community and advance its own version of the
Korean identity.
e competition between the two states in vying for the loyalties of a modern diasporic
community, though not as risky or consequential as issues on the peninsula, can be a source
of competition that validates one over the other. ough Zainichi Koreans may not adhere
to the traditional standards of identity, memory is something constructed, and the home-
land can become more real in the construction of imagined communities of memory by
nostalgic [...] communal identities."
23
Each state has sought to create a nostalgic memory
for itself, one that is deliberately constructed. From Chongryon's inception, North Korea has
promoted itself as the authentic national government, typecasting South Korea as a puppet
government of the US. As a result, Chongryon was very successful initially; a 1933 Japanese
intelligence report claimed that 90 of Koreans in Japan support the North Korean regime.
21 Public International Law & Policy Group, Engaging Diaspora Communities in Peace Processes," PILPG: Global Pro Bono
Law Firm 1 2009, 3.
22 South Korea," U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm, Accessed November 23, 2012.
23 Gerard Delanty, Cosmopolitan Community," Community, London, November 23, 2010.
30
31
is aura of nostalgia sparked the Chongryon movement, which heralded the joys of re-
turning to North Korea."
24
North Korean propaganda encouraged Zainichi Koreans to relo-
cate, hailing the homeland as a worker's paradise. Some 90,000 heeded the call, only to real-
ize upon arrival that North Korea was starkly dierent than as painted in propaganda reels.
In response to this movement, Mindan launched eorts to hinder the Chongryon
movement. In August 1939, Mindan members in Nigata attempted to forcibly obstruct
the train that would shuttle Zainichi Koreans to the harbor, where they would board ships
to North Korea. To this day, the organization claims that had the death-defying strug-
gle of Mindan not taken place, the number of compatriots forced to live in North Korean
'living hell' [would] have further increased."
23
In 1973, Mindan carried out its own 'Visit
the Motherland' project, aimed at the Zainichi population. e trip consisted of visits to
major South Korean landmarks and ancestral graves and granted them the chance to meet
their relatives in the South.
e project was a huge success. Many visitors, previously entrenched in Chongryon
propaganda, were astonished to see that South Korea was not as poverty-stricken and barren
as they had been told. Between 1973 and 2003, more than 30,000 Zainichi Koreans trav-
eled to South Korea as the project grew in popularity. rough this initiative, the organi-
zation was able to monitor Koreans who traveled to South Korea and ensure that anyone
who traveled there would become a member of Mindan.
26
us, the Korean Zainichi com-
munity, previously dominated by Chongryon, started leaning heavily towards Mindan. A
former Chongryon ocial told e Daily NK in a telephone conversation: Before that
Mindan project, people believed the propaganda released by Chongryon; that South Korea
is a colony of the U.S. and the South Korean people live in a real hell. However, aer visiting
South Korea, they were shocked at South Korea's economic development, and those facts
circulated rapidly among other Korean residents."
27

As Mindan grew rapidly in number, North Korean dictator Kim Il Sung reacted by
instructing Chongryon to strengthen its organization
28
. In the 1970s, Chongryon began to
focus on the educational system as a new venue to win the loyalties of the people. Today,
Chongryon runs about 60 schools across Japan, many of which are funded by the North
Korean government. Kang Hwa Jong, the principal of a Chongryon-run middle school,
said: You teach them he is the highest leader of modern North Korea. At the same time,
24 Bend It Like Jong," 101 East, Al Jazeera video, 23:19, August 19, 2010, http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/101ea
st/2010/08/2010817124710243411.html.
23 Mindan: Korean Residents Union in Japan," Mindan, http://www.mindan.org/eng/about/history.php, Accessed November
23, 2012.
27 Yong Hun Kim, South Korea Visits Weakened Chongryon," e DailyNK, New York, December 10, 2009. http://www.
dailynk.com/english/read.php:cataId=nk00400&num=3761, Accessed November 23, 2011.
28 Kim.
for common residents who live in Japan, we teach that he sends scholarship money and
nancial aid to our educational system."
29
Education occurs on two levels: rst is the edu-
cation of the students on North Korean ideology and the cult of Kim Jong Il; the second,
perhaps more subtle yet just as powerful, is the reminder to the community that Kim Jong
Il is the perennial father gure, one who is supporting their children's education and taking
care of their needs despite discrimination and hardships in Japan. Many parents who send
their children to Chongryon-run schools are grateful that the Great Leader supports their
children's education. Clearly, targeting education, a eld in which Zainichi Koreans are dis-
criminated, has been a strategy of the North to gain favor with the community.
e relationship works both ways, especially for Chongryon, which faces added dif-
culties for being communist sympathizers."
30
Chongryon's . maintenance [...] is linked
to the continued existence of the nation. us, individual eorts are directed toward the na-
tional interest, thereby serving to reinforce both the nation and its associated social groups,
institutions, and organizations."
31
North Korea's nancial support has been dwindling
in recent years, however, and the organization is facing diculties in sustaining domestic
activity. On February 26, 2011, the Chongryon headquarter in Tokyo was seized by the
government-backed Resolution and Collection Corporation (RCC) over a loan repayment
case. Financial troubles have plagued the organization since 2007, when it was ordered by
the Japanese courts to pay back 62.7 billion yen to the RCC. A testament to the diculties
they face today, the legal battle came to an end on June 27, 2012 when the Supreme Court
rejected Chongryon's request to prevent the auction of the building by the RCC.
32
Without much nancial support, the Chongryon-run school system also continues to
struggle. Because the schools were founded upon the notion of cultivating loyalty toward
North Korea and its leadership, the Japanese Ministry of Education does not provide any sort
of nancial support, although other foreign schools, such as international schools, are given
aid. us, the lack of funds from either government has hit the schools hard and many stu-
dents have begun attending regular Japanese schools. In addition, graduates of Chongryon-
run schools are not allowed to take the entrance exam for Japanese public universities which
has added to the diculties of pursuing higher education. ough private schools do accept
them on the basis of their performance, discrimination and higher standards oen restrict
their opportunities for education. is situation has led to an increasing distrust and loss
of faith in Chongryon and its leadership among people who relied on Manabu Chongryon
29 Bend It Like Jong."
30 Ryang and Lie.
31 Shipper, 73.
32 Manabu Aokie, Court OKs auction of Chongryon Tokyo head oce," e Asahi Shimbun, Seoul, June 29, 2012.
30
31
is aura of nostalgia sparked the Chongryon movement, which heralded the joys of re-
turning to North Korea."
24
North Korean propaganda encouraged Zainichi Koreans to relo-
cate, hailing the homeland as a worker's paradise. Some 90,000 heeded the call, only to real-
ize upon arrival that North Korea was starkly dierent than as painted in propaganda reels.
In response to this movement, Mindan launched eorts to hinder the Chongryon
movement. In August 1939, Mindan members in Nigata attempted to forcibly obstruct
the train that would shuttle Zainichi Koreans to the harbor, where they would board ships
to North Korea. To this day, the organization claims that had the death-defying strug-
gle of Mindan not taken place, the number of compatriots forced to live in North Korean
'living hell' [would] have further increased."
23
In 1973, Mindan carried out its own 'Visit
the Motherland' project, aimed at the Zainichi population. e trip consisted of visits to
major South Korean landmarks and ancestral graves and granted them the chance to meet
their relatives in the South.
e project was a huge success. Many visitors, previously entrenched in Chongryon
propaganda, were astonished to see that South Korea was not as poverty-stricken and barren
as they had been told. Between 1973 and 2003, more than 30,000 Zainichi Koreans trav-
eled to South Korea as the project grew in popularity. rough this initiative, the organi-
zation was able to monitor Koreans who traveled to South Korea and ensure that anyone
who traveled there would become a member of Mindan.
26
us, the Korean Zainichi com-
munity, previously dominated by Chongryon, started leaning heavily towards Mindan. A
former Chongryon ocial told e Daily NK in a telephone conversation: Before that
Mindan project, people believed the propaganda released by Chongryon; that South Korea
is a colony of the U.S. and the South Korean people live in a real hell. However, aer visiting
South Korea, they were shocked at South Korea's economic development, and those facts
circulated rapidly among other Korean residents."
27

As Mindan grew rapidly in number, North Korean dictator Kim Il Sung reacted by
instructing Chongryon to strengthen its organization
28
. In the 1970s, Chongryon began to
focus on the educational system as a new venue to win the loyalties of the people. Today,
Chongryon runs about 60 schools across Japan, many of which are funded by the North
Korean government. Kang Hwa Jong, the principal of a Chongryon-run middle school,
said: You teach them he is the highest leader of modern North Korea. At the same time,
st/2010/08/2010817124710243411.html.
23 Mindan: Korean Residents Union in Japan," Mindan, http://www.mindan.org/eng/about/history.php, Accessed November
23, 2012.
27 Yong Hun Kim, South Korea Visits Weakened Chongryon," e DailyNK, New York, December 10, 2009. http://www.
dailynk.com/english/read.php:cataId=nk00400&num=3761, Accessed November 23, 2011.
28 Kim.
for common residents who live in Japan, we teach that he sends scholarship money and
nancial aid to our educational system."
29
Education occurs on two levels: rst is the edu-
cation of the students on North Korean ideology and the cult of Kim Jong Il; the second,
perhaps more subtle yet just as powerful, is the reminder to the community that Kim Jong
Il is the perennial father gure, one who is supporting their children's education and taking
care of their needs despite discrimination and hardships in Japan. Many parents who send
their children to Chongryon-run schools are grateful that the Great Leader supports their
children's education. Clearly, targeting education, a eld in which Zainichi Koreans are dis-
criminated, has been a strategy of the North to gain favor with the community.
e relationship works both ways, especially for Chongryon, which faces added dif-
culties for being communist sympathizers."
30
Chongryon's . maintenance [...] is linked
to the continued existence of the nation. us, individual eorts are directed toward the na-
tional interest, thereby serving to reinforce both the nation and its associated social groups,
institutions, and organizations."
31
North Korea's nancial support has been dwindling
in recent years, however, and the organization is facing diculties in sustaining domestic
activity. On February 26, 2011, the Chongryon headquarter in Tokyo was seized by the
government-backed Resolution and Collection Corporation (RCC) over a loan repayment
case. Financial troubles have plagued the organization since 2007, when it was ordered by
the Japanese courts to pay back 62.7 billion yen to the RCC. A testament to the diculties
they face today, the legal battle came to an end on June 27, 2012 when the Supreme Court
rejected Chongryon's request to prevent the auction of the building by the RCC.
32
Without much nancial support, the Chongryon-run school system also continues to
struggle. Because the schools were founded upon the notion of cultivating loyalty toward
North Korea and its leadership, the Japanese Ministry of Education does not provide any sort
of nancial support, although other foreign schools, such as international schools, are given
aid. us, the lack of funds from either government has hit the schools hard and many stu-
dents have begun attending regular Japanese schools. In addition, graduates of Chongryon-
run schools are not allowed to take the entrance exam for Japanese public universities which
has added to the diculties of pursuing higher education. ough private schools do accept
them on the basis of their performance, discrimination and higher standards oen restrict
their opportunities for education. is situation has led to an increasing distrust and loss
of faith in Chongryon and its leadership among people who relied on Manabu Chongryon
29 Bend It Like Jong."
30 Ryang and Lie.
31 Shipper, 73.
32 Manabu Aokie, Court OKs auction of Chongryon Tokyo head oce," e Asahi Shimbun, Seoul, June 29, 2012.
32
33
as a center of unity for ethnic pride."
33
With its deepening nancial troubles and limited re-
sources, Chongryon is less eective in rousing North Korean allegiance.
On the other side of the spectrum, Mindan has also come under re for monopolizing
the access to South Korea for Koreans in Japan. It has been criticized for capitalizing on the
emotional trauma of national partition for rst-generation Koreans, exploiting their nostal-
gic sentiments for their long unseen home and turning it into political gain by forcing them
to join Mindan."
34
Such sentiments have caused distrust among the Zainichi population
about Mindan, and its recent movement to identify with the term Kankoku, the Japanese
word for South Korea, has been met with chilly reception.
33
Chongryon's troubles with the
Japanese state may be aecting Mindan's pivot toward this new movement to identify with
Kankoku, but for the younger generation whose identities are increasingly dened by the
interaction between South and North Korea instead of Mindan and Chongryon, this shi
can be deemed inconsistent.
While Mindan and Chongryon may not have as rm of a grip as they have had in the
past, the presence of both organizations and the respective governments behind them can
still be felt. In light of the earthquake and tsunami in Japan on March 11, 2011, North Korea
donated $300,000 USD to Chongryon members to help them recover from the crisis.
36
For
a state that is in dire need of aid itself, the gesture was an extremely generous one. Mindan
has also been utilized by the South Korean government to do goodwill activities in Japan,
such as providing Korean food for the victims of the disasters.
37
us, both organizations
may be shiing from serving political roles to more subtle social roles for the South and
North Korean states.
In the last two decades, South and North Korean involvement in the Zainichi popula-
tion has waned since the two states have started engaging in meaningful, formal inter-Ko-
rean dialogue, a relatively new approach. Direct contact began with the 1991 Agreement on
Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the
North," otherwise known as the Basic Agreement," which acknowledged that reunication
was the goal of both governments, and the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization
of the Korean Peninsula."
38
However, dierences on the process of reunication, issues re-
garding North Korean nuclear weapons programs, unstable South Korean domestic politics,
and the 1994 death of North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung contributed to the warming and
33 Ember, Ember, and Skoggard, 2003.
and Resident Koreans in Japan," Social Problems, (2008): 291-418.
36 Yonhap News Agency, N.K. Leader Donates US$300,000 to Pro-Pyongyang Residents in Japan," Seoul, March 24, 2011.
37 Yonhap News Agency, ('"), Yonhap News Agency, Seoul, April 4, 2011
38 South Korea," U.S. Department of State
cooling of relations. When Kim Dae-Jung assumed the South Korean presidency in 1998, at
the top of his agenda was a dierent approach of engagement toward the North. He intro-
duced the Sunshine Policy, a foreign policy initiative that proposed greater political contact
and advocated for more collaborative eorts with the North.
e Sunshine Policy brought about three terms of understanding and a subsequent
decrease in competition between North and South Korea over the Zainichi population.
First, both sides agreed that unication should be a process and not an immediate goal.
at is, it must be achieved peacefully without force or violence. Secondly, a loose form
of federation" was proposed, and the vision for one people, two systems, two independent
governments" was used as a point of convergence for further cooperation. Lastly, the two
sides agreed that continued US military presence is critical in stabilizing the peninsula and
Northeast Asia.
39
With these three points of understanding, a historical summit meeting between presi-
dent Kim Dae Jung and North Korean dictator Kim Jong-Il in June 2000 signaled the be-
ginning of a series of collaborative projects between the two states: railroads were built to
connect the two states; a tourist site, Mt. Kumgang, was established in North Korea which
allowed for a ow of South Korean visitors to the North; South Korean companies were
allowed into Kaesong Industrial Complex, north of the demilitarized zone, to employ as
many as 10,000 North Korean workers to make a wide variety of products. Such a relation-
ship was regarded as mutually benecial, as South Korean companies were satised by the
cheap labor and the goodwill of the relocation of labor while North Korea gained economic
assistance on its own terms. Other initiatives included economic and humanitarian aid as
well as reunication between long-divided family members. Kim Dae Jung was awarded
the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000 for his eorts, but was criticized heavily when it was revealed
that South Korea had paid the North $300 million dollars immediately before the summit
through secret dealings with one of its biggest conglomerates, Hyundai. Whether this was
money paid to persuade Kim Jong Il to agree to the summit in the rst place has been a
topic of contestation. Despite this, the succeeding South Korean president Roh Moo Hyun
has continued to engage the North through the initiatives of the Sunshine Policy.
40
While
its eectiveness can be debated, the policies have opened up the peninsula as an arena in
which to discuss and negotiate real issues. us, the need to utilize the Zainichi population
as a means of competing with one another is no longer necessary.
Meanwhile, later generations are becoming more indiIIerent to the bickering be-
tween Mindan and Chongryon, and see their identities more fuidly than past generations.
According to Oh Kong Don oI the Institute Ior DeIense Analysis, The younger genera-
tion [in Japan] sees North Korea as a hopeless case, even though they are indoctrinated
39 Kim Dae-jung - Nobel Lecture," Nobelprize.org.
40 Zhang Xiang, China Hopes for Early, Fruitful Inter-Korean Talks," English Xinhua News, Beijing, April 27, 2011.
32
33
as a center of unity for ethnic pride."
33
With its deepening nancial troubles and limited re-
sources, Chongryon is less eective in rousing North Korean allegiance.
On the other side of the spectrum, Mindan has also come under re for monopolizing
the access to South Korea for Koreans in Japan. It has been criticized for capitalizing on the
emotional trauma of national partition for rst-generation Koreans, exploiting their nostal-
gic sentiments for their long unseen home and turning it into political gain by forcing them
to join Mindan."
34
Such sentiments have caused distrust among the Zainichi population
about Mindan, and its recent movement to identify with the term Kankoku, the Japanese
word for South Korea, has been met with chilly reception.
33
Chongryon's troubles with the
Japanese state may be aecting Mindan's pivot toward this new movement to identify with
Kankoku, but for the younger generation whose identities are increasingly dened by the
interaction between South and North Korea instead of Mindan and Chongryon, this shi
can be deemed inconsistent.
While Mindan and Chongryon may not have as rm of a grip as they have had in the
past, the presence of both organizations and the respective governments behind them can
still be felt. In light of the earthquake and tsunami in Japan on March 11, 2011, North Korea
donated $300,000 USD to Chongryon members to help them recover from the crisis.
36
For
a state that is in dire need of aid itself, the gesture was an extremely generous one. Mindan
has also been utilized by the South Korean government to do goodwill activities in Japan,
such as providing Korean food for the victims of the disasters.
37
us, both organizations
may be shiing from serving political roles to more subtle social roles for the South and
North Korean states.
In the last two decades, South and North Korean involvement in the Zainichi popula-
tion has waned since the two states have started engaging in meaningful, formal inter-Ko-
rean dialogue, a relatively new approach. Direct contact began with the 1991 Agreement on
Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the
North," otherwise known as the Basic Agreement," which acknowledged that reunication
was the goal of both governments, and the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization
of the Korean Peninsula."
38
However, dierences on the process of reunication, issues re-
garding North Korean nuclear weapons programs, unstable South Korean domestic politics,
and the 1994 death of North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung contributed to the warming and
and Resident Koreans in Japan," Social Problems, (2008): 291-418.
36 Yonhap News Agency, N.K. Leader Donates US$300,000 to Pro-Pyongyang Residents in Japan," Seoul, March 24, 2011.
37 Yonhap News Agency, ('"), Yonhap News Agency, Seoul, April 4, 2011
38 South Korea," U.S. Department of State
cooling of relations. When Kim Dae-Jung assumed the South Korean presidency in 1998, at
the top of his agenda was a dierent approach of engagement toward the North. He intro-
duced the Sunshine Policy, a foreign policy initiative that proposed greater political contact
and advocated for more collaborative eorts with the North.
e Sunshine Policy brought about three terms of understanding and a subsequent
decrease in competition between North and South Korea over the Zainichi population.
First, both sides agreed that unication should be a process and not an immediate goal.
at is, it must be achieved peacefully without force or violence. Secondly, a loose form
of federation" was proposed, and the vision for one people, two systems, two independent
governments" was used as a point of convergence for further cooperation. Lastly, the two
sides agreed that continued US military presence is critical in stabilizing the peninsula and
Northeast Asia.
39
With these three points of understanding, a historical summit meeting between presi-
dent Kim Dae Jung and North Korean dictator Kim Jong-Il in June 2000 signaled the be-
ginning of a series of collaborative projects between the two states: railroads were built to
connect the two states; a tourist site, Mt. Kumgang, was established in North Korea which
allowed for a ow of South Korean visitors to the North; South Korean companies were
allowed into Kaesong Industrial Complex, north of the demilitarized zone, to employ as
many as 10,000 North Korean workers to make a wide variety of products. Such a relation-
ship was regarded as mutually benecial, as South Korean companies were satised by the
cheap labor and the goodwill of the relocation of labor while North Korea gained economic
assistance on its own terms. Other initiatives included economic and humanitarian aid as
well as reunication between long-divided family members. Kim Dae Jung was awarded
the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000 for his eorts, but was criticized heavily when it was revealed
that South Korea had paid the North $300 million dollars immediately before the summit
through secret dealings with one of its biggest conglomerates, Hyundai. Whether this was
money paid to persuade Kim Jong Il to agree to the summit in the rst place has been a
topic of contestation. Despite this, the succeeding South Korean president Roh Moo Hyun
has continued to engage the North through the initiatives of the Sunshine Policy.
40
While
its eectiveness can be debated, the policies have opened up the peninsula as an arena in
which to discuss and negotiate real issues. us, the need to utilize the Zainichi population
as a means of competing with one another is no longer necessary.
Meanwhile, later generations are becoming more indiIIerent to the bickering be-
tween Mindan and Chongryon, and see their identities more fuidly than past generations.
According to Oh Kong Don oI the Institute Ior DeIense Analysis, The younger genera-
tion [in Japan] sees North Korea as a hopeless case, even though they are indoctrinated
39 Kim Dae-jung - Nobel Lecture," Nobelprize.org.
40 Zhang Xiang, China Hopes for Early, Fruitful Inter-Korean Talks," English Xinhua News, Beijing, April 27, 2011.
34
33
and raised in the North Korean system.
41
The irrelevance of Mindan and Chongryon is
inIorming their decision to distance themselves Irom the institutions. Jong Tae Se, the her-
alded soccer star and North Korean supporter, belongs to such a generation: 'I respect Kim
Jong Il absolutely. I would like to believe and Iollow him whatever happens. Yet, asked
iI his love is great enough to one day permanently settle in the North, Jong shook his head,
remarking: 'My Iriends and Iamily are all in Japan; I wouldn`t know anyone. I would not
like to live in North Korea.
42
A Iar cry Irom the absolute brainwashed, 'can`t-live-without-
the-Chairman mentality oI other North Koreans, Jong`s attitude clearly demonstrates that a
North Korean passport and an upbringing in North Korean sponsored schools do not make
him a typical North Korean.
Perhaps this is the lesson that North Korea has learned itselI: that a modern diaspora
community cannot Iully absorb its own version oI the Korean identity. For the Zainichi
Korean population, a new and evolving identity, straddling the Korean duality oI Mindan
and Chongryon and the Ieatures oI Japanese societal upbringing, should be interesting to
watch in the years to come. As the purpose oI both Mindan and Chongryon begin to shiIt
within the Korean diaspora community, it will be important to observe what Iactors and
considerations infuence the next generations oI Zainichi Koreans. The fndings could very
well prove valuable iI the Sunshine Policy succeeds in bringing the two nations together
back as one Korean peninsula: though states and institutions may Iail, identity is a fuid
concept that can greatly enhance or deter the hold oI a nation on its people, and conversely,
the people`s Iaith in its nation. Whether South and North Korea can continue to engage in
identity construction with the Zainichi Koreans remains to be seen.
Works Cited
Agence France-Presse. Stage Set for Japan to Seize North Korea's 'embassy'," e In-
quirer. Manila, June 18, 2007. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/world/
view/20070618-71942/Stage_set_for_Japan_to_seize_North_Korea's_'embassy'. Ac-
Aokie, Manabu. Court OKs auction of Chongryon Tokyo head oce." e Asahi Shimbun.
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_aairs/AJ201206290049. Seoul. June
29, 2012. Accessed June 29, 2012.
41 Rosen.
st/2010/08/2010817124710243411.html.
Bend It Like Jong." 101 East. Al Jazeera video. http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/101
east/2010/08/2010817124710243411.html. August 19, 2010.
Chongryon Head Oce, Premises Seized over Loan Repayment Case," Japan Today, To-
kyo, February 23, 2011. http://www.japantoday.com/category/national/view/chongry-
on-head-oce-premises-seized-over-loan-repayment-case, Accessed April 13, 2011.
Davis, omas . Revisiting Group Attachment: Ethnic and National Identity," Political Psy-
chology 20.1 1999. 23-47. http://www.jstor.org/ Accessed November 23, 2011.
Delanty, Gerard. Cosmopolitan Community," Community. London, November 23, 2010.
Duerden, John. Jong Tae-se Is North Korea's Answer to Wayne Rooney," e Guardian.
London, May 30, 2010. http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2010/may/30/jong-tae-se-
north-korea-wayne-rooney. Accessed April 16, 2011.
Ember, Melvin, Carol R. Ember, and Ian A. Skoggard. Encyclopedia of Diasporas: Immi-
grant and Refugee Cultures around the World. New York: Springer, 2003.
Kim Dae-jung - Nobel Lecture." Nobelprize.org. http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/
laureates/2000/dae-jung-lecture.html. Accessed November 23, 2012.
Kim, Yong Hun. South Korea Visits Weakened Chongryon," e DailyNK. New
York, December 10, 2009. http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php:
cataId=nk00400&num=3761. Accessed November 23, 2011.
Mindan: Korean Residents Union in Japan," Mindan. http://www.mindan.org/eng/about/
history.php. Accessed November 23, 2012.
Motani, Yoko. Towards a More Just Educational Policy for Minorities in Japan: the Case
of Korean Ethnic Schools," Comparative Education 38.2 2002. 223-237. www.jstor.org
.Accessed November 23, 2011.
Yonhap News Agency, N.K. Leader Donates US$300,000 to Pro-Pyongyang Residents in
Japan." Seoul, March 24, 2011. http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2011/03/
24/63/0401000000AEN20110324003100313F.HTML. Accessed November 23, 2011.
Oce of Strategic Services. Aliens in Japan," in Occupation of Japan United States Planning
Documents Volume III. Washington, D.C., Oce of Strategic Services, 1943.
Public International Law & Policy Group. Engaging Diaspora Communities in Peace Pro-
cesses," PILPG: Global Pro Bono Law Firm 1 2009.
Ryang, Sonia, and John Lie. Diaspora without Homeland: Being Korean in Japan. Berkeley,
Berkeley, 2009.
Shipper, Apichia W.. Nationalisms of and Against Zainichi Koreans in Japan." Asian Politics
and Policy. 33-73. www.jstor.org. Accessed November 23, 2011.
34
33
and raised in the North Korean system.
41
The irrelevance of Mindan and Chongryon is
inIorming their decision to distance themselves Irom the institutions. Jong Tae Se, the her-
alded soccer star and North Korean supporter, belongs to such a generation: 'I respect Kim
Jong Il absolutely. I would like to believe and Iollow him whatever happens. Yet, asked
iI his love is great enough to one day permanently settle in the North, Jong shook his head,
remarking: 'My Iriends and Iamily are all in Japan; I wouldn`t know anyone. I would not
like to live in North Korea.
42
A Iar cry Irom the absolute brainwashed, 'can`t-live-without-
the-Chairman mentality oI other North Koreans, Jong`s attitude clearly demonstrates that a
North Korean passport and an upbringing in North Korean sponsored schools do not make
him a typical North Korean.
Perhaps this is the lesson that North Korea has learned itselI: that a modern diaspora
community cannot Iully absorb its own version oI the Korean identity. For the Zainichi
Korean population, a new and evolving identity, straddling the Korean duality oI Mindan
and Chongryon and the Ieatures oI Japanese societal upbringing, should be interesting to
watch in the years to come. As the purpose oI both Mindan and Chongryon begin to shiIt
within the Korean diaspora community, it will be important to observe what Iactors and
considerations infuence the next generations oI Zainichi Koreans. The fndings could very
well prove valuable iI the Sunshine Policy succeeds in bringing the two nations together
back as one Korean peninsula: though states and institutions may Iail, identity is a fuid
concept that can greatly enhance or deter the hold oI a nation on its people, and conversely,
the people`s Iaith in its nation. Whether South and North Korea can continue to engage in
identity construction with the Zainichi Koreans remains to be seen.
Works Cited
Agence France-Presse. Stage Set for Japan to Seize North Korea's 'embassy'," e In-
quirer. Manila, June 18, 2007. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/world/
view/20070618-71942/Stage_set_for_Japan_to_seize_North_Korea's_'embassy'. Ac-
Aokie, Manabu. Court OKs auction of Chongryon Tokyo head oce." e Asahi Shimbun.
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_aairs/AJ201206290049. Seoul. June
29, 2012. Accessed June 29, 2012.
41 Rosen.
st/2010/08/2010817124710243411.html.
Bend It Like Jong." 101 East. Al Jazeera video. http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/101
east/2010/08/2010817124710243411.html. August 19, 2010.
Chongryon Head Oce, Premises Seized over Loan Repayment Case," Japan Today, To-
kyo, February 23, 2011. http://www.japantoday.com/category/national/view/chongry-
on-head-oce-premises-seized-over-loan-repayment-case, Accessed April 13, 2011.
Davis, omas . Revisiting Group Attachment: Ethnic and National Identity," Political Psy-
chology 20.1 1999. 23-47. http://www.jstor.org/ Accessed November 23, 2011.
Delanty, Gerard. Cosmopolitan Community," Community. London, November 23, 2010.
Duerden, John. Jong Tae-se Is North Korea's Answer to Wayne Rooney," e Guardian.
London, May 30, 2010. http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2010/may/30/jong-tae-se-
north-korea-wayne-rooney. Accessed April 16, 2011.
Ember, Melvin, Carol R. Ember, and Ian A. Skoggard. Encyclopedia of Diasporas: Immi-
grant and Refugee Cultures around the World. New York: Springer, 2003.
Kim Dae-jung - Nobel Lecture." Nobelprize.org. http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/
laureates/2000/dae-jung-lecture.html. Accessed November 23, 2012.
Kim, Yong Hun. South Korea Visits Weakened Chongryon," e DailyNK. New
York, December 10, 2009. http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php:
cataId=nk00400&num=3761. Accessed November 23, 2011.
Mindan: Korean Residents Union in Japan," Mindan. http://www.mindan.org/eng/about/
history.php. Accessed November 23, 2012.
Motani, Yoko. Towards a More Just Educational Policy for Minorities in Japan: the Case
of Korean Ethnic Schools," Comparative Education 38.2 2002. 223-237. www.jstor.org
.Accessed November 23, 2011.
Yonhap News Agency, N.K. Leader Donates US$300,000 to Pro-Pyongyang Residents in
Japan." Seoul, March 24, 2011. http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2011/03/
24/63/0401000000AEN20110324003100313F.HTML. Accessed November 23, 2011.
Oce of Strategic Services. Aliens in Japan," in Occupation of Japan United States Planning
Documents Volume III. Washington, D.C., Oce of Strategic Services, 1943.
Public International Law & Policy Group. Engaging Diaspora Communities in Peace Pro-
cesses," PILPG: Global Pro Bono Law Firm 1 2009.
Ryang, Sonia, and John Lie. Diaspora without Homeland: Being Korean in Japan. Berkeley,
Berkeley, 2009.
Shipper, Apichia W.. Nationalisms of and Against Zainichi Koreans in Japan." Asian Politics
and Policy. 33-73. www.jstor.org. Accessed November 23, 2011.
36
Alyssa Min
South Korea." U.S. Department of State. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm. Ac-
cessed November 23, 2012.
Tsutsi, Kiyoteru, and Hwa Ji Shin. Global Norms, Local Activism, and Social Movement
Outcomes: Global Human Rights and Resident Koreans in Japan," Social Problems
2008. 291-418. www.jstor.org. Accessed November 23, 2011.
Watts, Meredith W., and Ofer Feldman. Are Nativists Dierent Kind of Democrat:
Democratic Values and Outsiders" in Japan," Political Psychology 22.4 2001. 639-663.
www.jstor.org. Accessed November 23, 2001.
World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples - Japan : Koreans," Minority Rights
Group International. www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49749cfd41.html. Accessed No-
vember 23, 2008.
Xiang, Zhang. China Hopes for Early, Fruitful Inter-Korean Talks," English Xinhua
News, Beijing, April 27, 2011. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-
04/27/c_13848820.htm. Accessed November 23, 2011.
Yonhap News Agency. ( '") Yonhap News
Agency, Seoul, April 4, 2011. http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2011/04/07/0200
000000AKR20110407128700073.html. Accessed April 13, 2011.
Genocide, Identity and the State
Erik Peterson
Colonial relationships create and propagate identities as a means of governance, resulting
in unstable societies and eventual conict. e Rwandan Genocide represents one of the most
horric instances of the purposeful corruption of a states society and culture via the colonial
powers that reigned over the state. e genocide was rooted in the historical background of
Rwandas colonization and the eects of the states aim to maintain power through societal ma-
nipulation. is article seeks to examine the development of identity conict through colonial
relationships through the lens of the Rwandan genocide. is paper will explore the hypothesis
that the colonial subordination of one state to the control of another leaves the dominated
society vulnerable to a corruption that permanently alters the socio-cultural landscape and
function of the state through augmented identities.
In just four weeks, eleven percent of the Rwandan population was murdered. In just
four weeks, the world witnessed Rwanda demonstrate the true horrors of human potential
as neighbor beheaded neighbor and a nation's people slaughtered its own. e Rwandan
Genocide of 1994 was a conict rooted in the ethnic division between the Hutus and Tutsis
and took the form of dispersed but highly organized mass killings across the nation's lands.
e subjugated majority Hutu group massacred the historically elite Tutsi group, leaving an
estimated 800,000 dead.
1
However, attribution to a solely ethnic basis for the conict is an
oversimplication, one that does not adequately address the multifactorial development of
the genocide itself. e imperialist motivations of Belgian colonial powers sought control
through the utilization of structural and institutional tools that manipulated the cultural,
psychological, and ethnic framework of the Rwandan population. Colonial powers, with
the intent of increased ease of governance, attempted to categorize and quantify Rwanda
and thereby formed ethnic divides based on arbitrary distinctions. is manipulation of
the sentiments of the Rwandan people laid the foundation for the post-colonial authoritar-
ian regime to dehumanize its victims by strengthening tensions between fabricated ethnic
groups. Ultimately, these sentiments sparked the violence that was seen as necessary to
maintain state control, culminating in the genocide of 1994.
1 Paul Magnarella, Explaining Rwanda's 1994 Genocide," in vol. 21 of Human Rights and Human Welfare, 2002, 23.
E P is a senior at the University of Southern California majoring in
36
Alyssa Min
South Korea." U.S. Department of State. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm. Ac-
cessed November 23, 2012.
Tsutsi, Kiyoteru, and Hwa Ji Shin. Global Norms, Local Activism, and Social Movement
Outcomes: Global Human Rights and Resident Koreans in Japan," Social Problems
2008. 291-418. www.jstor.org. Accessed November 23, 2011.
Watts, Meredith W., and Ofer Feldman. Are Nativists Dierent Kind of Democrat:
Democratic Values and Outsiders" in Japan," Political Psychology 22.4 2001. 639-663.
www.jstor.org. Accessed November 23, 2001.
World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples - Japan : Koreans," Minority Rights
Group International. www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49749cfd41.html. Accessed No-
vember 23, 2008.
Xiang, Zhang. China Hopes for Early, Fruitful Inter-Korean Talks," English Xinhua
News, Beijing, April 27, 2011. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-
04/27/c_13848820.htm. Accessed November 23, 2011.
Yonhap News Agency. ( '") Yonhap News
Agency, Seoul, April 4, 2011. http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2011/04/07/0200
000000AKR20110407128700073.html. Accessed April 13, 2011.
Genocide, Identity and the State
Erik Peterson
Colonial relationships create and propagate identities as a means of governance, resulting
in unstable societies and eventual conict. e Rwandan Genocide represents one of the most
horric instances of the purposeful corruption of a states society and culture via the colonial
powers that reigned over the state. e genocide was rooted in the historical background of
Rwandas colonization and the eects of the states aim to maintain power through societal ma-
nipulation. is article seeks to examine the development of identity conict through colonial
relationships through the lens of the Rwandan genocide. is paper will explore the hypothesis
that the colonial subordination of one state to the control of another leaves the dominated
society vulnerable to a corruption that permanently alters the socio-cultural landscape and
function of the state through augmented identities.
In just four weeks, eleven percent of the Rwandan population was murdered. In just
four weeks, the world witnessed Rwanda demonstrate the true horrors of human potential
as neighbor beheaded neighbor and a nation's people slaughtered its own. e Rwandan
Genocide of 1994 was a conict rooted in the ethnic division between the Hutus and Tutsis
and took the form of dispersed but highly organized mass killings across the nation's lands.
e subjugated majority Hutu group massacred the historically elite Tutsi group, leaving an
estimated 800,000 dead.
1
However, attribution to a solely ethnic basis for the conict is an
oversimplication, one that does not adequately address the multifactorial development of
the genocide itself. e imperialist motivations of Belgian colonial powers sought control
through the utilization of structural and institutional tools that manipulated the cultural,
psychological, and ethnic framework of the Rwandan population. Colonial powers, with
the intent of increased ease of governance, attempted to categorize and quantify Rwanda
and thereby formed ethnic divides based on arbitrary distinctions. is manipulation of
the sentiments of the Rwandan people laid the foundation for the post-colonial authoritar-
ian regime to dehumanize its victims by strengthening tensions between fabricated ethnic
groups. Ultimately, these sentiments sparked the violence that was seen as necessary to
maintain state control, culminating in the genocide of 1994.
1 Paul Magnarella, Explaining Rwanda's 1994 Genocide," in vol. 21 of Human Rights and Human Welfare, 2002, 23.
E P is a senior at the University of Southern California majoring in
38
39
Genocide, Identity and the State Erik Peterson
e Rwandan Genocide thus represents the corruption of a society by the external
inuence of a colonial relationship and the horric consequences that can result. Belgian
colonialism in Rwanda created the structural basis for the subsequent Rwandan regime and
thereby demonstrates the immense power of the colonial state to shape and inuence society
through the conscious creation and promotion of disparate identities. Colonial relationships
denote broad implications for the impetus and propagation of identity-based conicts. In
1974, tensions between Greek and Turkish Cypriots led to a Turkish invasion that resulted in
thousands of refugees, raped women, and aermath consequences that continue to haunt
Cypriots to this day."
2
e decades of civil war between the terrorist group Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam and Sri Lankan government forces sparked myriad deaths, massacres, and
widespread devastation. And, of course, in 1994, hundreds of thousands deaths resulted
from the Rwandan Genocide.
Each of these conicts evidences the potential ramications of colonial inuence.
Colonial powers seek control through utilization of structural and institutional tools that
manipulate the cultural, psychological, political, social, and ethnic frameworks of each pop-
ulation. e British colonial authority in Cyprus exacerbated the tensions between Turkish
minorities and resentful Greek Cypriots seeking enosis. Likewise, British segregation of po-
litical representation on an ethnic basis built a structural foundation for the divide between
Sinhalese and Tamil ethnic groups that would serve as justication for future violence in Sri
Lanka. In Rwanda, Belgian colonial authorities categorized and quantied the state's popu-
lation and thereby formed ethnic divides based on arbitrary distinctions. is perversion
of the cohesive identity of the Rwandan people laid the foundation for the post-colonial
authoritarian regime to dehumanize its victims by strengthening tensions between fabri-
cated ethnic groups. Ultimately, the nature of each of these conicts is rooted in clashes of
disparate identities. Analysis of the creation and propagation of identity is crucial to under-
standing the nature of the conict.
is paper will seek to examine the foundations and development of colonial inuence
and identity formation through the lens of the Rwandan genocide. is paper will explore
the hypothesis that the subordination of one state to the dominance and control of a colonial
relationship leaves the society vulnerable to corruption that permanently alters the socio-
cultural landscape and function of the state.
e Creation and Propagation of Disparate Identities
Conicts such as those in Sri Lanka, Cyprus, and Rwanda are built upon historical
foundations. Colonialism creates a relationship in which the subordination of one state to
2 Savvas Daniel Georgiades, Public Attitudes towards Peace: e Greek-Cypriot Position," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 44,
No. 3, Sep., 2007, 373.
the control of another leaves the dominated society vulnerable to the eects of the colonial
power's inuence. is can permanently alter the socio-cultural landscape of a state and
build ethnic divides and tension where there was previously coexistence and stable peace.
Colonial authorities seek to coerce subordinate groups into participating in a paradigm in
which their subordination is inexorable. is is accomplished by operating within preexist-
ing structural power dierences of race and class, resulting in a reication and rearmation
of the subordinates' position within society. Furthermore, the colonial authority seeks to
shape the dominated society toward progress, an idea that was a central part of the ideo-
logical framework that supported European imperial projects and explained the hegemony
of European civilizations."
3
e colonial power's primary means of shaping society is the
creation and propagation of disparate identities within a state, which can be wielded to or-
ganize its area of governance.
Oen, in colonial relationships, this injection of a colonial ideology takes the form of
an attempt to modernize and transform the colony with Western and European ideals. is
is accomplished via the interplay between disparate identities and the resulting ideologies
that become embedded within society. Strong, structurally rooted identities can supersede
individual thoughts and beliefs, forming a collective identity. Yet, when such disparate iden-
tities are based o of hatred of the other, they result in dehumanization and conict that
arises through the aegis of these populations themselves. e role of identity in conict is
exemplied by one of John Cockell's six basic categories of preconditions for protracted
social conict: .the polarization of social divisions around communal identity (ethnic,
religious, tribal)."
4
As divisions of identity are rearmed in successive generations, they
gain severity and signicance. Tensions escalate and ultimately lead to protracted conict
that is structurally rooted in the population's identity. Colonial powers produce and embed
these identities within a society for a variety of purposes. Yet regardless of their intent, this
process permanently changes the face of a society and constitutively reinforces the impor-
tance of identity itself.
Rwandas Path to Genocide
Genocide is dened as a form of one-sided mass killing in which the state or other
authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are dened by the
perpetrator."
3
e 1994 Rwandan Genocide falls precisely within these lines in its specic
planning, organized orchestration, and clear designation of the targeted group. Furthermore,
3 Yiannis Papadakis, Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History, and an Island in Conict," in New Anthropologies of Europe, Indi-
ana University Press, 2006, 60.
4 Sarah Holt, Aid, Peacebuilding, and the Resurgence of War: Buying Time in Sri Lanka, Palgrave Macmillan Publishers, 1977,
73.
3 D. Mirkovic, Ethnic conict and genocide: reections on ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia," in Annals, 1996, 197.
38
39
e Rwandan Genocide thus represents the corruption of a society by the external
inuence of a colonial relationship and the horric consequences that can result. Belgian
colonialism in Rwanda created the structural basis for the subsequent Rwandan regime and
thereby demonstrates the immense power of the colonial state to shape and inuence society
through the conscious creation and promotion of disparate identities. Colonial relationships
denote broad implications for the impetus and propagation of identity-based conicts. In
1974, tensions between Greek and Turkish Cypriots led to a Turkish invasion that resulted in
thousands of refugees, raped women, and aermath consequences that continue to haunt
Cypriots to this day."
2
e decades of civil war between the terrorist group Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam and Sri Lankan government forces sparked myriad deaths, massacres, and
widespread devastation. And, of course, in 1994, hundreds of thousands deaths resulted
from the Rwandan Genocide.
Each of these conicts evidences the potential ramications of colonial inuence.
Colonial powers seek control through utilization of structural and institutional tools that
manipulate the cultural, psychological, political, social, and ethnic frameworks of each pop-
ulation. e British colonial authority in Cyprus exacerbated the tensions between Turkish
minorities and resentful Greek Cypriots seeking enosis. Likewise, British segregation of po-
litical representation on an ethnic basis built a structural foundation for the divide between
Sinhalese and Tamil ethnic groups that would serve as justication for future violence in Sri
Lanka. In Rwanda, Belgian colonial authorities categorized and quantied the state's popu-
lation and thereby formed ethnic divides based on arbitrary distinctions. is perversion
of the cohesive identity of the Rwandan people laid the foundation for the post-colonial
authoritarian regime to dehumanize its victims by strengthening tensions between fabri-
cated ethnic groups. Ultimately, the nature of each of these conicts is rooted in clashes of
disparate identities. Analysis of the creation and propagation of identity is crucial to under-
standing the nature of the conict.
is paper will seek to examine the foundations and development of colonial inuence
and identity formation through the lens of the Rwandan genocide. is paper will explore
the hypothesis that the subordination of one state to the dominance and control of a colonial
relationship leaves the society vulnerable to corruption that permanently alters the socio-
cultural landscape and function of the state.
e Creation and Propagation of Disparate Identities
Conicts such as those in Sri Lanka, Cyprus, and Rwanda are built upon historical
foundations. Colonialism creates a relationship in which the subordination of one state to
2 Savvas Daniel Georgiades, Public Attitudes towards Peace: e Greek-Cypriot Position," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 44,
No. 3, Sep., 2007, 373.
the control of another leaves the dominated society vulnerable to the eects of the colonial
power's inuence. is can permanently alter the socio-cultural landscape of a state and
build ethnic divides and tension where there was previously coexistence and stable peace.
Colonial authorities seek to coerce subordinate groups into participating in a paradigm in
which their subordination is inexorable. is is accomplished by operating within preexist-
ing structural power dierences of race and class, resulting in a reication and rearmation
of the subordinates' position within society. Furthermore, the colonial authority seeks to
shape the dominated society toward progress, an idea that was a central part of the ideo-
logical framework that supported European imperial projects and explained the hegemony
of European civilizations."
3
e colonial power's primary means of shaping society is the
creation and propagation of disparate identities within a state, which can be wielded to or-
ganize its area of governance.
Oen, in colonial relationships, this injection of a colonial ideology takes the form of
an attempt to modernize and transform the colony with Western and European ideals. is
is accomplished via the interplay between disparate identities and the resulting ideologies
that become embedded within society. Strong, structurally rooted identities can supersede
individual thoughts and beliefs, forming a collective identity. Yet, when such disparate iden-
tities are based o of hatred of the other, they result in dehumanization and conict that
arises through the aegis of these populations themselves. e role of identity in conict is
exemplied by one of John Cockell's six basic categories of preconditions for protracted
social conict: .the polarization of social divisions around communal identity (ethnic,
religious, tribal)."
4
As divisions of identity are rearmed in successive generations, they
gain severity and signicance. Tensions escalate and ultimately lead to protracted conict
that is structurally rooted in the population's identity. Colonial powers produce and embed
these identities within a society for a variety of purposes. Yet regardless of their intent, this
process permanently changes the face of a society and constitutively reinforces the impor-
tance of identity itself.
Rwandas Path to Genocide
Genocide is dened as a form of one-sided mass killing in which the state or other
authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are dened by the
perpetrator."
3
e 1994 Rwandan Genocide falls precisely within these lines in its specic
planning, organized orchestration, and clear designation of the targeted group. Furthermore,
3 Yiannis Papadakis, Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History, and an Island in Conict," in New Anthropologies of Europe, Indi-
ana University Press, 2006, 60.
4 Sarah Holt, Aid, Peacebuilding, and the Resurgence of War: Buying Time in Sri Lanka, Palgrave Macmillan Publishers, 1977,
73.
3 D. Mirkovic, Ethnic conict and genocide: reections on ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia," in Annals, 1996, 197.
60
61
the genocide was by no means spontaneous, nor was it a sudden conagration of ethnic ten-
sions. Rather, the Rwandan Genocide is rooted in the historical background of Rwanda's
colonization and the eects of the state's aim to maintain power through societal manipula-
tion. Certainly, the genocide by this logic, had its deepest roots in a pre-colonial system
based on the 'premise of inequality'" and the manipulation of these structures toward ease
of governance.
6

Beginning in 1894, Rwanda belonged to German East Africa. Yet aer Germany's defeat
in World War I, the League of Nations Mandate of 1916 appointed Belgium to become the
nation's administrative authority, lasting from 1924 to 1962.
7
e Belgian colonial power
exercised control through the established Tutsi monarchs and chiefs that had historically
ruled Rwanda. In its desire to organize Rwanda and further its indirect power in the Tutsi
monarchy, Belgium developed and promoted the concept of Tutsi superiority over the Hutu
majority. To a signicant eect, prejudicial fabrications inated Tutsi egos inordinately and
crushed Hutu feelings, which coalesced into an aggressively resentful inferiority complex."
8

is development of a power divide was a Belgian manifestation of the Hamitic Hypothesis,
designating that the Tutsi superiority was grounded in their relation to the Hamites and
their creation of the rst civilization and technology in Africa.
9
is divide was further
exacerbated by the 1933-1934 Belgian census and introduction of an identity card system
to mark each Rwandan individual as belonging to the Tutsi, Hutu or Twa ethnic categori-
zations. Qualications for membership to any ethnicity were arbitrary in nature. Ethnic
identication was determined on a patrilineal basis, regardless of the 'ethnicity' of one's
mother. Furthermore, the Hutu-Tutsi designation was also determined by the Belgian 10
cow rule": any male who owned 10 cows was classied as a Tutsi; those with fewer than
10 cows were classied as Hutu."
10
us, ethnic designations closely followed existing so-
ciopolitical and economic structures, furthering the establishment of Tutsis as superior on
an economic basis as well. Likewise, colonial policy intensied this dierentiation by rel-
egating the vast majority of Hutus to particularly onerous forms of forced cultivation.
and by actively favoring Tutsi in access to administrative posts, education, and jobs in the
modern sector."
11
Belgium's direct involvement in Rwandan government ended in 1962
6 Neil Kressel, Mass Hate: e Global Rise of Genocide and Terror, Westview Press, 2002, 97.
7 Magnarella, 23.
8 Magnarella, 23.
9 Edith R. Sanders, e hamitic hyopthesis; its origin and functions in time perspecive," in e Journal of African History,
1969, 321.
10 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda, Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2001, 99.
11 Catharine Newbury, Background to Genocide: Rwanda," Issue: A Journal of Opinion, vol. 23, no. 2, African Studies
Association, 1993, 13.
with Rwandan independence following the UN supervised national election of the Hutu
President Gregoire Kayibanda. However, Belgium's colonial legacy would ultimately con-
tinue to color Rwanda's landscape a bloody red.
Tensions sparked shortly aer independence, and by 1963, the Hutu violently overthrew
King Kigri V and expelled about 130,000 Tutsi to the neighboring countries of Burundi,
Zaire, and Uganda. Tutsi attempts to reenter Rwanda and regain control were used as jus-
tication for the Hutu slaughtering of thousands of Tutsis living within Rwanda between
December 1963 and January 1964. July of 1973 marked the new, radical Hutu dictator regime
of Major Juvnal Habyarimana, whose supporters soon lled all-important governing posi-
tions. Most importantly, Habyarimana maintained and strengthened the use of ethnic iden-
tity card systems, rejected the return of half a million Rwandan refugees, and stirred ultra-
nationalist sentiments within Rwanda. e displaced Tutsi refugees formed the Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF) and eventually, backed by European pressure, the Habyarimana gov-
ernment signed a series of agreements, called the Accords, which reintegrated Tutsis into
Rwanda and infuriated radical Hutu groups. is sparked a fervent campaign by Hutu ex-
tremists of anti-Tutsi propaganda in both print and radio broadcasts, exemplied by Radio
Milles Collines," a station that broadcasted from the capital of Kigali. Such broadcasts were
particularly eective based on the abysmally low literacy rate of Rwanda's rural populations.
Furthermore, the RPF's return to Rwanda stirred the establishment of the Interahamwe, a
Hutu militia that was dispersed across the nation.
e culmination of the tensions between the radical Hutu groups and the Tutsi popu-
lations began on April 6, 1994 when President Habyarimana's plane was shot down near
the Kigali airport, killing the president and everyone on board. Although many scholars
attribute the assassination to pro-Hutu extremists within Habyarimana's military, the Radio
Milles Collines blamed the RPF and UN soldiers for the attack. With such justication, the
Interahamwe quickly established roadblocks and brutally killed any Tutsis they found via the
state-sponsored identity cards. Exploiting radio and print propaganda campaigns, national-
ist extremists and the Interahamwe incited Hutus across the nation to arm themselves with
machetes and slaughter any Tutsis they encountered. e opportunity to loot the economi-
cally superior Tutsis and overcome the Hutu's sense of inferiority was a strong motivator for
neighbor to turn on neighbor. us began the genocide and one of the most concentrated
instances of state-supported murder since Nazi Germany. e genocide continued until July
18th, when the RPF successfully defeated the Interahamwe and declared cease-re.
12
Shortly
aer, the RPF and moderate Hutu groups reestablished control through the formation of a
new government that committed itself to building a multiparty democracy and to discon-
tinuing the ethnic classication system utilized by the previous regime."
13
Rwanda reeled in
12 Magnarella, 27.
13 Magnarella, 28.
60
61
the genocide was by no means spontaneous, nor was it a sudden conagration of ethnic ten-
sions. Rather, the Rwandan Genocide is rooted in the historical background of Rwanda's
colonization and the eects of the state's aim to maintain power through societal manipula-
tion. Certainly, the genocide by this logic, had its deepest roots in a pre-colonial system
based on the 'premise of inequality'" and the manipulation of these structures toward ease
of governance.
6

Beginning in 1894, Rwanda belonged to German East Africa. Yet aer Germany's defeat
in World War I, the League of Nations Mandate of 1916 appointed Belgium to become the
nation's administrative authority, lasting from 1924 to 1962.
7
e Belgian colonial power
exercised control through the established Tutsi monarchs and chiefs that had historically
ruled Rwanda. In its desire to organize Rwanda and further its indirect power in the Tutsi
monarchy, Belgium developed and promoted the concept of Tutsi superiority over the Hutu
majority. To a signicant eect, prejudicial fabrications inated Tutsi egos inordinately and
crushed Hutu feelings, which coalesced into an aggressively resentful inferiority complex."
8

is development of a power divide was a Belgian manifestation of the Hamitic Hypothesis,
designating that the Tutsi superiority was grounded in their relation to the Hamites and
their creation of the rst civilization and technology in Africa.
9
is divide was further
exacerbated by the 1933-1934 Belgian census and introduction of an identity card system
to mark each Rwandan individual as belonging to the Tutsi, Hutu or Twa ethnic categori-
zations. Qualications for membership to any ethnicity were arbitrary in nature. Ethnic
identication was determined on a patrilineal basis, regardless of the 'ethnicity' of one's
mother. Furthermore, the Hutu-Tutsi designation was also determined by the Belgian 10
cow rule": any male who owned 10 cows was classied as a Tutsi; those with fewer than
10 cows were classied as Hutu."
10
us, ethnic designations closely followed existing so-
ciopolitical and economic structures, furthering the establishment of Tutsis as superior on
an economic basis as well. Likewise, colonial policy intensied this dierentiation by rel-
egating the vast majority of Hutus to particularly onerous forms of forced cultivation.
and by actively favoring Tutsi in access to administrative posts, education, and jobs in the
modern sector."
11
Belgium's direct involvement in Rwandan government ended in 1962
6 Neil Kressel, Mass Hate: e Global Rise of Genocide and Terror, Westview Press, 2002, 97.
7 Magnarella, 23.
8 Magnarella, 23.
9 Edith R. Sanders, e hamitic hyopthesis; its origin and functions in time perspecive," in e Journal of African History,
1969, 321.
10 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda, Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2001, 99.
11 Catharine Newbury, Background to Genocide: Rwanda," Issue: A Journal of Opinion, vol. 23, no. 2, African Studies
Association, 1993, 13.
with Rwandan independence following the UN supervised national election of the Hutu
President Gregoire Kayibanda. However, Belgium's colonial legacy would ultimately con-
tinue to color Rwanda's landscape a bloody red.
Tensions sparked shortly aer independence, and by 1963, the Hutu violently overthrew
King Kigri V and expelled about 130,000 Tutsi to the neighboring countries of Burundi,
Zaire, and Uganda. Tutsi attempts to reenter Rwanda and regain control were used as jus-
tication for the Hutu slaughtering of thousands of Tutsis living within Rwanda between
December 1963 and January 1964. July of 1973 marked the new, radical Hutu dictator regime
of Major Juvnal Habyarimana, whose supporters soon lled all-important governing posi-
tions. Most importantly, Habyarimana maintained and strengthened the use of ethnic iden-
tity card systems, rejected the return of half a million Rwandan refugees, and stirred ultra-
nationalist sentiments within Rwanda. e displaced Tutsi refugees formed the Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF) and eventually, backed by European pressure, the Habyarimana gov-
ernment signed a series of agreements, called the Accords, which reintegrated Tutsis into
Rwanda and infuriated radical Hutu groups. is sparked a fervent campaign by Hutu ex-
tremists of anti-Tutsi propaganda in both print and radio broadcasts, exemplied by Radio
Milles Collines," a station that broadcasted from the capital of Kigali. Such broadcasts were
particularly eective based on the abysmally low literacy rate of Rwanda's rural populations.
Furthermore, the RPF's return to Rwanda stirred the establishment of the Interahamwe, a
Hutu militia that was dispersed across the nation.
e culmination of the tensions between the radical Hutu groups and the Tutsi popu-
lations began on April 6, 1994 when President Habyarimana's plane was shot down near
the Kigali airport, killing the president and everyone on board. Although many scholars
attribute the assassination to pro-Hutu extremists within Habyarimana's military, the Radio
Milles Collines blamed the RPF and UN soldiers for the attack. With such justication, the
Interahamwe quickly established roadblocks and brutally killed any Tutsis they found via the
state-sponsored identity cards. Exploiting radio and print propaganda campaigns, national-
ist extremists and the Interahamwe incited Hutus across the nation to arm themselves with
machetes and slaughter any Tutsis they encountered. e opportunity to loot the economi-
cally superior Tutsis and overcome the Hutu's sense of inferiority was a strong motivator for
neighbor to turn on neighbor. us began the genocide and one of the most concentrated
instances of state-supported murder since Nazi Germany. e genocide continued until July
18th, when the RPF successfully defeated the Interahamwe and declared cease-re.
12
Shortly
aer, the RPF and moderate Hutu groups reestablished control through the formation of a
new government that committed itself to building a multiparty democracy and to discon-
tinuing the ethnic classication system utilized by the previous regime."
13
Rwanda reeled in
12 Magnarella, 27.
13 Magnarella, 28.
62
63
the aermath of the genocide. Every established structure and facet of society was demol-
ished and rebuilt with the intent to wipe clean Rwanda's history and begin anew. Although
the horrors of the genocide would never be forgotten, Rwanda's culture quickly bent itself
toward a rejection of previous ethnic classications and popular sentiments widely ignored
the Hutu or Tutsi status. Ethnic labels are now outlawed by the Rwandan Government of
National Unity, yet their legacy of dierentiation in morality, class, and status still perme-
ates the framework of Rwandan social relationships and yields an unspoken, yet powerful,
hierarchy.
14
e Dominant Perpetrator
e historical context and development of the Rwandan Genocide provides a unique
perspective into the power of states to shape and inuence society. When the dominant
power exploits the subjugation of a society, it creates an opportunity to radically inuence
its cultural, social, and political framework. e dominant power's tool is the creation and
propagation of disparate identities within a society, which the state can wield to organize
its area of governance. ese identities are produced and embedded within a society by a
variety of techniques and for a variety of purposes. Yet regardless of their intent, this process
permanently changes the face of a society and constitutively reinforces the importance of
identity itself. And as exemplied by Rwanda's genocide, this embedding may present un-
intended consequences and directions for a society when such disparate identities become
malicious in nature.
Colonial states possess the ability to change the society of another, but require a domi-
nant position. Accomplished through the establishment of a power divide between the dom-
inant state and the subordinate, the colonial state can eectively exercise control and thereby
wield tools to inuence the subordinate state's society. e Belgian, and earlier German,
control in Rwanda ltered through structures of tribal rule and Tutsi monarchies. Belgian
ocials, clergy, and soldiers implemented their directives with the voice of the Tutsi elite,
exploiting the preexisting concept of pre-colonial 'premise of inequality' which justied
and legitimated the Tutsi aristocracy's power through a notion of inherited and immutable
interracial dierences in ability and make-up."
13
In this way, the Belgian authority instated
a dominant-subordinate relationship between itself and Rwanda through the reication of
existing dominant-subordinate class structures between the Tutsi and Hutu. In its promo-
tion of the 'premise of inequality,' Belgium linked itself to forms of domination based on
14 Laura Eramian, Situating ethnic dierence: Personhood, power, and the 1994 genocide in Butare, Rwanda, York University,
Canada, 2011, ProQuest Dissertations and eses, 337.
13 J. J. Maquet, e Premise of Inequality in Rwanda: a study of political relations in a Central African Kingdom, London,
Oxford University Press, 1961, 18.
a premise or claim to inherent superiority by ruling elites."
16
erein, Belgium garnered
power through the re-appropriation and strengthening of Rwanda's historical structures of
dominance. Use of such structures enabled a subversive means of control and thus bolstered
the ecacy of Belgian policies and strategies of governance: e Belgian colonial period
saw signicantly more cooperation across the institutions comprising the colonial state
system."
17
Belgian authority similarly gained dominion over and compliance from the Tutsi
ruling elite through adherence to traditional power structures, reinforcing the legitimacy
of Tutsi superiority. e historical and scientically based superiority of the Tutsi people
became a tool for Belgium: Mytho-historical imaginings oen underpin state eorts to.
mandate their support for the state."
18
Tutsi cooperation was assured by the structural, cul-
tural, social, political, and economical benets they received during the colonial era and the
Rwandan nationalistic sentiments promoted by Belgium. Compounded with the League of
Nations' Mandate of 1916 that gave international legitimacy to the colonization of Rwanda
and the subjugation of its people, Belgium asserted and secured its authority in Rwanda by
solidifying its dominant-subordinate relationship.
e Power of Identity as a Tool
e primary means of control and inuence of a state to society lies in the state's ability
to generate and shape the formation of identity. e dominant nature of the state permits
the inuencing of the structural framework to create identity and inject the state's version
of truth and reality into the collective thought of a society. e dominant ideology, repre-
sented by the state, operates to conceal or misrepresent aspects of social relations that, if
apprehended directly, would be damaging to the interests of dominant elites."
19
e state's
ideology seeks to deceive and coerce populations into cooperation with its ideals. is is ac-
complished in two fashions: the establishment of thick and thin versions of false conscious-
ness. e state inuences the dominant elite within a society (who are subordinate to the
state) through thick false consciousness by persuading the subordinate groups to believe
actively in the values that explain and justify their own subordination."
20
is process re-
sults from the elites' cooperation with the state, promoted by their own increase in power
and control. e colonial state likewise exercises ideological power in the form of thin ver-
sions of consciousness via the subordinates within society. It seeks to achieve compliance
by convincing subordinate groups that the social order in which they live is natural and
16 James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts of Moorestown Friends' School, Yale University,
1990, 12.
17 Eramian, 86.
18 Barry Sautman, Peking Man and the Politics of Paleoanthropoligical Nationalism in China," in e Journal of Asian
Studies vol. 60, no. 1, Association for Asian Studies, 2001, 110.
19 Scott, 71.
20 Scott, 71.
62
63
the aermath of the genocide. Every established structure and facet of society was demol-
ished and rebuilt with the intent to wipe clean Rwanda's history and begin anew. Although
the horrors of the genocide would never be forgotten, Rwanda's culture quickly bent itself
toward a rejection of previous ethnic classications and popular sentiments widely ignored
the Hutu or Tutsi status. Ethnic labels are now outlawed by the Rwandan Government of
National Unity, yet their legacy of dierentiation in morality, class, and status still perme-
ates the framework of Rwandan social relationships and yields an unspoken, yet powerful,
hierarchy.
14
e Dominant Perpetrator
e historical context and development of the Rwandan Genocide provides a unique
perspective into the power of states to shape and inuence society. When the dominant
power exploits the subjugation of a society, it creates an opportunity to radically inuence
its cultural, social, and political framework. e dominant power's tool is the creation and
propagation of disparate identities within a society, which the state can wield to organize
its area of governance. ese identities are produced and embedded within a society by a
variety of techniques and for a variety of purposes. Yet regardless of their intent, this process
permanently changes the face of a society and constitutively reinforces the importance of
identity itself. And as exemplied by Rwanda's genocide, this embedding may present un-
intended consequences and directions for a society when such disparate identities become
malicious in nature.
Colonial states possess the ability to change the society of another, but require a domi-
nant position. Accomplished through the establishment of a power divide between the dom-
inant state and the subordinate, the colonial state can eectively exercise control and thereby
wield tools to inuence the subordinate state's society. e Belgian, and earlier German,
control in Rwanda ltered through structures of tribal rule and Tutsi monarchies. Belgian
ocials, clergy, and soldiers implemented their directives with the voice of the Tutsi elite,
exploiting the preexisting concept of pre-colonial 'premise of inequality' which justied
and legitimated the Tutsi aristocracy's power through a notion of inherited and immutable
interracial dierences in ability and make-up."
13
In this way, the Belgian authority instated
a dominant-subordinate relationship between itself and Rwanda through the reication of
existing dominant-subordinate class structures between the Tutsi and Hutu. In its promo-
tion of the 'premise of inequality,' Belgium linked itself to forms of domination based on
14 Laura Eramian, Situating ethnic dierence: Personhood, power, and the 1994 genocide in Butare, Rwanda, York University,
Canada, 2011, ProQuest Dissertations and eses, 337.
13 J. J. Maquet, e Premise of Inequality in Rwanda: a study of political relations in a Central African Kingdom, London,
Oxford University Press, 1961, 18.
a premise or claim to inherent superiority by ruling elites."
16
erein, Belgium garnered
power through the re-appropriation and strengthening of Rwanda's historical structures of
dominance. Use of such structures enabled a subversive means of control and thus bolstered
the ecacy of Belgian policies and strategies of governance: e Belgian colonial period
saw signicantly more cooperation across the institutions comprising the colonial state
system."
17
Belgian authority similarly gained dominion over and compliance from the Tutsi
ruling elite through adherence to traditional power structures, reinforcing the legitimacy
of Tutsi superiority. e historical and scientically based superiority of the Tutsi people
became a tool for Belgium: Mytho-historical imaginings oen underpin state eorts to.
mandate their support for the state."
18
Tutsi cooperation was assured by the structural, cul-
tural, social, political, and economical benets they received during the colonial era and the
Rwandan nationalistic sentiments promoted by Belgium. Compounded with the League of
Nations' Mandate of 1916 that gave international legitimacy to the colonization of Rwanda
and the subjugation of its people, Belgium asserted and secured its authority in Rwanda by
solidifying its dominant-subordinate relationship.
e Power of Identity as a Tool
e primary means of control and inuence of a state to society lies in the state's ability
to generate and shape the formation of identity. e dominant nature of the state permits
the inuencing of the structural framework to create identity and inject the state's version
of truth and reality into the collective thought of a society. e dominant ideology, repre-
sented by the state, operates to conceal or misrepresent aspects of social relations that, if
apprehended directly, would be damaging to the interests of dominant elites."
19
e state's
ideology seeks to deceive and coerce populations into cooperation with its ideals. is is ac-
complished in two fashions: the establishment of thick and thin versions of false conscious-
ness. e state inuences the dominant elite within a society (who are subordinate to the
state) through thick false consciousness by persuading the subordinate groups to believe
actively in the values that explain and justify their own subordination."
20
is process re-
sults from the elites' cooperation with the state, promoted by their own increase in power
and control. e colonial state likewise exercises ideological power in the form of thin ver-
sions of consciousness via the subordinates within society. It seeks to achieve compliance
by convincing subordinate groups that the social order in which they live is natural and
16 James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts of Moorestown Friends' School, Yale University,
1990, 12.
17 Eramian, 86.
18 Barry Sautman, Peking Man and the Politics of Paleoanthropoligical Nationalism in China," in e Journal of Asian
Studies vol. 60, no. 1, Association for Asian Studies, 2001, 110.
19 Scott, 71.
20 Scott, 71.
64
63
inevitable."
21
e state can do so by abiding by preexisting structural power dierentials,
reifying and rearming the subordinates' position within society. ese reications can
become embedded and pervasive, and highly detrimental to the stability of the society.
Oen, states wield the arousal of nationalist and patriotic sentiments as a powerful tool in
mobilizing public support" and thereby bolster belief in the power of a colonial state, fur-
thering its cause through the strengthening of state-created identities.
22
us, the process
and consequence of colonial interference marks a foundational aspect of the development
of the Rwandan Genocide in the Hutu extremists' projection of their identity and anti-Tutsi
ideals to the larger Hutu majority.
e Fabrication of Identity in Rwanda
e colonial authority of Belgium sought to shape identities in Rwanda in order to re-
inforce Belgian authority, increase ease of governance, and eventually bring Rwanda to the
modern era with an elite that could put Rwanda among the ranks of modern nation-states
in the absence of European guidance."
23
With a basis in the existing tribal Tutsi elite, this
production of a modernized ruling elite for Rwanda invariably forged power dierentials
between rival ethnic groups. us, colonial ruling practices resulted in the establishment of
disparate identities between the Tutsi and Hutu, and were manifested in a variety of ways.
First, the Belgian census of 1933-34 introduced an identity card system that categorized
and quantied arbitrary distinctions into racial separations. e creation of previously un-
realized categories gave Rwandans distinct identities that weakened the concept of a uni-
ed Rwandan national identity: colonial authorities were using increasingly sophisticated
administrative means.building on the principle of ethno-racial hierarchies."
24
e census
had the ultimate eect of naming and dening racial categorizations and uniquely distin-
guished between Hutu and Tutsi. ese disparate Hutu and Tutsi identities were further
strengthened in by the promotion of a modernized Tutsi ruling class. e colonial power
set up boarding schools, producing an educated elite who quite literally had one foot in the
world of the Rwandans and one in the world of the Europeans."
23
Such schools gave access
only to an elite few, favoring and educating the historically powerful Tutsi. Furthermore, in-
stitutionalized language training beyond Kinyarwanda conferred power almost exclusively
to the Tutsi as virtually no Hutu were educated in French. us, only Tutsi were capable of
21 Scott, 71.
22 William I. Zartman, Peacemaking In International Conict: Methods and Techniques, Rev. ed., United States Institute of
Peace, 2007, 83.
23 Eramian, 81.
24 Benedict Anderson, Census, Map and Museum" in Imagined Communities: Reections on the Origin and Spread of Nation-
alism, Revised edition, London, 1991, 247.
23 Eramian, 79.
communicating with the Belgian colonizers, relying on the colonial language rather than
the common Swahili. Access to the French language quickly became synonymous with
power in Rwanda because of the dierential access to 'the modern' and to colonial routines
of governance."
26

To a similar eect, colonial rule organized education, religion, administration and the
military around the accepted racial superiority of the Tutsi. With education, Tutsi were
enabled to fulll roles of governance and administrative positions as well as to shape the
framework of Rwanda's politics. Belgian placement of Tutsi in the leadership of the imposed
Christian religion conferred the ideological power of religion to the Tutsi people. And nal-
ly, Tutsi military leadership gave Tutsi control over the state's means of direct coercion and
violence. Ultimately, the Belgian administration between 1916 and 1923 produced struc-
tural transformations that contributed extensively to the consolidation of colonial power
and Tutsi-Hutu opposition," demonstrating that the overall eect of the Belgians and Tutsi
elite was the wholesale support and elevation of the Batutsi over the Bahutu."
27

e Consequences of a Division in Identity
is establishment of a modernized elite essentially portrayed the Tutsi in Rwandan
society as foreign and more European than a true Rwandan. erein, colonial institutions
based on Tutsi ethnic superiority proved subversive of Batutsi and monarchial hegemony."
28

e elevated status of Tutsi legitimated Hutu displeasure and resentment of their societal
standing. e newly emergent Hutu elite sought an expression of societal subjugation in
racial terms, and Catholicism gave added impetus to this crystallization of a sense of group
oppression and resentment against the Batutsi en masse."
29
As traditional tribal religious
structures had been replaced by the colonial insertion of Catholicism, the pre-colonial
and historical component of Tutsi rule was lost. is occurred when colonial power weak-
ened religious belief systems and clan structures, creating a monolithic division between
Hutu and Tutsi identities, and starting to dissolve the ideological glue of Rwandan monar-
chial society."
30
Economically disadvantaged and societally inferior, the Hutu emphasized
the Tutsi relationship with the Belgian colonization and rejected the superiority of their
'modernization.' e Tutsi elite was constructed as the alien invader unworthy of status as
Rwandan.
26 Eramian, 80.
27 Eramian, 87.
28 Helen M Hintjens, Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda," in e Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 37, no. 2,
1999, 233.
29 Hintjens, 233.
30 Hintjens, 234.
64
63
inevitable."
21
e state can do so by abiding by preexisting structural power dierentials,
reifying and rearming the subordinates' position within society. ese reications can
become embedded and pervasive, and highly detrimental to the stability of the society.
Oen, states wield the arousal of nationalist and patriotic sentiments as a powerful tool in
mobilizing public support" and thereby bolster belief in the power of a colonial state, fur-
thering its cause through the strengthening of state-created identities.
22
us, the process
and consequence of colonial interference marks a foundational aspect of the development
of the Rwandan Genocide in the Hutu extremists' projection of their identity and anti-Tutsi
ideals to the larger Hutu majority.
e Fabrication of Identity in Rwanda
e colonial authority of Belgium sought to shape identities in Rwanda in order to re-
inforce Belgian authority, increase ease of governance, and eventually bring Rwanda to the
modern era with an elite that could put Rwanda among the ranks of modern nation-states
in the absence of European guidance."
23
With a basis in the existing tribal Tutsi elite, this
production of a modernized ruling elite for Rwanda invariably forged power dierentials
between rival ethnic groups. us, colonial ruling practices resulted in the establishment of
disparate identities between the Tutsi and Hutu, and were manifested in a variety of ways.
First, the Belgian census of 1933-34 introduced an identity card system that categorized
and quantied arbitrary distinctions into racial separations. e creation of previously un-
realized categories gave Rwandans distinct identities that weakened the concept of a uni-
ed Rwandan national identity: colonial authorities were using increasingly sophisticated
administrative means.building on the principle of ethno-racial hierarchies."
24
e census
had the ultimate eect of naming and dening racial categorizations and uniquely distin-
guished between Hutu and Tutsi. ese disparate Hutu and Tutsi identities were further
strengthened in by the promotion of a modernized Tutsi ruling class. e colonial power
set up boarding schools, producing an educated elite who quite literally had one foot in the
world of the Rwandans and one in the world of the Europeans."
23
Such schools gave access
only to an elite few, favoring and educating the historically powerful Tutsi. Furthermore, in-
stitutionalized language training beyond Kinyarwanda conferred power almost exclusively
to the Tutsi as virtually no Hutu were educated in French. us, only Tutsi were capable of
21 Scott, 71.
22 William I. Zartman, Peacemaking In International Conict: Methods and Techniques, Rev. ed., United States Institute of
Peace, 2007, 83.
23 Eramian, 81.
24 Benedict Anderson, Census, Map and Museum" in Imagined Communities: Reections on the Origin and Spread of Nation-
alism, Revised edition, London, 1991, 247.
23 Eramian, 79.
communicating with the Belgian colonizers, relying on the colonial language rather than
the common Swahili. Access to the French language quickly became synonymous with
power in Rwanda because of the dierential access to 'the modern' and to colonial routines
of governance."
26

To a similar eect, colonial rule organized education, religion, administration and the
military around the accepted racial superiority of the Tutsi. With education, Tutsi were
enabled to fulll roles of governance and administrative positions as well as to shape the
framework of Rwanda's politics. Belgian placement of Tutsi in the leadership of the imposed
Christian religion conferred the ideological power of religion to the Tutsi people. And nal-
ly, Tutsi military leadership gave Tutsi control over the state's means of direct coercion and
violence. Ultimately, the Belgian administration between 1916 and 1923 produced struc-
tural transformations that contributed extensively to the consolidation of colonial power
and Tutsi-Hutu opposition," demonstrating that the overall eect of the Belgians and Tutsi
elite was the wholesale support and elevation of the Batutsi over the Bahutu."
27

e Consequences of a Division in Identity
is establishment of a modernized elite essentially portrayed the Tutsi in Rwandan
society as foreign and more European than a true Rwandan. erein, colonial institutions
based on Tutsi ethnic superiority proved subversive of Batutsi and monarchial hegemony."
28

e elevated status of Tutsi legitimated Hutu displeasure and resentment of their societal
standing. e newly emergent Hutu elite sought an expression of societal subjugation in
racial terms, and Catholicism gave added impetus to this crystallization of a sense of group
oppression and resentment against the Batutsi en masse."
29
As traditional tribal religious
structures had been replaced by the colonial insertion of Catholicism, the pre-colonial
and historical component of Tutsi rule was lost. is occurred when colonial power weak-
ened religious belief systems and clan structures, creating a monolithic division between
Hutu and Tutsi identities, and starting to dissolve the ideological glue of Rwandan monar-
chial society."
30
Economically disadvantaged and societally inferior, the Hutu emphasized
the Tutsi relationship with the Belgian colonization and rejected the superiority of their
'modernization.' e Tutsi elite was constructed as the alien invader unworthy of status as
Rwandan.
26 Eramian, 80.
27 Eramian, 87.
28 Helen M Hintjens, Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda," in e Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 37, no. 2,
1999, 233.
29 Hintjens, 233.
30 Hintjens, 234.
66
67
e void of an accepted elite in Rwandan society facilitated the intensication of the
Hutu hidden transcript",a privileged site for nonhegemonic, contrapuntual, dissident, sub-
versive discourse."
31
A subversive discourse enabled the Hutu to solidify and dene their
resentment of the dominant power and their frustration with their subordinate position.
e consequence of this Tutsi alienation and Hutu frustration was expressed in the Hutu
Revolution of 1939, wherein power was wrested from the Tutsi elite and the Hutu ascended
to rule. In response to the rise of Hutu rule, Belgian authorities quickly changed allegiances,
supporting the Hutu ethnic group that could maintain its power. e same principles co-
lonial authority had applied to the historically superior Tutsi class, now transferred to the
Hutu. Led by Abbe Kagame and Gregoire Kayibanda, the Hutu leadership created e
Bahutu Manifesto of 1937," which expressed the Hutu desire to end Tutsi dominance once
and for all. [and] defended the need for racial markers on identity cards."
32
Clearly, racial
categorizations were now rmly established and grounded in the social and cultural frame-
work of Rwanda. e disparate nature of the Hutu and Tutsi identities stigmatized the other
and created signicant tension that would lead to widespread violence: e origin of the
violence is connected to how Hutu and Tutsi were constructed as political identities by the
colonial state, Hutu as indigenous and Tutsi as alien."
33
e Foundation for Genocide by Dominant Inuence
An analysis of the rise and fall of Tutsi elites via the policies of colonial powers evidences
the unique ability of states to inuence society and impose ideology. e creation of iden-
tities through categorization and quantication with the intent of increased ease of gover-
nance eectively transformed pre and post-colonial Rwandan society. Although scholarship
disputes the specic terms used to describe the pre-colonial Hutu and Tutsi relationship,
it is evident that the Hutus and the Tutsis were probably two distinct ethnic groups that
time has culturally homogenized.and biologically mingled."
34
Yet the aermath of Belgium
colonialism demonstrates the ability of the state to erase cultural and biological factors in a
society. A previously cohesive population of Rwandans was stratied by specic techniques
of governance and the creation of identities, regardless of the established cultural homogeni-
zation and biological similarities. A unied Rwanda was broken in two. Ultimately, this ri
in Rwandan society laid the groundwork for the genocide that was to come. e pluralized
31 Scott, 23.
32 Hintjens, 233.
33 Mamdani, 99.
34 John A Berry and Carol Pott Berry, editors, Genocide in Rwanda: A Collective Memory, Washington, D.C., Howard Univer-
sity Press, 1999, 28.
Rwandan society impacted the relations between Hutu and Tutsi and constrain[ed] the
ability of these groups to respond to one another in a constructive way."
33

Aer Rwandan independence from Belgian rule in 1962 and the creation of e Hutu
Manifesto," tensions between the two groups continued to escalate and violence began. e
Rwandan state, now controlled by the Hutu regime of Major Juvnal Habyarimana, em-
ployed a variety of tactics to further popular sentiments against the alien Tutsi and justify
state-sponsored violence. By redirecting the population's strong sense of social solidarity
and cultural cohesion toward a common 'racial' enemy within the country, the political
architects of the I994 genocide were to destroy almost totally any sense of social cohesion
within Rwanda."
36
Fresh from their oppressive and subjugated position within Rwandan
society, Hutus fought tooth and nail" to maintain their power and prevent any possibility
of losing it. Radio and print propaganda campaigns projected the extremist Hutu identity
throughout Rwanda, oen fabricating stories of Tutsi violence and greed, convincing many
of the illiterate Hutu that the Tutsi were Rwanda's enemy. Hutu leadership also re-appropri-
ated the tenets of the Hamitic Hypothesis, declaring that the superior and foreign origins of
the Tutsi mandated their expulsion from Rwanda. Likewise, Tutsis were subjected to similar
limitations that the Hutus had experienced during the colonial era: strict quotas on higher
education and public employment. Violence that was entirely ignored by the state was like-
wise justied by the economic crisis that plagued Rwanda. e Hutu, adamant of their right
to prosperity and power, perpetrated violence against the Tutsi, evidencing how minority
groups, particularly those excluded from dominant society, become an easy scapegoat for
the deprivation felt on the part of the major society and a visible target for those who wish
to plunder."
37

Violence and societal subordination jarred harshly with the Tutsi superiority complex.
Infuriated by their social standing and fearful of the Hutu attacks that were increasing in
frequency and severity, many Tutsi ed to the neighboring states of Uganda and Burundi
and created the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which took its power from its ocials' high
statuses in the Ugandan political structure. e RPF and newly established Interahamwe
clashed violently over years following Rwandan independence. e RPF 'invasion' into
Rwanda was the nal justication needed for the Hutu regime to begin an orchestrated and
widespread removal of Tutsi within Rwanda. It is clear that the ideology of the hierarchy
of races" instituted by colonial powers had far more devastating eects in Rwanda.than
could ever have been imagined by the.European ethnographers who rst propounded
33 Stacey Gibson, e Role of Structures and Institutions in the genocide of the Rwandan Tutsi and the Armenians of the
Ottoman Empire," in Journal of Genocidal Research, Routledge Publishing, 2010, 308.
36 Hintjens, 249.
37 W. P. Zenner, Middlemen minorities and genocide," in, Genocide and the Modern Age: Case Studies of Mass Death, editors,
I. Wallimann and M. N. Dobkowski, New York, Greenwood Press, 1991, 23.
66
67
e void of an accepted elite in Rwandan society facilitated the intensication of the
Hutu hidden transcript",a privileged site for nonhegemonic, contrapuntual, dissident, sub-
versive discourse."
31
A subversive discourse enabled the Hutu to solidify and dene their
resentment of the dominant power and their frustration with their subordinate position.
e consequence of this Tutsi alienation and Hutu frustration was expressed in the Hutu
Revolution of 1939, wherein power was wrested from the Tutsi elite and the Hutu ascended
to rule. In response to the rise of Hutu rule, Belgian authorities quickly changed allegiances,
supporting the Hutu ethnic group that could maintain its power. e same principles co-
lonial authority had applied to the historically superior Tutsi class, now transferred to the
Hutu. Led by Abbe Kagame and Gregoire Kayibanda, the Hutu leadership created e
Bahutu Manifesto of 1937," which expressed the Hutu desire to end Tutsi dominance once
and for all. [and] defended the need for racial markers on identity cards."
32
Clearly, racial
categorizations were now rmly established and grounded in the social and cultural frame-
work of Rwanda. e disparate nature of the Hutu and Tutsi identities stigmatized the other
and created signicant tension that would lead to widespread violence: e origin of the
violence is connected to how Hutu and Tutsi were constructed as political identities by the
colonial state, Hutu as indigenous and Tutsi as alien."
33
e Foundation for Genocide by Dominant Inuence
An analysis of the rise and fall of Tutsi elites via the policies of colonial powers evidences
the unique ability of states to inuence society and impose ideology. e creation of iden-
tities through categorization and quantication with the intent of increased ease of gover-
nance eectively transformed pre and post-colonial Rwandan society. Although scholarship
disputes the specic terms used to describe the pre-colonial Hutu and Tutsi relationship,
it is evident that the Hutus and the Tutsis were probably two distinct ethnic groups that
time has culturally homogenized.and biologically mingled."
34
Yet the aermath of Belgium
colonialism demonstrates the ability of the state to erase cultural and biological factors in a
society. A previously cohesive population of Rwandans was stratied by specic techniques
of governance and the creation of identities, regardless of the established cultural homogeni-
zation and biological similarities. A unied Rwanda was broken in two. Ultimately, this ri
in Rwandan society laid the groundwork for the genocide that was to come. e pluralized
31 Scott, 23.
32 Hintjens, 233.
33 Mamdani, 99.
34 John A Berry and Carol Pott Berry, editors, Genocide in Rwanda: A Collective Memory, Washington, D.C., Howard Univer-
sity Press, 1999, 28.
Rwandan society impacted the relations between Hutu and Tutsi and constrain[ed] the
ability of these groups to respond to one another in a constructive way."
33

Aer Rwandan independence from Belgian rule in 1962 and the creation of e Hutu
Manifesto," tensions between the two groups continued to escalate and violence began. e
Rwandan state, now controlled by the Hutu regime of Major Juvnal Habyarimana, em-
ployed a variety of tactics to further popular sentiments against the alien Tutsi and justify
state-sponsored violence. By redirecting the population's strong sense of social solidarity
and cultural cohesion toward a common 'racial' enemy within the country, the political
architects of the I994 genocide were to destroy almost totally any sense of social cohesion
within Rwanda."
36
Fresh from their oppressive and subjugated position within Rwandan
society, Hutus fought tooth and nail" to maintain their power and prevent any possibility
of losing it. Radio and print propaganda campaigns projected the extremist Hutu identity
throughout Rwanda, oen fabricating stories of Tutsi violence and greed, convincing many
of the illiterate Hutu that the Tutsi were Rwanda's enemy. Hutu leadership also re-appropri-
ated the tenets of the Hamitic Hypothesis, declaring that the superior and foreign origins of
the Tutsi mandated their expulsion from Rwanda. Likewise, Tutsis were subjected to similar
limitations that the Hutus had experienced during the colonial era: strict quotas on higher
education and public employment. Violence that was entirely ignored by the state was like-
wise justied by the economic crisis that plagued Rwanda. e Hutu, adamant of their right
to prosperity and power, perpetrated violence against the Tutsi, evidencing how minority
groups, particularly those excluded from dominant society, become an easy scapegoat for
the deprivation felt on the part of the major society and a visible target for those who wish
to plunder."
37

Violence and societal subordination jarred harshly with the Tutsi superiority complex.
Infuriated by their social standing and fearful of the Hutu attacks that were increasing in
frequency and severity, many Tutsi ed to the neighboring states of Uganda and Burundi
and created the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which took its power from its ocials' high
statuses in the Ugandan political structure. e RPF and newly established Interahamwe
clashed violently over years following Rwandan independence. e RPF 'invasion' into
Rwanda was the nal justication needed for the Hutu regime to begin an orchestrated and
widespread removal of Tutsi within Rwanda. It is clear that the ideology of the hierarchy
of races" instituted by colonial powers had far more devastating eects in Rwanda.than
could ever have been imagined by the.European ethnographers who rst propounded
33 Stacey Gibson, e Role of Structures and Institutions in the genocide of the Rwandan Tutsi and the Armenians of the
Ottoman Empire," in Journal of Genocidal Research, Routledge Publishing, 2010, 308.
36 Hintjens, 249.
37 W. P. Zenner, Middlemen minorities and genocide," in, Genocide and the Modern Age: Case Studies of Mass Death, editors,
I. Wallimann and M. N. Dobkowski, New York, Greenwood Press, 1991, 23.
68
69
such theories."
38
Indeed, in a fantasy Africa without European intervention, the exploit-
ative Tutsi monarchy might have persisted, and, in this manner, genocide would have been
avoided."
39
e Resolution of Disparate Identities
e signicance of identity in protracted conicts evidences the necessity for a means
for societies to restructure societies against the inuence of colonial powers. Disparate iden-
tities present a challenging obstacle to such interaction because structurally rooted senti-
ments of hatred, fear, and distrust create divisions between communities and individuals,
constraining the ability of these groups to respond to one another in a constructive way."
40

erefore, disparate identities must be overcome and clashing communities unied into a
cohesive society capable of coexistence. Overcoming identity conicts can be accomplished,
not necessarily through a rejection of ethnic or historical dierences or a denial of diversity
in ideology, but rather through building a unifying peacemaking identity, facilitating nego-
tiations, and peace building. Such an attempt does not imply that past grievances and his-
torical traumas have been forgotten. [but] simply implies that a process has been set into
motion that addresses the central needs and fears of the societies and establishes continuing
mechanisms to confront them."
41

ese continuing mechanisms" serve to establish a shared hybrid identity between two
groups, representing the most eective means of producing a structurally enforced environ-
ment conducive to successful negotiation and peacemaking. Identity conicts are embed-
ded within societal frameworks and perpetuated through narratives. If historical memory
and memory entrepreneurship can be channeled to inuence perception of a shared iden-
tity, the root cause of conict can be changed and the inuence of colonialism's societal
interference can be shaken. rough the acceptance of a mutually agreed upon historical
narrative, disparate communities can reconcile past grievances and undermine the consti-
tutive eect of their clashes of identity. Such narratives enforce the formation of a hybrid
identity, which can be forged through a variety of techniques and strategies.
42

e formation of hybrid identities must combat the eects of attribution theory and
mirror imaging between groups. Attribution theory describes how, when observing the
behavior of others, people have a strong tendency to make dispositional attributions - to
commit what has been called the 'fundamental attribution error. when explaining the
38 Hintjens, 233.
39 Kressel, 98.
40 Gibson, 308.
41 Zartman, 67.
42 Douglas Becker, Memory Entrepreneurship and the Reagan Legacy Project: Partisanship, Misinterpretation, Manipula-
tion," in Global Governance: Political Authority in Transition, International Studies Association, 2011, 1-43.
causes of their own behavior, people are much more likely to make situational attributions."
43

Negative attribution of blame to another's identity simply reinforces the division between
disparate identities, providing seemingly sound reasons for individuals and communities
to loathe and fear. Likewise, disparate identity groups tend to exhibit a mirroring process in
which both parties tend to develop parallel images of self and other, except with the sign
reversed; that is, the two parties have similarly positive self-images and similarly negative
enemy images."
44
Diering groups within society must not see each other as polar opposites
that only recognize the positive aspects in themselves and focus exclusively on the negative
aspects of the adversary. Hybridity within a new overarching identity can be encouraged by
creating structural and psychological commitments to a peaceful, cooperative relationship,
breaking the conict spirals initiated by mirror images and developing communication pat-
terns to allow new information to challenge old assumptions."
43

Such a process mandates a reevaluation of a state's education systems to build the foun-
dation for a new unied peacemaking identity in future generations. e sentiments of
hatred and fear have become embedded within the framework and paradigm of older gener-
ations and can prove dicult to change. ough this remains the case, younger generations
provide a valuable opportunity to alter the pervasiveness of negative historical memory
and use memory entrepreneurship to reshape traditional negative perceptions and focus on
similarities between identity groups. Education systems are one of the most powerful ways
in which disparate identities are transmitted and propagated: An education system can act
as a repository for a conict, keeping alive memories and interpretations of history that sup-
port one side of a conict and denigrate the other. Because education shapes and transmits
values, it can serve as a battleground where dierent communities compete over history and
the society's narratives."
46
Yet, since education shapes and transmits values" it can likewise
instill a unifying identity in future generations. Historical memory and memory entrepre-
neurship paint history in accordance with specic viewpoints and paradigms. Education
that addresses historical memory undermines disparate identities in favor of hybrid ones
and therefore can also provide a means out of the war, fostering attitudes of openness, toler-
ance, and responsibility and creating the skills necessary for a lasting peace."
47
Furthermore,
education systems emphasizing conict resolution can prepare generations to bring about
43 Zartman, 97.
44 Zartman, 92.
43 Zartman, 101.
46 Zartman, 328.
47 Zartman, 339.
68
69
such theories."
38
Indeed, in a fantasy Africa without European intervention, the exploit-
ative Tutsi monarchy might have persisted, and, in this manner, genocide would have been
avoided."
39
e Resolution of Disparate Identities
e signicance of identity in protracted conicts evidences the necessity for a means
for societies to restructure societies against the inuence of colonial powers. Disparate iden-
tities present a challenging obstacle to such interaction because structurally rooted senti-
ments of hatred, fear, and distrust create divisions between communities and individuals,
constraining the ability of these groups to respond to one another in a constructive way."
40

erefore, disparate identities must be overcome and clashing communities unied into a
cohesive society capable of coexistence. Overcoming identity conicts can be accomplished,
not necessarily through a rejection of ethnic or historical dierences or a denial of diversity
in ideology, but rather through building a unifying peacemaking identity, facilitating nego-
tiations, and peace building. Such an attempt does not imply that past grievances and his-
torical traumas have been forgotten. [but] simply implies that a process has been set into
motion that addresses the central needs and fears of the societies and establishes continuing
mechanisms to confront them."
41

ese continuing mechanisms" serve to establish a shared hybrid identity between two
groups, representing the most eective means of producing a structurally enforced environ-
ment conducive to successful negotiation and peacemaking. Identity conicts are embed-
ded within societal frameworks and perpetuated through narratives. If historical memory
and memory entrepreneurship can be channeled to inuence perception of a shared iden-
tity, the root cause of conict can be changed and the inuence of colonialism's societal
interference can be shaken. rough the acceptance of a mutually agreed upon historical
narrative, disparate communities can reconcile past grievances and undermine the consti-
tutive eect of their clashes of identity. Such narratives enforce the formation of a hybrid
identity, which can be forged through a variety of techniques and strategies.
42

e formation of hybrid identities must combat the eects of attribution theory and
mirror imaging between groups. Attribution theory describes how, when observing the
behavior of others, people have a strong tendency to make dispositional attributions - to
commit what has been called the 'fundamental attribution error. when explaining the
38 Hintjens, 233.
39 Kressel, 98.
40 Gibson, 308.
41 Zartman, 67.
42 Douglas Becker, Memory Entrepreneurship and the Reagan Legacy Project: Partisanship, Misinterpretation, Manipula-
tion," in Global Governance: Political Authority in Transition, International Studies Association, 2011, 1-43.
causes of their own behavior, people are much more likely to make situational attributions."
43

Negative attribution of blame to another's identity simply reinforces the division between
disparate identities, providing seemingly sound reasons for individuals and communities
to loathe and fear. Likewise, disparate identity groups tend to exhibit a mirroring process in
which both parties tend to develop parallel images of self and other, except with the sign
reversed; that is, the two parties have similarly positive self-images and similarly negative
enemy images."
44
Diering groups within society must not see each other as polar opposites
that only recognize the positive aspects in themselves and focus exclusively on the negative
aspects of the adversary. Hybridity within a new overarching identity can be encouraged by
creating structural and psychological commitments to a peaceful, cooperative relationship,
breaking the conict spirals initiated by mirror images and developing communication pat-
terns to allow new information to challenge old assumptions."
43

Such a process mandates a reevaluation of a state's education systems to build the foun-
dation for a new unied peacemaking identity in future generations. e sentiments of
hatred and fear have become embedded within the framework and paradigm of older gener-
ations and can prove dicult to change. ough this remains the case, younger generations
provide a valuable opportunity to alter the pervasiveness of negative historical memory
and use memory entrepreneurship to reshape traditional negative perceptions and focus on
similarities between identity groups. Education systems are one of the most powerful ways
in which disparate identities are transmitted and propagated: An education system can act
as a repository for a conict, keeping alive memories and interpretations of history that sup-
port one side of a conict and denigrate the other. Because education shapes and transmits
values, it can serve as a battleground where dierent communities compete over history and
the society's narratives."
46
Yet, since education shapes and transmits values" it can likewise
instill a unifying identity in future generations. Historical memory and memory entrepre-
neurship paint history in accordance with specic viewpoints and paradigms. Education
that addresses historical memory undermines disparate identities in favor of hybrid ones
and therefore can also provide a means out of the war, fostering attitudes of openness, toler-
ance, and responsibility and creating the skills necessary for a lasting peace."
47
Furthermore,
education systems emphasizing conict resolution can prepare generations to bring about
43 Zartman, 97.
44 Zartman, 92.
43 Zartman, 101.
46 Zartman, 328.
47 Zartman, 339.
70
71
peace by enabling an understanding of the dynamics of conict in the world and the role of
democratic international institutions in building a more peaceful global society."
48
Unifying hybrid identities can also be established by addressing how identity conict
is .a process driven by collective needs and fears, rather than entirely a product of ra-
tional calculation of objective national interests."
49
Identities oen coalesce around col-
lective needs and fears. Perceived threats of the 'other' cause individuals to band together
around mutually shared concerns. ese fears vary; they can be economic concerns, fears
of physical safety, or institutionally and generationally instilled misconceptions regarding
the 'other'. Rwanda evidences the importance of addressing collective needs and fears as the
Hutu majority, perceiving the Tutsi as a biological and social threat, moved to exterminate
them and committed genocide. is genocide emphasizes the inuence of economic and
political disparities between communities and the resentment that they can foster in the af-
termath of a colonial power disparity. Rwanda's future thus requires a combination of long-
term economic and political development goals, as well as through the transformation of
hatred through reection and forgiveness, which could be encouraged by political leaders.
is perspective moves beyond the structural dimensions.and recognizes the inherently
human aspect of wars."
30
By undermining the remnants of colonial societal interference, the
supporting foundations that enable identities to rationalize and justify their disparities can
be altered and the root cause of an identity-based conict can be addressed.
Understanding identity provides a framework for analyzing the interactions of clashing
groups and, more importantly, illuminates the path toward eectively counteracting the det-
rimental consequences of a state's subordinate position to a colonial power. e promotion
of a hybrid identity to be adopted by future generations represents the most eective means
of resolving an identity-based conict. Reication of a new identity must encourage the
parties to penetrate each other's perspectives, to dierentiate their image of the enemy.and
to generate ideas for resolving the conict that are responsive to the fundamental needs and
fears of both sides."
31
e creation of hybrid identities does not advocate pure homogeneity,
but rather mutual understanding and respect. Refusing to acknowledge ethnicity or dier-
ence, whether fabricated or natural, does not remove the underlying framework nor does it
change how strongly the ideologies of ethnic dierence are still embedded within society.
us, hybrid identities must seek to preserve the sanctity of each separate group while fo-
cusing the similarities that can serve to join them. e power of addressing identity and un-
dermining colonial inuence lies in its ecacy in changing the structural, ideological, and
48 William J. Campbell, Toward a Global Community: Educating for Tomorrows World, Asian-Pacic Educational Research
Association, Springer Publications, 2006.
49 Zartman, 64.
30 Holt, 33.
31 Zartman, 102.
foundational barriers to negotiations and peace building. Historical memory and memory
entrepreneurship, trauma and forgiveness, can all serve to unite a people through a hybrid
identity to be reied and armed through future generations.
Conclusions on the Power of the Dominant
e development of the genocide in Rwanda evidences the ability of a state to exploit
the disparate identities within a society to achieve its own ends. Furthermore, it demon-
strates the unpredictable potential of such fervent identity formation in a society at the
hands of a colonial state. e very tools used by colonial powers for increased governance
changed the structure of Rwandan society and thereby made possible the massive violence
that resulted once European governance was removed. is is exemplied in the process of
the vilication of one identity in opposition to state interests, which is used to stir hatred
and eliminate any threat to the state's stability. e Hutu majority, perceiving the Tutsi as a
biological and social threat, moved to exterminate them and genocide began. is vilica-
tion became the majority opinion and was integral to Hutu identity and the justication for
individual murder: any murder of the Tutsi came to be perceived as constituting an act of
self-defense, because evil incarnate was now threatening to destroy the peaceful agrarian
democratic Hutu republic.it was a matter of survival."
32

In this way, the true power of the state is revealed. By inserting its own ideology into the
social framework of another state, the dominant state creates disparate identities that can be
used to exercise control and establish power dierentials. By working within the frame the
dominant state has created, it is enabled to govern eciently. However, crisis can arise once
the original dominant-subordinate relationship is deconstructed, leaving behind a fabri-
cated and unnatural system of interaction between imagined identities. is process, while
exacerbated by economic crisis or political turmoil, can take place in fully functioning and
stable states. e most necessary condition for a clash or crisis of identities is simply the fab-
rication of those identities themselves. eir articial nature and their existence as a creation
of a powerful dominant state give such identities incredible persistence and pervasiveness.
ey become so deeply embedded within society that the framework and capacity of the
society itself is constitutively altered by the interplay of the identities. us, when analyz-
ing the Rwandan genocide and its development via the creation of inauthentic and articial
ethnic identities, it becomes clear that any pre-colonial foundations for violence never could
have escalated to genocide without the inuence of an external state. States garner control
via the revivication of ethnic identities, placing ethnically dened categories in opposition
against each other.the intensication of ethnic conict was not the result of a 'collapsed
32 Prunier, 226.
70
71
peace by enabling an understanding of the dynamics of conict in the world and the role of
democratic international institutions in building a more peaceful global society."
48
Unifying hybrid identities can also be established by addressing how identity conict
is .a process driven by collective needs and fears, rather than entirely a product of ra-
tional calculation of objective national interests."
49
Identities oen coalesce around col-
lective needs and fears. Perceived threats of the 'other' cause individuals to band together
around mutually shared concerns. ese fears vary; they can be economic concerns, fears
of physical safety, or institutionally and generationally instilled misconceptions regarding
the 'other'. Rwanda evidences the importance of addressing collective needs and fears as the
Hutu majority, perceiving the Tutsi as a biological and social threat, moved to exterminate
them and committed genocide. is genocide emphasizes the inuence of economic and
political disparities between communities and the resentment that they can foster in the af-
termath of a colonial power disparity. Rwanda's future thus requires a combination of long-
term economic and political development goals, as well as through the transformation of
hatred through reection and forgiveness, which could be encouraged by political leaders.
is perspective moves beyond the structural dimensions.and recognizes the inherently
human aspect of wars."
30
By undermining the remnants of colonial societal interference, the
supporting foundations that enable identities to rationalize and justify their disparities can
be altered and the root cause of an identity-based conict can be addressed.
Understanding identity provides a framework for analyzing the interactions of clashing
groups and, more importantly, illuminates the path toward eectively counteracting the det-
rimental consequences of a state's subordinate position to a colonial power. e promotion
of a hybrid identity to be adopted by future generations represents the most eective means
of resolving an identity-based conict. Reication of a new identity must encourage the
parties to penetrate each other's perspectives, to dierentiate their image of the enemy.and
to generate ideas for resolving the conict that are responsive to the fundamental needs and
fears of both sides."
31
e creation of hybrid identities does not advocate pure homogeneity,
but rather mutual understanding and respect. Refusing to acknowledge ethnicity or dier-
ence, whether fabricated or natural, does not remove the underlying framework nor does it
change how strongly the ideologies of ethnic dierence are still embedded within society.
us, hybrid identities must seek to preserve the sanctity of each separate group while fo-
cusing the similarities that can serve to join them. e power of addressing identity and un-
dermining colonial inuence lies in its ecacy in changing the structural, ideological, and
48 William J. Campbell, Toward a Global Community: Educating for Tomorrows World, Asian-Pacic Educational Research
Association, Springer Publications, 2006.
49 Zartman, 64.
30 Holt, 33.
31 Zartman, 102.
foundational barriers to negotiations and peace building. Historical memory and memory
entrepreneurship, trauma and forgiveness, can all serve to unite a people through a hybrid
identity to be reied and armed through future generations.
Conclusions on the Power of the Dominant
e development of the genocide in Rwanda evidences the ability of a state to exploit
the disparate identities within a society to achieve its own ends. Furthermore, it demon-
strates the unpredictable potential of such fervent identity formation in a society at the
hands of a colonial state. e very tools used by colonial powers for increased governance
changed the structure of Rwandan society and thereby made possible the massive violence
that resulted once European governance was removed. is is exemplied in the process of
the vilication of one identity in opposition to state interests, which is used to stir hatred
and eliminate any threat to the state's stability. e Hutu majority, perceiving the Tutsi as a
biological and social threat, moved to exterminate them and genocide began. is vilica-
tion became the majority opinion and was integral to Hutu identity and the justication for
individual murder: any murder of the Tutsi came to be perceived as constituting an act of
self-defense, because evil incarnate was now threatening to destroy the peaceful agrarian
democratic Hutu republic.it was a matter of survival."
32

In this way, the true power of the state is revealed. By inserting its own ideology into the
social framework of another state, the dominant state creates disparate identities that can be
used to exercise control and establish power dierentials. By working within the frame the
dominant state has created, it is enabled to govern eciently. However, crisis can arise once
the original dominant-subordinate relationship is deconstructed, leaving behind a fabri-
cated and unnatural system of interaction between imagined identities. is process, while
exacerbated by economic crisis or political turmoil, can take place in fully functioning and
stable states. e most necessary condition for a clash or crisis of identities is simply the fab-
rication of those identities themselves. eir articial nature and their existence as a creation
of a powerful dominant state give such identities incredible persistence and pervasiveness.
ey become so deeply embedded within society that the framework and capacity of the
society itself is constitutively altered by the interplay of the identities. us, when analyz-
ing the Rwandan genocide and its development via the creation of inauthentic and articial
ethnic identities, it becomes clear that any pre-colonial foundations for violence never could
have escalated to genocide without the inuence of an external state. States garner control
via the revivication of ethnic identities, placing ethnically dened categories in opposition
against each other.the intensication of ethnic conict was not the result of a 'collapsed
32 Prunier, 226.
72
73
state'.in this case ethnic conict served to illustrate state power in action; in Rwanda, the
'ethnic conict' of 1994 was simply state sponsored terrorism against its own citizens."
33

Yet it can be argued that the decisions of individuals within the Rwandan Genocide
reveal a deviation from this concept. Many rural Hutus strove to hide and protect their
neighboring Tutsi from the rampaging Interahamwe and the roaming mobs of machete-
armed Hutu extremists. Such Hutus were murdered next to Tutsi when directly confronted
by the Interahamwe and refused to commit genocide. However, the power of identity to stir
conict is maintained. ese Hutu, who deviated from the violence of their socially estab-
lished identity, are simply those who escaped or rejected the adoption of an anti-Tutsi ide-
ology. In refusing to acknowledge the Tutsi as inhuman and worthy of extermination, these
Hutu deviants linked their identity to that of the subordinate Tutsi. In the eyes of the Hutu
majority, this was a betrayal of the prevailing Hutu identity and thus these Tutsi sympathiz-
ers represented a similar threat worthy of extermination.
Aer the successful intervention of the RPF, the defeat of the Interahamwe and the
end of the 1994 genocide, Rwanda entered a period of reconstruction. e modern regime
is ocially opposed to ethnic identication of groups of peoples and individuals, and has
removed ethnic labels from identity cards."
34
Such a rejection of ethnically based identi-
ties may be seen as progressing away from the divisive social framework of pre-genocide
Rwanda. However, this notion is awed. While the power of these identities may diminish
over time as future generations become further and further removed from the genocide,
modern Rwanda still reels from their eects. e state-mandated and culturally supported
ignoring of all ethnic classications actually reies the power of these classications and
marks ethnicity as hugely signicant. Refusing to overtly acknowledge ethnicity does not
remove the underlying framework nor does it change how strongly the ideologies of ethnic
dierence are still embedded within Rwandan society.
By tracing the progression of genocide through colonial Rwanda to the modern era, the
ultimate power of the state's inuence over society can be analyzed. e injection of ideology
via the formation of identity incites permanent structural changes that become embedded
within a culture and the minds of a nation's people. e subordination of one state to another
enables the dominant power to inict its will upon the subordinate's society via the fabrica-
tion of articial identity. eir permanence and pervasiveness emphasizes that identity is
one of the most powerful tools a state can wield, yet its eects can wreak devastating and
unpredictable consequences. Although the genocide occurred under the aegis of Rwandans
themselves, the external inuence of colonial powers and their resulting eects must be
33 Newbury, 13.
34 Hintjens, 279.
addressed to adequately understand how, in such a small period of time, the foundations
could be laid for neighbor to murder neighbor and a nation to slaughter its children.
Works Cited
Anderson, Benedict. Census, Map and Museum." Imagined Communities: Reections on
the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Revised edition. London 1991. 163-183.
Becker, Douglas, Memory Entrepreneurship and the Reagan Legacy Project: Partisanship,
Misinterpretation, Manipulation," International Studies Association. Global Gover-
nance: Political Authority in Transition. 2011. 1-43.
Berry, John A. and Berry, Carol Pott, eds., Genocide in Rwanda: A Collective Memory. Wash-
ington, D.C., Howard University Press, 1999.
Campbell, William J. Toward a Global Community: Educating for Tomorrows World. Asian-
Pacic Educational Research Association. Springer Publications. 2006.
Eramian, Laura. 2011. Situating Ethnic Dierence: Personhood, Power, and the 1994 Geno-
cide in Butare, Rwanda. York University, Canada. ProQuest Dissertations and eses.
Georgiades, Savvas Daniel. Public Attitudes towards Peace: e Greek-Cypriot Position,"
Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 44, No. 3 2007. 373-386.
Gibson, Stacey. e Role of Structures and Institutions in the genocide of the Rwandan
Tutsi and the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire," Journal of Genocidal Research. Rout-
ledge Publishing, 2010.
Hintjens, Helen M. Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda," e Journal of Modern Af-
rican Studies. Vol. 37, No. 2 1999. 241-286
Holt, Sarah. Aid, Peacebuilding, and the Resurgence of War: Buying Time in Sri Lanka."
Palgrave Macmillan Publishers, 1977.
Kressel, Neil. Mass Hate: e Global Rise of Genocide and Terror. Westview Press, Jan, 2002.
Magnarella, Paul. Explaining Rwanda's 1994 Genocide." Human Rights and Human Wel-
fare. Vol 21 2002.
Mamdani, Mahmood. When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Geno-
cide in Rwanda. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2001. 364.
Maquet, J. J. e Premise of Inequality in Rwanda: a study of political relations in a Central
African Kingdom. London: Oxford University Press, 1961.
Mirkovic, D. Ethnic conict and genocide: reections on ethnic cleansing in the former
Yugoslavia," Annals, 1996.
72
73
state'.in this case ethnic conict served to illustrate state power in action; in Rwanda, the
'ethnic conict' of 1994 was simply state sponsored terrorism against its own citizens."
33

Yet it can be argued that the decisions of individuals within the Rwandan Genocide
reveal a deviation from this concept. Many rural Hutus strove to hide and protect their
neighboring Tutsi from the rampaging Interahamwe and the roaming mobs of machete-
armed Hutu extremists. Such Hutus were murdered next to Tutsi when directly confronted
by the Interahamwe and refused to commit genocide. However, the power of identity to stir
conict is maintained. ese Hutu, who deviated from the violence of their socially estab-
lished identity, are simply those who escaped or rejected the adoption of an anti-Tutsi ide-
ology. In refusing to acknowledge the Tutsi as inhuman and worthy of extermination, these
Hutu deviants linked their identity to that of the subordinate Tutsi. In the eyes of the Hutu
majority, this was a betrayal of the prevailing Hutu identity and thus these Tutsi sympathiz-
ers represented a similar threat worthy of extermination.
Aer the successful intervention of the RPF, the defeat of the Interahamwe and the
end of the 1994 genocide, Rwanda entered a period of reconstruction. e modern regime
is ocially opposed to ethnic identication of groups of peoples and individuals, and has
removed ethnic labels from identity cards."
34
Such a rejection of ethnically based identi-
ties may be seen as progressing away from the divisive social framework of pre-genocide
Rwanda. However, this notion is awed. While the power of these identities may diminish
over time as future generations become further and further removed from the genocide,
modern Rwanda still reels from their eects. e state-mandated and culturally supported
ignoring of all ethnic classications actually reies the power of these classications and
marks ethnicity as hugely signicant. Refusing to overtly acknowledge ethnicity does not
remove the underlying framework nor does it change how strongly the ideologies of ethnic
dierence are still embedded within Rwandan society.
By tracing the progression of genocide through colonial Rwanda to the modern era, the
ultimate power of the state's inuence over society can be analyzed. e injection of ideology
via the formation of identity incites permanent structural changes that become embedded
within a culture and the minds of a nation's people. e subordination of one state to another
enables the dominant power to inict its will upon the subordinate's society via the fabrica-
tion of articial identity. eir permanence and pervasiveness emphasizes that identity is
one of the most powerful tools a state can wield, yet its eects can wreak devastating and
unpredictable consequences. Although the genocide occurred under the aegis of Rwandans
themselves, the external inuence of colonial powers and their resulting eects must be
33 Newbury, 13.
34 Hintjens, 279.
addressed to adequately understand how, in such a small period of time, the foundations
could be laid for neighbor to murder neighbor and a nation to slaughter its children.
Works Cited
Anderson, Benedict. Census, Map and Museum." Imagined Communities: Reections on
the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Revised edition. London 1991. 163-183.
Becker, Douglas, Memory Entrepreneurship and the Reagan Legacy Project: Partisanship,
Misinterpretation, Manipulation," International Studies Association. Global Gover-
nance: Political Authority in Transition. 2011. 1-43.
Berry, John A. and Berry, Carol Pott, eds., Genocide in Rwanda: A Collective Memory. Wash-
ington, D.C., Howard University Press, 1999.
Campbell, William J. Toward a Global Community: Educating for Tomorrows World. Asian-
Pacic Educational Research Association. Springer Publications. 2006.
Eramian, Laura. 2011. Situating Ethnic Dierence: Personhood, Power, and the 1994 Geno-
cide in Butare, Rwanda. York University, Canada. ProQuest Dissertations and eses.
Georgiades, Savvas Daniel. Public Attitudes towards Peace: e Greek-Cypriot Position,"
Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 44, No. 3 2007. 373-386.
Gibson, Stacey. e Role of Structures and Institutions in the genocide of the Rwandan
Tutsi and the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire," Journal of Genocidal Research. Rout-
ledge Publishing, 2010.
Hintjens, Helen M. Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda," e Journal of Modern Af-
rican Studies. Vol. 37, No. 2 1999. 241-286
Holt, Sarah. Aid, Peacebuilding, and the Resurgence of War: Buying Time in Sri Lanka."
Palgrave Macmillan Publishers, 1977.
Kressel, Neil. Mass Hate: e Global Rise of Genocide and Terror. Westview Press, Jan, 2002.
Magnarella, Paul. Explaining Rwanda's 1994 Genocide." Human Rights and Human Wel-
fare. Vol 21 2002.
Mamdani, Mahmood. When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Geno-
cide in Rwanda. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2001. 364.
Maquet, J. J. e Premise of Inequality in Rwanda: a study of political relations in a Central
African Kingdom. London: Oxford University Press, 1961.
Mirkovic, D. Ethnic conict and genocide: reections on ethnic cleansing in the former
Yugoslavia," Annals, 1996.
74
Erik Peterson
Newbury, Catharine. Background to Genocide: Rwanda." Issue: A Journal of Opinion, Vol.
23, No. 2, African Studies Association, 1993. 12-17
Papadakis, Yiannis. Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History, and an Island in Conict," New
anthropologies of Europe. Indiana University Press, 2006.
Prunier, G.. e Rwandan Crisis: History of a Genocide. London, Hurst, 1998.
Sanders, Edith R. e hamitic hyopthesis; its origin and functions in time perspecive." e
Journal of African History, 10 1969. 321-332.
Sautman, Barry. Peking Man and the Politics of Paleoanthropoligical Nationalism in Chi-
na." e Journal of Asian Studies. Association for Asian Studies. Vol. 60, No. 1 2001.
93-124.
Scott, James C. Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. Moorestown
Friends' School, Yale University, 1990.
Zartman, William I. Peacemaking In International Conict: Methods and Techniques. United
States Institute of Peace. Rev. ed., 2007.
Zenner, W. P. Middlemen minorities and genocide," in I. Wallimann and M. N. Dobkows-
ki, eds, Genocide and the Modern Age: Case Studies of Mass Death. New York, Green-
wood Press, 1991. 233-261.

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