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Petitioner Consolacion Sioson (CONSOLACION) and respondent Remedios S. Eugenio-Gino (REMEDIOS) are the niece and granddaughter, respectively, of the late Canuto Sioson (CANUTO). CANUTO and 11 other individuals, including his sister Catalina and his brother Victoriano, were co-owners of a parcel of land in Navotas. The property, known as Lot 2 was owned by CATALINA, CANUTO, and VICTORIANO. Each owned an aliquot 10/70 share or 1,335 square meters. On 20 November 1951, CANUTO had Lot 2 surveyed and subdivided into eight lots (Lot Nos. 2-A to 2-H) through Subdivision Plan which the Director of Lands approved on 30 May 1952. Lot No. 2-A, and Lot No. 2E, were placed under CANUTOs name. Three other individuals took the remaining lots. Later, CANUTO and CONSOLACION executed a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan ("KASULATAN") where CANUTO sold his 10/70 share in Lot 2 in favor of CONSOLACION for P2,250.00. CONSOLACION immediately took possession of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E. She later declared the land for taxation purposes and paid the corresponding real estate taxes. After 2 years, the surviving children of CANUTO, namely, Felicidad and Beatriz, executed a joint affidavit ("JOINT AFFIDAVIT") affirming the KASULATAN in favor of CONSOLACION. They also attested that the lots their father had sold to CONSOLACION were Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E of Subdivision Plan. CONSOLACION registered the KASULATAN and the JOINT AFFIDAVIT with the Register of Deeds who issued to CONSOLACION TCT covering Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E. REMEDIOS filed a complaint against CONSOLACION and her spouse Ricardo Pascual in the RTC for "Annulment or Cancellation of TCT and Damages." REMEDIOS claimed that she is the owner of Lot Nos. 2A and 2-E because CATALINA devised these lots to her in CATALINAs last will and testament ("LAST WILL") dated 29 May 1964. REMEDIOS added that CONSOLACION obtained title to these lots through fraudulent means since the area covered by TCT (232252) 1321 is twice the size of CANUTOs share in Lot 2. Petitioners sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground of prescription. Petitioners claimed that the basis of the action is fraud, and REMEDIOS should have filed the action within four years from the registration of CONSOLACIONs title. RTC denied Remedios claim and dismissed the case since her action prescribed already. They said she knew about the petitioners adverse title since she testified against petitioners in an ejectment suit which was filed more than 4 years before she filed her case. Furthermore, RTC ruled that REMEDIOS has no right of action against petitioners because CATALINAs LAST WILL from which REMEDIOS claims to derive her title has not been admitted to probate. Since Under Article 838 of the Civil Code, no will passes real or personal property unless it is allowed in probate in accordance with the Rules of Court. The CA reversed their judgement and held that what REMEDIOS filed was a suit to enforce an implied trust allegedly created in her favor when CONSOLACION fraudulently registered her title over Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E. Consequently, the prescriptive period for filing the complaint is ten years for breach of implied trust, not four. Also, the appellate court held that CATALINAs unprobated LAST WILL does not preclude REMEDIOS from seeking reconveyance of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E as the LAST WILL may subsequently be admitted to probate. The Issues
(1) whether prescription bars the action filed by REMEDIOS (2) whether REMEDIOS is a real party-in-interest. HELD:
What REMEDIOS filed was an action to enforce an implied trust but the same is already barred by prescription. Since Prescriptive Period is 10 Years Counted From Registration of Adverse Title For the 2nd issue. Respondent is Not a Real Party-in-Interest. Not only does prescription bar REMEDIOS complaint. REMEDIOS is also not a real party-in-interest who can file the complaint, as the trial court correctly ruled. Therefore she lacks a cause of action.
REMEDIOS anchored her claim over Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E (or over its one-half portion) on the devise of these lots to her under CATALINAs LAST WILL. However, the trial court found that the probate court did not issue any order admitting the LAST WILL to probate. REMEDIOS does not contest this finding. Indeed, during the trial, REMEDIOS admitted that Special Proceedings Case No. C-208 is still pending. Article 838 of the Civil Code states that "[N]o will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court." This Court has interpreted this provision to mean, "until admitted to probate, [a will] has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder." REMEDIOS anchors her right in filing this suit on her being a devisee of CATALINAs LAST WILL. However, since the probate court has not admitted CATALINAs LAST WILL, REMEDIOS has not acquired any right under the LAST WILL. REMEDIOS is thus without any cause of action either to seek reconveyance of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E or to enforce an implied trust over these lots. The appellate court tried to go around this deficiency by ordering the reconveyance of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E to REMEDIOS in her capacity as executrix of CATALINAs LAST WILL. This is inappropriate because REMEDIOS sued petitioners not in such capacity but as the alleged owner of the disputed lots. Union Bank v. Santibanez 452 SCRA 228 | Abu
FACTS: On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim Santibaez entered into a loan agreement in the amount of P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the payment of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations. On Dec. 1980, FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement for the payment of another unit of Ford 6600 and one unit of a Rotamotor. Again, Efraim and Edmund executed a promissory note and a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the later loan. In 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City. Edmund was appointed as the special administrator of the estate. During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence, executed a Joint Agreement, wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors: (2) tractors for Edmund and (1) for Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them. In the meantime, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and between FCCC and Union Bank, wherein the FCCC assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Bank. Demand letters were sent by Union Bank to Edmund, but the latter refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, Union Bank filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibaez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City. Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there was no information on his address or the date of his return to the Philippines. Florence filed her Answer and alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to Union Bank under the joint agreement. Union Bank asserts that the obligation of the deceased had passed to his legitimate heirs (Edmund and Florence) as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; and that the unconditional signing of the joint agreement estopped Florence, and that she cannot deny her liability under the said document. In her comment to the petition, Florence maintains that Union Bank is trying to recover a sum of money from the deceased Efraim Santibaez; thus the claim should have been filed with the probate court. She points out that at the time of the execution of the joint agreement there was already an existing probate proceedings. She asserts that even if the agreement was voluntarily executed by her and her brother Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the approval of the court as it may prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties. ISSUE: W/N the claim of Union Bank should have been filed with the probate court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibaez was pending. W/N the agreement between Edmund and Florence (which was in effect, a partition of hte estate) was void considering that it had not been approved by the probate court. W/N there can be a valid partition among the heirs before the will is probated.
HELD: Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered. The said court is primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate. In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated. In the present case, Efraim left a holographic will which contained the provision which reads as follows: (e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and Florence, my children. The above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing all the properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his mind at that time he was making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late fathers holographic will covering the said tractors. The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The bank, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibaez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court. The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is mandatory. This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold Florence accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibaez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty.
Rafael Maninang and Soledad Maninang, Petitioners Vs. Court of Appeals, Hon. Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr. and Bernardo S. Aseneta
Facts: On May 21, 1977, Clemencia Aseneta, single, died leaving a holographic will which provides that all her real and personal properties shall be inherited by Dra. Soledad L. Maninang, after which a petition for the probate of the will was filed by the petitioner at CFI Quezon City while private respondent on the other hand instituted intestate proceedings at CFI Pasig, Rizal being the adopted child and claims to be the sole heir of the decedent. Both cases were being consolidated in CFI Rizal. A motion to dismiss the Testate case was filed by the private respondent on the ground that the holographic will was null and void because he as the only compulsory heir was preterited. Petitioner in her opposition averred that it is still the rule that in case for probate of the will, the courts area of inquiry is limited to an examination of and resolution on the extrinsic validity of the will. Trial court as sustained by the Court of Appeals denied the opposition thus this case. Issue: Whether under the terms of the decedents Will, private respondent has been preterited or disinherited and was it a valid disinheritance.
Held: The court made a distinction between preterition and disinheritance stating that Preterition consist in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein or they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited, while, disinheritance is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heirs of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. It continued that by virtue of the dismissal of the testate case, the determination of the controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered and opined that the conclusion of the trial court that private respondent was preterited was not indubitable reading it from the face of the will.
Remedios Nuguid, Petitioner Vs. Felix Nuguid and Paz Nuguid, Oppositor
Facts: Rosario Nuguid died single without descendants. Surviving her was her parents the oppositor and six brothers and sisters. She left a will wherein the petioner submitted for probate and prayed for the letters of administration be issued to her. On opposition the parents said that by the institution of the petitioner as universal heir of the deceased, compulsory heirs in the direct line were illegally preterited thus the institution is void. Issue: Whether the compulsory heirs of the direct line were illegally preterited. Held: Studying the facts and the law applicable to the case, oppositors received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime neither they were expressly disinherited a clear case of preterition. The one-sentence will of the testator institute the petitioner as the sole, universal heir nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that the court says that the nullity is complete. There is no escaping the conclusion that the universal institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance results in totally abrogating the will.
Constantino C. Acain, Petitioner Vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson, Respondents
Facts: On May 29, 1984 petitioner, one of the children of Segundino Acain who was designated to received all the properties of the testator his brother upon his death who however predeceased said testator, filed a petition for a probate of the will of Nemesio Acain and for the issuance of letters testamentary on the premise that Nemesio Acain died leaving a will in which petitioners and his siblings were instituted as heirs. Motion to dismiss was filed by the private respondents on the grounds that petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings as he is merely a universal heir and the widow and adopted daughter were preterited. Issue: Whether or not private respondents have been preterited. Held: Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein or, they are neither instituted as heir nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, preterition may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir and that she is not of the direct line.
The adopted daughter however, whose legal adoption has not been questioned by the petitioner cannot be denied that she has totally omitted and preterited in the will and that both were deprived of at least their legitime. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child. The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.