Aggravating

Circumstances:

Classes,

Common

police, including policeman Rosacker, ascended a telephone pole, so as to enter a window of the house. Other policemen, headed by Townsend, broke in the outer door. Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the police. One of them

Features, Respective Peculiarities, Their Requisites People vs Veloso [G.R. No. 23051. October 20, 1925.] Facts: The building located in the City of Manila was used by an organization known as the Parliamentary Club. Jose Veloso was at that time a member of the House of Representatives of the Philippine Legislature. He was also the manager of the club. The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club was nothing more than a gambling house. J. F. Townsend, the chief of the gambling squad, had been to the club and verified this fact. As a result, Detective Andres Geronimo of the secret service of the City of Manila, applied for, and obtained a search warrant from Judge Garduno of the municipal court. Thus provided, the police attempted to raid the Parliamentary Club. They found the doors to the premises closed and barred. Accordingly, one band of

was the defendant Veloso. Veloso resisted the arrest. At last the patience of the officers was exhausted. So policeman Rosacker took hold of Veloso only to meet with his resistance. Veloso bit Rosacker on the right forearm, and gave him a blow in another part of the body, which injured the policeman quite severely. Those who were arrested were eventually acquitted in the Court of First Instance for lack of proof, with the sole exception of Veloso, who was found guilty of maintaining a gambling house. This case reached the appellate court where the accused was finally sentenced to pay a fine of P500 Issue: Held:

CRIMINAL LAW; RESISTANCE OF THE AGENTS OF THE AUTHORITY. V, the manager of a club in the City of Manila, forcibly resisted the police when the club was raided as a gambling house V bit a policeman on the right forearm and gave him a blow in another part of the body. V resisted being placed in the patrol wagon and shouted offensive epithets against the police department. Held: That V was guilty of the crime of resistance of the agents of the authority in violation of article 252 of the Penal Code. 2 CONSTITUTIONAL SEARCH LAW; SEARCHES "JOHN AND DOE" SEIZURES; WARRANTS;

4.

ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. The warrant will always be

construed strictly without, however, going the full length of requiring technical accuracy. 5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DESCRIPTION OF PLACE. A description a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended. 6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. The affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant described the building to be searched as "the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands." Held: That this was a sufficient designation of the premises to be searched. 7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF OFFICER TO TAKE OF PROPERTY FOUND ON THE POSSESSION

WARRANTS. By the eleventh and eighteenth paragraphs of the Philippine Bill of Rights, as found in the present Organic Act, and by various provisions of the Philippine Code of Criminal Procedure, the security of the dwelling and the person is guaranteed. 3. ID.; ID,; ID.; ID. A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and statutory provisions under which it is issued. Otherwise, it is void.

PERSON ARRESTED. An officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his person, which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime, or which may furnish the person arrested with the means of committing violence or of escaping, or which may be

used as evidence on the trial of the cause, but not otherwise. (Moreno vs. Ago Chi [1909], 12 Phil., 439.) 8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DESCRIPTION OF PERSON. The warrant for the apprehension of an unnamed party is void, "except in those cases where it contains a descriptio personae such as will enable the officer to identify the accused." The description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person upon whom the warrant is to be served. 9. ID; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. The affidavit and the search warrant stated that "John Doe has illegally in his possession in the building occupied by him, and which is under his control, namely, in the building numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands, certain devices and effects used in violation of the Gambling Law." Held: That the police could identity John Doe as V without difficulty, and that the search warrant is valid. People vs Pantoja [G.R. No. L-18793. 1968.] October 11, Facts: A group of seven young men serenaded the house, where Estelita Erotes lived. Invited to come up, the young men accepted the invitation. When Wenceslao Hernandez was seated beside Estelita, an uninvited Philippine Army Sergeant, Getulio Pantoja, in T-shirt, came up and asked Hernandez to allow him to sit beside Estelita, but Hernandez refused the request. Pantoja said nothing and showed no sign of anger. However, he immediately left and went to his camp about half a kilometer distant, put on his fatigue uniform, got a rifle, went back to the house and stationed himself on the stairway. The serenaders left the house to go to and serenade another house in the Northern part of the Barrio. Pantoja followed the group. Pantoja suddenly shouted "Ano yan? Ano yan?". Turning their heads back they saw Pantoja raise the garand rifle and aim at them. Before any of them could run away, Pantoja fired two shots in rapid succession. The first shot hit Angel

Marasigan who instantly fell on his back. The second shot hit Wenceslao Hernandez who fell down. The other serenaders scampered away for safety. Pantoja, who had walked nearer, then fired one more shot at the prostrate body of Marasigan and four more shots at the prostrate body of Hernandez. The lower court found the defendant guilty of double murder. Issues: What qualifying circumstances are present in this case? What mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present? Held: Qualifying circumstances: The premeditation qualifying can not circumstance be considered of evident the where

The qualifying

circumstance of treachery is

present where the defendant followed the serenaders as they walked, made no indication that he would shoot, and then suddenly fired from behind two shots in rapid succession at the two victims from a distance of about five meters. Aggravating circumstances: The mere fact that the defendant, a sergeant in the Philippine Army, was in fatigue uniform and had an army rifle at the time of the killing is not sufficient to establish that he misused his public position in the commission of the crime. The mere fact that the defendant fired several shots more at the prostrate bodies of the deceased is not sufficient to establish the aggravating circumstance of ignominy. Mitigating circumstances: The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is present where the defendant, an army officer, immediately after the commission of the murders, voluntarily surrendered to his detachment camp

defendant had only about one-half hour to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will had he desired to hearken to its warning.

commander to whom he also surrendered his garand rifle. People vs Ural [G.R. No. L-30801. March 27, 1974.] Facts: Brigido Alberto, a former detention prisoner went to Barrio Camongo, Dumalinao where his father resided. On July 31, 1966, he intended to go to his residence at Barrio Upper Lamari, Buug but night overtook him in the town. He decided to sleep in the Buug municipal building where there would be more security. Upon arrival in the municipal building at he saw Policeman Ural (with whom he was already acquainted) inside the jail. Ural was boxing the detention prisoner, Felix Napola. As a consequence of the fistic blows, Napola collapsed on the floor. Ural, the tormentor, stepped on his prostrate body. Ural went out of the cell. After a short interval, he returned with a bottle. He poured its contents on Napola's recumbent body. Then, he ignited it with a match and left

the cell. Napola screamed in agony. He shouted for help. Nobody came to succor him. Much perturbed by the barbarity which he had just seen, Alberto left the municipal building. Before his departure, Ural cautioned him: "You better keep quiet of what I have done". Napola died. Issues: W/N the accused took advantage of his public position in committing the crime circumstance? W/N the accused is entitled to the mitigating circumstance that offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed? Held: Yes. He could not have maltreated Napola if he was not a policeman on guard duty. Because of his position, he had access to the cell where Napola was confined The prisoner was under his custody. "The policeman, who taking advantage of his public position maltreats a private citizen, merits no judicial leniency. aggravating

The methods sanctioned by medieval practice are surely not appropriate for an enlightened democratic civilization. While the law protects the police officer in the proper discharge of his duties, it must at the same time just as effectively protect the individual from the abuse of the police." Yes. It is manifest from the proven facts that appellant Ural had no intent to kill Napola. His design was only to maltreat him may be because in his drunken condition he was making a nuisance of himself inside the detention cell. When Ural realized the fearful consequences of his felonious act, he allowed Napola to secure medical treatment at the municipal dispensary. People vs Clementer [G.R. No. L-33490. August 30, 1974.] Facts: Concordio Saraos, his wife, Dalmacia Melgar, their eight children and a nephew were resting in their house. The children were fast asleep. At that late hour, the

spouses were still awake. They heard the barking of their dog. Saraos peeped through a horizontal slit in the wall of his house. He saw eight persons in the yard. He recognized among them the five Clementer brothers named Piding, Tiago, Carlito, Esing, and Doming. He had known them for five years. They used to be his friends. Saraos heard Federico shouting: "All of you come down, we will not harm you. Do not be afraid, this is the authority. You are under arrest. There is a warrant of arrest for you." Saraos inquired: "Who are you" and Federico answered: "This is Noning". Federico, who pretended to be Noning, a policeman, urged Saraos to leave his house by assuring him: "Do not be afraid, this is Noning. This is the authority. We will not harm you." Saraos countered: "Noning, come near, let us talk as we have no fault." Irritated by Saraos' answers, Federico gave him an ultimatum: "You talk too much. Come down if you do not want to die." When Saraos could not be persuaded to go down, Federico uttered a last ominous threat: "So, you will not come down. I'll shoot you". Suiting his action to his threat,

Federico fired at the place in the house where he sensed that Saraos was stationed, judging from the direction where his voice originated. Federico was armed with a long gun. At that juncture, Saraos' wife, Dalmacia Melgar, in obedience to an impulse, suggested to him to accede to the request of the accused. She thought that she could mediate and pacify the malefactors. Thereupon, she went down. She was immediately seized by Eliseo Clementer. Eliseo dragged her to the nearby dinog treewhere Saraos' carabao was tethered, tore her blouse so that she was naked above the waist and tied her hands behind her back with the rope of the carabao. Then Eliseo shot her at the back. After his wife was shot, Saraos left the place where he was peeping. Federico fired at him (Saraos), hitting him. Saraos took the gun of his brother and fired back at Federico but missed him. Federico's companions ran away. After the malefactors had left, Sarao's went down and found his half-naked wife dead on the ground.

Issue: W/N the accused is guilty of murder? Held: Yes. The qualifying circumstance of abuse of superiority is present. Since the thirty-five-year old Eliseo Clementer was armed and Dalmacia Melgar was unarmed and she guilelessly approached the group of eight persons, without the least inkling that any harm would befall her, abuse of superiority was employed in liquidating her. She was not able to offer any resistance. In a sense, there was treachery because she was first reduced to helplessness before she was shot (U. S. vs. Elicanal, 35 Phil. 209, 218; U. S. vs. Caete, 44 Phil. 478, 480). There was also disregard of sex because her blouse was needlessly removed, a circumstance that is absorbed in treachery (People vs. Mangsant, 65 Phil. 548; People vs. Limaco, (88 Phil. 35). Treachery and nocturnity are absorbed in abuse of superiority. [G.R. No. L-28108. March 27, 1974.] PEOPLE vs. RAMOLETE

Quirino Ramolete, addressing to Rayray, said: FACTS: In the evening of June 24, 1961 there was a gathering in the house of the spouses, Mariano Ramolete and Calixta Rabot, located at Barrio Paratong, Sta. Catalina, Ilocos Sur. A game of cards known as briska was being played near the door of the sala. Among the players were Rayray and Refuerzo. The stakes were pieces of candy called lemon candies or vicks drops. At about ten o'clock, Quirino Ramolete, a twenty-fouryear old farmer, came to the house, entered the sala were the game was being played and asked for candy. Refuerzo and Rayray gave him candy. After eating it, he left the house. About a minute later, he returned, accompanied by Acosta and Rabara. Each of them was armed with a gun. Quirino Ramolete stood at the door, the only ingress and egress of the house. Behind him were his minions, Acosta and Rabara. They pointed their weapons at the astounded and trapped persons playing briska. HELD: Yes, there was treachery in the killing of Refuerzo. Appellant Quirino Ramolete first came to the house ISSUE: Whether the killing of Refuerzo was treacherous Whether the killing of Mariano Ramolete was treacherous "You should stand and I will shoot you." Calixta Rabot said: "Oh, my son, please don't do that". A commotion ensued. The guests inside the sala shouted simultaneously. They dispersed, scurried away and tried to hide or flee. Quirino Ramolete instructed Rabara and Acosta to go down and watch for those persons who were going to jump out of the house. Quirino shot Refuerzo while the latter was jumping through the window into the batalan or porch. He shot Mariano Ramolete who was in the batalan. He also shot Rayray downstairs. Refuerzo and Mariano Ramolete died on that same night. Rayray was wounded.

unarmed and ostensibly with pacific intentions. As it turned out, his purpose was to reconnoiter or to case the house and ascertain whether the intended victims were present and unarmed. That conduct of Quirino Ramolete amounted to "trickery or deceit". He dissembled and camouflaged his murderous intention by giving the inmates of the house the impression that he would not do them any harm. Having satisfied himself that the place and time were Propitious for the execution of his diabolical plan, he left the house and fetched his confederates, Acosta and Rabara. After equipping themselves with deadly weapons, they entered the house to put into effect their felonious design. They surprised the persons inside the house particularly Refuerzo. Ramolete strategically stationed himself near the door, "the only exit in the house". Refuerzo must have instinctively felt that he was one of the objects of Quirino Ramolete's vindictive hostility in view of the prior incident regarding Ragil, Quirino's friend. Inasmuch as Refuerzo was unarmed and utterly defenseless, he tried to escape through the

window. Quirino Ramolete shot him in that situation. Refuerzo fell into the batalan with three serious gunshot wounds of entry on his back. Treachery (alevosia) was manifest in that manner of assault because it insured the killing without any risk to the assailant. An attack made on a person who was running away and who was completely defenseless was held to be treacherous. Where the attack was made with firearms and the victims were unarmed and with no means of defense or escape because they were trapped inside a house, the assault in that situation was held to be treacherous. As to the culpability of appellant Quirino Ramolete for the death of Mariano Ramolete, the Court is not convinced that the killing was attended with treachery. As already noted, although. the prosecution had established Quirino Ramolete's responsibility for the killing of Mariano Ramolete, it failed to establish clearly the circumstances surrounding the killing. Consequently, the killing of Mariano Ramolete should be characterized as homicide aggravated by dwelling. He was killed in his own house without having given any provocations. But dwelling is

not aggravating in the killing of Refuerzo since he was a mere visitor in Mariano Ramolete's house. [G.R. No. L-38624. July 25, 1975.] PEOPLE vs. BAUTISTA FACTS: Accused George Daeng, Rolando Castillo, Conrado Bautista, Gerardo Abuhin, who were serving sentence by virtue of final judgment in the New Bilibid Prison, were charged with murder for inflicting multiple stab wounds upon and killing another convicted prisoner Basilio Beltran while the latter was in the process of serving the accused breakfast. After trial, accused were found guilty as charged and were each sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. Accused set up the defense of alibi and claimed that their written statements admitting the crime were extracted from them by force and intimidation. On mandatory review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether the offense when committed by the accused was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery and generic aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and obvious ungratefulness HELD: The trial court correctly considered the qualifying circumstance of treachery in the commission of the crime of murder. It was conclusively proven that the accused in a sudden, concerted and unprovoked act, all of them being armed with improvised deadly weapons, stabbed the victim to death after pushing their cell door open, threatening and throwing off-guard Miranda when the victim who was holding in both hands the bread and coffee intended for the breakfast of the assailants was not in a position to defend himself from the unexpected assault. As to the existence of evident premeditation, it was established by the following circumstances: (1) the sudden concerted attack, perpetrated and calculated to

throw off-guard the intended victim as he was in the act of giving food to the assailants, which attack necessarily must have been planned; (2) that all of the accused were armed with improvised deadly weapons which they were not supposed to possess and which they must have secretly prepared for a long time for committing the crime; and (3) the admission on the part of the accused in their sworn statements that they killed the victim by "attacking first" because they had heard that the members of the rival gang would liquidate them, leading to the conclusion that the accused must have planned how to counteract the supposed attack of the rival gang by literally beating the latter to the draw. The aggravating circumstance of obvious ungratefulness was present as the victim was suddenly attacked while in the act of giving the assailants their bread and coffee for breakfast. Instead of being grateful to the victim, at least by doing him no harm, they took advantage of his helplessness when his two arms were used for carrying their food, thus preventing him from defending himself from the sudden attack. FACTS: Early in the morning of November 28, 1959, at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning, while his wife was breast-feeding one of their children, Eminiano Bayo decided to start the day and went down the house to prepare their breakfast. As he opened the door, however, he was surprised to see a man, later identified as Felizardo Soria, menacingly standing and all set to attack him, and, just as quickly as he could yell a warning to his wife that there was an intruder in their abode, the man broke through their door, grabbed and wrestled with Bayo. On seeing the scuffle, his wife Brigida ran to the rescue of her husband. She tried to break the stranger away from Bayo, but before she could be of any effective help, the man (Soria) shouted for his companions, the herein two appellants, who came rushing to the house. Pio Montes was armed with a knife, Roberto Boyles with [G.R. No. L-15308. May 29, 1964.] PEOPLE vs. BOYLES

a gun. Promptly, they joined the fray, and with their quarry thus greatly outnumbered, Pio Montes stabbed Eminiano Bayo in the neck. In panic, fear and terror, Brigida blindly sought the window and jumped, the fall spraining her waist and breaking her legs. Immediately, the stranger who first confronted her husband ran down the house, grabbed and dragged her back upstairs where then the group demanded money from her. She opened a trunk and got the empty tin can of Klim milk in which she and her husband kept their savings of about P100.00 and handed over the contents to Pio Montes. The three, however, did not content themselves with the money. Exhibiting one of the ugliest and most revolting criminal perversity known to man, the trio forcibly brought Brigida near where her dead husband lay bathed in blood, and, completely insensitive to the painful, terrified anguish of the just-widowed mother, they forced her to lie beside the corpse and there took turns raping her. After everyone had quenched his lustful thirst, they tied her hands behind her back and left.

As soon as her attackers had departed, Brigida worked to free herself from the ropes. She then woke her 6-year old son and sent him out to ask for help from their neighbors. Upon their arrests, both appellants readily confessed to the crime. The third man in the group Felizardo Soria, was still at large when this case was filed. ISSUE: Whether capital punishment should be imposed on them HELD: Yes. In summary, then, the crime committed was robbery with homicide, aggravated by three (3) circumstances, namely, dwelling, use of superior force and habituality. Only one mitigating circumstance, voluntary plea of guilty, is legally assessible in appellants' favor. There is absolutely neither basis nor justice for the SC to extend unto them the extenuating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, the records of this case having conclusively demonstrated the contrary.

It may be said, though, that even if the SC were to credit the last mentioned circumstance in favor of the herein accused, they still would have to be meted the death penalty since the aggravating circumstances would still be one more than the mitigating circumstances a condition which under our penal system makes mandatory the imposition of the greater penalty, death. [G.R. No. L-32641. August 29, 1975.] PEOPLE vs. UNDONG FACTS: Accused appellant Sulayman Undong pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder and double frustrated murder. After the prosecution was through with its evidence, but before resting its case, accused through counsel, asked the court to allow him to withdraw his former plea of "not guilty" to that of "guilty." Upon rearrangement under the same information, he pleaded: "I am guilty, sir, because I was just taking revenge of the death of my uncle." Instead of imposing upon accused

the corresponding penalty for the crime charged, the Court proceeded to receive evidence on the guilt of the accused, his participation in the commission of the crime and the circumstances that would possibly aggravate or mitigate his guilt. After all the witnesses for the prosecution has testified, accused appellant took the witness stand, admitted his participation in, narrated the circumstance leading to the commission of, and revealed his motive for committing, the crime. Thereafter, the Court rendered judgment convicting accused and imposing the supreme penalty of death. ISSUE: Whether the court erred in considering the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, abuse of superior strength, treachery HELD: Nighttime per se is not an aggravating circumstance. To be an aggravating circumstance, the accused must have planned and sought darkness to

prevent him from being recognized. In the present case there is nothing in the records to show that the accusedappellant purposely planned and sought nighttime to prevent him from being recognized. Here the darkness of the night was merely incidental. But even granting that the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity attended the commission of the crime, the same was deemed absorbed in the treachery that actually attended the commission of the crime. If nighttime was absorbed in treachery, then it should not have been considered separately as such circumstance forms part of the peculiar treacherous means and manner adopted to insure the execution of the crime. With respect to the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength found by the lower court, We believe that like nighttime it should not have been considered separately. It is a well established doctrine that when treachery is already taken into account as a qualifying circumstance in murder, it is improper to consider the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, since the latter is necessarily

included in the former and that it cannot be separately and independently considered from the other. This circumstance therefore should not be appreciated against accused-appellant. A plea of "guilty" made after the prosecution has presented its witnesses cannot be considered as a mitigating circumstance. Lack of instruction and education should be considered as a mitigating circumstance in favor of the accused where the records show that the latter is ignorant and unschooled. There can be no doubt that treachery attended the commission of the crime, for the offenders here have availed themselves of the means to insure the execution of the crime without risk to themselves arising from the defense that may come from the victims. The records show that Laguia and his companions fired at the house of the victim without warning and without hesitation. However, while the prosecution was able to prove treachery, it was not able to prove evident premeditation on the part of the accused-appellant. Precisely accusedappellant knew of the plan only when his elder brother Datu Laguia Undong told him of the matter. Evident

premeditation obtains where the accused had sufficient time to reflect on his determination to commit the crime. In the case before Us, accused-appellant did not know until he was ordered by Laguia Undong to go with him to the house of Awal Magco. He did not have sufficient time to reflect on what he was to do. It results that only the qualifying circumstance of treachery was proven, which absorbs nocturnity. The aggravating circumstance of dwelling is offset by the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction and education. Inasmuch as the evidence shows that two carbines were used in the killing of the victim and in injuring the other two victims, and there were several shots fired, the proven crimes of murder and frustrated murder cannot be considered as complex crimes but are separate and distinct from each other. The lower court's decision is modified and the death penalty imposed on appellant Sulayman Undong for the killing of Awal Magco is reduced to reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE vs. LUNA FACTS: In this case, the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Lucena City Branch, found Silverio Luna guilty of robbery in band with homicide, sentencing him to death and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of Alfredo Adal. The same court in a related case, also convicted Luna of robbery in band with frustrated homicide, sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of sixteen (16) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal and ordered him to indemnify Eduardo Adal. ISSUE: Whether the death penalty was properly imposed HELD: Yes. Robbery with homicide is punished with

[G.R. No. L-28812. July 31, 1974.]

reclusion

perpetua

to

death.

There

being

three

aggravating Lack

circumstances of instruction

and cannot

no be

mitigating considered

this case, he had been previously convicted by final judgment of robbery. He had served sentence for it. The trial court regarded cruelty as aggravating. It reasoned out that to drown in the sea Alfredo Adal after he was stabbed while bound, was a merciless and unnecessary act. Cruelty has a special signification in penal law. There is cruelty (ensanamiento) when the wrong done in the commission of the crime is deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary in its commission or by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the victim's suffering or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse. In order that cruelty or vindictiveness may be appreciated, the evidence should show that the sadistic culprit, for his pleasure and satisfaction, caused the victim to suffer slowly and gradually and inflicted on him unnecessary moral and physical pain. Using that criterion, it cannot be said that Luna and his companion acted with cruelty within the meaning of article. The trial court erred in categorizing conspiracy as an aggravating circumstance. Price, promise or reward

circumstance, the death penalty was properly imposed mitigating. Luna is not illiterate. He finished Grade two. The lower court observed "that he usually answered in Tagalog after the question in English" was propounded. The trial court did not err in not giving him the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction The trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and treachery. Unquestionably, nighttime facilitated the consummation of robbery with homecide. The killing of a robbery victim while bound is regarded as treacherous. The lower court did not err in considering recidivism as aggravating although it was not alleged in the information. Generally, recidivism should be alleged in the information. If not alleged, it cannot be proven over the objection of the accused. However, in this case, Luna, by his own admission in his confession and on the witness stand, proved that he is a recidivist. At the time he was tried in

would be aggravating in cases of this character but that circumstances was not alleged in the information. No evidence was introduced to show that Pablo Adal made any promise or paid any price or reward to Luna for the commission of the robbery with homicide. It may be inferred from the evidence that robbery was resorted to not only to cause damage but so that Luna could compensate himself out of the spoils of the robbery. It could be that relationship by affinity was in itself a strong inducement to Luna to act as Pablo's tool in punishing Eduardo Adal and Alfredo Adal for having supposedly overreached Pablo in the partition of the inheritance. Luna said that he pitied his Uncle Pablo because he was aggrieved in the partition. The Solicitor General observes that the use of the motorboat (regarded as a motor vehicle) and despoblado should be considered aggravating. Those circumstances were not taken into account by the trial court. Even without taking into account those aggravating circumstances, the maximum penalty would have to be imposed on Luna since no mitigating circumstance could

be appreciated in his favor. His guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt. [G.R. No. L-33431. June 28, 1983.] PEOPLE vs. DRILON FACTS: It was Valentine's Day on February 14, 1967. At noon of that day, Rafaelito Neri, Jr. called up his friend, Esterlita Paca, by telephone inviting her to a dinner in the evening of that day. The girl accepted. On the way, the car stopped, Neri parking said car at the right side of the road, with both windows thereof closed. The two accused, together with civilians Matulac and Iraque, armed with a carbine for each of them were on their barracks, following the road to barrio Apas. It was showering a little bit. They saw a small painted white Volkswagen car which, as above-stated, was parked by the side of the road. Drilon went to the left side of the car and peeped at the occupants inside said car, with Lobaton close behind him. Matulac proceeded to the

other side of the car, then peeped at the right side thereof, while Iraque was at his back. While Paca and Neri were talking inside the parked car for about five minutes, shadows of men suddenly appeared. According to the girl, she noticed one at her side, which was the right side of the car, and two or more at the side of Neri, or left side of the car. She got scared and seemed to hear Neri say "Just take my money." but no reply was made from the men. As Neri switched on the ignition key and the car started to move forward towards the city, shots were fired at them, and although the shots hit Neri, as blood was seen by her on his face, the car continued to move, but suddenly it swerved to the right side of the road and down towards the cornfield. When the car stopped, she tried to help Neri out of the car but the latter waved her away. She got out of the car and, thinking that the men were following them. Again, she tried to help Neri but he waved her away. So, she ran like mad for the purpose of seeking help.

Despite the finding of the trial court that it is was Drilon alone who fired all the shots during the incident in question, it pronounced Lobaton guilty as charged on the theory that he and Drilon conspired and acted in common accord as to render him liable for the acts of the latter. ISSUE: Whether there was conspiracy HELD: No. The records are bereft of any fact or circumstance to establish the existence of a conspiracy. While it is true that direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy, for it may be established by facts and circumstances from which may logically be inferred the existence of a common design among the accused to commit the crime charged, nevertheless, the same degree of proof necessary to establish the crime is required to support a finding of the presence of a criminal conspiracy, which is, proof beyond reasonable doubt. The mere presence of appellant at the scene when the

crime was perpetrated by Drilon is not by itself indicative of the existence of conspiracy between them. In this case at bar, there is direct proof of an agreement among the accused and their two civilian companions to ogle and gawk at the couples dating at Britania Hills; but there is not a shred of evidence to justify the inference that they had any pre-conceived plan to shoot anyone that night. It being patent that no conspiracy to kill existed between the actual assailant and the appellant, the latter cannot be held liable for the criminal act of the former. The judgment is hereby modified, and appellant Nicolas Lobaton acquitted of the crime charged. [G.R. No. L-50276. January 27, 1983.] PEOPLE vs. BUTLER FACTS: Emelita Pasco, the housemaid of the victim, testified that, at about 11:30 p.m. or so of August 7, 1975, her mistress Gina Barrios came home with the accused-

appellant. As soon as she opened the door for them, the victim and accused-appellant immediately entered the victim's bedroom. Shortly thereafter, the victim left her bedroom holding an ID card and a piece of paper, and on the piece of paper, the victim purportedly wrote the following words: MICHAEL J. BUTLER, 44252-8519 USS HANCOCK. Said words were copied from the ID Card. Pasco testified that the victim said she was copying the name of the accused because she knew he would not be going back to her. Then she rushed back to her bedroom after instructing Pasco to wake her up the following morning. 2 Before retiring, however, the victim's friend, Rosemarie Juarez, came to the former's house and after having a small conversation, also left. The following day, August 8, 1975, at about 4:00 a.m., Pasco rose to wake her mistress as instructed. She knocked at the door. She found that the victim was lying on her bed, facing downward, naked up to the waist, with legs spread apart, with a broken figurine beside her head. Immediately, Pasco called the landlord and they called the authorities.

and rule that the crime committed is murder with the ISSUES: Whether or not the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength, with aggravating circumstances of treachery and scoffing at the corpse of the victim HELD: The SC held that there was an abuse of superior strength attending the commission of the crime. It is not only the notorious advantage of height that the accused had over his hapless victim, he being 6 feet tall and weighing 155 lbs. while the girl was only 4 ft. 11 inches tall, but also his strength which he wielded in striking her with the figurine on the head and in shoving her head and pressing her mouth and nose against the bed mattress, which pressure must have been very strong and powerful to suffocate her to death and without risk to himself in any manner or mode whatsoever that she may have taken or defend herself or retaliate since she was already struck and helpless on the bed, that convinced Us to find qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The evidence on record. however, is not sufficient to show clearly and prove distinctly that treachery attended the commission of the crime since there was no eyewitness account of the killing. The extrajudicial confession of the accused merely stated, thus: "I thought she was going to do something dangerous to me so I grabbed her, and we started wrestling on the bed. She grabbed me by the throat and I picked up a statue of Jesus Christ that was sitting on the bedside stand and I hit her in the head. She fell flat on her face." Although the figurine was found broken beside her head, the medical report, however, do not show any injury or fracture of the skull and no sign of intracranial hemorrhage. The SC, however, sustained the finding of the lower court that the aggravating circumstance of outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the deceased applies against the accused since it is established that he mocked or outraged at the person or corpse of his victim

by having an anal intercourse with her after she was already dead. It is true as maintained by the defense that the aggravating circumstance of outraging at the corpse of the victim is not alleged in the information and that the lower court found it had been proved but its contention that the said aggravating circumstance should not have been appreciated against the accused is without merit. And this is so because the rule is that a generic aggravating circumstance not alleged in the information may be proven during the trial over the objection of the defense and may be appreciated in imposing the penalty. Aggravating circumstances not alleged in the information but proven during the trial serve only to aid the court in fixing the limits of the penalty but do not change the character of the offense. [G.R. Nos. L-47136-39. July 25, 1983.] PEOPLE vs. MANALANG FACTS:

In the late afternoon of August 11, 1977, four (4) persons were found dead by police investigators in the house at No. 126 San Francisco St., Plainview, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. The body of Maria Lourdes Shih was in her bedroom, naked from the waist down. The bodies of Rosita Shih (sexagenarian) and Joy Angelique Shih, a five-year old child, were found in the adjoining room; while that of Hilda Pomida, housemaid, was found in her quarters. All four were victims of stabbing. Romeo Manalang was brought to the Office of Captain Pea where he executed a six-page extrajudicial confession narrating in detail how and why he killed his four victims. The extrajudicial confession was followed by the reenactment of the crimes during which the accused narrated the gruesome details of his misdeed. This was later affirmed in his voluntary plea of guilty, made with the assistance of counsel de oficio, followed by the taking of evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt the circumstances surrounding the killings and the authorship thereof.

In the four informations charging the accused of murder, treachery, evident premeditation and dwelling were uniformly alleged. They were all found by the trial court to have been established beyond doubt. ISSUE: Whether the court properly considered the aggravating circumstances HELD: The SC held that there was treachery. Rosita was stabbed suddenly and unexpectedly from behind as she was moving from the accused after a brief conversation with the later and was doubt to go the bathroom. Maria Lourdes Shih was similarly stabbed by the accused after hulling her into complacency by masking his evil design as he opened the gate for her, hiding the murder weapon behind his back so that his intended victim would not suspect his evil intent. The five-year old child was stabbed by the accused after putting her on bed.

However, the attack on Hilda, the maid was unplanned. The accused instinctively stabbed her as he was about to leave the room of his first victim (Rosita), when Hilda suddenly appeared at the door and shouted "saklolo," which impelled the accused to strike her at that very instance to keep her silent. The SC held that there was no treachery in the killing of Hilda.. Dwelling was correctly considered by the trial court as an aggravating circumstance inasmuch as the killing were perpetrated without provocation in the sanctity of the home of the house victims. The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was present in the killing of Rosita Shih and Maria Lourdes Shih. As admitted by the accused, he went to the Shih house precisely to kill Rosita (Lola) and Maria Lourdes (Marilou). Plea of guilty should however be appreciated in all the foregoing crimes as a mitigating circumstance. The SC affirmed the decision of the trial court sentencing appellant Manalang to death for each of the murders of Rosita Shih and Maria Lourdes Shih. For the killing of Joy

Angelique Shih, we find the appellant guilty of murder, with dwelling as an aggravating circumstance offset by his plea of guilty, and sentence him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. For the killing of Hilda Pomida, we find the appellant guilty only of homicide, attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling which is offset by his plea of guilty, and sentence him to twelve years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal as maximum. [G.R. No. L-36941. June 29, 1984.] PEOPLE vs. SAYLAN FACTS: Eutropia was raped by the appellant Rafael Saylan. Appellant accomplished this by placing his right arm around the neck of Eutropia with the dagger pointed at her left breast. He then dragged Eutropia at some distance. When they reached the junction of the trail for men and a trail for carabaos, he ordered everybody to stop and told the children accompanying (Nilsonita and

Rudy Gonzales) to stay behind and threatened to kill them if they persisted in following them. Thereafter, appellant again dragged Eutropia by her hand and brought her towards a creek near a coconut tree which was about five meters away from where Nilsonita and Rudy Gonzales were. The appellant then had sexual intercourse with her 5 times in 5 different positions. ISSUE: Whether there were the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength, nocturnity, despoblado, ignominy, and reiteracion. HELD: The trial court disregarded superiority because it "is inherent in the crime of rape or is absorbed in the element of force." It also did not consider nocturnity "there being no evidence that the accused purposely sought it to facilitate the commission of this rape." Despoblado was present according to the trial court because: "The accused dragged the offended party,

at the point of a dagger, to the carabao trail, about 10 meters from the junction, but 40 to 50 meters below to better attain his purpose without interference, and to better secure himself from detection and punishment. Even the junction where the two children were left is already 400 meters from the nearest house. While there maybe occasional passersby, this does not destroy its being an uninhabited place. We hold that the trial court for the reasons stated correctly held that the crime was committed in an uninhabited place. The trial court held that there was ignominy because the appellant used not only the missionary position, i.e. male superior, female inferior, but also "The same position as dogs do" i.e., entry from behind. The appellant claims there was ignominy because "The studies of many experts in the matter have shown that this 'position' is not novel and has repeatedly and often been resorted to by couples in the act of copulation." This may well be if the sexual act is performed by consenting partners but not otherwise.

The trial court also held that "there is no reiteracion because one of the offenses, namely Robbery in Band, for which the accused has been penalized, was committed after the commission of this rape case, and the penalty imposed on the other offense of Frustrated Homicide, is lighter than the penalty for rape." Although not alleged in the complaint, the trial court stated that the offense was aggravated by disregard of rank because it was a fact known to the appellant that Mrs. Agno was a school teacher. The appellant claims that this circumstance cannot be assigned to him because there was no deliberate intent to offend or insult the rank of Mrs. Agno. The judgment of the trial court is in accordance with the facts and the law but it cannot be affirmed completely because of the lack of the necessary number of votes in the SC. The SC ruled that the judgment under review is modified in the sense that the appellant shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua instead of death [G.R. No. L-60370. April 17, 1984.]

PEOPLE vs. DAMO FACTS: Evidence shows that appellant, 25 years old and a tricycle driver in Laoag City, was in the bus terminal of Laoag . A short while thereafter, one of the buses of the De Leon Transportation arrived from Manila and among its passengers was Lucretia D. Calina, 54 years old, who returned to the Philippines after 22 years stay abroad. Appellant approached Lucretia and asked her where she was going. She answered that she was bound for Bangui. Since there were no buses that early morning for Bangui which is about 75 kilometers from Laoag City, appellant offered to bring her to the place for P125.00. When Lucretia agreed. Instead of going to Bangui, appellant brought Lucretia to a vacant house at Barangay Naldo, Laoag City. Appellant invited Lucretia inside the house to rest for a while. Lucretia hesitated but later acceded when appellant put on the lights inside the house. on

When they were inside the house appellant made love to his lady passenger who, at first, resisted but later succumbed and consented to having sexual intercourse with him. After satisfying his lust, he told her to dress up as they would proceed to Bangui. He then went outside the house and after sometime returned passing through the kitchen door. Upon seeing her still standing by the door, appellant approached her and at once strangled her to death with his bare hands. The Laoag police, acting upon a tip, arrested appellant. He admitted his guilt in an extra-judicial confession. In this appeal, the defense assailed the decision of the lower court in that it erred (1) in finding that there was evident premeditation; (2) in finding that the offense was aggravated by nocturnity; (3) in appreciating treachery as an aggravating circumstance; (4) in not offsetting the aggravating circumstance of treachery by the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty; (5) in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of intoxication; and, (6) in imposing the death penalty.

ISSUE: Whether the court erred in properly considering the aggravating circumstances HELD: The SC held that in the commission of the crime the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was not present. The appellant thought of killing the deceased only after succeeding in satisfying his lust upon her. In fact, the appellant was waiting for her in his tricycle for sometime, after the carnal act, but as the deceased was not yet around, he returned to the house, and meeting her at the door of the kitchen, he strangled her. Thus, there does not seem to be sufficient time for him to reflect on his evil resolution. The SC held that the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity is absent in the case. For, nocturnity to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, it must be purposely and deliberately sought by the accused to facilitate the commission of the crime. In the case at bar, the meeting of appellant and Lucretia was by chance

and, therefore, it cannot be said that he purposely sought nighttime to commit the offense. Their meeting was accidental. Being a tricycle driver, he was in the bus terminal waiting for passengers when he met the victim. Appellant's contention that there was no treachery is untenable. After satisfying his lust, no woman would have anticipated that the man who took advantage of her would thereafter suddenly kill her. Time and again, Treachery is present in the commission of a crime when executed suddenly and unexpectedly even if made face to face. However, treachery in cases of robbery with homicide is not a qualifying circumstance but only a generic aggravating circumstance which may be offset by appellant's plea of guilty. Finally, appellant's claim that he was drunk at the time he executed the criminal act, is untenable. He failed to establish by convincing evidence that his reason was blurred to the extent that he was deprived of that degree of control of himself. The fact that he was able to drive his tricycle to the place where he brought his victim, made love to her following which he killed and dumped

her into a well and then drove his vehicle back to Laoag City, shows that he had complete control of his mental faculties. Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, provides for reclusion perpetua to death as the penalty for the offense of robbery with homicide. Considering the presence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery which is offset by the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, the correct penalty in the case at bar is reclusion perpetua. [G.R. No. 5292. August 28, 1909.] UNITED STATES vs. MANALINDE FACTS: Between 2 and 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 19th of January, 1909, while Juan Igual, a Spaniard, was seated on a chair in the doorway of Sousa's store in Cotabato, Moro Province, he suddenly received a wound on the head delivered from behind and inflicted with a kris. Ricardo Doroteo, a clerk in the said store, who was standing behind the counter, upon hearing the noise and

the cry of the wounded man, ran to his assistance and found him lying on the ground. Meanwhile the aggressor, the Moro Manalinde, approached a Chinaman named Choa, who was passing along the street, and just as the latter was putting down his load in front of the door of a store and was about to enter, attacked him with the same weapon, inflicting a severe wound in the left shoulder, on account of which he fell to the ground. The Moro, who came from the rancheria of Dupit and had entered the town carrying his weapon wrapped up in banana leaves, in the meantime escaped by running away from the town. Both wounded men, the Chinaman and the Spaniard, were taken to the hospital, where the former died within an hour, the record not stating the result of the wound inflicted on the Spaniard Juan Igual. When Manalinde was arrested he pleaded guilty and confessed that he had perpetrated the crime herein mentioned, stating that his wife had died about one hundred days before and that he had come from his home in Catumaldu by order of the Datto Rajamudah

Mupuck, who had directed him to go juramentado in Cotabato in order to kill somebody, because the said Mupuck had certain grievances to avenge against a lieutenant and a sergeant, the said datto further stating that if he, Manalinde, was successful in the matter, he would give him a pretty woman on his return, but that in case he was captured he was to say that he performed the killing by order of Maticayo, Datto Piang, Tambal and Inug. In view of the complaint filed by the provincial fiscal with the district court charging Manalinde with the crime of murder, and proceedings having been instituted, the trial judge rendered judgment sentencing the accused to the penalty of death. ISSUE: Whether the aggravating circumstances were properly considered HELD:

The fact that the victim of a treacherous murder was not predetermined does not affect or alter the nature of the crime, when the criminal intent which was carried out was to kill the first two persons whom the aggressor should meet at the place where he intended to commit the crimes. Even though in a crime committed upon offer of money, reward, or promise, premeditation is sometimes present, it must be borne in mind that the latter is not inherent in the former, and there existing no incompatibility between the two, they being independent of each other, premeditation can not necessarily be considered as included merely because an offer of money, reward, or promise was made, for the latter might have existed without the former. This case, wherein the accused made up his mind to kill two undetermined persons, the first whom he should meet on the way, in compliance with the inducement of a third persons, is entirely different from that of a criminal who, intending to kill a particular person, deprives of his life a person other than the object of his

criminal act; both deeds are equally punishable, but they are different and are differently dealt with by the penal law. [G.R. No. 30724. August 8, 1929.] PEOPLE vs. DUCUSIN FACTS: On the date of the crime and prior thereto, the deceased Cesareo Tadefa lived with his wife Teodora Vergara in the village of San Jose, municipality of Caba, Province of La Union. The defendant, who was Teodora's first cousin and Cesareo's second cousin, lived in the same village of which he was second lieutenant. The defendant Mariano Ducusin had been making love to Teodora Vergara for about a month before August 12, 1928, but she had rejected him saying: "I cannot accept your love for I am a married woman." The defendant then replied that he would do

everything in his power that her husband might die, that she might be able to marry him. Teodora Vergara related to her husband what the defendant had said and he became angry and said: "Why does he do that, being a relative of ours?" As Cesareo Tadefa failed to return home that night, his wife went to the house of her brother-in-law, Eugenio Domondon, which was a few meters away from her own, and told him that her husband had not returned from pasturing his carabaos. That same night Eugenio Domondon went in search of Cesareo Tadefa where Teodora Vergara had pointed out, but failed to find him. Very early the next morning they informed Cesareo Tadefa's father of what had happened, and all of them, together with Teodora's mother, went to the field in search of him. They found Cesareo's dead body that same morning on a hillside covered with cogon grass on the defendant's land, a kilometer away from the deceased's house, lying face downwards under an adaan tree with a

severed piece of vine wound about his neck with a slipknot at the back. During the preliminary investigation, when the information was read to him and he was asked whether he pleaded guilty or not guilty, he answered: "I admit that I caused the death, but I plead not guilty." ISSUE: Whether the accused should be given the death penalty HELD: In the commission of the crime, the circumstance of evident premeditation, qualifying the crime as murder, must be considered, because, according to his own confession, the defendant three times attempted to take the life of Cesareo Tadefa in order to be able to marry his widow, with whom he was in love, purchasing cognac in order to facilitate the commission of the crime. The aggravating circumstance defined in article 10, No. 9, of the Penal Code, that is, the employment of means to weaken the defense, consisting in this case, in having

made the deceased intoxicated, must be taken into account. This act cannot be juridically considered to give rise to the aggravating circumstance may legally exist, it is necessary that the means employed should tend directly and especially to insure the execution of a crime against persons, without risk to the perpetrator arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The defendant's confession does not furnish sufficient data as to the state of intoxication of the deceased at the moment of strangulation, and the fact that he could not articulate is not sufficient to determine whether, in his intoxicated state at that time, it was impossible for him to put up any sort of resistance. The aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place is likewise to be taken into account, inasmuch as the crime was committed in an isolated and unfrequented place overgrown with weeds. [G.R. No. 14476. November 6, 1919.] THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE I. BALUYOT, defendant-appellant.

when the act which gave occasion to this prosecution FACTS: At the general election which was held on June 6, 1916, Conrado Lerma was elected governor of the Province of Bataan. One of his competitors upon this occasion was the accused, Jose I. Baluyot, who came out third in the race. As a result of this contest a feeling of personal rancor was developed in the mind of Baluyot against his successful competitor, and during the two years which followed the accused became fully imbued with the idea that Governor Lerma was persecuting him. In the year 1918 Baluyot was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila for the offense of estafa in connection with a loan of money which had been negotiated at the Philippine National Bank. Upon the organization of the National Guard, Baluyot had been commissioned as captain in that body, and owing possibly to the pendency of the accusation for estafa and its damaging effects upon his reputation, he had been asked to resign from the position of captain in the National Guard and although he had not resigned occurred, he had apparently been temporarily relieved from duty with that organization pending investigation. The misfortunes above mentioned, as well as others of a minor character, were attributed by Baluyot to the machinations of Governor Lerma, all of which served to foment and increase his feeling of enmity towards the latter. The defendant left the city of Manila and went to the town of Orion, in the Province of Bataan, taking with him a revolver. The accused visited the governor in his office. The governor and the accused remained alone in the former's office for 3 or 4 minutes, whereupon it occurred to Governor Lerma that the interview might be more extended than he had expected, and he accordingly requested that Baluyot should withdraw long enough for the governor to confer with one Antonino Aranjuez, the other caller to whom reference has already been made. Baluyot accordingly withdrew into the recorder's office. The evidence shows that at the time Baluyot reentered the governor's office the latter was sitting

behind his desk in an ordinary office chair. Baluyot approached the desk and upon reaching a position directly in front of the governor spoke certain words which were heard, though not distinctly, by persons in the recorder's office, Antonino Aranjuez merely heard the accused call out "governor,' while Gregorio de Guzman understood Baluyot to be asking the governor for his revolver. Baluyot then shot and killed the governor. ISSUE: Whether the aggravating circumstance of treachery was present in this case HELD: The qualifying circumstance of alevosia essential to the crime of murder was found to be present in the case at bar not only because of the sudden and unexpected manner in which the fatal assault with a deadly weapon was begun against the defenseless victim, but also because of the peculiar conditions under which the offense was finally consummated.

Even though a deadly attack may be begun under conditions not exhibiting the feature of alevosia, yet if the assault is continued and the crime consummated with alevosia, murder. [G.R. No. L-32624. February 12, 1980.] PEOPLE vs. NIERRA FACTS: According to the evidence of the prosecution, Juliana Gadugdug-Nierra, 52, and Paciano Nierra, 39, her brother-in-law, were competitors in the businesses of launch transportation and the sale of soft drinks in Barrio Tinago, General Santos City. Juliana sold coca-cola while Paciano sold pepsi-cola. In order to monopolize those businesses in the locality, Paciano Nierra conceived the idea of liquidating his competitor, Juliana. For that purpose, Felicisimo Doblen, a cousin-in-law of Paciano, accompanied to such circumstance may be taken into consideration as a qualifying factor in the offense of

Paciano's house in the afternoon of July 4, 1969 Gaspar Misa, 29, a convicted murderer who in 1965 had escaped from the Davao Penal Colony. Misa came to Barrio Tinago in June, 1969. He resided with his cousin, Silvestre Misa. Upstairs in the bedroom of Paciano's house, Misa, in the presence of Gaudencia Garrido-Nierra, the wife of Paciano, agreed to kill Juliana in consideration of three thousand pesos. Paciano promised that in the morning after the killing he would pay Misa four hundred pesos near the municipal hall of Tupi, South Cotabato which is about forty kilometers away from General Santos City. The balance would be paid in the same place on August 12, 1969. Between seven and eight o'clock that night, the unwary Juliana went to the beach where she was accustomed to void and when she squatted, Misa unexpectedly appeared behind her, held her hair, thus tilting her face. And while in that posture, he inserted into her mouth the muzzle of the pistol and fired it. Felicisimo Doblen, Vicente Rojas and the spouses Paciano Nierra

and Gaudencia Nierra appealed from the decision convicting them of murder, sentencing each of them to death. ISSUE: Whether there were aggravating circumstances involved HELD: Yes, there were. The SC was convinced that the guilt of appellants Nierra was proven beyond reasonable doubt. The killing was correctly characterized by the trial court as murder qualified by treachery and aggravated by premeditation and price or reward. As to the Nierras, relationship is an additional aggravating circumstance. Treachery absorbed nocturnity and abuse of superiority. The manner in which Misa liquidated Juliana Nierraadded shame, disgrace or obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime. Hence, ignominy is aggravating. In Misa's case, recidivism as an aggravating circumstance offset his plea of guilty. That did not preclude the imposition of the death penalty upon him.

Considering the aggravating circumstances, the death penalty imposed on the Nierra spouses is in accordance with law. However, for lack of the requisite ten votes, the death penalty imposed on Gaudencia Nierra should be commuted to reclusion perpetua. [G.R. No. L-38016. September 10, 1981.] PEOPLE vs. MUOZ FACTS: Defendants-appellants were charged before the Court of First Instance with murder to which they all pleaded not guilty and claimed the defense of alibi. At the trial, it was established, however, that they were both seen on a police patrol jeep and armed on the afternoon of the date of the commission of the crime a few kilometers away from the scene of the crime; that together, they arrived at the scene of the crime, alighted from said vehicle and approached the victim; that appellant Muoz suddenly and without warning shot the deceased while appellant Millora stood by in a ready

position; and that they loaded the body of the victim in their vehicle and drove away. Consequently, the trial court convicted both accused as charged and imposed the death penalty because of the finding that the commission of the crime was attended by the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery and the ordinary aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle without any mitigating circumstance. The trial court, however, suspended judgment on appellant Millora, as he was only 14 years, five months and 24 days old at the time of the commission of the crime, in compliance with Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code. On appeal, defendants-appellants pointed to contradictions, discrepancies and improbabilities in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Appellant Muoz alleged that the trial court erred when it did not exclude his alleged confession the same having been allegedly extracted under duress, violence, threat and intimidation, while appellant Millora stressed that conspiracy was not proved during trial.

without giving him a chance to defend himself; 7) that the ISSUE Whether there were aggravating circumstances involved HELD: On review, the Supreme Court held: 1) that the findings of the trial court are supported by the evidence on record; 2) that although there was no direct proof that appellants Millora and Muoz entered into conspiracy to kill the victim, their unity of criminal design can be inferred from the specific acts done by both of them; 3) that the alleged inconsistencies on minor details as on matters that are not of material consequence as to affect the guilt or innocence of the accused do not detract from the credibility of the witness; 4) that appellant Muoz was not able to discharge the burden of proving the involuntariness of his confession; 5) that appellants' alibi cannot overcome the positive identification made by eyewitnesses; 6) that treachery qualified the killing to murder since the appellants deliberately perpetrated a surprise and sudden assault on the unarmed victim FACTS: At about 3:00 o'clock in the early morning of January 11, 1969, appellant Rolando Javier arrived at the "karinderia" owned and operated by witness Asuncion [G.R. No. L-30413. January 22, 1980.] PEOPLE vs. LANSETA use of motor vehicle, which was not alleged in the information, should not be considered as an aggravating circumstance in determining the penalty, since the same is merely incidental and not deliberately utilized to facilitate the killing of the victim, the escape of the appellants from the scene of the crime, and the concealment of the body of the victim; 8) that the crime committed is murder qualified by treachery under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and 9) that there being no aggravating circumstance, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua. Judgment of the court a quo affirmed with modification.

Tura. Asuncion's sister, Rosalia Tura, served the appellant. Aside from appellant there were many other customers eating at the "karinderia". After appellant had finished eating and while he remained seated at the "karinderia", witness Asuncion Tura noticed that a man, who turned out to be the victim, Pat. Surilla, approached the appellant and introduced himself as a detective to appellant. Witness Asuncion Tura saw that appellant stood up when accosted by the detective after which appellant and the detective walked away from the store. When the appellant and the detective had walked about ten (10) meters away from the store, witness Asuncion Tura heard two shots and somebody shouting for help. When she turned her face towards that direction, she saw the appellant sitting astride the detective and stabbing the latter many times. The detective was then lying flat on his stomach. After appellant had delivered many stab blows, witness Asuncion Tura saw him go towards the toilet, holding a gun in his left hand and a hunting knife in his right hand. Witness Asuncion Tura did not see appellant again. Said witness identified appellant

in Court and declared that she had known appellant for two years because he frequented the Soriano market and was her customer. However, it was the first time she saw the victim, Pat. Surilla. The Manila Circuit Criminal Court imposed the death penalty on herein appellant, Rolando Javier y Primera, for the crime of Robbery with Homicide, with the attendant aggravating circumstance of treachery, disregard of respect due to the deceased on account of his rank, and cruelty, offset only by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. ISSUE: Whether the court correctly considered the aggravating circumstances HELD: Contrary to the findings of the trial court, the SC held that there was no treachery. There is treachery when the offender employs means, methods or forms in the execution of the crime which tend directly and

specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In this case, while appellant suddenly and unexpectedly stabbed the deceased, treachery does not connote the element of surprise alone. The victim must have had no opportunity to defend himself or to repel the initial assault. As it is, the deceased was able to pull out his gun and was able to defend himself but was ultimately bested by appellant. The means employed by appellant in stabbing the victim, therefore, was not without risk to himself arising from the defense that the victim did make. The SC also found as erroneous, but which the defense failed to raise, the appreciation by the trial Court of the aggravating circumstance of cruelty based upon the presence of twenty seven (27) wounds on the victim's body. "There is cruelty when the culprit enjoys and delights in making his victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing him unnecessary moral and physical pain in the consummation of the criminal act which he intends to commit. The mere fact of inflicting various successive

wounds upon a person in order to cause his death, no appreciable time intervening between the infliction of one wound and that of another to show that he had wanted to prolong the suffering of his victim, is not sufficient for taking this aggravating circumstance into consideration. Neither did the SC find the circumstance of "disregard of respect due the offended party on account of his rank" under Art. 14, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, present in this case. The act of appellant in attacking the victim, an agent of a person in authority, while the latter was in the performance of official duty, is actually constitutive of Direct Assault, or atentado, under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. That crime is characterized by the spirit of aggression directed against the authorities or their agents, hence, the circumstance of "disregard of respect due the offended party on account of his rank" may be considered inherent therein. In sum, appellant should be convicted of simple Homicide, attended by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, without any aggravating circumstance to offset the same.

purpose of awaiting the coming of the mutineers. A [G.R. No. 6344. March 21, 1911.] UNITED STATES vs. RODRIGUEZ FACTS: The appellants, with nine others, being members of the second company of the Constabulary stationed at Davao, mutinied and attempted, during the course of such mutiny, to kill one of their superior officers, Lieutenant Goicuria. Immediately after such revolt the mutineers, they took arms and ammunition from the depositary, left the vicinity of Davao and marched toward the mountains of Lipada. The mutineers returned to Davao for the purpose of attacking the town. The inhabitants thereof, having received previous notice of the proposed attack, prepared themselves to meet it. J. L. Burchfield, P. C. Libby, A. M. Templeton, and Roy Libby, armed with rifles, were detailed by those commanding the defense of the town, on the afternoon of the day referred to. They advanced to the cemetery within the limits of the town, forming an outpost for the HELD: As to whether or not there was present premeditacion conocida, qualifying the crime as murder, a simple reading of the proofs presented by the Government is sufficient to demonstrate that beyond question or doubt. The learned trial court found premeditacion conocida as the element qualifying the crime as murder. The SC held that the circumstance of craft, fraud or disguise was not present. This circumstance is characterized by the intellectual or mental rather than the physical means to which the criminal resorts to carry out his design. The facts do not show any element which ISSUE: Whether there were aggravating circumstances gunfight ten ensued. Roy Libby was killed. No other person except Roy Libby was killed, although several others were more or less severely wounded.

warrants the conclusions of the learned trial court as to the presence of this circumstance in the commission of the crime of which the appellants were found guilty. They boldly marched from the mountains of Lipada to Davao, partly, at least, in the daytime, with the purpose of attacking the town, which purpose they communicated to at least three persons, one of whom was permitted to precede them to the town. They advanced against the town at about 4.15 in the afternoon without any effort at concealment. They were in no way disguised. There is nothing in the case of craft, fraud or disguise. The circumstance of superior strength or means are employed to weaken the defense depends upon the relative strength of the one attacking and the one attacked. It can hardly be said that advantage is taken of superior strength or means are employed to weaken the defense when twenty-three men, in the daytime, openly and without stratagem of any kind, attack a town the size of Davao. For the existence of abuse of confidence it is necessary that there exist a relation of trust or confidence

between the person committing the crime and the one against whom it is committed and that the former make use of such relation to commit the crime. In order that this aggravating circumstance exist it is necessary that the person committing the crime be a public official and that he use the influence, prestige or ascendency which such office gives him as the means by which he realizes his purpose. The SC does not believe that the facts of this case warrant the finding of the trial court in this particular. The reason why the commission of a crime on the occasion of a fire, shipwreck, or other calamity or misfortune is an aggravating circumstance is found in the debased form of criminality met in one who, in the midst of a great calamity, instead of lending aid to the afflicted, adds to their suffering by taking advantage of their misfortune to despoil them. As is readily seen from the facts, no such condition as is described in this paragraph existed in Davao on the occasion of the attack. With regard to the crime being committed in contempt with insult to the public authorities, the SC held that the courts shall take this circumstance into

consideration according to the nature and characteristics of the crime. In the case at bar, the persons exercising that authority were the very persons against whom, among others, the crime charged in this action was being committed. The judgment of the court below is hereby modified and the appellants are each sentenced to cadena perpetua.