CHAPTER 1 Fundamental Power of the State (Police Power) 1.

Read: Police Power and Purposes / Aspects of Police Power Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Assoc., Inc vs Mayor of Manila Police Power Due Process Clause Facts:On 13 June 1963, the Manila Municipal Board enacted Ord 4760 and the same was approved by then acting mayor Astorga. Ord 4760 sought to regulate hotels and motels. It classified them into 1st class (taxed at 6k/yr) and 2nd class (taxed at 4.5k/yr). It also compelled hotels/motels to get the demographics of anyone who checks in to their rooms. It compelled hotels/motels to have wide open spaces so as not to conceal the identity of their patrons. ErmitaMalate impugned the validity of the law averring that such is oppressive, arbitrary and against due process. The lower court as well as the appellate court ruled in favor of Ermita-Malate. ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 4760 is against the due process clause. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There is a presumption that the laws enacted by Congress (in this case Mun Board) is valid. W/o a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity, the presumption stays. As in this case, there was only a stipulation of facts and such cannot prevail over the presumption. Further, the ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power. There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. This is to minimize prostitution. The increase in taxes not only discourages hotels/motels in doing any business other than legal but also increases the revenue of the lgu concerned. And taxation is a valid exercise of police power as well. The due process contention is likewise untenable, due process has no exact definition but has reason as a standard. In this case, the precise reason why the ordinance was enacted was to curb down prostitution in the city which is reason enough and cannot be defeated by mere singling out of the provisions of the said ordinance alleged to be vague. White Light Corp., vs City of Manila Police Power Not Validly Exercised Infringement of Private Rights Facts:On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled An Ordinance prohibiting short time admission in hotels,motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of minihotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed bythe Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City. ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid. HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It also violates the dueprocess clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invadesprivate rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to wash up or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the saidordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. City of Manila vs Judge Perfecto Laguio Police Power Facts:On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It basically prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke bars, motels and hotels from operating in the Malate District which was notoriously viewed as a red light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist Development Corporation avers that the ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places offering amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do notmarket such nor do they use women as tools for entertainment. MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate motels but cannot prohibit their operation. The City reiterates that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power as provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized that the purpose of the law is to promote morality in the City. ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid. HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable. The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. In the case

at bar, the enactment of theOrdinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws. JMM Promotion and Management vs Court of Appeals Police Power Facts:Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory banned the deployment of performing artists to Japan and otherdestinations. This was relaxed however with the introduction of the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council which later proposed a plan to POEA to screen and train performing artists seeking to go abroad. In pursuant to the proposal POEA and the secretary of DOLE sought a 4 step plan to realize the plan which included an Artists Record Book which a performing artist must acquire prior to being deployed abroad. The Federation of Talent Managers of the Philippines assailed the validity of the said regulation as it violated the right to travel, abridge existing contracts and rights and deprives artists of their individual rights. JMM intervened to bolster the cause of FETMOP. The lower court ruled in favor of EIAC. ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation is a valid exercise of police power. Police power concernsgovernment enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. The welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to high risk destinations, a measure which would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies. Lao Ichong vs Jaime Hernandez Constitutional Law Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the Exercise of Police Power Facts: Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities herein abound (then) particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a monopoly in the local marketin Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity. ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles. HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced; and, that the equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market. United States vs Luis Toribio Facts: Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a license to have his carabao be slaughtered. His request was denied because hiscarabao is found not to be unfit for work. He nevertheless slaughtered his carabao without the necessary license. He was eventually sued and was sentenced by the trial court. His counsel in one way or the other argued that the law mandating that one should acquire a permit to slaughter his carabao is not a valid exercise of police power. ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid. HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained that it is not a taking of the property for public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of the publics. All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and interests of the community. TOMAS VELASCO et al vs HON. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS et al This is an appeal from an order of the lower court dismissing a suit for declaratory relief challenging the constitutionality based on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila, the contention being that it amounts to a deprivation of property of petitioners-appellants of their means of livelihood without due process of law. The assailed ordinance is worded thus: It shall be prohibited for any operator of any barber shop to conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of said barber shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as long as the operator ofthe barber shop and the room where massaging is conducted is the same person. 1 As noted in the appealed order, petitioners-appellants admitted that criminal cases for the violation of this ordinance had been previously filed and decided. The lower court,

therefore, held that a petition for declaratory relief did not lie, its availability being dependent on there being as yet no case involving such issue having been filed. 2 Even if such were not the case, the attack against the validity cannot succeed. As pointed out in the brief of respondents-appellees, it is a police power measure. The objectives behind its enactment are: (1) To be able to impose payment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers. 3This Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. As far back as U.S. v. Salaveria, 4 a 1918 decision, this Court through Justice Malcolm made clear the significance and scope of such a clause, which delegates in statutory form the police power to a municipality. As above stated, this clause has been given wide application by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case been liberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to really is the progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence. 5 As it was then, so it has continued to be. 6There is no showing, therefore, of the unconstitutionality of such ordinance. WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the lower court is affirmed. No costs. Agustin vs Edu Facts:Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter of Instruction No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have early warning devices particularly to equip them with a pair of reflectorized triangular early warning devices. Agustin is arguing that this order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars are already equipped with blinking lights which is already enough to provide warning to other motorists. And that the mandate to compel motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early warning devices is redundant and would only make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires. ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid. HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) blinking-lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles, 2) battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles, 3) built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles, or 4) well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other builtin warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision. On Police Power The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due process and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision, as nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state. Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, the most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable powers, extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out to all the great public needs. Its scope, ever expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time. The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare. It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin, compounded by the fact that the particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character. None has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, an enactment conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was: To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated as

national roads . . . As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public safety. Taxicab Operators vs Board of Transportation Facts: Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic. On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which reads: SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation. ISSUES: A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord with the manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the petitioners constitutional right to procedural due process? B. Granting arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, would the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners constitutional rights to. (1) Equal protection of the law; (2) Substantive due process; and (3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard? HELD As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. Mary Concepcion Bautista et al vs Alfredo Juinio et al Equal Protection Distinction Between Heavy and Extra Heavy Cars and Others Bautista is assailing the constitutionality of LOI 869 issued in 1979 which classified vehicles into Heavy and Extra Heavy. The LOI further banned these vehicles during weekends and holidays that is from 5am Saturday until 5am Monday. Purpose of this law is to curb down petroleum consumption as bigger cars consume more oil. Bautista claimed the LOI to be discriminatory as it made an assumption that H and EH cars are heavy on petroleum consumption when in fact there are smaller cars which are also big onoil consumption. Further, the law restricts their freedom to enjoy their car while others who have smaller cars may enjoy theirs. Bautista avers that there is no rational justification for the ban being imposed on vehicles classified as heavy (H) and extra-heavy (EH), for precisely those owned by them fall within such category. ISSUE: Whether or not the LOI violates equal protection. HELD: The SC held that Bautista was not able to make merit out of her contention. The classification on cars on its face cannot be characterized as an affront to reason. The ideal situation is for the laws benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the idea of law. The actual, given things as they are and likely to continue to be, cannot approximate the ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into account the realities of the situation. . . . To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest. Gancayco vs. Quezon City & MMDA, G.R. No. 177807, Oct. 11, 2011 Facts: The MMDA then sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of his building violated the National Building Code of the Philippines in relation to Ordinance No. 2904. He did not comply with the notice. Thelma then proceeded to demolish the party wall of the ground floor structure. The City Government of Quezon City claimed that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power, regulating the use of property in a business zone. Justice Gancayco filed a Petition with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The RTC ruled that the ordinance was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTCs decision and ruled that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the right of the local government unit to promote the general welfare of its constituents pursuant to its police powers. Issue: Did MMDA Resolution No. 02-28, validly empower the MMDA to demolish Justice Gancaycos property?

Ruling: No. the Supreme Court held that the power to enforce the provisions of the Building Code was lodged in the Department of Public Works and Highways, not in MMDA. Since there was no evidence that the MMDA had been delegated by the DPWH to implement the Building Code, it necessarily had no authority to carry out the demolition. Additionally, the penalty prescribed by Ordinance No. 2904 itself does not include the demolition of illegally constructed buildings in case of violations. Instead, it merely prescribes a punishment of a fine or by imprisonment, or both, at the discretion of the court. The ordinance itself clearly states that it is the regular courts that will determine whether there was a violation of the ordinance. Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform Equal Protection These are 3 cases consolidated questioning the constitutionality of the Agrarian Reform Act. Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake anagrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted by Congress on August 8, 1963. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by PD 27, which was promulgated on Oct 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. On July 17, 1987, Cory issued EO 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by PP 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and EO 229, providing the mechanics for its implementation. Afterwhich is the enactment of RA 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which Cory signed on June 10. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process. The equal protection clause is also violated because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other properties. The petitioners maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under PD 27 to be the owners of the lands occupied by them, EO 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution. In his comment the Sol-Gen asserted that the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to a different class and should be differently treated. The Comment also suggests the possibility of Congress first distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling the expropriation of private agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the petition for prohibition would be premature. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause. HELD: The SC ruled affirming the Sol-Gen. The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protectionbecause of the absence of retention limits has also become academic under Sec 6 of RA 6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the complaint that they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class with particular interests of their own. However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been violated. Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory. Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a differenttreatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. DECS VS SAN DIEGO, 180 SCRA 533 FACTS: 1. Private respondent Roberto Rey San Diego graduated from the University of the East with a BS degree in Zoology. 2. He took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times. 3. When he applied again petitioner rejected him because it contended that under the NMAT rule: a student shall be allowed to take 3 chances to take the NMAT. After three successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time. 4. Private respondent went to the RTC for a petition mandamus invoking his right to academic freedom and quality

education. 5. Respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong declared the challenged order unconstitutional. 6. Respondent Judge held that San Diego has been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of police power. ISSUE: Is person who has failed the NMAT three times entitled to take it again. HELD: The proper exercise of the police power of the State requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The thee-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved, and the closer the line, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are, not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction. The right to quality education is not absolute. The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has a right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements. {Art. XIV, Sec.5 (3)} The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well taken. A law does not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Art. III, Sec 1 of the Constitution. There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others who have also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what the equal protection requires is equality among equals. Villanueva vs Castaeda There is in the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, along Mercado Street, a strip of land measuring 12 by 77 meters on which stands a conglomeration of vendors stalls together forming what is commonly known as a talipapa. This is the subject of the herein petition. The petitioners claim they have a right to remain in and conduct business in this area by virtue of a previous authorization granted to them by the municipal government. The respondents deny this and justify the demolition of their stalls as illegal constructions on public property. At the petitioners behest, we have issued a temporary restraining order to preserve the status quo between the parties pending our decision. This dispute goes back to November 7, 1961, when the municipal council of San Fernando adopted Resolution No. 218 authorizing some 24 members of the Fernandino United Merchants and Traders Association to construct permanent stalls and sell in the above-mentioned place. The action was protested on November 10, 1961, in Civil Case No. 2040, where the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch 2, issued a writ of preliminary injunction that prevented the defendants from constructing the said stalls until final resolution of the controversy. On January 18, 1964, while this case was pending, the municipal council of San Fernando adopted Resolution No. 29, which declared the subject area as the parking place and as the public plaza of the municipality, thereby impliedly revoking Resolution No. 218, series of 1961. Four years later, on November 2, 1968, Judge Andres C. Aguilar decided the aforesaid case and held that the land occupied by the petitioners, being public in nature, was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could not be the subject of private occupancy. The writ of preliminary injunction was made permanent. HELD Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have effectively terminated the agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a contract. In fact, every contract affecting the public interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that it contains an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This power can be activated at any time to change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the paramount police power. We hold that the respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition for prohibition. On the contrary, he acted correctly in sustaining the right and responsibility of the mayor to evict the petitioners from the disputed area and clear it of all the structures illegally constructed therein. PRC vs DE Guzman Facts: The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. They passed the Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of Medicine (Board). Petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their names

as successful examinees in the medical licensure examination. Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-nine successful examinees from Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high. Eleven Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and twentyone scored 99% in OB-Gyne. For its part, the NBI found that the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees in the [1993] Physician Examination leads to the conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early access to the test questions. Issue: Was the act pursuant to R.A. 2382 a valid exercise of police power Ruling: Yes, it is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. Didipio Earth Savers Multipurpose Association et al vs DENR Sec Elisea Gozun et al Police Power Eminent Domain In 1987, Cory rolled out EO 279 w/c empowered DENR to stipulate with foreign companies when it comes to either technical or financial large scale exploration or mining. In 1995, Ramos signed into law RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act. In 1994, Ramos already signed an FTAA with Arimco Mining Co, an Australian company. The FTAA authorized AMC (later CAMC) to explore 37,000 ha of land in Quirino and N. Vizcaya including Brgy Didipio. After the passage of the law, DENR rolled out its implementing RRs. Didipio petitioned to have the law and the RR to be annulled as it is unconstitutional and it constitutes unlawful taking of property. In seeking to nullify Rep. Act No. 7942 and its implementing rules DAO 96-40 as unconstitutional, petitioners set their sight on Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 which they claim allow the unlawful and unjust taking of private property for private purpose in contradiction with Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandating that private property shall not be taken except for public use and the corresponding payment of just compensation. They assert that public respondent DENR, through the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, cannot, on its own, permit entry into a private property and allow taking of land without payment of just compensation. Traversing petitioners assertion, public respondents argue that Section 76 is not a taking provision but a valid exercise of the police power and by virtue of which, the state may prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. This government regulation involves the adjustment of rights for the public good and that this adjustment curtails some potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property. Public respondents concluded that to require compensation in all such circumstances would compel the government to regulate by purchase. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7942 and the DENR RRs are valid. HELD: The SC ruled against Didipio. The SC noted the requisites of eminent domain. They are; (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period. (3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. In the case at bar, Didipio failed to show that the law is invalid. Indeed there is taking involved but it is not w/o just compensation. Sec 76 of RA 7942 provides for just compensation as well as section 107 of the DENR RR. To wit, Section 76. xxx Provided, that any damage to the property of the surface owner, occupant, or concessionaire as a consequence of such operations shall be properly compensated as may be provided for in the implementing rules and regulations. Section 107. Compensation of the Surface Owner and Occupant- Any damage done to the property of the surface owners, occupant, or concessionaire thereof as a consequence of the mining operations or as a result of the construction orinstallation of the infrastructure mentioned in 104 above shall be properly and justly compensated. Further, mining is a public policy and the government can invoke eminent domain to exercise entry, acquisition and use of private lands. 5-a. Not a valid exercise of police power City Government of QC vs Judge Ericta & Himlayang Pilipino Police Power Not Validly Exercised Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF. The law basically provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. QC justified the law by invoking police power. ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid. HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased

paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building ormaintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. Restituto Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court Police Power Not Validly Exercised There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averredEO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided byEO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos. ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid. HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated a presumption based on thejudgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process isviolated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. Felicisima De La Cruz vs Paras Political Law Subject Shall Be Expressed in the Title De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition andClosure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawfulbusiness for the said ordinance would close out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due process. ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938. HELD: RA 938 was enacted in 1953. Section thereof reads The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have the power to regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction: . . . . Then in 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely the power to regulate, but likewise prohibit . . .. The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as RA 938. If considered as amended, a municipal council may go as far as to prohibit the operation of night clubs. If that were all, then the appealed decision is not devoid of support in law. That is not all, however. The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed one bit. The exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition. There is thus support for the view advanced by De La Cruz that to construe RA. 938 as allowing the prohibition of the operation of night clubs is in violation of the constitutional provision that a bill shall contain only one subject matter and shall be expressed in the title thereof. The title clearly expresses that the purpose of which is to regulate. The amendment including prohibition is therefore violative of the constitution for it runs counter against the title of the said RA. As noted, the title was not modified to accommodate the amendment. CHAPTER II Due Process 1. Requisites of Judicial Due Process El Banco Espaol-Filipino vs Vicente Palanca Judicial Due Process Requisites Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security to his debt. His debt amounted to P218,294.10. His property is worth 75k more than what he owe. Due to the failure of Engracio to make his payments, El Banco executed an instrument to mortgage Engracios property. Engracio however left for China and he never returned til he died. Since Engracio is a non resident El Banco has to notify Engracio about their intent to sue him by means of publication using anewspaper. The lower court further orderdd the clerk of court to furnish Engracio a copy and that itd be sent to Amoy, China. The court eventually granted El Banco petition to execute Engracios property. 7 years thereafter, Vicente surfaced on behalf of Engracio as his administrator to petition for the annulment of the ruling. Vicente averred that there had been no due process as Engracio never received the summons. ISSUE: Whether or not due process was not observed.

HELD: The SC ruled against Palanca. The SC ruled that the requisites for judicial due process had been met. The requisites are; 1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and decide the matter before it. 2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property subject of the proceedings. 3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard. 4. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing. 2. Read Also: Imelda Marcos vs Sandiganbayan Due Process Imelda was charged together with Jose Dans for Graft & Corruption for a dubious transaction done in 1984 while they were officers transacting business with the Light Railway Transit. The case was raffled to the 1st Division of the Sandiganbayan. The division was headed by Justice Garchitorena with J Balajadia and J Atienza as associate justices. No decision was reached by the division by reason of Atienzas dissent in favor of Imeldas innocence. Garchitorena then summoned a special division of the SB to include JJ Amores and Cipriano as additional members. Amores then asked Garchitorena to be given 15 days to send in hismanifestation. On the date of Amores request, Garchitorena received manifestation from J Balajadia stating that he agrees with J Rosario who further agrees with J Atienza. Garchitorena then issued a special order to immediately dissolve the special division and have the issue be raised to the SB en banc for it would already be pointless to wait for Amores manifestation granted that a majority has already decided on Imeldas favor. The SB en banc ruled against Imelda. ISSUE: Whether or not due process has been observed. HELD: The SC ruled that the ruling of the SB is bereft of merit as there was no strong showing of Imeldas guilt. The SC further emphasized that Imelda was deprived of due process by reason of Garchitorena not waiting for Amores manifestation. Such procedural flaws committed by respondent Sandiganbayan are fatal to the validity of its decision convicting petitioner. Garchitorena had already created the Special Division of five (5) justices in view of the lack of unanimity of the three (3) justices in the First Division. At that stage, petitioner had a vested right to be heard by the five (5) justices, especially the new justices in the persons of Justices Amores and del Rosario who may have a different view of the cases against her. At that point, Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justice Balajadia may change their mind and agree with the original opinion of Justice Atienza but the turnaround cannot deprive petitioner of her vested right to the opinion of Justices Amores and del Rosario. It may be true that Justice del Rosario had already expressed his opinion during an informal, unscheduled meeting in the unnamed restaurant but as aforestated, that opinion is not the opinion contemplated by law. But what is more, petitioner was denied the opinion of Justice Amores for before it could be given, Presiding Justice Garchitorena dissolved the Special Division. Emma Delgado vs Court of Appeals Due Process Delgado together with 3 others were charged for estafa causing the frustration of one medical student. Delgado was assisted by one Atty. Yco. The said lawyer has filed for multiple postponement of trial and one time he failed to appear in court by reason of him being allegedly sick. No medical certificate was furnished. The court was not impressed with such actuation and had considered the same as Delgados waiver of her right to trial. The lower court convicted her and the others. She appealed before the CA and the CA sustained the lower courts rule. Delgado later found out that Yco is not a member of the IBP. ISSUE: Whether or not due process was observed. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Delgado. An accused person is entitled to be represented by a member of the bar in a criminalcase filed against her before the Regional Trial Court. Unless she is represented by a lawyer, there is great danger that any defense presented in her behalf will be inadequate considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. This would certainly be a denial of due process. Pedro Consulta vs People of the Philippines Due Process Facts: Consulta is charged for stealing a gold necklace worth 3.5k owned by a certain Silvestre. He was convicted by the lower court.Consulta raised before the CA the issue that he was not properly arraigned and that he was represented by a non lawyer. ISSUE: Whether or not Consulta was denied of due process. HELD: The SC ruled that Consultas claim of being misrepresented cannot be given due course. He was assisted by two lawyersduring the proceeding. In the earlier part, he was assisted by one Atty. Jocelyn Reyes who seemed not to be a lawyer. Granting that she indeed is not a lawyer, her withdrawal from the case in the earlier part of the case has cured the defect as he was subsequently assisted by a lawyer coming from the PAO. People vs Opida Facts: On July 31, 1976, in Quezon City, several persons ganged up on Fabian Galvan, stoned and hit him with beer bottles until finally one of them stabbed him to death. The actual knife-wielder was identified as Mario del Mundo. 3 Nonetheless, Alberto Opida and Virgilio Marcelo were charged with murder as conspirators and, after trial, sentenced to death. 4 The basis of their conviction by the trial court was the testimony of two prosecution witnesses, neither of whom positively said that the accused were at the scene of the crime, their extrajudicial confessions, which were secured without the assistance of counsel, and corroboration of the alleged conspiracy under the theory of interlocking confession. 5

What is striking about this case is the way the trial judge conducted his interrogation of the two accused and their lone witness, Lilian Layug. It was hardly judicious and certainly far from judicial, at times irrelevant, at Worst malicious. Reading the transcript, one gathers the impression that the judge had allied himself with the prosecution to discredit at the outset the credibility of the witnesses for the defense. Opida is a police character, admittedly a member of the Commando gang and with a string of convictions for robbery, theft and vagrancy. It is worth noting that the judge took special interest in his tattoos, required him to remove his shirt so they could be examined, and even described them in detail for the record. Besides belaboring Opida's criminal activities and his tattoos, the judge asked him if he had "ever been convicted at the National Mental Hospital with what else but malice and suggested to him that his claim of manhandling by the police was a lie because investigators leave no mark when they torture a suspect. 8 This was a point that could have been validly raised by the prosecution but certainly not by the court. The judge also made it of record that the witness was gnashing his teeth, was showing signs of hostility, that he was uneasy and that he was restless. "Now, whom do you want to fool the judge asked, "the prosecutor, your lawyer, or the court? 9 In the hearing of September 22, 1976, the interrogation of Virgilio Marcelo, the other accused, was conducted almost wholly by the judge who started cross-examining the witness even before the defense counsel could ask his first question, and took over from the prosecution the task of impeaching Marcelo's credibility. 10 The judge asked him about his drug addiction, his membership in the Commando gang, his tattoos, his parentage, his activities, his criminal record all when he was supposed to be under direct examination by his own lawyer. Defense counsel could hardly put in a word edgewise because the judge kept interrupting to ask his own questions. 11 The questions were not clarificatory but adversary; and when they were not adversary, they were irrelevant, and sometimes also cruel. At one point, the judge drew from the witness the statement that his mother was living with another man; forthwith he suggested that the mother was unfaithful to his father. 12 We deplore this sadistic treatment of the witness, especially as, for all his supposed "toughness," he could not answer back. We fail to see what possible connection the mother's infidelity could have had, by any stretch of the imagination, with the instant prosecution. Ruling: Given the obvious hostility of the judge toward the defense, it was inevitable that all the protestations of the accused in this respect would be, as they in fact were, dismissed. And once the confessions were admitted, it was easy enough to employ them as corroborating evidence of the claimed conspiracy among the accused. The accused are admittedly notorious criminals who were probably even proud of their membership in the Commando gang even as they flaunted their tattoos as a badge of notoriety. 21 Nevertheless, they were entitled to be presumed innocent until the contrary was proved and had a right not to be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. 22 The judge disregarded these guarantees and was in fact all too eager to convict the accused, who had manifestly earned his enmity. When he said at the conclusion of the trial, "You want me to dictate the decision now?" 23, he was betraying a pre-judgment long before made and obviously waiting only to be formalized. The scales of justice must hang equal and, in fact, should even be tipped in favor of the accused because of the constitutional presumption of innocence. Needless to stress, this right is available to every accused, whatever his present circumstance and no matter how dark and repellent his past. Despite their sinister connotations in our society, tattoos are at best dubious adornments only and surely not under our laws indicia of criminality. Of bad taste perhaps, but not of crime. In any event, convictions are based not on the mere appearance of the accused but on his actual commission of crime, to be ascertained with the pure objectivity of the true judge who must uphold the law for all without favor or malice and always with justice. People vs Mortera (Right Of The Accused To An Impartial Trial) FACTS: Prosecution witness Ramil Gregorio testified that one afternoon, he together with other men were drinking tuba. They have just started drinking when Benancio Mortera, Jr. arrived. He wanted to hit Alberto Rojas with a Nescafe glass. Alberto Rojas ran away. Mortera said, "Sayang." He listened while the group of Ramil Gregorio were singing accompanied by a guitar. Jomer Diaz, brother-in-law of Alberto Diaz, arrived. Mortera said, "Here comes another Rojas." Gregorio and his companions told Jomer Diaz to run away. Mortera hurled a stone at Diaz but the latter was not hit. Mortera left but he said that he will return. After a few minutes, Mortera came back. When Jomer Diaz ran, Robelyn Rojas, brother of Alberto Rojas went to Jomer. Mortera met Robelyn at a distance of about seven meters from the place where the group were drinking. Mortera and Robelyn discussed with each other and later shook hands. Robelyn turned his face and Mortera suddenly stabbed Robelyn Rojas at the back. After stabbing Robelyn, Mortera ran away. Robelyn Rojas tried to chase Mortera but he was not able to catch up but he fell down mortally wounded. He was brought to the hospital by his brother but he was pronounced DOA at the hospital. Jovel Veales who was drinking together with Ramil Gregorio and others, corroborated Ramil Gregorio's testimony. Although the accused pleaded not guilty when arraigned, during the trial, he admitted having stabbed the victim whom he referred to as Tonying, but claimed self-defense. By his account he passed by a corner and saw a group of people drinking. They were Ramil Gregorio, Jonel Veales and Tonying. Upon seeing him, Tonying ran away and called his brother, Alberto Rojas. When the accused was about to reach the main road, Alberto Rojas, Tonying and a certain "Duk" (brother-in-law of Tonying) accosted him and asked him for liquor money. When he refused, the three men got angry. After telling them that he had to go, Tonying hit him with a spray gun (for painting), causing him to fall down. While he was in a supine position, Tonying attempted to hit him again. It was at that point that he was able to get hold of his knife and thrust it forward and hit someone. He did not know who got stabbed. He then immediately fled. On January 23, 2007, the RTC rendered judgment finding the accused guilty of murder. In rejecting the claim of selfdefense, the trial court stated that it was not worthy of belief as it was belied by the credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.

The accused appealed to the CA raising the issues of denial of due process of law and his right to an impartial trial. He claimed that the trial court judge, Judge Jesus Carbon, was hostile towards him and prejudged his guilt as could be inferred from his "prosecutor-like" conduct. The accused likewise reiterated his claim of self-defense. In its decision, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification as to the civil liabilities. The CA ruled that the trial judge did not transgress the standard of "cold neutrality" required of a magistrate and added that the questions he propounded were "substantially clarificatory." Still not satisfied, the accused now comes before the SC. ISSUE: WON the accused were denied of his right to have an impartial trial. HELD: As correctly pointed out by the CA, although the trial judge might have made improper remarks and comments, it did not amount to a denial of his right to due process or his right to an impartial trial. Upon perusal of the transcript as a whole, it cannot be said that the remarks were reflective of his partiality. Not only did the accused mislead the court by initially invoking a negative defense only to claim otherwise during trial, he was also not candid to his own lawyer, who was kept in the dark as to his intended defense. The invocation of Opida did not persuade the SC. In Opida, SC did not fail to notice the "malicious," "sadistic" and "adversarial" manner of questioning by the trial judge of the accused therein, including their defense witness. In Opida, the accused never admitted the commission of the crime, and so the burden of proof remained with the prosecution. ALEN ROSS RODRIGUEZ and REGIDOR TULALI, vs.The Hon. BIENVENIDO BLANCAFLOR. Facts: In his October 13, 2009 Decision, Judge Blancaflor found petitioners Rodriguez and Tulali guilty of direct contempt and ordered them to issue a public apology to the court. In the same decision, Judge Blancaflor suspended them indefinitely from the practice of law. Respondents are further directed to issue a public apology to the Court for the above grave offenses and should they fail to do so after the finality of this Sentence, a warrant for their arrest will be issued, and they will not be released unless they comply with the order of this Court. Ruling: In the case at bench, there was no prior and separate notice issued to petitioners setting forth the facts constituting the misconduct and requiring them, within a specified period from receipt thereof, to show cause why they should not be suspended from the practice of their profession. Neither were they given full opportunity to defend themselves, to produce evidence on their behalf and to be heard by themselves and counsel. Undoubtedly, the suspension proceedings against petitioners are null and void, having violated their right to due process. Likewise, Judge Blancaflors suspension order is also void as the basis for suspension is not one of the causes that will warrant disciplinary action. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules enumerates the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar from his office as attorney, to wit: (1) deceit, (2) malpractice, (3) gross misconduct in office, (4) grossly immoral conduct, (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, (6) violation of the lawyer's oath, (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, and for (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so. Judge Blancaflor failed to show that the suspension was for any of the foregoing grounds. Petitioner was the cashier of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA)-Aganan, Sta. Barbara River Irrigation System in Iloilo City. On November 8, 1982, Commission on Audit (COA) State Auditing Examiners Yvonne Gotera (Gotera) and TheresitaCajita (Cajita) conducted an audit examination of petitioner's account which indicated a shortage of P93,051.88.[3] Gotera and Cajita thus sent a letter of demand dated November 23, 1982 to petitioner directing him to account for the shortage.[4] Petitioner refused to receive the letter, however, hence, Gotera and Cajita sent it by registered mail.[5] Petitioner was thereupon charged of committing malversation of public funds before the Sandiganbayan to which he pleaded "not guilty."[6] By the account of Gotera, the lone witness for the prosecution, petitioner had an account balance of P30,162.46 prior to June 25, 1982; that from June 25 to November 8, 1982, the date petitioner's account was audited, his cash collections totaled P347,995.64; that his remittances from June 25 to November 8, 1982 totaled P285,105.41; and that the total collections less total remittances amounted to P93,051.88 as of November 8, 1982.[7] Still by Gotera's account, the audit team found in petitioner's drawer "vales/chits" or promissory notes or receivables signed by NIA employees involving the total amount of P79,044.51.[8] Petitioner, who claimed that he was assigned as cashier since 1978 and was also in charge of payment of salaries of more than 2,000 field employees in the NIA Jalaur Project, declared that his task of keeping the collected irrigation fees was temporarily assigned to Editha Valeria (Valeria) upon instruction of his superior, Regional Director Manuel Hicao, [9] for he (petitioner) was also handling the payroll of around 2,000 employees. Petitioner further declared that no accounting of the collected fees was undertaken since he trusted Valeria, who directly remitted them to the bank, after he signed the statement of collection without reading the contents thereof. [10] Petitioner presented "vales" and "chits" involving the total amount of P115,661.66 representing loans extended by Valeria to certain NIA employees and even COA auditors.[11] And he identified "chits" and "vales" dated 1975 to 1981 inclusive representing loans extended prior to the audit period. Requisites of Due Process (Procedural Due process) in Non-Criminal cases. Banco Espanol Filipno Case.

1. 2. 3. 4.

There must me a court or tribunal clothe with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceedings The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard (right to notice and hearing before a impartial court of law) judgment must be rendered upon a lawful hearing.

In Administrative cases(Fabella Case) 1. 2. 3. 4. The right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings, which may affect a respondents legal rights. Real opportunity to b heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones favor and to defend ones rights Tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee to honesty as well as impartiality a finding of said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained the records or made known to the parties affected

Imelda Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan (the case of informal meeting and discussion of cases in an unknown restaurant in QC- Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)

Sec of Justice vs. Lantion (A very important case, once asked in the Bar Exams 2005) The private respondent, Mark Jimenez filed a plea after the filing of MOR by the petitioner from the decision rendered by the Court of January 18. In his plea, the private respondent alleged that he was deprived of his right of due process, particularly his right to notice and hearing since he was not given a copy of his extradition documents during the evaluation of his extradition proceedings. Issue: Was the contention of the private respondent tenable? Held: No. He has no right for notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. According to PD 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition proceedings, that the extraditee will only have the right to access the evidence against him when the petition is filed on courts. It is well settled rule that the court cannot give an extraditee a right where there is no express provision in the treaty. This means however that the extraditee has no right, the provision only intends to temporarily withheld his right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings and will revive only when the suit is filed in extradition courts for his criminal proceedings. It is important to note that in procedural due process, it requires the determination of what process is due, when it is due and degree of what is due. All person is entitled of due process, however it should be determine if such right is due to him and the time requires it. In the case at bar, the private respondent is indeed entitled to a due process as provided by the bill of rights, however his plea for the same collides with the interest of the state which may affect the greater majority. Thus, the state commitment to the treaty and the protection of the principle of separation of powers (Judgment of the executive branch to matters relating to foreign affairs eg RP-US Extradition Treaty) should be given greater weight than that what the private respondent avers. However, as said, it is important to note that the right to due process of the extraditee-private respondent is not entirely deprived to him but only temporarily withheld because of conflict with the national interest. His right will be revive when criminal proceeding is instituted and not during the evaluation stage. DBP vs. CA Facts: The petitioners, DBP filed a petition to review the decision of CA concerning the loan obligations of CCC to the petitioner. During the hearing of the case, the counsel for APT (Asset Privatization Trust (Privatization arm of the government) continuously absented himself because of some excuses of illneses, unpreparedness etc. The lower court eventually favored the petitioner ordering CCC to pay its obligations to 61M to DBP, however, denying the motion submitted by the petitioner to foreclose some of the real and personal properties of CCC. Consequently, DBP filed an instant petition to review the decision of the lower court alleging that they were being deprived of their right of due process since they were allegedly never given a chance to cross examine the witnesses of the other party. Issue: Was the failure for cross-examination due to absences a breach to right of due process?

Held: No. The law prohibits absolute absences of the opportunity to be heard, thus, there can be no deprivation of right of due process if parties are afforded with time and chances to present its side but did not able to do so. In the case at bar, the court is correct by stating that the petitioners APT waived its right to present evidences and for cross-examination when their counsel repeatedly absents himself during the proceeding. They themselves, deprived their right of due process because of their failure and negligence for not appearing before the proceedings. The records shows that the lower court gave them substantial amount of time for the proceedings of the case but were not able to present evidences and conduct a cross examination because of their counsels absences. Thus, they are given the opportunity to exercise their right of due process. No deprivation happened. The petition is denied. Matuguina vs. CA Facts: The Matuguina Logging Enter. A single proprietorship venture owned by Mrs. Matuguina was given a license or concession area by the BFR to log. Later on, Mrs. Matuguina transferred all her rights, interest and ownership including the license of her concession area through a deed of sale to MIWPI in exchange for being the major stockholder of MIWPI, submitted to the Dir. Of Forest Devt and was then on acting as the owner of the said license. Davencor, later filed a complaint before the District Forestry alleging that Mrs. Matuguina/MLE is conducting an illegal logging to Davencors concession area. After an investigation, the Dir of Forest Mngt. Ordered MIWPI to pay the timber logged on the concession area of Davencor, the CA later on affirmed the order. Thus, bringing this suit. The petitioner, MIWPI filed a petition for review on certiorari the decision of the CA contending that they were being deprived of their right of due process since they were being made liable by the respondent despite the fact that MIWPI is not a participant to such case. The liability of Mrs. Matuguina cannot be imputed against the petitioner since they have separate personality. Issue: Was the contention correct? Held: Yes. Under the Corporation law, a corporation is clothed with separate and distinct personality from that of the persons composing it. In line with this basis, it is generally accepted principle that a person who is a stranger in a case cannot be made liable, therefore the stranger is not bound to answer such liability. In the case at bar, Mrs. Matuguina/MLE cannot be made an alter ego of MIWPIU since she has separate and distinct personality from the corp. The petitioner MIWPI cannot be held liable to the acts of Mrs. Matuguina, since MIWPI is never a party to the case filed by Davencor, deciding otherwise would mean that MIWPI will be deprived of their right to due process since they were not given an opportunity to defend themselves from the case filed against Mrs. Matuguina. The decision appealed from is null and void.

People vs. CA Facts: After the CA affirmed the enjoining of the preliminary investigation at the Regional State Prosecutors Office in the case of private respondent Jane S. Go by the Respondent Judge Espina of Tacloban City, the petitioner through the Solicitor General filed a petition for review on certiorari praying the annulment of the decision and enjoin the respondent judge from conducting proceeding of the criminal case filed against another respondent Jane S. GO. The petitioner contends that the respondent judge is not clothe with cold neutrality of an impartial judge as required by due process. Issue: Was the contention with merit? Held: Yes. One of the essential requirements of procedural due process is the presence of an impartial court or tribunal clothe with judicial power to hear and determine matter filed before it. Thus, every party in a judicial process is entitled to an impartial judge to assure him or herself that the judgment rendered is just and their rights are carefully considered and protected. In the case at bar based on the evidences presented before a Special Civil action to the respondent judge wherein he enjoined the authorities for further investigation and favored the accused Go, it is enough to doubt the impartiality as required by due process, of the respondent judge in handling cases. The petition is affirmed.

Javier vs. Comelec Facts: Alleging serious anomalies in the conduct of election and canvass of election returns, the private petitioner filed a motion before the respondent to prohibit the proclamation of his rival, respondent Pacificador in the election of Antique (Assembly Member). However, the respondent Comelec proclaims the respondent Pacificador as the rightful winner in the held elections. The private respondent then filed a petition to annul the said decision of the Comelec. In the said decision, Comm. Opinion was asked to inhibit himself to participate in the hearing of the case filed in the ground that he was a former law firm partner of the respondent Pacificador, however, he refused and even objected to transfer the hearing of such case to other division of Comelec. Issue: Was the refusal of Comm. Opinion to inhibit himself in participation of the case a breach to due process? Held: Yes. The spirit of due process is akin to the spirit of fair play. Due process requires that every party in a litigation is entitled to an impartial judge to assure that the decision is just and to protect the rights of every litigant. Fair play calls for equality of justice. Thus there cannot be equal justice if a judge is already committed to the other party, thus, a relationship between a judge and a party may give color and distort the rendering of a just decision and the this is a clear manifestation of an impartial judge, and would be a result of breach of due process law. In the case at bar, there is no fair play in the case. The action of Comm. Opinion, and his relationship with the respondent Pacificador tarnished the right of due process of the petitioner as he gave much more weight to such relationship rather than abiding the well-known rule of judicial conduct of fair play and impartiality. Indeed, it resulted into a unjust judgment prejudicial to the petitioner. The Comm could have just inhibit himself out of delicadeza in order to promote due process in a judicial proceeding. Paderanga vs. Azura Facts: The petitioner filed an administrative charges against the respondent judge alleging that the latter committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by denying the motion for inhibition filed by the petitioner inhibiting the respondent judge to take cognizance of the pending administrative charges where officials of the City of Gingoog are the parties. The loss of trust and confidence to the respondent judge to render impartial and just trials, bias and oppressive dispensation of justice and issuing orders against the interest of the city are the grounds of the motion for inhibition filed by the petitioner. Issue: Base on the positions and imputations of the parties against each other, should the respondent judge inhibit himself in taking cognizance of the pending administrative charges involving city officials to uphold the spirit of due process? Held: Yes. The spirit of due process calls for an impartiality and cold-neutrality of a judges in order to uphold justice and protect the integrity of the judiciary. A judge is not legally prohibited to hear cases, but if circumstances may incite his integrity and compromise the trust of the people to the judiciary, he may conduct a careful self-examination and may choose to inhibit himself to take cognizance of such cases, consequently to uphold due process. David vs. Aquilizan Facts: The Jugar brothers, shared tenants of the petitioner contended that they were refused by David to be reinstated in his land to cultivate corn crops. As a result, the Jugar brothers filed a petition for reinstatement before the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. The respondent judge later without conducting any hearing rendered judgment declaring the Jugar Brothers tenants of the land of David and by virtue of PD 27, declared the Jugar brothers owners of the land. The petitioner filed am original Action with certiorari and preliminary injunction before the Supreme court contending that his right of due process were deprived by the respondent by rendering judgment without considering the petitioners right to notice and hearing. Issue: Does rendering judgment without due hearing a breach of right to due process?

Held: Yes. As stated by the Banco Filipino Case, the defendant should be given opportunity to be heard and that judgment should be rendered upon lawful hearing, these two elements are indispensable for the protection of every persons right to due process. Thus, a person should have the assurance of notice and hearing and judgment of the courts should be derived from a lawful hearing. In the case at bar, these two elements are wanting and thus, resulted into judicial usurpation and oppression, violative of the petitioners right to due process. Equal protection clause: Requisites of People vs. Cayat (Reasonable classification) Facts: The accused Cayat was convicted under sections 2 and 3 of Act 1639 by a peace of court in Baguio City and was sentenced to pay fifty pesos or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Under the Act in question, the possession of intoxicating liquor other than native wines and liquors by any member of non-Christian tribes in the Philippines is considered unlawful and punishable under the same act. Sometime on January 1967, the accused was found unlawfully, illegally and willfully received, acquire and have in his possession a one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor not considered as a native wine or liquor and is illegal under the contemplation of Act 1639. He admitted all of the accusation against him however pleaded not guilty during his trial. He questions the constitutionality of the Act on the ground that it is discriminatory ad denies equal protection of the law, violative of due process and an improper exercise of police power. Issue: Does the Act in question violative of the equal protection clause? Held: No. In the colonial history of the Philippines, colonials always believed that they have a great respondibility to civilize these less civilized people of their colony, such that they impose upon themselves the duty to free them from obscurity of ignorance. They provided different measures to bring these people to civilization. One of which is the implementation of the Act in question, implemented to secure these people the blessings of peace and harmony, to facilitate and not to spoil their march towards civilization. Under the established principle of constitutional law, the guaranty of equal protection is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. Under the reasonable classification test, the following requisites should not be wanting. 1. It must rest on substantial distinctions 2. Must be germane to the purposes of the law. 3. must not be limited to existing conditions only. 4. Must apply equally to all members of the same class. In the case at bar, the Act in question satisfies such requirements. a. It must rest on substantial distinctions The classification is real and substantial, not merely whimsical and imaginary distinction, base on the degree of civilization and culture. Non-Christian tribes, under the Act refers not to religious belief but base on geographical area in which these people live and their degree of civilization. b. Must be germane to the purposes of the law The purpose of the Act in question tp prohibit the possession of non-Christian tribes of intoxicating liquors other than native liquors and wines where they accustomed themselves is designed to ensure peace and order in and among themselves. This is due to the fact that possession of intoxicating liquors often resulted to lawlessness and crime that hampers the standards of living and civilization. c. Must not be limited to existing conditions only. The ACT in question is intended to apply all times as long as those conditions aimed to be prevented exist since the legislation believes that civilization of people is a slow and it must go together with security and protection. d. Must apply equally to all members of the same class The act applies equally to all members of the same class, specifically non-Christian tribes.

The question on Due process of law This simply means that, 1) that there shall be a lawprescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the government 2) It shall have reasonable application 3) shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed 4) shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or all of a class. In the case at bar, there is a law that prohibits such act (Act 1639), it has reasonable application of fines or subsidiary imprisonment, it does not violate any regular procedure in its enforcement and applicable of a certain class. The question on improper exercise of police power Police power, as said is the least limitable of all inherent powers such that the state can limit the liberty and property of its citizens for the promotion of general welfare. It is geared towards self-protection and public prosperity and comfort. In the case at bar, the Act in question aims to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles towards their moral and intellectual growth. Thus, it has lawful subject and reasonable means of enforcement. Association of Small Landowners vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform Facts: In a consolidated petition to review the decision of the respondent, the petitioners contends that the implementation of the CARP (RA 6657) is violative of due process and their right of equal protection The petitioners in this consolidated petition are rice and sugar landowners. All of which are agricultural lands. They question the validity of the implementation of the CARP Law, contending that it is violative of their right to the equal protection clause. The Act in question primarily states that landowners will retain five to the maximum of seven hectares of their land and the excess will be given to tenant farmers, depending on the terrain, viable family size and fertility of the soil. They alleged that in the CARP law implementation, agricultural landowners are the only class that will carry the burden of the effects of the law and not any other land owners, thus, violating their right to equal protection of the law? Issue: Does the contention tenable? Held: No. The equal protection clause provided by the constitution is defined as all person or things similarly situated must be treated alike as to both rights conferred and liabilities imposed. And as held in the Cayat case, the valid classification test should occur. In the case at bar, the petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class so as not to be bounded by the CARP Law. All of the petitioners are in the same class such that they are all agricultural landowners as contemplated by legislation. There are substantial distinction between agricultural landowners and non-agricultural landowners. The purpose of the law is to give land to the landless to balance the distribution of ownership of land resources among the people, not to mention the constitutional provision that the government should formulate and implement a comprehensive agrarian reform program. And this purpose of the law does not only meant to answer existing condition since such condition of imbalance opportunity and ownership to one of the most important resource in earth has been existent long before the implemntatin of the CARP Law. Thus, base from the case at bar, the requirement of valid classification has been met. People vs. Vera Facts: This case involves Act 4221 or the Probation Act, which empowered Provincial Boards to appropriate salaries of probation officers for the maintenance of the probation system in respective provinces, also this act allows the delegation of power to provincial boards to support or not to support the probation system. This case came from the Criminal case of PP vs. Cu Injeng where the respondent judge of CFI Manila (7 th branch)heard the application of probation by Mariano Cu Unjieng. In a criminal case against Cu, the trial court under the respondent judge convicted Cu of the crime charged to him. The defendant, Cu, filed a motion for reconsideration, and was later, filed an application for probation, which was later approved by the respondent judge. Hence, an original action for certiorari and prohibition was filed by the petitioners alleging that the respondent judge CGADALEJ placing Cu under probation. The petitioners also questions the constitutionality of the RA 4221, contesting that it is violative of equal protection clause provided in the constitution, since it allows inequalities among different provinces. Issue: Does equal protection of law require territorial uniformity?

Held: No. While equal protection of law does not require territorial uniformity, however, there is a limit to allowable territorial lack of uniformity. It is clear that under the Act in question, promotes inequality among provinces permits denial of equal protection, by giving an option to provincial boards to either support or not to support the probation system, it may allow arbitrary decision from local bodies to adapt such. The probation system may be beneficial in its implementation in the Philippines, however, if the mode of its implementation may permit unreasonable classification so as to deprive peoples right to equal protection of law, then the law should be annulled, since the court said that there is no difference between law that denies equal protection and law that permits such denial. Subjecting the law in question to the four requisites of reasonable classification, 2 requisites will be wanting. It may be germane to the purpose of the law and that it is not only base on existing condition, however, the element of substantial distinctions, whereas there is a real and not to capricious differences cannot be established and second, since discretion is delegated to provincial boards, it cannot be applied to all of the members of the same class. Act 4221 is repugnant to the constitution (Art Bill of Rights) Marcos vs. CA Facts: RTC Manila Br. 26 under respondent judge Loja Sr, convicted Imelda Marcos pursuant to Circular 960 of the Central Bank. The public respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court, hence, the petitoner filed a petition for review on certiorari the decision of the public respondent. The circular in question consolidated the various rules promulgated by the CB. One of these rules under the circular is that it requires all resident who habitually earn or receive foreign exchange from invisibles locally or from abroad to submit reports on such earnings or receipts on prescribed forms with the proper CB departments and to register with the foreign Exchange department of the CB within 90 days from Oct. 21 1983. Violation of the said circular imposes criminal charges. On Dec 21 1991, marcos was allegedly opening and maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad specifically the SBC on various dates from 68 to 91 without prior authorization from CB as contemplated under the circular in question. During the pendency of the case in the trial court, circular 1353 was issued repealing all circulars inconsistent therewith including the circular in question, however, circular 1353 has a saving clause, stating that pending criminal charges from the violation of CB circular 960 and 1318 will not be affected by the repeal. Using circular 1318 as ground, the petition filed a motion to quash the charges filed against her but however denied by the lower court, resulting to an appeal to the public respondent, contesting that the lower court has no jurisdiction since the charges was committed outside Philippine territory and that the saving clause in Circular 1318 was designed to preserve criminal charges against her, violating her right to equal protection. She even avers that the saving clause was not germane to the purpose of the law, which is to stabilize the monetary system, but purely, for the purpose of preserving the criminal charges against her. Issue: Was the contention correct such that it denies the petitioners right to due process? Held: No. In fact, the petitioners contention that the circular was issued for the purpose of stabilizing the monetary system in the Philippines is exactly the reason why the government punishes as criminal offenses the violation of the issuances of the Monetary Board necessary for the effective discharge of their responsibility and function. The saving clause, thus then is anchored on the need to continue the prosecution of all of those who had already committed acts of monetary destabilization. The saving clause thus indeed germane to the purpose of the circular in question, and not merely to the paranoid and whimsical contention of the petitioner that it is lodged to preserve criminal charges against her, thereby not repugnant with the equal protection clause. Himagan vs. People The petitioner is a policeman assigned in a medical company of the PNP at Camp catitigan in Davao City. He was accused of murder and attempted murder of Benjamin and Bernabe machitar respectively. Pursuant to DILG Act of 1990 (RA 6875), the petitioner was suspended by virtue of the order of the court under the respondent Judge, until the termination of the case. Thus, the petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari and mandamus to lift his suspension in the ground that Equal protection clause: Requisites of

People vs. Cayat (Gin Blue boy) Facts: The accused Cayat was convicted under sections 2 and 3 of Act 1639 by a peace of court in Baguio City and was sentenced to pay fifty pesos or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Under the Act in question, the possession of intoxicating liquor other than native wines and liquors by any member of non-Christian tribes in the Philippines is considered unlawful and punishable under the same act. Sometime on January 1967, the accused was found unlawfully, illegally and willfully received, acquire and have in his possession a one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor not considered as a native wine or liquor and is illegal under the contemplation of Act 1639. He admitted all of the accusation against him however pleaded not guilty during his trial. He questions the constitutionality of the Act on the ground that it is discriminatory ad denies equal protection of the law, violative of due process and an improper exercise of police power. Issue: Does the Act in question violative of the equal protection clause? Held: No. In the colonial history of the Philippines, colonials always believed that they have a great respondibility to civilize these less civilized people of their colony, such that they impose upon themselves the duty to free them from obscurity of ignorance. They provided different measures to bring these people to civilization. One of which is the implementation of the Act in question, implemented to secure these people the blessings of peace and harmony, to facilitate and not to spoil their march towards civilization. Under the established principle of constitutional law, the guaranty of equal protection is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. Under the reasonable classification test, the following requisites should not be wanting. 5. It must rest on substantial distinctions 6. Must be germane to the purposes of the law. 7. must not be limited to existing conditions only. 8. Must apply equally to all members of the same class. In the case at bar, the Act in question satisfies such requirements. a. It must rest on substantial distinctions The classification is real and substantial, not merely whimsical and imaginary distinction, base on the degree of civilization and culture. Non-Christian tribes, under the Act refers not to religious belief but base on geographical area in which these people live and their degree of civilization. b. Must be germane to the purposes of the law The purpose of the Act in question tp prohibit the possession of non-Christian tribes of intoxicating liquors other than native liquors and wines where they accustomed themselves is designed to ensure peace and order in and among themselves. This is due to the fact that possession of intoxicating liquors often resulted to lawlessness and crime that hampers the standards of living and civilization. c. Must not be limited to existing conditions only. The ACT in question is intended to apply all times as long as those conditions aimed to be prevented exist since the legislation believes that civilization of people is a slow and it must go together with security and protection. d. Must apply equally to all members of the same class The act applies equally to all members of the same class, specifically non-Christian tribes. The question on Due process of law This simply means that, 1) that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the government 2) It shall have reasonable application 3) shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed 4) shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or all of a class. In the case at bar, there is a law that prohibits such act (Act 1639), it has reasonable application of fines or subsidiary imprisonment, it does not violate any regular procedure in its enforcement and applicable of a certain class. The question on improper exercise of police power Police power, as said is the least limitable of all inherent powers such that the state can limit the liberty and property of its citizens for the promotion of general welfare. It is geared towards self-protection and public prosperity and comfort. In the case at bar, the Act in question aims to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles towards their moral and intellectual growth. Thus, it has lawful subject and reasonable means of enforcement.

Association of Small Landowners vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (land for the landless case) Facts: In a consolidated petition to review the decision of the respondent, the petitioners contends that the implementation of the CARP (RA 6657) is violative of due process and their right of equal protection The petitioners in this consolidated petition are rice and sugar landowners. All of which are agricultural lands. They question the validity of the implementation of the CARP Law, contending that it is violative of their right to the equal protection clause. The Act in question primarily states that landowners will retain five to the maximum of seven hectares of their land and the excess will be given to tenant farmers, depending on the terrain, viable family size and fertility of the soil. They alleged that in the CARP law implementation, agricultural landowners are the only class that will carry the burden of the effects of the law and not any other land owners, thus, violating their right to equal protection of the law? Issue: Does the contention tenable? Held: No. The equal protection clause provided by the constitution is defined as all person or things similarly situated must be treated alike as to both rights conferred and liabilities imposed. And as held in the Cayat case, the valid classification test should occur. In the case at bar, the petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class so as not to be bounded by the CARP Law. All of the petitioners are in the same class such that they are all agricultural landowners as contemplated by legislation. There are substantial distinction between agricultural landowners and non-agricultural landowners. The purpose of the law is to give land to the landless to balance the distribution of ownership of land resources among the people, not to mention the constitutional provision that the government should formulate and implement a comprehensive agrarian reform program. And this purpose of the law does not only meant to answer existing condition since such condition of imbalance opportunity and ownership to one of the most important resource in earth has been existent long before the implementation of the CARP Law. Thus, base from the case at bar, the requirement of valid classification has been met. People vs. Vera (Probation case) Facts: This case involves Act 4221 or the Probation Act, which empowered Provincial Boards to appropriate salaries of probation officers for the maintenance of the probation system in respective provinces, also this act allows the delegation of power to provincial boards to support or not to support the probation system. This case came from the Criminal case of PP vs. Cu Injeng where the respondent judge of CFI Manila (7 th branch)heard the application of probation by Mariano Cu Unjieng. In a criminal case against Cu, the trial court under the respondent judge convicted Cu of the crime charged to him. The defendant, Cu, filed a motion for reconsideration, and was later, filed an application for probation, which was later approved by the respondent judge. Hence, an original action for certiorari and prohibition was filed by the petitioners alleging that the respondent judge CGADALEJ placing Cu under probation. The petitioners also questions the constitutionality of the RA 4221, contesting that it is violative of equal protection clause provided in the constitution, since it allows inequalities among different provinces. Issue: Does equal protection of law require territorial uniformity? Held: No. While equal protection of law does not require territorial uniformity, however, there is a limit to allowable territorial lack of uniformity. It is clear that under the Act in question, promotes inequality among provinces permits denial of equal protection, by giving an option to provincial boards to either support or not to support the probation system, it may allow arbitrary decision from local bodies to adapt such. The probation system may be beneficial in its implementation in the Philippines, however, if the mode of its implementation may permit unreasonable classification so as to deprive peoples right to equal protection of law, then the law should be annulled, since the court said that there is no difference between law that denies equal protection and law that permits such denial. Subjecting the law in question to the four requisites of reasonable classification, 2 requisites will be wanting. It may be germane to the purpose of the law and that it is not only base on existing condition, however, the element of substantial distinctions, whereas there is a real and not to capricious differences cannot be established

and second, since discretion is delegated to provincial boards, it cannot be applied to all of the members of the same class. Act 4221 is repugnant to the constitution (Art Bill of Rights) Marcos vs. CA (A case of insatiable love for money resulting to paranoia) Facts: RTC Manila Br. 26 under respondent judge Loja Sr, convicted Imelda Marcos pursuant to Circular 960 of the Central Bank. The public respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court, hence, the petitoner filed a petition for review on certiorari the decision of the public respondent. The circular in question consolidated the various rules promulgated by the CB. One of these rules under the circular is that it requires all resident who habitually earn or receive foreign exchange from invisibles locally or from abroad to submit reports on such earnings or receipts on prescribed forms with the proper CB departments and to register with the foreign Exchange department of the CB within 90 days from Oct. 21 1983. Violation of the said circular imposes criminal charges. On Dec 21 1991, marcos was allegedly opening and maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad specifically the SBC on various dates from 68 to 91 without prior authorization from CB as contemplated under the circular in question. During the pendency of the case in the trial court, circular 1353 was issued repealing all circulars inconsistent therewith including the circular in question, however, circular 1353 has a saving clause, stating that pending criminal charges from the violation of CB circular 960 and 1318 will not be affected by the repeal. Using circular 1318 as ground, the petition filed a motion to quash the charges filed against her but however denied by the lower court, resulting to an appeal to the public respondent, contesting that the lower court has no jurisdiction since the charges was committed outside Philippine territory and that the saving clause in Circular 1318 was designed to preserve criminal charges against her, violating her right to equal protection. She even avers that the saving clause was not germane to the purpose of the law, which is to stabilize the monetary system, but purely, for the purpose of preserving the criminal charges against her. Issue: Was the contention correct such that it denies the petitioners right to due process? Held: No. In fact, the petitioners contention that the circular was issued for the purpose of stabilizing the monetary system in the Philippines is exactly the reason why the government punishes as criminal offenses the violation of the issuances of the Monetary Board necessary for the effective discharge of their responsibility and function. The saving clause, thus then is anchored on the need to continue the prosecution of all of those who had already committed acts of monetary destabilization. The saving clause thus indeed germane to the purpose of the circular in question, and not merely to the paranoid and whimsical contention of the petitioner that it is lodged to preserve criminal charges against her, thereby not repugnant with the equal protection clause.

Himagan vs. People (murderreeerr-reklamador) The petitioner is a policeman assigned in a medical company of the PNP at Camp catitigan in Davao City. He was accused of murder and attempted murder of Benjamin and Bernabe machitar respectively. Pursuant to DILG Act of 1990 (RA 6875), the petitioner was suspended by virtue of the order of the court under the respondent Judge, until the termination of the case. Thus, the petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari and mandamus to lift his suspension in the ground that under PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, his suspension should only be limited to 90 days since as a member of PNP and pursuant to RA 6975, the Civil service Decree also applies to him, thus, his suspension should not exceed 90 days. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws since members of the PNP are the only class covered by the Civil Service law to be suspended in accordance to RA 6975 and not under PD 807. Issue: Was the contention tenable in so far as equal protection of law is concerned? Held: No. The petitioner misread the distinction between the application of RA 6975 and PD 807 in so far as his defense is concerned.

The petitioners was charged of a criminal offense considered as a grave felony as compared to violation of RA Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices act, thus, in accordance with the deliberation of the legislature, RA 6975 which imposes suspension of more than prescribed by the Civil Service Decree provides stricter rules on prevention to members of the PNP. Second, PD 807 cannot be applied if it runs inconsistent with RA 6975. To hold that the preventive suspension imposed against the petitioner invalid is incorrect. This is so since the reason why policemen are given an imposition of suspension during the duration of the case if committed criminal offense with a penalty of more than 6 years and one day is that, policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can or may use to harass or intimidate witnesses against and may result to their silence. Thus, there is a valid classification and satisfies the reasonable classification test. The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. 14 Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications, such as the one which exists in the instant case. PJA vs. Prado (An Exercise of self-preservation) The petitioners are judges of the lower court who questions the constitutionality of RA 7354, which withdraws the postal privileges of the SC, CA, RTC. MTC, LRC and Registers of Deeds. They contend that the implementation of the law in question by the respondents is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary such that it denies them of equal protection clause provided under the constitution. This is so since the privilege from the Judiciary is withdrawn but the not the privilege of the Executive and Representatives. The respondents countered the allegations and avers that it is not discriminatory and is based on valid classification. Issue: Was there an invalid classification so as to defeat the equal protection clause? Held: Yes. The law in question is undoubtedly discriminatory and not anchored in a valid classification, thereby, violating the petitioners right to equal protection of the law. The equal protection clause does not require universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction as this might result into unequal protection. And valid classification is anchored on substantial and not whimsical distinction. In the case at bar the court cannot locate a reasonable distinction between those that privilege has been withdrawn and those who are not. If the granting of privilege was based on the necessity of the grantee of such accommodation, the court cannot establish a reasonable justification as to why of all the government branches, it is the judiciary where privilege was withdrawn despite of the great need of such privilege of the judiciary in judicial proceedings, specifically communication with lawyers and litigants and the fact that the judiciary receive the least appropriation among the three branches. It is also in the opinion of the court that the contention of the respondents that the privilege of the judiciary must be withdrawn to prevent the crippling of the postal corporation since a large volume of mails came from this branch. The court says that sustaining such contention would mean that privilege should be withdrawn to those who are in need like the judiciary and not to those who does not really needs such privilege such as widows of former Presidents. Thus, the first element of substantial distinction that would picture a valid classification is wanting in the case at bar. Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons (The case of Bakit ngaun ka lang Hernandez-retroactivity) Facts: The petitioners, Gumabon, Bagolbagol. Agapito and Padua pleaded guilty in the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, kidnapping and arson, imposed to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and since imprisonment, they have served their sentence to 13 years. Subsequently, a case was adjudicated by the SC involving the same offense of rebellion complexed with kidnapping, robbery and arson and that the court ruled that there is no such complex crime under the contemplation of Art 134 of the RPC. In line with the new jurisprudence, the petitioners filed an original petition for habeas corpus, contending that by virtue of the PP vs. Hernandez case and that the petitioner had already served the maximum penalty that could have been impose on him, he should be entitled to liberty and his detention is illegal. Moreover, the petitioners assert that they were being deprived of their constitutional right to due process since in the similar charges in the Hernandez case, where the petitioners charged and convicted under the same law, the petitioners suffered reclusion perpetua while in the Hernandez case, the defendant only suffers prision mayor.

Issue: Should the petitioners be freed by virtue of the mandate of the equal protection clause? Held: Yes. The mandate of equal protection o the law stresses out that persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike with respect to their rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Thus, it calls for a uniform operation of legal norms to all persons similarly situated. In the case at bar, the petitioners and the defendant in the Hernandez case are similarly situated such that they are both charged of the same offense and punished by the same law, thus both persons belongs to the same class and has substantial similarities to each other and difference from all other classes. However, the latter has lesser penalty imposed as compared to the petitioners, thus, there is inequality of protection of the law. Base from the principle ingrained in the RPC, the jurisprudence applied to the Hernandez case should be retroactively applied to the petitioners and therefore must be granted liberty. Note: Criminal Law By virtue of the Ponce Enrile vs. Salazar Case (186 SCRA 217), affirming the landmark case of People vs. Hernandez, the Supreme Court called the attention of the Congress to modify the RPC provision on Rebellion, either to raise the penalty or the provide a clear cut definition to demarcate crimes that can or cannot be absorbed in the crime of rebellion. Thus, the Legislative department enacted the Coup detat Law (RA 6968), which now provides that common crimes involving killings, serious violence, robbery, rape and others, even though committed by rebels in furtherance of rebellion shall bring about a complex crime. The crime of Rebellion can now be complexed with other common crimes. Please read People vs. Hernandez (99 Phil 515) and Ponce Enrile vs Salazar Case, and the explanation of Atty. Abelardo Estrada in his book Review Notes in Criminal Law. Lacson vs. Sandiganbayan Facts: After the incident of the Kuratong Baleleng rub out which is allegedly committed by the petitioner, Chief Superintendent Panfilo Lacson, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel later absolve from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and personnel allegedly involved in the May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said incident was a legitimate police operation and not a rub out as alleged. However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified the Blancaflor panels finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six (26) respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors. This recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman, except for the withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon. Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as principal in eleven (11) information for murder filed before the Sandiganbayans Second Division, while intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those charged in the same information as accessories after-the-fact. After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven (11) amended information before the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as an accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and others. One of the accused Inspector Alvarez was dropped from the case. On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended information, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975.7 [Entitled "An Act To Strengthen The Functional And Structural Organization Of The Sandiganbayan, Amending For That Purpose Presidential Decree 1606, As Amended."] They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the "principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended information has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27. Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended information, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975.7 [Entitled "An Act To Strengthen The Functional And Structural Organization Of The Sandiganbayan, Amending For That Purpose Presidential Decree 1606, As Amended."] They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the "principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended information has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27. Thereafter, in a Resolution dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned by Justice Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon concurring, and Justices Balajadia and Garchitorena dissenting, Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justice De Leon were designated as special members of the Division pursuant to SB Administrative Order No. 121-96 dated March 26, 1996.9 the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and ordered the

cases transferred to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan, this motion was opposed by the petitioners. While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before the issue of jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended information on March 1, 1996, House Bill No. 229910 and No. 109411 Petition; (sponsored by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No. 84412, (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales), were introduced in Congress, defining/expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word "principal" form the phrase "principal accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975. Moreover, under Section 7 of the said law, the transitory provision prescribes that the amended law shall be applicable to all cases pending in any court over which the trial has not yet began as of the approval thereof. And under Section 4, Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, brings the said cases within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, and in the case at bar, it is a multiple murder allegedly committed by PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank, which is well-within the provision of the law. Thus, pursuant to RA 8349, which amends the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the Sandiganbayan issued an addendum, granting the motion for reconsideration by the Special Prosecutor praying for the retention of the case under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Thus, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, questioning the constitutionality of RA 8249 and alleging that it is violative of the petitioners right to due process and equal protection of law. The petitioners argue that the passage of the law is timed to frustrate their vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan rules and that it is timed specifically for the purpose of retaining their criminal case under the Sandiganbayan, thereby violating their equal protection of law. Issue: Is there a violation of equal protection of law against the petitioners? Held: No. The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality and reasonableness of the questioned provisions. In relation with the first requisite the law must be based on substantial distinction, the classification between 1) those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commenced and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against 2) those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences. In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witness and presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from those similarly situated as them Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to "all cases involving" certain public officials and, under the transitory provision in Section 7, to "all cases pending in any court." Contrary to petitioner and intervenors arguments, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." It just happened that the Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249). In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised on what is perceived as bad faith on the part of a Senator and two Justices of the Sandiganbayan38 [Senator Raul Roco and Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena and Justice Jose Balajadia.] for their participation in the passage of the said provisions. In particular, it is stressed that the Senator had expressed strong sentiments against those officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases during the hearings conducted on the matter by the committee headed by the Senator. Petitioner further contends that the legislature is biased against him as he claims to have been selected from among the 67 million other Filipinos as the object of the deletion of the word "principal" in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of the transitory provision of R.A. 8249.39 [Petition, p. 17.] R.A. 8249, while still a bill, was acted, deliberated, considered by 23 other Senators and by about 250 Representatives, and was separately approved by the Senate and House of Representatives and, finally, by the President of the Philippines. However, the amended information does not alleged that the Kuratong Baleleng rub out was committed in line of the petitioners official duty to render the case under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, but it was alleged as a plain act of murder, thereby, the case is remanded in RTC Quezon City. The law in question is declared constiotutional. Basco vs. Pagcor

Facts: The petitioners are lawyers who filed an instant petition before the SC seeking to annul the PAGCOR Charter 1869, on the following grounds. A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It waived the Manila City government's right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law; "B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the law has intruded into the local government's right to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy; C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices; "C. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free enterprise and privatization." D. Allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, (11- Personal Dignity and Human Rights), 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II, Section 1 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.) Issue: Was there a breach of equal protection of the law? Held: No. the contention is without merit. We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989). The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G. 2847). The Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827). Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection is not clearly explained in the petition. The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D. 449) horse racing (R.A. 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one, unconstitutional. "If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have been applied." (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827) "The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not mean that all occupations called by the same name must be treated the same way; the state may do what it can to prevent which is deemed as evil and stop short of those cases in which harm to the few concerned is not less than the harm to the public that would insure if the rule laid down were made mathematically exact." (Dominican Hotel v. Arizana, 249 US 2651 Tatad vs. Secretary of Energy (from the dissenting opinions of J. Melo and J. Francisco) Facts: RA 8180 was promulgated on 1996 aiming to deregulate the downstream Oils industry in the Philippines. Pursuant to Section 5 of the law in questin, it imposes a different tariff rate of 3% to imported crude oil and 7% rate on imported refined petroleum products. Respondents aver that the difference in tariff rates is designed to encourage new oil players to invest in refineries in the country. This is so since the different imposition of tariff rates will entice new oil players to establish refineries in the country and to import crude oil which has lesser tariff rate rather than importing a refined petroleum which has a greater tariff rates. The petitioners think otherwise. In a consolidated petition, the petitioners seek to declare some isolated provisions RA 8180 unconstitutional in the ground that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported petroleum products violate the equal protection of the laws.

The petitioners argues that the difference of imposition of tariff rates between those who imports crude oil and those players who imports refined petroleum is based on unreasonable classification, and that the law rather favors the existing oil players in the country who has established their refineries, In relation to this contention, the petitioners further avers that it runs afoul to the constitutional provision that the government shall regulate or prohibit monopolies and that unfair competition in the market shall not be allowed. Issue: Does section 5 of RA 8180 violates the equal protection clause of the constitution? Held: No. In relation to the contention that the law in question violates equal protection of laws: We must identify if there is a valid and reasonable cassification. 1, The classification is based on real and substantial distinction. There is substantial distinction between those who imports crude oil and those who imports refined petroleum. The former has invested a large amount of money to established and maintain a refinery in the Philippines, thereby they have higher production cost, which prompted the government to lessen the tariff rate imposed on them in importing crude oils, as compared new players who does not have refineries and thereby directly importing a refined petroleum, they have lower expenses in engaging in the competition since they will have to distribute petroleum and not to refine them anymore, thereby prompting the government to impose higher tariff rates. Leveling the tariff rates would otherwise promote an unfair competition in the oil industry since both players will be competing in an uneven field. 2. It must be germane to the purposes of the law. It is clear that the imposition of different tariff rates is in accordance with the purpose of the law to 1) to regulate fair prices 2) to protect the consumers 3) to ensure the continuous supply of oil products in the country 4) protect the consumers as well as oil players from fly-by-night oil players that only aims to have an immediate profit without serious consideration in investing and supplying steady supply of oil products in the Philippines. By doing so, then the government would encourage new players to compete in the oil industry in the Philippines and not otherwise bar them from doing so. 3. It must no be limited to existing conditions only. It is clear that Philippines has already experiencing oil crisis because of fluctuation of oil prices in the international market. Thus, this measure cannot be limited only to existing condition. 4. Must apply to all members of the same class. As stated, the different tariff rates are applied to all classes of the same class. It will not only benefit the existing oil players in the country but also benefits different oil players, whether crude or petroleum-exporting corporation. The tariff rates are uniformly applied to all members of the same class. Note: However, the SC rendered the decision favoring the contention of the petitioners. They opined that the imposition of different tariff rates to different players placed the major league players (Petron, Shell and Caltex) in immense advantage because it will discouraged the entrance of new players in the industry to compete in the Market. Oil players, who has no refineries, will compete against the big three will be forced to increase their cost up to 4 percent so as not to sustain heavy loss. Thereby, there is violation of equal protection of law, because the law in question favors the big three. Moreover, the provision of the law in question about minimum inventory requirement is disadvantageous to players who imports refined petroleum and does not have storage and refining facilities and again favors the big three who has an established storage and refining facilities. Again violating the equal protection of the laws. Another, is that the prohibition of the law in question about predatory pricing, wherein the government prohibits the selling of oil products in an unreasonably below average cost so as to attract consumers is also detrimental to the oil industry competition because of its anti-competitive nature.

Equal protection of Laws II Dumlao vs. Comelec Facts: The petitioners, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, and Alfredo Salapantan, questions the constitutionality of sec. 4 of BP 52 as it is discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection clause.

The law in question provides a special disqualification to those who are retired provincial, municipal or city official who have received their retirement benefits, who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired. Issue: Was the contention correct? Held: No. Equal protection of laws is anchored in valid and reasonable classification. This anchored in the reasoning that the state is permitted to apply different treatment of the law to different classes provided that such classification is base in a substantial and valid classification and not base in a capricious and arbitrary classification. For a valid classification, 4 elements should be present as decided in People vs. Vera. 1) The classification is base in a substantial classification, real differences of classes should be established 2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law 3) must be based not only in existing classification 4) applies to all members of a class. In the case at bar, all of the requisites are attained. In the first requisites, there might or may not be a reasonable classification since there are retirees who are below 65 years of age, however the Supreme Court ruled that it should be anchored to the purpose of the law, which is, to provide an opportunity of a new blood in government service, thus, such classification is germane to the purpose of the law. Note: The issue of locus standi by the petitioner is not well establish since the petitioner failed to assert the impending or actual adverse effect of the law in question to their interest in such case. The judicial review is granted to the SC as prescribed under Art. VIII, Section 5 (2), (a) and (b).

Antonio Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho Facts: The respondent, Hiu, is an employed alien in Manila, filed a petition before the CFI Manila Branch I, questioning the constitutionality of Ordinance 6537. The ordinance in question requires aliens in the city of manila to secure a employment permit from the city before engaging in any retail, trade, occupation or business in the city, it also imposes a P50.00 regulatory tax fee to aliens employed in the City. There is also imposable penalty in violating the said ordinance. The Lower court declared the ordinance in question as null and void for being violative of due process and equal protection of the law. The petitioner-mayor, then filed a petition for certiorari to review the judgment of the lower court. Issue: Whether or not the ordinance in question is violative of due process? Held: Yes. The lower court did erred in declaring the ordinance null and void. As decided, equal protection requires valid and substantial classification base from real distinction. The imposition of P50.00 as a regulatory fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but also the ordinance in question fails to establish real and valid differences between aliens who are required to pay it, whether the alien is casual or permanently employee, full-time or part-time, whether a lowly employee or a highly paid executive. Moreover, the ordinance in question is considered an arbitrary and undefined legislation that violates the rights of equal protection. This is so since, the ordinance in question failed to provide the limitations of the exercise of the delegated power of the petitioner and that it does not provide the purposes to be attained by requiring permit for aliens before engagement of business or employment. Aliens, once admitted in the Philippines, is also entitled to the benefits of shelter of equal protection and due process laws. Ceniza vs. Comelec Facts: Sometime December 199, the Interim Batasang Pambansa enacted Batas Blg. 51, providing for local elections on January 30, 1980. The law in questions provides that any city existing with an annual regular income derived from infrastructure and general funds of not less than 40M at the time of the approval shall be classified as highly urbanized city and all other cities shall be considered components of the provinces where they are geographically located. To implement the law in question, the respondent Comelec enacted Resolution no 1421, which provides the instruction of voting provincial officials from highly urbanized and component cities. The Resolution provides that

registered voter of a component city may be entitled to vote in the elction of the officials of the province of which the city is a component, if its charter provides, but in voters in a highly urbanized city, shall not participate nor vote in the election of officials of the province in which the highly urbanized city is geographically located. The effect of the law in question results to inconsistencies with other city. Two of which are; City of Cebu is considered as a highly urbanized city and its charter allows that registered voters can elect provincial officials, but pursuant to the law in question, they cannot. Also the City of Mandaue is classified as a component city but cannot vote on provincial officials since their charter prohibits them to do so. Thus, a taxpayer suit was instituted by the petitioners led by Ramon Ceniza, assailing the validity of BP 51, on which uses the annual income as basis for classification arbitrary and is not germane to the purposes of the law. Issue: Whether or not annual income as basis a reasonable and valid distinction. Whether or not BP 51 is not germane to the purposes of the law. Held: Yes. It is a substantial distinction and it is with accordance to the purpose of the law. In the issue of its relativity to the purpose of the law, What the law in question seeks to effectuate is the constitutional provision as prescribed in the Principal and State Policies that the State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units, specially the barrio to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities. By enacting BP 51, it defines a more responsive and accountable local government structure with an effective system of recall independent from the provincial government and officials. By virtue of city classification set by BP 51, then cities, with capability of independence and self-reliance will be detached from the supervisory powers of the provincial government. Because the revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent social, economic and political unit. Also, it will show whether or not the city has a sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province where it is located. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the provincial government thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in some instances. Thus, if a city will have an annual income as set which is 40M, then it would be self-reliant to mange itself and the provincial will no longer lend its assistance, thus corollary to their independence, is equal to the loss of the right to participate in provincial affairs specifically in electing provincial officials since these provincial officials have ceased to exercise any jurisdiction and authority over these highly urbanized cities. Rufino Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan Facts: On 1979, by virtue of the PD 1486 as amended by PD 1606, RA 1379 was passed supplemented by another act, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The petitioner, Rufino Nunez was convicted by the public respondent, Sandiganbayan, of Estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents. The petitioner filed a motion to quash in constitutional and jurisdictional grounds but was denied by the respondent. Thus, he filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition claiming that PD 1486 as amended is violative of his right to equal protection of laws. The petitioner contends that 1) an appeal, as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion, 2) appeal also was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidences and 3) there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC instead of traditional two chances, CA then SC. He also avers that other Estafa indictess are entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts. Issue: Was the law in question, amending the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan, violates the right of equal protection? Held: No it is not. The court ruled that the law in question satisfies the requisites laid under the People vs. Vera case, warranting it as a valid and reasonable classification. Base on substantial distinction. Since the institution of the 1973 constitution, there is already an established different procedures for an accused, a private citizen or a public official, and it is not necessarily a breach to equal protection of law. Germane to the purposes of the law Sandiganbayan is created to promote a accountable and honest public service since as constitution provides, public office/service is a public trust. Moreover, this special court is created in a purpose of providing remedy to a problem, which is, dishonesty in public service.

Dissenting Opinion, Justice Makasiar Persons who are charged with Estafa or malversation of funds not belonging to the government or any of its instrumentalities or agencies are guaranteed the right to appeal to two appellate courts - first, to the Court of Appeals, and thereafter to the Supreme Court. Estafa and malversation of private funds are on the same category as graft and corruption committed by public officers, who, under the decree creating the Sandiganbayan, are only allowed one appeal - to the Supreme Court (par. 3, Sec. 7, P.D. No. 1606). The fact that the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court does not generate any substantial distinction to validate this invidious discrimination. Three judges sitting on the same case does not ensure a quality of justice better than that meted out by a trial court presided by one judge. The ultimate decisive factors are the intellectual competence, industry and integrity of the trial judge. But a review by two appellate tribunals of the same case certainly ensures better justice to the accused and to the people. It should be stressed that the Constitution merely authorizes the law-making authority to create the Sandiganbayan with a specific limited jurisdiction only over graft and corruption committed by officers and employees of the government, government instrumentalities and government-owned and - controlled corporations. The Constitution does not authorize the lawmaker to limit the right of appeal of the accused convicted by the Sandiganbayan to only the Supreme Court. The Bill of Rights remains as restrictions on the law-maker in creating the Sandiganbayan pursuant to the constitutional directive. It is also clear that paragraph 3, Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606 trenches upon the due process clause of the Constitution, because the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals and thereafter to the Supreme Court was already secured under Sections 17 and 29 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, otherwise known as R.A. No. 296, as amended, and therefore also already part of procedural due process to which the petitioner was entitled at the time of the alleged commission of the crime charged against him (Marcos vs. Cruz, 68 Phil. 96, 104 [1939]; People vs. Moreno, 77 Phil. 548, 555; People vs. Casiano, 1 SCRA 478 [1961]; People vs. Sierra, 46 SCRA 717; Fernando, Phil. Constitution, 1974 ed., pp. 674-675). This is also reiterated in Our discussion hereunder concerning the violation of the constitutional prohibition against the passage of ex post facto laws. Then again, paragraph 3 of Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606, by providing that the decisions of the Sandiganbayan can only be reviewed by the Supreme Court through certiorari, likewise limits the reviewing power of the Supreme Court only to question of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, and not questions of fact nor findings or conclusions of the trial court. In other criminal cases involving offenses not as serious as graft and corruption, all questions of fact and of law are reviewed, first by the Court of Appeals, and then by the Supreme Court. To repeat, there is greater guarantee of justice in criminal cases when the trial court's judgment is subject to review by two appellate tribunals, which can appraise the evidence and the law with greater objectivity, detachment and impartiality unaffected as they are by views and prejudices that may be engendered during the trial. Limiting the power of review by the Supreme Court of convictions by the Sandiganbayan only to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, likewise violates the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused, which presumption can only be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt (Sec. 19, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). Even if in certiorari proceedings, the Supreme Court, to determine whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion, can inquire into whether the judgment of the Sandiganbayan is supported by substantial evidence, the presumption of innocence is still violated; because proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be equated with substantial evidence. Because the Supreme Court under P.D. No. 1606 is precluded from reviewing questions of fact and the evidence submitted before the Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court is thereby deprived of the constitutional power to determine whether the guilt of the accused has been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt - by proof generating moral certainty as to his culpability - and therefore subverts the constitutional presumption of innocence in his favor which is enjoyed by all other defendants in other criminal cases, including defendants accused of only light felonies, which are less serious than graft and corruption. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan is composed of a presiding Justice and 8 associate Justices, sitting in three divisions of 3 Justices each (Sec. 3, P.D. No. 1606). Under Section 5 thereof, the unanimous vote of three Justices in a division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of the judgment. In the event that the three Justices do not reach a unanimous vote, the Presiding Justice shall designate two other Justices from among the members of the Court to sit temporarily with them, forming a division of five Justices, and the concurrence of the majority of such division shall be necessary for rendering judgment. At present, there are only 6 members of the Sandiganbayan or two divisions actually operating. Consequently, when a member of the Division dissents, two other members may be designated by the Presiding Justice to sit temporarily with the Division to constitute a special division of five members. The fact that there are only 6 members now composing the Sandiganbayan limits the choice of the Presiding Justice to only three, instead of 6 members from whom to select the two other Justices to compose a special division of five in case a member of the division dissents. This situation patently diminishes to an appreciable degree the chances of an accused for an acquittal. Applied to the petitioner, Section 5 of P.D. No. 1606 denies him the equal protection of the law as against those who will be prosecuted when three more members of the Sandiganbayan will be appointed to complete its membership of nine.

P.D. No. 1606 therefore denies the accused advantages and privileges accorded to other defendants indicted before other trial courts. Section 1 of P.D. No. 1606 further displays such arbitrary classification; because it places expressly the Sandiganbayan on "the same level as the Court of Appeals." As heretofore stated, the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court and not an appellate court; its jurisdiction is purely limited to criminal and civil cases involving graft and corruption as well as violation of the prohibited drug law committed by public officers and employees of the government, its instrumentalities and government-owned or controlled corporations. The Court of Appeals is an appellate tribunal exercising appellate jurisdiction over all cases - criminal cases, civil cases, special civil actions, special proceedings, and administrative cases - appealable from the trial courts or quasi-judicial bodies. The disparity between the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan is too patent to require extended demonstration. Even the Supreme Court is not spared from such odious discrimination as it is being downgraded by Section 14 of P.D. No. 1606, which effectively makes the Sandiganbayan superior to the Supreme Court; because said Section 14 expressly provides that "the appropriation for the Sandiganbayan shall be automatically released in accordance with the schedule submitted by the Sandiganbayan" There is no such provision in any law or in the annual appropriations act in favor of the Supreme Court. Under the 1982 Appropriations Act, the funds for the Supreme Court and the entire Judiciary can only be released by the Budget Ministry upon request therefore by the Supreme Court. Sometimes compliance with such request is hampered by bureaucratic procedures. Such discrimination against the Supreme Court - the highest tribunal of the land and the only other Branch of our modified parliamentary-presidential government - the first Branch being constituted by the merger or union of the Executive and the Batasang Pambansa emphasizes the peril to the independence of the Judiciary, whose operations can be jeopardized and the administration of justice consequently obstructed or impeded by the delay or refusal on the part of the Budget Ministry to release the needed funds for the operation of the courts. Note: It should be noted that petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1606 on the ground that it impairs the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court and its power of supervision over inferior courts. Sandiganbayan, jurisdiction Jurisdiction over all criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in GOCCs, in relation to their office as maybe determined by law.- RA 1379 An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor Of The State Any Property Found To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer Or Employee And Providing For The Proceedings Therefor. Sison Jr. vs. Ancheta Facts: BP 135 was enacted and provides for rates of tax on citizens or residents on 1) taxable compensation income 2) taxable net income 3) royalties, prices and other winning 4) interest from bank deposits and yield or any other monetary benefit from deposit substitutes and from trust fund and similar arrangements 5) dividends and share of individual partner in the net profits of taxable partnership 6) adjusted gross income. Thus, the law in question imposes different tax rate to different taxpayers. 1) on net income and 2) compensation income, taxpayers. The petitioner, Antero M. Sison, filed a taxpayer suit for declaratory relief or prohibition proceeding on the validity of Section I BP 135 contending that BP 135 is oppressive and arbitrary in character and violative of the due process clause. Issue: Does the revenue measures set by BP 135 arbitrary? Held: No. The revenue measures are anchored in a substantial distinction between taxpayers ability to pay taxes. It is enough that the classification must rest upon substantial distinctions that make real differences. In the case of the gross income taxation embodied in Batas Pambansa Blg. 135, the discernible basis of classification is the susceptibility of the income to the application of generalized rules removing all deductible items for all taxpayers within the class and fixing a set of reduced tax rates to be applied to all of them. Taxpayers who are recipients of compensation income are set apart as a class. As there is practically no overhead expense, these taxpayers are not entitled to make deductions for income tax purposes because they are in the same situation more or less. On the other hand, in the case of professionals in the practice of their calling and businessmen, there is no uniformity in the costs or expenses necessary to produce their income. It would not be just then to disregard the disparities by giving all of them zero deduction and indiscriminately impose on all alike the same tax rates on the basis of gross income. There is ample justification then for the Batasang Pambansa to adopt the gross system of income

taxation to compensation income, while continuing the system of net income taxation as regards professional and business income. Citizens Surety vs. Puno Facts: Pursuant to Resolution 542, only laborers (obreros) who are bona fide residents in Manila whose wages does not exceed P180.00 or P6.00 a day shall have the privilege of buying lots in Barrio Obrero, Tondo Manila. The petitioner filed an appeal by certiorari to review the judgment of the respondent court, contending that the Resolution in question is null and void because it bars non-laborers to acquire lots, wherein there are also non-laborers who may exceed monthly salary as provided in the Resolution but still considered poor, thereby it is an arbitrary classification violating the due process clause? Issue: Was there an arbitrary classification? Held: No. There is a justifiable and reasonable basis to limit the sale of lots- lowly paid laborers. Lowly paid laborers are not with same class as that of lowly paid non-obreros. Moreover, the resolution merely seeks to implement the Charter of the City which is to give lots to bona fide resident of the city on easy terms, and secondary priority to laborers and low salaried employees. Peralta vs. Comelec Facts: PD 1296 otherwise known as Election Code of 1978 was enacted and provides voting system. The law in question allows either individual voting or block voting. In a consolidated petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, the petitioners assail the constitutionality of the law in question, contending that the straight party voting system is violative of the equal protection of law, because it provides undue favor to party candidates and arbitrary against independent candidates. Issue: Whether or not the straight party voting system discriminate independent candidates. Held: No. Block voting is permitted in the Philippine electoral system. Freedom of association entails privileges and benefits, consequential or incidental to such membership. It is an extension of individual freedom. In relation to the requisites of valid classification, candidates of a political party are distinguishable from independent candidates. The former are bound by the parties rules. They owe loyalty to the party, its tenets, its policies, platforms and programmes for the government. To the electorate, they represent the party, principles, ideals and objectives, which is not true to independent candidates. If the electoral law has bias in favor of political parties, it is because political parties constitute a basic element of the democratic institutional apparatus. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental results not contemplated." If the independent candidates are to be prejudiced by the adoption of the optional block-voting scheme, the resulting harm to their candidacy is attributable to their decision to run as such. There is nothing to prevent them from joining a party or aggrupation and hoping to be nominated as candidates. Any adversity suffered by them comes under the heading of a self-inflicted wound. Dissenting Opinion, Teehankee. The block voting scheme offends the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution and is furthermore proscribed by the express injunction of the new provision in Article XII, section 9 (1) of the 1973 Constitution that "Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." Petitioner Peralta as an independent La Union candidate complains with reason that he is unfairly discriminated against and prejudiced by the block voting scheme in that "there are three ways to vote for a KIBALI [Kilusang ng Bagong Lipunan] candidate: (1) by writing his name, (2) by writing KIBALI and (3) by writing NACIONALISTA, on the ballot. On the other hand, there is but one way to vote for an independent, like petitioner, only by writing his name." Actually, the arbitrary and oppressive edge given the KBL candidate against an independent candidate amounts to 6 to 1 for judicial notice may be taken of the ballot subject of the petition in Case L-47883 entitled "Lakas ng Bayan (Laban) vs. Comelec" complaining against the double listing of KBL candidates in Metro Manila where the Comelec recognizes three additional ways of voting for a KBL candidate viz by writing (4) KBL (5) NP (for Nacionalista Party) or (6) just a plain N unless enjoined by the Court in said pending case. Said petitioner further

aptly observes that "under martial law where the freedom, privileges and immunities of the citizens are curtailed or suspended, the evils of block voting are enhanced to a hundredfold."

Ormoc Sugar vs. Ormoc City Facts: Sometime 1964, the Municipal Board of ormoc City passed Ordinance 4, imposing on any and all productions of sugar milled the Ormoc Sugar Company Inc in Ormoc City a Municipal tax equivalent to one (1%) percent export sale to the US and other foreign countries. The petitioner, being the subject of the said resolution filed a suit before the CFI Leyte, contending the said resolution is violative of the Equal protection of laws. The lower court upheld the constitutionality sustaining the defense of the respondent that the resolution is well within the boundaries set by the Local Autonomy Act to include all forms of taxing power of the Municiapal Board. Hence this petition. Issue: Was all of the requirements of the equal protection met by the resolution. Held: No. Requisites provided under PP vs. Cayat is wanting. The resolution only points out to tax centrifugal sugar milled and exported at the petitioner, and none other sugar-milling companies. For a classification to be valid, it should be related not only to existing conditions only, but also in the future. In the time of the enactment, even if the petitioner is the only existing sugar milling company available, it would still be arbitrary since it does not include others where the petitioner is in the same class. Sustaining the constitutionality of the resolution would mean that other subsequently installed sugar milling company would not be bounded by the resolution. The resolution is unconstitutional. Flores vs. Comelec Facts: The petitioner, Roque Flores, was proclaimed by the board of canvassers as having received the highest number of votes for kagawad in Brgy. Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and thus became punong barangay pursuant to Sec 5 RA 6679. He was voted punong barangay during the 1982 elections, a separate position as that of Kagawad. The private respondent, Nobelito Rapisora, protected the result and filed a protect before the MCTC Tayum. He argued that the ballot, which only indicated Flores, should be declared stray votes and should not be divided equally to them. In his defense, the petitioner argued that in accordance with the Omnibus Election Code, the 4 questioned votes should be entitled to him under the equity of the incumbent rule, which states that if there are 2 or more candidates with the same full name and one of them is an incumbent and the ballot is written only on such full name, the vote is counted in favor of the incumbent. The lower court sustained the contention of the private respondent and subsequently declared him as the punong barangay. Hence this petition. The petitioner argued that by not following the rule stated, he is deprived of his right to equal protection of the law since he is also an incumbent punong barangay running for election, thereby he should be entitled by the rule. Issue: Was the petitioner considered an incumbent to be entitled under the rule? Held: No. Under the new rule Resolution 2022- A passed by the Comelec, Barangay Captains who filed their candidacy for the office of Kagawad, which is another office, shall be deemed resigned in their former office. In his filing of candidacy, it stated that he is running for kagawad and not as a punong barangay. Thus, pursuant to the resolution, he deemed to resign his position as punong barangay when he filed for his candidacy as a kagawad. The rule cannot thus then be applied to the petitioner since pursuant to the resolution, he is not considered as an incumbent punong barangay, he is not within the same class as that of the incumbents. The court cannot sustain the argument of the petitioner that since RA 669 speaks of 7 candidates for kagawad, the foremost of them is the punong barangay, he should be regarded as running for the same office. There is a substantial distinction between Punong barangay and kagawad. The former is vested with executive power and the latter legislative power pursuant to the LGC. Note:

In 1982 procedures, there are separate election for Punong barngay and members of the Sanguniang pambarangay. In 1989 elections, the only disputed position for direct election is the Kagawad and PB will be granted by operation of law to the highest vote earned.

Define probable Cause? Who determines Probable cause? Probable Cause, Defined Such facts and Circumstances which would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched (20th Century Fox Film. Corp. vs. CA) De Los Santos vs. Montesa Facts: This case came from the Criminal Case for the murder of Reyes et. al in San Juan Del Monte Bulacan. After the submission of an investigation by the State Prosecutor, RTC of Malolos Bulacan issued a warrant of Arrest. First, the accused filed a petition to grant bail and to Reduce Bail, subsequently withdrawn and rather filed an urgent motion to quash warrants of arrest for lack of existence of probable cause. After an examination of the lower court of the case and documents forwarded to him by the prosecution, the trial court found the existence of probable cause, but instead of issuing of correspondent Arrest Warrant for acquiring jurisdiction of the persons involved in the crime, the respondent judge granted the petition for bail despite of the its withdrawal and lack of hearing where the prosecution would have been accorded the right to present evidence showing the evidence of guilt is strong. Thus the petitioner filed an administrative complaint charging the respondent judge with gross ignorance of the law and evident dishonesty in his exercise of his function. Issue: What should be the procedure in the determination of the existence of a probable cause? Held: What the respondent judge had in mind in the case at bar is that, since he believed that the evidence agisnt the accused are purely circumstantial and weak, he resolved to granting the petition of the accused to grant bail in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction over these persons instead of issuing warrant of arrest and set hearing for the prosecutions presentation of evidence. He is thus then confused in the procedure of determining the existence of probable cause in the issuance of arrest warrant and proceedings for admission to bail. What the court is given prerogative by the constitution in accordance to Sec. 2 Art III is that, it is sufficient that he personally evaluates the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecution in determining probable cause, hearing is not necessary. In satisfying the existence of probable cause, the judge shall either 1. Personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and in basis thereof, issue arrest warrant and If there is no sufficient establishment of probable cause, he may disregard the prosecutors certification and require the submission of the supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

2.

The judge is not tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. Thus, once a judge found the probable cause, what he should have to do is to issue warrants of arrest and admission to bail shall only be granted once persons are apprehended and are under their jurisdiction. Lim vs. Felix Facts: The petitioners. Lim et al, was charged of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder of Congressman Espinosa of Masbate among others. Private respondent, Alfane was designated to review the case and was raffled to RTC Makati Br. 56 of the respondent judge, Nemesio Felix. After transmittal of the case, the respondent Judge issued warrant of Arrest against the accused by virtue of the prosecutors certification in each submitted information recommending the existence of a probable cause. Issue: Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecutions certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists.

Held: Yes. But by itself, it does not bind judges to come out with the warrant of arrest. Issuance of warrants calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing judge. If the judge is satisfied from the preliminary examination conducted by him or by the investigating officer than an offense complained of has been committed and that there is a reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant or order for an arrest. A judge is not required to personally examine the complainants and witnesses, what the constitution mandates in satisfying the existence of probable cause, the judge shall either; 1. Personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and in basis thereof, issue arrest warrant and If there is no sufficient establishment of probable cause, he may disregard the prosecutors certification and require the submission of the supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

2.

Moreover, the constitution pursuant to Sec 2 Art III also mandates that x x x probable cause should be personally determined by the judgex x x. This means that 1. The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge. 2. Preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the judge. 3. Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry, which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper, which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or release. In the case at bar, the only basis of the respondent judge in issuing warrants of arrest is only the certification of the prosecutor, without personally examining the information (which still in Masbate, and wherein the respondent denied the motion for transmittal of such records of the cases in the ground that certification id enough ground for the determination of probable cause and issuance of warrant). Thus, there is no personal examination conducted by the judge to establish the existence of probable cause, thereby, the respondent committed abuse of discretion. Note: Preliminary investigation for the determination of sufficient ground for filing of information and investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, Distinguished. The former is executive in nature and part of a PROSECUTORS JOB. While the latter aka preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged to the JUDGE. Amarga vs. Abbas Facts: The respondent Judge, Macapanton Abbas, after receiving; 1) An information with a certification stating that the petitioner fiscal, Amarga has conducted a sufficient preliminary investigation pursuant to the provision of RA 732, and 2) One supporting affidavit of one witness (Jubair) stating that he saw the deceased Dugusan Paspasan was shot and killed by three gunmen, Dismissed the criminal handled by the petitioner against Appang et. al on the ground that; 1) The affidavit of Jubair is hearsay and does not possess gravity for the establishment of the existence of probable cause. 2) So as the certification of the petitioner fiscal wont warrant the existence of probable cause. Therefore, there can be no prima facie evidence as to necessity for the issuance of warrant of arrest against the accused. Thus, the petitioner filed a petitioner for certiorari and mandamus contending that petitioner has already conducted a preliminary examination and thus it is ministerial function for the respondent to issue arrest warrants. Upon the other hand, the respondent judge argues that the issuance of a warrant of arrest involves a judicial power which necessarily imposes upon him the legal duty of first satisfying himself that there is probable cause, independently of and notwithstanding the preliminary investigation made by the provincial fiscal under Republic Act No. 732; and to that end he may require the fiscal to submit such evidence as may be sufficient to show at least a prima facie case. Issue: Whether or not the certification of a prosecutor is sufficient to issue a warrant of arrest.

Held: No. The constitution mandates that the determination of probable cause depends upon the judgment and discretion of the judge or magistrate in issuing warrant of arrest. It simply means that sufficient facts must be presented to the judge or magistrate issuing the warrant to convince him, not that the particular person has committed the crime, but that there is probable cause for believing that the person whose arrest is sought committed the crime charged In the case at bar, the petitioners certification that he had already conducted a preliminary investigation in the case does not sufficiently warrant the existence of probable cause. Nor the single affidavit submitted to the respondent as it is not enough for the respondent judge to exercise his judicial function to determine the existence of probable cause. However, the petition is granted to continue the hearing of the case in the ground of lack of prosecution and that refusal of the prosecution to submit additional affidavit is not a valid ground for the dismissal of a case.

20th Century Fox vs. CA Facts: After surveillance and investigation, petitioner, with the NBI apllied for three separate search warrants against the video outlets owned by private respondents, Barretto et al, and was subsequently granted and issued by the lower court. The applicants did not present the master tapes and the pirated tapes upon their application of search warrant. Instead, only the deposition of two NBI witnesses served as the basis for the existence of probable cause. Subsequently, the lower court lifted the three issued search warrants in the ground that the articles seized, which were still under the custody of NBI, could not be a basis for any criminal prosecution. Issue: Was there an establishment of probable cause for the issuance of search warrant against the respondent? Held: None. The probable cause is wanting in the issuance of the search warrant. As ingrained by law and jurisprudence, probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offenses are in the place sought to be searched. The existence of probable cause requires that there should be a personal knowledge by the complainant and witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In the case at bar, the lower court lifted the issued search warrant on the ground of the discovery that the NBI witnesses does not have personal knowledge that the crime of Piracy has been committed. The deposition of such witnesses cannot provide a sufficient existence of probable cause necessary for the issuance of search warrant. Moreover, in accordance with PD 49 (Anti Film Piracy), the essence of such law is the similarity of the pirated and the copyrighted work. Thus, the applicants must present the court the copyrighted films and compare them with the evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether or not the crim has been violated. In the case at bar, the applicants does not provide any evidences 9master tapes and pirated tapes) that would convince the judge that violation of PD 49 has been committed, and therefore for the existence of probable cause. The articles included in the search warrant is couched in general term, making it a general warrant which is prohibited under the Constitution. Note: Search and Seizure, guaranteed rights. Protects a citizen against unreasonable searchers invasion of his privacy and liberty as to his person, houses, papers and effects. The privacy of a person must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need and only under stringent procedural safeguards. Thus, the government so as not to make arrest, search and seizure unreasonable should strictly follow constitutional and statutory guidelines.

Quintero vs. NBI (Marcos manipulation) Facts: After the expose of the petitioner, Eduardo Quintero of the 1 st district of Leyte in the 1971 Con-con alleging that some delegates, including him, in the Con-con are under the payroll of the first lady and then President Marcos, NBI agents raided the houses of the petitioner by virtue of the search warrant issued by the respondent Judge Elias Asuncion. The raid confiscated an amount of money amounting to 379K.

The said search warrant was base from the application of two persons. One is from the affidavit of Congressman Artemio Mate, also from 1st district of Leyte and an NBI Agent Samuel Castro, alleging that the petitioner committed the crime of bribery. The affidavit of the latter applicant however showed that he has no personal knowledge about the allegations against the petitioner. The affidavit of the statements of the Congressman also shows that his allegations are anchored upon speculations. No sufficient evidence is presented to the respondent judge. Issue: Was there an establishment of the existence of a probable cause? Held: No. The allegations and the statements of the applicants are merely anchored on hearsay and speculations. As ingrained under jurisprudence (Roan vs. Gonzales as cited), in application for a search warrant, if based on hearsay, sannot, standing alone justify the issuance of search warrant. Thus, it is indispensable that the applicants should have personal knowledge of the crime committed. In the case at bar, the deposition of the NBI agent is based on hearsay in which only and anchored on the information given by Cong. Mata. Moreover, the deposition of Cong. Mata cannot establish that he has a direct personal knowledge of the alleged bribery of the petitioner since his affidavit shows that it is only based on speculation. The element of directness and definiteness is wanting so as to establish his personal knowledge. Not to mention, there is no concrete evidence that would support their accusation, so as to validly establish probable cause. Irregularities: 1) Moreover, there is also irregularity in the printing of the search warrant, wherein the crime of bribery Art 210 of RPC was superimposed by ink, which was originally Art. 282. In the case at bar, the search warrant presented was in the case of grave threats directed against the nephew of the petitioner (nephew), thus, the confiscation of he money is not related to the articles seized. 2) The search team also violated statutory guidelines for a lawful search since there is no members of the household present while others are searching the premises. Thus it is planted and orchestrated search. 3) Also the respondents also violated the statutory guidelines that they should issue a detailed receipt of articles seized. The lifting of the respondent judge of the search warrant are null and void.

Presidential Anti-Dollar vs. CA (quasi-judicial body daw) Facts: The petitioner, PADS, is the presidents arm assigned to investigate and prosecute :dollar-salting activities in the country pursuant to PD 1936. Sometime 1985, PADS issued a search warrant against respondent Karamfil Import-Export Co. et al. Atty. Gatmaitan of Bureau of Customs applied for a Search warrant, a deputized member of PADS with attached affidavit by Castro, an investigator and operative of PADS. After the search procedure, the respondent contested the search warrant and subsequently declared by the lower court null and void. The respondent CA initially favored the petitioner stating that it is a quasi judicial body that ranks with RTC and that, lower courts has no jurisdiction to declare the issued search warrants of the petitioners null and void. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner Karamfil and subsequently, November of the same year, the respondent CA reversed itself. Thus, the petitioner filed an appeal alleging that the respondent CA committed grave abuse of discretion and acted in excess of its appellate jurisdiction by validating the restraining of the lawful orders or decrees issued by the petitioner as a quasi judicial body by the lower Court. This is so since the petitioner contends that they are quasijudicial body that ranks with the RTC. Issue: As we have observed, the question is whether or not the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is, in the first place, a quasi-judicial body, and one whose decisions may not be challenged before the regular courts, other than the higher tribunals ---- the Court of Appeals and this Court. Held: Quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule making." Thus, these bodies

has the basic function to adjudicate claims and/or to determine rights, unless its decisions are appealed to proper reviewing authorities. In the case at bar, the PADS is not meant to exercise quasi judicial function, that is to decide and try claims and execute its judgments, its only task is to handle the prosecution of salting or black marketing activities and nothing more. However, the enabling statute of the petitioner empowers them to determine the existence of probable cause and therefore power to issue warrants of arrest or search and seizure however it does not make them co-equal with RTC nor make this agency semi-court. Note: Kinds of quasi-Judicial agencies: (1) Agencies created to function in situations wherein the government is offering some gratuity, grant, or special privilege, like the defunct Philippine Veterans Board, Board on Pensions for Veterans, and NARRA, and Philippine Veterans Administration. (2) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to carry on certain government functions, like the Bureau of Immigration, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Board of Special Inquiry and Board of Commissioners, the Civil Service Commission, the Central Bank of the Philippines. (3) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is performing some business service for the public, like the Bureau of Posts, the Postal Savings Bank, Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage Authority, Philippine National Railways, the Civil Aeronautics Administration. (4) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to regulate business affected with public interest, like the Fiber Inspections Board, the Philippine Patent Office, Office of the Insurance Commissioner. (5) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking under the police power to regulate private business and individuals, like the Securities & Exchange Commission, Board of Food Inspectors, the Board of Review for Moving Pictures, and the Professional Regulation Commission. (6) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to adjust individual controversies because of some strong social policy involved, such as the National Labor Relations Commission, the Court of Agrarian Relations, the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor, the Social Security Commission, Bureau of Labor Standards, Women and Minors Bureau. 31 PD 1936, the enabling statute of PADS is unconstitutional, reason. Under the constitution, the existence of probable cause is under the sole responsibility and discretion of a judge, who, must be neutral and prudent enough for his exercise of conducting preliminary examination of the facts and circumstances of the case submitted by the fiscal. Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached "judge" to determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his case. Although his office "is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused," he stands, invariably, as the accused's adversary and his accuser. To permit him to issue search warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and jury in his own right, when he is neither. That makes, to our mind and to that extent, Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, unconstitutional.

Soliven vs. Makasiar (A controversial case) This case softens the doctrine laid down by the BACHE case where the court states that the judge should personally depose the complainants and witnesses under oath and in writing in determining the existence of probable cause. This is a responsibility that should not be delegated to clerk of court or other authority. Facts: This is a consolidated petition for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the respondent Judge Ramon Makasiar. In the case filed by Beltran, he alleged that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when the respondent judge issued a warrant of arrest against the petitioner

for the crime of libel, without the respondent judge personally examining the complainant and witnesses for the determination of probable cause. The petitioner contend that the constitution requires that the judge should personally examine the complainant and/or witness for the determination of probable cause and therefore issue an arrest warrant. Issue: Was the contention correct? Held: No. (Sadly) What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) Personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or

(2) If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting down guidelines for the issuance of warrants of arrest. The procedure therein provided is reiterated and clarified in this resolution. It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained. Pendon vs. CA (Similar Case with the 20th Century Fox) Facts: Sometime February of 1987, 1st Lt. Felipe Rojas, Officer in charge of the Philippine Constabulary - Criminal Investigation Service (PC-CIS), Bacolod City, filed an application for a search warrant, alleging that KENER Trading is the possession of some NAPOCOR Properties, contrary to anti-fencing law. His application was subscribed before Judge Demosthenes Magallanes of MTC Bacolod City supported by the joint deposition of two (2) witnesses, Ignacio L. Reyes, an employee of NAPOCOR (National Power Corporation) and IAI Eduardo Abaja of the CIS of Bacolod City. Search warrant was issued by the lower court and then proceeded the search operation, seizing some articles from the premises. The petitioner, Pendon, filed an application for the return of the articles seized by the PC-CIS contending that the search warrant is illegally issued, which, however denied by the lower court. The petitioner subsequently filed a petition for mandamus certiorari and prohibition in the CA assailing the legality of the Search Warrant, which also was denied by the CA stating that there is an existence of a probable cause. The petitioner contend that the applicants for the assailed warrants has no personal knowledge that the articles sought to be seized were stolen. Moreover, he also alleged that there is irregularities with the contents of the joint deposition of the two witnesses and that there is no personal examination conducted by the judge as required by the law and the rules. Issue: Whether or not the search warrant is illegally issued. Held: Yes. The assailed search warrant was illegally issued. The constitution provides that search warrants are issued based solely on probable cause. And in determining probable cause, it is required that 1) The judge (or) officer must examine the witnesses personally; 2) The examination must be under oath; and 3) The examination must be reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers And also, such finding of probable cause should be substantiated by the records. In the case at bar, We find that the requirement mandated by the law and the rules that the judge must personally examine the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers before issuing the warrant,

was not sufficiently complied with. The applicant himself was not asked any searching question by Judge Magallanes. The records disclose that the only part played by the applicant, Lieutenant Rojas was to subscribe the application before Judge Magallanes. The application contained pre-typed questions, none of which stated that applicant had personal knowledge of a robbery or a theft and that the proceeds thereof are in the possession and control of the person against whom the search warrant was sought to be issued. Affidavits of the complainants and witness are not sufficient for determining a probable cause. Pursuant to the Anti fencing law, the records also shows that the questions asked during the deposition cannot support the finding of the probable cause There was also no statement in the joint deposition that the articles sought to be seized were derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or a theft or that applicants have any knowledge that a robbery or theft was committed and the articles sought to be seized were the proceeds thereof. Moreover, the items to be confiscated listed in the SW is couched on general terms, therefore considered as a prohibited general warrants. (Galvanized bolts, aluminum wires and other Napocor tower and line parts and accessories) The items confiscated does not also fall under the personal properties that are allowed to be seized under the law. Thus the petition is granted and the articles are ordered to be return since possession thereof is not prohibited by the law. Note: Anti Fencing Law, commission of, in the case at bar, The offense which petitioner was sought to be charged was violation of the anti-fencing law which punishes the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy or sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should have known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft (Sec. 2a, P.D. 1612) Personal properties that may be confiscated in accordance with the law, enumerate Section a) b) c) 2, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure The subject of an offense; Stolen or embezzled property and other proceeds or fruits of an offense; and Used or intended to be used as a means of committing an offense.

If the law does not prohibit the possession of the articles sought, it should be returned to the owner.

People vs. Inting (similar to De Los Santos case) Preliminary inquiry of the prosecutor does not bind the judge for the determination of probable cause Facts: Sometime 1988, Editha Barba filed a letter complaint against OIC Mayor of Tanjay, Negros oriental with the Comelec for transferring her to a remote barangay without prior clearance from the Comelec. The complaint was handled by the provincial election Supervisor of Dumaguete City, atty. Gerardo Lituanas . after his investigation, he found prima facie evidence and then filed to the respondent Trial court under Judge Enrique Inting a criminal case in violation of Sec. 261 of the Omnibus Election Code against the OIC Mayor. An arrest warrant was issued but later set aside on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to determine the existence of probable cause. Hence this petition. Issue: Does the Provincial Election Supervisor of the Comelec has the jurisdiction to find the existence of a probable cause? Held: No. the phrase under Sec 2 Art II of the Constitution which reads and such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law has been deleted, making the determination for the existence of a probable cause under the sole responsibility and discretion of a Judge. It should be distinguished that preliminary investigation for the determination of a probable cause is vested with the authority of Judges (Judicial in nature) and while preliminary investigation in determining whether or not the accused is guilty of the offense charged and therefore should be subjected to litigation is vested to the authority of the prosecutor (executive in nature). The separate kinds of preliminary investigation has been delineated and that the latter kind has been deleted to the authorities of judges (preliminary investigation proper).

What the constitution vested the Comelec is to investigate and prosecute cases in violation of election laws (Art. IX Sec 2), however, this does not mean that the power to determine the existence of probable cause is within the scope of their authority, but rather, they are empowered only in purpose in assisting the Judge to determine the probable cause and for filing for an information. Note: The Prosecutor cannot assume roles in the prosecution of election offenses, if he has, it is because he is deputized by the Comelec to handle such election offenses. Umil vs. Ramos Facts: This is a consolidated petition for habeas corpus where the petitioners alleged that their detention is illegal and unlawful as their arrests were made without warrant and that no preliminary investigation was first conducted, making the informations filed against them are null and void. The respondents contends otherwise. In this consolidated case, all of the petitioners are charged under the Anti Subversion Law, with an exception to the case of Enrile vs. Lim (Inciting to sedition) and Nazareno vs. Station Commander. The rest are charged guilty of rebellion, a crime against the State, and is a continuing crimes in nature. They were found of the possession of unlicensed firearms and ammunitions as well as subversive documents. Issue: Was warrantless arrest in the case at bar illegal, as the arrest was not made pursuant to the constitutional and statutory guidelines for the issuance of warrantless arrest? Held: Warrantless arrest conducted in the case at bar is lawful. Pursuant to 5 Rule 113 of RRC, arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint is recognized by law. The instances where a valid warrantless arrest may be effected are the following. Sec5. Arrest without Warrant: When lawful A peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committees, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement or another. Thus, pursuant to the RRC, warrantless arrest is justified when a person arrested is caught in flagranti delicto or in the act of committing an offense; or when an offense has just been committed and the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it. The rational behind the concept o warrantless arrest is laid down in the PPI vs. Malasugui, that to sustain that arresting a person without warrant illegal would leave the society, into a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances. In the case at bar, the petitioners had freshly committed or were actually committing an offense. In the case of the petitioners who were charged of rebellion and inciting to sedition, the court held that they are lawfully detained and the informations filed against them are valid. This is since the crime in which they are arrested are continuous crime which is against the State, thus, the continued possession of subversive materials and unlicensed firearms and ammunitions, even without preliminary investigation and without warrant, as long as the authorities have confiscated such prohibited materials under their possession and that in the case of Enrile vs. Lim, they had actually done what is prohibited by law as long as they are positively identified by a witness having a personal knowledge of the committed crime, their arrest are lawful. This is justified since under the doctrine of Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, persons arrested of rebellion does not need to follow strict procedures, since their crimes committed are violence against the State, which concerns the very survival of the society and government. In the case of Nazareno vs. station Commander, the warrantless arrest is justified since there was a prior information filed against the petitioner for the same offense, and that he was positively identified by a witness who has a personal knowledge about the crime he committed. He was arrested while he was at large. Paderangs vs. Drilon Facts: Felizardo Roxas, was included as a co-accused in an amended information for the murder of Bucag et. al.

The respondent state prosecutor Henrick Gingoyan was designated by the DOJ to conduct the preliminary investigation and directed to include the petitioner Roxas as a co-accused in the criminal case. Contending that the preliminary investigation was not yet completed so as to include Roxas as a Co-accused in the case and that he was deprived of his right to present a corresponding counter-affidavit and additional evidence crucial to the determination of the allege linkage to the crime charged, the petitioner filed a Motion for reconsideration, but was later denied. A petition for Review was subsequently filed in the DOJ but was also denied. Thus, the petitioner filed a suit before the SC contending that preliminary investigation is not yet completed thereby, there is no existing prima facie evidence or probable cause that would justify the petitioners inclusion to the crime charged. Issue: Whether or not the preliminary investigation is the proper forum to present evidence to prove or disprove the guilt of the party. Held: No. A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum of evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient to "engender a well founded belief" as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof Preliminary investigation is generally inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the person against whom it is taken in jeopardy. Section II: Search and Seizure provision Requisites of a valid search warrant Uy and BIR Facts: Rodrigo Abos, after executing an affidavit and tipping of the NBI, the respondent-judge Mercedez Dadole issues three successive Search Warrants against the petitioner Uy Chin Ho, owner of Unifish Packing Corporation (Mandaue), for violation of Section 253 (attempt to evade and defeat tax) of the NIR Code. After the search, the petitioner filed an appeal to the SC, contending that the respondent judge violated the pertinent provision of the Constitution and Rules of Court in relation with the requisites of a valid search warrant. Thus, they argue that the search warrant is invalid. Contentions 1) In a caption of the A-1 Search Warrant, its address Hernan Cortes St, Cebu City is inconsistent with the address indicated in the succeeding two search warrants which is in Mandaue City. 2) There is also inconsistencies in the name of the persons named in the warrants. A-1 Search Warrants indicated Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy while A-2 indicated Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy and Unifish Packing Corporation. 3) Two warrants issued at one time for one crime and one place. 4) There is also an allegation that Probable cause is wanting. 5) There is also an alleged lack of particularity in the description of the things seized. They also alleged that other articles not listed in the warrants were taken (e.g. one composition notebook with Chinese characters, Surety Agreement, One bound gate pass, 2 packs of chemicals and others). Because of these irregularities, the petitioner argues contend that the warrant is invalidated and the objects seized by the police enforcers are inadmissible in evidence. Issue: Was the Search warrant issued by the respondent Judge valid? Held: Yes. A search warrant must conform strictly to the constitutional and statutory requirements, namely;

Constitutional Requirements: 1) Must be issued upon probable cause. 2) The Probable cause must be determine by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person 3) In the determination of the probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce, and 4) The warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. Statutory Requirements (Rule 126 of Revised Rules of Court) 5) One search warrant for one specific crime/offense. 6) The warrant cannot be served or issued on nighttime, on legal holidays, weekdays, Sundays. Must be on daytime. 7) Should be issued and search with at least two witnesses present in the place where the search and seizure happened. The issuing judges disregard of such requirements for the issuance of the search warrant constitutes grave abuse of discretion, and maybe remedied on certiorari. Such disregard will also result to the invalidity of the search warrant. Regarding the arguments of the petitioner: 1) In a caption of the A-1 Search Warrant, its address Hernan Cortes St, Cebu City is inconsistent with the address indicated in the succeeding two search warrants which is in Mandaue City: The validity of the warrant requires that there should be a particular description of the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized. The rule is that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. Irregularity in this requirement is not of sufficient gravity to call for its invalidation. In the case at bar, it was not established that the enforcers have difficulty of locating the place to be searched. The inconsistency of the A-1 warrant would be a sufficient ground for its invalidity. 2) There are also inconsistencies in the name of the persons named in the warrants. A-1 Search Warrants indicated Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy while A-2 indicated Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy and Unifish Packing Corporation. The court held that these discrepancies are hardly relevant. US jurisprudence even dictates that where a warrant is issued for the search of specifically described premises only and the failure to name the owner or occupant of such property in the affidavit and search warrant does not invalidate the warrant. In the case at bar, the warrant was issued not for search of the persons owning or occupying the premises, but only a search of the premises occupied by them. Inserting their name in the warrant does not violate any constitutional right of the petitioner nor invalidate the warrant. 3) Two warrants issued at one time for one crime and one place The subsequent warrants issued by the judge merely seeks to correct the inconsistencies and made it more precise in the names of the persons against whom the warrant is issued and the description of the place to be searched. This allegation does make the warrant invalid. 4) There is also an allegation that Probable cause is wanting. Probable cause defined, Such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in the connection of the offense are in the place sought to be searched. In the determination of probable cause, the constitution and the RRC require an examination of the witness under oath. The examination should be probing and exhaustive enough and not for mere routine. The witness in return must testify under oath, it must refer to the truth within their own personal knowledge. The purpose of the oath is to convince the examining magistrate in the existence of probable cause, and that, fraud in the part of the witness will render him liable for perjury. Hearsay wont warrant a probable cause. In the case at bar, the judge deposed Nestor Labaria and Rodrigo Abos. The formers testimonies is based only on hearsay and anchored on a third persons perception. Thus it wont be sufficient enough to warrant probable cause. However, Aboss testimony is sufficient enough to produce probable cause since it is based on his knowledge as a former operating Chief of Unifish. 4) There is also an alleged lack of particularity in the description of the things seized. They also alleged that other articles not listed in the warrants were taken (e.g. one composition notebook with Chinese characters, Surety Agreement, One bound gate pass, 2 packs of chemicals and others).

The constitution requires that objects to be seized should be particularly described so as to eliminate general warrants. In the case at bar the things to be seized are described as: 1) Multiple sets of Books of Accounts, Ledgers, journals etc. 2) Production record Books. 3) Unregistered delivery receipts. 4) Unregistered Purchase and Sales invoices. 5) Sales, records, Job orders. 6) Corporate Financial Records 7) Bank Statements. The court held that these descriptions failed to conform the requirements set forth by the Constitution. The judge, despite of the witnesses procurement of documents need to be searched, the respondent judge still employed generic descriptions. The use of generic terms are acceptable only when a more specific description of the things to be seized is unavailable. The failure to employ specific description will render the warrant invalid. However in the case of unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices is excusable, the generic description is needed in this case since there is no way to make these documents specified because they are UNREGISTERED. The seizure of these objects is valid. In the case of the objects seized which are not specified in the warrant, it should be returned to the petitioners.

Note definition: Search Warrant, Defined A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the PPI, signed by the judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property described therein and bring it before the court. The place to be searched in the warrant is controlling

People vs. CA Judge Cesar Casanova, RTC Malolos Bulacan. Facts: "On December 14, 1995, S/Insp PNP James Brillantes applied for search warrant before Branch 261, RTC of Quezon City against Mr. Azfar Hussain, who had allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan." "The following day, December 15, 1995, Search Warrant No. 1068 (95) against Mr. Hussain was issued not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent (to) Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of four (4) Pakistani nationals and in the seizure of their personal belongings, papers and effects such as wallet, wrist watches, pair of shoes, jackets, t-shirts, belts, sunglasses and traveling bags including cash amounting to $3,550.00 and P1,500.00 aside from US$5,175.00 (receipted) which were never mentioned in the warrant. The sum of $5,175.00 was however returned to the respondents upon order of the court on respondents' motion or request. Included allegedly are one piece of dynamite stick; two pieces of plastic explosives C-4 type and one (1) fragmentation grenade. But without the items described in the search warrant are: (a) three (3) Ingram machine pistols; (b) four (4) gmm pistol; (c) blasting caps; (d) fuse; (e) assorted chemical ingredients for explosives; and (f) assorted magazine assg and ammunitions." According to the private respondents in their pleading On January 29, 1996, an ocular inspection of the premises searched was conducted by respondent Judge and the following facts had been established as contained in the order dated January 30, 1996 . . . to wit: "1) That the residence of all the accused is at Apartment No. 1 which is adjacent to the Abigail's Variety Store; 2) That there is no such number as '1207' found in the building as it is correspondingly called only as 'Apartment No. 1, 2, 3 and 4;' 3) That Apartment No. 1 is separate from the Abigail's Variety Store; 4) That there are no connecting doors that can pass from Abigail's Variety Store to Apartment No. 1; 5) That Abigail's Variety Store and Apartment No. 1 have its own respective doors used for ingress and egress. The judgment of quashing the search warrant was grounded on the following propositions, to wit:

1. The place actually searched was different and distinct from the place described in the search warrant. The place searched, in which the accused (herein petitioners) were then residing was Apartment No. 1. It is a place other than and separate from, and in no way connected with, albeit adjacent to, Abigail's Variety Store, the place stated in the search warrant. Issue: The whole case actually hinges on the question of whether or not a search warrant was validly issued as regards the apartment in which private respondents were then actually residing, or more explicitly, whether or not that particular apartment had been specifically described in the warrant. Held: The Government insists that the police officers who applied to the Quezon City RTC for the search warrant had direct, personal knowledge of the place to be searched and the things to be seized. It claims that one of said officers, in fact, had been able to surreptitiously enter the place to be searched prior to the searched: this being the first of four (4) separate apartments behind the Abigail Variety Store; and they were also the same police officers who eventually effected the search and seizure. They thus had personal knowledge of the place to be searched and had the competence to make a sketch thereof; they knew exactly what objects should be taken therefrom; and they had presented evidence sufficient to establish probable cause. That may be so; but unfortunately, the place they had in mind - the first of four (4) separate apartment units (No. 1) at the rear of "Abigail Variety Store" - was not what the Judge who issued the warrant himself had in mind, and was not what was ultimately described in the search warrant. Now, at the time of the application for a search warrant, there were at least five (5) distinct places in the area involved: the store known as "Abigail's Variety Store," and four (4) separate and independent residential apartment units. These are housed in a single structure and are contiguous to each other although there are no connecting doors through which a person could pass from the interior of one to any of the others. Each of the five (5) places is independent of the others, and may be entered only through its individual front door. Admittedly, the police officers did not intend a search of all five (5) places, but of only one of the residential units at the rear of Abigail's Variety Store: that immediately next to the store (Number 1). The case at bar, however, does not deal with the correction of an "obvious typographical error" involving ambiguous descriptions of the place to be searched, as in Burgos, but the search of a place different from that clearly and without ambiguity identified in the search warrant. It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched - although not that specified in the warrant - is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. Indeed, following the officers' theory, in the context of the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of Abigail's Variety Store would have been fair game for a search. The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers' own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search. The Government alleges that the officers had satisfactorily established probable cause before Judge Bacalla for the issuance of a search warrant. While this may be conceded, the trouble is, to repeat, that the place described in the search warrant - which, of course, is the only place that may be legitimately searched in virtue thereof - was not that which the police officers who applied for the warrant had in mind, with the result that what they actually subjected to search-and-seizure operations was a place other than that stated in the warrant. In fine, while there was a search warrant more or less properly issued as regards Abigail's Variety Store, there was none for Apartment No. 1 - the first of the four (4) apartment units at the rear of said store, and precisely the place in which the private respondents were then residing. General or roving warrants Stonehill vs. Diokno Violation of 1) Warrants is issued only upon probable cause, in the case at bar, an abstract violation is indicated in the Warrant, to wit, violation of CB Law, tariff and Customs, IR Code and RPC. Impliedly, the issuing judge cannot identify specific offense of the petitioners so as to warrant the validity of the Search warrant 2) Particular description of object to be seized, in the case at bar, the objects to be seized indicated in the search warrant is expressed in general terms. Thereby, violating the sanctity of Sec 2 Art III. Bache vs. Ruiz

Facts: After an instruction from the Comm. Of Internal revenue, revenue Examiner, Rodolfo de Leon and his witness Arturo Logronio applied for a search warrant against the petitioners , Bache and Co (Phil) for violation of Section 46 (a) and pertinent provisions of the NIR Code, particularly 53, 72,73, 208 and 209. By means of a note, the respondent judge ordered the Deputy Clerk of the Court to depose the witnesses. After an oath, the respondent judge, Vivencio Ruiz signed the application and directed to the peace officers for the serving of the warrant. The officers confiscated 6 boxes of documents y virtue of the warrant. The petitioners, in return filed a motion to dissolve the Search warrant before the CFI Rizal, but was later denied. Hence this petition of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus praying for the quashal of the search warrant issued by the Respondent Judge. Issue: What requisites of a valid search warrant is wanting in the case at bar? Held: Constitutional provision provides 1) that a search warrant can only be issued upon probable cause 2) single warrant for a single offense 3) particular description of the objects to be seized and 4) the RRC provides that a judge should personally examine the complainant or witnesses that he may produce under oath to prove existence of a probable cause. The deposition should be in writing and should be attached to the record and any affidavits presented to him In the case at bar there is no personal examination done by the respondent judge to the witnesses. While it may be true that deposition is in printed from, subscribed and sworn, the respondent did not even asked the witnesses and the complainant any question to prove existence of a probable cause. Second, the statutory provision of a single warrant for single offense rule is also violated. The single search warrant was issued for 4 distinct offenses. a) 46 (a) failure to file income tax returns, b) b3 (Withholding income tax at source) c) 209 (failure to make a return of receipts, sales or business gross value output and d) 208 unlawful pursuit of business. Lastly, the search warrant does not indicated a particular or specific description to the object to be seized. A violation in the objective to eliminate general search warrant Petition granted. Castro vs. Pabalan Facts: The respondent, Ernesto Luman, in his application for a search warrant, admitted that he was informed that the petitioners, Maria Castro and Co ling, has in their possession of narcotics and other contraband. The application is accompanied with joint affidavit from the officers of the Philippine Constabulary. The officers of the Pc appeared before the respondent Judge Javier Pabalan for their application for search warrant. They were asked by the judge, however, it was not in writing and recorded. The place where to be searched is written in ink, inserting Maria Cristina to Padasil. After a routine taking of oath and examination, the judge signed the warrant. Sometime July 1967, the search warrant was issued. The search warrant only mentioned in terms of the properties to be seized, illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband inside the warehouse and premises of the petitioners. The petitioners then filed a certiorari praying for the nullification of the search warrant in the ground that the respondent judge did not follow the constitutional and statutory requirements in issuing a valid warrant of arrest. Issue: What are the constitutional and statutory provisions of a valid search warrant did the issuing judge omitted? Held: These are. The existence of a probable cause The constitution provides that a search warrant can only be issued upon a probable cause. In the case at bar, the existence of a probable cause is not establish since the search is based on hearsay. Moreover, the alleged offense of the petitioner is abstract, since the inquiry is only brief and the deposition is merely on writing and it was therefore not attached to the records. There should be particular description of the things to be seized and place to search. There is a mistake in indicating the place of the petitioners. But this is not grave enough to invalidate the Search warrant. However, in relation with the objects to be seized, it only indicated narcotics and contraband, which are expressed in general terms. A violation of the constitutional provision against general warrant. Single warrant single offense rule. In the case at bar, the warrant was issued against the petitioners in violation of illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband, which are also expressed in generic terms, that, which may arise from different offenses.

Note: Illegality of a search warrant does not call for the return of the things seized, what is prohibited is the continued possession. All the court may do is to exonerate (free somebody from guilt) the defendants from such omissions leading to invalidity of the search warrant. Asian Surety vs. Herrera Facts: On October 1965, upon a sworn application of NBI agent Celso Zoleta Jr. supported with the deposition of witness Manuel Cuaresma, the respondent Judge Jose Herrera, issued a search warrant against the petitioner for criminal case of Estafa, falsification, insurance fraud and tax evasion. By virtue of the search warrant, NBI agents seized the place in the office of the petitioner in Republi Market and carried away two car loads of documents, papers and receipt. The petitioners, then filed a suit assailing the validity of the SW, contending that it doesnot follow the Constitutional and statutory requirements of a valid SW. Issue: What are the violated procedures in the case at bar? Held: Single warrant single offense rule. General warrant. The constitution requires that a SW should be issued upon a probable cause in connection with one single offense. In the case at bar, the SW was issued for 4 separate and distinct offenses. Estafa, falsification, tax evasion and insurance fraud. Therefore it is invalid for it is a general warrant. Particular description of the objects to be seized. The constitution mandates that objects to be seized should be couched not on generic but specific terms. Section 2 provides that a SW may be issued for the search and seizure of the following personal properties. a) Property subject to the offense b) Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense c) Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense In the case at bar, the respondent judge used all three of the description in relation to the things to be seized in the petitioner. Thus, they are all couched in generic terms. The respondent judge did not bother to specify the things to be seized that would be admitted as an evidence to the offense charged. The Rule on RRC that the SW should be issued on day time. In the case at bar, the SW was conducted evening of Oct 27, 1965 at 7:30 pm until morning. Remoteness of the time of the offense and the application of the SW. Joseph Varon provides rules to apply affidavits for SW. 1) Such statement as to the time of the alleged offense must be clear and definite and must not be too remote from the time of the making of the affidavit and issuance of the search warrant 2) There is no rigid rule for determining whether the stated time of observation of the offense id too remote from the time when the affidavit was made or the search warrant issued but generally speaking, a lapse of time of less than three weeks will be held not to invalidate the search warrant, while the lapse of four weeks will be held to be so. Thus, the nearer the time at which the observation of an offense is alleged to have been made, the more reasonable the conclusion of establishment of a probable cause. In the case at bar, the alleged commission of the crime is from 1961 to 1964 and the application for SW is made 1965. thus, there can be doubt as to the establishment of a probable cause because of the remoteness of time. Petition granted. People vs. Villanueva A clear difference between the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutional provision on Sec 2 Art III (responsible officers authorized by law)

Facts: Sometime 1980, the petitioners, city fiscal and assistant City fiscal filed an information against Rogelim Yee with serious slander by deed. The petitioners certified that they have already conducted a preliminary investigation and find probable cause. Instead of issuing an arrest warrant, the respondent Judge, Napoleon Villanueva conducted an ex parte preliminary examination for scanning the records to determine the existence of probable cause. After such examination, the respondent judge found out that the crime committed may wither be slander by deed or slight physical injury. However, since the information was filed 64 days after the commission of the crime, the judge dismissed the case by prescription. Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In his defense, the respondent judge contends that he was not satisfied in the existence of probable cause and that he needed to conduct a separate examination for its determination and that, the case was dismissed because of prescription. Issue: Whether or not the judge may dismiss the case outright upon the absence of probable cause. Held: No. Under the 1973 constitution, the judge has the power and legal duty to determine the existence of probable cause, also, in cases where he is not satisfied with the certification of the prosecutor in the information, he may conduct preliminary investigation authorized under Sec 6 Rule 112 of the RRC. But that power does not include the authority to dismiss outright the information if the judge believes that there is no probable cause. The judge should require the fiscal to present additional evidence to show probable cause. If the fiscal refuses to do so, then the case may be dismissed for "lack of prosecution" as also stated under the case of Amarga vs. Abbas. The fiscal is a "responsible officer authorized by law" within the meaning of Section 3 of the Bill of Rights. His determination of probable cause is a sufficient justification for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Thus, it was held that "in a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the fiscal's should normally prevail" Thus, during the 73 constitution, it is a rule that the certification that probable cause exist by the preliminary investigation of the prosecutor is a sufficient ground for a judge to issue probable cause. The judge, therefore shouldnt conduct another examination. Note: Fiscals certification is sufficient, reason: The time-saving practice has been for the judge (municipal, city or Court of First Instance) to rely on the preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal as the basis for issuing the warrant of arrest. That practice is supported by the presumption that the fiscal performed his duties regularly and competently (Edillon vs. Narvios, Administrative Case No. 1753, August 21, 1980, 99 SCRA 174). And that practice existed even under the old Constitution when Section 1(3) of the Bill of Rights did not contain the terms "warrant of arrest" and "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law." We hold that, as a rule, a trial judge should not hold another preliminary examination to determine probable cause in case the fiscal has filed an information and certified that he has conducted the requisite preliminary investigation. That certification means that there is a prima facie case against the accused and that the issuance of a warrant of arrest is justified. Placer vs. Villanueva Conflicting decision as far as the fiscals certification in the existence of probable cause is concerned Facts: The petitioners, Fiscal and assistant City Fiscal, in their submission of ten information in the court of the respondent, provides certification that probable cause exists and that there is a reasonable ground to believe that crime has been committed and the accused are probably guilty thereof and therefore be subjected to arduous litigation process.(existence of probable cause and prima facie evidence) Following receipt of said informations, respondent judge issued an order setting on April 5, 1982 the hearing of said criminal cases for the purpose of determining the propriety of issuing the corresponding warrants of arrest. After said hearing, respondent issued the questioned orders dated April 13, 15, 16 and 19, 1982, requiring petitioners to submit to the court the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other documentary evidence in support of the informations to aid him in the exercise of his power of judicial review of the findings of probable cause by petitioners. Petitioners filed two separate motions for reconsideration of said orders, contending that under P.D. Nos. 77 and 911, they are authorized to determine the existence of a probable cause in a preliminary examination/investigation, and that their findings as to the existence thereof constitute sufficient basis for the

issuance of warrants of arrest by the court. On April 28, 1982, respondent judge denied said motions and reiterated his order to petitioners to submit the supporting affidavits and other documents within five (5) days from notice. Hence this petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed. Issue: Whether or not the respondent city judge may, for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest, compel the fiscal to submit to the court the supporting affidavits and other documentary evidence presented during the preliminary investigation. Held: NO. As dictated in the Amarga case, the certification of the fiscal may relied upon by the judge bit however not binding for an automatic issuance of arrest warrant, this is so, since the issuance of warrants is not ministerial function, it calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate. Under Section 6, Rulle 112 of RRC the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant or order of arrest. If on the face of the information the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's certification and require the submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable cause. This has been the rule since U.S. vs. Ocampo and Amarga vs. Abbas. And this evidently is the reason for the issuance by respondent of the questioned orders of April 13, 15, 16, 19, 1982 and July 13, 1982. Without the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other evidence which, as a matter of long-standing practice had been attached to the informations filed in his sala, respondent found the informations inadequate bases for the determination of probable cause. For as the ensuing events would show, after petitioners had submitted the required affidavits, respondent wasted no time in issuing the warrants of arrest in the cases where he was satisfied that probable cause existed. Note: Cases subjected to Summary Procedures, reason for requiring the submission of affidavits of the complainant and witnesses To enable the court to determine whether to dismiss the case or require further proceedings. Under the Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases, the respondent judge has the power to order the outright dismissal of the charge if, from the information and the affidavits attached thereto, he finds the same to be patently without basis or merit. Important: Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure On Probable cause: To be determined by the Judge, The probable cause here to be determine by the judge is to whether to issue a search or arrest warrant or not. Note however that, though the judge finds probable cause, this does not mean that he should automatically issue the same, in cases of an arrest warrant, he should determine whether there is a necessity to arrest the accused so as not to frustrate the ends of justice. Otherwise, the judge may refuse to issue an arrest warrant. To be determined by the prosecutor The probable cause here is to determine whether or not there is a crime committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. This is not tantamount to the determination of guilt of the accused, what is important is that he is probably guilty thereof. Tolentino vs. Villaluz Facts: Sometime 1973, the respondent Fiscal Mojica filed a complaint against the petitioners Bayot, Parra and Castillo before the Circuit Criminal Court Court of Pasig under the respondent Judge, Onofre Villaluz, for violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. After preliminary examination and investigation, the respondent judge issued a resolution stating that; 1. There exists a prima facie case against the petitioners. 2. Ordering as arrest warrant against the accused-petitioners. 3. Ordering respondent Fiscal to conduct a preliminary examination and investigation in this case to determine the criminal liability of all the members of the said City Council and thereafter to file the corresponding information in the court of competent jurisdiction, if evidence so warrant. A subsequent motion to Dismiss was filed by the petitioners but however was denied by the respondent court.

Hence a petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioners enjoining the respondent Judge to take cognizance in the criminal case filed against them and to declare all the proceedings undertaken and orders issued by the lower court null and void. They contend that the respondent judge has limited jurisdiction as a judge of the Circuit Criminal Court to try and decided specific criminal cases. They allege that the respondent has no authority to conduct preliminary investigations pursuant to RA 519. Issue: Does the limited jurisdiction of the respondent Judge also limits its authority as to the issuance of warrants of arrest, determination of probable cause and conducting preliminary investigation? Held: No. What is limited by RA 5179 is only the scope of the cases tat maybe tried by Circuit Criminal Courts. These courts cannot try all criminal cases falling under the jurisdiction of the CFIs as courts of general jurisdiction. They can only try cases provided under section 1 of the said law. However, these does not follow that judges under these courts also has limited power and authority. They have the same authority and powers as those conferred upon regular CFIs. Thus, the judges under these courts can also conduct preliminary investigations for the determination of prima facie case and of probable cause for the issuance of warrants. Note: Reason for the establishment of Circuit Criminal Courts. To alleviate the burden of the CFI and expedite the disposition of case. Limiting the powers conferred to judges of these courts would defeat such purpose, as the judges of the CFIs will still carry the burden to try and decide these cases. Cruz vs. Gatan Facts: Serafin G. Cruz was arrested by PC agents on August 30, 1976, at the Baguio Checkpoint along Kennon Road, Baguio City, and brought to Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, under the command of respondent Gen. Romeo Gatan, for custodial interrogation, where he is presently detained. On October 22, 1976, a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus was filed in his behalf wherein it was claimed that the said Serafin Cruz is held incommunicado; that he is restrained of his liberty without due process of law and is in the custody of the respondent not by virtue of a judgment or court order; that he is not a member of any subversive organization covered by Proclamation No. 1081 and falls within the clays of persons to whom the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has not been suspended. The petitioner is said to be an over-all Commander and Contractor General of the Bataan Defenders Command, an unregistered veterans outfit. He is thus allegedly violated Art. 147 of the RPC (Illegal Associations). Subsequently, the counsel for the petitioner however calimed after a discussion with the petitioner claimed that his continued detention is the free will and volition of the petitioner who expressed fears that he might be harmed or injured by some members of the "Bataan Defenders Command" if he were free from custody while the mastermind and legal counsel of the association, one Atty. Cecilio Baylon Buenafe, has not yet been arrested. Issue: Was the petitioner illegally detained? Held: No. The privilege of writ of habeas corpus was suspended by virtue of the declaration of PD 1081. Moreover, the case (petition for habeas corpus) became moot and academic since the petitioner voluntarily give its consent for its detention due to threats. The petitioner in the instant case was arrested and detained by virtue of an Arrest, Search, and Seizure Order issued by the Secretary of National Defense for violation of Article 147 of the Revised Penal Code pursuant to the aforequoted General Order No. 2-A, as amended; hence, his arrest and continued detention is legal. The declaration of martial law and the consequent suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus with respect to persons reasonably believed or charged to be engaged in the disorder or in fomenting it having been settled in the case of Aquino, Jr. vs. Ponce Enrile etc., et al., any inquiry by this Court into the continued detention of the petitioner would be purposeless.

Geronimo vs. Ramos Facts: On January 8, 1980, private respondent Julian Pendre filed a petition with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify petitioner Meliton C. Geronimo from running as a candidate for the mayorship of Baras, Rizal on the ground of political turncoatism. After hearing, the Comelec declared his adversary for the position of mayor in the said town Bayani Ferrera as duly elected mayor. The decision of the Comelec resulted into anger and discontent from the supporters of the petitioners, they entered the municipal hall and stayed until May 13, 1982. Subsequently, Pendre filed a petition before the SC praying to cite the petitioner in contempt. After hearing, the Comelec granted the petition, sentencing the petitioner to suffer 5-month imprisonment with fine. As a result, the PC forcibly arrest the petitioner, a commotion between the PC and supporters of the petitioners happened on May 14, 1982. The incident resulted to the issuance of 5 warrants of arrest against the supporters of the petitioner for the following violations: Usurpation of Authority [Art. 177, Revised Penal Code (RPC)]; Violation of Usurpation of Authority of Official (sic) [Art. 177, Revised Penal Code (RPC)]; Tumultuous Affray [Art. 153, RPC]; Sedition (Art. 139, RPC); Illegal Possession of Firearms; Disobedience to a Person in Authority or the Agent of such Person (Art. 151, RPC) and Alarm and Scandal (Art. 155, RPC). Thus three separate petitions were filed by the petitioner. One of these prays for the dismissal of the 75 complaints filed against the petitioner and his supporters. Issue: Was the issuance of 75 warrant in a single day valid as a matter of procedure? Held: No. It is impossible for one Judge to finish the preliminary investigation/examination of 75 persons in one day. Similar caution is warranted for the issuance of warrants of arrest. In the case at bar and especially considering the background circumstances which led to the filing of charges, we find it highly improbable for the judge to be able to determine the existence of reasonable grounds to believe that the offenses have been committed and that each and everyone of the seventy-six (76) persons are probably guilty thereof in a matter of a few hours and to proceed with the issuance of the warrants of arrest also on the same day. It should be remembered and the judge should have taken into account that all the offenses which were allegedly committed were only the product and result of the outburst of the feelings and emotions of the people of Baras due to the highly tense situation in the municipality, which culminated with the May 14, 1982 incident. The judge, therefore, in conducting his preliminary investigation should have ascertained with double care if, indeed, there was ample evidence to warrant the issuance of arrest warrants and eventually the filing of criminal informations against such a big number of persons, most of whom were impelled by different motivations and whose respective participations were of varying natures and degrees. One of the crimes charged was sedition, a particularly grave offense not to be lightly treated by any prosecuting officer or judge. The possibility of prolonged detention because of the charge should have been considered. Thus, such a hasty and manifestly haphazard manner of conducting the preliminary examination to determine probable cause for the issuance of the warrants of arrest and eventually for the filing of the necessary information cannot be sanctioned by the Supreme Court. It is an undisputed fact that all the criminal charges were the result of the events that transpired before and until the May 14, 1982 incident, when Mr. Geronimo was forcibly taken out of the municipal building of Baras by the military. The charges were also filed almost successively: one on March 20; one on April 12; one on April 14; two on May 4, two on May 14, and one on May 19, - and with the same court and presided over by the same judge. In one of the criminal complaints wherein about 75 people were charged, the warrants of arrest were issued on the same day that the preliminary examination was conducted. A judge (Ricardo Javier in the case at bar) must first satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant or order of arrest. The requirements are strict. The examination must be legitimate and not a feigned one intended to justify a course of action already predetermined. Thus, because of the inherent impossibility of a judge to conduct preliminary examination to all 75 complaints and finding probable cause to all of it resulting to his issuance of warrants is hasty and haphazard. Note (Very Important): Existing Ruling on determination of probable cause: Issuance of; Search and Seizure Warrant: The judge should personally examine the witnesses and complainant under oath or affirmance for the determination of probable cause. This is the doctrine embodied under Sec 2 Art III of the Constitution.

Arrest Warrant: The judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and witnesses to determine the probable cause. It is enough that (a) He examines the report and supporting documents provided by the fiscal in the determination of probable cause, and in basis thereof, issue arrest warrant. (b) If there is no sufficient establishment of probable cause, he may disregard the prosecutors certification and require the submission of the supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Warrantless Search and Seizure- When valid or not? People vs. Go Facts: After an information was relayed to the intelligence and Follow Up Unit of Calamba Police that shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride is supplied in Crossing, Calamba Laguna, agents went in the place for follow up. A police agent, Panuringan, then reported that he saw the accused, Luisito Go, enter a disco House with two women with a gun tucked in the accused waist. Three policemen entered the disco House for the Operation Bakal to search for illegally possessed firearms. Thus, when the accused was ordered to stand-up, police agents saw a revolver tucked in his waist, they asked for its licensed but the accused never showed it, instead, he gave his drivers license bearing other name. The police agents confiscated the gun with 10 live ammunitions. The agents also confiscated glass toothers and tin foils in the accused-appellants car together with an alleged shabu wrapped in cellophane. The accused was arrested without search and arrest warrants. Thus, two information were filed against the accused, one in violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act (RA 6452) and violation to PD 1866 or the Illegal Possession of firearms and ammunitions. The accused assails the validity of his arrest and his subsequent convictions for two crimes. Issue: Was the warrantless arrest valid? Held: Yes. It is valid. Rules of Court and Jurisprudence recognize exceptional cases where an arrest may be effected without warrant, to wit; (a) In the presence of a peace officer, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. (c) When the accused is a fugitive from law while serving his sentence from a final conviction. In the case at bar, it is clear that the policemen saw a gun tucked in his waist when he was arrested. The gun is plainly visible and no corresponding license was found. Thus, it is a valid search under the RRC (Plain view doctrine) no arrest warrant is necessary. The case also falls under the recognize instances provided under the RRC (Search incidental to lawful arrest), thus, the police has the authority to search the accused for dangerous drugs or weapons that is used as proof to the commission of the offense. The incidental discovery and confiscation of the drug paraphernalia to his car is lawful. Note: Bail; Criminal Procedure: Admission for bail does not preclude the accused to raise question on the validity of his arrest, as long as he raised the same before he enters plea, otherwise, it will bar him from questioning the same as he place himself already under the jurisdiction of the court. Absence of Preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash the information. Search Incidental to a valid arrest

Moreno vs. Ago Chi Facts: Sometime May 1904, the defendant (Ago Chi), represented by the plaintiff was charged and was convicted by the CFI Manila in the crime of assassination. He was sentenced to capital punishment but was later reduced to 20 years of reclusion temporal upon appeal in the SC.

Upon the defendants arrest, the arresting officer confiscated his money amounting to P700 and was deposited in the clerk of court. The plaintiff Moreno, filed a petition to the CFI Manila under Judge Quintero praying for the court to pay the plaintiff of his legal services to the defendant in the amount of P600 that will be taken from the confiscated money of the defendant. The lower court only granted P50 as legal services to the plaintiff. Hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not the search and confiscation of the defendant is a valid search. Can the plaintiff validly claim any lien from the confiscated money? Held: No. Under the Rules of Criminal procedure, an officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause. In the case at bar, the defendant was convicted in the crime of assassination, thus, the confiscation of his money amounting to P700 cannot in no way be connected with the crime where he was charged or in any cases mentioned. To deprive the defendant of his money or property under other circumstances than those mentioned above is to deprive him, perhaps, of the lawful means of defense. Thus, the money is illegally searched and confiscated and cannot be admitted as evidence. Since it was illegally confiscated, third persons cannot validly claim any liens from the confiscated money and should remain under the custody of the defendant. Case remanded to the lower court. People vs. Ang Chun Kit Facts: ANG CHUN KIT, a Chinese national and reputed to be a member of a Hong Kong-based drug syndicate operating in Metro Manila, was collared by NARCOM operatives in a buy-bust operation after he sold to an undercover agent for P400, 000.00 a kilo of methamphetamine hydrochloride known as shabu. His car also yielded more of the regulated drug neatly tucked in a Kleenex box. After tipping an information from a Confidential Informer, Chief investigator Avelino Razon arranged a buy-bust operation using operatives and marked money, scheduled to be operated in Cardinal Santos Hospital. The buy-bust operation was successful, the money was confiscated and nearly a kilo of shabu was seized in the defendants car. He was then brought to the Camp Crame, charged with violation to the Dangerous drugs Act. He was convicted by RTC Pasig Br. 155 in violation of RA 6425, Sec 15 Art III. Hence This petition. He argued that the confiscated articles are inadmissible as evidence since it was procured through an illegal search and seizure and that the drugs are not found in his person but in his car. Issue: Was the defendats contention correct? Held: No. It was a search and seizure incidental to a valid arrest. Under the constitutional and statutory provision, a valid warrantless arrest may be effected when the accused is actually committed, committing or about to commit a crime. And that a warrantless search and seizure can be effected when the search is incidental to a valid arrest. Moreover, a warrantless search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. In the case at bar, RA 6425 actually punishes even a mere possession of regulated drugs, thus the accused is in the process of committing a crime during the buy bust operation. It is thus then a valid warrantless arrest. Since it is a valid, the warrantless search may extend to the accused surrounding under his immediate control, thus the search seizure of shabu in his car is a valid seizure. Note: In the case at bar . the Court however agree with the accused that his signature on the receipt or lists of items confiscated from him is inadmissible in evidence as there is no showing that he was then assisted by counsel. In People v. Mauyao we said that "conformance to these documents are declarations against interest and tacit admissions of the crime charged, since merely unexplained possession of prohibited drugs is punished by law. They have been obtained in violation of his right as a person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense, there being nothing in the records to show that he was assisted by counsel."

With regard to the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, we already said in People v. Morico that "when an arrested person signs a Booking Sheet and Arrest Report at a police station he does not admit the commission of an offense nor confess to any incriminating circumstance. The Booking Sheet is merely a statement of the accused's being booked and of the date which accompanies the fact of an arrest. It is a police report and may be useful in charges of arbitrary detention against the police themselves. It is not an extra-judicial statement and cannot be the basis of a judgment of conviction."

People vs. Lua Facts: The defendant, Rolando Chekwa Lua, was arrested by a buy bust operation under the Oplan Saturn by the Caloocan police operatives in Bagong Silang Caloocan City. In the buy bust operation, after the informant/operative successfully bought some marijuana from the accused, the police subsequently acted and arrested Lua, confiscated the marked money, the regulated drug marijuana and a . 38 cal paltik and live bulletswhich was found in the accused waistline. These articles are sought outside the accuseds house The police operatives also found and confiscated a brick of marijuana inside the accuseds house. The RTC Br. 124 of Caloocan City convicted the accused in violation of RA 6425. Hence this petition. Issue: Was there a valid warrantless search and seizure? Held: Yes. The search and seizure is lawful, that being a warrantless search and seizure incidental to a lawful arrest, however, the articles (brick of marijuana) seized inside the accuseds house is inadmissible evidence. Having settled the issues raised by appellant, the equally important matter as regards admissibility of the evidence should likewise be passed upon. The buy-bust operation conducted by the police operatives is a form of entrapment allowed by law. The arrest of the appellant was lawful having been caught in flagrante delicto. Consequently, there is no need for a warrant for the seizure of the 3 tea bags of marijuana (5.3934 grams) the same being the fruit of the crime. With respect to the body search made by Puno, the same was valid being incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore, the .38 cal. paltik and the two (2) live bullets and the empty shell found in the cylinder are admissible in evidence. As regards the brick of marijuana found inside the appellant's house, the trial court correctly ignored it apparently in view of its inadmissibility. While initially the arrest as well as the body search was lawful, the warrantless search made inside appellant's house became unlawful since the police operatives were not armed with a search warrant. Such search cannot fall under "search made incidental to a lawful arrest," the same being limited to body search and to that point within reach or control of the person arrested, or that which may furnish him with the means of committing violence or of escaping. In the case at bar, appellant was admittedly outside his house when he was arrested. Hence, it can hardly be said that the inner portion of his house was within his reach or control. In sum, this court finds accused-appellant Rolando Lua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended, under which the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed. People vs. Figueroa Facts: The accused was charged with Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions and and of RA 645 and subsequently convicted by the RTC Br. 23 of Trece Martires in Cavite. While serving the warrant of arrest, the officers noticed, strewn around, aluminum foil packages of different sizes in the sala. Suspecting thus the presence of "shabu" in the premises, the arresting officers requested appellant, as well as his brother and sister, to acquiesce to a search of the house. The search yielded a .45 caliber pistol, a magazine, seven live ammunitions, and a match box containing an aluminum foil package with "shabu." Confronted, Figueroa denied ownership of the items. An inventory was conducted by the PC team, attested to by Barangay Captain Bigornia, of the seized items. The accused questions the admissibility in evidence of the firearm and confiscated ammunition for it was discovered during a warrantless search. Issue: Was their an unlawful warrantless search and seizure. Held: No. the search and seizure of the articles sought is a valid being a search incidental to an arrest. The .45 caliber pistol, magazine and rounds of ammunition were not unlawfully obtained. While the SC might concede difficulty in readily accepting the statement of the prosecution that the search was conducted with consent

freely given by appellant and members of his household, it should be pointed out, in any case, that the search and seizure was done admittedly on the occasion of a lawful arrest. A significant exception from the necessity for a search warrant is when the search and seizure is effected as an incident to a lawful arrest. As a doctrine in jurisprudence, the warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surrounding under his immediate control. Objects in the `plain view' of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence." Nolasco vs. Pano Conflicting views between the ponente Justice Melencio-Herrera and Justices Teehankee and Cuevas concerning the validity place of arrest and search of the accused in connection with Lawful Search Incidental to an Arrest Facts: The petitioners, Nolasco, Aguilar-Roque and Tolentino were charged of the crime of Rebellion, Subversion and/or Conspiracy o commit Rebellion/Subversion and was arrested by Constabulary Security Group (CSG) on August 6th at 11:30 AM at the intersection of Mayon St. and P. Margali St, Quezon City. At 12 noon of that same day, a search was conducted at the residence of the petitioner Aguilar-Roque at 239 B Mayon St. QC. The CSG confiscated 428 written documents, typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. The petitioners alleged that the search warrant and arrest warrants issued was void in the ground that there is no established existing probable cause and that the warrant is a general in nature, violative of their constitutional right. Moreover, they contend that the articles confiscated in inadmissible as evidence as the search is illegal not being a search incidental to an arrest. Issue: Was the search cannot be qualified as a lawful search incidental to lawful arrest? Held: No. The Search is lawful. UNDER Sec 12, rule 126 of the RRC, Section 12. Search without warrant of person arrested. - A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense." The provision is declaratory in the sense that it is confined to the search, without a search warrant, of a person who had been arrested. It is also a general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the place or premises where the arrest was made can also be search without a search warrant. In this latter case, "the extent and reasonableness of the search must be decided on its own facts and circumstances, and it has been stated that, in the application of general rules, there is some confusion in the decisions as to what constitutes the extent of the place or premises which may be searched". "What must be considered is the balancing of the individual's right to privacy and the public's interest in the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals." Considering that AGUILAR-ROQUE has been charged with Rebellion, which is a crime against public order; that the warrant for her arrest has not been served for a considerable period of time; that she was arrested within the general vicinity of her dwelling; and that the search of her dwelling was made within a half hour of her arrest, we are of the opinion that, in her respect, the search at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, did not need a search warrant; this, for possible effective results in the interest of public order. The search in the residence of the petitioner Aguilar-Roque is valid since in relation with the nature of the crime of rebellion, which is a crime against public order, it is a search incidental to an arrest. The immediate vicinity of the arrest is not controlling as far as the publics interest in the prevention of the crime and apprehension of the criminals are concerned.

Separate and Dissenting opinion of justices Teehankee and Cuevas Justice Teehankee The exception of Rule 126, sec. 12 which allows a warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested is absolutely limited to his person, at the time of and incident to his arrest and to "dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense." Such warrantless search obviously cannot be made in a place other than the place of arrest. In this case, petitioner Aguilar-Roque was arrested at 11:30 a.m. on board a public vehicle on the road (at Mayon and P. Margall Streets). To hold that her dwelling could "later on the same day" be searched without warrant is to sanction an untenable violation, if not nullification, of the cited basic constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. Justice Cuevas

The lawful arrest being the sole justification for the validity of the warrantless search under the statutory provision (Sec. 12, Rule 126) the same must be limited to and circumscribed by, the subject, time, and place of said arrest. As to subject, the warrantless search is sanctioned only with respect to the person of the suspect, and things that may be seized from him are limited to "dangerous weapons" or "anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense." "An officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime or might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or escaping or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause. With respect to the time and place of the warrantless search allowed by law, it must be contemporaneous with the lawful arrest. Stated otherwise, to be valid, the search must have been conducted at about the time of the arrest or immediately thereafter and only at the place where the suspect was arrested. "The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search a person lawfully arrested while committing a crime and to search the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed, as well as weapons or other things to effect an escape from custody is not to be doubted. But the right does not extend to other places The second element which must exist in order to bring the case within the exception to the general rule is that, in addition to a lawful arrest, the search must be incident to the arrest. "The search must be made at the place of the arrest, otherwise, it is not incident to the arrest. AGNELLO vs. U.S. supra. In this latter case, 269 U.S. 20 at 30, it is said that the officers have a right to make a search contemporaneously with the arrest. And if the purpose of the officers in making their entry is not to make an arrest, but to make a search to obtain evidence for some future arrest, then search is not incidental to arrest. BYARS vs. U.S. 273 U.S., 28 ET AL." (Papani vs. U.S., 84 F 2d 160, 163) In the instant case, petitioners were arrested at the intersection of Mayon St. and P. Margall St. at 11:30 A.M. of August 6, 1976. The search, on the other hand, was conducted after the arrest, that was at around 12:00 noon of the same day or "late that same day (as respondents claim in their "COMMENT") at the residence of petitioner AGUILAR-ROQUE in 239B Mayon St., Quezon City. How far or how many kilometers is that place from the place where petitioner was arrested do not appear shown by the record, But what appears undisputed is that the search was made in a place other than the place of arrest and, not on the occasion of nor immediately after the arrest. It cannot be said, therefore, that such a search was incidental to the arrest of the petitioners. Not being an incident of a lawful arrest, the search of the premises at 239B Mayon St., Quezon City WITHOUT A VALID SEARCH WARRANT is ILLEGAL and violative of the constitutional rights of the respondent. The things and properties seized on the occasion of said illegal search are therefore INADMISSIBLE in evidence under the exclusionary rule Search of Moving Vehicles Espano vs. Court of Appeals Facts: Sometime July of 1991, the narcotics division of the WPD conducted a by bust operation in Zamora and Pandacan Streets in Manila after the confirmation of drug pushing reports in the same area. During the operation in the area, after the police officers saw the accused selling something to a buyer, they approached Espano and frisked him. The officers seized two plastic tea bags of marijuana from the accused. They then later asked the accused if there are more marijuana in him, the Espano replied that there are more in his house. Thus, the arresting officers went to Espanos house and subsequently confiscated ten more plastic tea bags of marijuana. Espano was brought to the police, and charged in violation with RA 6425. The RTC Br. 1 of Manila convicted him in the charges whish was later affirmed in toto by the respondent appellate court. Hence, this petition for review. As defense, the petitioner contends that the drugs confiscated are inadmissible evidence against him being search and seized illegally. Issue: Was the contention correct? Held: Partly, the drugs confiscated in his person is admissible, however, the articles sought in his residence cannot be admitted as evidence by the prosecution being unlawfully seized. Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court provides that an officer may without a warrant arrest a person when in his presence: (a) Has committed (b) Is actually committing (c) Or is about to commit a crime In the case at bar, petitioner's arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He was caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers on the basis of information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area of Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila. The police officer saw petitioner handing over

something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they searched him and discovered two cellophanes of marijuana. His arrest was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the crime. As for the ten cellophane bags of marijuana found at petitioner's residence, however, the same inadmissible in evidence. The 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom against unreasonable searches and seizures under Article III, Section 2 which provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purposes shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or anything, which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. It may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. In this case, the ten cellophane bags of marijuana seized at petitioner's house after his arrest at Pandacan and Zamora Streets do not fall under the said exceptions. The articles seized from petitioner during his arrest were valid under the doctrine of search made incidental to a lawful arrest. The warrantless search made in his house, however, which yielded ten cellophane bags of marijuana became unlawful since the police officers were not armed with a search warrant at the time. Moreover, it was beyond the reach and control of petitioner. People vs. Malsmedt With substantial dissenting opinions of Justices Narvasa (CJ) and Cruz Facts: Upon reports that vehicles coming from Sagada are transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs, the First regional NARCOM was ordered to set-up a temporary checkpoint area to monitor all vehicle coming from Sagada. The accused, Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national was boarding in the rear end of the bus when the officers are inspecting. One officer saw a bulging object in the waist of the accused and asked Malmstedt to show his passport and other identification documents. The accused failed to comply and was asked to bring out whatever the object bulging in his stomach. It turns out to be haishish a derivative of marijuana. The accused was invited to step out of the bus for questioning. Before doing so, the accused first get his two traveling bags from the luggage carrier of the bus. The officers inspected the bags and saw a suspicious teddy bear, which turned out to be containing the same materials confiscated from the accused. The RTC of La Trinidad Benguet later convicted the accused with the violation of RA 6425. hence this petition for reversal. The accused contended that his arrest and seizure of his personal effects are illegal there being conducted without warrant, therefore follows that articles confiscated is inadmissible evidence against him. Issue: Were the arrest, search and seizure illegal? Held: No. It is legal, being one of the instances provided by statutory provision that warrantless arrest and seizure can be effected. It was search pursuant to a lawful arrest and search in a moving vehicle. Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law (committed a crime), which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. Note: Dissenting Opinions of Justices Narvasa and Cruz Justice Narvasa: If, on the other, a person is searched without a warrant, or under circumstances other than those justifying an arrest without warrant in accordance with law, supra, merely on suspicion that he is engaged in some felonious enterprise, and in order to discover if he has indeed committed a crime, it is not only the arrest which is illegal but also, the search on the occasion thereof, as being "the fruit of the poisonous tree." In that event, any evidence taken, even if confirmatory of the initial suspicion, is inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." They are merely fishing for evidence to corroborate their speculations. The search was not made by virtue of a warrant or as an incident of a lawful warrantless arrest, i.e., under circumstances sufficient to engender a reasonable belief that some crime was being or about to be committed, or had

just been committed. There was no intelligent and intentional waiver of the right against unreasonable searches and seizure. The search was therefore illegal, since the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest of an individual before a search of his body and his belongings may licitly be made. The process cannot be reversed, i.e., a search be first undertaken, and then an arrest effected, on the strength of the evidence yielded by the search. An arrest made in that case would be unlawful, and the search undertaken as an incident of such an unlawful arrest, also unlawful. Search may extend to the area "within his immediate control, defined: The area from which said person arrested might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. Mustang Lumber vs. CA A consolidated petition Facts: First Case: On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the SAID organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322, loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City. The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because of the refusal of the owner. 2 The special Action and nvestigation Division of DENr also procured a search warrant from Jusge Adriano Osorio of RTC Valenzuela, by virtue of the warrant, the team seized for truckloads of narra woods including almaciaga and supa. Moreover, the lumberyard of the petitioner was also placed under administrative seizure. For failure to produce certificates of lumber origins, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets and delivery receipts. Subsequently, the Sec of DENR Factoran issued an order confiscating the woods seized in the truck of the petitioner as well as those found in their lumberyard. Thus, the petitioner filed a petitioner for certiorari and prohibition contending that the search and seizure operation by the respondents is a violation under Sec 2 Art III of the Constitution for not having a valid search warrant. Second case: PP vs. Capulong et al This case deals with whether the Forestry Code where the petitioner allegedly violated refers to either timber or lumber Issue: Was the warrantless search and seizure invalid? Held: No. It is a valid warrantless search being one of the statutory instances that accepted. Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted exceptions to the constitutional mandate that no search and seizure shall be made except by a virtue of a warrant. Thus a search could be lawfully conducted on a moving vehicle without a search warrant. In the case at bar, the conducted search and seizure is indeed without a valid warrant, however, it was conducted to search the materials that can be found in a moving vehicle, which is the truck of the first case. Seizure of goods concealed to avoid duties/taxes Papa vs. Mago Facts: Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, acting upon a reliable information received on November 3, 1966 to the effect that a certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone. When the trucks left gate No. 1 at about 4:30 in the afternoon of November 4, 1966, elements of the counterintelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two trucks, consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of

Duties Collected on Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit. The respondent Mago, filed a petition for mandamus and certiorari before the CFI Manila contending that the search and seizure is illegal for lack of a valid warrant. Moreover, she also contends that such articles sought from her is not included by the law for prohibited importation and that it no longer under the control of the Tariff and Customs code for it (articles) were already sold to the petitioner. She also contends that the search seizure conducted by the respondents are illegally being made outside the jurisdiction of the BOC and that the subsequent search warrant issued by the collector of customs is not valid being not issued by a judge. The respondent Mago filed an ex-parte motion to release the confiscated articles upon her posting a bond. This motion was then granted by the respondent Judge Jarencio. Issue: Was the seizure of the goods unlawful? And that the BOC has no jurisdiction over the articles sought? Held: No. it is a valid seizure. The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in writing by the Commissioner of Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect searches, seizures, and arrests, and it was his duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or other movable property when the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff laws. He could lawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when he had reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such article as aforesaid. It cannot be doubted, therefore, that petitioner Ricardo G. Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect the search and seizure of the goods in question. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to demand assistance of any police officer to effect said search and seizure, and the latter has the legal duty to render said assistance. This was what happened precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the search and seizure of the two trucks loaded with the nine bales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle. He was given authority by the Chief of Police to make the interception of the cargo. Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board, or stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. It is our considered view, therefore, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws. Note: The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among others, (1) to assess and collect all lawful revenues from imported articles, and all other dues, fees, charges, fines and penalties, accruing under the tariff and customs laws; (2) to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the customs; and (3) to enforce tariff and customs laws. The goods in question were imported from Hongkong, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry." As long as the importation has not been terminated the imported goods remain under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. Importation is deemed terminated only upon the payment of the duties, taxes and other charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid, at the port of entry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been granted. The payment of the duties, taxes, fees and other charges must be in full. Pacis vs. Pamaran Facts: The petitioner, Pedro Pacis, acting Collector of Customs in the Port of Manila, issued a warrant of seizure and detention for an automobile (Mercury 1957) owned by the respondent Ricardo Santos, who, by the records of his office, have not fully paid the customs duty collectible from the car. The respondent Santos filed a suit against the petitioner on the ground usurpation of justice, for the petitioner has no power granted by the constitution to issue a warrant, which, is s judicial function of a judge. Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is clothe with jurisdiction to issue a warrant. Held: Yes. The Collector of customs may order seizure of untaxed goods being without being liable for usurpation of judicial function as provided under the tariff and customs Code. Hizon vs. CA Facts: Sometime 1992, the Maritime Command of the PNP Palawan arrested the petitioner who are allegedly conducting muro-ami a prohibited system of fishing while on board FB robinson. The PNP filed a complaint against the petitioners (31 of 35) charging them in violation of the Fishery Laws in the Philippines, by using sodium Cyanide in catching fishes. The RTC Puerto princesa convicted the petitioners and was affirmed by the CA., hence this petition. As defense, the petitioners alleged that the search and seizure is illegal for the absence of a warrant and the fishes sought cannot be admitted as evidence against them. Issue: Was the arrest, search and seizure invalid? Held: No. it is a valid being a search in a moving motor vehicle. Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure and the arrest of persons without a judicial warrant. 16 As a general rule, any evidence obtained without a judicial warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is, however, subject to certain exceptions. Some of these are: (1) A search incident to a lawful of arrest; (2) Seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) Search of a moving motor vehicle; and (4) Search in violation of customs laws. Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant. It is rooted on the recognition that a vessel and an aircraft, like motor vehicles, can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought and secured. Yielding to this reality, judicial authorities have not required a search warrant of vessels and aircrafts before their search and seizure can be constitutionally effected. The same exception ought to apply to seizures of fishing vessels and boats breaching our fishery laws. These vessels are normally powered by high-speed motors that enable them to elude arresting ships of the Philippine Navy, the Coast Guard and other government authorities enforcing our fishery laws. Thus, in the case at bar, the warrantless search on the F/B Robinson, a fishing boat suspected of having engaged in illegal fishing is valid. The fish and other evidence seized in the course of the search were properly admitted by the trial court. People vs. Que Facts: After receiving information that a truck loader with plate number PAD 548 contains illegally cut lumber and will pass through Ilocos Norte, the PNP then proceeded and patrol along the vicinity of General Segundo Ave. Laoag City. Sometime March 1994, the officers saw the truck with the plate number indicated, they followed and then apprehended in Marcos bridge. The officers then arrested the petitioners for failure to show the necessary documents such as (1) Certificate of Lumber Origin (2) Certificate of Transport Agreement (3) Auxiliary invoice and others. The petitioners were charged for violating the Forestry Code and was convicted by RTC Laoag. The petitioners filed an appeal before the SC contending that the search and seizure is illegal and the confiscated articles cannot be used as evidence against them being fruits of a poisonous tree. Issue: Was there an illegal search? Held: No. The search is legal being conducted in search of a moving vehicle. As held in the PP vs. Bagista explaining the exception and rational of a validity in search of a moving vehicle; With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or

probable cause to believe before search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched. (citations omitted; emphasis supplied) The police officers in the case at bar had probable cause to search appellant's truck. A member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging received a reliable information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegal lumber would pass through Ilocos Norte. Two weeks later, while members of the Provincial Task Force were patrolling along General Segundo Avenue, they saw the ten-wheeler truck described by the informant. When they apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge, accused-appellant, the owner of the truck and the cargo, admitted that there were sawn lumber in between the coconut slabs. When the police officers asked for the lumber's supporting documents, accused-appellant could not present any. The foregoing circumstances are sufficient to prove the existence of probable cause which justified the extensive search of appellant's truck even without a warrant. Thus, the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber were lawfully seized and were thus properly admitted as evidence to prove the guilt of accused-appellant. The Plain View Doctrine PP. vs. Valdez Facts: After a tip from a source hat there is a plantation of marijuana owned by the appellant at Sitio Bulan Villaverde NV, the PNP Nueva Vizcaya immediately formed an operation to verify the report with an instruction to uproot said marijuana plants and arrest the cultivator of the same. Upon reaching their destination, the police say seven five-foot height marijuana flowering tops situated approximately 25 meters from the accused. Valdez admitted that the plants are his, thus, the police uprooted the plants and subject it to forensic analysis which was later found positive to be a marijuana. The accused was arrested The lower court was convicted and sentenced to suffer the capital punishment of death. Hence this automatic appeal. The petitioner through counsel contended that the search is unlawful since the officers has ample time to secure a search warrant, thereby the evidences cannot be admitted as evidence against him being a fruit of a proverbial poisoned tree. The respondent, through the solicitor General avers that the search is lawful since it is one of the considered as plain view doctrine/ search. Issue: Whether the search is in accordance with the plain view doctrine. Held: The search is unlawful and cannot be classified as a plain view search. As ingrained in jurisprudence, if the arresting officers has ample time to secure a arrest warrant, specially when they all have the information needed to identify the place and the person sought to be searched and/or arrested, search warrant is needed. However, statutory and constitutional provisions also allows instances where warrants are dispensable. One of which is search of plain view or the plain view doctrine. For the doctrine to apply, the following requisites should be present. (a) (b) (c) (d) A prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; The evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; and The evidence must be immediately apparent; and Plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

Thus, the plain view doctrine applies only where the police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. In the case at bar, their discovery of the plant is not inadvertent. It is clear from the records and the orders of the officer that they have to uproot the cannabis plants when seen and that the officers testified that they first located the marijuana before the arrest of Valdez. Thus, the search is illegal and that the confiscated plants cannot be admitted as evidence being a fruit of a poisonous tree. Note: The guarantee refers to "the right of personal security" of the individual. As appellant correctly points out, what is sought to be protected against the State's unlawful intrusion are persons, not places. To conclude otherwise would not only mean swimming against the stream, it would also lead to the absurd logic that for a person to be immune against unreasonable searches and seizures, he must be in his home or office, within a fenced yard or a

private place. The Bill of Rights belongs as much to the person in the street as to the individual in the sanctuary of his bedroom. People vs. Damaso Facts: After a sequence of arrest among members of the NPA, the Philippine Constabulary officers of Lingayen Pangasinan, the apprehended NPA (Luz Tancianco) members pointed out to the PC the house of the Appellant Damaso where the same is leasing. Being pointed out that the appellant is the lessee of the house, the police went inside and eventually saw M-14 rifles, radio sets, subversive materials and pamphlets, maps, computer machines, bullets and ammunitions. These articles are confiscated to use as evidence against the accused in the crime of Subversion. He was then convicted by the RTC Dagupan in the crime of subversion, hence this appeal. The appellant contends that the seizure in his house is illegal for absence of a search warrant. Issue: Was the search unlawful? Held: Yes. The search n the house of the appellant is illegal because of absence of search warrant and even probable cause for the issuance of the same. In the testimony of the witness by the prosecution, he has no personal knowledge making its testimonies hearsay and weak to establish the existence of a probable cause. Moreover, the search conducted is not one being qualified as a valid search without warrant (1) Search incidental to an arrest. (2) Customs search. (3) Consented search (4) Search of a moving vehicle (5) Stop frisk (6) Plain view search. (Apply the Mendoza doctrine- incidental discovery of incriminating evidence to qualify as a plain view search) Moreover, the rights granted under the Bill of Rights is personal and that cannot be waived by anyone else rather than the person whose rights is invaded or one who expressly to do so in his behalf. In the case at bar, the prosecution did not established that Luz Tancianco was authorized by the appellant to allow the officers to enter the appellants house and seized the effects of the appellant upon seeing it in presumption that it is connected with the crime of subversion. Thereby violating the appellants rights of privacy and security of house and effects. Thus, the prosecutions evidences are weak and that the search being illegal, the articles sought are inadmissible as evidences being a fruit of poisonous tree. People vs. Velasco Facts: A close surveillance by the Narcotics unit of the WPD confirmed that the Accused, Yolanda Velasco aka Shabu Queen is indeed engage in peedling shabu, a regulated drug, along Quirada St. in Manila. After the confirmation, the WPD organized a buy-bust operation involving a poseur and marked money. The operation was successful and the appellant was caught in flagranti delicto, was arrested and brought to precinct for an investigation. The confiscated five decks of shabu were found in the accuseds pockets. Hence this petition, arguing that the articles sought cannot be used as an evidence since the search was illegal being obtained through a warrantless arrest. She also allege that she was framed-up by the officers. Issue: Was there an illegal warrantless arrest? Held: No. it being one of the exceptions provided by statutory provision. The RRC provides that an officer, in his presence, can arrest even without a search or arrest warrant when the person arrested actually committed, committing or attempting to commit a crime. In the case at bar, the accused was caught in flagranti delicto (in the act of committing the crime), thus it justified the warrantless arrest conducted by the officer, thus, debunk the petitioner contention of frame up and inadmissibility of evidence against her. No evidence presented by the petitioner that the arresting officers are engage in unscrupulous discharge of their duty to back up her contention of a frame up.

People vs. Leangsiri Facts: Suchinda Leangsiri was arrested in the NAIA in the act of bringing into the country approximately more than * kilo of heroin. In his arrest, he informed the arresting officers that the heroin is meant to deliver to three other people in Las Palmas Hotel in Manila. Immediately, the NARCOM formed a group for a follow up operation in the said Hotel. In the accuseds cooperation, he was allowed to check in to Room 504, where the others will meet him to give the drugs. Around 10 pm, Amidu two other co-appellants entered Room 504 and Leagsiri gave them the drugs, before the appellants leave the room, the NARCOM officers barged in and arrested the appellants. Amidu, told the officers that he is staying in Rm 413 and that the two others are in royal Palm Hotel. The officers then went to the room of Amidu, searching for evidence and subsequently confiscated a telephone address bearing the name of Leangsiri, other possessions and documents of Amidu were also confiscated. In the case of the two other, the police confiscated a suit case and masking tape and empty transparent bag, allegedly will be use in transporting the drugs. The appellants were charged and was convicted in conspiring to transport heroin violative of RA 6425. Hence this petition, alleging that the search is illegal being conducted not in the direct premises of the arrest. Issue: Whether the articles sought in the other room and hotel, outside the direct premises of the arrest admissible as evidence? Held: No. those article are inadmissible as evidence as it was obtained not in plan view nor within the direct premises of the arrest. The plain view doctrin applies to OBJECTS OF THE PLAIN VIEW OF AN OFFICER WHO HAS THE RIGHT TO BE IN THE POSITION TO HAVE THAT VIEW ARE SUBJECT TO SEIZURE AND MAYBE PRESENTED AS EVIDENCE. Thus, what can be admitted are evidences seized within the direct premise where the accused has an immediate control which should only be Rm. 509. In the case at bar, appellants were arrested in Room 504 of the Las Palmas Hotel. The piece of paper bearing Leangsiri's name was obtained through a warrantless search of Room 413 of the same hotel, and found tucked within the pages of appellant Amidu's telephone and address book. Clearly, the warrantless search is illegal and the piece of paper bearing Leangsiri's name cannot be admitted as evidence against appellants. The inadmissibility of this evidence will not, however, exculpate appellants. Its exclusion does not destroy the prosecution's case against appellants. The remaining evidence still established their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Note: Plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not, searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the following limitations on the application of the doctrine. What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. When there is waiver of right or gives his consent A Valid waiver of right in Sec 2 art III, elements (1) The right to be waived is existing (2) The person waiving it had knowledge, actual or constructive (3) He or she has actual intention to relinquish the right.

People vs. Baula Facts: After the gruesome killing of Patronicia Caburao in the municipality of Sual, Pangasinan, the investigating police went to the residence of the accused-appellant, Baula et al.

In the process of questioning the appellants, the police saw bloodstained bolo, short pants, polo shirts and was subsequently confiscated without search warrant and directed to the NBI for forensic exams. The exam resulted that the bloods found in the confiscated articles bears the same blood type O as that of the victim. Thus, the accused were arrested, charged and was convicted in the crime of murder by the RTC Lingayen and sentenced to suffer RP. Hence this appeal for review on the decision of the lower court in the ground that the articles sought (bloodstained bolo, shirt and short pants) cannot be admitted as evidence against the accused since it was seized without a valid search and seizure warrant. Issue: Whether the articles are validly seized even without a valid search warrant and therefore admitted as evidence in the case at bar. Whether the articles when with consent given to the officers can be admitted as an evidence? Held: The articles are unlawfully searched and seized. A search incidental to a valid arrest is one of the statutory exceptions to the constitutional mandate that no search and seizure shall be effected without a valid warrant. In this instance, the arrest should be lawful before search and seizure by the arresting officer would be conducted. A warrantless arrest may be effected by the arresting officer when in his presence the person arrested is have committed, committing or attempting to commit the crime. It cannot be reversed; otherwise, it would unlawful and unconstitutional and the seized article would be inadmissible evidence. In the case at bar, Accused-appellants were not being arrested at the time that the subject articles were allegedly taken from them but were just being questioned by the police officers conducting the investigation about the death of Patrocinia Caburao. The investigating officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed the crime. Being in no position to effect a warrantless arrest, the police officers were thus likewise barred from effecting a warrantless search and seizure. An illegal search cannot be undertaken and then an arrest effected on the strength of the evidence yielded by that search. The Court finds it less than credible the stance of the prosecution that the polo shirt and short pants have been voluntarily given. An alleged consent to a warrantless search and seizure cannot be based merely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty. This presumption, by itself, cannot prevail against the constitutionally protected rights of an individual, and zeal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself abhors. Thus, the bloodstained polo, bolo and shorts are inadmissible as evidence. Veroy vs. Layaguwe Facts: The petitioners, Leopoldo Veroy has a residential house in K-8th St. Quezon City where it is under the care of two houseboys and a certain Soquilon. The bedrooms in this house are constantly locked and access to the kitchen is the only key to the caretakers. Sometime 1990, a directive issue was ordered to Capt. Obrero to search the house of the petitioner in the report that their residence is a hideout and recruiting site of rebel soldiers. They were able to enter the yard with the help of the caretakers but did not enter the house since the owner was not present and they did not have a search warrant. Petitioner Ma. Luisa was contacted by telephone in her Quezon City residence by Capt. Obrero to ask permission to search the house in Davao City as it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center of rebel soldiers. Petitioner Ma. Luisa Veroy responded that she is flying to Davao City to witness the search but relented if the search would not be conducted in the presence of Major Ernesto Macasaet, an officer of the PC/INP, Davao City and a long time family friend of the Veroys. The authority given by Ma. Luisa Veroy was relayed by Capt. Obrero to Major Macasaet who answered that Ma. Luisa Veroy has called him twice by telephone on the matter and that the permission was given on the condition that the search be conducted in his presence. The officers in the following day with Maj. Macasaet, by virtue of the authority granted by the petitioner, gained an entrance to the house and first search the masters and childrens bedroom, where they saw and confiscated .45 cal handgun with live bullets, printed materials of RAM-SFP, traveling bag with assorted clothes, telescope, map, a book, medicines and religious pamphlets. The petitioners were then charged with a criminal complaint in the crime of illegal possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in furtherance with Rebellion, and that the prosecution recommended no bail. Due to stress and anxiety, the petitioners were confined in a hospital and filed Motions for Bail and Hospital Confinement under the respondent judge Layague, which was denied. Then an order was issued by the respondent judge to transfer the petitioners from St Lukes to Camp Crame. Hence this petition. The petitioners question the admissibility in evidence of the articles seized in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure. Petitioners aver that while they concede that Capt. Obrero had permission from Ma. Luisa Veroy to break open the door of their residence, it was merely for the purpose of ascertaining thereat the presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers. The permission did not include any authority to conduct a room-to-room search once inside the house. The

items taken were, therefore, products of an illegal search, violative of their constitutional rights. As such, they are inadmissible in evidence against them. Issue: Does the articles seized unlawful and cannot be admitted as evidence? or Does the consent given by the petitioners make the search and seizure lawful? Held: The articles are illegally seized therefore inadmissible as evidence. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures (Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution). However, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute one. Among the recognized exceptions thereto are: (1) a search incidental to an arrest; (2) a search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view None of these exceptions pertains to the case at bar. The reason for searching the house of herein petitioner is that it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center for rebel soldiers. While Capt. Obrero was able to enter the compound, he did not enter the house because he did not have a search warrant and the owners were not present. This shows that he himself recognized the need for a search warrant, hence, he did not persist in entering the house but rather contacted the Veroys to seek permission to enter the same. Permission was indeed granted by Ma. Luisa Veroy to enter the house but only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers. Under the circumstances it is undeniable that the police officers had ample time to procure a search warrant but did not. In a number of cases decided by this ,Court, (Guazon v. De Villa, supra.; People v. Aminnudin), warrantless searches were declared illegal because the officials conducting the search had every opportunity to secure a search warrant. The objects seized, being products of illegal searches, were inadmissible in evidence in the criminal actions subsequently instituted against the accused-appellants Undeniably, the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum but it does not follow that the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by the exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as evidence against the petitioners in the criminal action against them for illegal possession of firearms. De Garcia vs. Locsin Facts: Mariano Almeda, an agent of Anti-usury Board applied for a search warrant before the respondent judge against the petitioner, believing that there is a probable cause that the petitioner, Leona De Garcia, keeps and conseals in her house and store at Victoria Tarlac certain books, lists, chits, receipts and documents relating to her activities as usurer, contrary to law. The search warrant was granted and with officers of the law, Almeda et al search the person and house/store of the petitioner to seized evidence related to usury. The search proceeded without the presence of the petitioner, and thus, packages of records were confiscated, turned over to the fiscal by the Anti-Usury Board and was later filed six separate complaint against the petitioner for violation of the Anti-usury law. Thus, a motion was filed by the petitioner demanding the respondent Board to return the articles seized in the search in the ground of its invalidity. The respondent judge denied such motion and contends that even though the search warrant is invalid, the articles are still admissible as evidence since there is a waiver of right on the part of the petitioner. Issue: Was there a waiver of right? If there is, would it make the search valid and therefore articles seized are admissible evidence? Held: No. There is no waiver of right and that the articles are inadmissible evidence. The constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived.The waiver may be either express or implied. In the case at bar, no express waiver has been made. It is urged, however, that there has been a waiver by implication. It is well-settled that to constitute a waiver of a constitutional right, it must appear, (1) First, that the right exists; (2) Secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and, (3) Lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

It is true that the petitioner did not object to the legality of the search when it was made. She could not have objected because she was sick and was not present when the warrant was served upon Alfredo Salas. Certainly, the constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf. Of course, the petitioner came to know later of the seizure of some of her papers and documents. But this was precisely the reason why she sent her attorneys to the office of the Anti-Usury Board to demand the return of the documents seized. In any event, the failure on the part of the petitioner and her bookkeeper to resist or object to the execution of the warrant does not constitute an implied waiver of constitutional right. As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. Moreover, the invalidity of the search warrant not only anchored in the mentioned ground, but also, the respondent judge did not follow the constitutional requirement in determining probable cause to issue warrants, such that, it is the applicant that determines the probable cause in the case at bar. In 35 constitution, it mandated the judge to personally determine the existence of probable cause and no other. Lopez and Velasco vs. Commissioner of Customs Confusing case where it is adverse to later jurisprudence that a waiver of right can only be waived by the person whose right against unreasonable search and seizure was invaded. Facts: After the surveillance conducted by the respondents NBI officers, NBI and PC Davao officers went to the room (Rm 220) rented by the petitioner, Tomas Velasco, to search and seized articles papers and documents including a .45 cal pistol, that became evidence that commodities confiscated in the wharf (MV Jojo Lema) allegedly smuggled from Indonesia to the country (sacks of coffee beans and copra). The search was without a search warrant, however, the officers have successfully confiscated the articles by virtue of the consent of the petitioners wife (Teofila ibanez) who also is an occupant of the room rented by the petitioner. The petitioner contends that the consent given by Ibanez cannot be regarded since she was not the legal wife of the petitioner Velasco, but a certain Corazon Velasco. The decision of CTA is adverse by the petitioner, affirmed by the SC. Issue: Was the consent valid to justify the warrantless search and seizure? Held: As far as the decision is concerned, yes, the consent given by Ibanez is a valid so as to dispense the necessity of a search warrant. The court ruled that the mere fact that Ibanez is present in a room rented by the petitioner, her consent would lead to belief that her consent as an alleged wife of the petitioner and that it would be an act on behalf of the petitioner. Note: Exact decision penned by J. Laurel There was an attempt on the part of petitioners to counteract the force of the above recital by an affidavit of one Corazon Y. Velasco, who stated that she is the legal wife of petitioner Tomas Velasco, and another by such petitioner himself reiterating such a fact and that the person who was present at his hotel room was one Teofila Ibaez, "a manicurist by occupation." Their effort appurtenant thereto is doomed to failure. If such indeed were the case, then it is much more easily understandable why that person, Teofila Ibaez, who could be aptly described as the wrong person at the wrong place and at the wrong time, would have signified her consent readily and immediately. Under the circumstances, that was the most prudent course of action. It would save her and even petitioner Velasco himself from any gossip or innuendo. Nor could the officers of the law be blamed if they would act on the appearances. There was a person inside who from all indications was ready to accede to their request. Even common courtesy alone would have precluded them from inquiring too closely as to why she was there. Under all the circumstances, therefore, it can readily be concluded that there was consent sufficient in law to dispense with the need for a search warrant. The petition cannot, therefore, prevail. Stop and Frisk Doctrine Defined: Stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon

People vs. Posadas Facts: On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar, both members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While they were within the premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his resistance. They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196 two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun, a smoke (tear gas) grenade a and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. They brought the petitioner to the police station for further investigation. In the course of the same, the petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City wherein after a plea of not guilty and trial on the merits a decision was rendered on October 8, 1987 finding petitioner guilty of the offense. The CA affirmed the decision in toto. Thus, this appeal was filed by the appellant in the ground that the search and seizure is unlawful and the articles sought are inadmissible evidence against him. Issue: Was the warrantless search valid? Held: Yes. The warrantless search is valid. Under the statutory provision (RRC) warrantless arrest t may be effected by a peace officer or private person, among others, when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it. The Solicitor General argues that when the two policemen approached the petitioner, he was actually committing or had just committed the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the presence of the police officers and consequently the search and seizure of the contraband was incidental to the lawful arrest in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure However, in the case at bar, the record does not show that when the officers arrested the petitioner who attempted to flee, there is no probable cause nor a personal knowledge by the officers that the appellant is actually committed or committing a crime, the apprehension was only due to the fact of suspicion by the officers that he is hiding something in the bag. Thus, it does justified a warrantless arrest. However, this does not make the arrest invalid as the case at bar falls with the exclusionary rule of stop and frisk doctrine. Jurisprudence has already dictate that warrantless arrest, search and seizure by checkpoints of military and police is justified by the stop and frisk method. Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search thereat in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same. It would be useless and too late for the officers if they should first procure a warrant before searching the bag of a suspicious person. Manalili vs. People Facts: Policemen from the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police Station were conducting a surveillance along A. Mabini street, Caloocan City, in front of the Caloocan City Cemetery. The surveillance was being made because of information that drug addicts were roaming the area in front of the Caloocan City Cemetery. Upon reaching the Caloocan City Cemetery, the policemen alighted from their vehicle. They then chanced upon a male person in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The male person was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. When this male person tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and introduced themselves as police officers. The policemen then asked the male person what he was holding in his hands. The male person tried to resist.

Pat. Romeo Espiritu asked the male person if he could see what said male person had in his hands. The latter showed the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took the wallet and examined it. He found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents. The confiscated residue was tested positive fir marijuana. However, the petitioner rebutted the information in narrating a different facts in the case. The petitioner filed an appeal questioning the admissibility of the evidence presented by the prosecution. Issue: Was the search qualified as a stop and frisk measure therefore justified as a valid warrantless arrest and search? Held: Yes. The search is valid being conducted through a stop and frisk method. Stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon. This method allows police officer to approach a person, in appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause to make an actual arrest. In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to police information was a popular hangout of drug addicts. From his experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who were "high." The policemen therefore had sufficient reason to stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such investigation, they found marijuana in petitioner's possession. Issue on waiver of rights: The Sc also ruled for the Solicitor General's contention that petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of any evidence illegally obtained when he filed to raise this issue or to object thereto during the trial. A valid waiver of a right, more particularly of the constitutional right against unreasonable search, requires the concurrence of the following requirements: (1) The right to be waived existed; (2) The person waiving it had knowledge, actual or constructive, thereof; and (3) He or she had an actual intention to relinquish the right. Otherwise, the Courts will indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental safeguards and will not deduce acquiescence from the failure to exercise this elementary right. In the present case, however, petitioner is deemed to have waived such right for his failure to raise its violation before the trial court. In petitions under Rule 45, as distinguished from an ordinary appeal of criminal cases where the whole case is opened for review, the appeal is generally limited to the errors assigned by petitioner. Issues not raised below cannot be pleaded for the first time on appeal. Malacat vs. CA Facts: The arresting officers conducted a foot patrol due to the report that a grioup of Muslim extremists was going to explode a grenade somewhere on the vicinity of Plaza Miranda. While on patrol, they chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with "[t]heir eyes. . . moving very fast." Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about thirty minutes. The police officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended petitioner. Upon searching petitioner, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioner's "front waist line." Yu's companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered. Petitioner and Casan were then brought to Police Station No. 3 where Yu placed an "X" mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander. The lower court then charged the petitioners and was convicted holding that the search is valid being a search incidental to a lawful arrest. The petitioner filed an appeal in the ground that the CA erred in ruling that the search is valid since they are about to or attempting to commit a crime due to their attempt to flee when the officers approached them. Issue: Was the search qualified as a search incidental to valid arrest or stop frisk measure? Held: None. The lower and appellate court erred in the decision in such a way the the case at bar is neither a lawful search incidental to valid arrest nor a valid warrantless search by stop frisk method The search is not qualified as a search incidental to a valid arrest.

In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless search as a "stop and frisk" with "the seizure of the grenade from the accused [as an appropriate incident to his arrest," hence necessitating a brief discussion on the nature of these exceptions to the warrant requirement. At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. 36 In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence. Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed. Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search conducted on petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest. On the other hand, stop and frisk is limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons or any other incriminating evidence against the arrestee, which does not require probable cause but the existence of a genuine reason. A "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) The general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) The more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. The court did not qualify the case at bar as a valid warrantless search through stop and frisk method. For the following reasons: First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yu's claim that petitioner was a member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group. Aside from impairing Yu's credibility as a witness, this likewise diminishes the probability that a genuine reason existed so as to arrest and search petitioner. If only to further tarnish the credibility of Yu's testimony, contrary to his claim that petitioner and his companions had to be chased before being apprehended, the affidavit of arrest (Exh. "A") expressly declares otherwise, i.e., upon arrival of five (5) other police officers, petitioner and his companions were "immediately collared." Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble. Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered" "inside the front waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. In fact, as noted by the trial court: When the policemen approached the accused and his companions, they were not yet aware that a hand grenade was tucked inside his waistline. They did not see any bulging object in [sic] his person. What is unequivocal then in this case are blatant violations of petitioner's rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution. Lastly, the search is illegal since the officers has ample time to procure a valid search and arrest warrant. In the issue of admissibility of conducted testimony and investigation by NBI: Serapio conducted the custodial investigation on petitioner the day following his arrest. No lawyer was present and Serapio could not have requested a lawyer to assist petitioner as no PAO lawyer was then available. Thus, even if petitioner consented to the investigation and waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel, the waiver was invalid as it was not in writing, neither was it executed in the presence of counsel. Contrary to Sec 12 Art III involving right to a competent counsel and that any admission or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. Umil vs. Ramos

Facts: This is a consolidated petition for habeas corpus where the petitioners alleged that their detention is illegal and unlawful as their arrests were made without warrant and that no preliminary investigation was first conducted, making the informations filed against them are null and void. The respondents contends otherwise. In this consolidated case, all of the petitioners are charged under the Anti Subversion Law, with an exception to the case of Enrile vs. Lim (Inciting to sedition) and Nazareno vs. Station Commander. The rest are charged guilty of rebellion, a crime against the State, and is a continuing crimes in nature. They were found of the possession of unlicensed firearms and ammunitions as well as subversive documents. Issue: Was warrantless arrest in the case at bar illegal, as the arrest was not made pursuant to the constitutional and statutory guidelines for the issuance of warrantless arrest? Held: Warrantless arrest conducted in the case at bar is lawful. Pursuant to 5 Rule 113 of RRC, arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint is recognized by law. The instances where a valid warrantless arrest may be effected are the following. Sec5. Arrest without Warrant: When lawful A peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (d) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committees, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. (e) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (f) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement or another. Thus, pursuant to the RRC, warrantless arrest is justified when a person arrested is caught in flagranti delicto or in the act of committing an offense; or when an offense has just been committed and the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it. The rational behind the concept o warrantless arrest is laid down in the PPI vs. Malasugui, that to sustain that arresting a person without warrant illegal would leave the society, into a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances. In the case at bar, the petitioners had freshly committed or were actually committing an offense. In the case of the petitioners who were charged of rebellion and inciting to sedition, the court held that they are lawfully detained and the informations filed against them are valid. This is since the crime in which they are arrested are continuous crime which is against the State, thus, the continued possession of subversive materials and unlicensed firearms and ammunitions, even without preliminary investigation and without warrant, as long as the authorities have confiscated such prohibited materials under their possession and that in the case of Enrile vs. Lim, they had actually done what is prohibited by law as long as they are positively identified by a witness having a personal knowledge of the committed crime, their arrest are lawful. This is justified since under the doctrine of Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, persons arrested of rebellion does not need to follow strict procedures, since their crimes committed are violence against the State, which concerns the very survival of the society and government. In the case of Nazareno vs. station Commander, the warrantless arrest is justified since there was a prior information filed against the petitioner for the same offense, and that he was positively identified by a witness who has a personal knowledge about the crime he committed. He was arrested while he was at large. Note: A valid warrantless arrest and valid warrantless search and seizure, circumstances differentiated. Valid Warrantless arrest: Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part: Sec. 5. Arrest, without warrant; when lawful A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped . . . A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest. Turning to valid warrantless searches,

They are limited to the following: (1) Customs searches; (2) Search of moving vehicles; (3) Seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) Consent searches; (5) A search incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) A "stop and frisk." 4. Equal Protection in General Biraogo vs Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 Facts:The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency. The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor. The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives. Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signedExecutive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). Issues:Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause; and Ruling:The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional safeguard. They contend that it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the "previous administration" as its sole object makes the PTC an "adventure in partisan hostility." Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of former President Arroyo. The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken. Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration" only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. Quinto vs ComelecG. R. No. 189698 FACTS: Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions. In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it only copied the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369. ISSUE: Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid. HELD: NO. In the Farias case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for giving undue benefit to elective officials in comparison with appointive officials. Incidentally, the Court upheld the substantial distinctions between the two and pronounced that there was no violation of the equal protection clause. However in the present case, the Court held that the discussion on the equal protection clause was an obiter dictum since the issue raised therein was against the repealing clause. It didnt squarely challenge Sec. 66. Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and elective officials. Applying the 4 requisites of a valid classification, the proviso does not comply with the second requirement that it must be germane to the purpose of the law. The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence of the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electorate arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work. Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his certificate of candidacy for the election. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to wield influence in the political world. The provision is directed to the activity any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or non partisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level. Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commission on Elections. The latter moved to question an earlier decision of the Supreme Court declaring Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 unconstitutional. Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 provides that, Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in governmentowned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.Be it noted that petitioners of the above-entitled case are appointive officials who intend to be elected in the previously held 2010 elections and who felt aggrieved by the issuance of the questioned resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is constitutional. RULING: The Supreme Court overruled its previous decision declaring the assailed resolution unconstitutional. Here, it strongly upholds the constitutionality of the resolution saying that it does not violate the equal protection clause. It is settled that the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The test used is reasonableness which requires that: 1. The classification rests on substantial distinctions; 2. It is germane to the purposes of the law; 3. It is not limited to existing conditions only; and 4. It applies equally to all members of the same class. In the case under consideration, there is a substantial distinction between public and elective officials which has been rendered moot and academic by the ruling made in the case of Farinas, etl. al. vs. Executive Secretary, et. al.Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is constitutional. VICTORIA C. GUTIERREZ vs DBM Facts:Congress enacted in 1989 Republic Act (R.A.) 6758, called the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 to rationalize the compensation of government employees. Its Section 12 directed the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation already being enjoyed by employees into their standardized salary rates. But it exempted certain additional compensations that the employees may be receiving from such consolidation. Thus: Section 12. Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation. -- All allowances, except for representation and transportation allowances; clothing and laundry allowances; subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels and hospital personnel; hazard pay; allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and such other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM, shall be deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed. Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized. Pursuant to the above, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued NCC 59 dated September 30, 1989, covering the offices of the national government, state universities and colleges, and local government units. NCC 59 enumerated the specific allowances and additional compensations which were deemed integrated in the basic salaries and these included the Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) and Inflation Connected Allowance (ICA). The DBM re-issued and published NCC 59 on May 3, 2004. The DBM also issued Corporate Compensation Circular (CCC) 10 dated October 2, 1989, covering all governmentowned or controlled corporations and government financial institutions. The DBM re-issued this circular on February 15, 1999and published it on March 16, 1999. Accordingly, the Commission on Audit (COA) disallowed the payments of honoraria and other allowances which were deemed integrated into the standardized salary rates. Employees of government-owned or controlled corporations questioned the validity of CCC 10 due to its non-publication. In De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, this Court declared CCC 10 ineffective because of such non-publication. Until then, it ordered the COA to pass on audit the employees honoraria which they were receiving prior to the effectivity of R.A. 6758. Meanwhile, the DBM also issued Budget Circular 2001-03 dated November 12, 2001, clarifying that only the exempt allowances under Section 12 of R.A. 6758 may continue to be granted the employees; all others were deemed integrated in the standardized salary rates. Thus, the payment of allowances and compensation such as COLA, amelioration allowance, and ICA, among others, which were already deemed integrated in the basic salary were unauthorized. The Courts ruling in subsequent cases involving government-owned or controlled corporations followed the De Jesus ruling. On May 16, 2002 employees of the Office of the Solicitor General filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. 153266, questioning the propriety of integrating their COLA into their standardized salary rates. Employees of other offices of the national government followed suit. In addition, petitioners in G.R. 159007 questioned the disallowance of the allowances and fringe benefits that the COA auditing personnel assigned to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) used to get. Petitioners in G.R. 173119 questioned the disallowance of the ICA that used to be paid to the officials and employees of the Insurance Commission. The Court caused the consolidation of the petitions and treated them as a class suit for all government employees, excluding the employees of government-owned or controlled corporations and government financial institutions. On October 26, 2005 the DBM issued National Budget Circular 2005-502which provided that all Supreme Court rulings on the integration of allowances, including COLA, of government employees under R.A. 6758 applied only to specific government-owned or controlled corporations since the consolidated cases covering the national government employees are still pending with this Court. Consequently, the payment of allowances and other benefits to them, such as COLA and ICA, remained prohibited until otherwise provided by law or ruled by this Court. The circular further said that all agency heads and other responsible officials and employees found to have authorized the grant of COLA and other allowances and benefits already integrated in the basic salary shall be personally held liable for such payment. Issue: Whether or not the grant of COLA to military and police personnel to the exclusion of other government employees violates the equal protection clause Ruling:Petitioners contend that the continued grant of COLA to military and police personnel under CCC 10 and NCC 59 to the exclusion of other government employees violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. But as respondents pointed out, while it may appear that petitioners are questioning the constitutionality of these issuances, they are in fact attacking the very constitutionality of Section 11 of R.A. 6758. It is actually this provision which allows the uniformed personnel to continue receiving their COLA over and above their basic pay, thus:

Section 11. Military and Police Personnel. - The base pay of uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Integrated National Police shall be as prescribed in the salary schedule for these personnel in R.A. 6638 and R.A. 6648. The longevity pay of these personnel shall be as prescribed under R.A. 6638, and R.A. 1134 as amended by R.A. 3725 and R.A. 6648: Provided, however, That the longevity pay of uniformed personnel of the Integrated National Police shall include those services rendered as uniformed members of the police, jail and fire departments of the local government units prior to the police integration. All existing types of allowances authorized for uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and Integrated National Police such as cost of living allowance, longevity pay, quarters allowance, subsistence allowance, clothing allowance, hazard pay and other allowances shall continue to be authorized. Nothing is more settled than that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked collaterally because constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not collaterally. In any event, the Court is not persuaded that the continued grant of COLA to the uniformed personnel to the exclusion of other national government officials run afoul the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class. To be valid and reasonable, the classification must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class. It is clear from the first paragraph of Section 11 that Congress intended the uniformed personnel to be continually governed by their respective compensation laws. Thus, the military is governed by R.A. 6638, as amended by R.A. 9166 while the police is governed by R.A. 6648, as amended by R.A. 6975. Certainly, there are valid reasons to treat the uniformed personnel differently from other national government officials. Being in charged of the actual defense of the State and the maintenance of internal peace and order, they are expected to be stationed virtually anywhere in the country. They are likely to be assigned to a variety of low, moderate, and high-cost areas. Since their basic pay does not vary based on location, the continued grant of COLA is intended to help them offset the effects of living in higher cost areas. PAGCOR vs BIR Facts: PAGCOR was created pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1067-A on January 1, 1977. Simultaneous to its creation, P.D. No. 1067-B (supplementing P.D. No. 1067-A) was issued exempting PAGCOR from the payment of any type of tax, except a franchise tax of five percent (5%) of the gross revenue. Thereafter, on June 2, 1978, P.D. No. 1399 was issued expanding the scope of PAGCOR's exemption. PAGCOR's tax exemption was removed in June 1984 through P.D. No. 1931, but it was later restored by Letter of Instruction No. 1430, which was issued in September 1984. On January 1, 1998, R.A. No. 8424,otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, took effect. Section 27 (c) of R.A. No. 8424 provides that government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) shall pay corporate income tax, except petitioner PAGCOR, the Government Service and Insurance Corporation, the Social Security System, the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. With the enactment of R.A. No. 9337 on May 24, 2005, certain sections of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 were amended. The particular amendment that is at issue in this case is Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337, which amended Section 27 (c) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 by excluding PAGCOR from the enumeration of GOCCs that are exempt from payment of corporate income tax. Different groups came to this Court via petitions for certiorari and prohibition assailing the validity and constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337. On September 1, 2005, the Court dismissed all the petitions and upheld the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337. On the same date, respondent BIR issued Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 16-2005, specifically identifying PAGCOR as one of the franchisees subject to 10% VAT imposed under Section 108 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended by R.A. No. 9337. Issue: WHETHER OR NOT RA 9337, SECTION 1 (C) IS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO FOR BEING REPUGNANT TO THE EQUAL PROTECTION [CLAUSE] EMBODIED IN SECTION 1, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. Ruling:In this case, PAGCOR failed to prove that it is still exempt from the payment of corporate income tax, considering that Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337 amended Section 27 (c) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 by omitting PAGCOR from the exemption. The legislative intent, as shown by the discussions in the Bicameral Conference Meeting, is to require PAGCOR to pay corporate income tax; hence, the omission or removal of PAGCOR from exemption from the payment of corporate income tax. It is a basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others as expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.Thus, the express mention of the GOCCs exempted from payment of corporate income tax excludes all others. Not being excepted, petitioner PAGCOR must be regarded as coming within the purview of the general rule that GOCCs shall pay corporate income tax, expressed in the maxim: exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis. PAGCOR cannot find support in the equal protection clause of the Constitution, as the legislative records of the Bicameral Conference Meeting dated October 27, 1997, of the Committee on Ways and Means, show that PAGCORs exemption from payment of corporate income tax, as provided in Section 27 (c) of R.A. No. 8424, or the

National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, was not made pursuant to a valid classification based on substantial distinctions and the other requirements of a reasonable classification by legislative bodies, so that the law may operate only on some, and not all, without violating the equal protection clause. The legislative records show that the basis of the grant of exemption to PAGCOR from corporate income tax was PAGCORs own request to be exempted. ROMA DRUG vs.THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF GUAGUA, PAMPANGA Facts: On 14 August 2000, a team composed of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) operatives and inspectors of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) conducted a raid on petitioner Roma Drug, aduly registered sole proprietorship of petitioner Romeo Rodriguez (Rodriguez) operating a drug store located at San Matias, Guagua, Pampanga. The raid was conducted pursuant to a search warrant issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 57, Angeles City. The raiding team seized several imported medicines, including Augmentin (375mg.) tablets, Orbenin (500mg.) capsules, Amoxil (250mg.) capsules and Ampiclox (500mg.). It appears that Roma Drug is one of six drug stores which were raided on or around the same time upon the request of SmithKline Beecham Research Limited (SmithKline), a duly registered corporation which is the local distributor of pharmaceutical products manufactured by its parent London-based corporation. The local SmithKline has since merged with Glaxo Wellcome Phil. Inc to form Glaxo SmithKline, private respondent in this case. The seized medicines, which were manufactured by SmithKline, were imported directly from abroad and not purchased through the local SmithKline, the authorized Philippine distributor of these products. The NBI subsequently filed a complaint against Rodriguez for violation of Section 4 (in relation to Sections 3 and 5) of Republic Act No. 8203, also known as the Special Law on Counterfeit Drugs (SLCD), with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in San Fernando, Pampanga. The section prohibits the sale of counterfeit drugs, which under Section 3(b) (3), includes "an unregistered imported drug product." The term "unregistered" signifies the lack of registration with the Bureau of Patent, Trademark and Technology Transfer of a trademark, tradename or other identification mark of a drug in the name of a natural or juridical person, the process of which is governed under Part III of the Intellectual Property Code. In this case, there is no doubt that the subject seized drugs are identical in content with their Philippine-registered counterparts. There is no claim that they were adulterated in any way or mislabeled at least. Their classification as "counterfeit" is based solely on the fact that they were imported from abroad and not purchased from the Philippineregistered owner of the patent or trademark of the drugs. During preliminary investigation, Rodriguez challenged the constitutionality of the SLCD. However, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Celerina C. Pineda skirted the challenge and issued a Resolution dated 17 August 2001 recommending that Rodriguez be charged with violation of Section 4(a) of the SLCD. The recommendation was approved by Provincial Prosecutor Jesus Y. Manarang approved the recommendation. Issue: Whether or not RA 8203 violates the right to equal protection of law Ruling:As written, the law makes a criminal of any person who imports an unregistered drug regardless of the purpose, even if the medicine can spell life or death for someone in the Philippines. It does not accommodate the situation where the drug is out of stock in the Philippines, beyond the reach of a patient who urgently depends on it. It does not allow husbands, wives, children, siblings, parents to import the drug in behalf of their loved ones too physically ill to travel and avail of the meager personal use exemption allotted by the law. It discriminates, at the expense of health, against poor Filipinos without means to travel abroad to purchase less expensive medicines in favor of their wealthier brethren able to do so. Less urgently perhaps, but still within the range of constitutionally protected behavior, it deprives Filipinos to choose a less expensive regime for their health care by denying them a plausible and safe means of purchasing medicines at a cheaper cost. The absurd results from this far-reaching ban extends to implications that deny the basic decencies of humanity. The law would make criminals of doctors from abroad on medical missions of such humanitarian organizations such as the International Red Cross, the International Red Crescent, Medicin Sans Frontieres, and other like-minded groups who necessarily bring their own pharmaceutical drugs when they embark on their missions of mercy. After all, they are disabled from invoking the bare "personal use" exemption afforded by the SLCD. Even worse is the fact that the law is not content with simply banning, at civil costs, the importation of unregistered drugs. It equates the importers of such drugs, many of whom motivated to do so out of altruism or basic human love, with the malevolent who would alter or counterfeit pharmaceutical drugs for reasons of profit at the expense of public safety. Note that the SLCD is a special law, and the traditional treatment of penal provisions of special laws is that of malum prohibitumor punishable regardless of motive or criminal intent. For a law that is intended to help save lives, the SLCD has revealed itself as a heartless, soulless legislative piece. The challenged provisions of the SLCD apparently proscribe a range of constitutionally permissible behavior. It is laudable that with the passage of Rep. Act No. 9502, the State has reversed course and allowed for a sensible and compassionate approach with respect to the importation of pharmaceutical drugs urgently necessary for the peoples constitutionally-recognized right to health. People of the Philippines & HSBC vs Judge Jose Vera & Mariano Cu Unjieng Political Law Equal Protection Probation Law Facts:Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by Cu Unjieng

allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon. ISSUE: Whether or not equal protection is violated when the Probation Law provides that only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer may the probation system be applied. HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a way an imposition of penalty. There is undue delegation of power because there is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation. The SC declared the old probation law as unconstitutional. Imelda Marcos vs Court of Appeals, Manila RTC Judge Guillermo Loja Sr., et al Equal Protection Facts: Marcos was charged for violating Central Bank Circ 960 which banned residents, firms, associations and corporations from maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad w/o permission from the CB. The circular was issued in 1983. Any violation thereof constitutes a criminal offense. In 1991, 8 informations were filed against Marcos accusing her of maintaining a foreign account in Switzerland from 1968-1991. On 21 Dec 1991, 14 more informations were filed against Marcos, Benedicto and Rivera for the same offense. In January 1992, 11 more informations were filed. The RTC consolidated the cases and Marcos was arraigned in Feb 1992. During the pendency of these cases, CB Circ 1318 and CB Circ 1353 (Further Liberalizing Foreign Exchange Regulations) were issued which basically allowed residents, firms, associations and corporations to maintain foreign exchange accounts abroad but the circulars have a saving clause excepting from the circular pending criminal actions involving violations of CB Circ 960. Marcos filed a Motion to Quash based on the new circular. The RTC denied the Motion so did the CA hence the appeal. Marcos averred that her right to equal protection has been violated, among others, as the new circular was purposedly designed to preserve the criminal cases lodged against her. ISSUE: Whether or not Imeldas right to equal protection had been violated by CB Circ 1353. HELD: The SC ruled against Imelda. The SC said Her lamentations that the aforementioned provisions are discriminatory because they are aimed at her and her co-accused do not assume the dignity of a legal argument since they are unwarranted conjectures belied by even the text of the circulars alone. Hence, as respondent appellate court correctly concludes, the foregoing facts clearly disprove petitioners claim that her constitutional right to equal protection of the law was violated. Should she nonetheless desire to pursue such objection, she may always adduce additional evidence at the trial of these cases since that is the proper stage therefor, and not at their present posture.

Ishmael Himagan vs People of the Philippines & Judge Hilario Mapayo Equal Protection Suspension of PNP Members Charged with Grave Felonies Facts: Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged for the murder of Benjamin Machitar Jr and for the attempted murder of Benjamins younger brother, Barnabe. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws. ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution. HELD: The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time from within which the trial should be finished.

The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions. If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. the imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended policemans constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension of accused be lifted? The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word shall before the phrase be terminated within ninety (90) days, there is nothing in RA 6975 that suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without justifiable reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal or civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus. Philippine Judges Association et al vs DOTC Secretary Pete Prado et al Equal Protection Franking Privilege of the Judiciary Facts: A report came in showing that available data from the Postal Service Office show that from January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to P90,424,175.00, of this amount, frank mails from the Judiciary and other agencies whose functions include the service of judicial processes, such as the intervenor, the Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails coming from the Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those coming from the petitioners reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00. The postmasters conclusion is that because of this considerable volume of mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn from it. Acting from this, Prado implemented Circ. No. 9228 as the IRR for the said law. PJA assailed the said law complaining that the law would adversely impair the communication within the judiciary as it may impair the sending of judicial notices. PJA averred that the law is discriminatory as it disallowed the franking privilege of the Judiciary but has not disallowed the franking privilege of others such as the executive, former executives and their widows among others. ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection before the law. HELD: The SC ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection clause. The judiciary needs the franking privilege so badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident to that need is the high expense allotted to the judiciarys franking needs. The Postmaster cannot be sustained in contending that the removal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is in order to cut expenditure. This is untenable for if the Postmaster would intend to cut expenditure by removing the franking privilege of the judiciary, then they should have removed the franking privilege all at once from all the other departments. If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution. The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars. In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege. Mario Gumabon et al vs Director of the Bureau of Prisons Equal Protection Hernandez Doctrine Facts: Gumabon et al were charged for rebellion punished under Art 134 of the RPC. Their offense was complexed with multiple murder, robbery, arson, and kidnapping. They were all sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Their sentence had become final and executory when the Hernandez Doctrine was promulgated by the SC. Hernandez Doctrine simply states that murder cannot be complexed to rebellion as it is necessarily absorbed therein. Hence, the without such complexion the penalty must be lower than reclusion perpetua. Gumabon precisely assert a deprivation of a constitutional right, namely, the denial of equal protection. The petitioners were convicted by CFI for the very same rebellion for which Hernandez and others were convicted. The law under which they were convicted is the very same law under which the latter were convicted. It had not and has not been changed. For the same crime, committed under the same law, how can the SC, in conscience, allow petitioners to suffer life imprisonment, while others can suffer only prision mayor? ISSUE: Whether or not Gumabon et al is entitled to the effects of the Hernandez Doctrine.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Gumabon et al. The continued incarceration after the twelve-year period when such is the maximum length of imprisonment in accordance with the controlling doctrine, when others similarly convicted have been freed, is fraught with implications at war with equal protection. That is not to give it life. On the contrary, it would render it nugatory. Otherwise, what would happen is that for an identical offense, the only distinction lying in the finality of the conviction of one being before the Hernandez ruling and the other after, a person duly sentenced for the same crime would be made to suffer different penalties. If Gumabon et al would continue to endure imprisonment, then this would be repugnant to equal protection, people similarly situated were not similarly dealt with. What is required under this constitutional guarantee is the uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a recent decision: Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest. Panfilo Lacson vs Sandiganbayan, Executive Secretary, et al Equal Protection KBG Cases Before the Sandiganbayan Facts: On 18 May 1995, alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang were shot to death. The incident was later sensationalized as a rub out. This implicated Lacson among others as guilty for multiple murder. The case was raised before the Sandiganbayan. In 1996, Lacson et al filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Sec 2 (par a and c) of RA 7975 An Act To Strengthen The Functional And Structural Organization Of The Sandiganbayan, Amending For That Purpose Presidential Decree 1606, As Amended. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the principal accused are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27. In 1997, RA 8249 was passed which basically expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The law was authored by Lagman and Neptali Gonzales. Lacson assailed the law as it was introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioners cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereover to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has footdragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioners vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975). ISSUE: Whether or not the right to equal protection by Lacson et al has been violated with the passage of RA 8249. HELD: The SC ruled that RA 8249 did not violate the right of Lacson et al to equal protection. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commenced and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences. In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witness and presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, Lacson et al cannot claim that Secs 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely, par A of Sec 4 provides that it shall apply to all cases involving certain public officials and, under the transitory provision in Sec 7, to all cases pending in any court. Contrary to petitioner and intervenors arguments, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in any court. It just happened that the Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Sec 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249). Humberto Basco et al vs Philippine Amusements & Gaming Corporation Equal Protection Gambling Facts: PAGCOR was originally created by virtue of PD 1067-A dated Jan 1, 1977 and was granted a franchise under PD 1067-B also dated Jan 1, 1977 to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. Its operation was originally conducted in the well known floating casino Philippine Tourist. The operation was considered a success for it proved to be a potential source of revenue to fund infrastructure and socioeconomic projects, thus, PD 1399 was passed on June 2, 1978 for PAGCOR to fully attain this

objective. Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCORs charter was created under PD 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law, under the following declared policy: Section 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law. Basco and other lawyers assailed the validity of PAGCOR averring among others that it violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices. ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of PAGCOR violates the equal protection clause. HELD: The SC found Bascos petition to be devoid of merit. Just how PD 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection is not clearly explained in their petition. The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting (PD 449) horse racing (RA 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by BP 42) are legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, PD. 1869 for one, unconstitutional. Bascos posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause equal protection of the laws. The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary. A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Sec 1 of the Constitution. The equal protection clause does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate. The Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same. Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila Inc vs The Board of Transportation et al Equal Protection Phasing Out of Old Taxis in MM but not Elsewhere Facts: On 10 Oct 1977, BOT issued Circ 77-42 which has for its purpose the phasing out of old and dilapidated taxis which are 6 years older. The law is set to be immediately implemented in Metro Manila first before it would be implemented elsewhere. Pursuant to this, the Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation issued Circ 52 which is the IRR of the law in the NCR. TOMMI assailed the constitutionality of the law. It avers, among other things, that the Circular in question violates their right to equal protection of the law because the same is being enforced in Metro Manila only and is directed solely towards the taxi industry. At the outset it should be pointed out that implementation outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in Memorandum Circular No. 77-42. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of the equal protection clause by the implementation of the said circular. HELD: The SC held that Circ 77-42 is valid. BOTs reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. Thus is of common knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed. In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation services is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object or subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. What is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. The challenged Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria. Mary Concepcion Bautista et al vs Alfredo Juinio et al Equal Protection Distinction Between Heavy and Extra Heavy Cars and Others Facts: Bautista is assailing the constitutionality of LOI 869 issued in 1979 which classified vehicles into Heavy and Extra Heavy. The LOI further banned these vehicles during weekends and holidays that is from 5am Saturday until 5am Monday. Purpose of this law is to curb down petroleum consumption as bigger cars consume more oil. Bautista claimed the LOI to be discriminatory as it made an assumption that H and EH cars are heavy on petroleum consumption when in fact there are smaller cars which are also big on oil consumption. Further, the law restricts their freedom to enjoy their car while others who have smaller cars may enjoy theirs. Bautista avers that there is no rational justification for the ban being imposed on vehicles classified as heavy (H) and extra-heavy (EH), for precisely those owned by them fall within such category. ISSUE: Whether or not the LOI violates equal protection. HELD: The SC held that Bautista was not able to make merit out of her contention. The classification on cars on its face cannot be characterized as an affront to reason. The ideal situation is for the laws benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the idea of law. The actual, given things as they are and likely to continue to be, cannot approximate the ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into account the realities of the situation. . . . To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every

person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest. Patricio Dumlao et al vs COMELEC Equal Protection Eligibility to Office after Being 65 Facts: Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired from his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom. He filed for reelection to the same office for the 1980 local elections. On the other hand, BP 52 was passed (par 1 thereof) providing disqualification for the likes of Dumlao. Dumlao assailed the BP averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. His petition was joined by Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jr. These two however have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign and the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law. ISSUE: Whether or not the there is cause of action. HELD: The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case would never have been merged. Dumlaos cause is different from Igots. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so that itd be eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case. In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met. The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office as null and void. The assertion that Sec 4 of BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable. In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials. Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree. But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. MM Mayor Antonio Villegas vs Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho Equal Protection Delegation of Powers Administrative Bodies Facts: Pao Ho is a Chinese national employed in the City of Manila. On 27 March 1968, then Manila Mayor Antonio Villegas signed Ordinance No. 6537. The said ordinance prohibits foreign nationals to be employed within the City of Manila without first securing a permit from the Mayor of Manila. The permit will cost them P50.00. Pao Ho, on 04 May 1968 filed a petition for prohibition against the said Ordinance alleging that as a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and non-useful occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit, which is out of proportion to the cost of registration and that it fails to prescribe any standard to guide and/or limit the action of the Mayor, thus, violating the fundamental principle on illegal delegation of legislative powers. Judge Arca of Manila CFI ruled in favor of Pao Ho and he declared the Ordinance as being null and void. ISSUE: Whether or not there a violation of equal protection by virtue Ord 6537. HELD: The decision of Judge Arca is affirmed. Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. Hence an undue delegation of power. Further, the P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification, should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every employed alien, whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.

Ramon Ceniza et al vs Commission on Elections, COA & National Treasurer Equal Protection Gerrymandering **Gerrymandering is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. ** Facts: Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC adopted Resolution No. 1421 which effectively bars voters in chartered cities (unless otherwise provided by their charter), highly urbanized (those earning above P40 M) cities, and component cities (whose charters prohibit them) from voting in provincial elections. The City of Mandaue, on the other hand, is a component city NOT a chartered one or a highly urbanized one. So when COMELEC added Mandaue to the list of 20 cities that cannot vote in provincial elections, Ceniza, in behalf of the other members of DOERS (Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to Succeed) questioned the constitutionality of BB 51 and the COMELEC resolution. They said that the regulation/restriction of voting being imposed is a curtailment of the right to suffrage. Further, petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering motives were behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of Mandaue City. They contend that the Province of Cebu is politically and historically known as an opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716 registered voters in the province, close to one-third (1/3) of the entire province of Cebu would be barred from voting for the provincial officials of the province of Cebu. Ceniza also said that the constituents of Mandaue never ratified their charter. Ceniza likewise aver that Sec 3 of BB 885 insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu City as highly urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial officials is inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such classification is not based on substantial distinctions germane to the purpose of the law which in effect provides for and regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal protection. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection. HELD: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of local government units. In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is stated that The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities. The petitioners allegation of gerrymandering is of no merit, it has no factual or legal basis. The Constitutional requirement that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in character and therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came into existence on 21 June 1969. The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of their regular annual income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It would also show whether the city has sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province where it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the provincial government thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in some instances. The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal protection of the law since the voters in other component cities are allowed to vote for provincial officials. The contention is without merit. The practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincial officials and denying the same privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of legislative discretion which violates neither the Constitution nor the voters right of suffrage. United Democratic Opposition vs Commission on Elections Equal Protection Access to Media Facts: In 1981, the BP proposed amendments to the 1973 Constitution. The amendments were to be placed to a plebiscite for the peoples approval. The YES vote was being advanced by KBL Marcos Party. While the NO vote was being advanced by UNIDO. To ensure parity and equality, COMELEC issued Resolutions 1467-1469 w/c basically provided that there be equal opportunity, equal time and equal space on media use for campaigns for both sides. On 12 Mar 1981, Marcos campaigned for the YES vote via TV and radio from 9:30pm to 11:30pm. The same was broadcasted live by 26 TV stations and 248 radio stations nationwide. UNIDO petitioned before the COMELEC that they be granted the same opportunity as Marcos has pursuant to Resns 1467-69. COMELEC denied the demand. UNIDO assailed the denial as a denial of equal protection before the laws. ISSUE: Whether or not UNIDO was denied equal protection by virtue of COMELECs denial of their request. HELD: The SC ruled that UNIDO was not denied due process nor were they not afforded equal protection. It is the considered view of the SC that when Marcos conducted his pulong-pulong or consultation with the people on March 12, 1981, he did so in his capacity as President/Prime Minister of the Philippines and not as the head of any political party. Under the Constitution, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet shall be responsible . . . for the program of government and shall determine the guidelines of national policy. In instances where the head of state is at the same time the president of the political party that is in power, it does not necessarily follow that he speaks with two voices when he dialogues with the governed. The president is accorded certain privileges that the opposition may not have. Further, the SC cannot compel TV stations and radio stations to give UNIDO free air time as they are not party to this case. UNIDO must sought contract with these TV stations and radio stations at their own expense. Rufino Nuez vs Sandiganbayan & the People of the Philippines Equal Protection Creation of the Sandiganbayan Facts: Nuez assails the validity of the PD 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as amended by PD 1606. He was accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. It is the claim of Nuez that PD1486, as amended, is violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. He claims

that the Sandiganbayan proceedings violates Nuezs right to equal protection, because appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC, instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the CA and thereafter to the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection insofar as appeals would be concerned. HELD: The SC ruled against Nuez. The 1973 Constitution had provided for the creation of a special court that shall have original jurisdiction over cases involving public officials charged with graft and corruption. The constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, the classification therein set forth met the standard requiring that it must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. Further still, decisions in the Sandiganbayan are reached by a unanimous decision from 3 justices - a showing that decisions therein are more conceivably carefully reached than other trial courts. Justice Makasiar (concurring & dissenting) Persons who are charged with estafa or malversation of funds not belonging to the government or any of its instrumentalities or agencies are guaranteed the right to appeal to two appellate courts first, to the CA, and thereafter to the SC. Estafa and malversation of private funds are on the same category as graft and corruption committed by public officers, who, under the decree creating the Sandiganbayan, are only allowed one appeal to the SC (par. 3, Sec. 7, P.D. No. 1606). The fact that the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court does not generate any substantial distinction to validate this invidious discrimination. Three judges sitting on the same case does not ensure a quality of justice better than that meted out by a trial court presided by one judge. The ultimate decisive factors are the intellectual competence, industry and integrity of the trial judge. But a review by two appellate tribunals of the same case certainly ensures better justice to the accused and to the people. Then again, par 3 of Sec 7 of PD 1606, by providing that the decisions of the Sandiganbayan can only be reviewed by the SC through certiorari, likewise limits the reviewing power of the SC only to question of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, and not questions of fact nor findings or conclusions of the trial court. In other criminal cases involving offenses not as serious as graft and corruption, all questions of fact and of law are reviewed, first by the CA, and then by the SC. To repeat, there is greater guarantee of justice in criminal cases when the trial courts judgment is subject to review by two appellate tribunals, which can appraise the evidence and the law with greater objectivity, detachment and impartiality unaffected as they are by views and prejudices that may be engendered during the trial. Limiting the power of review by the SC of convictions by the Sandiganbayan only to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, likewise violates the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused, which presumption can only be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt (Sec. 19, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). Antero Sison Jr. vs Acting BIR Commissioner Ruben Ancheta et al Equal Protection Facts: Sison assails the validity of BP 135 w/c further amended Sec 21 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977. The law provides that thered be a higher tax impost against income derived from professional income as opposed to regular income earners. Sison, as a professional businessman, and as taxpayer alleges that by virtue thereof, he would be unduly discriminated against by the imposition of higher rates of tax upon his income arising from the exercise of his profession vis-a-vis those which are imposed upon fixed income or salaried individual taxpayers. He characterizes the above section as arbitrary amounting to class legislation, oppressive and capricious in character. There is a transgression of both the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution as well as of the rule requiring uniformity in taxation. ISSUE: Whether the imposition of a higher tax rate on taxable net income derived from business or profession than on compensation is constitutionally infirm. HELD: The SC ruled against Sison. The power to tax, an inherent prerogative, has to be availed of to assure the performance of vital state functions. It is the source of the bulk of public funds. Taxes, being the lifeblood of the government, their prompt and certain availability is of the essence. According to the Constitution: The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. However, the rule of uniformity does not call for perfect uniformity or perfect equality, because this is hardly attainable. Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation. Where the differentiation complained of conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity it is not discriminatory within the meaning of this clause and is therefore uniform. There is quite a similarity then to the standard of equal protection for all that is required is that the tax applies equally to all persons, firms and corporations placed in similar situation. What misled Sison is his failure to take into consideration the distinction between a tax rate and a tax base. There is no legal objection to a broader tax base or taxable income by eliminating all deductible items and at the same time reducing the applicable tax rate. Taxpayers may be classified into different categories. In the case of the gross income taxation embodied in BP 135, the discernible basis of classification is the susceptibility of the income to the application of generalized rules removing all deductible items for all taxpayers within the class and fixing a set of reduced tax rates to be applied to all of them. Taxpayers who are recipients of compensation income are set apart as a class. As

there is practically no overhead expense, these taxpayers are not entitled to make deductions for income tax purposes because they are in the same situation more or less. On the other hand, in the case of professionals in the practice of their calling and businessmen, there is no uniformity in the costs or expenses necessary to produce their income. It would not be just then to disregard the disparities by giving all of them zero deduction and indiscriminately impose on all alike the same tax rates on the basis of gross income. There is ample justification then for the Batasang Pambansa to adopt the gross system of income taxation to compensation income, while continuing the system of net income taxation as regards professional and business income. Citizens Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs Judge Ricardo Puno, Register of Deeds Manila Equal Protection Purchase of Land Barrio Obrero Facts: In 1956, Resolution 542 was passed by the Register of Deeds Manila which provided that only Filipino laborers whose wages do not exceed P180.00/month or P6.00/day and at the same time residents of Manila may be allowed to purchase lands in Barrio Obrero, Tondo, Manila. On 10 Oct 1966, Maria Barcelon mortgaged her 180 sq. m. land located in Barrio Obrero to CSICI. CSICI foreclosed the property due to nonpayment and later bought the land. CSICI later sought to register and consolidate the land before the Register of Deeds but then Justice Puno denied the request pursuant to Resn 542 as CSICI does not meet the qualification. CSICI averred that Resn 542 is null and void. It averred: As may be seen from Sec 4 of Resn 542, only laborers earning not more than P180.00 a month, or P5.00 a day are qualified to buy Lands in Barrio Obrero. Employees working in offices or establishments and earning as much but who are not laborers cannot buy lands in that area. Also persons who are engaged in some calling or occupation earning as much are not also qualified. It should not be overlooked that the intention of the pertinent provisions of the Charter of the City of Manila contained in Sections 97, 98 and 100 of said Charter is to help the poor people of Manila to acquire residential lands on easy terms. CSICI points out that there is no substantial difference between these laborers to those mentioned in the Resolution. ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution 542 violates equal protection. HELD: The SC ruled against CSICI. CSICI, which is a corporation and not a lowly paid worker, is not competent to raise this claim. For even if the SC sustain it, no benefit can accrue to CSICI who will nonetheless be disqualified to acquire the lot. Moreover, in the absence of manifest abuse of power, the SC not vent to substitute their judgment for that of the City of Manila which is tasked by its Charter to acquire private lands in the city and to subdivide the same into home lots for sale on easy terms to residents, giving first priority to the bona-fide tenants or occupants of said lands, and second priority to laborers and low-salaried employees. Obviously, the questioned resolution merely seeks to implement the Charter provision. Peralta et al vs Commission on Elections et al Equal Protection 1978 Election Code Block Voting Facts: Peralta was an independent candidate in the April 1978 Interim Batasang Pambansa Elections. He, along with others, assailed the constitutionality of PD 1269 or the 1978 Election Code. Secs140 and 155, sub-paragraphs 26 to 28, of the 1978 Election Code, grants the voter the option to vote either for individual candidates by filling in the proper spaces in the ballot the names of candidates he desires to elect, or to vote for all the candidates of a political party, group or aggrupation by simply writing in the space provided for in the ballot the name of the political party, group or aggrupation (office-block ballot). Peralta was vehement in contending that the optional block voting scheme is violative of this provision of the Constitution: Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination. He sought the shelter of its protection for himself and other independent candidates who, according to him, would be thus made to suffer if the assailed provision is not nullified. Essentially, in terms of individual rights, he would raise a due process and equal protection question. The main objection of Peralta against the optional straight party voting provided for in the Code is that an independent candidate would be discriminated against because by merely writing on his ballot the name of a political party, a voter would have voted for all the candidates of that party, an advantage which the independent candidate does not enjoy. In effect, it is contended that the candidate who is not a party-member is deprived of the equal protection of the laws, as provided in Sec 1 of Article IV, in relation to Sec 9 of Article XII, of the 1973 Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not the 1978 Election Code is violative of equal protection. HELD: The SC ruled that the 1978 Election Code is valid. Before a voter prepares his ballot, the voter will be able to read all the names of the candidates. No candidate will receive more than one vote, whether he is voted individually or as a candidate of a party group or aggrupation. The voter is free to vote for the individual candidates or to vote by party, group or aggrupation. The choice is his. No one can compel him to do otherwise. In the case of candidates, the decision on whether to run as an independent candidate or to join a political party, group or aggrupation is left entirely to their discretion. Certainly, before filing his certificate of candidacy, a candidate is aware of the advantages under the law accruing to candidates of a political party or group. If he wishes to avail himself of such alleged advantages as an official candidate of a party, he is free to do so by joining a political party group or aggrupation. In other words, the choice is his. In making his decision, it must be assumed that the candidate had carefully weighed and considered the relative advantages and disadvantages of either alternative. So long as the application of the rule depends on his voluntary action or decision, he cannot, after exercising his discretion, claim that he was the victim of discrimination. Hawaiian Philippine Co. versus Asociacion de Hacenderos de Silay-Saravia Inc., et al Equal Protection Sugar Cane Industry Facts: Hawaiian is a sugar milling company while Asociacion is a corporation organized to represent sugar cane planters in Negros Occidental. In 1953, both had a contract which would include 12 crop (years) until the 1963-1964 crop. For the 1st 6 years, the sharing would be 63% to 37%, Asociacion being the highest getter. And from the next 5 years itd be 63.5% to 36.5% and in the 63-64 crop year itd be 64% to 36%. In 1961, Asociacion made known its

intention to buy out Hawaiian which was reluctant at first but later agreed at a selling price of $14M. The sale was never actualized and Asociacion initially sought to restructure the contract to a 70%-30% sharing. Eventually, Asociacion severed ties with Hawaiian and Asocicion established its own milling company, the Agricultural Industrial Development Company of Silay-Saravia. Apparently, Asociacion is authorized by law to break existing contracts by virtue of RA 809. Hawaiian assailed the constitutionality of the said law: Secs 1, 4 and 9 of RA 809, Secs 4 and 5 of RA 1825 and Sec 3 of RA 1072 amending Sec 9 of Act 4166, for being violative of the constitutional guarantees against impairment of the freedom of contracts, denial of equal protection of the laws, taking of private property for public use without due process and without just compensation and impairment of vested rights and (2) validity of: aforesaid laws for being violative of treaty commitments previously entered into by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection. HELD: The SC ruled that there is no such violation. RA 809 is a social justice and police power measure for the promotion of labor conditions in sugar plantations, hence whatever rational degree of constraint it exerts on freedom of contract and existing contractual obligations is constitutionally permissible. RA 1825 and RA 1072 amending Act 4166 covering as they do the same subject, i.e. sugar production, partake of the same nature as RA 809 and for the same reasons as above stated, cannot be considered constitutionally objectionable. Sugar production is one of the great industries of our nation, sugar occupying a leading position among its export products, that it gives employment to thousands of laborers in field and factories, that it is a great source of the states wealth, is one of the important sources of foreign exchange needed by our government, and is thus pivotal in the plans of a regime committed to a policy of currency stability. Its promotion, protection and advancement therefore, redounds greatly to the general welfare. Hence it was competent for the legislature to find that the general welfare demanded that the sugar industry should be stabilized in turn, and in the wide field of its police power, the lawmaking body could provide that the distribution of benefits therefrom be readjusted among its components. Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. vs Ormoc City et al Equal Protection Facts: In 1964, Ormoc City passed a bill which read: There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Incorporated, in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries. Though referred to as a production tax, the imposition actually amounts to a tax on the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For production of sugar alone is not taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the sugar produced is exported. Ormoc Sugar paid the tax (P7,087.50) in protest averring that the same is violative of Sec 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides: It shall not be in the power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried into the municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to impose an import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge for wharfage, use of bridges or otherwise, shall be void. And that the ordinance is violative to equal protection as it singled out Ormoc Sugar As being liable for such tax impost for no other sugar mill is found in the city. ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection. HELD: The SC held in favor of Ormoc Sugar. The SC noted that even if Sec 2287 of the RAC had already been repealed by a latter statute (Sec 2 RA 2264) which effectively authorized LGUs to tax goods and merchandise carried in and out of their turf, the act of Ormoc City is still violative of equal protection. The ordinance is discriminatory for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinances enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon. Flores vs.Comelec Facts:The petitioner, Roque Flores, was proclaimed by the board of canvassers as having received the highest number of votes for kagawad in Brgy. Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, andthus became punong barangay pursuant to Sec 5 RA 6679.He was voted punong barangay during the1982 elections, aseparate position as that of Kagawad.The private respondent, Nobelito Rapisora, protested the result and filed a protest before the MCTCTayum. He argued that the ballot, which only indicatedFlores, should be declared stray votes and should not bedivided equally to them.In his defense, the petitioner argued that inaccordance with the Omnibus Election Code, the questioned votes should be entitled to him under theequity of the incumbent rule,which states that if there are 2 or morecandidates with the same full name and one of them is anincumbent and the ballot is written only on such full name,the vote is counted in favor of the incumbent.The lower court sustained the contention of theprivate respondent and subsequently declared him as thepunong barangay.Hence this petition. The petitioner argued that bynot following the rule stated, he is deprived of his right toequal protection of the law since he is also anincumbent punong barangay running for election, thereby he should beentitled by the rule. Issue:Was the petitioner considered anincumbent to beentitled under the rule? Held:No. Under the new rule Resolution 2022- A passedby the Comelec, Barangay Captains who filed their candidacy for the office of Kagawad, which is another office,shall be deemed resigned in their former office. In his filing of candidacy, it stated that he is runningfor kagawad and not as a punong barangay. Thus, pursuantto the resolution, he deemed to resign his position as punongbarangay when he filed for his candidacy as a kagawad.The rule cannot thus then be applied to thepetitioner since pursuant to the resolution, he is notconsidered as an incumbent punong barangay, he is notwithin the same class as that of the incumbents.The court cannot sustain the argument of thepetitioner that since RA 669 speaks of 7 candidates for kagawad, the foremost of them is the punong barangay, heshould be regarded as running for the same office.

CHAPTER 1V THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROVISION Read: Section 18, 19 and 26 of RA No. 9372, the Human Security Act or the Anti-Terrorism Law SEC. 18. Period of Detention Without Judicial Warrant of Arrest. - The provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to the contrary notwithstanding, any police or law enforcement personnel, who, having been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council has taken custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall, without incurring any criminal liability for delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities, deliver said charged or suspected person to the proper judicial authority within a period of three days counted from the moment the said charged or suspected person has been apprehended or arrested, detained, and taken into custody by the said police, or law enforcement personnel: Provided, That the arrest of those suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism must result from the surveillance under Section 7 and examination of bank deposits under Section 27 of this Act. The police or law enforcement personnel concerned shall, before detaining the person suspected of the crime of terrorism, present him or her before any judge at the latter's residence or office nearest the place where the arrest took place at any time of the day or night. It shall be the duty of the judge, among other things, to ascertain the identity of the police or law enforcement personnel and the person or persons they have arrested and presented before him or her, to inquire of them the reasons why they have arrested the person and determine by questioning and personal observation whether or not the suspect has been subjected to any physical, moral or psychological torture by whom and why. The judge shall then submit a written report of what he/she had observed when the subject was brought before him to the proper court that has jurisdiction over the case of the person thus arrested. The judge shall forthwith submit his/her report within three calendar days from the time the suspect was brought to his/her residence or office. Immediately after taking custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, the police or law enforcement personnel shall notify in writing the judge of the court nearest the place of apprehension or arrest: Provided ,That where the arrest is made during Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office hours, the written notice shall be served at the residence of the judge nearest the place where the accused was arrested. The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon the police or law enforcement personnel who fails to notify and judge as Provided in the preceding paragraph. SEC. 19. Period of Detention in the Event of an Actual or Imminent Terrorist Attack. - In the event of an actual or imminent terrorist attack, suspects may not be detained for more than three days without the written approval of a municipal, city, provincial or regional official of a Human Rights Commission or judge of the municipal, regional trial court, the Sandiganbayan or a justice of the Court of Appeals nearest the place of the arrest. If the arrest is made during Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office hours, the arresting police or law enforcement personnel shall bring the person thus arrested to the residence of any of the officials mentioned above that is nearest the place where the accused was arrested. The approval in writing of any of the said officials shall be secured by the police or law enforcement personnel concerned within five days after the date of the detention of the persons concerned: Provided, however, That within three days after the detention the suspects, whose connection with the terror attack or threat is not established, shall be released immediately. SEC. 26. Restriction on Travel. - In cases where evidence of guilt is not strong, and the person charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is entitled to bail and is granted the same, the court, upon application by the prosecutor, shall limit the right of travel of the accused to within the municipality or city where he resides or where the case is pending, in the interest of national security and public safety, consistent with Article III, Section 6 of the Constitution. Travel outside of said municipality or city, without the authorization of the court, shall be deemed a violation of the terms and conditions of his bail, which shall then be forfeited as provided under the Rules of Court. He/she may also be placed under house arrest by order of the court at his or her usual place of residence. While under house arrest, he or she may not use telephones, cellphones, e-mails, computers, the internet or other means of communications with people outside the residence until otherwise ordered by the court. The restrictions abovementioned shall be terminated upon the acquittal of the accused or of the dismissal of the case filed against him or earlier upon the discretion of the court on motion of the prosecutor or of the accused. Requisites of a valid search warrant Frank Uy & Unifish Packing Corp. vs Bureau of Internal Revenue et al Search and Seizure Requisites of a Valid Search Warrant Facts: In Sept 1993, Rodrigo Abos, a former employee of UPC reported to the BIR that Uy Chin Ho aka Frank Uy, manager of UPC, was selling thousands of cartons of canned cartons without issuing a report. This is a violation of Sec 253 & 263 of the Internal Revenue Code. In Oct 1993, the BIR requested before RTC Cebu to issue a search warrant. Judge Gozo-Dadole issued a warrant on the same day. A second warrant was issued which contains the same substance but has only one page, the same was dated Oct 1st 2003. These warrants were issued for the alleged violation by Uy of Sec 253. A third warrant was issued on the same day for the alleged violation of Uy of Sec 238 in relation to sec 263. On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by members of the PNP, on 2 Oct 1993, searched the premises of the UPC. They seized, among other things, the records and documents of UPC. A return of said search was duly made by Labaria with the RTC of Cebu. UPC filed a motion to quash the warrants which

was denied by the RTC. They appealed before the CA via certiorari. The CA dismissed the appeal for a certiorari is not the proper remedy. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search warrant issued. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of UPC and Uy in a way for it ordered the return of the seized items but sustained the validity of the warrant. The SC ruled that the search warrant issued has not met some basic requisites of validity. A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions. These requirements, in outline form, are: (1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. The SC noted that there has been inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched as indicated in the said warrants. Also the thing to be seized was not clearly defined by the judge. He used generic itineraries. The warrants were also inconsistent as to who should be searched. One warrant was directed only against Uy and the other was against Uy and UPC. The SC however noted that the inconsistencies wered cured by the issuance of the latter warrant as it has revoked the two others. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. a. The place to be searched in the warrant in controlling People of the Philippines vs Court of Appeals & Bulacan RTC Judge Caesar Casanova Search Warrant Place to be Searched is Controlling Facts: In December 1995, Quezon City PNP applied for a search warrant before the QC RTC against Azfar Hussain who had allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. A warrant was issued the next day by J Bacalla not at AVS but at AVS, Apt. 1 Area F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan Apt 1 is immediately adjacent to AVS. The PNP then proceeded to search the said apartment where they seized money, some clothings, 4 Pakistani nationals including Hussain and some explosives. The Pakistanis petitioned before J Casanova that the search warrant is invalid for there is a discrepancy in the place described and place indicated in the warrant. AVS is not in any way the same as Apt 1 for Apt 1 is totally separate. J Casanova quashed the search warrant and ordered the return of the things seized and at the same time ordered the seized things to be inadmissible as evidence. Prosecutor Chiong moved that the decision be reversed. The CA affirmed the decision of J Casanova. Chiong averred that the policemen who did the search has acted on their knowledge. The PNP actually knew that the Pakistanis are indeed residing in Apt 1 and not in the AVS. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search warrant issued. HELD: The SC affirmed the decision of the CA. The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search. CHAPTER V FREEDOM OF SPEECH, PRESS, EXPRESSION 1. Rule on criticisms against acts of public officers Art. III, Sec. 4. , 1987 Constitution Art. III, Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievance. Id., Sec. 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations. O OSCAR ESPUELAS Y MENDOZA, petitioner, vs.THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. v Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code punishes those who shall write, publish or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the Philippines or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots or which tend to stir up the people againts the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community. "About the time compromised between June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended form the limb of the tree, when in truth and in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel (Exhibit A, C-I). After securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to several newspapers and

weeklies of general circulation (Exhibit C, F, G, H, I), not only in the Province of Bohol but also throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear that it was written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the latter's supposed wife translation of which letter or note in hereunder reproduced: Dearest wife and children, bury me five meters deep. Over my grave don't plant a cross or put floral wreaths, for I don't need them. Please don't bury me in the lonely place. Bury me in the Catholic cemetery. Although I have committed suicide, I still have the right to burried among Christians. But don't pray for me. Don't remember me, and don't feel sorry. Wipe me out of your lives. My dear wife, if someone asks to you why I committed suicide, tell them I did it because I was not pleased with the administration of Roxas. Tell the whole world about this. And if they ask why I did not like the administration of Roxas, point out to them the situation in Central Luzon, the Leyte. Dear wife, write to President Truman and Churchill. Tell them that here in the Philippines our government is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis.lawphil.net Teach our children to burn pictures of Roxas if and when they come across one. I committed suicide because I am ashamed of our government under Roxas. I cannot hold high my brows to the world with this dirty government. I committed suicide because I have no power to put under Juez de Cuchillo all the Roxas people now in power. So, I sacrificed my own self. He caused its publication in the Free Press, the Evening News, the Bisayas, Lamdang and other local periodicals and that he had impersonated one Alberto Reveniera by signing said pseudonymous name in said note or letter and posed himself as Alberto Reveniera in a picture taken wherein he was shown hanging by the end of a rope tied to a limb of a tree." Ruling: Not to be restrained is the privilege of any citizen to criticize his government officials and to submit his criticism to the "free trade of ideas" and to plead for its acceptance in "the competition of the market." However, let such criticism be specific and therefore constructive, reasoned or tempered, and not a contemptuous condemnation of the entire government set-up. Such wholesale attack is nothing less than an invitation to disloyalty to the government. In the article now under examination one will find no particular objectionable actuation of the government. It is called dirty, it is called a dictatorship, it is called shameful, but no particular omissions or commissions are set forth. Instead the article drip with male-violence and hate towards the constituted authorities. It tries to arouse animosity towards all public servants headed by President Roxas whose pictures this appellant would burn and would teach the younger generation to destroy. As heretofore stated publication suggest or incites rebellious conspiracies or riots and tends to stir up people against the constituted authorities, or to provoke violence from opposition who may seek to silence the writer. 7 Which is the sum and substance of the offense under consideration. To top it all, the appellant proclaimed to his readers that he committed suicide because he had "no power to put under juez de cuchillo all the Roxas people now in power." Knowing, that the expression Juez de Cuchillo means to the ordinary layman as the Law of the Knife, a "summary and arbitrary execution by the knife", the idea intended by the appellant to be conveyed was no other than bloody, violent and unpeaceful methods to free the government from the administration of Roxas and his men. The meaning, intent and effect of the article involves maybe a question of fact, making the findings of the court of appeals conclusive upon us. But in this instance, the attack on the President passes the furthest bounds of free speech and common decency. More than a figure of speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws." The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there being no question as to the legality of the penalty imposed on him, the decision will be affirmed with costs. T THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.FELIPE BUSTOS, ET AL., defendants-appellants. v This appeal presents the specific question of whether or not the defendants and appellants are guilty of a libel of Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Province of Pampanga. First, the facts. In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary through the law office of Crossfield and O'Brien, and five individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. Crossfield and O'Brien submitted this petition and these affidavits with a complaint to the Executive Secretary. The petition transmitted by these attorneys was signed by thirty-four citizens apparently of considerable standing, including councilors and property owners (now the defendants), and contained the statements set out in the information as libelous. Briefly stated the specific charges against the justice of the peace were. 1. That Francisca Polintan, desiring to make complaint against Mariano de los Reyes, visited the justice of the peace, who first told her that he would draw up complaint for P5; afterwards he said he would take P3 which she paid; also kept her in the house for four days as a servant and took from her two chickens and twelve "gandus;" 2. That Valentin Sunga being interested in a case regarding land which was on trial before the justice of the peace, went to see the justice of the peace to ascertain the result of the trial, and was told by the justice of the peace that if he wished to win he must give him P50. Not having this amount, Sunga gave the justice nothing, and a few days later

was informed that he had lost the case. Returning again to the office of the justice of the peace in order to appeal, the justice told him that he could still win if he would pay P50; 3. That Leoncio Quiambao, having filed a complaint for assault against four persons, on the day of the trial the justice called him over to his house, where he secretly gave him (Quiambao) P30; and the complaint was thereupon shelved. The judge of first instance found the first count not proved and counts 2 and 3 established. In view of this result, the judge, the Honorable Percy M. Moir, was of the opinion "that it must be, and it is hereby, recommended to the Governor-General that the respondent be removed from his position as justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Province of Pampanga, and it is ordered that the proceedings had in this case be transmitted to the Executive Secretary. Later the justice of the peace filled a motion for a new trial; the judge of first instance granted the motion and reopened the hearing; documents were introduced, including a letter sent by the municipal president and six councilors of Masantol, Pampanga, asserting that the justice of the peace was the victim of prosecution, and that one Agustin Jaime, the auxiliary justice of the peace, had instituted the charges for personal reasons; and the judge of first instance ordered a suppression of the charges against Punsalan and acquitted him the same. Criminal action against the petitioners, now become the defendants, was instituted on October 12, 1916. All the writings and publications by the accused were with deliberate purpose of attacking the virtue, honor, and reputation of the justice of the peace, Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano, and thus exposing him to public hatred contempt. Issue: The court erred in not holding that the alleged libelous statement was unqualifiedly privileged. Ruling: It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a private person, might well be considered libelous per se. The charges might also under certain conceivable conditions convict one of a libel of a government official. As a general rule words imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct touching him in his office are actionable. But as suggested in the beginning we do not have present a simple case of direct and vicious accusations published in the press, but of charges predicated on affidavits made to the proper official and thus qualifiedly privileged. Express malice has not been proved by the prosecution. Further, although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege. These respectable citizens did not eagerly seize on a frivolous matter but on instances which not only seemed to them of a grave character, but which were sufficient in an investigation by a judge of first instance to convince him of their seriousness. No undue publicity was given to the petition. The manner of commenting on the conduct of the justice of the peace was proper. And finally the charges and the petition were submitted through reputable attorneys to the proper functionary, the Executive Secretary. In this connection it is sufficient to note that justices of the peace are appointed by the GovernorGeneral, that they may be removed by the Governor-General upon the recommendation of a Judge of First Instance, or on the Governor-General's own motion, and that at the time this action took place the Executive Bureau was the office through which the Governor-General acted in such matter. The present facts are further essentially different from those established in other cases in which private individuals have been convicted of libels of public officials. Malice, traduction, falsehood, calumny, against the man and not the officer, have been the causes of the verdict of guilty. Privilege is classified as either absolute or qualified. With the first, we are not concerned. As to qualified privilege, it is as the words suggest a prima facie privilege which may be lost by proof of malice. The rule is thus stated by Lord Campbell, C. J. A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable. A pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege is a complaint made in good faith and without malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer or a board having some interest or duty in the matter. Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. But the statements must be made under an honest sense of duty; a self-seeking motive is destructive. Personal injury is not necessary. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate terms. A further element of the law of privilege concerns the person to whom the complaint should be made. The rule is that if a party applies to the wrong person through some natural and honest mistake as to the respective functions of various officials such unintentional error will not take the case out of the privilege. T THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.ISAAC PEREZ, defendant-appellant. v Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, and Fortunato Lodovice, a citizen of that municipality, happening to meet on the morning of April 1, 1992, in the presidencia of Pilar, they became engaged in a discussion regarding the administration of Governor-General Wood, which resulted in Perez shouting a number of times: "The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our independence." Charged in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon with a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code having to do with contempt of ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority, and convicted thereof, Perez has appealed the case to this court.

Section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, as amended by Act No. 1692, appears to have been placed on the statute books exactly to meet such a situation. This section reads as follows: Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, or who shall write, publish or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or against the Government of the Philippine Islands, or who shall print, write, publish utter or make any statement, or speech, or do any act which tends to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office or in performing his duty, or which tends to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or which tends to stir up the people against the lawful authorities, or which tends to disturb the peace of the community or the safety or order of the Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil practices from the constituted authorities, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars United States currency or by imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court. Issue:What crime, if any, did the accused commit? Ruling: In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes. He has made a statement and done an act which suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to stir up the people against the lawful authorities. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to disturb the peace of the community and the safety or order of the Government. All of these various tendencies can be ascribed to the action of Perez and may be characterized as penalized by section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended. The result is to agree with the trial Judge in his findings of fact, and on these facts to convict the accused of a violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended. R RAFAEL S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs.COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH V, CITY FISCAL OF v QUEZON CITY and VIRGINIA M. MERCADO, respondents. The relevant question in this suit is whether or not the landmark case of United States v. Bustos, enunciating the doctrine that the free speech and free press guarantees of the Constitution constitute a bar to prosecutions for libel arising from a communication addressed to a superior complaining against the conduct of a subordinate, is impressed with significance. The information in this certiorari, mandamus and prohibition proceeding to quash an information for libel quoted in full the alleged offensive telegram. Thus: "[Secretary David Consunji Department of Public Works and [Communications] Manila In line with President Marcos appeal to give information on undesirable employees in the government service to achieve the objectives of the New Society request that investigation image of the activities of Mrs. Virginia Mercado of Public Service Commission as we have reason to believe that she has enriched herself thru corrupt practices considering that she has properties and spending above what her salary can afford with the husband jobless stop If investigation confirms this we trust you take necessary action stop In case you need further details wire me at 101 Mariano Cuenco Quezon City and I will give further details stop Expecting prompt action on this matter. Rafael Mercado]" 2 It closed with the assertion that Virginia Mercado, private respondent, "never enriched herself in office." There was first a motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Ramon Mercado on the ground of the telegram being a privileged communication. It was denied by the lower court.t@lF Thereafter, through another counsel, came a motion to quash, alleging that the facts charged do not "constitute an offense." Again, it met with a denial. A motion for reconsideration having proved futile, the present proceeding was instituted. Issue:Is the telegram a privilege communication? Ruling: What casts doubt on the good faith of petitioner is a summary of his conduct, viz a viz private respondent: a letter complaint for grave violation of Republic Act No. 2260 and civil service rules was filed by him with the Chairman of the Board of Transportation on October 14, 1972. Fourteen days later, on October 28, 1972, the telegram subject of this litigation, was sent to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. Then on November 23, 1972, there was an amended complaint with the Board of Transportation to include such charges as dishonesty, pursuit of private business or corrupt practices and misconduct. The Board of Transportation found private respondent innocent, in an order of June 26, 1973. There was a motion for reconsideration on July 17, 1973 filed by petitioner. It was denied on August 29, 1973 and during the pendency of such administrative case, petitioner not content, filed with the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group a complaint against private respondent and her husband, a relation, accusing them of selling a Ford Willys engine, which was carnapped. After due hearing, a resolution was issued recommending that said case be closed for lack of evidence. Again, during the pendency of such administrative complaint, petitioner filed with the Criminal Investigation Service, a complaint for corrupt practices against private respondent, likewise found without support in the evidence submitted. The tenacity with which petitioner had pursued a course of conduct on its face would seem to indicate that a doubt could reasonably be entertained as to the bona fides of petitioner.t @lF The prosecution should be given the opportunity then of proving malice. Respondents have in their favor a decision of this Court supporting their stand. In People v. Monton, the question of whether or not a motion to quash based on a qualified privilege should be upheld was decided adversely against the claim of those accused of libel, This Court made clear that malice can be shown. It "simply puts the burden of doing so on the prosecution." 10 The ponencia of then Justice, later Chief Justice, Makalintal distinguished the Bustos decision, thus: "That case is not here applicable, because the acquittal of the accused therein on the ground that the defamatory imputation was qualifiedly privileged was adjudged only after trial, wherein the prosecution tried to establish, although unsuccessfully, the element of malice." 11 Further, the opinion stated: " It need only be added that in the instant case the information alleges that the defendants, appellees here, wrote and sent the subject letter to the President 'with malicious intent and evil motive of attacking, injuring and impeaching the character, honesty, integrity, virtue and reputation of one Jose J. Monteclaro ... and with malicious intent of exposing (him) to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, discredit and dishonor, without any justifiable motive.' Under the foregoing allegation, the

prosecution is entitled to go to trial and present the necessary evidence to prove malice; and the denial, to it of the opportunity to do so, upon the defendants' motion to quash, constitutes reversible error." WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER, OSEO HAMADA A AND CECILLE AFABLE, EDITOR-IN-CHIEF, petitioners, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER SP, 6TH v DIVISION) AND RAMON LABO, JR., respondents. Contention: Afable also denied that the quoted portions of her 03 and 10 January 1988 column were libelous, insisting that they were devoid of malice and "at most contained valid and timely doubts."14 She also contended that the contents of her column were protected by the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press and that the same were privileged as they dealt with a public figure. Ruling: In the present case, private respondent was unable to prove that petitioner Afable's column was tainted with actual malice. Verily, the records are replete with evidence that, indeed, private respondent incurred an obligation which had remained unpaid until the time the questioned article was published. While counsel for private respondent persistently harped at the difference between the P27,000 which appeared in petitioner Afable's column and the P27,415 actual indebtedness of private respondent to Baguio Printing and Publishing Co., Inc., the minuscule difference in the amount fails to establish reckless disregard for truth on the part of petitioners. As held by this Court in the Borjal case Even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice of language. There must be some room for misstatement of fact as well as for misjudgment. Only by giving them much leeway and tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as critical agencies in our democracy.50 Lastly, we hold that petitioner Afable's article constitutes a fair comment on a matter of public interest as it dealt with the character of private respondent who was running for the top elective post in Baguio City at the time. Considering that private respondent assured his would-be constituents that he would be donating millions of his own money, petitioner Afable's column with respect to private respondent's indebtedness provided the public with information as regards his financial status which, in all probability, was still unbeknownst to them at that time. Indeed, the information might have dissuaded some members of the electorate from voting in favor of private respondent but such is the inevitable result of the application of the law. The effect would have been adverse to the private respondent but public interest in this case far outweighs the interest of private respondent. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 07 January 1992, and its Resolution, dated 29 September 1992, denying reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the trial court's Decision of 14 June 1990 is AFFIRMED. D DIONISIO LOPEZ y ABERASTURI, Petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SALVADOR G. v ESCALANTE, JR., Respondents. "CADIZ FOREVER" "______________ NEVER" thereby deliberately titillating the curiosity of and drawing extraordinary attention from the residents of Cadiz City and passers-by over what would be placed before the word "NEVER". Later on November 15, 2002, accused affixed the nickname of the herein private complainant "BADING" and the name of the City of "SAGAY" before the word "NEVER" thus making the billboard appear as follows "CADIZ FOREVER" "BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" For which the words in the signboards/billboards were obviously calculated to induce the readers/passers-by to suppose and understand that something fishy was going on, therefore maliciously impeaching the honesty, virtue and reputation of Mayor Salvador G. Escalante, Jr., and hence were highly libelous, offensive and defamatory to the good name, character and reputation of the offended party and his office and that the said billboards/signboards were read by thousands if not hundred[s] of thousands of persons. Issue: ASSUMING WITHOUT CONCEDING THAT THE WORDS "CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" CONTAINED IN THE BILLBOARDS ERECTED BY PETITIONER ARE DEFAMATORY, DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THEY COMPRISE FAIR COMMENTARY ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST WHICH ARE THEREFORE PRIVILEGED? Ruling: We cannot subscribe to the appellate courts finding that the phrase "CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" tends to induce suspicion on private respondents character, integrity and reputation as mayor of Cadiz City. There are no derogatory imputations of a crime, vice or defect or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending, directly or indirectly, to cause his dishonor. Neither does the phrase in its entirety, employ any unpleasant language or somewhat harsh and uncalled for that would reflect on private respondents integrity. Obviously, the controversial word "NEVER" used by petitioner was plain and simple. In its ordinary sense, the word did not cast aspersion upon private respondents integrity and reputation much less convey the idea that he was guilty of any offense. Simply worded as it was with nary a notion of corruption and dishonesty in government service, it is our considered view to appropriately consider it as mere epithet or personal reaction on private respondents performance of official duty and not purposely designed to malign and besmirch his reputation and dignity more so to deprive him of public confidence. Contrary to private respondents assertion, there is nothing in the subject billboards which state, either directly or indirectly, that he is, in his words, a "tuta" or "puppet" of Sagay City. Except for private respondent, not a single

prosecution witness testified that the billboards portray Mayor Bading Escalante, Jr. as a "tuta or "puppet" of Sagay City. The billboards erected by petitioner simply say "CADIZ FOREVER", "BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR No. 28175 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET AL. A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC ***Note: Nov. 2012 decision of the SC reversed this decision. Live coverage is not allowed for it violates the accuseds right to be presumed innocent. Facts: On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media practitioners were killed while on their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao. Touted as the worst election-related violence and the most brutal killing of journalists in recent history, the tragic incident which came to be known as the Maguindanao Massacre spawned charges for 57 counts of murder and an additional charge of rebellion against 197 accused, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-09162148-72, Q-09-162216-31, Q-10-162652-66, and Q-10-163766, commonly entitled People v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. Following the transfer of venue and the reraffling of the cases, the cases are being tried by Presiding Judge Jocelyn Solis-Reyes of Branch 221 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City inside Camp Bagong Diwa in Taguig City. Almost a year later or on November 19, 2010, the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., relatives of the victims, individual journalists from various media entities, and members of the academe filed a petition before this Court praying that live television and radio coverage of the trial in these criminal cases be allowed, recording devices (e.g., still cameras, tape recorders) be permitted inside the courtroom to assist the working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated to govern the broadcast coverage and the use of devices. The Court docketed the petition as A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC. Contention: Petitioners seek the lifting of the absolute ban on live television and radio coverage of court proceedings. They principally urge the Court to revisit the 1991 ruling in Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President Corazon C. Aquinos Libel Case[12] and the 2001 ruling in Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against the Former President Joseph E. Estrada[13] which rulings, they contend, violate the doctrine that proposed restrictions on constitutional rights are to be narrowly construed and outright prohibition cannot stand when regulation is a viable alternative. Ruling: One apparent circumstance that sets the Maguindanao Massacre cases apart from the earlier cases is the impossibility of accommodating even the parties to the cases the private complainants/families of the victims and other witnesses inside the courtroom. On public trial, Estrada basically discusses: An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings.(underscoring supplied) Even before considering what is a reasonable number of the public who may observe the proceedings, the peculiarity of the subject criminal cases is that the proceedings already necessarily entail the presence of hundreds of families. It cannot be gainsaid that the families of the 57 victims and of the 197 accused have as much interest, beyond mere curiosity, to attend or monitor the proceedings as those of the impleaded parties or trial participants. It bears noting at this juncture that the prosecution and the defense have listed more than 200 witnesses each. The impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom that will accommodate all the interested parties, whether private complainants or accused, is unfortunate enough. What more if the right itself commands that a reasonable number of the general public be allowed to witness the proceeding as it takes place inside the courtroom. Technology tends to provide the only solution to break the inherent limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open and public trial. In so allowing pro hac vice the live broadcasting by radio and television of the Maguindanao Massacre cases, the Court lays down the following guidelines toward addressing the concerns mentioned in Aquino and Estrada: (a) An audio-visual recording of the Maguindanao massacre cases may be made both for documentary purposes and for transmittal to live radio and television broadcasting. (b) Media entities must file with the trial court a letter of application, manifesting that they intend to broadcast the audio-visual recording of the proceedings and that they have the necessary technological equipment and technical plan to carry out the same, with an undertaking that they will faithfully comply with the guidelines and regulations and cover the entire remaining proceedings until promulgation of judgment. No selective or partial coverage shall be allowed. No media entity shall be allowed to broadcast the proceedings without an application duly approved by the trial court. (c) A single fixed compact camera shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom to provide a single wideangle full-view of the sala of the trial court. No panning and zooming shall be allowed to avoid unduly highlighting or downplaying incidents in the proceedings. The camera and the necessary equipment shall be operated and controlled only by a duly designated official or employee of the Supreme Court. The camera equipment should not produce or beam any distracting sound or light rays. Signal lights or signs showing the equipment is operating should not be

visible. A limited number of microphones and the least installation of wiring, if not wireless technology, must be unobtrusively located in places indicated by the trial court. The Public Information Office and the Office of the Court Administrator shall coordinate and assist the trial court on the physical set-up of the camera and equipment. (d) The transmittal of the audio-visual recording from inside the courtroom to the media entities shall be conducted in such a way that the least physical disturbance shall be ensured in keeping with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings and the exclusivity of the access to the media entities. The hardware for establishing an interconnection or link with the camera equipment monitoring the proceedings shall be for the account of the media entities, which should employ technology that can (i) avoid the cumbersome snaking cables inside the courtroom, (ii) minimize the unnecessary ingress or egress of technicians, and (iii) preclude undue commotion in case of technical glitches. If the premises outside the courtroom lack space for the set-up of the media entities facilities, the media entities shall access the audio-visual recording either via wireless technology accessible even from outside the court premises or from one common web broadcasting platform from which streaming can be accessed or derived to feed the images and sounds. At all times, exclusive access by the media entities to the real-time audio-visual recording should be protected or encrypted. (e) The broadcasting of the proceedings for a particular day must be continuous and in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof where Sec. 21 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court[27] applies, and where the trial court excludes, upon motion, prospective witnesses from the courtroom, in instances where, inter alia, there are unresolved identification issues or there are issues which involve the security of the witnesses and the integrity of their testimony (e.g., the dovetailing of corroborative testimonies is material, minority of the witness). The trial court may, with the consent of the parties, order only the pixelization of the image of the witness or mute the audio output, or both. (f) To provide a faithful and complete broadcast of the proceedings, no commercial break or any other gap shall be allowed until the days proceedings are adjourned, except during the period of recess called by the trial court and during portions of the proceedings wherein the public is ordered excluded. (g) To avoid overriding or superimposing the audio output from the on-going proceedings, the proceedings shall be broadcast without any voice-overs, except brief annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them at the start or at the end of the scene. Any commentary shall observe the sub judice rule and be subject to the contempt power of the court; (h) No repeat airing of the audio-visual recording shall be allowed until after the finality of judgment, except brief footages and still images derived from or cartographic sketches of scenes based on the recording, only for news purposes, which shall likewise observe the sub judice rule and be subject to the contempt power of the court; (i) The original audio-recording shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance with law. (j) The audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of the trial court which may issue supplementary directives, as the exigency requires, including the suspension or revocation of the grant of application by the media entities. (k) The Court shall create a special committee which shall forthwith study, design and recommend appropriate arrangements, implementing regulations, and administrative matters referred to it by the Court concerning the live broadcast of the proceedings pro hac vice, in accordance with the above-outlined guidelines. The Special Committee shall also report and recommend on the feasibility, availability and affordability of the latest technology that would meet the herein requirements. It may conduct consultations with resource persons and experts in the field of information and communication technology. (l) All other present directives in the conduct of the proceedings of the trial court (i.e., prohibition on recording devices such as still cameras, tape recorders; and allowable number of media practitioners inside the courtroom) shall be observed in addition to these guidelines. Indeed, the Court cannot gloss over what advances technology has to offer in distilling the abstract discussion of key constitutional precepts into the workable context. Technology per se has always been neutral. It is the use and regulation thereof that need fine-tuning. Law and technology can work to the advantage and furtherance of the various rights herein involved, within the contours of defined guidelines. WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisition, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS PRO HAC VICE the request for live broadcast by television and radio of the trial court proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases, subject to the guidelines herein outlined. Pablito v. Sanidad Vs. Comelec On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law. Pursuant to said law, the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras which consist of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao, all comprising the Cordillera Autonomous Region, shall take part in a plebiscite for the ratification of said Organic Act originally scheduled last December 27, 1989 which was, however, reset to January 30, 1990 by virtue of Comelec Resolution No. 2226 dated December 27, 1989. The Commission on Elections, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), said R.A. 6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. In a petition dated November 20, 1989, herein petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which provides:

Section 19.Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues. Contention: It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in the Constitution. Ruling: However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis. Anent respondent Comelec's argument that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 does not absolutely bar petitionercolumnist from expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or against the organic act because he may do so through the Comelec space and/or Comelec radio/television time, the same is not meritorious. While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner's freedom of expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the forum where he may express his view. No reason was advanced by respondent to justify such abridgement. We hold that this form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable reason. ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is GRANTED. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is declared null and void and unconstitutional. The restraining order herein issued is hereby made permanent. In re: Ramon Tulfo, April 17, 1990 On 13 October 1989, respondent Ramon Tulfo (Tulfo, for short) wrote an article entitled "Idiotic Decision" in his column "On Target" in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, stating therein that the Supreme Court rendered an "idiotic decision" in legalizing the checkpoints. This was followed by another article in the same column on 16 October 1989, entitled "Sangkatutak na Bobo," Tulfo referring therein to the members of the Supreme Court as "stupid" for having rendered such decision on checkpoints, and calling them "sangkatutak na bobo justices of the Philippine Supreme Court." Contention: Citing press freedom, a Motion for Intervention was filed by the National Press Club, Union of Journalists of the Philippines, Press Photographers of the Philippines, and the People's Movement for Press Freedom, in connection with the resolution of the Court requiring Tulfo to explain why he should not be held in contempt of court. Movants alleged that such resolution is an unwarranted assault and undue restriction on freedom of speech and press. Ruling: Freedom of expression is not license to insult the Court and its members and to impair the authority, integrity and dignity of the Court. The inherent power of courts to punish any publication calculated to interfere with the administration of justice is not restricted by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press, for freedom of the press is subordinate to the authority, integrity and independence of the judiciary and the proper administration of justice. Freedom of the press must not be confounded with license or abuse of that freedom. Writers and publishers of newspapers have the right, but no greater than the right of others, to bring to public notice the conduct and acts of courts, provided the publications are true and fair in spirit; in short, there is no law to restrain or punish the freest expression of disapprobation of what is done in or by the courts,[18] provided that free expression is not used as a vehicle to satisfy one's irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy the courts and their members. Consequently, Tulfo's as well as intervenors' claim to press freedom, is not well taken in this instance. ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds and adjudges respondent Ramon Tulfo in CONTEMPT OF COURT, and he is hereby GRAVELY CENSURED, with the STRONGEST WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar misconduct will be dealt with MORE SEVERELY. There are two (2) types of publication of newspaper comments on proceedings in court, which have been considered in contempt proceedings, namely: (1) those in which the object of the publication is to affect the decision in a pending case or action, and (2) those which have for their purpose the bringing of courts or judges or other court officers into discredit.[6] Tulfo's articles comprise both types of publication. As already pointed out, at the time his articles were written and published, the case on the checkpoints was sub judice as the Court's decision therein had not became final. As to why and how said articles have for their purpose to bring the Supreme Court and its members into discredit, will be shown presently. In re: Atty. Emil Jurado, April 6, 1995 This proceeding treats of Emiliano P. Jurado, a journalist who writes in a newspaper of general circulation, the "Manila Standard." He describes himself as a columnist, who "incidentally happens to be a lawyer," remarking that while he values his membership in the law profession, "such membership is neither a critical nor indispensable adjunct in the exercise of his occupation as a newspaperman." 2 His column in the "Manila Standard" is entitled "Opinion." Jurado had been writing about alleged improperties and irregularities in the judiciary over several months (from about October, 1992 to March, 1993). Other journalists had also been making reports or comments on the same subject. At the same time, anonymous communications were being extensively circulated, by hand and through the mail, about alleged venality and corruption in the courts. And all these were being repeatedly and insistently adverted to by certain sectors of society. In light of these abnormal developments, the Chief Justice took an extraordinary step. He issued Administrative Order No. 11-93 dated January 25, 1993, "Creating an Ad Hoc Committee to Investigate Reports of Corruption in the Judiciary. Material to the present inquiry are Jurado's published statements from late 1992 to the middle of February, 1993.

1. In his column of October 21, 1992, he wrote of "(j)udges in a number of regional trial courts in Metro Manila (who) have become so notorious in their dealings with litigants and lawyers that they are now called the "Magnificent Seven."" He stated that "(i)t has come to a point where lawyers and litigants try their darndest to stay away from these judges. The answer, of course, is obvious." 2. In his February 3, 1993 column, he adverted to another group, also named "Magnificent Seven," which, he said, should be distinguished from the first. He wrote: "When lawyers speak of the "Magnificent Seven" one has to make sure which group they are referring to. Makati's "Magnificent Seven" are a bunch of Makati regional trial court judges who fix drug-related cases. The "Magnificent Seven" in the Supreme Court consists of a group of justices who vote as one." 4 3. Aside from the "Magnificent Seven," he also wrote about a group which he dubbed the "Dirty Dozen." In his column of October 21, 1992 he said that there are " . . . 12 judges who have acquired such reputation for graft and corruption that they are collectively known as the "dirty dozen". These judges, I am told, are not satisfied with accepting bribes; they actually sell their decisions to the litigants and "solicit" their bids for what is clearly an auction for the judge's decision." According to him, the most corrupt judges now are Makati's "Dirty Dozen" judges, supplanting some of those from Pasay, Pasig and Quezon City; corruption in lower Courts had been admitted by an Executive Judge in a Metro Manila Regional Trial Court (column of November 9, 1992); and because the "Dirty Dozen" had given Makati the reputation of having the most corrupt RTC in the country, multi-nationals and financing institutions explicitly stipulate in their agreements that litigation in connection with these contracts may be held anywhere in Metro Manila except in Makati; and lawyers confirm that Makati Judges, including some persons in the sheriffs office, are the most corrupt, where before, Pasay and Quezon City had that dubious distinction (column of December 1, 1992). 4. In his November 9, 1992 column, he wrote about "a former appellate justice (who) "holds office" at a restaurant near the Court of Appeals building. He is known as the contact man of five CA divisions. Lawyers say that this former jurist really delivers." In his column of January 29, 1993, he adverted to the same unnamed former Justice as being "known for fixing cases for five CA divisions (that is what he tells lawyers and litigants) for a fee. And if the price is right, the lawyer of the litigant paying can even write his own decision using a CA justice as ponente. This ex-justice holds court at the mezzanine of a restaurant owned by the wife of a former Marcos cabinet member and which has become a meeting place for judges, CA justices, practicing lawyers, prosecutors and even Supreme Court justices. The former CA justice also has his own Chinese contact. After I exposed this last year, the habitues became scarce. But they are back again, and the ex-justice is still-doing brisk business." 5. In his column of March 24, 1993, he made the claim that one can "get a temporary restraining order from a regional trial court in Metro-Manila by paying the judge anywhere between P30,000.00 and P50,000.00." Other columns of Jurado refer to: a) a police from the South Capital Command . . . (to the effect) that 8 Makati judges where paid for decisions favoring drug-traffickers and other big-time criminals, naming the judges and giving detailed accounts of the bribery (January 30, 1993); b) a bank, later identified by him as the Equitable Banking Corporation (Ermita Branch), which had "hosted a lunch at its penthouse mainly for some justices, judges, prosecutors and law practitioners" (January 12, 1993); 5 c) the lady secretary of an RTC Judge in Makati who allegedly makes sure, for a fee of P10,000.00 or more, depending on how much money is at stake, that a case is raffled off to a Judge who will be "extremely sympathetic," and can arrange to have the Court issue attachments or injunctions for a service fee of 1% over and above the regular premium of the attachment or injunction bond; a Chinese-Filipino businessman who paid this "miracle worker" P300,000.00 on top of the regular premium on the attachment/injunction bond (October 27, 1992); d) Executive Judge de la Rosa, who "has unilaterally decided to discard the rule that cases seeking provisional remedies should be raffled off to the judges," thus violating the rule that no case may be assigned in multi-sala courts without a raffle (January 28, 1993); e) the Secretary of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), who had supposedly gotten that body to nominate him to the Court of Appeals; and a son and a nephew of JBC members, who were also nominated to the Court of Appeals, contrary to ethics and delicadeza (January l6, 1993; and January 29, 1993); f) what he denominates "a major determinant of promotion," i.e., having a relative in the JBC or the Supreme Court, or having a powerful politician as sponsor, citing specifically, the following nominees to the Court of Appeals Conrado Vasquez, Jr., son and namesake of the Ombudsman and brother of the head of the Presidential Management Staff; Rosalio de la Rosa, "nephew of Justice Relova and cousin of Chief Justice Narvasa;" and the fact that nomination of some worthy individuals was blocked because they "incurred the ire of the powers that be," e.g., Judge Maximiano Asuncion, Quezon City RTC, and Raul Victorino, closely identified with former Senate President Salonga (January 25, 1993). Contention: The principle of press freedom is invoked by Jurado in justification of these published writings. That invocation is obviously unavailing in light of the basic postulates and the established axioms or norms for the proper exercise of press freedom earlier set forth in this opinion. Ruling: It is worth stressing that false reports about a public official or other person are not shielded from sanction by the cardinal right to free speech enshrined in the Constitution. Even the most liberal view of free speech has never countenanced the publication of falsehoods, specially the persistent and unmitigated dissemination of patent lies. The U.S. Supreme Court, 29 while asserting that "(u)nder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea," and that "(h)owever pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas" (citing a passage from the first Inaugural Address of Thomas Jefferson), nonetheless made the firm pronouncement that "there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact," and "the

erroneous statement of fact is not worthy of constitutional protection (although) . . . nevertheless inevitable in free debate." "Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error," it said, "materially advances society's interest in "unhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate on public issues. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US, at 270, 11 L Ed 2d 686, 95 ALR2d 1412. They belong to that category of utterances which "are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to the truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." Chaplinsky v, new Hampshire, 315 US 568, 572, 86 L Ed 1031, 62 S Ct 766 (1942). "The use of calculated falsehood," it was observed in another case, 30 "would put a different cast on the constitutional question. Although honest utterances, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately published about a public official, should enjoy a like immunity. . . . (T)he knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection." Similarly, in a 1969 case concerning a patently false accusation made against a public employee avowedly in fulfillment of a "legal, moral, or social duty," 31 this Court, through the late Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, ruled that the guaranty of free speech cannot be considered as according protection to the disclosure of lies, gossip or rumor, viz.: . . . Defendant's civil duty was to help the Government clean house and weed out dishonest, unfit or disloyal officers and employees thereof, where there is reasonable ground to believe that they fall under this category. He had no legal right, much less duty, to gossip, or foster the circulation of rumors, or jump at conclusions and more so if they are gratuitous or groundless. Otherwise, the freedom of speech, which is guaranteed with a view to strengthening our democratic institutions and promoting the general welfare, would be a convenient excuse to engage in the vituperation of individuals, for the attainment of private, selfish and vindictive ends, thereby hampering the operation of the Government with. administrative investigations of charges preferred without any color or appearance of truth and with no other probable effect than the harassment of the officer or employee concerned, to the detriment of public service and public order. Jurado would have the Court clarify in what capacity whether a journalist, or as a member of the bar he has been cited in these proceeding. Thereby he resurrects the issue he once raised in a similar earlier proceeding: that he is b being called to account as a lawyer for his statements as ajournalist. 27 This is not the case at all. Upon the doctrines and principles already inquired into and cited, he is open to sanctions as journalist who has misused and abused press freedom to put the judiciary in clear and present to the danger of disrepute and of public obdium and opprobrium, detriment and prejudice of the administration of justice. That he is at the same time a member of the bar has nothing to do with the setting in of those sanctions, although it may aggravate liability. At any rate, what was said about the matter in that earlier case is equally cogent here: Respondent expresses perplexity at being called to account for the publications in question in his capacity as a member of the bar, not as a journalist. The distinction is meaningless, since as the matter stands, he has failed to justify his actuations in either capacity, and there is no question of the Court's authority to call him to task either as a newsman or as a lawyer. What respondent proposes is that in considering his actions, the Court judge them only as those of a member of the press and disregard the fact that he is also a lawyer. But his actions cannot be put into such neat compartments. In the natural order of things, a person's acts are determined by, and reflect, the sum total of his knowledge, training and experience. In the case of respondent in particular the Court will take judicial notice of the frequent appearance in his regular columns of comments and observations utilizing legal language and argument, bearing witness to the fact that in pursuing his craft as a journalist he calls upon his knowledge as a lawyer to help inform and influence his readers and enhance his credibility. Even absent this circumstance, respondent cannot honestly assert that in exercising his profession as journalist he does not somehow, consciously or unconsciously, draw upon his legal knowledge and training. It is thus not realistic, nor perhaps even possible, to come to fair, informed and intelligent judgment of respondent's actuations by divorcing from consideration the fact that he is a lawyer as well as a newspaperman, even supposing, which is not the case that he may thereby be found without accountability in this matter. To repeat, respondent cannot claim absolution even were the Court to lend ear to his plea that his actions be judged solely as those of a newspaperman unburdened by the duties and responsibilities peculiar to the law profession of which he is also a member. WHEREFORE, the Court declares Atty. Emil (Emiliano) P. Jurado guilty of contempt of court and in accordance with Section 6, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, hereby sentences him to pay a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000,00). Burgos v. Chief of Staff 133 SCRA 800 (1984) Illegal search of newspaper offices and press freedom F: On the basis of two warrants issued by the RTC of QC, the offices of the Metropolitan Mail and the We Forum were search and printing machines, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the newspapers as well as papers and other literature seized on the ground that they were used in the commission of the crime of subversion. Petitioners brought and action to annul the warrants and compel the return of the things seized. HELD: Petitioners'' thesis is impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. When addressed to a newspaper publisher or editor, the application for a warrant must contain a specification stating with particularity the alleged subversive materials he has published or intending to publish. Broad statement in the application is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirement of probable cause. Another factor that makes the search warrants constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. In Stanford v. State of Texas, the US SC declared this type of warrant void

Corro v. Lising 137 SCRA 341 (1985) F: Respondent Judge issued a search warrant for the seizure of articles allegedly used by petitioner in committing the crime of sedition. Seized were printed copies of the Philippine Times, newspaper dummies, typewriters, mimeographing machines and tape recorders, video machines and tapes. The petitioner moved to quash the warrant but his motion was denied. HELD: The statements made in the affidavits are mere conclusions of law and do not satisfy the requirement of probable cause. The language used is all embracing as to include all conceivable words and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The search warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which is objectionable. ARLENE BABST, ODETTE ALCANTARA CERES P. DOYO, JO ANN Q. MAGLIPON, DOMINI TORREVILLAS SUAREZ, LORNA KALAW-TIROL, CIELO BUENAVENTURA, SYLVIA MAYUGA, SHEILA S. CORONEL, ET AL., petitioners,vs.NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BOARD, SPECIAL COMMITTEE NO. 2, BRIG. GEN. WILFREDO ESTRADA (ret.), COL. RENATO ECARMA, NBI ASST. DIRECTOR PONCIANO FERNANDO, COL. BALBINO DIEGO, COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, COL. EUSTAQUIO PERALTA, ET AL., respondents. This was originally a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction which was superseded by the amended and supplemental petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by petitioners on March 3, 1983, seeking to prohibit the respondents (a) from issuing subpoenas or letters of invitation to petitioners and interrogating them, and (b) from filing libel suits on matters that have been the subject of inquiry by respondent National Intelligence Board (NIB). Petitioners are columnists, feature article writers and reporters of various local publications. At different dates since July, 1980, some of them have allegedly been summoned by military authorities who have subjected them to sustained interrogation on various aspects of their works, feelings, sentiments, beliefs, associations and even their private lives. Typical of the letters received by the petitioners from respondent NIB is that addressed to petitioner Arlene Babst, dated December 20,1982, which reads: Madam: Pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, you are hereby requested to appear before this Special Committee at Philippine Army Officer's Clubhouse, Fort Bonifacio, Metro Manila (sketch attached), 9:00 A.M., December 22, 1982, to shed light on confidential matters being looked into by this Committee. Your failure to appear on the specified date and place shall be considered as a waiver on your part and this Committee will be constrained to proceed in accordance with law. Very truly yours, (SGD.) WILFREDO C. ESTRADA Brig. General, AFP (Ret.) Chairman Aside from the interrogations, a criminal complaint for libel was filed by Brig. Gen. Artemio Tadiar, Jr. on February 9, 1983 with the Office of the City Fiscal, Manila, against petitioners Domini Torrevillas-Suarez, editor of the Panorama, and Ma. Ceres Doyo based on an article written by Doyo and published in the March 28, 1982 issue of the Panorama, on which the author had been interrogated by respondents. The complaint included an staggering P10 million claim for damages. (An information for libel has since been filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region against Suarez and Doyo.) Petitioners maintain that the respondents have no jurisdiction over the proceedings which are violative of the constitutional guarantee on free expression since they have the effect of imposing restrictive guidelines and norms on mass media; that they are a punitive ordeal or subsequent punishment of petitioners for lawful publications; that they amount to a system of censorship, curtailing the "free flow of information and petition and opinion," indispensable to the right of the people to know matters of public concern guaranteed in Section 6 of Article IV of the Constitution; and that they constitute intrusions into spheres of individual liberty. Regarding the libel charge against Suarez and Doyo, petitioners denounce the filing as instituted with intent to intimidate and based on illegally obtained evidence, referring to the matters inquired into by respondents in previously conducted, allegedly illegal interrogations. In their comment, respondents counter that no issue of jurisdiction exists since they do not pretend to exercise jurisdiction over the petitioners; that what respondents have sent to petitioners were neither subpoenas nor summonses, but mere invitations to dialogues which were completely voluntary, without any compulsion employed on petitioners; that the dialogues themselves were designed simply to elicit information and exchange Ideas and that the expression of personal preferences and opinions by members of the respondent Board is not equivalent to the imposition of norms and guidelines to be followed by petitioners. Relative to the libel case, respondents contend that petitioners have no cause of action against respondent Board since respondent General Tadiar is not a member of respondent Board and has filed the libel case in his personal capacity; and the libel case is not pending before any of the respondents. Furthermore, respondents aver that this case has been rendered moot and academic because the proceedings before NIB Special Committee No. 2 (which conducted the interrogations) have already been ordered terminated by General Fabian C. Ver in his capacity as Director General and Chairman of the NIB, and said proceedings have in fact been terminated. The petition is premised upon the alleged illegality and unconstitutionality of the issuance by respondent NIB to petitioners of letters of invitation, their subsequent interrogation, and the filing of the aforementioned libel suit. HELD Under the circumstances of the case, the petition cannot be granted. The assailed proceedings have come to an end. The acts sought to be prohibited (i.e., the issuance of letters of invitation petition and subsequent interrogations) have therefore been abated, thereby rendering the petition moot and academic as regards the aforesaid matters.

Be that as it may, it is not Idle to note that ordinarily, an invitation to attend a hearing and answer some questions, which the person invited may heed or refuse at his pleasure, is not illegal or constitutionally objectionable. Under certain circumstances, however, such an invitation can easily assume a different appearance. Thus, where the invitation comes from a powerful group composed predominantly of ranking military officers issued at a time when the country has just emerged from martial rule and when the suspension of the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus has not entirely been lifted and the designated interrogation site is a military camp, the same can easily be taken, not as a strictly voluntary invitation which it purports to be, but as an authoritative command which one can only defy at his peril, especially where, as in the instant case, the invitation carries the ominous seaming that "failure to appear . . . shall be considered as a waiver . . . and this Committee will be constrained to proceed in accordance with law." Fortunately, the NIB director general and chairman saw the wisdom of terminating the proceedings and the unwelcome interrogation. Similarly, prohibition will not issue in respect of the libel charges now pending in court against two of the petitioners and similar suits that might be filed. Firstly, the writ of prohibition is directed against a tribunal, board or person acting without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion vis-a-vis certain proceedings pending before it. The libel cases adverted to are not pending before respondent NIB or any other respondent. Secondly, the issue of validity of the libel, charges by reason of their alleged collision with freedom of expression, is a matter that should be raised in the proper forum, i.e., before the court where the libel cases are pending or where they may be filed. The same rule applies to the issue of admissibility as evidence of matters that have been elicited in the course of an inquiry or interrogation conducted by respondent NIB, which petitioners claim to have been illegally obtained. Finally, the right to seek redress when libeled is a personal and individual privilege of the aggrieved party, and no one among the respondent officials has the authority to restrain any of his subordinates who has been libeled from vindicating his right by instituting a libel suit. Brig. Gen. Tadiar has filed the libel case against petitioners Suarez and Doyo in his personal capacity. Moreover, he is not even a member of respondent NIB. And the NIB does not appear to have anything to do with Gen. Tadiar's private right to complain of libel. WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. Elizalde vs. Gutierrez,76 SCRA 448 (In order that any news item relating to a judicial proceeding will not be actionable, the same must be [a] a true and fair report of the actual proceedings; [b] must be done in good faith; and [c] no comments nor remarks shall be made by the writer} Elizalde v Gutierrez: A prosecution for libel lacks justification if the offending words find sanctuary withinthe shelter of free press guaranty. It should not beallowed to continue where, after discounting thepossibility that the words may not be really that libelous,there is likely to be a chilling effect, a patently inhibitingfactor on the willingness of newspapermen, especially editors and publishers to courageously perform theircritical role in society. Ordinarily, libel is not protected by the free speech clause but we have to understand that some provocative words, which if taken literally may appear to shame or disparage a public figure, may really be intended to provoke debate on public issues when uttered or written by a media personality. MANUEL ELIZALDE, FRED J. ELIZALDE, PRUDENCIO R. EUROPA, Petitioners, vs. HON. MARIO J. GUTIERREZ, Presiding Judge, CFI-Ilocos Sur, Branch III, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented in this instance by JESUS F. GUERRERO, Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Sur, Respondents. It was the refusal of respondent Judge Mario J. Gutierrez 1 to grant motion to quash of petitioners, who were the accused in a prosecution for libel, notwithstanding the invocation of their constitutional right to freedom of expression 2 that led to this suit for certiorari and prohibition. All that could be alleged in the information against them was the publication in the Evening News, a newspaper of general circulation, of an item reproducing in full a dispatch from the Philippine News Service, a reputable news-gathering agency. It summarized the testimony of Jaime Jose in a pending rape case wherein the name of Vincent Crisologo, the offended party in the information for libel, was mentioned. This excerpt from the recent case of Bocobo v. Estanislao 3 comes to mind: "This is contrary to the legal tradition of the Philippines dating back to the landmark case of United States v. Bustos, where Justice Malcolm emphasized that to prevent dilution of the constitutional right to free speech and free press, every libel prosecution should be tested by the rigorous and exacting standard of whether or not it could be violative of such fundamental guarantee. 4 It is easily understandable then why in the motion to quash, the main reliance was on the Bustos doctrine, although other grounds were alleged as warranting the dismissal of the information. 5 When respondent Judge ignored such a fundamental constitutional principle, the proper basis for a certiorari and prohibition proceeding was laid. Petitioners are entitled to the remedies sought. The alleged offending news item was a reproduction of a news item coming from the Philippine News Service, furnished the Evening News, of which petitioners Manuel Elizalde and Fred J. Elizalde were the Publisher and Assistant Publisher and Prudencio R. Europa was the Editor-in-Chief. It reads thus: "Jaime Jose implicated Tuesday Vincent Crisologo, son of Rep. Floro Crisologo ( N, Ilocos Sur ) as among his four companions the night of the alleged rape of a former nightclub hostess last year. Jose, one of four principal accused in the celebrated Maggie de la Riva rape case, denied, however, the charges of forcible abduction with rape and robbery filed against him and his companions by Zenaida de la Cruz, 28, and Araceli Sy, both nightclub hostesses. Jose mentioned Vincent Crisologo as among his companions while testifying in his defense before Judge Francisco de la Rosa of the local court of first instance. Jose claimed that both Zenaida and Araceli went voluntarily with his group to the Queen's Court motel here in the early morning of July 4, 1966. Jose said Zenaida and Crisologo went to a room together. However, Jose said, the two girls complained when he and his companions failed to give the girls any money. ...6This was the continuation of such news

item: "The girls charged that they were robbed by Jose and his friends of cash and jewelry inside the hotel. In their original complaint filed with the fiscal's office, the two girls named Vincent Crisologo as among the accused. The taxi driver, whose vehicle was used by Miss de la Cruz, also Identified Vincent Crisologo among the five youths in the incident. But the girls later executed an affidavit saying that they were mistaken in Identifying Crisologo as among the five men who allegedly abused them. Jose testified that he and Tillman were about to go to a party in Mandaluyong, Rizal, on the night of July 3, 1966, when Crisologo with three companions arrived. Jose said that young Crisologo wanted to borrow his car since his car would be used by his congressman father. Jose said that after the party they proceeded to Pasay City where Crisologo and a companion went to Bayside nightclub to look for Crisologo's girl friend. Minutes later, Crisologo and his friend went out of the club and they all proceeded to the Barbecue Plaza where they drank liquor. Shortly before 2 a.m., July 4, the group allegedly started for home in Jose's two-toned Mercedez Benz car. On the way, a taxicab overtook them. The cab allegedly carried Zenaida and Araceli. Jose said that Zenaida called Vincent and shouted for them to stop. They then proceeded to Queen's Court motel, Jose said. 7 The alleged offended party, according to the information filed by respondent Provincial Fiscal, Jesus F. Guerrero, is Vincent Crisologo. The information is dated February 5, 1970. Thereafter, there was a motion to quash filed by petitioners on August 14, 1970. An opposition was then filed by an assistant provincial fiscal on September 25, 1970. The order by respondent Judge denying the motion to quash came on December 17, 1970. An extensive motion for reconsideration submitted on February 23, 1971 having proved futile in view of an order of denial a month later from respondent Judge, this petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed with this Court. As noted at the outset, certiorari and prohibition lie. 1. Petitioners were prosecuted for libel because the Evening News carried in its issue of September 1, 1967 a news item furnished it by the Philippine News Service. It was a faithful and accurate summary of what was testified to by a witness in a pending rape case. That was all. The name of the alleged offended party, Vincent Crisologo, was repeatedly mentioned in such testimony. It would have been a plain and simple distortion thereof if such a fact were omitted by the Philippine News Service. The Evening News in turn published such item. This is a case therefore that falls squarely within the protection of the free press provision found in the Constitution. That such news item possessed a defamatory aspect is beside the point. It cannot justify a prosecution for libel. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, under the previous organic act, the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, which contained a similar provision mandating a free press, this Court, in the epochal Malcolm opinion in United States v. Bustos 8 decided almost sixty years ago, to be precise on March 8, 1918, enunciated the principle that the freedom of the press is "so sacred to the people of these Islands and won at so dear a cost, [that it] should now be protected and carried forward as one would protect and preserve the covenant of liberty itself." 9 Thus it is clear that a prosecution for libel lacks justification if the offending words find sanctuary within the shelter of the free press guarantee. This Court has since then been committed to such an authoritative doctrine. 10 The opinion of Chief Justice Paras in Quisumbing v. Lopez, 11 a 1955 decision, is even more explicit on the matter. Thus: "The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and edition usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words. 12 At the beginning of this decade, this Court in Lopez v. Court of Appeals 13expressed its commitment to such a principle in these words: "No inroads on press freedom should be allowed in the guise of punitive action visited on what otherwise could be characterized as libel whether in the form of printed words or a defamatory imputation resulting from the publication of respondent's picture with the offensive caption as in the case here complained of. ... If the cases mean anything at all then, to emphasize what has so clearly emerged, they call for the utmost care on the part of the judiciary to assure that in safeguarding the interest of the party allegedly offended, a realistic account of the obligation of a news media to disseminate information of a public attendant on the business of publishing cannot be ignored. 14 2. To be more specific, no culpability could be imputed to petitioners for the alleged offending publication without doing violence to the concept of privileged communication implicit in freedom of the press. As was so well put by Justice Malcolm in Bustos: "Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege. 15 He then quoted this excerpt from an American Supreme Court decision, Abbott v. National Bank of Commerce: "The doctrine of privileged communication rests upon public policy, 'which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice, though as incidental result, it may in some instances afford an immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer. 16Considering how ample is the protection afforded a person alleged to have injured another's reputation, it appears quite obvious that respondent Judge did infringe on the constitutional right of petitioners to press freedom when it denied the motion to quash. He apparently was equally unaware of this relevant paragraph in the Malcolm opinion: "A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged communications. The ultimate test is that of bona fides. 17 By no stretch of the imagination then could it be said that the Philippine News Service and the Evening News exhibited mala fides by the mere fact of narrating in a news item the testimony of a witness in a rape case just because it did cast a reflection on the conduct of a third party. The prosecution in its pleadings before the lower court could not deny the accuracy of what was reported. Petitioners then ought not to have been subjected to the annoyance, inconvenience, and trouble of going to a distant province and defend themselves against a charge unwarrant under well-settled norms of constitutional dimension. The doctrine of privileged communication moreover is explicitly provided for in the Revised Penal Code, as an exception to the general principle that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it is true in the absence of "good intention" and "justifiable motive" thus: "A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature,

or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions. 3. There being a denial of a constitutional right, a jurisdictional issue was raised. It has been a well-settled doctrine since Conde v. Rivera, 19 that under such circumstances, the competence of a court to continue with a pending case ceases. 20 Nor is it to indulge merely in general propositions. In People v. Andres, 21 this Court precisely sustained a court of first instance when it quashed an information for libel, the accused, respondent Andres, relying on press freedom to show that the fact charged do not constitute an offense. As pointed out in the opinion of Justice Barrera, it was argued by the prosecution "that the trial court erred in dismissing the case on a mere motion to quash, contending that the trial judge's conclusion on the face of the information that defendant-appellee was prompted only by good motives assumes a fact to he proved, and that the alleged privileged nature of defendant-appellee's publication is a matter of defense and is not a proper ground for dismissal of the complaint for libel ... ." 22 That contention was rejected in this wise: "While there is some point to this contention, yet when in the information itself it appears, as it does in the present case, that the communication alleged to be libelous is contained in an appropriate pleading in a court proceeding, the privilege becomes at once apparent and defendant need not wait until the trial and produce evidence before he can raise the question of privilege. And if added to this, the questioned imputations appear, as they seem in this case, to be really pertinent and relevant to defendant's plea for reconsideration based on complainant's supposed partiality and abuse of power from which defendant has a right to seek relief in vindication of his client's interest as a litigant in complainant's court, it would become evident that the facts thus alleged in the information would not constitute an offense of libel. 23 Similarly, a motion to quash was sustained in the later case of People v. Alvarez, 24 In the opinion of Justice Regala, it was pointed out: "As heretofore stated, this Court has adopted a liberal attitude in favor of the writer in matter of the relevancy of allegedly libelous statements in judicial pleadings. In U.S. v. Bustos, et al., 37 Phil. 731, this Court found occasion to express ills opinion on privileged communications, to wit: ... A privileged communication should not be subjected to miscroscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrunity would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged communication. ... It is worthy to mention here that in the information for libel, there is no allegation of the irrelevancy or impertinency of the questioned statements to the cause. Considering the above, We are of the opinion and so hold that no error was committed by the lower court in considering the questioned remarks of the appellee as privileged and in consequently dismissing the information for lack of cause of action. 25 In a third case, People v. Aquino, 26 reference was made to People v. Andres to demonstrate that it is fitting and appropriate for a court of first instance to dismiss an information on a motion to quash where the privileged character of the, alleged offending publication is apparent. Respondent Judge ought not to have betrayed lack of sensitivity to the categorical pronouncements of this Court in the above three decisions that call for application, 4. Nor is a different conclusion called for just because the heading of the news item arising from the testimony of Jaime Jose was worded thus: "LINK CRISOLOGO SON TO PASAY RAPE CASE." How else could it have been expressed? That was to portray with accuracy what was contained in the news item. What was testified to was to that effect. It succinctly set forth the facts. There was no attempt to sensationalize. The tone is both neutral and objective. Again there is relevance to the following excerpt from Quisumbing v. Lopez: "The Court of Appeals found 'that the context of the article in question, is a fair, impartial and true report of official or public proceeding authorized by law. The news item was the result of a press release in connection with an official investigation of the Anti-Usury Division, N. B. I., and was a substantial, if not a faithful reproduction of the said press release which was, in turn, an accurate report of the official proceedings taken by the Anti-Usury Division. The article merely reported a raid on the 'business offices of three alleged money lenders;' and related the steps actually taken or to be taken by the proper officials relative to the investigation. It did not go beyond the actual report of official actuations. The theory of the petitioner, stripped of incidentals, is that while the body of the news item may be considered as being fair, impartial and accurate report of an official investigation of the Anti-Usury Division of the National Bureau of Investigation and therefore privileged, its headline NBI MEN RAID OFFICES OF 3 CITY USURERS, admittedly not forming part of the basic press release but merely added by the respondents, is libelous per se, because the petitioner had thereby been branded and condemned as a 4 usurer' when as a matter of fact no criminal charge was even filed against him for the crime of usury in any court of justice. 27 Nonetheless, the newspaper publisher was not held liable. The Chief Justice then explained why: "We are of the opinion that the appealed decision is correct. The petitioner, while assuming that the article in question is privileged, argues that the headline (libelous per se) added by the respondents rendered the same actionable, because said headline is not borne out by the facts recited in the context. We believe that nobody reading the whole news item would come to the conclusion that the petitioner had been accused or convicted of usury. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the headline complained of may fairly be said to contain a correct description of the news story. The fact that the raid was conducted by anti-usury agents following receipt of a complaint against the petitioner and two others, coupled with the announcement by the Chief of the NBI Anti-Usury Division that criminal action would be filed in the city fiscal's office, naturally would lead one to think that the persons involved were usurers. Nothing in the headline or the context of the article suggested the Idea that the petitioner was already charged with or convicted of the crime of usury. 28 WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted and the order of respondent Judge denying the motion to quash of December 17, 1970 as well as the order of respondent Judge of March 25, 1971 denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners are set aside and nullified. The writ of prohibition is likewise granted and the restraining order issued on June 10, 1971 made permanent, respondent Judge or any person who may have taken his place being prohibited from taking any action in Criminal Case No. 11-V for Libel except for the purpose of dismissing the same. No costs. LUMEN POLICARPIO,vs.THE MANILA TIMES PUB.CO., INC., CONSTANTE C. ROLDAN, MANUEL V. VILLAREAL, E.AGUILAR CRUZ and CONSORCIO BORJE, ISSUE:Whether or not the defendant is guilty of having publishedlibelous/defamatory articles?

Policarpio was executive secretary of UNESCO Natl Commission.As such, she had filed charges against Herminia Reyes, one of her subordinates in the Commission, & caused the latter to beseparated from the service. Reyes, in turn, filed counter-chargeswhich were referred for investigation. Pending completion, Reyesfiled a complaint against Policarpio for alleged malversation of public funds & another complaint for estafa thru falsification of public documents. Policarpio filed a libel suit to Manila Times Publishing Co. for publishing two defamatory, libelous and false articles/news items inSaturday Mirror of August 11, 1956 and in the Daily Mirror of August 13, 1956.Saturday Mirror (Aug 11, 1956):WOMAN OFFICIAL SUEDPCAC RAPS L. POLICARPIO ON FRAUDSUnesco Official Head Accused on Supplies, Funds Use byColleagueDaily Mirror (Aug 13, 1956):PALACE OPENS INVESTIGATION OF RAPS AGAINSTPOLICARPIOAlba Probes Administrative Phase of Fraud ChargesAgainst Unesco Woman Official; Fiscal Sets Prelim Quizof Criminal Suit on Aug 22 The articles contain news on Reyes charges against Policarpio for having malversed public property and of having fraudulently soughtreimbursement of supposed official expenses. It was said thatPolicarpio used several sheets of government stencils for her private and personal use. The other charge refers to the supposedreimbursements she had made for a trip to Quezon andPangasinan. Reyes complaint alleged that Policarpio had asked for refund of expenses for use of her car when she had actually madethe trip aboard an army plane. Policarpio was said to be absentfrom the Bayambang conference for which she also sought arefund of expenses. CFI dismissed the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff had notproven that defendants had acted maliciously in publishing thearticles, although portions thereof were inaccurate or false. RULING OF THE CASE: The headline of the Aug 11 article was given prominence with a 6-column (about 11 inches) banner headline of 1-inch types. Its sub-title PCAC raps Policarpio on fraud printed in bold 1 cm type is not true. Also, the statement in the 1st paragraph of the article, to the effect that plaintiff was charged with malversation & estafa by the Presl Complaint & Action Commission (PCAC) is not true, the complaints for said offenses having been filed by Reyes. Neither is it true that said criminal action was initiated as a result of current administrative investigation. PLAINTIFF maintains that the effect of these false statements wasto give the general impression that said investigation by Col. Albahad shown that plaintiff was guilty and that, as a consequence,PCAC had filed the corresponding complaints w/ the fiscals office.She also said that the article did not mention that fact that the number of stencils involved in the charge was only 18 or 20; that the sum allegedly misappropriated by her was only P54, and that the falsification imputed to her was said to have been committed by claiming that certain expenses for which she had sought reimbursement were incurred in trips during the period from July 1 Sept 30 1955, although the trips actually were made from Jul 8-Aug 31, 1955. By omitting these details, plaintiff avers that the Aug11 article had the effect of conveying the idea that the offense simputed to her were more serious than they really were. DEFENDANTS contend that though the complaints were filed, not by the PCAC but by Reyes, this inaccuracy is insignificant &immaterial to the case for the fact is that said complaints were filed. As regards the number of sheets & the nature of the falsification charged, they argue that these details do not affect the truthfulness of the article as a whole. Besides, defendants had no means of knowing such details.SC: Prior to Aug 11, Col. Alba had already taken the testimony of witnesses; hence, defendants could have ascertained the detailshad they wanted to. The number of stencil sheets used wasactually mentioned in the Aug 13 article. Moreover, the penalty for estafa/embezzlement depends partlyupon the amount of the damage caused to the offended party.Hence, the amount or value of the property embezzled is materialto said offense. It is obvious that the filing of criminal complaints by another agency of the Govt , like the PCAC, particularly after an investigation conducted by the same, imparts the ideal that the probability of guiltis greater than when the complaints are filed by a private individual, especially when the latter is a former subordinate of the alleged offender, who was responsible for the dismissal of the complainant from her employment. Newspapers must enjoy a certain degrees of discretion in determining the manner in which a given event should be presented to the public, and the importance to be attached thereto, as a news item, and that its presentation in a sensational manner is not per se illegal. Newspapers may publish news items relative to judicial, legislative or other official proceedings, which are not of confidential nature, because the public is entitled to know the truth with respect to such proceedings. But, to enjoy immunity, a publication containing derogatory information must be not only true, but, also, fair, and it must be made in good faith and without any comments or remarks. Art. 354, RPC provides:Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious even if itbe true, if no good intention & justifiable motive for making it isshown, except, A fair and true report, made in good faith, w/o any comments or remarks. In the case at bar, aside from containing information derogatory to the plaintiff, the Aug 11 article presented her in a worse predicament than that in which she, in fact was. Said article was not a fair and true report of the proceedings therein alluded to. What is more, its sub-title PCAC raps Policarpio on fraud is a comment or remark, besides being false. Accordingly, the defamatory imputations contained in said article are presumed to be malicious CASE DIGESTS ON LIBELCM 217 Mass Media Law In falsely stating that the complaints were filed by PCAC, either defendants knew the truth or they did not. If they did, then thepublication would actually be malicious. I f they did not, or if theyacted under a misapprehension of the facts, they were guilty of negligence in making said statement.We note that the Aug 13 article rectified a major inaccuracy in the1 st article, by stating that neither Col. Alba nor the PCAC had filedthe complaints. It likewise indicated the number of stencil sheetsinvolved. But, this rectification or clarification does not wipe out theresponsibility arising from the publication of the Aug 11 article,although it should mitigate it. HELD:

Decision reversed. Defendants ordered to pay plaintiff moraldamages, attys fees plus cost LOPEZ VS. CA This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle published aseries of articles in January, 1956 about the Hoax of theYear. It also erupted in the earlier part of that month. The story goes that Fidel Cruz was a sanitary inspectorin the Babuyan Islands. He sent out a distress signal toa US air force plane who relayed it to Manila. AnotherUS plane dropped emergency supplies together with atwo-way radio. Cruz told of killings committed sinceChristmas, 1955 which terrorized the populace. ThePhilippine army was sent out only to find Cruz who only wanted transportation home to Manila. The armybranded it as a hoax. The series of articles published the photo of Fidel Cruz.However, it was not the sanitary inspectors photo that was published but that of former Mayor Fidel G. Cruz of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, businessman and contractor. Assoon as the error was noticed, a correction wasimmediately published.Fidel G. Cruz sued and the trial court awarded himdamages which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. ISSUE:WON the Publishers were guilty of libel? HELD:Yes, though the standard is actual malice, in weeklymagazines there is little excuse for errors in data. RATIONALE: No liability would be incurred if the petitioners couldprove that their actions are embraced by press freedom.Included therein is the widest latitude of choice as to what items should see the light of day as long as theyare relevant to a matter of public interest, the insistenceon the requirement as to its truth yielding at times tounavoidable inaccuracies attendant on newspapers andother publications being subject to the tyranny of deadlines. If there is no such showing, there is a quasi-delict. Libel has both a criminal and civil aspect becauseit induces breach of the peace by the defamed personand it deprives him of his good reputation.Libel was defined in the old libel law as a maliciousdefamation expressed either in writing, printing or bysigns or pictures or like exposing [someone, dead oralive] to public hatred, contempt or ridicule. Newell(Slander and Libel) states that libel is incurred when the wrong persons photograph was published with alibelous article. Holmes points out that publishing aportrait by mistake was no excuse. The publisher tookthe risk in publishing a libelous article and he publishesat his peril. Learned Hand states that when a photoexposes a person to ridicule it is libelous. Cardozo statesthat though words dissolve, writings persevere and writings include any symbol as long as it is intelligible. Criticism, however, is justified in the interest of society and the maintenance of good govt. Liberty to commenton public affairs creates a full discussion and public officers should not be too thin skinned that they canttake it. Newspapers have the legal right to have andexpress opinions on legal questions. Debate on publicissues should be uninhibited, robust, wide-open, evenallowing vehement, caustic and sharp attacks. Criticism turns to libel when actual malice is used when a statement was made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard that it was false or not (US SC,NY Times vs Sullivan).Paras as ponente in Quisumbing vs Lopez states that newspapers should not be held to account for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words. However this is not the case here. A weekly magazine is not oppressed by the tyranny of deadlines as much as dailies. There is no need to act in haste. Retractions do not absolve one from pecuniary liability. There is still responsibility arising from the publication of the first article Dizon J, dissent: The facts do not bear out the conclusion that actualmalice was involved. Damages on the basis of tort areuntenable because the articles do not involve moralturpitude. Whatever negligence there is in the caseshould be considered as excusable. NEWYORK TIMES VS. SULLIVAN A full-page advertisement came out in the NewYork Times on March 29, 1960 which talkedabout the nonviolent demonstrations beingstaged by Southern Negro students in positiveaffirmation of the right to live in human dignityas guaranteed in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights signed at the bottom by the Committeeto Defend Martin Luther King and the Strugglefor Freedom in the South L.B. Sullivan, the Commissioner of Public Affairsof Montgomery, Alabama, whose duties includesupervision of the Police and Fire Department,brought a civil libel suit against those those whocame out with the ad (4 Negro clergymen) and the NY Times Company. Basis of the suit was statements in the text of the ad saying in the 3rd par. That after students sang My Country, Tis of Thee on the State Capitol steps their leaders were expelled from school,policemen armed with shotguns and tear gas ringed the State College Campus, their dining hall was padlocked to starve them when the student body protested and in the 6thpar. that again and again the Southern violators have answered Dr. Kings peaceful protest with violence and intimidation going on to cite instances in which They have done this (e.g. They have assaulted his person). -Neither of these statements mentions the respondent by name but he arguesthat the word police in the 3rd par referred to him as Commissioner who supervised the Police Department andthat the word They used in the 6thpar would be equated with the ones did the other described acts and hence be readas accusing the Montgomery police and therefore him, of answering Dr. Kingsprotests with violence and intimidation. -Trial judge submitted the case to the jury underinstructions that the statements made werelibelous per se, which implies legal injury fromthe bare fact of publication itself, and were notprivileged therefore the only things left to beproven are whether petitioners published the adand whether the statements were made of andconcerning respondent. --trial judge found forSullivan, sustained by the Alabama SC A publication is libelous per se if the words tend to injure a person in his reputation or tobring him in public contemptthis standard is met if the words are such as to injure him inhis public office, impute misconduct to him in his office, or want of official integrity.

Once libel per se has been establishedthe defendant has no defense as tostated facts unless he can persuade the jury that they were true in theirparticulars. Unless he can discharge theburden of proving truth, generaldamages are presumed and may beawarded w/o proof of pecuniary injury. ISSUE: 1.W/N the rule of liability (regarding libel per se)regarding an action brought by a public officialagainst critics of his official conduct abridges thefreedom of speech and of the press that isguaranteed by the 1st and 14th Amendments.YES a.W/N the advertisement forfeits theprotection guaranteed to free speech and the press by the falsity of some of its factual statements and by its allegeddefamation of respondent. NO The maintenance of the opportunity forfree political discussion to the end that govtmay be responsive to the will of the peopleand that changes may be obtained by lawfulmeans, an opportunity essential to thesecurity of the Republic, is a fundamentalprinciple of our constitutional system. Factual error of statement: Authoritative interpretations of the First Amendmentguarantees have refused to recognize an exception forany test of truth especially one that puts the burden of proving truth on the speaker. Cases which impose liability for erroneousreports of the political conduct of officials reflectthe obsolete doctrine that the governed must notcriticize their governors. The interest of thepublic outweighs the interest of any otherindividual. The protection of the public requiresnot merely discussion, but information. Errors of fact are inevitable. Whatever is added to thefield of libel is taken from the field of free debate. A rule compelling the critic of official conduct toguarantee the truth of all his factual assertions--and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtuallyunlimited in amount--leads to a comparable'self-censorship.' Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on thedefendant, does not mean that only false speech will be deterred. *Under such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred fromvoicing their criticism, even though it isbelieved to be true and even though it isin fact true, because of doubt whether itcan be proved in court or fear of theexpense of having to do so. They tend tomake only statements which 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone. The rulethus dampens the vigor and limits thevariety of public debate. It isinconsistent with the First andFourteenth Amendments. Defamatory character: Criticism of their official conduct does not lose itsconstitutional protection merely because it is effectivecriticism and hence diminishes their official reputations. If neither factual error nor defamatory content suffices to remove the constitutionalshield from criticism of official conduct, the combination of the two elements is no less inadequate.When an article is considered privileged: Where an article is published and circulated amongvoters for the sole purpose of giving what the defendantbelieves to be truthful information concerning acandidate for public office and for the purpose of enabling such voters to cast their ballot moreintelligently, and the whole thing is done in good faithand without malice, the article is privileged, although theprincipal matters contained in the article may be untruein fact and derogatory to the character of the plaintiff;and in such a case the burden is on the plaintiff to showactual malice in the publication of the article. Privilege for criticism of public official isappropriately analogues to the protectionaccorded a public official when he is sued forlibel by a private citizen. Actual malice must beproved. *Proof of actual malice should be presented In cases where that line must be drawn, the rule isthat we examine for ourselves the statements in issue and the circumstances under which they were made tosee whether they are of a character which the principles of the First Amendment, as adopted by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, protect. We must make an independent examination of the whole record,so as to assure ourselves that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression. Proof showing actual malice not sufficiently shown to support judgment. On the part of the NY Times, statement does not indicate malice at the time of publication and even if the ad was not substantially correct the opinion presented therein was a reasonable one and there is no evidence to impeach the good faith of the Times in publishing it. Reference to respondent in the ads: Evidence is incapable of supporting conclusion thatstatements were made of and concerning respondent.No reference to respondent was made either by name orofficial position. None of the statements made suggestedany basis for the belief that respondent was himself attached beyond the bare fact that he was in overallcharge of the Police Department. With regard to damages: General and punitive damages must bedifferentiated and since the judge did not instruct the jury to differentiate it would then be impossible to know which one they awarded and if adequate proof was presented warranting such an award of damages.Because of this uncertainty in addition to the those discussed above, the judgment must be reversed and remanded. LIWAYWAY PUBLISHING, INC. AND U.S. AUTOMOTIVE CO., INC., petitioners, vs. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, HON. RAMON A. DIAZ, DEPUTY MINISTER, HON. MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA COMMISSIONER, respondents. I. LIWAYWAY CASE FACTS In G.R. 77422, the Commission had issued on February 12, 1987 two writs of sequestration, one addressed to the President/Chairman of the Board of the U.S. Automotive sequestering the President/Chairman's shares of stocks in the Liwayway as of April 15, 1986, and the other addressed to the President/Chairman of the Board of Liwayway sequestering all shares of stocks pertaining to U.S. Automotive in Liwayway Publishing, Inc. as of April 15, 1986.

On the same date, the Commission requested the Central Bank to instruct all commercial banks and non-bank financial institutions not to allow any withdrawals, transfers or remittances from funds or assets under any type of deposit accounts, trust accounts, and/or money market placements, including safety deposit boxes, stocks and bonds, bearer certificates and unnumbered accounts, except those which may pertain to payment of regular salaries and wages of Liwayway and HM Holding and Management, Inc. (hereafter HMH&M). Petitioners' plea for a temporary restraining order was heard on February 26, 1987, the hearing being limited to whether a restraining order should issue to restrain the commission against denying Liwayway the use and availment of its funds in the banks to put out its regular publications as well as against the Commission's interference or intervention in the management or operations of Liwayway, considering the Central Bank's blanket memorandum, at the Commission's behest, to all banks not to allow any withdrawals or remittances from its funds, except for "payment of regular salaries and wages" which would virtually shut down its publications. The then Solicitor General, now Secretary of Justice, Sedfrey Ordoez, as well as the Commission's then ViceChairman, now Chairman, Ramon Diaz, assured the Court that Liwayway's funds would not be choked off and that the Commission would not in any way interfere or intervene in the management or operations of the publication nor with its editorial policy or reportage or in any way impinge upon its freedom. It was brought out that Liwayway made over P8 million in 1986 and paid more than half of that in income tax, and they agreed further to preserve the status quo ante pending joining of the issues on the merits or a showing of some irregularity that would warrant the Commission's intervention. On February 27, 1987, the Solicitor General filed his manifestation as undertaken by him, submitting a copy of the Commission's letter dated February 26, 1987, to the CB Governor, Jose Fernandez, modifying its previous memorandum of February 12th and asking him to instruct all banks to honor all checks of Liwayway and further stating that "(A)lthough mention is made in the letter of the naming of a fiscal agent, respondent Commission is not naming anyone at this time. On the issue of freedom of the press, the Court noted with commendation the Solicitor General's pledge at the hearing that the Commission will not in any way act in such a way as to impinge upon the freedom of expression or freedom to publish the newspaper. The Court gave due faith and credence thereto and the above-cited undertakings of the Commission. Accordingly, in lieu of a temporary restraining order which has been rendered unnecessary by the Commission's manifestation and undertakings, the Court enjoined faithful compliance therewith by all concerned. This renders moot this particular issue of unwarranted intervention of the Commission and impairment of press freedom. But with the closing out of this case, as hereafter ordered and the denial of petitioner's plea to lift the sequestration orders, the Court will formalize the parties' agreement through the issuance of an injunction to the same effect, to assure compliance regardless of any change in the composition of the Commission or of other public officials concerned. As to the sequestration orders, the Commission claims that Emilio Yap, founder of U.S. Automotive Co., organized long before martial law, is a "crony" if not downright "dummy" of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos. Mr. Yap, in turn, has strongly countered the Commission's allegations as to his alleged business association with Mr. Marcos and their prima facie sufficiently in this wise: On March 2, 1987, petitioners filed its manifestation and reply to the opposition alleging the following: 1. Mr. Yap admits that he owns 2,508 shares of stocks of BASECO which constitute less than 2% of the total 218,819 outstanding shares of stocks of the company. He acquired the original 240 shares by subscription at the time of incorporation and augmented by stock dividends to the present stockholding of 2,508 shares. 2. Regarding the BASECO certificates of shares of stocks purportedly belonging to Yap and endorsed to "someone" whose name was left in blank this Court should require the respondents to produce the originals of said stock certificates in order to verify the claim that they have been endorsed in blank. 3. He had resigned from the chairmanship of BASECO since October 20, 1983. Out of his duly paid investment of P60,000, he never received any cash dividend nor profited from BASECO. 4. He has never been a stockholder nor an officer of the Jai-Alai Corporation. 5. He owned only one qualifying share in the Manila International Port Terminals, Inc.(MIPTI) which he later endorsed to the new MIPTI Chairman. He resigned as chairman of the Board before the Aquino administration. 6. He invested in the Bulletin in 1961, as second biggest stockholder on the invitation of Gen. Menzi long before Mr. Marcos became president. 7. All original stock certificates issued to U.S. Automotive and treasury shares are all in the respective possession of the registered owners and have not been endorsed to anyone. But as the Court has consistently held and reiterated in PCGG vs. Pea, G.R. No. 77663, decided also this month, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and the parties' conflicting factual contentions have to be threshed out and adjudged in the Sandiganbayan, which is vested with exclusive jurisdiction over the case. ACCORDINGLY, in the Liwayway case, G.R. No. 77422, judgment is rendered. 1. As per agreement of the parties as set forth in the Resolution of March 3, 1987, enjoining the Commission from any act interfering or intervening in any way or manner with the management or operations or afffirms of petitioner Liwayway Publishing, Inc.; and 2. Dismissing the petition for a writ of prohibition to enjoin respondents from enforcing in any manner the writs of sequestration heretofore issued over the questioned Liwayway shares whose ownership will have to be tried and determined in the Sandiganbayan. ADIONG VS. COMELEC [207 SCRA 712; G.R. NO. 103956; 31 MAR 1992] Facts: COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 which provides that decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas, prohibiting posting in "mobile" places, public or private. Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now assails the Resolution. In addition, the petitioner believes

that with the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition. Issue: Whether or Not the COMELECs prohibition unconstitutional. Held: The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech. The preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. The so-called balancing of interests individual freedom on one hand and substantial public interests on the other is made even more difficult in election campaign cases because the Constitution also gives specific authority to the Commission on Elections to supervise the conduct of free, honest, and orderly elections. When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or party and freedom to know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for maintaining clean and free elections, the police, local officials and COMELEC, should lean in favor of freedom. The regulation of election campaign activity may not pass the test of validity if it is too general in its terms or not limited in time and scope in its application, if it restricts one's expression of belief in a candidate or one's opinion of his or her qualifications, if it cuts off the flow of media reporting, and if the regulatory measure bears no clear and reasonable nexus with the constitutionally sanctioned objective. The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship. NATIONAL PRESS CLUB VS. COMELEC [201 SCRA 1; G.R. NO. 1026653; 5 MAR 1992] Facts: Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented from selling or donating space and time for political advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates for office (one for national and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election Issue and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed. It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 66461 invades and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely, media-based election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election Issue. Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and Issue in the election thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion. Issue: Whether or Not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 constitutional. Held: Yes. It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of the press has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to be a special provision applicable during a specific limited period i.e., "during the election period." In our own society, equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources that one may have at one's disposal, is clearly an important value. One of the basic state policies given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law." The essential question is whether or not the assailed legislative or administrative provisions constitute a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the operations of communication and information enterprises during an election period, or whether such act has gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during election periods. Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time to election periods. Section 11 (b) does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television stations of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political parties and programs of government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at least as such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary other coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political office. Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political advertisements of particular candidates.

The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of the candidates themselves is not unduly repressive or unreasonable. E ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. v GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondents. Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case TANODBAYAN Justice Raul M. Gonzalez said yesterday the Supreme Court order stopping him from investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar can aggravate the thought that affluent persons "an prevent the progress of a trial." What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that while rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course. Gonzalez told the Daily Globe in an exclusive interview. Gonzalez said the high tribunal's order '"eightens the people's apprehension over the justice system in this country, especially because the people have been thinking that only the small fly can get it while big fishes go scot-free." Gonzalez was reacting to an order issued by the tribunal last week after Zaldivar petitioned the court to stop the Tanodbayan from investigating graft cases filed against him. Zaldivar had charged that Gonzalez was biased in his investigations because the latter wanted to help promote the political fortunes of a friend from Antique, lawyer Bonifacio Alentajan. Acting on Zaldivar's petition, the high court stopped Gonzalez from investigating a graft charge against the governor, and from instituting any complaint with the Sandiganbayan. While President Aquino had been prodding me to prosecute graft cases even if they involve the high and mighty, the Supreme Court had been restraining me. Gonzalez said. In accordance with the President's order, Gonzalez said he had filed graft cases against two "very powerful" officials of the Aquino government-Commissioner Quintin Doromal of the Presidential Commission on Good Government and Secretary Jiamil I.M. Dianlan of the Office of Muslim Affairs and Cultural Communities. In his Motion, respondent Gonzalez, after having argued the legal merits of his position, made the following statements totally unrelated to any legal issue raised either in the Court's Decision or in his own Motion: 1. That he "ha(d) been approached twice by a leading member of the court ... and he was asked to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him;' " 2. That he "was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the COA report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will embarass the Court;" and 3. That "(i)n several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over the phone by a leading member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the cases against (two Members of the Court)." Issue:Is there a privilege communication? Ruling: Respondent Gonzalez lastly suggests that punishment for contempt is not the proper remedy in this case and suggests that the members of this Court have recourse to libel suits against him. While the remedy of libel suits by individual members of this Court may well be available against respondent Gonzalez, such is by no means an exclusive remedy. Moreover, where, as in the instant case, it is not only the individual members of the Court but the Court itself as an institution that has been falsely attacked, libel suits cannot be an adequate remedy. The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar. ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez from the practice of law indefinitely and until further orders from this Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. E EASTERN BROADCASTING CORPORATION (DYRE) petitioner, vs.THE HON. JOSE P. DANS, JR., MINISTER OF v TRANSPORTATION & COMMUNICATIONS, THE HON. CEFERINO S. CARREON, COMMISSIONER, NATIONAL TELECOM., COMMISSION, ET AL., respondents. This petition was filed to compel the respondents to allow the reopening of Radio Station DYRE which had been summarily closed on grounds of national security. The petitioner contended that it was denied due process when it was closed on the mere allegation that the radio station was used to incite people to sedition. it alleged that no hearing was held and not a bit of proof was submitted to establish a factual basis for the closure. The petitioner was not informed beforehand why administrative action which closed the radio station was taken against it. No action was taken by the respondents to entertain a motion seeking the reconsideration of the closure action. The petitioner also raised the issue of freedom of speech. It appears from the records that the respondents' general charge of "inciting people to commit acts of sedition" arose from the petitioner's shift towards what it stated was the coverage of public events and the airing of programs geared towards public affairs. Ruling: All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent, In his Constitution of the Philippines (2nd Edition, pp. 569-570) Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando cites at least nine of our decisions which apply the test (Primicias v. Fugoso [80 Phil. 71], American Bible Society v. City of Manila [101 Phil. 386], Cabansag v. Fernandez [102 Phil. 152], Vera v. Arca [28 SCRA 351], Navarro v. Villegas [31 SCRA 931], Imbong v. Ferrer [35 SCRA 28], Badoy v. Commission on Elections [35 SCRA 285], People v. Ferrer [48 SCRA 382], and the Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. [51 SCRA 189]. More recently, the clear and present danger test was applied in J.B.L. Reyes in behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition v. Bagatsing [125 SCRA 553].

The clear and present danger test, however, does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums. Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated among qualified users. A broadcast corporation cannot simply appropriate a certain frequency without regard for government regulation or for the rights of others. All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media. The American Court in Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation (438 U.S. 726), confronted with a patently offensive and indecent regular radio program, explained why radio broadcasting, more than other forms of communications, receives the most limited protection from the free expression clause. First, broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all citizens, Material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but in the privacy of his home. Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children. Bookstores and motion picture theaters may be prohibited from making certain material available to children, but the same selectivity cannot be done in radio or television, where the listener or viewer is constantly tuning in and out. WHEREFORE, the case having become moot and academic, the petitioner's motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition is hereby GRANTED. N NEWSWEEK, INC., petitioner, vs.THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and NATIONAL FEDERATION OF v SUGARCANE PLANTERS INC., BINALBAGAN-ISABELA PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ASOCIACION DE AGRICULTORES DE LA CARLOTA, LA CASTELLANA y PONTEVEDRA, INC., DONEDCO PLANTERS ASSOCIATION INC., ARMANDO GUSTILO, ENRIQUE ROJAS, ALFREDO MONTELIBANO, JR., PABLO SOLA, JOSE MONTALVO, VICENTE GUSTILO, JOSEPH MARANON, ROBERTO CUENCA, JOSE SICANGCO, FLORENCIO ALONSO, MIGUEL GATUSLAO, PEDRO YULO, MARINO RUBIN and BENJAMIN BAUTISTA, respondents. Newsweek, Inc., a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, in this special action for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction, seeks to annul the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated December 17, 1982 sustaining the Order of the then Court of First Instance of Bacolod City which denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss the complaint for libel filed by private respondents (Civil Case No. 15812), and the Resolution dated March 10, 1983 which denied its Motion for Reconsideration. It appears that on March 5, 1981, private respondents, incorporated associations of sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental claiming to have 8,500 members and several individual sugar planters, filed Civil Case No. 15812 in their own behalf and/or as a class suit in behalf of all sugarcane planters in the province of Negros Occidental, against petitioner and two of petitioners' non-resident correspondents/reporters Fred Bruning and Barry Came. The complaint alleged that petitioner and the other defendants committed libel against them by the publication of the article "An Island of Fear" in the February 23, 1981 issue of petitioner's weekly news magazine Newsweek. The article supposedly portrayed the island province of Negros Occidental as a place dominated by big landowners or sugarcane planters who not only exploited the impoverished and underpaid sugarcane workers/laborers, but also brutalized and killed them with imprunity. Complainants therein alleged that said article, taken as a whole, showed a deliberate and malicious use of falsehood, slanted presentation and/or misrepresentation of facts intended to put them (sugarcane planters) in bad light, expose them to public ridicule, discredit and humiliation here in the Philippines and abroad, and make them objects of hatred, contempt and hostility of their agricultural workers and of the public in general. They prayed that defendants be ordered to pay them PlM as actual and compensatory damages, and such amounts for moral, exemplary and corrective damages as the court may determine, plus expenses of litigation, attorney's fees and costs of suit. A photo copy of the article was attached to the complaint. Ruling:The disputed portion of the article which refers to plaintiff Sola and which was claimed to be libelous never singled out plaintiff Sola as a sugar planter. The news report merely stated that the victim had been arrested by members of a special police unit brought into the area by Pablo Sola, the mayor of Kabankalan. Hence, the report, referring as it does to an official act performed by an elective public official, is within the realm of privilege and protected by the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press. On the other hand, petitioner would do well to heed the admonition of the President to media that they should check the sources of their information to ensure the publication of the truth. Freedom of the press, like all freedoms, should be exercised with responsibility. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is reversed and the complaint in Civil Case No. 15812 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental is dismissed. KAPISANAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CAMARA SHOES, DEMETRIO RAMOS and ANANIAS ASTURIAS, p petitioners, vs.CAMARA SHOES AND HEIRS OF SANTOS CAMARA, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS v COMMISSION AND MINISTER OF LABOR, respondents. Demetrio Ramos, petitioner alleges that the deduction of P1.00 a day from his salary without his consent was unlawful; and that when he wrote "under protest" on the company payroll, he was merely exercising his right to air his grievances on the unauthorized deductions made by respondent company. Petitioner denied that he incurred a loan from the respondent company in the amount of P50.00, and P500.00 for two cartloads of second hand lumber and building materials taken from the demolished store at Nueva Street. Petitioner asserts that his suspension was due primarily to his union activities. He contends that his suspension was discriminatory and constitutes an unfair labor practice. Ruling: It is thus an too clear from the foregoing that petitioner Ramos was justified in airing his grievances against the unauthorized and illegal deductions made by respondent company. By writing "under protest" on the company payroll, petitioner Ramos was well within the ambit of his constitutional freedom of expression as well as the right to petition

against what was obviously a calculated undue harassment amounting to unfair labor practice perpetuated by respondent employer herein. WHEREFORE, THE ASSAILED ORDER DATED FEBRUARY 19,1979 OF RESPONDENT MINISTER OF LABOR AFFIRMING THE FEBRUARY 19, 1976 DECISION OF THE LABOR ARBITER IS HEREBY MODIFIED, AND THE RESPONDENT CAMARA SHOES AND HEIRS OF SANTOS CAMARA ARE HEREBY ORDERED TO PAY PETITIONER ANANIAS ASTURIAS BACK WAGES EQUIVALENT TO THREE (3) YEARS WITHOUT QUALIFICATION AND TO PAY PETITIONER DEMETRIO RAMOS ONE (1) MONTH BACK WAGES. IN RE ATTY. EMMANUEL S. TIPON respondent. The Postmaster General in a first indorsement to the Chief Justice dated May 17, 1965 transmitted certain papers purporting to show that Atty. Emmanuel S. Tipon (admitted to the bar in 1956) might have violated the lawyer's oath for having imported the magazine Playboy, which was considered as non-mailable matter. In this Court's resolution of May 31, 1965 action on the complaint of the Postmaster General was deferred until after Civil Case No. 3898-111 of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte entitled "Emmanuel S. Tipon vs. Belarmino P. Navarro and Enrico Palomar" (Assistant Postmaster General and Postmaster General, respectively) is decided. That case was a mandamus action filed by Atty. Tipon in 1964 in Ilocos Norte against the Postmaster General and his assistant. In a decision dated March 19, 1966 the court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction or improper venue. So that decision is not determinative of the question of whether or not the complaint of the Postmaster General should be given due course. What is decisive is the second indorsement dated July 5, 1967 of Hon. Antonio V. Raquiza, Secretary of Public Works and Communications, who, as Department Head, exercised direct control, direction, and supervision over the Bureau of Posts. In that indorsement Secretary Raquiza rendered the opinion that Playboy magazine cannot be character as obscene and that it can be carried and deposited in Philippine mails. The Secretary said that he scrutinized the background of Atty. Tipon, a 1955 law graduate of the University of the Philippines who placed third in the bar examinations, a Fullbright Smith-Mundt scholar, and a holder of the Master of Laws degree from the Yale Law School. The Secretary concluded that "there is absolutely no to show that Atty. Tipon had violated or intended to violate the postal laws, the lawyer's oath or the Canons of Legal Ethics." Secretary Raquiza requested that the Postmaster General's t of May 17, 1965 be considered withdrawn. WHEREFORE, this case is considered closed for having become moot and academic. Lacsa vs. IAC 161 SCRA 427 May 23, 1988 - Lacsa was a CPA and amember of the Board of Directors of the Phil. Columbian Association;complainant is Ponciano Marquez (President of Board). Lacsa had access tothe records of its members and he discovered that Marquez was a mere associate member of the association. Hence, he questioned Marquezsqualifications and wrote a letter to the Board (and even to Marquez;Which was later published and circulated to the members) branded Marquez as a DE FACTO president. SC:1.Test of libelous meaning is NOT the analysis of a sentence into component phrases with the meticulous care of the grammarian or stylist, But the import conveyed by the entirety of the language to the ordinary reader .2.Even if the letter is a privileged communication,it lost its character as such when the matter was published in the newsletter and circulated among the members .3.No good faith since it was his irresponsible act of letter writing to expose his alleged discovery of what he perceived to be an anomaly without the verification which ordinary prudence demands Kapunan v de Villa Facts: prohibition and/or habeascorpus, petitioners, who wereimplicated in the unsuccessful coupd'etat of August 28, 1987 and relievedof their duties in the Philippine MilitaryAcademy (PMA), seek the issuance of the writs of certiorari and prohibition (1) to set aside, as null and void, the"pre-trial investigation" report finding aprima facie case against them andrecommending their trial for mutinyand conduct unbecoming an officer andthe denial of their motion forreconsideration, and (2) to enjoinrespondent General Court Martial No. 8from further proceeding in the case of "People v. Lt. Col. Eduardo Kapunan, etal." Further, petitioner Kapunan seeksthe issuance of a writ of habeas corpusto procure his release fromconfinement. In the aftermath of thefailed August 28, 1987 coup d'etatwhere cadets of the Philippine MilitaryAcademy reportedly openly supportedthe plotters and issued statements tothat effect. PMA Board of Officers toinvestigate the alleged involvement of officers and cadets of the PMA [Rollo, p.187]. A fact-finding investigation wasconducted by the PMA Board fromSeptember 1 to 11, 1987 and onSeptember 23, 1987 it submitted itsfindings to the AFP Chief of Staff.Charge sheets were filed againstpetitioners for mutiny and conductunbecoming an officer and a "pre-trialinvestigation" was conducted byrespondent Maj. Baldonado. Kapunanwas allegedly summoned to theGeneral Headquarters of the AFP for adialogue, but upon his arrival thereaton September 4, 1987 he was orderedconfined under "house arrest" by thenChief of Staff Gen. Fidel Ramos. OnFebruary 19, 1988, the arrest of petitioner Kapunan, together with three (3) others, was ordered by respondentChief of Staff De Villa in connection with the killing of Atty. Rolando Olalia andLeonore Alay-ay Issue: Whether or not the house arrestor confinement of Kapunan is illegal Ruling: the Court Resolved to DISMISS the Petition . The Court finds that petitioner Kapunan's continued confinement is not tainted with illegality. Among the grounds for thedisallowance of the writ of habeascorpus is that the applicant has beencharged with or convicted of in offense[Sec. 4, Rule 102, Rules of Court]. In the instant case, petitioner Kapunanhad been charged with mutiny, aserious offense punishable by death orsuch other punishment as a courtmartial may direct. There is a legalcause of his confinement. Art. 70.Arrest or confinement.Any personsubject to

military law charged withcrime or with a serious offense underthese Articles shall be placed inconfinement or in arrest, ascircumstances may require; but whencharged with a minor offense only, suchperson shall not ordinarily be placed inconfinement. Any person placed inarrest under the provisions of thisarticle shall thereby be restricted to hisbarracks, quarters, or tent, unless suchlimits shall be enlarged by properauthority. ...It cannot be gainsaid thatcertain liberties of persons in themilitary service, including the freedomof speech, may be circumscribed byrules of military discipline. Thus, to acertain degree, individual rights may becurtailed, because the effectiveness of the military in fulfilling its duties underthe law depends to a large extent onthe maintenance of discipline within itsranks. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,vs.J. J. KOTTINGER, defendant-appellant. The question to be here decided is whether or not pictures portraying the inhabitants of the country in native dress and as they appear and can be seen in the regions in which they live, are absence or indecent. On November 24, 1922, detective Juan Tolentino raided the premises known as Camera Supply Co. at 110 Escolta, Manila. He found and confiscated the post-cards which subsequently were used as evidence against J. J. Kottinger, the manager of the company. Out of these facts arose the criminal prosecution of J. J. Kottinger in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The information filed in court charged him with having kept for sale in the store of the Camera Supply Co., obscene and indecedent pictures, in violation of section 12 of Act No. 277. Act No. 277 is the Philippine Libel Law. But included therein is a section, No. 12, making obscene or indecent publications misdemeanors The pictures which it is argued offend against the law on account of being obscene and indecent, disclose six different postures of non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines. The prosecution produced no evidence proving the postcards obscene and indecent because it thought the post-cards themselves the best evidence of that fact. The fiscal admitted in open court "that those pictures represented the natives (non-Christians) in their native dress." The defendant, on the other hand, attempted to show that the pictures as true to life. Dr. H. Otley Beyer, Professor in the University of the Philippines, corroborated by other witnesses, testified from his studies in various parts of the Islands, such as the Mountain Province, Abra, Palawan, and Mindanao and Sulu, that none of the pictures represented poses which he had not observed on various occasions, and that the costumes worn by the people in the pictures are the true costumes regularly worn by them. Are such pictures obscene or indecent? HELD:The word "obscene" and the term "obscenity" may be defined as meaning something offensive to chastify, decency, or delicacy. "Indeceny" is an act against behavior and a just delicacy. The test ordinarily followed by the courts in determining whether a particular publication or other thing is obscene within the meaning of the statutes, is whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall. Another test of obscenity is that which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency, (29 Cyc., 1315; 8 R. C. L., 312.) The Philippine statute does not attempt to define obscene or indecent pictures, writings, papers, or books. But the words "obscene or indecent" are themselves descriptive. They are words in common used and every person of average intelligence understand their meaning. Indeed, beyond the evidence furnished by the pictures themselves, there is but little scope for proof bearing on the issue of obscenity or indecency. Whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case. (People vs. Muller [1884], 96 N. Y., 408; 48 Am. Rep., 635.) The statute does not undertake to define the meaning of the terms "obscene," etc., further than may be implied by the succeeding phrase, "or other publication of an indecent character." On the well-organized canon of construction these words are presumed to have been employed by the law-maker in their ordinary acceptation and use. The test of obscenity is this: Where the tendency of the matter charged as obscene is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall;" and where "it who suggest to the minds of the young of either sex, or even to persons of more advanced years, thoughts of the most impure and libidinous character." So, also, it has been held that a book is obscene which is offensive to decency or chastity, which is immodest, which is indelicate, impure, causing lewd thoughts of an immoral tendency." U. S. vs. Bennet, 16 Blatchf., 338. Judge Thayer, in U. S. vs. Clarke, 38 Fed. Rep., 732, observed: "The word "obscene" ordinarily means something which is offensive to chastity; something that is foul or filthy, and for that reason is offensive to pure-minded persons. That is the meaning of the word in the concrete; but when used, as in the statute, to describe the character of a book, pamphlet, or paper, it means containing immodest and indecent matter, the reading whereof would have a tendency to deprave and corrupt the minds of those into whose hands the publication might fall whose minds are open to such immoral influences." The pictures in question merely depict persons as they actually live, without attempted presentation of persons in unusual postures or dress. The aggregate judgment of the Philippine community, the moral sense of all the people in the Philippines, would not be shocked by photographs of this type. We are convicted that the post-card pictures in this case cannot be characterized as offensive to chastity, or foul, or filthy. We readily understand the laudable motives which moved the Government to initiate this prosecution. We fully appreciate the sentiments of colleagues who take a different view of the case. We would be the last to offend the sensibilities of the Filipino people and the sanction anything which would hold them up to ridicule in the eyes of mankind. But we emphasize that we are not deciding a question in political theory or in social ethics. We are dealing with a legal question predicated on a legal fact, and on this question and fact, we reach the conclusion that there has not been proved a violation of section 12 of the Libel Law. When other cases predicated on other states of facts are brought to our attention, we will decide them as they arise. We seem to recall the statement of counsel that the proprietor of the photographic concern whom he represents would on his own initiative place suitable and explicit inscriptions on the pictures so that no one may be misled as to them.

Indeed, he might even go further and out of consideration for the natural sensibilities of his customers, withdraw from sale certain pictures which can be pointed out to him. We hold that pictures portraying the inhabitants of the country in native dress and as they appear and can be seen in the regions in which they live, are not obscene or indecent within the meaning of the Libel Law. Disagreeing therefore with the appellant on his technical argument but agreeing with him on his main contention, it becomes our duty to order the dismissal of the information. 1awph!l.net Judgment is reversed, the information is dismissed, and the defendant-appellant is acquitted with all costs de oficio. Mr. Chief Justice Manuel ROMUALDEZ, J., dissent- I do not agree with the view taken by the majority as to the nature of the photographic pictures in question. While said pictures cannot, strictly, be termed obscene, they must, however, be regarded as indecent, for they are so. Such pictures offend modesty and refinement, and for this reason, they are indecent. This is shown by common sense. No woman claiming to be decent would dare to stand before the public in Manila, where said pictures were exhibited, in the same fashion as these pictures are. It is alleged that these pictures were taken from nature in non-Christian regions. We agree that in said regions they are not, perhaps, regarded as offensive to modesty, and, therefore, are accidentally not indecent there. But in the City of Manila where they were exhibited, no doubt they are. And the law prohibits the exhibition not only of obscene pictures, but of indecent as well. (Sec. 12, Act No. 277.) I understand that the judgment appealed from should have been affirmed. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.GO PIN, defendant-appellant. Go Pin, an alien and a Chinese citizen, was charged with a violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code for having exhibited in the City of Manila at the Globe Arcade, a recreation center, a large number of one-real 16-millimeter films about 100 feet in length each, which are allegedly indecent and/or immoral. At first, he pleaded not guilty of the information but later was allowed by the court to change his plea to that of guilty which he did. Not content with the plea of guilty the trial court had the films in question projected and were viewed by it in order to evaluate the same from the standpoint of decency and morality. Thereafter, and considering the plea of guilty entered by the accused, and the fact that after viewing the films the trial court noted only a slight degree of obscenity, indecency and immorality in them, it sentenced the appellant to 6 months and 1 day of prision correcciconal and to pay a fine of P300, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. He is now appealing from the decision. Go Pin does not deny his guilt but he claims that under the circumstances surrounding the case, particularly the slight degree of obscenity, indecency and immorality noted by the court in the films, the prison sentence should be eliminated from the penalty imposed. His counsel brings to our attention some authorities to the effect that paintings and pictures of women in the nude, including sculptures of that kind are not offensive because they are made and presented for the sake of art. We agree with counsel for appellant in part. If such pictures, sculptures and paintings are shown in art exhibits and art galleries for the cause of art, to be viewed and appreciated by people interested in art, there would be no offense committed. However, the pictures here in question were used not exactly for arts sake but rather for commercial purposes. In other words, the supposed artistic qualities of said pictures were being commercialized so that the cause of art was of secondary or minor importance. Gain and profit would appear to have been the main, if not the exclusive consideration in their exhibition; and it would not be surprising if the persons who went to see those pictures and paid entrance fees for the privilege of doing so, were not exactly artists and persons interested in art and who generally go to art exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and improve their artistic tastes, but rather people desirous of satisfying their morbid curiosity and taste, and lust, and for love for excitement, including the youth who because of their immaturity are not in a position to resist and shield themselves from the ill and perverting effects of these pictures. Before rendering sentence the trial court asked the prosecuting attorney for this recommendation and said official recommendation that considering that the accused Go Pin is an alien who is supposed to maintain a high degree of morality while he is in the Philippines, and considering that he engaged in a very nefarious trade, which degenerates the moral character of our youth, who are usually the regular customers of his trade, he recommended that appellant be sentenced to 2 years imprisonment and a fine of P300. Notwithstanding this recommendation, the trial court as already said, probably considering its opinion that the pictures were not so obscene, indecent and immoral but only slightly so, gave appellant only 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional in addition to P300 fine. HELD:The penalty imposed by the trial court is within the range provided by Article 201 of the Revised Code. We are satisfied that in imposing the penalty the trial court made use of its sound discretion, and we find no reason for modifying the said sentence. The Solicitor General in his brief even urges that we recommend to the proper authorities that deportation proceedings be instituted against appellant as an undesirable alien. The trial court could have done this but did not do so, believing perhaps that it was warranted. We repeat that we do not feel justified in interfering with the discretion of the trial court in the imposition of the sentence in this case. In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs. Miller VS California was a Landmark United States Supreme Court case that changed the precedence involving what constitutes unprotected obscenity for First Amendment purposes. The decision reiterated that obscenity was not protected by the First Amendment and established the Miller test for determining what constituted obscene material. Brief Fact Summary. The Defendant, Millers (Defendant) conviction for mailing advertisements for adult books to unwilling recipients was vacated and remanded in an effort to shift the burden of obscenity determinations to the state and local courts. Synopsis of Rule of Law. In determining whether speech is obscene, the basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find the material, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest of sex, (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,

sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literacy, artistic, political, or scientific value. Facts. The Defendant was convicted under the California Penal Code for mailing advertisements for adult material to non-soliciting recipients. Issue. Whether state statutes may regulate obscene material without limits? Held. No. Judgment of the lower court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. In determining whether speech is obscene, the basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find the material, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest of sex, (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literacy, artistic, political, or scientific value. The Supreme Court of the Untied States (Supreme Court) does not adopt as a constitutional standard the utterly without redeeming social value test. If a state law that regulates obscene material is thus limited, as written or construed, First Amendment constitutional values are adequately protected by the ultimate power of appellate courts to conduct an independent review of constitutional claims when necessary. Dissent. To send men to jail for violating standards that they cannot understand due to vagueness, denies them of due process. The statute in question is overbroad and thus, unconstitutional. Discussion. This case attempts a new definition and clarification of obscenity while also trying to shift the burden of obscenity determinations to the state and local courts. Additional Info: History The appellant, Marvin Miller, operator of one of the West Coast's largest mail-order businesses dealing in pornography, had conducted a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of illustrated books, labeled "adult" material. Miller was convicted by the Superior Court of Orange County, California (the state trial court) of having violated California Penal Code 311.2 by mailing unsolicited sexually explicit material in violation of a California statute that fulfilled the criteria of the obscenity test formulated in the previous similar case of Memoirs v. Massachusetts. The jury was instructed to analyze Californias community standards of obscenity. The appellants case was affirmed on appeal. The content that was mailed was confirmed to be sexually explicit. It was found that the work, as a whole, did not have any serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value and therefore did not obtain the protection of the first amendment (freedom of speech). This was considered a misdemeanor, by knowingly distributing obscene material. The conviction was affirmed by the California Court of Appeals. As stated in the preface to Chief Justice Warren Burger's majority opinion, the Appellant's conviction was specifically based on his conduct in causing five unsolicited advertising brochures to be sent through the mail in an envelope addressed to a restaurant in Newport Beach, California. The envelope was opened by the manager of the restaurant and his mother. They had not requested the brochures and complained to the police. According to the Court's decision, the materials in question primarily... consist[ed] of pictures and drawings very explicitly depicting men and women in groups of two or more engaging in a variety of sexual activities, with genitals often prominently displayed. Since the Court's decision in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), the Court had struggled to define what constituted constitutionally unprotected obscene material. Under the Comstock laws that prevailed before Roth, articulated most famously in the 1868 English case Regina v. Hicklin, any material that tended to "deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences" was deemed "obscene" and could be banned on that basis. Thus, works by Balzac, Flaubert, James Joyce, and D. H. Lawrence were banned based on isolated passages and the effect they might have on children. Roth repudiated the Hicklin test and defined obscenity more strictly, as material whose "dominant theme taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest" to the "average person, applying contemporary community standards." Only material now meeting this test could be banned as "obscene." Hugo Black and William O. Douglas, who were First Amendment literalists, chafed at the Roth test and argued vigorously that the First Amendment protected obscene material. In subsequent cases the Court encountered tremendous difficulty in applying the Roth test, which did not define what it meant by "community standards." For example, in the 1964 case Jacobellis v. Ohio, involving whether Ohio could ban the showing of a French film called Les Amants (French for The Lovers), the Court ruled that the film was protected by the First Amendment, but could not agree as to a rationale, yielding four different opinions from the majority, with none garnering the support of more than two justices, as well as two dissenting opinions. In his concurring opinion in Jacobellis, Justice Potter Stewart, holding that Roth protected all obscenity except "hard-core pornography," famously wrote, "I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that." In Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), a plurality of the Court further redefined the Roth test by holding unprotected only that which is "patently offensive" and "utterly without redeeming social value," but no opinion in that case could command a majority of the Court either, and the state of the law in the obscenity field remained confused. Pornography and sexually oriented publications proliferated as a result of the Court's holdings. The Sexual Revolution of the 1960s flowered, and pressure increasingly came to the Court to allow leeway for state and local governments to crack down on obscenity. During his ill-fated bid to become Chief Justice, Justice Abe Fortas was attacked vigorously in Congress by conservatives such as Strom Thurmond for siding with the Warren Court majority in liberalizing protection for pornography. In his 1968 presidential campaign, Richard Nixon campaigned against the Warren Court, pledging to appoint strict constructionists to the Supreme Court.

Chief Justice Warren Burger came to the Court in 1969 believing that the Court's obscenity jurisprudence was misguided and governments should be given more leeway to ban obscene materials. In consideration of Miller in May and June 1972, Burger pushed successfully for a looser definition of "obscenity" which would allow local prosecutions, while Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., who by now also believed the Roth and Memoirs tests should be abandoned, led the charge for protecting all "obscenity" unless distributed to minors or exposed offensively to unconsenting adults. Decision of the case was contentious, and Miller was put over for reargument for October term 1972, and did not come down until June 1973, with Burger prevailing by a bare 5-4 vote. [1] [2] [3] The decision The question before the court was whether the sale and distribution of obscene material was protected under the First Amendment's guarantee of Freedom of Speech. The Court ruled that it was not. It indicated that "obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment", specially that of hardcore pornography, thereby reaffirming part of Roth.[4][5] However, the Court acknowledged "the inherent dangers of undertaking to regulate any form of expression," and said that "State statutes designed to regulate obscene materials must be carefully limited."[6] The Court, in an attempt to set such limits devised a set of three criteria which must be met in order for a work to be legitimately subject to state regulation: whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards (not national standards, as some prior tests required), would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct or excretory functions[7] specifically defined by applicable state law; and "whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."[8] This obscenity test overturns the definition of obscenity set out in the Memoirs decision, which held that "all ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance . . . have the full protection of the guaranties [of the First Amendment]" and that obscenity was that which was "utterly without redeeming social importance."[9] The Miller decision vacated the Superior Court of California Appeals Court decision and remanded the case to that Court for further proceedings consistent with the First Amendment standards established by the opinion. Effects of the decision Miller provided states greater freedom in prosecuting alleged purveyors of "obscene" material because, for the first time since Roth, a majority of the Court agreed on a definition of "obscenity." Hundreds of "obscenity" prosecutions went forward after Miller, and the Supreme Court began denying review of these state actions after years of reviewing many "obscenity" convictions (over 60 appeared on the Court's docket for the 1971-72 term, pre-Miller). A companion case to Miller, Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, provided states with greater leeway to shut down adult movie houses. Controversy arose over Miller's "community standards" analysis, with critics charging that Miller encouraged forum shopping to prosecute national producers of what some believe to be "obscenity" in locales where community standards differ substantially from the rest of the nation. For example, under the "community standards" prong of the Miller test, what might be considered "obscene" in Massachusetts might not be considered "obscene" in Utah, or the opposite might be true; in any event, prosecutors tend to bring charges in locales where they believe that they will prevail. The "community standards" portion of the decision is of particular relevance with the rise of the Internet, as materials believed by some to be "obscene" can be accessed from anywhere in the nation, including places where there is a greater concern about "obscenity" than other areas of the nation. In the years since Miller, many localities have cracked down on adult theatres and bookstores, as well as nude dancing, through restrictive zoning ordinances and public nudity laws. These types of actions have been upheld by the Supreme Court. Additionally, in 1982's New York v. Ferber, the Court declared child pornography is unprotected by the First Amendment, upholding the state of New York's ban on that material. In the recent Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition case, however, the Court held that sexually explicit material that appears to depict minors might be constitutionally protected. In American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression v. Strickland, plaintiffs American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression, joined by various publishers, retailers, and web site operators, sued Ohios Attorney General and Ohio county prosecutors in United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. Plaintiffs alleged that Ohio Revised Code 2907.01(E) and (J), which prohibited the dissemination or display of materials harmful to juveniles, unconstitutionally violated both the First Amendment and the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. Plaintiffs specifically challenged the statute's definition of "harmful to juveniles," as well as the provisions governing internet dissemination of those materials. The court held the statute unconstitutional because the statute's definition of "material harmful to minors" did not comply with Miller. Defendants appealed the decision to the Sixth Circuit. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) No. 47 Facts: Appellant and his wife operate "Sam's Stationery and Luncheonette" in Bellmore, Long Island. They have a lunch counter, and, among other things, also sell magazines including some so-called "girlie" magazines. Appellant was prosecuted under two informations, each in two counts, which charged that he personally sold a 16-year-old boy two "girlie" magazines on each of two dates in October 1965, in violation of 484-h of the New York Penal Law. He was tried before a judge without a jury in Nassau County District Court and was found guilty on both counts. 1 The judge found (1) that the [390 U.S. 629, 632] magazines contained pictures which depicted female "nudity" in a manner defined in subsection 1 (b), that is "the showing of . . . female . . . buttocks with less than a full opaque covering, or the showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any portion thereof below the top of the nipple . . .," and (2) that the pictures were "harmful to minors" in that they had, within the meaning of subsection 1 (f) [390 U.S. 629, 633] "that quality of . . . representation . . . of nudity . . . [which] . . . (i) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, and (ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult

community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and (iii) is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors." He held that both sales to the 16-year-old boy therefore constituted the violation under 484-h of "knowingly to sell . . . to a minor" under 17 of "(a) any picture . . . which depicts nudity . . . and which is harmful to minors," and "(b) any . . . magazine . . . which contains . . . [such pictures] . . . and which, taken as a whole, is harmful to minors." The conviction was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Term, Second Department, of the Supreme Court. Appellant was denied leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals and then appealed to this Court. We noted probable jurisdiction. 388 U.S. 904 . We affirm. Contention of the accused: Ginsberg argued before the court that the State of New York did not have the power to classify two different sets of the population in regards to obscene material and that it was an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty. He cited Meyer v. Nebraska, Pierce v. Society of Sisters and Prince v. Massachusetts Held: Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the court. The court rejected Ginsbergs argument that New York had deprived minors of their liberty. The court found that it was well within the states power to protect minors and that just because the material is not classified as obscene to adults it may still be regulated with minors. Obscenity is not within the area of protected speech or press, and there is no issue here of the obscenity of the material involved as appellant does not argue that the magazines are not "harmful to minors." PITA VS. COURT OF APPEALS [178 SCRA 362; G.R. NO.80806; 5 OCT 1989] Facts: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors,newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of various student organizations. Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita. Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District of the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiffs magazines or from preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. Plaintiff also filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order against indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy" Magazines, pending hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction. The Court granted the temporary restraining order. The case was set for trial upon the lapse of the TRO. RTC ruled that the seizure was valid. This was affirmed by the CA. Issue: Whether or Not the seizure violative of the freedom of expression of the petitioner. Held: Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws punishing the author, publishers and sellers of obscene publications. However, It is easier said than done to say, that if the pictures here in question were used not exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial purposes, the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection. Using the Kottinger rule: the test of obscenity is "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall." Another is whether it shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. Ultimately "whether a picture is obscene or indecentmust depend upon the circumstances of the case and that the question is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it." The government authorities in the instant case have not shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant. The court provides that the authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion an obscenity seizure is in order and that; 1. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are obscene and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action; 2. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene. The question is to be resolved on a caseto-case basis and on the judges sound discretion; NORBERTO QUISUMBING, petitioner-appellant,vs. EUGENIO LOPEZ, ET AL., respondents-appellees ISSUE: Whether or not The Manila Chronicles published article with amalicious headline is liable of libel? FACTS: The respondents Eugenio Lopez, Ernesto del Rosario and RobertoVillanueva are the publisher, editor-in-chief, and general manager respectively of The Manila Chronicle , a daily newspaper publishedand circulated in English in the City of Manila. On July 15, 1949, thepetitioner, Norberto Quisumbing, filed a complaint against saidrespondents in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the recoveryof damages in the sum of P50,000 as a result of the followingalleged libelous publication inThe Manila Chronicleof November 7,1947.NBI MEN RAID OFFICES OF 3 CITY USURERS" After answer and trial the Court of First Instance of Manila rendereda judgment dismissing the complaint from which the petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The latter Court, in its decisionpromulgated on January 19, 1953, affirmed the judgment of thecourt of origin; and the case is now before us on petition for reviewoncertiorari filed by the petitioner.

The Court of Appeals found "that the context of the article inquestion, is a fair, impartial and true report of official or publicproceeding authorized by law. The news item was the result of apress release in connection with an official investigation of the Anti-Usury Division, N.B.I., and was a substantial, if not a faithful reproduction of the said press release which was, in turn, an accurate report of the official proceedings taken by the Anti-UsuryDivision. The article merely reported a raid on the 'business officesof three alleged money lenders'; and related the steps actuallytaken or to be taken by the proper officials relative to theinvestigation. It did not go beyond the actual report of officialactuations. RULING OF THE CASE:HELD1)NO. The elements of libel are NOT present. i)Headlines which are voluntarily defamatory statements of thepublisher are not privileged even though they head a privilegedreport of a judicial or other public proceedings. It is notnecessary to reiterate the rule that the headline of an articlemight be libelous while the body of the article is privileged. Thewhole libel might be included in the headlines.A publication claimed to be defamatory must be read andconstrued in the sense in which the readers to whom it isaddressed would ordinarily understand it. So, the wholeitem, including display lines, should be read andconstrued together, and its meaning and significationthus determined. ii)The headline of an article or paragraph, being so conspicuousas to attract the attention of persons who look casually over apaper without carefully reading all its contents, may in itself inflict very serious injury upon a person, both because it maybe the only part of the article which is read, and because it maycast a graver imputation than all the other words following it.There is no doubt that in publications concerning privatepersons, as well as in all other publications which are claimedto be libelous,the headlines directing the attention to thepublication may be considered as a part of it and may even justify a court in regarding the publication aslibelous when the body of the article is not necessarily so. PP v Alarcon: which was impliedly adopted in subsequent cases dealing with contempt Justice Manuel V. Moran noted the two kinds of publication which are punishable with contempt, to wit: Contempt, by reason of publications relating to court and to court proceedings, are of two kinds. A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by courts. This is the rule announced in the cases relied upon by the majority. A publication which tends to degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by courts. In the language of the majority, what is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. In the first, there is no contempt where there is no action pending, as there is no decision which might in any way be influenced by the newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity. x x x Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed. In Alarcon, we emphasized: It is true that the Constitution guarantees the freedom of speech and of the press. But license or abuse of that freedom should not be confused with freedom in its true sense. Well-ordered liberty demands no less unrelaxing vigilance against abuse of the sacred guaranties of the Constitution than the fullest protection of their legitimate exercise. As important as is the maintenance of a judiciary unhampered in its administration of justice and secure in its continuous enjoyment of public confidence. x x x. Gov. Enrique Garcia v Manrique Facts: The instant case stemmed. from an article in Luzon Tribune, a newspaper of general circulation wherein respondent Manrique is the Decision 2 G.R. No. 186592 publisher/editor, which allegedly contained disparaging statements against the Supreme Court. The petitioners, namely: Governor Enrique T. Garcia, Jr. (Gov. Garcia), Aurelio C. Angeles, Jr. (Angeles), Emerlinda S. Talento (Talento) and Rodolfo H. De Mesa (De Mesa) alleged that the subject article undermines the peoples faith in the Supreme Court due to blunt allusion that they employed bribery in order to obtain relief from the Court, particularly in obtaining a temporary restraining order (TRO) in G.R. No. 185132. The pertinent portions of the article which was entitled, TRO ng Korte Suprema binayaran ng P20-M? and published in the January 14 to 20, 2009 issue of the Luzon Tribune, are reproduced as follows: 1Bukod sa mga kontrobersiya na bumabalot ngayon sa Korte Suprema dahil sa isyu ng umanoy pagpapatalsik kay Chief Justice Renato Puno, hindi maalis sa isip ng ilang Bataeo ang pagtatanong kung totoo nga kayang binayaran ng kampo ni Bataan Governor Enrique Garcia, Jr. ang isa o ilang Mahestrado ng Korte upang mag-isyu ng Temporary Restraining Order ang Korte na humarang sa implementasyon ng anim na buwang suspensyon ng Punong Lalawigan. Marami umano ang nagdududa kung papaano nakakuha ng TRO si Garcia gayung malinaw na ang kaso ay kasalukuyang dinidinig noon ng Court of Appeals. Ito umano ay paglabag sa tinatawag na Forum Shopping. In his Comment, Manrique alleged that there was nothing malicious or defamatory in his article since he only stated the facts or circumstances which attended the issuance of the TRO. He likewise denied that he made any degrading remarks against the Supreme Court and claimed that the article simply posed academic questions. If the article ever had a critical undertone, it was directed against the actions of the petitioners, who are public officers, and never against the Supreme Court. At any rate, he asseverated that whatever was stated in his article is protected by the constitutional guaranties of free speech and press. Issue: The pivotal issue in this case is whether the contents of Manriques article would constitute indirect contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court which reads: (d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice[.]

Held: This Court has always exercised utmost restraint and tolerance against criticisms on its decisions and issuances, bearing in mind that official actions are subject to public opinion as a means of ensuring accountability. Manriques article, however, has transgressed the ambit of fair criticism and depicted a legitimate action of this Court as a reciprocated accommodation of the petitioners interest. Contrary to Manriques claim of objectivity, his article contained nothing but baseless suspicion and aspersion on the integrity of this Court, calculated to incite doubt on the mind of its readers on the legality of the issuance. It did not simply dwell on the propriety of the issuance on the basis of some sound legal criteria nor did it simply blame this Court of an irregularity in the discharge of duties but of committing the crime of bribery. The article insinuated that processes from this Court may be obtained for reasons other than that their issuance is necessary to the administration of justice. Judging from the title alone, TRO ng Korte Suprema binayaran ng P20M? the article does not aim for an academic discussion of the propriety of the issuance of the TRO but seeks to sow mistrust in the dispositions of this Court. To suggest that the processes of this Court can be obtained through underhand means or that their issuance is subject to negotiation and that members of this Court are easily swayed by money is a serious affront to the integrity of the highest court of the land. Such imputation smacks of utter disrespect to this Court and such temerity is deserving of contempt. Manrique claims that he was only being critical of the actions of the petitioners as public officers and that no disrespect was meant to the Court. While he claims good faith, the contents of his article bespeak otherwise. A persons intent, however good it maybe, cannot prevail over the plain import of his speech or writing. It is gathered from what is apparent, not on supposed or veiled objectives. Certainly, the making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not an exercise of free speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefore and confidence therein.Therefore; Manrique's article, lacking in social value and aimed solely at besmirching the reputation of the Court, is undeserving of the protection of the guaranties of free speech and press. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, respondent Leo Ruben C. Manrique is hereby adjudged GUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT and is ordered to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by its National President, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, and JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, Petitioners, vs.HONORABLE MANILA MAYOR JOSE "LITO" ATIENZA, Respondent. F: Petitioners Integrated Bar of the Philippines1 (IBP) and lawyers H. Harry L. Roque and Joel R. Butuyan appeal the June 28, 2006 Decision2 and the October 26, 2006 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals that found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Jose "Lito" Atienza, the then mayor of Manila, in granting a permit to rally in a venue other than the one applied for by the IBP. On June 15, 2006, the IBP, through its then National President Jose Anselmo Cadiz (Cadiz), filed with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila a letter application4 for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. to be participated in by IBP officers and members, law students and multi-sectoral organizations. Respondent issued a permit5 dated June 16, 2006 allowing the IBP to stage a rally on given date but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge, which permit the IBP received on June 19, 2006. The rally pushed through on June 22, 2006 at Mendiola Bridge, after Cadiz discussed with P/Supt. Arturo Paglinawan whose contingent from the Manila Police District (MPD) earlier barred petitioners from proceeding thereto. Petitioners allege that the participants voluntarily dispersed after the peaceful conduct of the program. The MPD thereupon instituted on June 26, 2006 a criminal action,8 docketed as I.S. No. 06I-12501, against Cadiz for violating the Public Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not indicated in the permit, to which charge Cadiz filed a Counter-Affidavit of August 3, 2006. In the meantime, the appellate court ruled, in CA-G.R. SP No. 94949, by the first assailed issuance, that the petition became moot and lacked merit. The appellate court also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration by the second assailed issuance. Hence, the filing of the present petition for review on certiorari, to which respondent filed his Comment of November 18, 2008 which merited petitioners Reply of October 2, 2009. Issue: Petitioners assert that the partial grant of the application runs contrary to the Pubic Assembly Act and violates their constitutional right to freedom of expression and public assembly. WON there is a violation of the said right Held: Undoubtedly, the petition filed with the appellate court on June 21, 2006 became moot upon the passing of the date of the rally on June 22, 2006. Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest.1The Court in Bayan stated that the provisions of the Public Assembly Act of 1985 practically codified the 1983 ruling in Reyes v. Bagatsing.15 In juxtaposing Sections 4 to 6 of the Public Assembly Act with the pertinent portion of the Reyes case, the Court elucidated as follows: x x x [The public official concerned shall] appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority.1 WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94949 areREVERSED. The Court DECLARES that respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in

modifying the rally permit issued on June 16, 2006 insofar as it altered the venue from Mendiola Bridge to Plaza Miranda. GESITE et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 444 SCRA 51 Freedom of public school teachers to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances; right of public school teachers to form union. The petitioners admitted that they participated in concerted mass actions in Metro Manila from September to the first half of October, 1990 which temporarily disrupted classes in Metro Manila but they claimed that they were not on strike. They claimed that they were merely exercising their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of their grievances. Thus, they may not be penalized administratively. HELD:The issue of whether or not the mass action launched by the public school teachers during the period from September up to the 1st half of October, 1990 was a strike or not has been decided in the case of MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION VS. LAGUIO, 200 SCRA 323 where it was held that these mass actions were to all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the teachers duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons. It is undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and that petitioners purpose was to realize their demands by withholding their services. The fact that the conventional term strike was not used by the striking employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, SINCE THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SITUATION, AND NOT ITS APPEARANCE, WILL BE DEEMED CONTROLLING. Despite the constitutional right to form associations under the Constitution, employees in the public service may not engage in strikes, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass actions that will lead to temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. The right of government employees to organize IS LIMITED TO THE FORMATIONS OF UNIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS ONLY, WITHOUT INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO STRIKE. (Bangalisan vs. CA, 276 SCRA 619) The petitioners are not therefore entitled to their salaries during their suspension because the general proposition is that a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he had not rendered any service. BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), and GABRIELA vs.EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Manila City Mayor LITO ATIENZA, Chief of the Philippine National Police, Gen. ARTURO M. LOMIBAO, NCRPO Chief Maj. Gen. VIDAL QUEROL,and Western Police District Chief Gen. PEDRO BULAONG, G.R. No. 169848, May, 2006 Petitioners come in three groups. The first petitioners, Bayan, et al., in G.R. No. 169838, allege that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880. The second group consists of 26 individual petitioners, Jess del Prado, et al., in G.R. No. 169848, who allege that they were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they held on September 26, 2005 was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. They further assert that on October 5, 2005, a group they participated in marched to Malacaang to protest issuances of the Palace which, they claim, put the country under an undeclared martial rule, and the protest was likewise dispersed violently and many among them were arrested and suffered injuries. The third group, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al., petitioners in G.R. No. 169881, allege that they conduct peaceful mass actions and that their rights as organizations and those of their individual members as citizens, specifically the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR) being followed to implement it. KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along Espaa Avenue in front of the University of Santo Tomas and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. Three other rallyists were arrested. All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the no permit, no rally policy and the CPR policy recently announced. STATEMENT OF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA-In view of intelligence reports pointing to credible plans of anti-government groups to inflame the political situation, sow disorder and incite people against the duty constituted authorities, we have instructed the PNP as well as the local government units to strictly enforce a no permit, no rally policy, disperse groups that run afoul of this standard and arrest all persons violating the laws of the land as well as ordinances on the proper conduct of mass actions and demonstrations. The rule of calibrated preemptive response is now in force, in lieu of maximum tolerance. The authorities will not stand aside while those with ill intent are herding a witting or unwitting mass of people and inciting them into actions that are inimical to public order, and the peace of mind of the national community. Unlawful mass actions will be dispersed. The majority of law-abiding citizens have the right to be protected by a vigilant and proactive government. We appeal to the detractors of the government to engage in lawful and peaceful conduct befitting of a democratic society. The Presidents call for unity and reconciliation stands, based on the rule of law. Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory.

They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words lawful cause, opinion, protesting or influencing suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase maximum tolerance shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test. Furthermore, the law delegates powers to the Mayor without providing clear standards. The two standards stated in the laws (clear and present danger and imminent and grave danger) are inconsistent. Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being void for being vague and for lack of publication. Finally, petitioners KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane. As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action even before the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive order supports the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble. I s s u e s: 1. On the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12 13(a) and 14(a) thereof, and Republic Act No. 7160: 1. Are these content-neutral or content-based regulations? 2. Are they void on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness? 3. Do they constitute prior restraint? 4. Are they undue delegations of powers to Mayors? 5. Do they violate international human rights treaties and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? 2. On the constitutionality and legality of the policy of Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR): 1. Is the policy void on its face or due to vagueness? 2. Is it void for lack of publication? 3. Is the policy of CPR void as applied to the rallies of September 26 and October 4, 5 and 6, 2005? H e l d: Petitioners standing cannot be seriously challenged. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880 which requires a permit for all who would publicly assemble in the nations streets and parks. They have, in fact, purposely engaged in public assemblies without the required permits to press their claim that no such permit can be validly required without violating the Constitutional guarantee. Respondents, on the other hand, have challenged such action as contrary to law and dispersed the public assemblies held without the permit. Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution provides: Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected. As stated in Jacinto v. CA, the Court, as early as the onset of this century, in U.S. v. Apurado already upheld the right to assembly and petition, as follows: There is no question as to the petitioners rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances and, for that matter, to organize or form associations for purposes not contrary to law, as well as to engage in peaceful concerted activities. These rights are guaranteed by no less than the Constitution, particularly Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) of Article IX, and Section 3 of Article XIII. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed pronouncements defending and promoting the peoples exercise of these rights. As early as the onset of this century, this Court inU.S.vs. Apurado, already upheld the right to assembly and petition and even went as far as to acknowledge: It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater, the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers. But if the prosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities, then the right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances would expose all those who took part therein to the severest and most unmerited punishment, if the purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. If instances of disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished therefore, but the utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line between disorderly and seditious conduct and between an essentially peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising. Again, in Primicias v. Fugoso, the Court likewise sustained the primacy of freedom of speech and to assembly and petition over comfort and convenience in the use of streets and parks.

Next, however, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. In Primicias, this Court said: The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. But it is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign police power, which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is exercised by the government through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional and civil rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities and cities by authorizing their legislative bodies called municipal and city councils enact ordinances for purpose Reyes v. Bagatsing further expounded on the right and its limits, as follows: It is thus clear that the Court is called upon to protect the exercise of the cognate rights to free speech and peaceful assembly, arising from the denial of a permit. The Constitution is quite explicit: No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. Free speech, like free press, may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has a right to prevent. Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress that it is a necessary consequence of our republican institutions and complements the right of free speech. To paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking for the majority of the American Supreme Court in Thomas v. Collins, it was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and of the press were coupled in a single guarantee with the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances. All these rights, while not identical, are inseparable. In every case, therefore, where there is a limitation placed on the exercise of this right, the judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the challenged governmental actuation. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest. 3. Nowhere is the rationale that underlies the freedom of expression and peaceable assembly better expressed than in this excerpt from an opinion of Justice Frankfurter: It must never be forgotten, however, that the Bill of Rights was the child of the Enlightenment. Back of the guaranty of free speech lay faith in the power of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful means for gaining access to the mind. It was in order to avert force and explosions due to restrictions upon rational modes of communication that the guaranty of free speech was given a generous scope. But utterance in a context of violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument of force. Such utterance was not meant to be sheltered by the Constitution. What was rightfully stressed is the abandonment of reason, the utterance, whether verbal or printed, being in a context of violence. It must always be remembered that this right likewise provides for a safety valve, allowing parties the opportunity to give vent to their views, even if contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion. For if the peaceful means of communication cannot be availed of, resort to non-peaceful means may be the only alternative. Nor is this the sole reason for the expression of dissent. It means more than just the right to be heard of the person who feels aggrieved or who is dissatisfied with things as they are. Its value may lie in the fact that there may be something worth hearing from the dissenter. That is to ensure a true ferment of ideas. There are, of course, well-defined limits. What is guaranteed is peaceable assembly. One may not advocate disorder in the name of protest, much less preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent. The Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a rally or assembly. Resort to force is ruled out and outbreaks of violence to be avoided. The utmost calm though is not required. As pointed out in an early Philippine case, penned in 1907 to be precise, United States v. Apurado: It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers. It bears repeating that for the constitutional right to be invoked, riotous conduct, injury to property, and acts of vandalism must be avoided. To give free rein to ones destructive urges is to call for condemnation. It is to make a mockery of the high estate occupied by intellectual liberty in our scheme of values. There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. The Philippines is committed to the view expressed in the plurality opinion, of 1939 vintage of, Justice Roberts in Hague v. CIO: Whenever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but must not, in the guise of respondents, be abridged or denied. The above excerpt was quoted with approval in Primicias v. Fugoso. Primicias made explicit what was implicit in Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, a 1915 decision, where this Court categorically affirmed that plazas or parks and streets are outside the commerce of man and thus nullified a contract

that leased Plaza Soledad of plaintiff-municipality. Reference was made to such plaza being a promenade for public use, which certainly is not the only purpose that it could serve. To repeat, there can be no valid reason why a permit should not be granted for the proposed march and rally starting from a public park that is the Luneta. 4. Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets to the gates of the US embassy, hardly two blocks away at the Roxas Boulevard. Primicias v. Fugoso has resolved any lurking doubt on the matter. In holding that the then Mayor Fugoso of the City of Manila should grant a permit for a public meeting at Plaza Miranda in Quiapo, this Court categorically declared: Our conclusion finds support in the decision in the case of Willis Cox v. State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S., 569. In that case, the statute of New Hampshire P.L. chap. 145, section 2, providing that no parade or procession upon any ground abutting thereon, shall be permitted unless a special license therefor shall first be obtained from the selectmen of the town or from licensing committee, was construed by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire as not conferring upon the licensing board unfettered discretion to refuse to grant the license, and held valid. And the Supreme Court of the United States, in its decision (1941) penned by Chief Justice Hughes affirming the judgment of the State Supreme Court, held that a statute requiring persons using the public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgment of the rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute is construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a consideration of the time, place, and manner of the parade or procession, with a view to conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing, and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license, * * *. Nor should the point made by Chief Justice Hughes in a subsequent portion of the opinion be ignored: Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestricted abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend. The control of travel on the streets of cities is the most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need. Where a restriction of the use of highways in that relation is designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to protection. xxx 6. x x x The principle under American doctrines was given utterance by Chief Justice Hughes in these words: The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects. There could be danger to public peace and safety if such a gathering were marked by turbulence. That would deprive it of its peaceful character. It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion. While prudence requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place is that the permit must be for the assembly being held there. The exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice Roberts, speaking for the American Supreme Court, is not to be abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place. xxx 8. By way of a summary. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary, even more so than on the other departments rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so felicitiously termed by Justice Holmes as the sovereign prerogative of judgment. Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy. x x x. B.P. No. 880 was enacted after this Court rendered its decision in Reyes. The provisions of B.P. No. 880 practically codify the ruling in Reyes: PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, et. al. v. GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYO, as President and Commander-In-Chief, et al. (G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489, 171424, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160) Facts: On February 24, 2006, as the Philippines celebrated the 20thAnniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation (PP) 1017 declaring a state of national emergency. This proclamation was precipitated by alleged intelligence reports that the political opposition consisting of the Extreme Left (communist rebels) and the Extreme Right (military adventurists) had conspired to overthrow the Arroyo Administration through violent and unlawful means. Thus, the President, pursuant to her constitutional powers as Commander-in-Chief, called out the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National

Emergency. To implement this proclamation, the President issued General Order No. 5 which directed the military to pursue the aforementioned objectives and, in addition, required them to suppress acts of terrorism. Thereafter, the Office of the President announced that all permits to rally originally granted by the cities or municipalities are revoked. The Presidential Chief of Staff announced that warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including media, can already be implemented. Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and public assemblies would not be allowed, groups of protesters, including some of the herein petitioners, marched from various parts of Metro Manila with the intention of converging at the EDSA shrine. Those who were already near the EDSA site were violently dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot police. In particular, petitioner Prof. Randy David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and a newspaper columnist, and his companion were arrested without a warrant but later released due to insufficiency of evidence to criminally charge them. Petitioners went to the Supreme Court to challenge the constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 on the grounds that: (3) the issuances violated petitioners rights to peaceably assemble and freedom of the press CRISANTO EVANGELISTA, plaintiff-appellant, vs.TOMAS EARNSHAW, Mayor of the City of Manila, defendant-appellee. F: This is an action of mandamus brought against the defendant mayor of the City of Manila. The plaintiff alleges that he is the president of the Communist Party in the Philippine Islands, a political group seeking the speedy granting of independence in these Islands and the redemption of the proletariat, numbering over 300,000 men and woman in its ranks; that on the 2d of March, 1931, by means of a letter to the defendant mayor of the city, the plaintiff requested the necessary permission to hold a popular meeting at Plaza Moriones in that city, on the afternoon of March 12, 1931, to be followed by a parade through the streets of Juan Luna, Azcarraga, Avenida Rizal, Echague, and General Solano in order to deliver to the Governor-General a message from the laboring class; that on the 3d of March, 1931, the mayor of the city denied the plaintiff's petition, instructing his subaltern, the chief of police, to prohibit all kinds of meetings held by the Communist Party throughout the city, because he had revoked their permits and licenses; that consequently, the Communist Party has not been able to hold any private or public meetings in the city since the 6th day of March, 1931; that in refusing the requested permission and in prohibiting all meetings of the party within the city, the defendant deprived the Communist Party of a constitutional right. The plaintiff further prays "that a writ of mandamus be issued against the herein defendant compelling him to issue a permit for the holding of meetings and parades by the Communist Party in Manila." The defendant in his answer and special defense stated that subsequent to the issuance of the above-mentioned permit, it was discovered after an investigation conducted by the office of the fiscal for the City of Manila, that said Communist Party of the Philippines is an illegal association, or organization, which having for its principal object to incite the revolt of the proletariat or laboring class, according to its constitution and by-laws, states as follows: The Philippines, as a subject nation, in order to establish an independent government, has to revolt under the leadership of the laborers. . . . It is clear that the different political parties of the burgesses (Nacionalista-Consolidado, Democrata, etc.) are no different from another. They have but one aim; to rise into power and exploit, with independence or not; to enrich themselves and strengthen the control of a government which is procapitalist and proimperialist. Because of these, we need a Communist Party, one that is not reformist but revolutionary. Only by revolutionary means can we demolish the slavery of man by another and of one nation by another nation. . . The principal ideal of the C. P. P. (Communist Party of the Philippines) in the desire to head the Philippine Government is different from that of the burgees political parties. Its aim is not to strengthen the capitalist government but to engender as it cannot be avoided the war of the classes and to bring about its downfall. Therefore, the aims of the C. P. P. are the following: 1. To lead the movement for the immediate and complete independence of the Philippines. 2. To fight and bring about the downfall of American imperialism which oppresses the Philippines; 3. To stop the exploitation of the laborers and defend their rights and interests; 4. To establish in the Philippines a Soviet Government under the laborers. 5. To bring about the downfall of capitalism. 6. Under the dictatorship of the laborers, to emancipate and redeem the laborers and farm hands, to embrace communism. With these high ideals the Communist Party of the Philippines will be established. And inasmuch as these ideals are the same as those of the C. I. (Communist International), the C. P. P. will extend its full help for the redemption and welfare of the laborers. . . . Here in the Philippines, American Imperialism is being fought also. The reluctance of the Moros in paying taxes to the Government, the disorders in the large haciendas, the farmers resisting the owners and the Constabulary, the strike of the high-school students, the uprising of the Colorums, and the oppression of the imperialists and capitalists of the laborers, are symptoms of a movement, which if carried on with unity, will perforce bring about the downfall of American imperialism and the obtaining of Philippine independence. Before achieving this ultimate ideal of the C. P. P. we will have you take other steps. First, to overthrow American imperialism which oppresses the Philippines; second, to overthrow capitalism and feudalism; third, to seize the power in the government; fourth, the establishment of labor dictatorship; fifth, the bringing about of class consciousness and class struggle and the prompt establishment of communism. Under this state of affairs, a struggle is indespensable. This struggle may be peaceful or violent, but just the same it will be a bitter struggle, where life and death will be staked. For the prompt overthrow of the institutions of capitalism and for the purpose of opening the eyes of the people that the imperialists are not really in earnest about giving subject peoples their independence because independence is an enemy of oppression and exploitation unless their downfall is brought about, it is necessary to struggle, not only during elections.

Held: Instead of being condemned or criticised, the respondent mayor should be praised and commended for having taken a prompt, courageous, and firm stand towards the said Communist Party of the Philippines before the latter could do more damage by its revolutionary propaganda, and by the seditious speeches and utterances of its members. In the case of Gitlow vs. New York (268 U. S., 652), the Supreme Court of the United States said: Such utterances, by their very nature, involve danger to the public peace and to the security of the state. They threaten breaches of the peace and ultimate revolution. And the immediate danger is none the less real and substantial because the effect of the given utterance cannot be accurately foreseen. The state cannot reasonably be required to measure the danger from every such utterance in the nice balance of a jeweler's scale. A single revolutionary spark may kindle a fire that, smoldering for a time, may burst into a sweeping and destructive conflagration. It cannot be said that the state is acting arbitrarily on unreasonably when, in the exercise of its judgment as to the measures necessary to protect the public peace and safety, it seeks to extinguish the spark without waiting until it has enkindled the flame or blazed into the conflagration. It cannot reasonably be required to defer the adoption of measures for its own peace and safety until the revolutionary utterances lead to actual disturbances of the public peace or imminent and immediate danger of its own destruction; but it may, in the exercise of its judgment, suppress the threatened danger in its incipiency. In People vs. Lloyd, supra, p. 35 (136 N. E., 505)., it was aptly said: "Manifestly, the legislature has authority to forbid the advocacy of a doctrine designed and intended to overthrow the government without waiting until there is a present and imminent danger of the success of the plan advocated. If the state were compelled to wait until the apprehended danger became certain, then its right to protect itself would come into being simultaneously with the overthrow of the government, when there would be neither prosecuting officers nor courts for the enforcement of the law." At any rate, the right of peaceful assemblage is not an absolute one. In the case of People vs. Perez (45 Phil., 599, 605), this court said: . . . when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and the existence of the State. (Citing III Wharton's Criminal Law, pp. 2127 et seq.; U. S. vs. Apurado [1907], 7 Phil., 422; People vs. Perfecto [1922], 43 Phil., 887.) The judgment appealed from is affirmed with the costs against the appellant. PRIMICIAS VS. FUGOSO [80 PHIL 71; L-1800; 27 JAN 1948] Facts: An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the respondent to issue a permit to them to hold a public meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of grievances to the government. The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order." Giving emphasis as well to the delegated police power to local government. Stating as well Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public peace, and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public Place.1 Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated. Held: Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said section provides for two constructions: (1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; (2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The court favored the second construction. First construction tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of government no such unlimited power may be validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of national emergency. The Mayors first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one . The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the state. NAVARRO, petitioner, vs.CITY MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, respondent. "In Case G.R. No. L-31687 (Navarro vs. Villegas), the Court, after considering the pleadings and arguments of the parties, issued the following Resolution: Without prejudice to a more extended opinion and taking into account the following considerations: That respondent Mayor has not denied nor absolutely refused the permit sought by petitioner; That as stated in Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 75, respondent Mayor possesses reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the assembly in order to secure convenient use thereof by others and provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risks of disorder and maintain public safety and order; That respondent Mayor has expressly stated his willingness to grant permits for peaceful assemblies at Plaza Miranda during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays when they would not cause unnecessarily great disruption of the normal activities of the community and has further offered Sunken Gardens as an alternative to Plaza Miranda as the site of the demonstration sought to be held this afternoon;

That experiences in connection with present assemblies and demonstrations do not warrant the Court's disbelieving respondent Mayor's appraisal that a public rally at Plaza Miranda, as compared to one at the Sunken Gardens as he suggested, poses a clearer and more imminent danger of public disorders, breaches of the peace, criminal acts, and even bloodshed as an aftermath of such assemblies, and petitioner has manifested that it has no means of preventing such disorders; That, consequently, every time that such assemblies are announced, the community is placed in such a state of fear and tension that offices are closed early and employees dismissed, storefronts boarded up, classes suspended, and transportation disrupted, to the general detriment of the public: That civil rights and liberties can exist and be preserved only in an order society; The petitioner has failed to show a clear specific legal duty on the part of respondent Mayor to grant their application for permit unconditionally; The Court resolved to DENY the writ prayed for and to dismiss the petition. Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. PBM, 51 SCRA 189 Post under case digests, labor law at Tuesday, February 21, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind Facts: Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of Malacaang to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police. After learning about the planned mass demonstration, PhilippineBlooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out that the demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in fact an exercise of the laborers inalienable constitutional right to freedomof expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances. The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course of their business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the rally. A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the workers may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves to participate , otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the No Strike and No Lockout clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement. The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days late. Issue: Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA. Held: No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed. Reyes v. Bagatsing (G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983, 125 SCRA 553, 569) 8. By way of a summary. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. B.P. No. 880 Sec. 4. Permit when required and when not required. A written permit shall be required for any person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. However, no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private property, in which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required, or in the campus of a governmentowned and operated educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for by law are not covered by this Act. Sec. 5. Application requirements. All applications for a permit shall comply with the following guidelines: (a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or organizers; the purpose of such public assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and place or streets to be used for the intended activity; and the probable number of persons participating, the transport and the public address systems to be used. (b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of applicant under Section 8 hereof. (c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days before the scheduled public assembly.

(d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or municipal building. Sec. 6.Action to be taken on the application. (a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. (b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2) working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed. (c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter. (d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the applica[nt] within twenty-four hours. (e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law. (f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate Court, its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. A decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall be immediately executory. (g) All cases filed in court under this section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank. (h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court. (i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed. It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. This was adverted to in Osmea v. Comelec,[1] where the Court referred to it as a content-neutral regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies.[2] A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies[3] that would use public places. The reference to lawful cause does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable and entitled to protection. Neither are the words opinion, protesting and influencing in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject. The words petitioning the government for redress of grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally. Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the right even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear and present danger of the substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent. There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation. As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise and sufficient standard the clear and present danger test stated in Sec. 6(a). The reference to imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil in Sec. 6(c) substantially means the same thing and is not an inconsistent standard. As to whether respondent Mayor has the same power independently under Republic Act No. 7160[4]is thus not necessary to resolve in these proceedings, and was not pursued by the parties in their arguments. Finally, for those who cannot wait, Section 15 of the law provides for an alternative forum through the creation of freedom parks where no prior permit is needed for peaceful assembly and petition at any time: Sec. 15.Freedom parks. Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months after the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable freedom park or mall in their respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall be centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without the need of any prior permit. In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall establish the freedom parks within the period of six months from the effectivity this Act. 2 The Court now comes to the matter of the CPR. As stated earlier, the Solicitor General has conceded that the use of the term should now be discontinued, since it does not mean anything other than the maximum tolerance policy set forth in B.P. No. 880. This is stated in the Affidavit of respondent Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, submitted by the Solicitor General, thus: The truth of the matter is the policy of calibrated preemptive response is in consonance with the legal definition of maximum tolerance under Section 3 (c) of B.P. Blg. 880, which is the highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other peacekeeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same. Unfortunately, however, the phrase maximum tolerance has acquired a different meaning over the years. Many have taken it to mean inaction on the part of law enforcers even in the face of mayhem and serious threats to public order. More so, other felt that they need not bother secure a permit when holding rallies thinking this would be tolerated. Clearly, the popular connotation of maximum tolerance has departed from its real essence under B.P. Blg. 880. It should be emphasized that the policy of maximum tolerance is provided under the same law which requires all pubic assemblies to have a permit, which allows the dispersal of rallies without a permit, and which recognizes certain instances when water cannons may be used. This could only mean that maximum tolerance is

not in conflict with a no permit, no rally policy or with the dispersal and use of water cannons under certain circumstances for indeed, the maximum amount of tolerance required is dependent on how peaceful or unruly a mass action is. Our law enforcers should calibrate their response based on the circumstances on the ground with the view to preempting the outbreak of violence. Thus, when I stated that calibrated preemptive response is being enforced in lieu of maximum tolerance I clearly was not referring to its legal definition but to the distorted and much abused definition that it has now acquired. I only wanted to disabuse the minds of the public from the notion that law enforcers would shirk their responsibility of keeping the peace even when confronted with dangerously threatening behavior. I wanted to send a message that we would no longer be lax in enforcing the law but would henceforth follow it to the letter. Thus I said, we have instructed the PNP as well as the local government units to strictly enforce a no permit, no rally policy . . . arrest all persons violating the laws of the land . . . unlawful mass actions will be dispersed. None of these is at loggerheads with the letter and spirit of Batas Pambansa Blg. 880. It is thus absurd for complainants to even claim that I ordered my co-respondents to violate any law. In sum, this Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding the fundamental rights of our people, especially freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious, maximum tolerance is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally permits is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound clear and present danger standard. WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL and VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements of maximum tolerance. Ruiz v Gordon G.R. No. L-65695 December 19, 1983 C. J. Fernando Facts: Hector S. Ruiz, Coordinator of Olongapo Citizen's Alliance for National Reconciliation, filed a petition for mandamus against Richard Gordon to be allowed to hold a parade/march from Gordon Avenue to the Rizal Triangle starting at 1:00 P.M. The Court required the respondents to answer. Respondents replied by stating the request for a prayer rally was received in the Office of the Mayor and that respondent had repeatedly announced in his regular program on Sunday over the radio (DWGO) and at the Monday morning flag ceremony before hundreds of government employees that he would grant the request of any group that would like to exercise their freedom of speech and assembly. When interviewed on the matter by the Editor-in Chief of the 'Guardian', he mentioned the fact that he had granted the permit of the petitioner, which interview appeared in the November 22-28, 1983 issue of the said newspaper. Given these, the respondent prayed for the dismissal of the petition. This was complied with. Issue: Can the petition be granted? Held No. Petition dismissed. Ratio: The Reyes case was given some discussion in the course of this petition as to the role of the judiciary in petitions for permits to hold peaceable assembles. "The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision must be transmmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. They can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary, even more so than on the other departments rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. As shown both in the manifestation and the answer, this action for mandamus could have been obviated if only petitioner took the trouble of verifying on November 23 whether or not a permit had been issued. A party desirous of exercising the right to peaceable assembly should be the one most interested in ascertaining the action taken on a request for a permit. Necessarily, after a reasonable time or, if the day and time was designated for the decision on the request, such party or his representative should be at the office of the public official concerned. If he fails to do so, a copy of the decision reached, whether adverse or favorable, should be sent to the address of petitioner. Teehankee concurring: The burden to show the existence of such grave and imminent danger that would justify an adverse action lies on the mayor as the licensing authority. There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof of the existence of such clear and present danger. As the Court stated in its Resolution of October 25, 1983 in the J. B. L. Reyes case, "It is essential for the validity of a denial of a permit which amounts to a previous restraint or censorship

that the licensing authority does not rely solely on his own appraisal of what public welfare, peace or safety may require. To justify such a limitation, there must be proof of such weight and sufficiency to satisfy the clear and present danger test. The possibility that subversives may infiltrate the ranks of the demonstrators is not enough." As likewise underscored in the J. B. L. Reyes case, the exercise of the right of peaceable assembly is not to be 4 abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place" (at paragraph 6) and "It is the duty of the city authorities to provide the proper police protection to those exercising their right to peaceable assembly and freedom of expression" (at paragraph 7). J. Conception concurring opinion 9 In order that public officials may not be charged, rightly or wrongly, with dereliction of duty or abuse of powers in the granting or denying of such permits, the following guidelines are deemed necessary: (a) When a peaceful assembly is to be held in a private lot, house, or edifice, only the consent of the owner of the place is necessary. No permit from the government or any public officer is required. (b) When an application to hold a rally, parade, or peaceful assembly has to make use of public places like parks, plazas, and streets, the public authority charged with the duty of granting or denying the permit should also consider the convenience and the right of the rest of the public to use and enjoy these same facilities. (c) Conditions of peace and order in the locality should be carefully considered and precautionary steps taken to prevent vandals, hooligans, provocateurs, and other criminals from turning into a violent one what otherwise should be a peaceful demonstration, Villar v. TIP, 136 SCRA 706 (1985)F: The petitioners were students of the Technological Institute of the Phils. (TIP).Theyfiled an action for certiorari and prohibition, alleging that the TIP had denied them enrollmentbec.of their involvement in student demonstrations and activism. On the other hand, the TIPclaimed that the students were denied enrollment bec.of academic deficiencies. Their recordsshowed that Rufino Salcon and Remeo Guilatco each failed in 1 subject in the first semester ofthe SY 1984-1985. Venecio Villar failed in 2 subjects in the first sem of SY 1983-1984.Inocencio Recitis passed all subjects in the first sem of 1983-1984 but failed 1 subject in the 2ndsem. of that year and the next year he had 2 failing grades. On the other hand, Noverto Barretofailed in 5 subjects in the 1st sem of SY 1983-1984 and in year 1984-1985, he again failed in 6subjects. Edgardo de Leon had 3 failing grades in the 1st sem of the SY 1984-1985. Regloban Laxamana had 5 failing grades and no passing grade in the 1st sem of the 1984-1985 SY. VV. ISSUE: W/N the exercise of the freedom of assembly on the part of certain students of resp. TIPcould be a basis for their being banned from enrollment.HELD: NO. As in Reyes v. Bagatsing, the invocation of the right to freedom of peaceablesassembly carries w/ it the implication that the right to full speech has also been disregarded.Both are embraced in the concept of freedom of expression w/c is the liberty to discuss publicly& truthfully, any matter of public interest w/o censorship or punishment & w/c is not to be limitednor denied except on a showing of a clear & present danger of a substantive evil that the statehas a right to prevent.The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of higher learning "includes the right toset academic standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice inexpulsion of students. However, it cannot be utilized to discriminate against those students whoexercise this constitutional rights to peaceable assembly & full speech. If it does so, then thereis a legitimate guidance by the students prejudiced, their right to the equal protection clausebeing disregarded.ISSUE: W/N the constitutional provision as to the state maintaining "a system of full public elem.educ. & in areas where finances permit, est. & maintain a system of the pub. educ. up to highschool level excludes the exercise of that it in colleges & universities.HELD: The Constitutional provision does not per se exclude the exercise of that right. incolleges& universities. It is only at the most a reflection of the lack of sufficient funds for such aduly to be obligatory in the case of students in colleges & Universities. As far as the right itself isconcerned, Art. 26 of the Universal Declaration of HRs provides: "Everyone has the right toeducation. Educ. shall be full at the least in the elem. & fundamental stages. xxx Technical &professional educ. shall be made generally available & higher educ. shall be equally accessibleto all on the basis of merit."Hence, to that extent, there is justification for excluding 3 of the pets. bec. of theirmarked academic deficiency. Adapted.Right to quality education available only on the basis of merit.-- While the right tocollege education is a social, economic and cultural right, it is available only "on the basis ofmerit," as provided in Art. 26 of the Declaration of Human Rights.Accordingly, bec.of markedacademic deficiency, the denial of enrollment to Barreto, De Leon and Laxamana was justified.However, w/ regard to Villar, Salcon, Guitlatco and Recitis, the refusal of the TIP to allow them toenroll was unjustified. They could not be expelled for exercising their constitutional right of freespeech and peaceable assembly. As J. Fortas said, students do not shed their constitutionalrights at the schoolhouse gate. VV. MALABANAN VS. RAMENTO [129 SCRA 359; G.R. NO.62270; 21 MAY 1984] Facts: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University. They sought and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M, on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court (VMAS), the place indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated but at the second floor lobby. At such gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. The same day, they marched toward the Life Science Building and continued their rally. It was outside the area covered by their permit. Even they rallied beyond the period allowed. They were asked to explain on the same day why they should not be held liable for holding an illegal assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were informed that they were under preventive suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly. The validity thereof was challenged by petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal against private respondents and before the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports. Respondent Ramento found petitioners guilty of the charge of illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for one academic year. Hence this petition. Issue: Whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action and the penalty imposed, there was an

infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech. Held: Yes. Student leaders are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. But with the activity taking place in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct, "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others." The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the state, has a right to present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense. NESTLE PHILIPPINES INC. VS.SANCHEZ PER CURIAM,SEPTEMBER 30, 1987 -During the period July 8-10, 1987, members of therespondent labor unions (Union of Filipino Employeesand Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity,Activism and Nationalism-Olalia) intensified theintermittent pickets they had been conducting since June 17, 1987 in front of the Padre Faura gate of theSupreme Court building. They set up pickets'quarters on the pavement in front of the SupremeCourt building, at times obstructing access to andegress from the Court's premises and offices of justices, officials and employees. They constructedprovisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up akitchen and littered the place with food containersand trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene andsanitation. They waved their red streamers andplacards with slogans, and took turns haranguing thecourt all day long with the use of loudspeakers.-These acts were done even after their leaders hadbeen received by Justices Pedro L. Yap and MarceloB. Fenian as Chairmen of the Divisions where theircases are pending, and Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counselof the Union of Filipro Employees, had been called inorder that the pickets might be informed that thedemonstration must cease immediately for the sameconstitutes direct contempt of court and that theCourt would not entertain their petitions for as longas the pickets were maintained. Thus, on July 10,1987, the Court en banc issued a resolution givingthe said unions the opportunity to withdrawgraciously and requiring the leaders of therespondent union leaders to appear before the Courton July 14, 1987 at 10:30 A.M. and then and there toSHOW CAUSE why they should not be held incontempt of court. Atty. Jose C. Espinas was furtherrequired to SHOW CAUSE why he should not beadministratively dealt with.-On the appointed date and time, the above-namedindividuals appeared before the Court, representedby Atty. Jose C. Espinas, apologizing for their actionsdescribed and assuring that the acts would not berepeated. Atty. Espinas likewise manifested to theCourt that he had explained to the picketers whytheir actions were wrong and that the cited personswere willing to suffer such penalty as may bewarranted under the circumstances. He, however,prayed for the Court's leniency considering that thepicket was actually spearheaded by the leaders of the "Pagkakaisa ng Mang. gagawa as TimogKatagalogan" (PAMANTIK), an unregistered loosealliance of about seventy-five (75) unions in theSouthern Tagalog area, and not by either the Unionof Filipro Employees or the Kimberly IndependentLabor union.-Atty. Espinas further stated that he had explained tothe picketers that any delay in the resolution of theircam is usually for causes beyond the control of theCourt and that the Supreme Court has alwaysremained steadfast in its role as the guardian of theConstitution.-To confirm for the record that the person cited forcontempt fully understood the reason for the citationand that they win abide by their promise that saidincident will not be repeated, the Court required therespondents to submit a written manifestation to thiseffect, which respondents complied with on July 17,1987 ISSUE:WON THE RESPONDENTS and ATTY. ESPINASSHOULD BE HELD IN DIRECT CONTEMPT OFCOURT?HELD: NO. Contempt charges dismissed.Ratio The respondents who are nonlawyers are notknowledgeable in her intricacies of substantive andadjective laws. They are not aware that even as therights of free speech and of assembly are protectedby the Constitution, any attempt to pressure orinfluence courts of justice through the exercise of either right amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longerwithin the ambit of constitutional protection, nor didthey realize that any such efforts to influence thecourse of justice constitutes contempt of court. Theduty and responsibility of advising them, therefore,rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when hisattention was called by this Court, did his best todemonstrate to the pickets the untenability of their acts and posture. It is their duty as officers of thecourt to properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice, and to labor leaders of the importance of acontinuing educational program for their members. Reasoning The Court will not hesitate in futuresimilar situations to apply the full force of the lawand punish for contempt those who attempt topressure the Court into acting one way or the otherin any case pending before it. Grievances, if any,must be ventilated through the proper channels, i.e.,through appropriate petitions, motions or otherpleadings in keeping with the respect due to theCourts as impartial administrators of justice entitledto "proceed to the disposition of its business in anorderly manner, free from outside interferenceobstructive of its functions and tending to embarrassthe administration of justice.- courts and juries, in the decision of issues of factand law should be immune

from every extraneousinfluence; that facts should be decided uponevidence produced in court; and that thedetermination of such facts should be uninfluencedby bias, prejudice or sympathies. Dispositive WHEREFORE, the contempt chargesagainst herein respondents are DISMISSED.Henceforth, no demonstrations or pickets intended topressure or influence courts of justice into acting oneway or the other on pending cases shall be allowed inthe vicinity and/or within the premises of any and allcourts.SO ORDERED. CARMELO A. ARREZA, LONESTO G. OIDEM, JACOB F. MEIMBAN and EDGARDO S. FERNANDO, petitioners, vs. THE GREGORIO ARANETA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION, TOMAS B. MESINA, in his capacity as the Dean for Student Affairs of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, JOSE B. LALOY in his capacity as the Officer-in-Charge of the Student Affairs (Evening) and RODOSENDO GALVANTE, in his capacity as the Registrar of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, respondents. FERNANDO, CJ: Student militancy manifested through rallies and demonstrations characterized by condemnatory language in speeches and leaflets led respondent Gregorio Araneta University 1 to refuse enrollment to petitioners. Hence, this mandamus proceeding filed by Carmelo Arreza, Lonesto G. Oidem, Jacob F. Meimban, and Eduardo S. Fernando, officers and members of the Supreme Student Council of said university. There was a plea by petitioners for a preliminary mandatory injunction to allow them to enroll. This Court issued a temporary mandatory restraining order against the enforcement of such ban imposed by respondent University. The fact that they were seniors strengthened their plea. As the principal issue involved, the respect to be accorded the cognate rights of free speech and peaceable assembly, is likewise that raised in Malabanan v. Ramento, 2 not to mention the fact that the respondent is likewise the same University, the Second Division of this Court transferred it to the Court en banc. There is this difference. The principal respondent in Malabanan was Director Anastacio Ramento of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, who affirmed the action taken by respondent Araneta Foundation University finding petitioners guilty of illegal assembly and suspending them for one academic year. Here the action is directed only against respondent University. Nonetheless, insofar as the issue involved relates to the right of students to free speech and peaceable assembly, such distinction is of no significance. As we ruled in Malabanan, so we rule now. Petitioners, as all other students, may freely exercise such rights, "They enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom to express their views and communicate their thoughts to those disposed to listen" 3 in rallies and demonstrations. According to the version of petitioners, they were either leaders or participants in what respondent University referred to as a rally/demonstration held on September 28, 1982, in front of the Life Science Building of the respondent University, but which for them, could be more accurately described as "a continuation of the General Assembly of the student body held the day before one authorized by the School Administration." 4 Its purpose was to register the opposition of the students to the abolition of the school's Institute of Animal Science, as those taking courses therein would not be able to graduate. 5Such exercise of their right to peaceable assembly was visited by respondent University with a refusal to let them enroll after what for petitioners was a sham investigation of their alleged violation of school rules and regulations. 6 Respondent University denied granting the authorization to hold such general assembly, or student rally on September 28, 1982, alleging that the students on said date through the use of battery-operated megaphones criticized and lambasted the school administration, specifically the decision of the Board of Trustees of respondent University to merge its Institute of Animal Science with its Institute of Agriculture, ignoring the fact that the aforementioned merger of the above-named Institutes - intended as a cost-saving measure - would not deprive the students enrolled in the former Institute of Animal Science from earning their degrees. 7 Moreover, there were other rallies, according to respondent, held on September 8, 27 and 29, 1982, for the purpose of sympathizing with the suspension of five (5) student leaders who conducted an illegal assembly on August 27, 1982, causing additional disturbance on the campus, not only by the disorderly conduct observed but also by the resulting boycott of classes. 8 There is, therefore, relevance to this excerpt from the decision in the companion case of Malabanan v. Ramento: 9 "Objection is made by private respondents to the tenor of the speeches by the student leaders. That there would be a vigorous presentation of views opposed to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture was to be expected. There was no concealment of the fact that they were against such a move as it confronted them with a serious problem ("isang malaking suliranin"). They believed that such a merger would result in the increase in tuition fees, an additional headache for their parents ("isa na naman sakit sa ulo ng ating mga magulang"). If in the course of such demonstration, with an enthusiastic audience goading them on, utterances, extremely critical, at times even vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite understandable. Student leaders are hardly the timid diffident types. They are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe At any rate, even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to accord full credence to their fiery exhortations. They take into account the excitement of the occasion, the propensity of speakers to exaggerate, the exuberance of youth. They may give the speakers the benefit of their applause, but with the activity taking place in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct, which, to borrow from Tinker I materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.
10

There is no need, therefore, to inquire into the allegations of respondent University as to the non-peaceable character of the rally or demonstration. As made clear from the above excerpt, infractions of University rules or regulations by petitioner-students justify the filing of appropriate charges. What cannot be justified is the infliction of the highlydisproportionate penalty of denial of enrollment and the consequent failure of senior students to graduate, if in the exercise of the cognate rights of free speech and peaceable assembly, improper conduct could be attributed to them.

One last word. In the even more recent case of Villar v. Technological Institute of the Philippines, 11reference was made to Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: "Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at 'least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory; Technical and professional education shall be made generally accessible to all on the basis of merit," 12 Then came this relevant paragraph: "It is quite clear that while the right to college education is included in the social, economic, and cultural rights, it is equally manifest that the obligation imposed on the State is not categorical, the phrase used being 'generally available' and higher education, while being equally accessible to all should be on the basis of merit.' To that extent, therefore, there is justification for excluding three of the aforementioned petitioners because of their marked academic deficiency." 13 It is quite clear then that an educational institution may drop a student with failing grades, under standards set by it and made to apply to all similarly situated. WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is granted The restraining order issued by this Court in the resolution of November 15, 1982 is made permanent. No costs, FREEDOM FROM PRIOR RESTRAINT ***1ST THREE CASES refer to pp. 95, 99, and 109 respectively. GONZALEZ VS KALAW KATIGBAK FACTS: Petitioner was the producer of the movie Kapit sa Patalim which the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Televisions allowed on condition that certain deletions were made and that it was shown on adults only. The petitioner brought an action, claiming violation of their freedom of expression. HELD: Motion pictures are important both as a method for the communication of ideas and the expression of the artistic impulse. The power of the Board is limited to the classification of films. For freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions the exception. The power to impose prior restraint is not to be presumed, rather the presumption is against its validity. Censorship is allowable only under the clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest. The Board committed an abuse of discretion in subjecting petitioner to difficulty and travail before the movie was classified as "For adults only" without deletion. However there is not enough votes to consider the abuse of discretion grave as it explained that there were reasons for its action because of the scenes showing women erotically dancing naked and kissing and caressing each other like lesbians. VV. Notes: The movie involved in this case was "Kapit sa Patalim" which the censors wanted to cut in some part and to label "For Adults". The SC rules that movies are within the constitutional protection of freedom of expression, so that censorship is presumed to be valid as constituting prior restraint. The only case whe the Board of Censors can order a deletion is when there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil against national security or public morals or other public interest. In all other cases, the Board can only classify. But a different standard must be followed in television because of the pervasive and intrusive influence of the medium on people who watch its programs without having to pay anything. On the issue of obscenity, the SC held that sex along is not necessarily obscenity, the test being whether, using contemporary community standards, the dominant appeal us to the prurient interest. (Miller v. California). Thus on this score, it found abuse of discretion of the part of the Board for subjecting the producer to difficulty and for entertaining a narrow view of obscenity, but it lacked the votes to rules that the abuse was grave. New York Times Co. v. United States [The Pentagon Papers Case] Brief Fact Summary. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) held that the Government failed to meet the requisite burden of proof needed to justify a prior restraint of expression when attempting to enjoin the New York Times and Washington Post from publishing contents of a classified study. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Any system of prior restraints on expression comes to the Supreme Court bearing a heavy presumption against its invalidity. The Government thus creates a heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such a restraint.Facts. The United States sought to enjoin the New York Times and Washington Post from publishing contents of a confidential study about the Governments decision making with regards to Vietnam policy. The District Court in the New York Times case and the District Court and the Court of Appeals in the Washington Post case held that the Government had not met the requisite burden justifying such a prior restraint. Issue. Whether the United States met the heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such a restraint on the New York Times and Washington Post to enjoin them from publishing contents of a classified study? Held. No. Judgments of the lower courts affirmed. The order of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is reversed and remanded with directions to enter a judgment affirming the District Court. The stays entered June 25, 1971, by the Court are vacated. The mandates shall issue forthwith. Near v. Minnesota Brief Fact Summary. A Minnesota law that gagged a periodical from publishing derogatory statements about local public officials was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court). Synopsis of Rule of Law. The freedom of press is essential to the nature of a free state but that freedom may be restricted by the government in certain situations.

Facts. The Saturday Press (the Press) published attacks on local officials. The Press claimed that the chief of police had illicit relations with gangsters. Minnesota officials obtained an injunction in order to abate the publishing of the Press newspaper under a state law that allowed this course of action. The state law authorized abatement, as a public nuisance, of a malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, or other periodical. A state court order abated the Press and enjoined the Defendants, publishers of the Press (Defendants), from publishing or circulating such defamatory and scandalous periodicals. Issue. Whether a statute authorizing such proceedings is consistent with the conception of the liberty of the press as historically conceived and guaranteed? Held. No. Judgment of the state court reversed. The fact that the liberty of press may be abused by miscreant purveyors of scandal does not effect the requirement that the press has immunity from previous restraints when it deals with official misconduct. Subsequent punishment for such abuses as may exist is the appropriate remedy, consistent with the constitutional privilege. Therefore, a statute authorizing such proceedings is not consistent with the conception of the liberty of the press as historically conceived and guaranteed and is thus, unconstitutional. The statute in question cannot be justified by reason of the fact that the publisher is permitted to show, before injunction issues, that the matter published is true and is published with good motives and for justifiable ends. This statute, if upheld, could lead to a complete system of censorship. Thus, the statute is a substantial infringement on the liberty of the press and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Co nstitution. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago A. Background: Petitioner Times Film Corporation owned the exclusive right to exhibit the film Don Juan in Chicago. A Chicago city ordinance required that anybody who wished to publicly exhibit a film within city limits submit the film to the office of the commissioner of police and pay a license fee. The office of the commissioner of police was allowed to refuse to issue a permit to show the film if it determined that the film did not meet certain standards. A denial of a permit to show a film could be appealed to the mayor and the mayor's decision would then be final. Petitioner paid the license fee, but refused to submit the film Don Juan to the office of the commissioner of police for examination. After Petitioner was refused a permit to show the film, the corporation brought suit in federal court seeking to prevent the city from interfering with the exhibition of the film. Petitioner argued that the provision of the ordinance requiring submission of the film constitutes a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court dismissed Times Film Corporation's suit on the grounds that it did not have jurisdiction over the matter. Petitioner appealed that ruling to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit which also denied that the corporation had jurisdiction. Subsequently, Petitioner sought review in the United States Supreme Court and the high court granted certiorari. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION: "[T]here is not a word in the record as to the nature and content of 'Don Juan.' We are left entirely in the dark in this regard, as were the city officials and the other reviewing courts. Petitioner claims that the nature of the film is irrelevant, and that even if this film contains the basest type of pornography, or incitement to riot, or forceful overthrow of orderly government, it may nonetheless be shown without prior submission for examination. The challenge here is to the censor's basic authority; it does not go to any statutory standards employed by the censor or procedural requirements as to the submission of the film. In this perspective we consider the prior decisions of this Court touching on the problem. Beginning over a third of a century ago in Gitlow v. New York, they have consistently reserved for future decision possible situations in which the claimed First Amendment privilege might have to give way to the necessities of the public welfare. It has never been held that liberty of speech is absolute. Nor has it been suggested that all previous restraints on speech are invalid... Chicago emphasizes here its duty to protect its people against the dangers of obscenity in the public exhibition of motion pictures. To this argument petitioner's only answer is that regardless of the capacity for, or extent of, such an evil, previous restraint cannot be justified. With this we cannot agree. It is not for this Court to limit the State in its selection of the remedy it deems most effective to cope with such a problem, absent, of course, a showing of unreasonable strictures on individual liberty resulting from its application in particular circumstances. We, of course, are not holding that city officials may be granted the power to prevent the showing of any motion picture they deem unworthy of a license. As to what may be decided when a concrete case involving a specific standard provided by this ordinance is presented, we intimate no opinion. The petitioner has not challenged all - or for that matter any - of the ordinance's standards. Naturally we could not say that every one of the standards, including those which Illinois' highest court has found sufficient, is so vague on its face that the entire ordinance is void. At this time we say no more than this - that we are dealing only with motion pictures and, even as to them, only in the context of the broadside attack presented on this record." Held: the judgment is affirmed.

CLEAR AND PREENT DANGER RULE AND DANGEROUS TENDENCY RULE Cabansag vs Fernandez Facts: This is a contempt proceeding.Apolonio Cabansag and his lawyersRoberto V. Merrera were found guiltyand sentenced the first to pay a fine of P20 and the last two P50 each with thewarning that a repetition of the of offense will next time be heavily dealtwith. Apolonio Cabansag filed on January 13, 1947 in the Court of FirstInstance of Pangasinan a complaintseeking the ejectment of GeminianaFernandez, et al. from a parcel of land.the court, presided over by JudgeVillamor upon petition of both parties,ordered the stenographers who tookdown the notes during the previoushearings to transcribe them within 15days upon payment of their fees, andthe hearing was postponed until thetranscript of said notes had beensubmitted. Notwithstanding the failureof the stenographers to transcribe theirnotes, the hearing was set. , JudgePasicolan presiding, issued an ordersuggesting to the parties to arrangewith the stenographers who took downthe notes to transcribe their respectivenotes and that the case would be setfor hearing after the submission of thetranscript. From December 9, 1952 toAugust 12, 1954, no further step wastaken either by the court or any of thecontending parties in the case. . ,President Magsaysay assumed office,he issued Executive Order No. Icreating the Presidential Complaintsand Action Commission (PCAC),Apolonio Cabansag, apparently irkedand disappointed by the delay in thedisposition of his case, wrote the PCAC,a letter copy which he furnished theSecretary of Justice and the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. Atty. Manuel Fernandez,counsel for defendants, filed a motionbefore Judge Morfe praying thatApolonio Cabansag be declared incontempt of court for an allegedscurrilous remark he made in his letterto the PCAC to the effect that he,Cabansag, has long been deprived of his land "thru the careful maneuvers of a tactical lawyer", to which counsel forCabansag replied with a counter-chargepraying that Atty. Fernandez be in turndeclared in contempt because of certain contemptuous remarks made byhim in his pleading. Judge Morfedismissed both charges but orderedCabansag to show cause in writingwithin 10 days why he should not beheld liable for contempt for sending theabove letter to the PCAC which tendedto degrade the court in the eyes of the President and the people .Cabansag filed his answer stating thathe did not have the idea to besmirchthe dignity or belittle the respect duethe court nor was he actuated withmalice when he addressed the letter tothe PCAC. order requiring also saidattorneys to show cause why theyshould not likewise be held forcontempt for having committed actswhich tend to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice Issue: whether or not the Cabansagshould be held in contempt for hisremarks.Ruling: the decision appealed from isreversed, without pronouncement as tocosts. the criticism refers, not to thecourt, but to opposing counsel whosetactical maneuvers" has allegedlycaused the undue delay of the case. The grievance or complaint, if any, isaddressed to the stenographers fortheir apparent indifference intranscribing their notes. The onlydisturbing effect of the letter whichperhaps has been the motivating factorof the lodging of the contempt chargeby the trial judge is the fact that theletter was sent to the Office of thePresident asking for help because ofthe precarious predicament of Cabansag. To be so the danger mustcause a serious imminent threat to theadministration of justice. Nor can weinfer that such act has "a dangeroustendency" to belittle the court orundermine the administration of justicefor the writer merely exercised hisconstitutional right to petition thegovernment for redress of a legitimategrievance. The fact is that even the trialcourt itself has at the beginningentertained such impression when itfound that the criticism was directednot against the court but against thecounsel of the opposite party, and thatonly on second thought did it change itsmind when it developed that the act of Cabansag was prompted by the adviceof his lawyers. Cabansag cannotcertainly be blamed for entertaining thebelief that the only way by which hecould obtain redress of his grievance isto address his letter to the PCAC whichafter all is the office created by the latePresident to receive and hear allcomplaints against officials andemployees of the government tofacilitate which the assistance andcooperation of all the executivedepartments were enjoined ***READ AGAIN REYES AND RUIZ CASE Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. Nos. 79690-707 October 7,1988] Petitioner filed Resolution including Motion to Cite in Contempt Special Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzalez. Gonzalez in: (1) having caused the filing of the information against petitioner in criminal case before the Sandiganbayan, and (2) issuing certain allegedly contemptuous statements to the media in relation to the proceedings in where respondent is claiming that he is acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman. A Resolution from the Supreme Court required respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for making certain public statements. Portion of the published article from Philippine Daily Globe in his interview: What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that while rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course. Respondent has not denied making the above statements; indeed, he acknowledges that the newspaper reports of the statements attributed to him are substantially correct. ISSUE:Whether or not respondent Atty. Gonzales is entitled to invoke freedom of speech as a defense. HELD:NO. Respondent indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. RATIO:The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.(Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court)

[F]reedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. Enrique Zaldivar vs Raul Gonzalez - Contemptuous Language Duty of a Lawyer Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who was investigating the case. Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases under the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and Desist Order against Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating and filing informations against Zaldivar. Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal informations against Zaldivar. Gonzalez even had a newspaper interview where he proudly claims that he scored one on the Supreme Court; that the Supreme Courts issuance of the TRO is a manifestation theta the rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, [while] it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course. Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then ordered Gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in the newspapers were true; that he was only exercising his freedom of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. He also said, even attaching notes, that not less than six justices of the Supreme Court have approached him to ask him to go slow on Zaldivar and to not embarrass the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt. HELD: Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. His statements necessarily imply that the justices of the Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office. Such statements constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Supreme Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the country. Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalez seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the Supreme Court as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The responsibility of Gonzalez to uphold the dignity and authority of the Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer. Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must be bona fide. In the case at bar, his statements, particularly the one where he alleged that members of the Supreme Court approached him, are of no relation to the Zaldivar case. The Supreme Court suspended Gonzalez indefinitely from the practice of law. THE BALANCING-OF-INTEREST TEST AYER PRODUCTIONS VS.CAPULONG [160 SCRA 861; G.R. NO. L-82380; 29 APR 1988] Facts: Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Ayer Productions, envisioned, sometime in 1987, for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release, the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as and other government agencies consulted. Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production. It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary footage as background. David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American historian have developed a script. Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation. petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion picture. However, a complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to privacy. RTC ordered for the desistance of the movie production and making of any reference to plaintiff or his family and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which nevertheless is based on, or bears substantial or marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence the appeal. Issue: Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated. Held: Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television. Furthermore the circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression. The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look like. There was, in other

words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy. Subject matter is one of public interest and concern. The subject thus relates to a highly critical stage in the history of the country. At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking place, Enrile was a "public figure:" Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least, their right to privacy. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events. LAGUNZAD V. GONZALES [92 S 476 (1979)] An agreement whereby a film producer would pay the heirs and relatives of Moises Padilla a sum of money inorder to depict them in the movie which he included a love interest angle depicting the mother and a sweetheart, is not a violation of freedom of ex-pression. While it is true that the film producer purchased the rights to the book entitled "The Moises Padilla Story," that did not dispense with the need for prior consent and authority from the deceased's heirs to portray publicly episodes in said deceased's life and in that of his mother and the members of his family. As held in Schuyler v. Curtis, "a privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a deceased person to protect his memory, but the privilege exists for the benefit of the living, to protect their feelings and to prevent a violation of their own rights in the character and memory of the deceased." "Being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto a person's right to privacy. The right to invade a person's privacy to disseminate public information does not extend to fictional or novelized representation of a person, no matter how public a figure he or she may be. In the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little romance in the film because without it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality." "The right of freedom of expression, indeed, occupies a preferred position in the hierarchy of civil liberties. However, it is limited by the clear and present danger rule and the balancing of interest test. The latter requires the court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interest observable in a given situation. The interests observable in this case are the right to privacy and freedom of expression. Taking into account the interplay of those interest, we hold that under the particular circumstances presented, and considering the obligations in the contract, the validity of such contract must be upheld because the limits of freedom of expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern." Gitlow v. New York Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner, Gitlow (Petitioner), published a communist manifesto for distribution in the United States. He was charged with plotting to overthrow the United States government. Synopsis of Rule of Law. State statutes are unconstitutional if they are arbitrary and unreasonable attempts to exercise authority vested in the state to protect public interests. Facts. The Petitioner was charged with criminal anarchy because he was an advocate of socialist reform in the United States. The Petitioner is a member of the Left Wing Section of the Socialist Party. He served as the business manager for the paper that was run by the organization. In 1919 he published the groups manifesto and prepared for widespread distribution from the New York City headquarters. Issue. Did the statute prohibiting such activity deprive the Petitioner of his First Amendment constitutional right to freedom of expression? Held. No. The current statute is not an unreasonable or arbitrary means of exercising the states police power. It is within the states power to prevent the disturbance of the peace and regulate speech that may incite crime even if the threat of such action is not immediate. Dissent. A state may not prohibit speech unless it presents a clear and present danger to the public interest. Discussion. Freedom of speech and press do not confer an absolute right to publish or speak without being held responsible for the results of such speech. The state may regulate to protect its interests in general welfare of its citizens. ***See the ZALDIVAR CASE OVERBREADTH AND VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE: People vs. Siton - Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged with vagrancy pursuant to Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code in two separate Informations dated November 18, 2003. - Article 202, Paragraph 2 of RPC states that: Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty. The following are vagrants: 2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support; - Instead of submitting their counter-affidavits as directed, respondents filed separate Motions to Quash on the ground that Article 202 (2) is unconstitutional for being vague and overbroad. - In an Order dated April 28, 2004, the municipal trial court denied the motions and directed respondents anew to file their respective counter-affidavits. The municipal trial court also declared that the law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the States police power and justified by the Latin maxim salus populi est suprem(a) lex, which calls for the subordination of individual benefit to the interest of the greater number.

- Respondents assailed the constitutionality of Anti-Vagrancy Law claimed that Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause under the Constitution because it discriminates against the poor and unemployed, thus permitting an arbitrary and unreasonable classification. - The Regional Trial Court declared Article 202 (2) as unconstitutional and granted the petition of the respondents. Issue:- Whether or not Article 202 (2) is unconstitutional or not. Held:The legislature must inform the citizen with reasonable precision what acts it intends to prohibit so that he may have a certain understandable rule of conduct and know what acts it is his duty to avoid. This requirement has come to be known as the void-for-vagueness doctrine which states that a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law. In the instant case, the assailed provision is paragraph (2), which defines a vagrant as any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support. In the instant case, the assailed provision is paragraph (2), which defines a vagrant as any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support. This provision was based on the second clause of Section 1 of Act No. 519 which defined vagrant as every person found loitering about saloons or dramshops or gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the country without visible means of support. The second clause was essentially retained with the modification that the places under which the offense might be committed is now expressed in general terms public or semi-public places. U.S. Supreme Court in Jacksonville declared the ordinance unconstitutional, because such activities or habits as nightwalking, wandering or strolling around without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafing, habitual spending of time at places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served, and living upon the earnings of wives or minor children, which are otherwise common and normal, were declared illegal. But these are specific acts or activities not found in Article 202 (2). The Supreme Court said As applied to the instant case, it appears that the police authorities have been conducting previous surveillance operations on respondents prior to their arrest. On the surface, this satisfies the probable cause requirement under our Constitution. For this reason, we are not moved by respondents trepidation that Article 202 (2) could have been a source of police abuse in their case. This is exactly why we have public order laws, to which Article 202 (2) belongs. These laws were crafted to maintain minimum standards of decency, morality and civility in human society. Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does it discriminate against the poor and the unemployed. Offenders of public order laws are punished not for their status, as for being poor or unemployed, but for conducting themselves under such circumstances as to endanger the public peace or cause alarm and apprehension in the community. Being poor or unemployed is not a license or a justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct. Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to be considered constitutionally offensive. It is a public order crime which punishes persons for conducting themselves, at a certain place and time which orderly society finds unusual, under such conditions that are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society, as would engender a justifiable concern for the safety and well-being of members of the community. Every statute is presumed valid and every reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality. As an obvious police power measure, Article 202 (2) must therefore be viewed in a constitutional light. The decision of the RTC declaring Article 202 (2) as unconstitutional is reversed and set aside. Under Due Process in General