CTC Sentinel

AUGUST 2012 . VoL 5 .
ISSUE 8
Contents
FEATURE ARTICLE
1 A Fight for the Spoils: The Future Role of Syrias Armed Groups By Stephen Starr
REpoRTS
A Fight for the Spoils: The Future Role of Syrias Armed Groups
By Stephen Starr
4 Defining Cyberterrorism: Capturing a Broad Range of Activities in Cyberspace By Jonalan Brickey 6 Pakistani Taliban Renew Attacks on Punjabi Heartland By Arif Rafiq 9 The Strategic Limitations of Boko Haram in Southern Nigeria By Jacob Zenn 13 Yemens Huthi Movement in the Wake of the Arab Spring By Lucas Winter 18 Understanding Drivers of Violent Extremism: The Case of al-Shabab and Somali Youth By Muhsin Hassan 21 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity 24 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts
A Syrian rebel in the city of Aleppo on August 18, 2012. - Bulent Kilic/AFP/Getty Images
About the CTC Sentinel

The Combating Terrorism Center is an independent educational and research institution based in the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy, West point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses the Centers global network of scholars and practitioners to understand and confront contemporary threats posed by terrorism and other forms of political violence.
n august 6, 2012, President Bashar al-Assads prime minister defected, dealing another blow to the Syrian leaders efforts to preserve his regime. Since the start of the Syrian uprising in March 2011, the strong central authority the al-Assad regime built and institutionalized during four decades has been rapidly crumbling. Yet the factors that made Libyas uprising succeeda united and organized opposition, sparse population patterns and a weak army are absent in Syria. The country becomes more militarized after each passing week, with various, competing rebel groups gaining more leverage and territory and even reportedly committing their own massacres. 1 For now, the rebels habitually termed the Free Syrian Army 2
(FSA)mostly operate independently on tribal and geographic bases, and interaction between them, violent or cooperative, is for the most part relatively rare. 3 Jihadist groups, such as Jabhat al-Nusra, have also definitively entered the fray. The role and future actions of the milieu of armed groups operating in Syria is sure to affect the shape of the country following the seemingly inevitable fall of
ries of armed groups operating independently across the country. Although in propaganda videos groups claim to be part of the FSA, in reality their chain of command stops at a local commander. 3 In Aleppo this summer, rebels from all over northern Syria joined in the fight against government forces in one of the only examples of a large-scale coordinated military campaign against the Syrian army. Rebel groups regularly bicker over funding and weapons. See Ghaith AbdulAhad, Al-Qaida Turns Tide for Rebels in Battle for Eastern Syria, Guardian, July 30, 2012.
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.
1 Rebels Execute Regime Loyalists in Aleppo, al-Jazira, August 1, 2012. 2 The Free Syrian Army is less an army, and more a se-
AUGUST 2012 . VoL 5. ISSUE 8
al-Assads regime. Rebel units number in the dozens. Some are secular, while others call for an Islamic state in Syria. All are vying for weapons and territory. For now, what unites them is their shared goal of defeating the Syrian regime. This mutual interest will likely change if the regime falls. Conversely, the future role played by those who fill the ranks of the governments roving shabiha gangs is also troubling. Infamous for their brutality mostly upon civilians in di s s enting ar e as , th e largely Alawite s h a b i ha have be e n successful in s o w i n g s e ctar ian divisions among S y r i ans by attack ing Sunni civilians. 4 A s t h e central authority controlling t h e s hab i h a br e ak s down, the role t h es e gov e r nm e nt m ilitias play will be significant in the future. If the al-Assad regime falls, these heavily armed, battle-hardened fighters will likely destabilize the country going forward. As a result, the postAssad authorities will face a number of challenges. This ar ticle will assess the ev ol u t ion of the F SA and what role t h e g r oup will s e r ve in a post-Assad S y r i a. It als o addr e s ses the challenges of t h e sh ab i h a, de termining whether t h e pr o-A s s ad m iliti as will return to t h ei r m ountain villages or attempt to mount a counterinsurgency against a new FSA-organized government in Damascus.
The Evolution of the Free Syrian Army The FSA is largely a collection of defected Syrian army soldiers and local civilians who have grouped together to fight the Bashar al-Assad government in their immediate neighborhoods and towns. The FSA is not a unified entity, and as a result there will be difficulties restructuring or disbanding these forces in a new political system. 5 Many FSA battalions are clan- and tribebased, organized around a specific geographical areasuch as a town, village or city district. Fighters answer to local commandersoften a respected
4 Christoph Reuter and Abd al-Kadher Adhun, Searching for the Truth Behind the Houla Massacre, Der Spiegel, July 23, 2012. 5 As of August 4, 2012, 10 FSA military bureaus were operating inside Syria. See Rania Abouzeid, Going Rogue: Bandits and Criminal Gangs Threaten Syrias Rebellion, Time Magazine, July 30, 2012.
member of the local communitynot to a central command. 6 In many respects, this operational system has worked to their advantage in a guerrilla war against the Syrian army. At its core, th e re b e l mo v e me n t i s n o t manifestl y I s l a mi s t. Re l i g i o u s rh e to ri c has been a f e a tu re o f w a r re b e l s seeking i n s p i ra ti o n f o r ce n tu ri e s . Against a f a r mo re p o w e rf u l a rmy , th e rebels tu rn to Go d f o r i n s p i ra ti o n a n d to find me a n i n g i n co n ti n u i n g th e i r fight un d e r s u c h t e s t i n g c o n d i t i o n s . As the re g i me u p p e d th e f e ro ci ty of its a tta ck s o n b o th ci v i l i a n s a n d armed op p o s i ti o n e l e me n ts , th e re b e l s have tu rn e d mo re re l i g i o u s i n th e i r rhetoric. L imit ed public backing from Western states makes the rebel movement often appear a product of, or at least sponsored by, Gulf states Saudi Arabia and Qatar, two conservative and undemocratic countries. Many secular Syrians, particularly in the major cities, fear Gulf influence in the country and believe these states are attempting to destabilize Syria and replace the al-Assad regime with an Islamist government. Ind e e d , b oth Sa u d i A ra b i a a n d Q a ta r h a v e openly co mmi tte d f i n a n ci a l s u p p o rt and wea p o n s to th e re b e l s . 7 T h i s i s a versio n o f e v e n ts th a t a l s o w o rri e s Syrias n o n - Su n n i mi n o ri ti e s , w h o compose a ro u n d a qu a rte r o f th e count rys population. 8 Violent I s l a m i s t e l e m e n t s , h o w e v e r , have atte m p t e d t o h i j a c k t h e u p r i s i n g , and jih a d i s ts a re beginning to puncture through the rebel movement. 9 Militant gro u p s s u ch a s a l - Q a ` i d a a n d J abhat a l - Nu s ra a re co n f i rme d to b e operatin g i n Syri a , o n ce a co u n try with an e x tra o rd i n a ri l y co mp e te n t
s e cu ri ty a p p a ra tu s . 10 T h e M u sl i m Brothe rhood, an organization that excites significant fear among Syrias minority groups, reportedly now has fighters on the ground. 11 The capture and consequent release of two Western photographers held by foreign fighters inside the SyrianTurkish border post of Bab al-Hawa
Divisions between rebel leaders and the political oppositionsuch as the Syrian National Council are likely to destabilize the political climate post-Assad as neither are united and both feel it is their right to govern the country.
confirms past suspicions about foreign jihadists. 12 U p to 1 00 f i g h t er s h a d ca mp e d i n s i d e th e Sy r i a n bo r d er i n Ju l y , a n d e v i d e n ce o f a l - Q a ` i d a a cti v i ty i n o th e r p a rts o f t h e c o u n t r y g ro w s e a ch w e e k . 13 Mo re o v e r, f o re i g n f i g h t er s h a ve re ce n tl y b e e n co n f i rm ed i n S y r i a f i g h ti n g g o v e rn me n t f o r c es. T h e I r i s h T i m e s re p o rte d th e p r esen c e o f a n u mb e r o f Li b y a n f i g h te r s o u t si d e t h e northwestern town of Idlib in July. An I ri s h - Li b y a n re v o l u ti o n a r y , M eh d i a l H a ra ti , h a s b e e n o p e ra ti n g a m i l i t a n t g ro u p i n Syri a s i n ce l a st sp r i n g a n d ha s introduce d an Islamic undertone to the Syrian revolt. 14 A Syrian fighter working with this Libyan-led brigade, the Liwa al-Umma, said he wanted to
10 Abdul-Ahad; Neil MacFarquhar and Hwaida Saad,
6 Although the Syrian National Council signed a memorandum of understanding with the rebel leadership in March 2012, in reality FSA rebels do not take combat orders from the SNC. 7 Justin Vela, Arab States Arm Rebels as UN Talks of Syrian Civil War, Independent, June 13, 2012. 8 Stephen Starr, Revolt in Syria: Eye-Witness to the Uprising (London/New York: Hurst/Columbia University Press, 2012). 9 See the YouTube video apparently showing al-Qaìda operatives after taking control of the Bab al-Hawa border crossing in northwest Syria, available at www.youtube. com/watch?v=fYfsVOMyAms.
As Syrian War Drags On, Jihadists Take Bigger Role, New York Times, July 29, 2012. 11 Ruth Sherlock and Richard Spencer, Muslim Brotherhood Establishes Militia Inside Syria, Daily Telegraph, August 3, 2012. 12 Rod Norland, Syrian Rebels Free 2 Journalists After Weeklong Ordeal With Islamic Extremists, New York Times, July 27, 2012; Rania Abuzeid, Meet the Islamist Militants Fighting Alongside Syrias Rebels, Time Magazine, July 26, 2012. 13 Ibid. 14 Mary Fitzgerald, Syrian Minds Focused on Likely Outcome at Aleppo, Irish Times, July 28, 2012.
take part in their operations because they are fighting for truth and justice with an Islamic background. 15 As the violence surges and the regime endures, the growth and spread in jihadist activity will likely expand. Islamists will begin to claim responsibility for military gains against the regime and consequently assert that they have a genuine stake in shaping Syrias future. What constitutes todays FSA leadership, where it exists, will likely become the central military figures in a new Syrian political system if for no other reason than it is they who fought and died to oust the al-Assad regime (and not the traditional political opposition watching events from the safety of other countries). 16 Divisions between rebel leaders and the political oppositionsuch as the Syrian National Council (SNC)are likely to destabilize the political climate post-Assad as neither are united and both feel it is their right to govern the country. The perfunctory head of the FSA, Riad al-Asaad, is unlikely to hold much sway in a post-Assad Syria since he has spent much of the revolution in Turkey rather than fighting regime troops inside the country. He is a figurehead; few FSA members answer to him today, and they are unlikely to in the future.
The Shabiha The central kernel in the regimes attempts at maintaining control of power centers is the deployment and actions of the governments militias, the shabiha. Originally a small group of men some from the presidents extended familywho operated in trafficking and smuggling in and around the coastal city of Latakia on Syrias northwest coast during the 1980s and 1990s, 17 the shabiha today number in the thousands.
regime over the course of the uprising. 18 The shabiha are mostly drawn from the Alawite sect to which President Bashar al-Assad belongs and have roamed town centers and surrounded mosques at prayer time since the uprisings beginning. They have been accused of atrocities in the towns of Houla, Tremseh and Qubeir in May, June and July 2012. As of December 2011, one respected source claimed that shabiha members were reportedly being paid 50,000 Syrian pounds ($800) per month in cash that came from Iran via Hizb Allah in neighboring Lebanon. 19 If true, Iranian meddling in Syria illustrates yet another difficulty facing any post-Assad government. The possible role played by the shabiha gangs after the inevitable demise of the al-Assad regime is difficult to quantify and chart. If regional supporters Hizb Allah and Iran provide them with financial backing, however, then they will be a destructive force during the reorganization of the Syrian state. With outside backing, the shabiha could mount a counterinsurgency, possibly resulting in a long-term civil conflict. Until now, direct confrontations between rebel forces and pro-regime militias have been rare. In the absence of a central authority (the Syrian armed forces) controlling important cities, the future may bring many such clashes. As the regime seeks to consolidate its control of urban centers such as Damascus and Aleppo, Syrias open countryside will be free for shabiha and rebels to operate and fight each other. The Syrian governments stockpile of chemical weapons and missiles remains secure. Yet if al-Assad falls, an organized transfer of government weapons and security installations to a new authority appears unlikely. 20 The possibility of these weapons falling into rebel, shabiha or Islamist hands is a growing prospect.
Controlling a Multifaceted Powder Keg The bloodshed a n d d e s t r u c t i o n t h a t h a s e n g u l f e d Sy ri a f o r t h e p a st 17 months means that a successful re v o l u ti o n w i l l n o t b ri n g t h e st a bi l i t y s e e n i n Eg yp t o r Li b y a . A s su c h , i t will require far more international involve me nt in pe acekeeping and postconflict reconstruction. A UN-backed monitoring presence to oversee the internal workings and developments of the nascent government will be crucial to maintain law and order. Furthermore, an international peacekeeping force that protects against the possibility of reprisals and sectarian fighting in regions where tensions between Alawite and Sunni towns exist may be necessary. Few international actors want Alawite militias roaming western Syria and Lebanon, destabilizing an already volatile neighborhood.
For Syrians themselves, amnesties and statements that assure the safety of Alawite civilians will be essential in helping eliminate further interreligious strife. Dialogue between rebel leaders and the political opposition that includes, among others, the SNC, over the makeup and formation of a new Syrian army and government must be fruitful. A nationwide arms dump program that incentivizes rebels and shabiha militias to hand in weapons will help Syria on the road to a more peaceful future. Of course, none of these measures are guaranteed to take place. As more Syrians die, piecing the country back together becomes increasingly difficult. As long as the al-Assad regime remains in control of militias and key army divisionswhich looks likely for at least several more monthsSyrias future looks dark. Stephen Starr is a freelance journalist and author who lived in Syria from 2007 to February 2012. His writings have appeared in the Los Angeles Times, the Washington Post, ForeignPolicy.com, USA Today, the Guardian and the London Times. His book, Revolt in Syria: EyeWitness to the Uprising, was released in North America on August 14, 2012.
Many in the newly rejuvenated gangs are career criminals whose loyalty was bought through a series of political prisoner amnesties enacted by the
15 Ibid. 16 Joshua Landis, Syrias Next Leader: Will He Come from the SNC or the Militias? SyriaComment, February 16, 2012. 17 Ahed al-Hendi, The Structure of Syrias Repression, Foreign Affairs, May 3, 2011.
18 1,180 Detainees Involved in Events in Syria Released, Syrian Arab News Agency, November 15, 2011; Starr. 19 Personal interview, civilian familiar with their activities, Damascus, Syria, December 2011. This information, however, has not been corroborated by other sources. 20 John Reed, Whats Up with Syrias MANPADS? Foreign Policy, July 27, 2012.
Defining Cyberterrorism: Capturing a Broad Range of Activities in Cyberspace

By Jonalan Brickey
a 1999 study prepared for the Defense Intelligence Agency and produced at the Naval Postgraduate School began with a disclaimer stating, cyberterror is not a threat. At least not yet, and not for a while. 1 Nevertheless, the authors warned, cyberterror is indeed coming. 2 Around the same time, Richard Clarke, who at that time was the White House special adviser for cyberspace security, preferred use of the term infowarfare instead of cyberterrorism. More than a decade later, he still rejected the word cyberterrorism on the basis that it is a red herring that conjure[s] up images of Bin Ladin waging war from his cave; he did, however, caution that there may be such a term as cyberterrorism in the future. 3 Barry Collin first introduced the term cyberterrorism in the 1980s, although just as experts have not formed a consensus definition of terrorism, there is still no unifying definition of cyberterrorism. 4 Cyberterrorism is an even more opaque term than terrorism, adding another layer to an already contentious concept. Cyber 5 events in general are often misunderstood by the public and erroneously reported by the media. People tend to use the terms cyberwar, cyberterrorism, cybercrime, and hacktivism interchangeably, although there are important, sometimes subtle, differences. 6
1 Bill Nelson, Rodney Choi, Michael Iacobucci, Mark Mitchell, and Greg Gagnon, Cyberterror: Prospects and Implications (Monterey, CA: Center for Study of Terrorism and Irregular Warfare, 1999). 2 Ibid. 3 Richard Clarke and Robert Knake, Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It (New York: HarperCollins, 2010). 4 Barry Collin, The Future of CyberTerrorism, Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Symposium on Criminal Justice Issues, The University of Illinois at Chicago, 1996. 5 The term cyber is commonly used as a synonym for computer, but it could also include other information communication technologies, people, and anything with the ability to interpret and act upon code. 6 The specific types of cyber attacks vary based on the motivation and affiliation of that attacker, as well as the
The purpose of this article is to propose a comprehensive definition of cyberterrorism that captures the full range of how terrorists have used the internet in the past and how they will likely use more robust cyber capabilities in the future. This article will first look at clusters of cyberterrorism graphed according to methods and targets; it will then describe the clusters in more detail and provide examples. Finally, the article will offer a new definition of cyberterrorism incorporating these clusters.
Three Clusters of Cyberterrorism Figure 1 depicts the activities associated with the various cyberterrorism terms as described in the literature: online jihad, virtual jihad, electronic jihad, and pure cyberterrorism. While the chart is not a quantitative plotting of the activities, it is a qualitative approximation based on an understanding of the concepts along the x (targets) and y (methods) axes. Also, since terrorists are motivated by the pursuit of political goals, this two-dimensional graph intersects a motivation plane characterized by the pursuit of political goals. Some of these same activities may be carried out by other actors with different motivations, but they would appear in a different plane. 7
Figure 1. Clusters of cyberterrorism.
This i n cl u d e s i n d i vi d u a l and o rg a n i z a ti o n a l w e b s i te s, wh i c h a l l o w v i rtu a l i n te ra cti o n s . F i n a l l y , t h e p h ys i ca l d o ma i n co n s i st s o f wh a t e x i s ts i n th e n a tu ra l , p h y si c a l wo r l d ( a s opposed to the man-made, virtual world). The y-axis in Figure 1 represents the methods of cyber activity: enabling, disruptive, and destructive. The range of the methods variable is similarly described by General Keith Alexander, National Security Agency director and commander o f U . S. C yber Co m m a n d , w h o re ma rk e d th a t c y ber a t t a c ks a g a i n s t U . S. i n f o rma ti o n n et wo r ks s ta rte d a s e x p l o i ta ti v e b ef o r e bec o m i n g d i s ru p ti v e , b u t n o w s u c h a t t a c ks a r e moving into the realm of destructive. 9 The activities in Figure 1 form three clusters that represent different types of cyber militancy at the intersection of cyberspace and terrorism. Enabling Cyber Militancy The bottom-left grouping represents activities tha t a re not d i r ec t l y a s s o ci a te d w i th o p e r a t i o n a l a c t s o f tra d i ti o n a l te rro ri s m ; h o wever , th e y p l a y a k e y s u p p o r t i n g r o l e i n f a ci l i ta ti n g a tta ck s i n t h e c o g n i t i ve a n d v i rtu a l d o ma i n s . En a bl i n g c y ber mi l i ta n cy ( EC M) a cti vi t i es i n c l u d e recruiting, inciting, radicalizing, f i n a n ci n g , tra i n i n g , pl a n n i n g , a n d co mmu n i ca ti n g . Re s e a rc h o n t er r o r i st use of the internet, often described as online jihad or virtual jihad, has revealed the many (similar) benefits that al-Qaìda and other terrorists seek to achieve through the virtual world, including recruiting, radicalizing,
9 John T. Bennett, NSA General on Cyberattacks: Probability for a Crisis Is Mounting, U.S. News and World Report, July 9, 2012.
The x-axis represents the targets of cyberspace 8 operations, spanning the cognitive, virtual, and physical domains. Cognitive targets are human mindsthe cognitive faculties that enable thinking, reasoning, and judgment. Virtual targets are cyber manifestations of physical objects, such as organizations or people.
type of target and attack techniques. For example, cyberwar is warfare conducted in the cyberspace domain between nation-states; cybercrime is crime committed by individuals or organizations via cyber tools; and hacktivism is the use of cyber by activists to voice dissent and support for a cause. 7 For example, cybercriminals may communicate with each other and plan operations, but that activity would appear along another plane represented by the motivation to pursue financial gain. 8 Cyberspace is defined in a draft U.S. military document (Joint Publication 3-12) as a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and associated data, including the internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.
financing, targeting, operational planning, and communicating. 10 There are several definitions in the literature that broadly include these activities as acts of cyberterrorism, and some courts agree with this characterization. A key operative associated with al-Qaìda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) conducted ECM-like activities in France in 2008 and 2009, leading to his conviction
means, although they are not disruptive or destructive acts themselves that leverage the full potential of the cyberspace domain. Disruptive Cyber Militancy The center cluster includes exposing, defacing, and denying. Disruptive cyber militancy (DiCM) is similar to electronic jihad, a cyberterrorism term described as jihadist hacking designed to take down websites and disrupt the normal (cyber-dependent) lifestyle of Westerners, which relies on critical infrastructure supporting medical, utility, transportation, and especially financial systems. Like ECM, electronic jihad also includes less nefarious, more nuisance-minded activities such as web defacement, denial of service attacks, 12 and unauthorized access and disclosure of confidential (and oftentimes embarrassing) information. At the outbreak of Syrian unrest in early 2012, Abu Hafs al-Sunni al-Sunni, a senior writer for jihadist websites and supporter of al-Qaìda and mujahidin everywhere, proposed DiCM acts against the Syrian regime. In a detailed article posted online in February, al-Sunni enumerated several ways the mujahidin could attack the Bashar al-Assad regime. 13 He called on skilled hackers like Red Virus, Omar OX, and other jihadi hackers to conduct electronic jihad against the Syrian regime. These hackers have also been active in cyber attacks between Palestinian and Israeli supporters that have disrupted financial, transportation, and other business websites. Destructive Cyber Militancy The goal of terrorists using destructive cyber militancy (DeCM) is to manipulate computer code and corrupt information system functions to damage or destroy virtual and physical assets. Manipulating or corrupting information may, at a minimum, provide misinformation and induce confusion and loss of confidence in critical
12 A denial of service (DoS) attack prevents the exchange of legitimate network data by overwhelming target computers with messages; a DoS attack may cause users to experience loss of connectivity to the internet and other network services. 13 Abu Hafs al-Sunni al-Sunni, The Electronic Arm of al-Qaida Should Work to Topple Bashar, Shumukh alIslam Network, February 16, 2012.
The goal of terrorists using destructive cyber militancy is to manipulate computer code and corrupt information system functions to damage or destroy virtual and physical assets.
in 2012. Court documents described how Adlene Hicheur provided intellectual and logistical support to AQIM through the internet. His support included uploading projihadist materials online, distributing encryption software to facilitate covert electronic communications, moderating a pro-jihadist website, and establishing virtual payment processes to finance AQIM operations. 11 Actors committing ECM do not have to be motivated by religious ideals, although to fit in this category they must seek political change. ECM activities may enable terrorists to achieve their goals via traditional meansknives, guns, and bombsor through cyber
10 Gabriel Weimann, Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2006); Bruce Hoffman, Using the Web as a Weapon: The Internet as a Tool for Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism, testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, November 6, 2007; Sajjan M. Gohel, The Internet and its Role in Terrorist Recruitment and Operational Planning, CTC Sentinel 2:12 (2009). 11 Judgment of 4 May 2012, Case No. 0926639036 of the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (14th Chamber/2), Paris, France, 2012.
systems. In the worst case, DeCM may cause catastrophic effects on critical infrastructure, possibly resulting in death and destruction. DeCM activities are often described in the literature as pure cyberterrorism, which is the direct use of cyber hardware, software, and networks to create kinetic effects on par with traditional acts of terrorism, as opposed to merely using information communication technology in support of organizational communication and traditional terrorism. 14 Most experts in the field narrowly define cyberterrorism to include only the direct use of cyber capabilities, as opposed to ECM-like activities in support of terrorism. Although there have been no destructive cyberterrorism attacks to date, terrorists may engage in DeCM to cause massive physical damage and economic disruption to critical infrastructure such as the power grid, fuel distribution and storage systems,
One example of a possible DeCM event would be the destruction of a key natural gas pipeline, the flow of which is regulated by electronic industrial control systems.
public water sanitation systems, air traffic control systems, and financial systems (especially ATM networks). Many of these critical systems are either directly connected to the internet or indirectly accessible via removable media and out-of-band channels. 15 A 2011 al-Qaìda video called upon cybersavvy mujahidin to attack U.S. critical information systems by conducting
14 Sarah Gordon and Richard Ford, Cyberterrorism? Computers and Security 21:7 (2002): pp. 636-647. 15 Removable media, such as flash drives, enable automatic transfer of computer code from one network to another as users plug devices into computers physically connected to those networks, oftentimes inadvertently creating an electronic link between otherwise disconnected systems. An out-of-band channel is a network connection that is not typically used for routine communications; for example, system administrators may establish an out-of-band channel by using a dial-up telephone connection to conduct off-site maintenance.
an information raid in the manner of the raids of September 11. 16 The video included translated interviews of cyber experts in the United States discussing how DeCM-like attacks may cause extensive damage to life-sustaining critical infrastructure. One example
Although there have been no destructive cyberterrorism attacks to date, terrorists may engage in DeCM to cause massive physical damage and economic disruption to critical infrastructure.
of a possible DeCM event would be the destruction of a key natural gas pipeline, the flow of which is regulated by electronic industrial control systems (ICS). These systems are vulnerable to hacking exploits, which could allow the manipulation of ICS functions such as a sudden increase in pipeline pressure, resulting in a large kinetic explosion.
A New Definition of Cyberterrorism Bruce Hoffman defines terrorism as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. 17 If one assumes for a moment that this was the accepted definition of terrorism, then the addition of cyber to this term results in a simple, though circular definition: cyberterrorism is the use of cyber to commit terrorism. Given the range of cyberterrorism activities described in the literature and depicted in the clusters shown in Figure 1, this simple definition can be expanded to: cyberterrorism is the use of cyber capabilities to conduct enabling, disruptive, and destructive militant operations in cyberspace to create and exploit fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.
Conclusion Current definitions for cyberterrorism range from narrow to broad, although most experts subscribe to the narrow definition of pure cyberterrorism. The definition proposed here includes three shades of cyberterrorism to capture the full range of cyber activities terrorists use or wish to employ in the pursuit of political goals. Such a definition in the hands of practitioners and academics may engender more granular research, debate, and potentially strategies to counter the threat stemming from the three different shades of cyberterrorism.
Pakistani Taliban Renew Attacks on Punjabi Heartland

By Arif Rafiq
More work is needed to understand and assess the risk associated with cyberterrorismthreats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. Computer security experts routinely expose vulnerabilities in cyberspace; however, there is a paucity of research on cyberterrorism threats and potential consequences. The cyberterrorism definition proposed here is broad enough to give researchers a wider lens to study the cyber capabilities of terrorists across the full spectrum of cyberspace. Lieutenant Colonel Jonalan Brickey is an Information Systems Officer and the Army Cyber Command Fellow at the Combating Terrorism Center, West Point. He holds a B.S. in American Political Studies from the United States Military Academy, an M.S. in Information Technology Management from the Naval Postgraduate School, and a Ph.D. in Computer Science and Information Systems from the University of Colorado Denver. He has held leadership positions in cyber-related programs at the National Security Agency, U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. Army Central Command.
after an extended pause, Tehrik-iTaliban Pakistan (TTP) resumed attacks in Punjab, Pakistans most populated, prosperous, and centrally-located province. The boldest attack was a complex operation on August 16, 2012, on Pakistan Air Force Base Minhas (PAF Minhas), located in the northern Punjab city of Kamra. 1 Two additional attacks occurred in July, one of which was a drive-by shooting that killed seven Pakistani soldiers in the central Punjab city of Wazirabad. 2 Pakistani counterterrorism intelligence and policing have improved in recent years at the federal level as well as in most provinces, including in Punjab. Nevertheless, a number of factors hinder the provinces fight against terrorism, including a justice system ill-equipped to handle terrorism cases, poor prison security, aid to militants from a powerful Deobandi religious network, public antipathy toward military operations, and the absence of a clear-cut anti-jihadist strategy. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province remain the primary targets of domestic terrorists in Pakistan. Yet attacks in Punjab could increase during the next few months due to TTP fear of impending military operations against it in North Waziristan Agency and as Islamabad proceeds in partnering with Washington on Afghanistan. 3 Attacks in Punjab are one of the most effective ways for the TTP to retaliate, sending a direct message to Pakistans leadership and citizens.
1 Taliban Carry Out Brazen Attack on Pakistan Base, Associated Press, August 16, 2012. 2 Gunmen Kill Seven in Attack on Pakistan Military Camp, Reuters, July 9, 2012. 3 U.S.-Pakistan relations have improved since early July
16 Electronic Jihad Video, al-Shabab, 2011, available at www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/?id=483eca14-3c0e4a30-9038-f4bf4a1fad60. 17 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), p. 40.
following Secretary of State Hillary Clintons apology for the accidental killing of two dozen Pakistani soldiers in a U.S. raid on November 26, 2011. The Pakistan-based NATO supply route has reopened and high-level meetings between U.S. and Pakistani officials have resumed.
This article explains the significance of the August 16 attack on PAF Minhas as well as the difficulties in combating terrorism in Punjab Province.
A Preemptive Strike by the TTP in Punjab? On August 16, 2012, nine militants including six suicide attackers launched a complex attack on PAF Minhas, located along Punjabs border with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. The base, home to dozens of fighter jets and surveillance aircraft, was previously attacked by terrorists in 2009 when a suicide bomber blew himself up at the gate, killing eight people. 4
22, 2011, for example, the TTP launched a complex attack on the PAF Mehran naval base in Karachi, destroying two P3C Orion surveillance aircraft. 8 The TTPs show of strength took place on the 27th of Ramadan, which is the date Muslims believe most likely is Laylatul Qadr (The Night of Power), the holiest night in the month and the most probable night in which the Quran is believed to have been revealed to the Prophet Muhammad. The importance of this date in the Islamic tradition suggests that the TTP aimed to send a message to its members, sympathizers, and other Pakistanis that the execution of a spectacular attack on this day was demonstration of its righteousness. Additionally, the TTP likely saw the night as providing an opportunity to exploit security weaknesses. The attacks took place after midnight on a holy night when many Muslims stay awake for much or all of the night to perform extra prayers and supplication. As a result, base personnel were reportedly dispersed praying at the time of the attack. 9 The TTP stated that the attack was conducted to exact revenge for the killings of former TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud and former al-Qaìda chief Usama bin Ladin. 10 In another interview, spokesman Ihsanullah described the attack on the airbase as revenge for the aerial bombing of the tribal areas by the Pakistani air force. 11 Beyond revenge and symbolism, there could be broader strategic objectives behind the TTPs attack. The resumption of attacks against the state in Punjab comes after Pakistan announced the restoration of the NATO supply route from Pakistan to Afghanistan in early July. Additionally, the summer of 2012 is effectively the last fighting season with the surge troops present in Afghanistanperhaps a final opportunity for the United States and Pakistan to strike militants in North Waziristan with a hammer and anvil approach. The TTP is possibly
8 Faraz Khan, PNS Mehran: Official Naval Complaint at Odds with Ministry, Express Tribune, May 25, 2011. 9 Ibid. 10 Shaheryar Popalzai and Nabil Ansari, Tehreek-iTaliban Claim Revenge Attack on Kamra Airbase, Express Tribune, August 16, 2012. 11 Anjum.
retaliating against the Pakistani state for restoring cooperation with the United States and demonstrating that Islamabad will have to pay high costs in its heartland if it expands operations in the North Waziristan tribal area where TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud is believed to be based. 12 If Pakistan defers
The most recent attack lasted nearly six hours, with both the Pakistani military and the TTP stating that all nine terrorists were killed. An unnamed source told Pakistans Express Tribune that the driver of the militants vehicle escaped, a point that clashes with the official government narrative. 5 The militants were armed with hand
The TTP is possibly retaliating against the Pakistani state for restoring cooperation with the United States and demonstrating that Islamabad will have to pay high costs in its heartland if it expands operations in the North Waziristan tribal area.
anti-TTP military operations in North Waziristan until next year, it could allow the TTP to conserve strength during the winter. Indeed, in August, as the NATO supply route reopened, Hakimullah Mehsud reportedly ordered an increase in terrorist attacks in Punjab, focusing on its largest city, Lahore. Mehsud is alleged to have disbursed over $260,000 for attacks on a Pakistan Air Force base and other government installations in Lahore, a considerable distance away from Kamra. 13 So me o b s e rv e rs p o i n t t o wa r d o t h er T T P - a f f i l i a te d j i h a d i s ts a s h a vi n g o rg a n i z e d th e a tta ck . T h e m o st n o ta b l e s u s p e ct i s A d n a n R a sh i d , a f o rme r te ch n i ci a n a t P A F M i n h a s w h o w a s a rre s te d i n 2 00 4 f o r a l l eg ed involvement in an assassination a tte mp t o n th e n - P re si d en t P er vez Mu s h a rra f . 14 Ra s h i d w a s f r eed f r o m p ri s o n i n th e ci ty o f B a n n u i n K h y ber Pakhtunkhwa Province in a large, daring escape along with more than
If Pakistan defers antiTTP military operations in North Waziristan until next year, it could allow the TTP to conserve strength during the winter.
and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), mines, and automatic weapons. 6 Local security personnel were aided by commandos from the Special Services Group (SSG) flown in from the Tarbela Ghazi airbase. Two Pakistani soldiers were killed, and RPG fire damaged a Saab-2000 Airborne Early Warning and Control plane. 7 This was the second attack in a year-and-a-half that targeted Pakistani aircraft, which are difficult for the government to replace without foreign financial assistance. On May
4 Taliban Claim Attack on Minhas Base; Nine Militants Killed, Dawn, August 16, 2012. 5 Irfan Ghauri, Lingering Questions: Is Something Being Hidden about the Militants Approach? Express Tribune, August 17, 2012. 6 Shakeel Anjum, Nine Militants Killed in Raid on Kamra Airbase, The News International, August 17, 2012. 7 Hanif Khalid, Damaged Awacs Aircraft Repairable, The News International, August 17, 2012.
12 Targeting Punjab: TTP Chief Wants Increase in Attacks, Express Tribune, August 1, 2012. 13 Ibid. 14 Talibans Attack on PAF Base Kamra: Pity the Nation Whose Security is in the Hands of Dangerous Duffers, Let Us Build Pakistan, August 17, 2012.
200 other inmates. 15 The raid focused on Rashid, who reportedly used three cell phones, got married, and fathered a child while in one of Pakistans notoriously lax prisons. 16 During his incarceration, Rashid was also reportedly in contact with Dr. Aqeel, who is accused of plotting the complex attack on the Pakistan Armys General Headquarters in 2009. 17
A failing judicial and prison system emboldens militants and either results in their undeserved release from detention or allows them unwarranted access to the public.
In a video released shortly after his escape, Rashid is shown in the North Waziristan cities of Mir Ali and Miran Shah, near where Hakimullah Mehsud is reportedly based. 18 Pakistani intelligence reports suggested that attacks in the month of August were being planned, but the reports were conflicting and inconclusive. Reports preceding the PAF Minhas attack pointed to two different TTP cells based in Miran Shah, one led by Qari Aslam and the other led by Qari Yasin, and possibly even the Ilyas Kashmiri Group. 19 According to one report, the PAF Minhas attack as well as two other smaller-scale attacks in Punjab, including an August 1 attack on a fruit stall in Lahore, were in response to the killing of militant leader Ghaffar Qaiserani by Punjab police. 20 Qaiserani was killed in an encounter with Multan police on August 1, 2012. 21
15 Fida Adeel et al., Prison Break: Taliban Attack Bannu Jail, Nearly 400 Inmates Escape, Express Tribune, April 15, 2012. 16 Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari, Pakistans New Most Wanted: A Short Sketch of Adnan Rasheed, Militant Leadership Monitor 3:5 (2012); Reforming Pakistans Prison System, International Crisis Group, October 12, 2011. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Asad Kharal, Pre-Warned: Attack was Expected, Express Tribune, August 17, 2012. 20 Ibid. 21 Alleged Terrorist Killed in DG Khan, The News Inter-
Prior to the killing of Qaiserani, the TTP conducted two major attacks in Punjab in the month of July. On July 9, it executed a drive-by shooting, brazenly killing seven Pakistani soldiers who were camped in the central Punjab city of Wazirabad while on a search and rescue mission. 22 Ironically, a rally of the Lashkar-i-Tayyiba-led Defense of Pakistan Council was close by. 23 It is possible that the perpetrators of these killings hid among the other militants and religious party activists. Separately, on July 12, TTP terrorists stormed a building housing Pakistani police cadets and killed nine people. 24
The Fight for Punjab Pakistans Pashtun belt bordering Afghanistan has borne the brunt of the post-9/11 insurgent and terrorist wave. Yet given the size of the province, the fight in Punjab is almost as important as the one in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province.
into the conservative tendencies of the urban Punjab populace. In 2010, Shahbaz Sharif, the powerful chief minister of Punjab, asked the Taliban for mercy and to spare his province from violence. 29 Sharif said, If the Taliban are also fighting for the same cause [i.e., opposing Musharrafs policies and foreign interference in Pakistani politics], then they should not carry out acts of terror in Punjab. A failing judicial and prison system emboldens militants and either results in their undeserved release from detention or allows them unwarranted access to the public. Malik Ishaq, a selfconfessed culprit behind the murder of
Punjab is h o m e t o L a s h k a r - i - T a y y i b a as well a s t h e v a r i o u s P u n j a b i T a l i b a n groups. 2 5 T h e P u n j a b p o l i ce h a v e made so me i mp o rta n t a rre s ts i n th e past yea r. I n No v e mb e r 2 01 1 , th e P unjab p o l i ce a rre s te d 1 7 s u s p e cte d TTP comma n d e rs . 26 Q a ri A z ma t, th e masterm i n d o f ma n y a tta ck s i n La h o re , was app re h e n d e d i n Ju l y. 27 I n e a rl y August, f i v e a l l e g e d T T P me mb e rs were arre s te d i n th e s o u th e rn P u n j a b city of Mu l ta n. 28 Intelligence gathering and police training have improved, but Punjab-based politicians are reluctant to muster public support for the war and instead defer to and even feed
national, August 2, 2012. 22 Gunmen Attack Army Camp, Kill Seven, Agence France-Presse, July 9, 2012. 23 Arif Rafiq, The Emergence of the Difa-e-Pakistan Islamist Coalition, CTC Sentinel 5:3 (2012). 24 Taliban Claim Lahore Attack Killing Nine Personnel, Dawn, July 12, 2012. 25 The Punjabi Taliban is a generic term that refers to Tehrik-i-Taliban Punjab as well as splinter groups emerging from the anti-Shià Lashkar-i-Jhangvi as well as the once Kashmir-focused Jaysh-i-Muhammad and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami. 26 Punjab Police Arrest 17 Suspected Militants from Various Cities, Express Tribune, November 17, 2011. 27 Mastermind of Several Bomb Attacks in Lahore Arrested, Press Trust of India, July 8, 2012. 28 5 Alleged TTP Men Arrested in Multan, Express Tribune, August 4, 2012.
Militancy is bolstered by religious, social, and political networks in Punjabmost notably, the spread of Deobandism and conservative nationalist politics.
many Shià, was acquitted on 34 out of 44 murder counts and released on bail on the remaining 10. 30 He once again openly calls for the murder of Shià and rebellion against the government in public speeches. Much like Adnan Rashid, Omar Saeed Sheikh, who was allegedly involved in a number of plots, including the murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl, is said to have had access to three mobile phones, six batteries, and 18 SIM cards while in prison. 31 In 2008, he managed to call Pervez Musharrafs personal cell phone and threaten his life. 32
29 Zeeshan Haider, Punjab Minister Asks for Mercy from Taliban, Earns Womans Scorn, Reuters, March 17, 2010. 30 Owais Raza, Sectarian Clashes: LeJ Chief Malik Ishaq Placed Under House Arrest, Express Tribune, September 22, 2011. 31 Plot to Kill Musharraf Unearthed, Geo TV, December 18, 2008. 32 Ibid.
Rather than directing their focus on threats within, many Pakistanis are pointing their fingers outward. H a m i d Mir, a popular television t al k s how hos t, s ingled out the New Y o r k T i me s Pakistan bureau chief D e c l a n Walsh for allegedly following t h e C I A s age nda after he suggested t h a t PAF Minhas stored some of t h e countr ys nuclear weapons. 33 Popular support for counterinsurgency operations is also waning, dropping from 53% in 2009 to 32% in 2012. 34 Only 49% of those polled in Punjab Province see the Taliban as a threat, compared to 94% in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. 35 The decline in attacks seems to have reversed public support for the war, but rising anti-American sentiment, growing economic troubles, and overall war fatigue could also be factors.
Conclusion In September 2012, Pakistan could launch military operations in North Waziristan to target the TTP before the end of the cur r e nt f ighting season this w i n t er. 3 6 D ir e ct op erations against t h e Haq q ani ne twork, based in the s a m e tr ibal ar e a, appear unlikely. T h e P ak is tani m ilita ry has restricted c ou n t e r ins ur ge ncy operations to m i l i t a nts that pr imarily attack the P a k i s tani s tate with reasonab le e f f e c t i veness. In Malakand Division an d much of F A TA , the TTP no longer s er v es as the de -facto government. M or eo ve r , the m ultiple intelligence r ep o r ts r e ce iv e d about a potential t h r eat to PA F Minhas demonstrate t h a t Pak is tani inte l ligence networks ar e a c tive and wor k ing. The inability of the base attackers to penetrate deep into the base, destroy, and kill large numbers of personnel point toward an improvement in security of high-
profile targetsa marked contrast to the militarys failure to secure the PNS Mehran naval base in May 2011. The TTP umbrella organization has splintered into smaller factions that often rival one another. 37 Funding for the organization has reportedly dried up, possibly resulting in less spectacular attacks. Still, the TTP has shown great resilience. It continues to operate in both North and South Waziristan as well as Dir, Chitral, and adjacent safe havens in Afghanistanand it often reminds Punjab that it still exists through violence. Pakistan faces a long-term challenge from militancy and terrorism, which is not restricted to the border regions with Afghanistan. Militancy is bolstered by religious, social, and political networks in Punjabmost notably, the spread of Deobandism and conservative nationalist politics. Rather than looking to face the threat within, the urban Punjab populace is directing its support toward anti-war politicians like Imran Khan, who call for a quick, negotiated settlement with Pakistani jihadists. Based on polling data, Punjabs urban middle class is largely averting their eyes from the threat, hoping that terrorism and radicalism in Pakistan were caused by the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and will end when U.S. forces depart the region. 38 Arif Rafiq is an adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute and president of Vizier Consulting, LLC.
The Strategic Limitations of Boko Haram in Southern Nigeria

By Jacob Zenn
on july 30, 2009, Boko Haram founder Muhammad Yusuf was killed while in custody of Nigerian security forces in Maiduguri, Borno State, in northeastern Nigeria. 1 On August 9, Boko Harams new leader announced in a written statement that Yusufs ideas would live on forever and that Boko Haram would begin a series of bombings in the evil cities of Lagos, Ibadan, Enugu and Port Harcourt, all in southern Nigeria. He stated that Boko Harams Islamic revolution was not limited to the northern states and that the southern states, especially the Yoruba, Igbo and Ijaw infidels, would become Boko Harams immediate target. 2 As Nigeria is split between a predominantly Muslim north, where Boko Haram originates and primarily operates, and a predominantly Christian south, attacks against Christians in southern Nigeria would spread instability to the south. Boko Haram attacks on churches in the religiously mixed Middle Belt in the first half of 2012 have already led to retaliation by Christians against Muslims in that region and heightened the prospects for a religious civil war in the country. 3 In addition, the insecurity caused by Boko Haram attacks in the south, including kidnappings or sabotage, would affect the countrys economy because all of Nigerias oil reserves, which account for more than 90% of the countrys export earnings and 80% of government revenues, are in the southern zones. 4
1 The moments before Yusufs death were recorded on a cellular phone and posted on YouTube. See Boko
33 Capital Talk, Geo TV, August 16, 2012. Hamid Mir said, Now if any Pakistani journalist expressed an opinion that was according to the line of the ISI or the army, they would say that he is an ISI agent. But if Declan Walsh is following Leon Panettas line, then we cannot say that he is a CIA agent, because if we were to do so, it would infringe upon his journalistic freedom. This translation was made by the author. 34 Pakistani Public Opinion Ever More Critical of U.S., Pew Research Center, June 27, 2012. 35 Ibid. 36 Pakistan Military Plans to Open New Front: Panetta, Associated Press, August 14, 2012. 37 Kathy Gannon, Expert: Pakistan Taliban are Weak and Divided, Associated Press, December 4, 2011. 38 Pakistani Public Opinion Ever More Critical of U.S.
Haram Leader Muhammad Yusuf Interrogation Before his Execution by Nigerian Security Agents, August 3, 2009, available at www.youtube.com/ watch?v=ePpUvfTXY7w. 2 Boko Haram Resurrects, Declares Total Jihad, Vanguard, August 14, 2009. The Yorubas, Igbos and Ijaws are the three largest ethnicities in southern Nigeria. 3 Nigeria Tightens Curfew on Middle Belt Area, alJazira, July 9, 2012. 4 Nigeria is unofficially divided into six geopolitical zones, with all 36 of the countrys states and Abuja Federal Capital Territory falling into one of these zones. The geopolitical zones do not represent ethnic or religious ho-
An attack in southern Nigeria would also render a psychological victory for Boko Haram because it would show that the group could strike anywhere in the country and that Lagos, Nigerias economic hub and Africas most populous city, is in Boko Harams targeting range. Following Boko Harams August 9 threat on the south, the group did not carry out any successful attacks in southern Nigeria. In fact, all of the approximately 500 Boko Haram attacks recorded since 2009 were carried out in the countrys northern zones. 5 During this period, Boko Haram expanded its operations from its original bases in Yobe and Borno states in the far northeast to North-Central zones commercial capital of Kano and North-West zones traditional capital of Sokoto, and to the Middle Belt states of Plateau, Kaduna and Kogi, but the threats to attack the south were never realized. 6
mogeneity and are broadly accepted in political discourse by almost all Nigerians. The six geopolitical zones are: North-Central (Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, Plateau and Abuja Federal Capital Territory); NorthEast (Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe); North-West (Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto and Zamfara); South-East (Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, and Imo); South-South (Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo and Rivers); SouthWest (Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun and Oyo). For the purposes of this article, northern Nigeria will refer to the countrys three northern zones and southern Nigeria will refer to the countrys three southern zones. 5 See Terrorist Incidents Attributed to Boko Haram, 2009-2011, Institute for the Study of Violent Groups, 2011. This study records 271 attacks during those three years. Since attacks have escalated in 2011 and 2012, 500 attacks is an appropriate estimate at present. Most attacks have targeted police stations, banks, poker and beer halls, universities and schools, and political leaders and, more recently, media houses and churches. Approximately 1,500 people have been killed in these attacks. 6 Muhammad Bello et al., Four Killed in First Boko Haram Attack on Sokoto, ThisDayLive, July 31, 2012; Isaac Abrak, Nigeria Church Bombings Kill 19, Spark Reprisals, Reuters, June 17, 2012. Sokoto, the seat of the traditional caliphate in Nigeria, had enjoyed relative peace despite a threat by Boko Haram to attack the state in 2011. On July 30, 2012, Boko Haram fighters set off twin bomb blasts in the capital city of Sokoto, including a suicide vehicle bombing at the zonal police headquarters, and engaged policemen in a gunfight in which two Boko Haram members were killed. On January 23, 2012, Boko Haram shattered any sense of peace in Kano when it killed more than 200 people in a day-long series of attacks. Among other attacks in the Middle Belt region, on June 17, 2012, Boko Haram suicide vehicle bombers attacked three churches in Zaria, Kaduna State, killing 19 people and sparking reprisals by Christians against Muslims. According to one report, After the bombings, Christian youths blocked the highway leading south out of Kaduna to the capital Abuja, pulling Muslims out of cars and killing them. On June 10, 2012, Boko Haram attacked one church in Jos, Plateau State, and one church in Biu, Borno State. These church attacks were all carried out on Sunday when services were being held. 7 Kogi is in the North-Central zone and is the only state in the country that borders on three geopolitical zones as well as Abuja: South-South, South-East and South-West. Okene is only 20 miles to the border of South-South zone and 30 miles to the border of South-West zone. 8 Ibrahim Garba, Nigeria Soldiers Arrest Boko Haram Commander, Christian Science Monitor, May 11, 2012; Captive Ethnic Yoruba Boko Haram Kingpin Says We Planned To Invade Lagos, Onitsha, Ibadan, Enugu and Warri Too; Says Terrorists Feeling The Impact Of The Security Crackdown, Beegeagles Blog, May 17, 2012.
i n h i s n a ti v e So u th - W est zo n e a n d co n f e s s e d to p l a n n i n g a t t a c ks a t s tra te g i c ta rg e ts i n La g o s, i n c l u d i n g a five-star hotel, Tafawa Balewa Square, churches and markets, and a bank. H e re v e a l e d th a t B o k o H a r a m d o es not want to limit itself to an ethnic agenda and be perceived as working for the interests of the Hausas, who are the majority ethnic group in northern Nigeria, or any other ethnic group. 9 This came less than four months after Abu Qaqa, a Boko Haram spokesman and Shura Council member, was captured in January 2012. Abu Qaqa revealed that ethnic Kanuris, who are the majority ethnic group only in Borno State, have been selling out members of other ethnicities, including Abu Qaqa, an ethnic Ebira from Kogi State. 10 Among the reasons why northern elites, who are mostly Hausas and Fulanis, have rejected B o k o H a ra m i s t h a t t h ey p e rce i v e K a n u ri s a s t h e d o m i n a n t e th n i c g ro u p w i th i n B o ko H a r a m . 1 1 An attack on southern Nigeria, according to Suleiman Mohammed, would show that Boko Haram is a national movement with an Islamic co n s ci o u s n e s s a n d u n i t e t h e va r i o u s Muslim ethnic groups in the country. H e a l s o s ta te d th a t a t t a c ks i n t h e s o u th w o u l d d i v e rt th e a t t en t i o n o f t h e s e cu ri ty f o rce s i n th e n o r t h a n d r el i eve pressure on Boko Haram members there, while also helping Boko Haram prove its worth to southern sponsors. 12 Another Boko Haram leader from the north, Kabiru Sokoto, masterminded the vehicle bombing of Saint Theresa Catholic Church in Madalla, Niger State, on Christmas Day 2011, which killed more than 35 people. 13 He had been on the police intell i g e n ce s l i st o f Bo ko H a ra m s u s p e cts b e f o re t h e a t t a c k a n d w a s mo n i to re d b y th e p o l i c e wh i l e scouting targets on Snake Island,
9 Ibid. 10 Ike Abonyi and Ibrahim Shuaibu, Nigeria: Qaqa Boko Haram is Under Duress, Divided, AllAfrica.com, February 7, 2012. 11 James J.F. Forest, Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria, JSOU Reports 12-5, May 2012, p. 84. 12 Garba; Captive Ethnic Yoruba Boko Haram Kingpin Says We Planned To Invade Lagos, Onitsha, Ibadan, Enugu and Warri Too; Says Terrorists Feeling The Impact Of The Security Crackdown. 13 Terror: 40 Killed in Christmas Bombings, Vanguard, December 26, 2011.
A map of Nigeria.
As this article will detail, there is still only speculation about Boko Harams ability to strike southern Nigeria. There is, however, growing certainty about Boko Harams infiltration of North-Central zones Kogi State, which could serve as a staging point for operations deeper into southern Nigeria. 7 Interrogations of captured Boko Haram leaders in 2012 have also shed light on internal divisions in Boko Haram that explain some of the groups practical motivations for attacking the south beyond the rhetoric of public statements.
Internal Tensions Suleiman Mohammed, an ethnic Yoruba, was arrested in Kano on May 11, 2012, with 10 IEDs and thousands of rounds of ammu n i ti o n i n h i s h o me . 8 H e w a s a commander for Boko Haram operations
10
L ag os , on D e ce m ber 1 3, 201 1 . He t h en d is appe ar e d from surveillance m on i t or ing pe r haps due to police i n ep t i tude or collaboration with Boko H a r am until thr e e days before he w a s c aptured on January 14, 2012, in A b u j a. 14 A s our ce fr om Nigerias State S ec u r i ty Service said that Sokotos presence in Lagos was no coincidence and that Boko Haram was planning to attack the southern cities of Lagos, Ibadan, Enugu, Onitsha and Warri. 15
Failed Operations and False Attributions The Nigerian m e dia o ften assumes that an y militant or cr im i nal activity in the s o u t h that m ay be the work of B oko H a r am is the wor k of B oko Haram r e g a r dless of the evidence, which i n f l at e s the actual threat that the group pos es in the r e gion. Nevertheless, the s ev er al atte m pte d attacks on churches i n t h e S outh-We s t zone, which is the m o s t r eligiously-mixed of the southern z on es , and othe r s ymbolically-timed at t empte d attack s in the region show t h a t eithe r Bok o Haram or violent s y mpathize r s ar e op erational in the s o u t h . Bok o Har am s intent to expand o p e r a tions in the south, however, h a s b ee n m e t with poor results. B oko H a r am fig hte r s appear to have failed i n a l l of the ir atte mpts to carry out a t t a c ks in southern Nigeria or been captured before initiating attacks.
about their plans to bomb a church symbolically timed for New Years Eve. The State Security Service director for Edo State, however, later said that the suspects Boko Haram connections were not yet established. 17 The earliest reported Boko Haram operation in the South-West zone was in August 2011 when a suspected member was
While Boko Haram activity in the three southern zones is hard to corroborate, Boko Haram has a more verifiable presence in North-Central zones Kogi State.
conducting surveillance of churches in Ibadan disguised as a beggar. When he began talking in Hausa, the common language of northern Nigeria, on his smart-phone near a church, locals reported him to police. 18 Like the other incidents in the zone, however, the suspect was not conclusively a Boko Haram operative. In South-South zone, there has only been one reported Boko Haram operation, which was in December 2011 when military intelligence officers arrested three northerners, one Yoruba Muslim and one Muslim convert from Rivers State in Nigerias top oil-producing city of Port Harcourt, Rivers State. The Boko Haram cell was reportedly on a mission to carry out a bomb attack on Christmas Eve at the Nigerian Armys 2 nd Brigade Command, a mid-size hotel, and the Shell Oil facility timed to coincide with Kabiru Sokotos church bombing in Madalla. 19 Hotels and oil facilities, however, have never been the targets of Boko Haram attacks in northern Nigeria or the Middle Belt, and a closer look at the operation shows that the operatives were more likely Niger Delta militants or simply oil robbers. 20
17 Mike Osarogiagbon, SSS Confirms Arrests of Boko Haram Suspects, Nigerian Observer, January 3, 2012. 18 Ola Ajayi, Suspected Boko Haram Member Nabbed in Ibadan, Vanguard, August 1, 2011. 19 Fidelis Soriwei and Chukwudi Akasike, Five Boko Haram Bombers Arrested in Port Harcourt - Army Puts Formations on the Red Alert, Punch, January 22, 2012. 20 Port Harcourt Blasts: Nigerian Robbers Killed,
In South-East zone, two men from northwestern Nigerias Zamfara State were arrested in a motor park in Ebonyi State on May 4, 2012, with guns and machetes. They were accused of belonging to Boko Haram, although there was no clear evidence of their membership. 21 In a much larger incident in February 2012, 25 suspected Boko Haram members, also from Zamfara State, were arrested while traveling on a bus in Enugu State. They were reportedly planning to bomb the University of Nigeria campus in Nsukka during its 41 st convocation ceremony and were traveling with 27 guns wrapped in fertilizer bags, axes, daggers, and acid. After four weeks of interrogation, however, they were released. 22 Like in the South-South and South-West zones, there was no conclusive evidence that the suspects in South-East zone were Boko Haram members.
Kogi State Exception While Boko Haram activity in the three southern zones is hard to corroborate, Boko Haram has a more verifiable presence in North-Central zones Kogi State, which borders Abuja and all three southern zones. Boko Harams first operation in the state was in February 2012 when it raided the Koton Karfe Prison and freed 119 inmates, including seven Boko Haram members. Unlike the attacks attributed to Boko Haram in the southern zones, Boko Haram claimed the attack, with its spokesperson saying, We staged the operation in Kogi to rescue seven of our members incarcerated there and Allah made it possible for the operation to be successful. 23
In South-West zone, all suspected Boko Haram operatives have targeted churches. In Ikorodu, Lagos, on April 24, 2012, a man from Taraba State who locals suspected was a member of Boko Haram placed a bomb in an amulet outside of a Methodist church before security officers detected his behavior and seized him. 16 Three months earlier, in January 2012, members of a Boko Haram cell were arrested in Benin City, Edo State, after police were tipped off
14 Kabiru Sokoto was arrested on January 14, 2012, but escaped from police custody within 24 hours with the help of Zakaria Biu, the police commissioner in charge of criminal investigations, and local youths organized by Biu. Sokoto was rearrested on February 10 in MutumBiu Village in Taraba State by a joint team of State Security Service and army operatives. See Mitaire Ikpen, Kabiru Sokotos Escape Zakaria Biu Dismissed, Vanguard, February 22, 2012. 15 Security Agencies Uncover Boko Haram Plot to Attack South, Punch, March 10, 2012. 16 Steve Ogwu-Chinuwa, Attempt to Bomb Lagos Church Fails, The Moment, April 25, 2012.
BBC, May 17, 2012. That article stated, Boko Haram has staged numerous attacks across northern Nigeria but has not targeted the countrys oil industry, based in the south. Other militant groups used to carry out frequent attacks on the oil industry in Port Harcourt and the surrounding region but many have now joined a government amnesty and the area has been relatively calm recently. 21 Nnamdi Akpa, Ebonyi Police Arrest 2 Suspected Terrorists, Daily Times, May 4, 2012. 22 Tony Edike, 25 Boko Haram Members Nabbed in Enugu, Vanguard, January 28, 2012; Abdulkadir Badsha Mukhtar, Nigeria: Boko Haram - Police Free 25 Hunters in Enugu, Daily Trust, February 22, 2012. 23 Hamza Idris and Aliyu M. Hamagam, Boko Haram: Why We Attacked Kogi PrisonNiger Police Arrest 9 Escapees, Weekly Trust, February 18, 2012.
11
Following the prison break, the State Security Service uncovered a series of hideouts and bomb factories in Kogi State, several of which were suspected of belonging to Boko Haram. A bombmaking factory was uncovered on March 26 in Kabba; then, on April 1, the State Security Service raided a c el l s hide out in O kene, killing nine s u s p ecte d Bok o Haram fighters. 2 4 On A p r i l 9 , anothe r bo mb factory was
Since most of Boko Harams rank-and-file fighters come from the poorly educated Quranic schools of northern Nigeria, they would struggle to blend in with the population in southern Nigeria.
u n c ov er e d in O gam inana. 2 5 On April 2 3 , t h e N ig e r ian A i r Force attacked a s u spe cte d bom b-making factory i n a for e s t in U s omi. 2 6 On J uly 1 6, 2 01 2 , the day af te r a vehicle bomb at t r i b ute d to Bok o Haram exploded ou t s i d e of a chur ch in Okene, the s t a t e police uncov e r ed another b ombmaking factory in Okehi. 27 On August 22, 2012, Nigerian police uncovered two more bomb factories, one in Okene and one in Okehi, and a car loaded with ammunition, two rocket launchers and explosives, and arrested five suspected Boko Haram fighters. 28 The level of violence in Kogi State escalated to new levels on August 6, 2012, when suspected Boko Haram fighters chanting Islamic slogans surrounded a church in Okene during the middle of a service and opened fire
24 Shola Oyeyipo, Ibrahim Shuaibu, and Sherrif Bologu, Victorious Weekend for Military, Police, as they Bomb Boko Haram Hideout, ThisDayLive, April 23, 2012. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Boluwaji Obahopo, Car Bomb Explodes in Kogi, Suspect Arrested, Vanguard, July 16, 2012; Usman A. Bello, Nigeria: Another Bomb Factory Uncovered in Kogi, Daily Trust, July 18, 2012. 28 Police Raid Bomb Factories in Central Nigeria State, Reuters, August 23, 2012.
on the worshippers with AK-47 assault rifles, killing 20 people. 29 The following day, a bomb was detected at a church in Kogis capital, Lokoja, before it detonated. 30 As evidence of the toll that these attacks are having on Nigerians faith in the government and the ability for the country to remain united, the reverend of the church publicly blamed the government for not carrying out its responsibility to protect its citizens, while also calling for Boko Haram and those who want Islamic laws to form their own country. 31 There is now talk of a Kogi Boko Haram faction, which may be distinct from Kanuri and Hausa Boko Haram factions in the north, but whose operational capabilities may be derived from interacting with Boko Haram operatives, weapons traffickers and criminal networks in the north. 32 It remains to be seen whether Kogi State becomes Boko Harams staging point for launching attacks further south, but Boko Haram cells and weapons hideouts in the state would facilitate Boko Harams southward expansion.
Misperceptions vs. Reality The rhetoric about Boko Haram in the south continues to mislead southerners about the threat that the group actually poses in the region. In a few examples of overreaction, the Southeast chapter of the Christian Association of Nigeria announce d i n Ju n e 2 01 2 th a t mo re th a n 6,000 B o k o H a ra m me mb e rs h a v e infiltrat e d th e th re e s o u th e rn z o n e s , even th o u g h mo s t e s ti ma te s p l a ce B oko Ha ra ms to ta l ca d re b e tw e e n 1 ,000 an d 4, 000 p e o p l e . 33 I n th e s a me month, th e Y o ru b a e th n o - n a ti o n a l i s t youth gro u p A p a p o O o d u a K o ya s ta te d pub licly th a t i t i s a l mo s t i n e v i ta b l e that B oko H a ra m w i l l co n d u ct s u i ci d e bombing a t t a c k s i n L a gos and Ibadan by July 2012, a prediction that proved
false. 34 In March 2012, in response to reports from the anti-terror Rapid Response Squad (RRS) that Boko Haram might use religious sanctuaries as cover for attacks, the state government of Lagos demolished mosques in strategic locations, such as commercial hubs and areas near government offices. 35 These fatalistic predictions about Boko Haram overlook two important reasons why the group is unable to gain a foothold in the south. First, since most of Boko Harams rank-and-file fighters come from the poorly educated Quranic schools of northern Nigeria, they would struggle to blend in with the population in southern Nigeria, such as in the oil-producing states, where northern languages are not spoken and Christianity is the religion of more than 95% of the population. 36 In fact, the dozens, or even hundreds, of Boko Haram fighters who have traveled northwards to Gao, Mali, to join the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West
As in any insurgency, Boko Haram depends on some level of local support and collaboration to carry out attacks.
Africa and other insurgent groups in the newly proclaimed State of Azawad have integrated more smoothly into the human terrain there than northern Nigerian Boko Haram fighters would in southern Nigeria. 37 As in any insurgency, Boko Haram depends on some level of local support and collaboration to carry out attacks. In the Middle Belt, for example, some Muslim Fulani communities embroiled in land conflicts with Christian ethnic
34 Boko Haram Likely To Attack Lagos and Ibadan in Next Few Weeks, Pan Yoruba Group Warns, Sahara Reporters, June 18, 2012. 35 Emmanuel Mayah, Boko Haram Scare Forces Lagos to Demolish Five Mosques, Africa Review, March 23, 2012. 36 Abimbola Adesoji, Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Response of the Nigerian State, Africa Today 57:4 (2011): pp. 99-119. 37 Dozens of Boko Haram Help Malis Rebel Seize Gao, Vanguard, April 9, 2012.
29 Shola Oyeyipo, Yemi Akinsuyi and Chiemelie Ezeobi, Kogi Death Toll Rises to 20, This Day, August 8, 2012. 30 Bomb Found in Kogi, Business Day, August 8, 2012. 31 Kogi Church Attack: Primate Condemns Killings, August 7, 2012, available at www.youtube.com/ watch?feature=player_embedded&v=eaHyVd1R2wo. 32 Forest, p. 3. 33 Tony Edike, Boko Haram Plans Jihad on Christians, S-East CAN Alleges, Vanguard, June 19, 2012; David Cook, Boko Haram Escalates Attacks on Christians in Northern Nigeria, CTC Sentinel 5:4 (2012).
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groups have overlapping objectives with Boko Haram to drive out the Christians, so the Fulani communities may have formed a temporary alliance with Boko Haram. 38 Nigeria is plagued by a tradition in which local community leaders support local gangs to attack rival communities. In the case of the
As long as the Muslim ethnic groups of southern Nigeria, especially the Yorubas, continue to deny Boko Haram a foothold in the southern zones, Boko Harams attempts to strike the south will likely remain isolated, infrequent and ineffectual.
Middle Belt, a group like Kogi Boko Haram may be a local gang which is funded by Fulanis to strike fear in the Christian population, while in other parts of the country, even in Christian majority areas, militias like the Yoruba Oodua Peoples Congress, the Igbo Bakassi Boys, the Ijaw Egbesu Boys, and the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra pursue agendas targeting their rival ethnic groups. All of these militias would be out of place anywhere except their indigenous lands, and the same is true of Boko Haram in the southern zones. Second, the Yorubas, who form more than 20% of Nigerias population and are indigenous to the South-West zone, have stood united against Boko Haram. Leading Yoruba Muslims, for example, disowned commander Suleiman Mohammed after his arrest and have stated publicly that nobody can fight for God. 39 The Yorubas
38 Yinka Ibukun, Sect Attack Claim Complicates Nigeria Crisis, Associated Press, July 13, 2012. 39 Garba; Captive Ethnic Yoruba Boko Haram Kingpin Says We Planned To Invade Lagos, Onitsha, Ibadan, Enugu and Warri Too; Says Terrorists Feeling The Impact Of The Security Crackdown. A Muslim community leader in Lagos said, The southern Muslims have value for human lives; they know that nobody can fight for God. They are not inconsiderate. The Muslim leader-
recognize that they would suffer from inter-religious conflict more than any other ethnic group in the country since they are religiously mixed, while two other large ethnic groups, the Igbos and the Hausas, are almost uniformly Christian and Muslim. If the country were to fissure along religious lines, the Yorubas would become a minority in a Hausa-dominated north and Igbodominated south and face the prospect of internal fratricide if Yoruba Muslims and Christians fought each other.
Conclusion As long as the Muslim ethnic groups of southern Nigeria, especially the Yorubas, continue to deny Boko Haram a foothold in the southern zones, Boko Harams atte m p t s t o s t r i k e t h e s o u t h will like l y re ma i n i s o l a te d , i n f re qu e n t and ine f f e ctu a l . No n e th e l e s s , j u s t as Boko H a ra m s tru ck th e U N Headqua r t e r s i n A b u j a o n A u g u s t 2 6 , 201 1 , in a s u i ci d e v e h i cl e b o mb i n g after h a v i n g n e v e r t a r g e t e d a n internati o n a l i n s ti tu ti o n b e f o re , B o k o Haram co u l d s u cce e d i n ca rry i n g o u t a powerf u l a tta ck i n La g o s o r a n o th e r major city i n th e s o u th . Th i s w o u l d a d d credib ili ty to th e a l a rmi s t p re d i cti o n s that alrea d y e x i s t a b o u t B o k o H a ra m s capab ili ti e s i n th e s o u th . U n l e s s th e attack o ri g i n a te s f ro m K o g i Sta te , where Bo k o H a ra m h a s d e mo n s tra te d that it h a s b a s e s a n d w e a p o n s ca ch e s , and fro m w h e r e i t i s c a p a b l e o f carrying o u t a s e ri e s o f a tta ck s , a n y single o p e ra ti o n i n th e s o u th w o u l d likely be a n a n o ma l y ra th e r th a n p a rt of a sust a i n e d o f f e n s i v e .
Yemens Huthi Movement in the Wake of the Arab Spring

By Lucas Winter
since february 2011, the Huthi movement has played an important though largely overlooked role in Yemens political transition. The group has responded to the Arab Spring and in particular to the slow, negotiated toppling of Ali Abdullah Salih in Yemen. Since protests began in Yemen, the Huthi positions have aligned with those of the revolutionary youth, calling for the downfall of the regime and justice for its victims. 1 As the central governments focus turned toward the capital, state authority in Sa`da Province crumbled, allowing the Huthis to consolidate control over the administration of a province they had been contesting for over a decade. At the same time, the group has attempted to seize administrative control in areas where it only had a foothold, with mixed results. This article provides a brief background of the Huthi movement, and then looks at the activities of the Huthis since the start of the Arab Spring in early 2011 on three different levels: local, national and regional. It highlights significant developments in the Huthi stronghold of Sa`da Province and its environs during the past year. In addition, it looks at the Huthi stance toward Yemens Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-backed transitional process as well as how regional developments may begin to play a stronger role in driving the conflict. The future of the movement will depend on the complex interaction of political dynamics at all three levels.
Brief Background of the Huthi Movement The Huthis (who officially refer to themselves as Ansar Allah) are named after their f o r m e r l e a d e r , H u s a y n a l - H u th i , w h o w a s ki l l ed by Y e me n i g o v e rn me n t f o r c es i n 2 0 0 4 a f te r re f u s i n g to tu rn h i m sel f i n f o r qu e s ti o n i n g . 2 B a s i n g h i m sel f i n t h e mo u n ta i n o u s w e s t of Sa`da Province
1 The fact that the positions align does not imply shared motivations or coordination. 2 For details on this incident, see Iris Glosemeyer, Local
Jacob Zenn is a legal adviser and international security analyst based in Washington D.C. He writes regularly for The Jamestown Foundation, Asia Times and SAIS Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst. He researches the socio-economic and political factors behind militancy in Nigeria, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and South America.
ship in the south are putting their members on the alert; imams are already doing that.
Conflict, Global Spin: An Uprising in the Yemeni Highlands, Middle East Report 232 (2004).
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in Yemens northwest corner, Husayn al-Huthi combined Zaydi revivalism with sharp political criticism of both local and international actors, crafting a historically rooted discourse of justice and empowerment that resonated throughout the region. 3 Zaydism is a branch of Shià Islam that arose around the figure of Zayd ibn Ali, 4 who was killed in battle in 740 AD in an attempted uprising against the ruling Umayyad dynasty. Departing from what would become the dominant Shià narrative (as followed in contemporary Iran, Lebanon, Iraq and parts of the Arabian Peninsula), Zayds followers held that the rightful imam must fulfill certain conditions, including descent from the Prophet Muhammad through his grandsons Hassan and Husayn, possession of superior skills both as a warrior and a scholar, and a willingness to rise up against injustice and oppression. Husayn al-Huthi was able to create a strong network of devoted followers in Yemens north, where Zaydism remained strong despite the overthrow of Yemens Zaydi Imamate in 1962, in part due to the political liberalization that accompanied the unification of Yemen in 1990 as well as the crisis within Zaydism precipitated by the growth of Salafist influence in the region. AlHuthis growing influence in the late 1990s was accompanied by increasingly contentious behavior on the part of his followers, which in turn prompted the government, acting partly in response to shifting international dynamics, to overreact. 5 The manhunt that eventually killed al-Huthi unleashed a spiral of violence beginning in 2004 that became known as the six Sa`da Wars. The group transformed from a grassroots Zaydi revivalist network under Husayn al-Huthis leadership to a strong insurgent fighting force under the
A map of Yemen.
al-Jawf to the east of Sa`da and Hajjah to its southwest. Political power, however, is particularly opaque and regularly contested in Yemens tribal areas. The country itself is a patchwork of influence over which the central government exerts varying degrees of authority and through a variety of methods. This context needs to be taken into account when speaking of Huthi control over certain areas. In Sa`da Province, the Huthis are believed to have replaced the government as the main power-brokers in several parts of the province, most importantly the provincial capital. 9 The important question is not whether they will play a role in Yemens future, but rather what that role will be.
Local Level In January 2011, heavy fighting broke out on the outskirts of Sa`da city between the Huthis and the al-Abdin tribe, whose leader, Othman Mujalli, was a vocal Huthi critic. 10 He was also a parliamentary representative from Sa`da Province for the ruling General Peoples Congress (GPC) party. A few weeks after the clashes started, the student protest movement that began in the capital Sanaà spread to other parts of the country, including Sa`da. Meanwhile, the Huthis began laying siege to Mujalli and his followers. As protests grew, Sa`das provincial government came under increasing pressure. On March 18, government snipers fired on a mass protest in the Yemeni capital Sanaà (the Karama Massacre) prompting national outrage and a flood of defections from the regime. Protests flared throughout the country, and over the following days Sa`das provincial governor fled to the capital Sanaà in the face of popular outrage at the regime. 11 Bereft of government support, Othman Mujalli and his followers were chased out of town and the Huthis seized or destroyed most
9 The opacity of political power has increased since the forced resignation of Ali Abdullah Salih. Sa`da Province is nominally controlled by governor Faris Manaà. Reports, however, indicate that Huthi commander Abu Ali al-Hakim is the provincial capitals ultimate power-broker. This, of course, does not mean that Huthi power is uncontested. See: What is Happening in Sa`das Houthi Kingdom? al-Masdar, November 30, 2011. 10 Violent Clashes Between Tribes and Houthi Fighters in Sa`da, al-Masdar, January 17, 2011. 11 Houthi Group Appoints Arms Dealer as Governor of Saada Province, Yemen Post, March 27, 2011.
leadership of Husayns younger halfbrother, Abdul Malik. 6 By the sixth war in 2009, an aura of invincibility surrounded Huthi fighters as they pushed the fighting beyond Yemens borders. In November 2009, the Saudi Arabian military intervened to support the Yemeni government in its fight with the Huthis. 7 Three months later, the Huthis accepted a Qatari-negotiated cease-fire that teetered along during the following year. 8 In the wake of the Arab Spring, the Huthis have managed to seize control of parts of Sa`da Province. The Huthis increasingly authoritarian conduct, however, may have dented their discourse of justice and resistance. As they go from being victim to aggressor, the Huthis may find their self-defense justifications ringing hollow to many in Yemen. This may not matter: the Huthis have seized power in Sa`da Province and appear to be extending their influence outward, specifically in the provinces of
6 The group was initially known as the Shabab alMumin (Believing Youth). 7 Kristen Chick, Yemens Houthi Rebels Get Iran Assurance, Ask Saudis to Stop Strikes, Christian Science Monitor, November 11, 2009. 8 Good overviews of the conflict include: Yemen: De-
3 For a useful exposition of Husayn al-Huthis thought, see Abdullah Lux, Yemens Last Zaydi Imam: The Shabab al-Mumin, the Malazim, and Hizb Allah in the Thought of Husayn Badr al-Din al-Huthi, Contemporary Arab Affairs 2:3 (2009). 4 Zayd was the grandson of Husayn ibn Ali, himself the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad through his daughter Fatima. 5 Ayman Hamidi, Inscriptions of Violence in Northern Yemen: Haunting Histories, Unstable Moral Spaces, Middle Eastern Studies 45:2 (2009).
fusing the Saada Time Bomb, International Crisis Group, 2009; Lucas Winter, Conflict in Yemen: Simple People, Complicated Circumstances, Middle East Policy 18 (2011). A recent analysis of the conflict weaving politics and sectarianism is Sami Dorlian, The Sada War in Yemen: Between Politics and Sectarianism, Muslim World 101:2 (2011). The most comprehensive account is the excellent Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt and Madeleine Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010).
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of his properties. Not long after this a group of Sa`da notables, with Huthi backing, appointed Faris Manaà as the regions unofficial governor, a post he continues to hold. 12 The neighboring province of al-Jawf proved less amenable to Huthi control. When protests broke out in February 2011, Huthi influence in the province as compared to that of Islah, the main opposition partywas limited. 13 After failed government efforts to contain the
Huthi and Islah adherents for control of government installations, particularly military and security facilities, broke out immediately and continued for several months until they negotiated a truce. In August 2011, the groups agreed to appoint a new provincial governor affiliated with Islah. 16 It is unclear, though, whether a balance has been reached in the province, particularly given al-Qaìda in the Arabian Peninsulas (AQAP) increased targeting of Huthis in the area. 17 Most recently, Huthi focus has turned to the impoverished province of Hajjah, southwest of Sa`da. 18 In Hajjah, the Huthis initially used soft power methods to enter the area and establish alliances in the provinces northern districts. Their use of hard power began in the spring of 2011, when Yusuf al-Madani, a key Huthi field commander who is married to one of Husayn al-Huthis daughters, moved into a family property in the Abu Dawar area. This settlement is along the border of Kushar and Mustabah districts and overlooks the market town of Ahim, famous in Yemen for its weapons and all other types of goods from and for Saudi Arabian markets. According to local accounts, al-Madani
found in Shelagh Weir, A Clash of Fundamentalisms: Wahhabism in Yemen, Middle East Report 204 (1997). Among other elements, Huthi proselytism revolves around disseminating the thoughts of Husayn al-Huthi as well as the regular chanting of the Huthi slogan (Allahu Akbar! Death to America! Death to Israel! Curse the Jews! Victory for Islam!). 16 Sunni-Shiites War in Al-Jawf, Yemen Times, October 3, 2011. 17 The most notable AQAP attack was in November 2010. On November 24, a suicide bombing in al-Jawf killed Husayn al-Huthis elderly father Badr al-Din al-Huthi. An attack on the funeral procession in Sa`da Province two days later took the lives of several more. Other attacks against the Huthis claimed by AQAP include a suicide attack against a meeting of Huthi leaders in al-Jawf Province on August 15, 2011, and a bomb at another gathering of Huthis in al-Jawfs capital on May 25, 2012. 18 The description given here of events in Hajjah Province is based on a comprehensive account written by a member of the Yemeni media and human rights delegation that visited the area, and which was simultaneously published in two of Yemens main opposition publications (al-Ahale and Marib Press). See Hajjahs Deathmill Where the Houthis Route to Midi Begins, al-Ahale, March 21, 2012. By most, if not all, neutral accounts, the Huthis are seen as the aggressor in Hajjah.
and as many as 200 armed followers began aggressively proselytizing and setting up checkpoints in the area. The Huthis claim that al-Madani and his followers were harassed from the moment they arrived and that their use of violence was in self-defense. The Hajoor tribe of Kushar district, likely with support from Sunni sympathizers, has been engaged in fierce battles with the Huthis for months. The violence in
In the wake of the Arab Spring, the Huthis have managed to seize control of parts of Sa`da Province.
protests (promising more resources, replacing the governor, firing on protesters), locals overran provincial government installations, including the base of the Yemeni Armys 115 th Division. 14 Control of the province fell to members of the al-Islah Party, Yemens main opposition party which draws its support largely from the Hashid tribal confederation and various Sunni organizations (most prominent among them, groups affiliated with noted cleric Abdul Majid al-Zindani). Although the Huthis and Islah both opposed the Salih administration, this shared objective did not extend to the local level in al-Jawf, where Sunni tribesmen have historically resisted Huthi influence. 15 Fighting between
12 Manaà, who is from the region, is a notorious arms dealer who fell out of favor with the regime after being accused of helping arm the Huthis. He appears to be a respected consensus figure and has thus far been able to help stabilize Sa`da Province. He has been involved in mediation efforts between the Huthis and other groups. 13 On Huthi presence in al-Jawf and its impact on alQaìda, see Gabriel Koehler-Derrick ed., A False Foundation? AQAP, Tribes and Ungoverned Spaces in Yemen (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2011), pp. 59-62. 14 115th Infantry Division in al-Jawf without a Commander, Revolutionary Youth Guard Government Installations, al-Masdar, March 21, 2011. 15 Part of this was due to aggressive Huthi proselytism, which like other aspects of Huthi doctrine and practice may be viewed as a response to the incursion of Wahhabism and Salafism into Yemens northwest provinces. The best account of the origins of this dynamic can be
With the government largely absent from the area, a common refrain has been that the Huthis aim to reach Hajjahs small Red Sea port of Midi.
Hajjah has become severe, with nearly 50,000 residents displaced from the three most heavily affected districts (Washhah, Kushar and Mustabah). 19 The Huthis have been held responsible for the outbreak and the escalation, and are accused of laying landmines in several parts of Kushar district. 20 Control of this province is at present highly fragmented and uncertain, as neither side is willing to yield even though violence has increased. With the government largely absent from the area, a common refrain has been that the Huthis aim to reach Hajjahs small Red Sea port of Midi. Their critics accuse the Huthis of expansionist designs, specifically the creation of a Zaydi State or Huthi Imamate in Yemens northern provinces (Sa`da, Hajjah, Amran, al-Jawf and Marib), which the Huthis themselves deny. 21
19 An illustrated map and factsheet are available at www.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ New_idps_accessHajjah_2703122.pdf. 20 On the landmines, see for instance: Yemen: Rising Landmine Death Toll in Hajjah Governorate, IRIN, April 18, 2012. 21 A report by a Yemeni think-tank (Abaad Studies and Research Center), for instance, sees the aim of Huthi militarism as the creation of a state-within-a-state composed of the five provinces mentioned above plus parts of three other ones. See Houthis Look to Establish Shiite State along Saudi Border, Yemen Times, February 11, 2011. For a summary of the Abaad Center report, see Abaad Report: Houthi Military Movements Driven by Emotion
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Assuming that the Huthis are acting with expansionist purposes, the limits and goals of this behavior might also be more modest. National politics provide some insight.
National Level Although the exact start date of Yemens Arab Spring is disputed, mass nationwide protests began in February 2012 and eventually toppled longtime president Ali Abdullah Salih. The Huthis, unlike the opposition al-Islah Party, were quick to publicly support the protest movement and openly call for the downfall of the regime. 22 Large anti-regime protests sprouted early in areas of Huthi influence, and the groups youth delegation set up a presence in the tent city of Sanaàs Sahat al-
finally signed on November 23, 2011. The Huthis, along with revolutionary youth groups and the Southern Movement (Hiraak), boycotted the oneman elections for Abd Rabbuh Mansur al-Hadi. The Huthis rejection of the GCC initiative has opened them up to direct criticism from the main political opposition front (the Islah-dominated Joint Meeting Parties, JMP). As the transitional process begins creating its own legitimacy, the Huthis are accused of acting opportunistically and lacking a constructive vision. 24 Regardless of the purity of their motives, the Huthis alignment with both the revolutionary youth and the Southern Movement creates a strong informal opposition bloc that helps legitimize Huthi reluctance to fully endorse the transitional process. In fact, despite their public rejection of the transitional process, the Huthis appear to have some interest in playing politics. Several prominent Zaydi figures, including defectors from the main Zaydi political party (Hizb alHaqq), recently formed a political party (Hizb al-Umma) which, despite denials of formal links by Huthi leaders in Sa`da, looks like a Huthi party. 25 Whatever form the Huthis entry into politics takes, it will be cautious and laden with preconditions. The GCC agreement calls for a national dialogue that includes all political forces and actors, explicitly mentioning the Huthis. They have been ambivalent about participating, although this is a change given their initial rejection of the agreement itself. 26 While it is unclear whether they will participate
24 For instance, accusations of Huthi collusion with the beleaguered head of the Republican Guard and erstwhile inheritor of the presidency Ahmad Ali Abdullah Salih (the former presidents son). It should be emphasized that the charge of opportunism is also made against most other opposition groups in Yemen and is not unique to the Huthis. 25 For more on Hizb al-Umma see: A New Political Party Deranged by the Foreign Devil: The Birth of alUmmah Party, al-Masdar, January 5, 2012. 26 In May 2012, the Huthis said they did not in principle reject the talks but were undecided on participation, setting as a preliminary condition that the national dialogue be held under United Nations auspices, rather than those of a particular country (specifically, the United States and Saudi Arabia). See: Houthis: Final Position on National Dialogue not yet Determined, National Yemen, May 11, 2012.
and what their expectations are, at the national level the Huthis appear to be showing a willingness to take part in the transitional process. 27 Whether and how their gains on the ground translate into a stake in national politics remains a major question looming over Yemens transition.
Regional Level The GCC, and Saudi Arabia in particular, has played an important role in Yemens transition away from Ali Abdullah Salih. The Huthis could be of concern to Saudi Arabia for reasons that include fears of Iranian influence, enmity from Huthi cross-border raids
Yet it is likely that instability, rather than Huthi control over Sa`da Province, is Saudi Arabias principal security concern in this area.
Tagheer (Change Square), under the banner of Shabab al-Sumud (The Steadfast Movement). In a testament to the importance of the groups political stance, the Huthi protesters were, for the most part, young, educated sympathizers from urban areas like Taiz and Sanaà who found in the Huthi ideology one among many new outlets to express disenchantment with the regimes repressive apparatus. 23 The Huthi movement has taken positions that largely mirror those of the revolutionary youth. When the GCC unveiled its plan to transition from the rule of Ali Abdullah Salih, both the Huthis and the youth rejected its legitimacy. Furthermore, they refused to recognize the agreement that Salih
and Based on a Misreading of Changing Conditions, alMasdar, February 21, 2011. 22 See Laurent Bonnefoy, Yemens Islamists and the Revolution, The Middle East Channel, Foreign Policy, February 9, 2012. 23 Madeleine Wells, Yemens Houthi Movement and the Revolution, Middle East Channel, Foreign Policy, February 27, 2012.
The Huthis themselves suffer from accusations from Saudi Arabian and Yemeni opposition media of ideological and material support from Iran.
and Saudi Arabias military response in 2009, and general concern with having a religiously motivated non-state actor in control of areas across the border from a province that has not fit comfortably in the Saudi Kingdom. 28 Yet it is likely that instability, rather than Huthi control over Sa`da Province, is Saudi Arabias principal security concern in this area. 29
27 On May 31, 2012, the Huthis officially expressed their willingness to participate in the national dialogue. It is, however, difficult to predict whether or not this position will be maintained. 28 The Saudi Arabian border province of Najran is a historical component of Yemen that was annexed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1934. It has a large Ismaili (Shià) population whose relations with the Sunni rulers in Riyadh have at times been contentious. 29 Sarah Phillips contends that when it comes to Saudi Arabias policy toward Yemen, the overriding objective is to contain Yemens problems within Yemen and to prevent them from spilling over the border, or as one diplomat put it, We dont care what they do, as long as its stable. Sarah Phillips, Yemen and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, Chapter Five: The Regime, Adelphi Series 51:420 (2011): p. 76. Saudi Arabia has previously noted its view of the Huthis as a mild threat to regional security unless they are seen as part of a three-way alliance with Al-Qaeda and Iran. See Zuhair al-Harithi, Understanding Yemens Troubles: A Saudi Perspec-
16
The Huthis accuse Saudi Arabia of meddling, although these attacks are often to justify actions driven by events on the ground. In early May 2012, for instance, Abdul Malik al-Huthi explained the fortification of positions in Hajjah as a defensive measure to confront a looming attack by Saudi Arabian mercenaries. 30 Huthi ire is
1990s, which paved the way for the rise of the Huthis, was largely a reaction to the influx of Wahhabism into Yemens Zaydi heartland. Because arguments of tradition and indigeneity were central to Husayn al-Huthis critique of Wahhabism, the charge that the roots of Huthi doctrine are deeper in Tehran than in Sa`da is an attempt to undermine the very foundation of this critique. The growing sectarian discourse, in particular between Salafists and Huthis, has created the potential for regional or international events to play a greater role in shaping the conflict. Sectarian tensions based on domestic factors have already escalated. I n late 201 1 a n d e a r l y 2 0 1 2 , t h e H u t h i b lockade o f a Sa l a f i s t re l i g i o u s s ch o o l (Dar al- H a d i th ) l o ca te d n e a r Sa ` d a city, pa rt o f th e g ro u p s s te p s to consolid a t e c o n t r o l o v e r t h e p r o v i n c e , threaten e d t o e x p l o d e i n t o s e c t a r i a n war. Simi l a r s p i k e s i n v i o l e n ce h a v e occurred a g a i n s t t h e b a c k d r o p o f a n ongoing s o f t w a r f o r i n f l u e n ce i n th e region, p i t t i n g t h e m i l i t a n t e g a l i t a r i a n puritani s m o f Sa l a f i s m a g a i n s t H u s a yn al-Huthi s m e s s a g e o f n a t i o n a l ism, political justice and divine rights. 33 More recently, the AQAP-aligned Ansar al-Sharià appears to be taking their sectarian fight to areas of Huthi control, threatening to engulf those provinces in sectarian conflict. 34
Conclusion The Huthis appear to be in a position of relative strength and are unlik ely to give up their g a i n s e a s i l y. T h e y ma y f i n d themselv e s i n a s i tu a ti o n o f s ta b i l i ty in an i n c r e a s i n g l y c h a o t i c Y e m e n . Develop m e n t s i n n o r t h e r n Y e m e n will con t i n u e t o b e m o s t l y d r i v e n b y events o n th e g ro u n d , w i th s h i f ts in the n a ti o n a l p o l i ti ca l l a n d s ca p e exercising an important pull. It is likely
33 On the origins of this clash, see Bernard Haykel, A Zaydi Revival? Yemen Update 36 (1995); Shelagh Weir, A Clash of Fundamentalisms: Wahhabism in Yemen, Middle East Report 204 (1997). As Weir notes, Salafism found willing adherents in the 1990s among Yemeni tribesmen partly due to its language of egalitarianism, which contrasted sharply with the exceptionalism of sayyids (descendants of Hassan and Husayn) in Zaydi doctrine. 34 For more on this, see Koehler-Derrick. The most recent attack was a suicide vehicle bomb in al-Jawf: Suicide Bombing Kills 14 Houthis in al-Jawf, Yemen Times, May 28, 2012.
that sectarianism will continue and perhaps increase, with the consequence that broader regional phenomena are likely to exert even greater influence on this part of Yemen. T h e H u th i s co n ti n u e f i g h t i n g t o e s ta b l i s h co n tro l o v e r a r ea s t h ey see as in their natural sphere of i n f l u e n ce . A t th e s a m e t i m e, t h ey co n ti n u e to s e n d mi x e d si g n a l s a bo u t th e i r willingness to participate in national politics. Whether a n a ti o n a l l y n e g o ti a te d so l u t i o n c a n h a l t th e co n ti n u e d f i g h t i n g d ep en d s on how well the local dynamics of Y e me n s n o rth ca n b e m a p p ed o n t o the national political negotiations in a w a y th a t s a ti s f i e s b o t h t h e H u t h i s a n d th e o th e r p a rti e s (p r i m a r i l y I s l a h ) . A s s u mi n g th e H u t h i s h a ve n o s e ce s s i o n i s t a s p i ra ti o n s , wh a t d o t h ey co n s i d e r th e i r s p h e re o f i n f l u en c e? D o th e y h o p e to s e i z e co nt r o l o f M a r i b Province and its oil facilities as part of the future Huthi Imamate? Or are they simply taking precautions against renewed attacks by a new Saudisponsored, Sunni-dominated Yemeni state? Clear answers to these questions will be crucial in determining the role of the Huthi movement in post-Salih Yemen. Lucas Winter is a Middle East Analyst for the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Mr. Winter holds an M.A. in International Relations from Johns Hopkins SAIS and an M.P.S. in Arabic from the University of Maryland.
The Huthis appear to be in a position of relative strength and are unlikely to give up their gains easily; they may find themselves in a situation of stability in an increasingly chaotic Yemen.
not limited to Saudi Arabia, and the group has been consistent in keeping its slogan (which includes Death to America, Death to Israel) relevant by constantly referring to U.S. and Israeli plots in Yemen. 31 The Huthis themselves suffer from accusations from Saudi Arabian and Yemeni opposition media of ideological and material support from Iran. These charges are ongoing since at least the early 2000s. The charge of ideological links to the Iranian Shià is sensitive, as it undermines a basic tenet of the Huthis ideological project, namely the idea that they represent an indigenous form of Islam. 32 The Zaydi revival of the
tive, Arab Insight 2:7 (2010): p. 80. 30 Houthi Says Saudi Arabia Prepares to Attack Yemen Area, Yemen Post, May 6, 2012. The reference is to local tribes that are seen as receiving Saudi backing. 31 See any of a number of articles (in Arabic) on the Huthi website at www.ansaruallah.net. 32 The spread of Huthi Zaydi revivalism, which they call spreading Quranic culture, has in part succeeded through its appeals to Yemeni tradition. Zaydism is endemic to Yemen and the charge that the Huthis are actually spreading a foreign ideology deeply undermines their religious and nationalist credentials. Their detractors point to several Huthi practicesnot to mention the wording of their sloganas proof of the influence of Twelver Shiism on Huthism. For more on this, see Lucas Winter, Conflict in Yemen: Simple People, Complicated Circumstances, Middle East Policy 18 (2011): pp. 107-109.
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Understanding Drivers of Violent Extremism: The Case of al-Shabab and Somali Youth
By Muhsin Hassan
on june 20, 2012, U.S. Representative Peter King convened a fifth hearing on the radicalization of Muslim Americans. Although the hearings covered radicalization of Muslim Americans in general, special emphasis was placed on al-Shababs recruitment of more than 40 young Americans. This article provides clarity on the driving factors that attract youth to al-Shabab. It argues that identity as manipulated by ideology in the trappings of religion, as well as the perceptions of neglect, combine to drive youth to join the Somali group. This conclusion is based on an extensive review of literature on al-Shabab, including U.S. government documents, and field research in Nairobi, Kenya. The latter included focus group discussions with 15 former al-Shabab members between the ages of 19 and 27 living in Eastleigha predominantly Somali suburb of Nairobi. 1 Their membership in al-Shabab ranged from six months to two years. Due to the small sample size, the argument presented cannot be generalized to all al-Shabab members. The findings, however, offer valuable insight into the reasoning of an important subset of Somali youth in joining violent extremism. Given the porous border between Somalia and Kenya, the large presence of Somali refugee youth in Eastleigh facing dire conditions (almost identical to those in Somalia with the exception of war), and the growth of al-Shabab recruitment in Eastleigh, the voices of the interviewed youth are relevant to this debate.
The article will look at two driving factors for recruitment, examining both push and pull. 2 Push factors are the negative social, cultural, and political features of ones societal environment that aid in pushing vulnerable individuals onto the path of violent extremism. Push factors are what are commonly known as underlying/root causes such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, discrimination, and political/ economical marginalization. Pull factors, on the other hand, are the positive characteristics and benefits of an extremist organization that pull vulnerable individuals to join. These include the groups ideology (e.g., emphasis on changing ones condition through violence rather than apathetic and passive democratic means), strong bonds of brotherhood and sense of belonging, reputation building, prospect of fame or glory, and other socialization benefits. The participants unanimously stated that it was a confluence of factors that led them to join al-Shabab, as the group presented a package deal in its recruitment propaganda. The following provides brief explanations of the factors listed, as understood and explained by the participants.
Push Factors Unemployment Five of the 15 youth said that al-Shabab was a form of employment. According to them, joining al-Shabab paid well, from $50 - $ 1 5 0 m o n t h l y , d e p e n d i n g on the w o rk , ye t re qu i re d l i ttl e effort. A l l o n e h a d to d o w a s ca rry around a g u n a n d p a tro l th e s tre e ts , explaine d a p a r t i c i p a n t . I t w a s a n easy job c o m p a r e d t o o t h e r j o b s s u c h as cons t r u c t i o n w o r k . T h e r e f o r e , for some o f th e s e yo u th , a s i g n i f i ca n t reason for joining al-Shabab was because it enabled them to provide for themselves and their families.
Although personal poverty is not a reason for joining violent extremism, the cases of these youth show that the effects of poverty, such as idleness and low self-esteem, cannot be ignored in this discussion. The fact that many Somali youth are unemployed and rely
Those who joined alShabab, especially in towns where the group had a large presence, were seen as heroes for defending the country and the religion.
on relatives for sustenance, either in Somalia or in the diaspora, dampens their self-worth such that when an opportunity to fend for oneself arises, they are quick to take advantage. Fear of Victimization Some of those interviewed feared being victimized for not joining al-Shabab. They also worried about being seen as weak by family and society at large and thus had to man up and join. This was especially the case for those youth who lived in al-Shabab controlled areas. If an able-bodied youth did not join, one could be suspected of supporting the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Since some of them would move between al-Shabab and TFG controlled areas regularly, they had to pick a side. As one youth put it, You have to make a choice. You are either on one side or the other. AMISOM Bombardment Some explained that the bombing of Somali towns by the mostly Ugandan and Burundian UN peacekeeping force, AMISOM, built intense hatred toward this group. The destruction of property and life was a great cause of distress. They stated that they joined al-Shabab to seek revenge as well as to protect themselves and their families. Revenge Some participants mentioned they sought revenge against TFG soldiers. Their urge for revenge was due to harassment, particularly of female relatives at checkpoints. The youth who listed revenge described TFG
2 Although the author offers expanded definitions, this 1 As part of his undergraduate thesis, the author conducted these interviews as focus group discussions in Kenya on January 5, 2012. The dataset included 15 Somali youth, aged from 19 to 27. They came from different areas in Somalia, such as Mogadishu, Baidoa, and Kismayo, while others came from Dadaab and Ifo refugee camps in Kenya. All of the quotes and data in this article are drawn from these interviews. dichotomization of factors into push and pull was drawn from Guilain Denoeux and Lynn Carter, Guide to the Drivers of Extremism, Management Systems International, publication produced for USAID review. This terminology appears to have been borrowed from migration literature. They are used to categorize the various push and pull factors that either push one to move out of a bad neighborhood and pull them to a better one.
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soldiers as animals who would touch our women inappropriately at the checkpoints. Imagine when you see this being done to your mother or your sisterit is humiliating and infuriating. Lack of Education Only two participants mentioned lack of education. When asked to clarify, they stated that this entailed a lack of education in general and not religious education. According to them, they were not able to pursue different avenues in life and they did not see a bright future ahead. As a result, it was easier to join al-Shabab rather than languish in poverty with no chance to pursue something greater.
Pull Factors Reputation (hero for defending country and religion) The participants mentioned that alShabab uses reputation to attract youth. An al-Shabab recruiter would first identify a group of youth who seemed to consistently socialize in or frequent a specific location. He would then approach one of the youth and offer to make him an amir of his own men if he could get three or more of his friends to also join. This was the most popular reason cited. In the words of one respondent, Walking the city with a gun as a member of al-Shabab ensured everybody feared and respected you. Girls also liked you. Those who joined al-Shabab, especially in towns where the group had a large presence, were seen as heroes for defending the country and the religion.
clan politics has brought nothing but chaos and destruction. That is why when asked whether they were Somali or Muslim first, a great majority of the respondents answered they were Muslim first. This does not necessarily indicate religious zealousness, but rather the intertwined nature of religion and nationality in their sense of identity. More importantly, though, it echoes Seth Schwartzs argument that terrorism represents a confluence of cultural, social, and personal identity. 3 It particularly underlines the role of a cultural identity strongly rooted in collectivismprioritizing the group over oneselfin accepting terrorism. In this case, collectivism is evinced by the youths willingness to sacrifice their ambitions, relationships, and lives (what generally constitute a personal identity) for the sake of religion or country. Mental Manipulation and Fighting Islams Enemies When asked to define what they meant by mental manipulation, the two respondents who chose these words explained: Mental manipulation through religion. They convince you that joining al-Shabab is your religious duty and that is what Islam requires of someone in your position. Framing it as manipulation indicates that these youth may never have fully believed that it was a religious duty to join alShabab. The firm opposition by those who chose to use manipulation also hints at the power of disillusionment and betrayal, since they have come to see it as manipulation after the fact. It is especially distinct from the six who opted to use fighting Islams enemies. These six, albeit not al-Shabab supporters anymore, still think that Ethiopian and AMISOM forces are antiMuslima testament to the power of alShababs ideological indoctrination. Obtain Paradise Obtaining paradise as a reason for joining al-Shabab stems from the belief that al-Shabab was conducting valid jihad in defense of Gods religion. All schools within orthodox Islam, both Shià and Sunni, accept that paradise is a reward for those who die as martyrs. It
3 Seth J. Schwartz et al., Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32:6 (2009): pp. 552-553.
is one of the surest paths that guarantee meeting God. The disagreements arise as to what exactly constitutes valid jihad. Thus, to convince a Muslim that paradise is waiting, al-Shabab must justify that ones struggle is indeed valid jihad. In the case of these youth, who admitted to not being well versed in religion, the task was not particularly challenging.
Recruitment Processes The following explanations were given in response to how they found out about joining.
Encouraged by Family Members and Peers In the words of one respondent: My father bought me a gun and brought it home. He said that if he were me, young and healthy, he would be at the front line of the battle and not at home. While al-Shabab targets marginalized youth and orphans, even those who do not fit in those categories are not immune from recruitment. The fact that close relatives encourage youth to join demonstrates that some in society see al-Shababs fight as their fight. It is not because society is radicalized and has fully embraced jihadist ideology and certainly not due to the debilitating poverty that has riddled Somalia for decades; rather, it is a fight to maintain their culture, language, religion and way of lifeit is a fight to safeguard their identity and its important features from foreign invaders such as Ethiopia and AMISOM. Encouraged by Religious Leaders Religious leaders would deliver fiery sermons about jihad and urge the populace to join al-Shabab. Encouraged by Businessmen Seeking Protection Businessmen in Somalia benefit from security and order. Thus, they often support al-Shabab in areas where the group is dominant (and other groups elsewhere). 4 These businessmen encourage youth to join al-Shabab to ensure ranks are well filled. This also functions as an alternative career for idle youth who would otherwise turn to petty crime and hooliganism.
In the case of most youth, the reputation that one earns by joining al-Shabab is attractive for two main reasons. First, it delivers them from irrelevance to prominence. In a society that places great emphasis on age, the economically dependent youth command little respect and are seen as powerless. By becoming a member of al-Shabab, youth are able to gain immediate respect and access to power, thereby strengthening their sense of self-worth. Second, it strengthens a particular identity: in this case, defender of country and religion. This is important for two reasons. It highlights the centrality of Islam in Somalis sense of identity. The role of religion is especially magnified in the identity of youth for whom
4 This can be seen in the history of the Islamic courts. Each side of the conflict had a benefactor, and even today al-Shabab receives its funds from major businessmen with interests in Somalia.
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Offered Guns and Money as Gifts Some youth were enticed by money, especially those who were more impoverished than others in society. Others were attracted to the power and influence that al-Shabab affords to its members, as recruiters offered them guns for joining.
Reasons for Disengagement with Al-Shabab There were multiple reasons why those interviewed decided to quit al-Shabab.
Going Abroad This was the second most cited response. As was explained, this entails getting a chance to pursue a life free from violence and war outside Somalia. Many youth expressed frustration with the situation and claimed that when their parents or close relatives found a way for them to go to either South Africa or the West, they chose to leave Somalia. Al-Shabab Became Powerless One respondent mentioned this as a reason. According to him, the benefits that came with being an al-Shabab member disappeared with their defeat in his town, thus rendering it pointless to continue aligning with the group. This attests to the point that in many cases people switch sides due to convenience in Somalia. Experts have noted that in Somalia, Islamists have historically been flexible and have switched sides several times 5 which points to the lack of an ideological core in many Somalis who join al-Shabab. Injustice and Inequality Injustice was mentioned once while inequality came up twice. The youth explained that they came to realize that al-Shabab was oppressive. One participant explained that al-Shabab did not live by its professed belief of transcending clan politics. He saw that most youth from minority clans were given the most dangerous jobs and used as pawns while those from powerful clans were given leadership positions.
Implications The argument presentedidentity, as manipulated by ideology in the trappings of religion, coupled with perceptions of neglect plays a central role in driving Somali youth to al-Shababaims to give nuance to the understanding of radicalization that leads to violent extremism. In this case, this applies to Somali youth who have fled al-Shabab in Somalia. This argument should neither be mistaken for a version of poverty causes terrorism theory nor others that undermine the role of religious ideology. The main reasons these youth cite for joining al-Shabab are not deeply held religious beliefs, but
5 Roland Marchal, The Rise of a Jihadi Movement in a Country at War: Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen in Somalia, Center for Scientific Research at Sciences-Po., Paris, 2011, p. 12.
rather factors that revolve around their sense of identity and perceptions of neglect that stem from their frustration with clan politics, lack of opportunities to improve the quality of their lives, and other difficulties that come with war. A testament to this is the fact that most of them gave up violent extremism when given the chance of a better life, especially when trusted relatives were the ones presenting such opportunities. Although the youth interviewed are currently in Kenya, their motivation to both join and leave al-Shabab developed in Somalia. Their desire for peace or education had nothing to do with being in Kenya; these goals were merely suppressed or put on hold while fighting for al-Shabab. As their frustration with the situation in Somalia increased, it became harder to justify why they had delayed their ambitions for al-Shabab, and they finally put themselves first. In other words, the personal identityand not the social and culturalcame to the forefront in their decision-making. In the case of such youth, typical programs that merely address some of the push and pull factors will not suffice. The challenge is to develop programs centered on bolstering the personal identities of vulnerable youth while also addressing the relevant push and pull factors driving them into militancy. Muhsin Hassan is a graduate of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. He is a SINSI (Scholars in the Nations Service Initiative) fellow currently pursuing a Masters in Public Affairs at Princeton.
Seeking Peace The three youth who listed this as one of the main reasons they left alShabab expressed that they had grown tired of fighting. They stated that the deteriorating environment in Somalia had become unbearable and that is why they fled to Kenya. Once again, the quality of life is germane to the decision making process of these youth. Seeking Education Four youth provided this response. They explained that there were no opportunities to go to school in Somalia, and they wanted to further their education so as to be able to earn a good living for themselves and their families. Medical Attention Only one youth mentioned this. Due to a severe injury, he left Somalia to receive treatment in Kenya. Family/Clan Ties These were listed by various youth. One youth phrased it as looking for group identity but explained that his relatives, who had fled to Kenya, persuaded him to join them and leave Somalia. Another respondent cited clan coalitions and explained that his clan had severed ties with al-Shabab, which forced him to quit the group. He also fled to Kenya where he could live among close relatives. Other respondents cited advice from parents. This was the most cited reason (6 out of 15). They explained that this had to do with either clan politics or prospects for a better life. Some also explained that their parents would try to get them to leave al-Shabab for Kenya, as they wanted their children out of danger.
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Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity

J u l y 1, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): An A f g h a n police m an s h ot and killed three B r i t i s h s oldie r s in Helmand Province. T h e Taliban claimed responsibility. A c c o r d ing to the Los Angeles Times, Afghan off icials identified the s h o o t er as a member of the Afghan N a t i o nal Civil Order Police, a special u n i t s e t up unde r U . S. auspices to help k eep i ns ur ge nts at bay and enforce the l a w i n towns and villages. Its memb ers u n der go a m or e s e lective recruitment pr oc ess and m or e rigorous training t h a n r e gular A f g han police, adding to t h e di squie t s ur r ounding the attack. Los Angeles Times, July 2 J u l y 1, 20 12 (K ENYA): Masked as s ai l ants launche d a coordinated gun an d g r e nade attack on two churches i n G a rissa, a northern Kenyan town. A t l eas t 17 pe ople were killed. It was t h e mos t de adly atta ck in Kenya since i t d e ployed troops into neighboring S o mal i a to f ig ht al-Shab ab eight m o n t hs ago. There was no claim of r es pons ibility. Reuters, July 2 J u l y 2, 20 12 (A F GHANISTAN): A s u i c i de bom be r in an explosives-laden v eh i c l e k ille d s e ve n people near the g at es of a univ e r sity in Kandahar c i t y . T he bom be r r e portedly targeted a v e h icle carrying workers from a n ear b y U . S . m ilitar y b ase. Reuters, July 2; RTTNews, July 2 J u l y 2, 20 12 (S O MALIA): A joint o p e r a tion by Kenyan and Somali m i l i t a r y f or ce s ins ide Somalia resulted i n t h e r e s cue of four international aid w or k er s , w ho had b een kidnapped t h r ee d ays e ar lie r in Kenya. Voice of America, July 2 J u l y 2, 20 12 (N IG ERIA): Suspected B ok o Har am g r oup militants killed nine construction workers in M ai d u g ur i, Bor no State. AllAfrica.com, July 3 J u l y 3, 2012 (FRANCE): French authorities arrested the alleged administrator of an extremist websitea Tunisian nationalaccused of helping al-Qaìda and related terrorist groups recruit new members and finance oper a tions . Voice of America, July 3
J uly 3, 201 2 ( Y EMEN) : Tw o s u s p e cte d U.S. airs tri k e s k i l l e d a t l e a s t f o u r alleged a l - Q a ` i d a i n th e A ra b i a n Peninsu l a ( A Q A P ) m i l i t a n t s i n S h a b w a P rovince. Y e me n s D e f e n s e Mi n i s try identified tw o o f th e d e a d a s s e n i o r AQAP fi g u re s Fa h d Sa l a h a l - A n j a f al-Harith i a n d H a s s a n A l i a l - I s h a q i . Reuters, July 3 J uly 3, 201 2 ( P A K I ST A N) : I s l a ma b a d agreed to re o p e n NA TO s s u p p l y routes i n P a k i s t a n , w h i c h h a v e b e e n closed si n ce NA T O tro o p s mi s ta k e n l y killed 2 4 P a k i s t a n i s o l d i e r s i n Novemb e r 2 01 1 . A cco rd i n g to C NN, The P a k i s ta n i ro u te s o f f e r a s h o rte r and more d i re ct ro u te th a n th e o n e NATO h a s b e e n u s i n g s i n ce No v e mb e r that wen t th ro u g h Ru s s i a a n d o th e r nations, a v o i d i n g P a k i s t a n a l t o g e t h e r . It has co s t t h e U . S . $ 1 0 0 m i l l i o n m o r e a month to u s e th e a l te rn a ti v e n o rth e rn routes. CNN, July 24 J uly 5, 2 01 2 ( U NI TED ST A T ES) : Th e U.S. Tr e a s u ry D e p a rtme n t i mp o s e d sanction s o n tw o Eri tre a n g o v e rn me n t officials o n c h a r g e s o f a s s i s t i n g Islamist mi l i ta n ts , i n cl u d i n g a l Shabab, i n So ma l i a . Reuters, July 5 J uly 5, 201 2 ( I RA Q ) : A s u i ci d e b o mb e r detonated e x p l o s i v e s i n a b a rb e r s shop fre q u e n t e d b y p o l i c e i n M o s u l , Ninawa P ro v i n ce , k i l l i n g a t l e a s t th re e people. Reuters, July 5 July 5, 2 0 1 2 ( S Y R I A ) : I r a q i F o r e i g n Minister H o s h ya r Z e b a ri s a i d th a t the Ira qi g o v e rn me n t h a s s o l i d informa ti o n a n d i n te l l i g e n ce th a t memb ers of al-Qaìda te rro ri s t networks h a v e g o n e i n th e o th e r direction , to Syri a , to h e l p , to l i a i s e , to carry out terrorist attacks. Zeb ari said that al-Q a ` i d a o p e ra ti o n a l o f f i ce rs were mo v i n g i n to Syri a th ro u g h o l d smugglin g ro u te s . Reuters, July 5 J uly 5, 2 01 2 ( NI GERI A ) : A Ni g e ri a n court cha r g e d t w o m e n O l a n i y i L a w a l and Luk ma n B a b a tu n d e w i th h a v i n g links to a l - Q a ` i d a i n t h e A r a b i a n P eninsu l a ( A Q A P ) . Th e tw o Ni g e ri a n s are accu s e d o f re ce i v i n g mo re th a n $6,000 f ro m A Q A P to re cru i t n e w members a n d s e n d t h e m t o Y e m e n . Voice of America, July 5; Reuters, July 6
Ju l y 6 , 2 01 2 ( I RA Q ) : A s u i c i d e bo m ber d e to n a te d a n e x p l o s i v e s - l a d en veh i c l e n e a r th e h o me o f a n a n t i - a l - Q a ` i d a mi l i ti a ma n i n Ra ma d i, ki l l i n g si x p e o p l e . AFP, July 6 July 6, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. d ro n e k i l l e d a t l e a s t 15 su sp ec t ed T a l i b a n mi l i ta n ts i n Z o i N a r a i vi l l a g e i n No rth Wa z i ri s ta n A g en c y o f the Federally Administered Tribal A re a s . A cco rd i n g to t h e New York Times, A d ro n e f i re d f o u r m i ssi l es a t a co mp o u n d o w n e d by a T a l i ba n co mma n d e r n a me d Ra h i m u l l a h , sa i d a l o ca l re s i d e n t w h o wa s r ea c h ed b y te l e p h o n e . Th e co m m a n d er , wh o a p p a re n tl y w a s n o t p r esen t a t t h e time of the strike, is thought to be a close aide of a local warlord, Hafiz Gul Bahadur, who controls a vast part of No rth Wa z i ri s ta n New York Times, July 6 July 6, 2012 (PAKISTAN): Gunmen o n m o t o r c y c l e s k i l l e d 18 p e o p l e a t a ro a d s i d e re s ta u ra n t i n Ba l u c h i st a n Province. A government official to l d th e New York Times th a t P a ki st a n i s attempting to travel to Europe with s mu g g l e rs w e re th e ta r g et s o f t h e a tta ck . New York Times, July 6 July 7, 2012 (MAURITANIA): Abu H a f s a l - Ma u ri ta n i , w h o p r evi o u sl y served as an adviser to Usama bin Ladin, was released from a prison in Ma u ri ta n i a . Re p o rts s u g g est ed t h a t h i s f re e d o m ca me a f te r h e r en o u n c ed h i s ti e s to a l - Q a ` i d a a n d c o n d em n ed th e 9 / 1 1 a tta ck s . A s s t a t ed by t h e Associated Press, He spent years in cu s to d y i n I ra n b e f o re b e i n g ext r a d i t ed to Ma u ri ta n i a i n A p ri l . AP, July 9 July 8, 2012 (UNITED KINGDOM): B ri ti s h a u th o ri ti e s a rr est ed a n a l Q a ` i d a s u s p e ct a f te r h e t r a vel ed n ea r the venue for the upcoming London Olympics five times in one day. T h e s u s p e ct, w h o i s o r i g i n a l l y f r o m So ma l i a , h a s o n l y b e e n i d en t i f i ed a s C F. al-Arabiya, July 8 Ju l y 8, 2 01 2 ( A FGH AN I S T A N ): A ro a d s i d e b o mb k i l l e d s i x U. S . so l d i er s i n Wa rd a k P ro v i n ce . Fox News, July 8; CBS/AP, July 9
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J u l y 8, 20 12 (A F GHANISTAN): A r oads i de bom b k il led five Afghan p o l i c e officers in Bamyan Province. New York Times, July 9 J u l y 9 , 20 12 (PA K ISTAN): Militants a t t a c ked a Pakistani army camp in G u j r a t, Punjab Province, killing seven s o l di er s and police . Voice of America, July 12 J u l y 10, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A c c o r d ing to N A TO, An Afghan and c oal i t ion s e cur ity f orce conducted an o p e r a tion to detain the leader of a T a l i b an attack cell in Chimtal district, B al kh Pr ovince , today. During the oper a tion a gr oup of insurgents at t ac k e d the com bi ned force. The f o r c e r e tur ne d f ir e killing all of the at t ac k e r s . A s the f or ce continued their m i s s i on, another armed individual a p p r o ached and threatened them with h i s w eapon. He was consequently en g ag e d and k ille d by the security f o r c e. The ope r ation resulted in the det en tion of one s uspected insurgent an d t h e s e izur e of multiple weapons. ISAF, July 10 J u l y 10, 2012 (SUDAN): The U.S. g o v e r nment released Ibrahim al-Qosi f r o m Guantanam o Ba y and repatriated h i m t o Sudan. Miami Herald, July 10 J u l y 11, 20 12 (YE MEN): A suicide b o mb er s us pe cte d of b elonging to al - Q a` ida in the Arabian P eninsula k i l l ed at le as t 10 Ye meni police cadets as t h e y we r e le aving an academy in S a n a ` a. Som e r e por ts placed the death t ol l at 22. AP, July 11; Telegraph, July 11 J u l y 12, 2012 (PAKISTAN): Taliban m i l i t a nts ope ne d fire on a police c om pound in Lahore, Punjab P r o v i n ce , k illing ni ne officers. The m i l i t a nts e s cape d on motorb ikes and i n a v e hicle . New York Daily News, July 12; Voice of America, July 12 J u l y 1 3, 20 12 (N IGERIA): A suicide b o mb er k ille d f iv e people at the c en t r al m os q ue in Maiduguri, Borno S t a t e. Reuters, July 13 J u l y 14, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A s u i c i d e bomber attacked a wedding r e c e p t ion in Samangan Province, k i l l i n g pr om ine nt lawmaker Ahmad K h an S am ang ani and 22 other g u e s t s. General Mohammed Khan,
the pro v i n ce s n a ti o n a l s e cu ri ty director, w a s a l s o k i l l e d i n th e b l a s t. The Tal i b a n d e n i e d re s p o n s i b i l i ty. Reuters, July 14; Voice of America, July 14 July 14 , 2 0 1 2 ( A F G H A N I S T A N ) : Afghan a n d co a l i ti o n f o rce s k i l l e d two Ta l i b a n mi l i ta n ts i n Wa rd a k P rovince. A cco rd i n g to I SA F, b o th Qari Z ia u d d i n , a s e n i o r Ta l i b a n l e a d e r, and Tor Gu l , a w e a p o n s s mu g g l e r, were kil l e d a l o n g w i th s e v e ra l o th e r insurgen ts d u ri n g th e o p e ra ti o n . . . Qari Z ia u d d i n , a l s o k n o w n a s I k ra m J an, wa s th e s e n i o r Ta l i b a n l e a d e r for Maid a n Sh a h r d i s tri ct. H e a rme d insurgen t f i g h te rs , tra n s p o rte d suicide b o mb e rs , co o rd i n a te d th e emplaceme n t o f i mp ro v i s e d e x p l o s i v e devices, a n d p e rs o n a l l y l e d n u me ro u s attacks t h r o u g h o u t t h e d i s t r i c t . ISAF, July 16 J uly 1 4 , 2 01 2 ( SY RI A ) : A s u i ci d e bomber d e t o n a t e d a n e x p l o s i v e s - l a d e n vehicle i n th e to w n o f Mu h ra d a , k i l l i n g four peo p l e . Th e b o mb e r a p p a re n tl y targeted th e l o ca l mi l i ta ry s e cu ri ty headqua rte rs . CBS/AP, July 14 July 16, 2 0 1 2 ( P A K I S T A N ) : P a k i s t a n i Taliban mi l i ta n ts a tta ck e d a p o l i ce station i n B a n n u D i s tri ct o f K h y b e r P akhtun k h w a P ro v i n ce , k i l l i n g o n e officer. Tw o o f th e mi l i ta n ts w e re disguised i n b u rqa s . CNN, July 16 July 16, 2 0 1 2 ( N I G E R ) : T h e E u r o p e a n Union a p p ro v e d a n e w mi s s i o n to send ex p e rts to Ni g e r to tra i n i ts security f o r c e s t o f i g h t a l - Q a ` i d a . Increas e d te rro ri s t a cti v i ty a n d the con s e q u e n c e s o f t h e c o n f l i c t i n Libya h a v e d ra ma ti ca l l y h e i g h te n e d insecuri ty i n th e Sa h e l , e x p l a i n e d EU foreign p o l i c y c h i e f C a t h e r i n e A s h t o n . Accordin g t o R e u t e r s , A b o u t 5 0 internati o n a l s ta f f a n d 3 0 s ta f f h i re d locally w i l l b e b a s e d i n th e mi s s i o n s headqua r t e r s i n N i a m e y , w i t h l i a i s o n officers i n B a ma k o , th e ca p i ta l o f neighbor i n g M a l i , a n d N o u a k c h o t t , capital o f Ma u ri ta n i a . Reuters, July 16 July 18, 2 0 1 2 ( A F G H A N I S T A N ) : A b omb d e s tro y e d 2 2 NA TO s u p p l y trucks th a t w e re p a rk e d i n A i b a k , th e capital o f S a m a n g a n P r o v i n c e . A f g h a n authorit i e s blamed the Taliban. Reuters, July 18
Ju l y 1 8, 2 01 2 ( SY RI A ): A su i c i d e b o mb e r a tta ck e d a n a ti o n a l sec u r i t y building in Damascus, killing Syrian D e f e n s e Mi n i s te r D a o u d R a j h a a n d D e p u ty Defense Mi n i st er A ssef Shawkat. There were a number of o th e r ca s u a l ti e s . AFP, July 18 Ju l y 1 8, 2 01 2 ( B U LGA RI A ): A su i c i d e b o mb e r a tta ck e d a n I s ra el i t o u r i st bu s at Burgas airport in eastern Bulgaria, k i l l i n g a t l e a s t s i x p e o p l e. T h e bo m ber ca rri e d a f a k e d ri v e r s l i c en se f r o m t h e s ta te o f Mi ch i g a n i n th e U n i t ed S t a t es. I s ra e l b l a me d Le b a n e s e Hi zb A l l a h f o r th e o p e ra ti o n . BBC, July 19; CNN, July 19 July 19, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): P a k i s ta n a n d A f g h a n i st a n a g r eed to re s u me re g u l a r d i sc u ssi o n s o n A f g h a n i s ta n s p e a ce p ro c ess. Reuters, July 19 Ju l y 1 9 , 2 01 2 ( Y EME N ): Y em en i C o l o n e l A b d u l l a h a l - M a o u za ei wa s k i l l e d b y a ca r b o mb o u t si d e h i s h o m e i n A d e n . A l - Ma o u z a e i , wh o su r vi ved three previous assassination attempts, w a s ta s k e d w i th f i n d i n g m em ber s o f al-Qaìda in the Arabian Peninsula. AP, July 19 Ju l y 2 1 , 2 01 2 ( P A K I STA N ): A su i c i d e b o mb e r a tta ck e d th e h o m e o f a m i l i t a n t co mma n d e r i n O ra k z a i Ag en c y o f t h e Federally Administered Tribal Areas, killing nine people. The commander, Mullah Nabi, is apparently part of a ri v a l , p ro - g o v e rn me n t m i l i t a n t g r o u p . Na b i w a s n o t i n j u re d . S o m e r ep o r t s p l a ce d th e l o ca ti o n o f N a bi s h o m e i n K u rra m A g e n cy . CNN, July 21; BBC, July 21; New York Times, July 21 July 22, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A f g h a n a u th o ri ti e s s a i d t h a t si x A f g h a n s re tu rn i n g h o me f r o m wo r k a t a NA T O b a s e i n Wa rd a k P r o vi n c e wer e ca p tu re d b y Ta l i b a n m i l i t a n t s. T h e T a l i b a n th e n e x e cu te d f i ve o f t h e m en a n d b o o b y - t r a p p e d t h e ir b o d i e s w i t h e x p l o s i v e s . T h e s i x th ma n m a n a g ed t o e s ca p e . AFP, July 22 July 22, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): An Afghan police commander and 12 j u n i o r o f f i ce rs d e f e cte d t o t h e T a l i ba n in Farah Province. The commander, i d e n ti f i e d a s Mi rw a i s , wa s i n c h a r g e o f a 2 0- ma n ch e ck p o i n t . S even o t h er o f f i ce rs w h o re f u s e d to d ef ec t wer e p o i s o n e d . A cco rd i n g to r ep o r t s, t h e
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m e n t ook with them heavy weapons, r adi o s and at le ast one U.S.-made ar m or e d Hum v e e . BBC, July 24; Reuters, July 24 J u l y 22, 20 12 (IRAQ): Two car b o m b s exploded minutes apart in M ah mudiyya, 18 miles south of B a g h dad. The blasts killed at least 10 peo p l e . AFP, July 21 J u l y 22, 20 12 (IRA Q): Abu B akr alB a g h dadi, the leader of the Islamic S t a t e of Ir aq (ISI), purportedly r el ea s ed a ne w audio message s a y i n g that the m ilitant group was s t a r t ing a ne w s tage. He said, The f i r s t priority in this is releasing M u s l i m pr is one r s everywhere, and c h a s i ng and e lim ina ting judges and i n v es t i g ator s and their guards. AlB ag h d adi be cam e head of the ISI in 2 01 0 . AFP, July 21 J u l y 23, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A c c o r d ing to IS AF, An Afghan N a t i o n al A r m y s ol dier turned his w ea pon agains t Inte rnational Security A s s i s tance F or ce service members in n orthern Afghanistan today. IS AF tr oops r e tur ned fire killing the s h oot e r . The r e we r e n o ISAF fatalities. A f g h a n and coaliti on officials are i n v es t i g ating the incident. ISAF, July 23 J u l y 23, 2012 (IRAQ): A series of c oor dinate d bom bin gs and shootings o c c u r red in more than a dozen Iraqi c i t i es , k illing m or e than 1 00 people. T h e I s lam ic State of Iraq (ISI) later c l a i me d r e s pons ibili ty. The violence m a r k ed the deadliest day in Iraq in m or e than two ye ars. The attacks oc c u r re d one day af ter the ISI warned of a ne w s tag e o f operations. As des c r i be d by the Associated Press, M an y of M ondays attacks were s t u n n ing in the ir s co pe and boldness. T h e y bore the hallmarks of al-Qaida, h a p p e ning within a few hours of each ot h er a nd s tr ik ing mainly at security f o r c es , gov e r nm e nt officials and S h i i t e neighborhoods. In one brazen a s s a u l t, three carloads of gunmen pu l l ed up at an Ir aqi army b ase near t h e n o r the as te r n town of Udaim and open ed f ir e , k illing 13 soldiers b efore es c aping . . . AP, July 23; Voice of America, July 25
J uly 24, 2 01 2 ( P A K I ST A N) : Gu n me n fired on a co n v o y o f NA T O s u p p l y trucks i n K h yb e r A g e n cy o f th e Federall y A d m i n i s t e r e d T r i b a l A r e a s , killing tw o p e o p l e . I t w a s th e f i rs t attack o n NA T O s u p p l y tru ck s s i n ce the P ak i s ta n s u p p l y ro u te s w e re reopened e a rl i e r i n Ju l y. CNN, July 24 J uly 25, 2 01 2 ( NI GERI A ) : Su s p e cte d Boko Ha r a m g r o u p g u n m e n s t o r m e d a factory a n d k i l l e d tw o I n d i a n n a ti o n a l s in Maid u g u ri , B o rn o Sta te . Reuters, July 26 July 26, 2 0 1 2 ( A F G H A N I S T A N ) : N A T O forces u n c o v e r e d a l a r g e c a c h e o f drugs in D e h R a w u d d i s t r i c t , U r u z g a n Province . A c c o r d i n g t o I S A F , D u r i n g the opera ti o n , th e s e cu ri ty f o rce s e i z e d 40,000 k i l o g r a m s ( 1 8 , 1 8 1 p o u n d s ) o f hashish s e e d a n d 4 2 5 k i l o g r a m s ( 1 9 3 pounds) o f p ro ce s s e d h a s h i s h . T h e security f o rce d e s tro ye d th e s e e d s a n d drugs. ISAF, July 27 J uly 26 , 2 01 2 ( NO RT H A FRI C A ) : U.S. Ge n e ra l C a rte r H a m, th e h e a d of Afri c a C o m m a n d ( A F R I C O M ) , said tha t a l - Q a ` i d a i n th e I s l a mi c Maghreb ( A Q I M) i s l i k e l y a l Q a e d a s best fu n d e d , w e a l t h i e s t a f f i l i a t e . Accordin g to H a m, A Q I M g a i n e d strength , th e y g a i n e d a l o t o f mo n e y through k i d n a p p i n g f o r ra n s o ms a n d they b eca me a s tro n g e r a n d s tro n g e r organiz a ti o n . Reuters, July 26 July 28 , 2 0 1 2 ( A F G H A N I S T A N ) : Militants k i l l e d tw o NA TO s e rv i ce members i n e a s t e r n A f g h a n i s t a n . The exa ct l o ca ti o n o f th e a tta ck , o r the natio n a l i ti e s o f th e d e a d , w a s n o t immedia te l y d i s cl o s e d . Los Angeles Times, July 28 July 28, 2 0 1 2 ( A F G H A N I S T A N ) : N A T O forces k i l l e d th e H a qqa n i n e tw o rk militant A b d u l l a h , a l s o k n o w n a s Tufan, in P a k t i a P r o v i n c e . A c c o r d i n g to ISAF, Tu f a n w a s d i re ctl y i n v o l v e d in the p l a n n i n g a n d e x e cu ti o n o f th e J une 20 s u i ci d e a tta ck i n th e K h o s t capital th a t k i l l e d mo re th a n a d o z e n Afghan ci v i l i a n s . ISAF, July 31
July 28, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A f g h a n a n d co a l i ti o n f o r c es a r r est ed a n e x p l o s i v e s e x p e rt bel o n g i n g t o th e I s l a mi c Mo v e me n t o f Uzbeki st a n in Kunduz P ro v i n ce. According to I SA F, Th e a rre s te d exp l o si ves e x p e rt ma n a g e d th e co n st r u c t i o n a n d p l a ce me n t o f e x p l o s i v e d evi c es a n d d i re cte d i mp ro v i s e d e x p l o si ve d evi c e a tta ck s i n n o rth e rn K u n d u z. ISAF, July 31 July 28, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A f g h a n a n d co a l i ti o n s e c u r i t y f o r c es k i l l e d T a l i b a n f i n a n c i er M a u l a wi Abdul Rahman in Chimtal district, B a l k h P ro v i n ce . Ra h ma n f a c i l i t a t ed th e tra n s f e r o f mo n e y , wea p o n s a n d e x p l o s i v e s to o th e r i n s u r g en t s. - ISAF, July 28 July 28, 2012 (PHILIPPINES): P h i l i p p i n e a u th o ri ti e s a r r est ed Ust a d z A h ma d s a l i A s ma d B a d ro n , a f o u n d i n g m e m b e r o f t h e A b u Sa y y a f G r o u p . H e w a s a p p re h e n d e d in t h e r em o t e Tawi-Tawi islands in the southern P h i l i p p i n e s . AFP, July 30 Ju l y 2 8, 2 01 2 ( TH A I LA N D ): T h i r t een a rme d mi l i ta n ts a tta ck ed a n a r m y patrol in Pattani Province in southern Thailand, killing four so l d i er s. Bangkok Post, July 30 July 29, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): Afghan s e cu ri ty f o rc es a r r est ed s e v e ra l s u s p e cte d H a qq a n i n et wo r k me mb e rs i n Sa b a ri d i st r i c t , K h o st P ro v i n ce . ISAF, July 29 Ju l y 2 9 , 2 01 2 ( I RA Q ) : A c a r bo m b e x p l o d e d i n K a rma , n ea r F a l l u j a . Fifteen minutes later, a group of g u n m e n o p e n e d f i r e on t h e K a r m a police station, killing four people. AP, July 29 Ju l y 3 0, 2 01 2 ( SY RI A ) : A n ew r ep o r t i n th e Guardian n e w s p a p er sa i d t h a t s co re s o f f o re i g n j i h a d i st s h a ve cro s s e d i n to Sy ri a f ro m T u r key i n t h e past two weeks. The report quoted a s m u g g l e r w h o s a i d , T he r e h a v e b e e n T u n i s i a n s , me n f ro m Uzbeki st a n t o o a n d f ro m P a k i s ta n . Guardian, July 30
23
CTC Sentinel Staff

Editor-in-Chief Erich Marquardt Senior Editor, CTC Editorial Board CoL Michael J. Meese, ph.D. Department Head Department of Social Sciences (West point) CoL Cindy R. Jebb, ph.D. Deputy Department Head Department of Social Sciences (West point) LTC Liam Collins Director, CTC
July 30 , 2 0 1 2 ( U N I T E D S T A T E S ) : Shaker Ma s ri , a 2 8- ye a r- o l d U . S. born c i t i z e n o f S y r i a n d e s c e n t , pleaded g u i l t y t o p l a n n i n g t o t r a v e l to Soma l i a t o f i g h t w i t h a l - S h a b a b . Masri w a s a r r e s t e d i n A u g u s t 2 0 1 0 while pre p a ri n g to l e a v e f o r So ma l i a . The Chic a g o ma n f a ce s n e a rl y 1 0 ye a rs in prison . Chicago Tribune, July 30 J uly 30, 2 01 2 ( NI GERI A ) : Tw o s u i ci d e b omb ers a tta ck e d p o l i ce p o s ts i n Sokoto, k i l l i n g tw o p e o p l e . T h e B o k o Haram g r o u p c l a i m e d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . ANP/AFP, August 1 J uly 31 , 2 01 2 ( I RA Q ) : Tw i n ca r b o mb s exploded m i n u t e s a p a r t i n c e n t r a l Baghdad , k i l l i n g a t l e a s t 1 9 p e o p l e . Once firs t re s p o n d e rs ru s h e d to th e scene, a t l e a s t tw o s u i ci d e b o mb e rs disguised a s p o l i ce o f f i ce rs e n te re d a nearby p o l i ce s ta ti o n a n d tri e d to free tw o a l - Q a ` i d a p ri s o n e rs . T h e suicide b o m b e r s w e r e k i l l e d b y p o l i c e . Reuters, July 31
CONTACT
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The Combating Terrorism Center would like to express its gratitude to its financial supporters, for without their support and shared vision of the Center products like the CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you are interested in learning more about how to support the Combating Terrorism Center, please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu or call Kristin Sorenson at West points Association of Graduates at 845-446-1561.
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.
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AUGUST 2012 . VoL 5 .

About the CTC Sentinel

AUGUST 2012 . VoL 5. ISSUE 8

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Defining Cyberterrorism: Capturing a Broad Range of Activities in Cyberspace

Figure 1. Clusters of cyberterrorism.

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Pakistani Taliban Renew Attacks on Punjabi Heartland

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The Strategic Limitations of Boko Haram in Southern Nigeria

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Yemens Huthi Movement in the Wake of the Arab Spring

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Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity

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CTC Sentinel Staff

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