Hume's Bundle Theory of the Self: A Limited Defense Author(s): Nelson Pike Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.

4, No. 2 (Apr., 1967), pp. 159-165 Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical Publications Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009239 Accessed: 06/11/2010 04:11
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American Volume

Philosophical Quarterly 2, April 4, Number 1967

VIII.

HUME'S

BUNDLE THEORY OF THE SELF: A LIMITED DEFENSE

NELSON PIKE
existence of a Transcendent Ego, i.e., a self other

secondary literature on Hume's Treatise of Human Nature contains two major criticisms of THE the bundle theory of the self. The first centers on the problem of specifying a criterion by which perceptions can be grouped together into individual bundles. Given that the mind is simply a collection of perceptions (as Hume said), by what principle shall we the perceptions between distinguish up your mind and the perceptions making making an answer to this question is up mine? Providing often taken to be the crucial problem confronting any advocate of the bundle theory of the self. It is sometimes thought to be the problem Hume tried to solve in the section of the Treatise (unsuccessfully) entitled "Of Personal Identity."1 The second major criticism of Hume's bundle theory of the self in? volves the claim that the theory is inconsistent with a certain line of thinking evident in almost every section of the Treatise. In "Of Personal Identity," for example, Hume claims to "look within" and discover only a series of perceptions. What is it that looks within and makes this discovery ? Surely a collection of perceptions could not perform this task. In his discussion of causation, to take another
case, Hume says that the mind remembers that

than a mere collection of perceptions, the notion of just such a self seems to work importantly in his In addition to the bundle of perceptions thinking. to constitute that is supposed the mind, Hume seems to have presupposed the existence of a self that deals with perceptions in a wide variety of
ways.

It is clear, I think, that the criticisms just out? lined are distinct. Suppose Hume had provided an adequate criterion by which to divide perceptions into individual bundles. We could still ask whether he presupposed the existence of a Transcendent when he claimed to look within and discover Ego suppose only a series of perceptions. Conversely, we agreed that looking within does not require a self other than a series of perceptions. We should still want to inquire about the principle by which can be divided into individual bundles. perceptions I shall here attempt to defend Hume against the second criticism outlined above. I shall not deal an adequate with the problem of providing to divide perceptions criterion by which into in? I dividual of discussion, bundles. For purposes
shall assume that this latter is not a problem?or,

perceptions in the past this mind could not This same

respect

sort have been followed of another sort. What is by perceptions that remembers perceptions? Surely it be the collection of perceptions itself. sort of question could be raised with
of other comments in the Treatise.

of a certain

to a range

Hume that not only constantly speaks of a mind observes and remembers perceptions, but which unites, confuses, feigns, and believes things about the perceptions. Though Hume officially denied
1 Cf. 2 In

I shall assume that this problem is not better, it is simply awaiting solution.2 My insuperable: remarks will be divided into three sections. In the some preliminary observations first, I shall make about the purpose of Hume's bundle theory of the self. In the second I shall address myself to the specific version of the second criticism to be found
in D. G. C. Macnabb's commentary on the Treatise.

And in the third I shall attempt to show how the defense given in the second section of the paper

for example, A. H. Basson, David Hume Books, (Baltimore, Penguin 1958), p. 128. the Philosophy takes much the same attitude toward this problem. "You Russell writes: of Logical Atomism, Russell can collect a whole set of experiences into one string as all belonging to you, and similarly can other people's experiences as all belonging be collected to them by relations are observable that actually the existence and without together assuming of a persistent in the least to what we are concerned is the given empirical relation ego. It does not matter with, what exactly two experiences between us say, 'these are two that makes of the same person.' It does not matter experiences precisely what this relation the logical formula for the construction of the person is the same whatever the relation may is, because be, the mere and because fact that you can know that two experiences to the same person proves that there is such an belong to be ascertained relation ed. by R. G. Marsh Allen and Unwin, empirical {Logic and Knowledge, by analysis." [London, 1956], pp. 276-277.) 159

l60

AMERICAN

PHILOSOPHICAL

QUARTERLY All and them: sembling abstract ones, ideas, especially obscure: the mind has but they are apt to be when confounded we have and ideas; without though it has or all are a faint naturally of hold slender with often other employed we are to re? a apt it.

can be applied
other than

to versions

of the same sort of attack

Macnabb's.

I According to John Locke, words are the ". . .

term, to imagine On either limits nor

a distinct

a determinate impressions, are

meaning, idea annexed that strong is all and

sensible marks of ideas, and the ideas they stand for are their proper and immediate signification."3 This ties in with doctrine view that Locke's to communicate is used primarily ideas. language Thus a given word (or sound) that does not stand for some specific idea can not be assigned a proper or use. And, it would also seem to signification follow, the analysis of any given word will consist of an examination of the idea for which that word stands.4 Bishop Berkeley disagreed with this view. even Berkeley held that a word may have meaning if it does not stand for an idea. He offered the terms "spirit" and "will" as illustrations of this claim. Berkeley also disagreed with Locke's view that the chief use of language is to communicate
ideas. He said that words are often used to arouse

the contrary, outward

more between determined: exactly error or mistake to fall into any is it easy with we to them. When entertain any therefore, regard with? term is employed that a philosophical suspicion meaning what we is frequent) need but is that supposed idea derived? impression serve to assign this will any, impossible or idea (as suspicion.6

inward, are them

sensations, the vivid:

out

inquire, from if it be And to confirm

our

now to the topic of the self, Hume Turning assumes that our idea of mind is derived from intro?
spective observation, i.e., from "inward" sensations

in the passage just (to use the phrase introduced from the Enquiry). On Hume's account, what quoted
we perceive via "inward" perceptions is a series of

emotions and that this need not involve of ideas.5 In Book I of the Treatise, munication Hume makes use of a theory of meaning very much to Hume, like Locke's. ideas are According to words. If one is to discover whether "annexed" a given term has meaning and, if so, what meaning it has, one must discover whether there is an idea to the word and, if so, what idea it is. "annexed"
To analyze the meaning of a given word is to

the com?

numerically
The tions glide postures theatre mind

distinct
is a kind

perceptions.
of theatre their

Hume
where

concludes:
percep,

several

successively away, and must and

make mingle situations. that

not mislead only

pass, re-pass appearance; of infinite in an variety . . . The of the comparison are the successive us. They the mind.7

perceptions

constitute

to it. Further, for the idea "annexed" analyze to analyze a given idea is to identify the Hume, or sensations) from impression(s) (i.e., feelings to which for Hume, that idea is derived. Thus, of a given word is to identify analyze the meaning that impression (or those impressions) from which to the word is derived. If there the idea "annexed"
are no impressions, there is no idea and, accord?

is here stated in the material Hume's conclusion mode of speech. It is presented as a theory about
the make-up of the mind. But the same conclusion

is more
Treatise.

enlighteningly
Here Hume

stated
writes:

in the Abstract

to the

As only

our that

idea

sistence,

we find it If there is meaning, particular ingly, no meaning. we call substance, or compound.8 either the the impressions that generated simple by uncovering doctrines "annexed" idea. These methodological are set out in any number in the The point is that the bundle of passages theory of the self is offered by Hume as an analysis of the idea of mind. Treatise, but the following passage from the Enquiry of the word brings most of them together into compact form : It is offered as a meaning-analysis
3 Essay, Bk. 4 Essay, Bk. 5 Cf. paras. III., eh. II (opening sentence). III., chs. I-III. to the Principles, 18-20 of the Introduction

is a peach, for instance, of any body, of a particular size, con? taste, color, figure, that of is only etc. So our idea of any mind the notion of anything without perceptions,

and para. 14 of the seventh para. 27 of the Principles, the Alcephron. 6An of Human Court, 1952), p. 20. Cf. also A Treatise (La Salle, Open Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and and 74-75 ; the Enquiry, pp. 66-67; L. A. Selby-Bigge Press, 1958), pp. 33, 48-49 (Oxford, The Clarendon 10-11. to A Treatise Press, University 1938), pp. of Human Nature (Cambridge, 7 Treatise, p. 253. 8 Abstract, p. 25. Italics are mine.

dialogue

of

ed. Nature, the Abstract

hume's

bundle

theory

of

the

self:

limited

defense

161

"mind."9
consider

At
an

this point
objection.

I must

diverge

briefly

to

literature on Here and there in the secondary denied that the Treatise it is suggested that Hume we have an idea of mind. Of course, if this were a correct interpretation of the text, what I have just the point of Hume's bundle theory said concerning It would of the self would have to be withdrawn. be absurd to suppose that Hume offered an analysis of an idea he thought not to exist. I have two reasons for thinking that this inter? is mistaken. First, Hume often pretation of Hume of the idea of mind. The passage makes mention just quoted from the Abstract is a case in point. And if we turn to Book II of the Treatise we can is quite clear on the find passages in which Hume
topic. evident, of ourselves that that our of our own 'Tis that the idea, or rather present so lively possible the impression with us, and a conception to imagine it.10

is agreed by most scholars of Hume's writings, when Hume uses the term "self" or "person," he to be referring only to the mind, generally means not (as we might say) to the whole person.12 Of course, one might argue at this point that affirms the existence of an idea of while Hume in Book II of the Treatise, he denies mind its in Book I. On the opening page of his existence on Hume's Norman commentary philosophy, Smith asks the following question: Kemp Why is it that in Book I of the Treatise, the existence of an impression of the self is explicitly denied, while
his at of the "indirect" theory passions propounded II is made to rest on the assumption in Book length an in fact that we do of the experience impression and that this impression is ever-present to us?13

self,

is always consciousness

intimately gives us that 'tis not

person, can anything

in this particular

go beyond

And
The us

again:
idea and of ourselves is always sensible object, a conveys of any other lively idea these to present intimately to the of vivacity degree we are related. to which

idea This

pression; great measure degree In these

changes two kinds the and same,

im? into a real by degrees in a of perceptions being in their and differing only

of force

vivacity.11 to be Hume does not

passages, idea of

sure, our

explicitly mention
of the

the idea of mind. He

or own

speaks only
But, as

ourselves

person.

This brings me to my second reason for rejecting of Hume the above interpretation the concerning existence of the idea of mind. In the first two paragraphs of "Personal Iden? Hume considers a view that he ascribes to tity," to some philo? "some philosophers." According says, the self is a simple substance sophers, Hume It is not simply the collection that has perceptions. of perceptions itself. Unfortunately for these philo? we have no idea of the Hume continues, sophers, self "after the manner it is here explained" (italics are mine). We have no impression of a self-substance that has perceptions, "we have and, accordingly, no such idea" (italics are mine). I think it has been these remarks which have led Smith (and others) to suppose that Hume denied the explicitly existence of an idea of self in Book I. But if one looks closely at these paragraphs, I think it is plain

9 is usually as a theory about the bundle formulated the contemporary theory of "mind" Among explicitly empiricists, and the World Order [New York, of the single term "mind" (cf., e.g., G. I. Lewis, Mind Scribner, meaning 1929], p. 421) or, as a theory about of whole the empirical sentences in more the mind about fashion, meaning sophisticated (cf., e.g., A. J. In this connection, it is interesting to note that Press, Ayer, Language Truth and Logic [New York, Dover 1946], pp. 123-124). as a substance works which while "has" perceptions spoke of the self in his published Bishop Berkeley (e.g., Works, vol. II, and Sons, Ltd., Nelson ed. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop in his Notebook A he entertained the [London, 1948], pp. 232-234) of this theory formulation bundle than Hume's) casts it as a theory Berkeley's theory of the self. Further, (more obviously "The very existence writes: the meaning of the word "mind." of ideas constitutes about the soul. Consciousness, Berkeley ransack your understanding. of ideas seem to be all one. Consult, existence What find you there besides several perceptions, . . . To mean or thoughts. a thing you do not What mean you by the word mind? is a contradiction. We perceptions perceive are in this matter is a congeries of perceptions. abused Take the perceptions and you by the words. Mind strangely away and you put the mind. is not the perceptions, take away the mind. Put the perceptions but the thing which Say you the mind . . .These are vague, I answer you are abused by the words empty words without 1, p. 72. perceives. meaning." {Works, vol. I have taken the liberty of re-punctuating these passages. Italics are mine. makes them hard to read.) punctuation Berkeley's 10 of the section of the Treatise to the Senses," with Regard Treatise, p. 317. The sixth paragraph (Bk. I) entitled "Scepticism of our "ideas of self and person." also contains mention 11 Treatise, p. 354. 12This on Personal is made "Hume The Philosophical Penelhum, nicely by Terence point Review, vol. 64 (1955), Identity," PP. 575-586. 18The Philosophy of David Hume (London, Macmillan, i960), p.v.

I?2

AMERICAN

PHILOSOPHICAL

QUARTERLY

that they contain

we have no idea

no such denial. Hume

of a certain kind of mind,

says that
viz., a

of
make

the
no

collection
mention

<f>?a description
of a pure-ego that

that would
"has55 the

has perceptions. mind-substance which He does not say that we have no idea of mind. We do have an idea of mind?as the passages just quoted from Book II make clear. Under analysis we discover that this idea is not the idea of a mental-substance; it is, rather, the idea of a bundle of perceptions. is no inconsistency There of the sort alleged by a certain Hume Smith. rejects philosophical analysis of our idea of mind, but he does not deny to be analyzed. that there is an idea of mind II the statement: "I see a chair." I shall Consider call this statement S. It is sometimes supposed that the whole point of a theory of the self (such as is to identify the object referred to by Huem's) in sentences such as S. But what? the pronoun T ever may be true of some theories of the self, this of the theory put is not an adequate description advanced his theory as forward by Hume. Hume an analysis of "mind." He had nothing directly to of the pronoun T5. Yet it say about the meaning
is clear, I think, that sentences such as S say some?

The collection perceptions <?. constituting collection of perceptions whose members are to one another by the special relation R; collection is <j> the collection of perceptions
members share a common introspectable

is <j> the related or, the whose

feature

F;
have

or some
such a

such. Of
criterion.

course, we
But, as

do not
out

actually
above,

pointed

I am putting this problem aside for the present. The point is that for Hume, "my mind55 must a certain collection of perceptions that designate is specifiable without mention of anything other than perceptions, their qualities or relations. Thus for Hume, "I see a chair55 reduced to "The visual of a chair is presently occurring in my perception mind55 and this, in turn, reduces to "The visual of a chair is presently in the collection perception of perceptions </>"(where the criterion for identi? of nothing other than fying <f)requires mention their qualities and relations). perceptions, We can see, I think, that one result of Hume's a specific analysis of "mind55 is that it provides It might analysis of the "in55 in "in my mind." be thought that "in" is properly a special term
occurring in the phrase "in my mind55 in a meta?

tell us something They thing about my mind. about what is going on inmy mind. S reports that the visual perception of a chair is presently occur? in my mind. This is not to say that my mind ring
is seeing a chair. / am seeing the chair. But if I am

sense. I can find no reason to think this phorical is true. "In55 is not always used to signify spatial uses that place. It has plenty of non-metaphorical
have "in nothing his name,55 "in to do with "in the space mood55). (e.g., I "in think a hurry,55 a more

seeing a chair, the visual perception in my mind. occurring presently of "Scepticism with Regard messages
is that "I see a chair5' is reducible to

of a chair is One of the to the Senses55

the statement

enlightening
of my

way
mind55

to look at the matter

as a pre-analytical

is to think
phrase re?

"The

visual
then

perception
mind.55 assume

of a

chair

is presently
with Hume's

occurring us Let

in my

attention. With this under? quiring philosophical is suggesting is that the "in55 standing, what Hume in question is the "in55 of membership (e.g., "I am in that club55). The visual perception of a chair is
a present member of the collection of perceptions <f>.

(in accordance

that S reports the presence of a visual intentions) in my mind. Given the bundle chair-perception
analysis of "mind,55 the phrase "my mind55 must

that special collection be understood as designating of perceptions which is mine. And which collection to is that? The collection of perceptions belonging
some pure ego?me? Surely not. "My mind,55

Let us now consider the following passage from the closing page of D. G. G. Macnabb's discussion of Hume's writes theory of knowledge. Macnabb as follows:
A difficulty hexametrical of conscious when has which been has states been be formulated of Hume. aware of someone by can a "How itself as a series?" in a series But

criticism

considered this body

certain

as a meaningful (the body sitting

etc.) designates

sound produced by in a certain chair at a

a certain collection

I consider

time, the

of perceptions
by phrase

It </>. is the same collection

"Pike's mind55 when

designated
others are

wrongly is required all self-conscious times. be It that must

this hexameter, I see that the difficulty It is not the series as a whole put. to be the of it is some aware We of of are itself. We of to be are the not at series of of the the time. self-conscious

certain series. of

the members is said

speaking. Had we an adequate criterion by which to divide perceptions into individual bundles, we could now go on to provide a unique description

aware

themselves is really

as members the members

Just itself as a nation,

as when

a nation

conscious

hume's

bundle

theory

of

the

self:

limited

defense

163

or some nation, as members of perception relational not know

are aware of themselves them, who the nation. But still, what is it for a to be aware of that of itself as a member of mind? I do

perceptions
say that only of themselves

is aware
some

of itself as a series. He
of of the the series series. are The

need
aware real

members

as members

we of perceptions call unity to this question.14 the answer a series of conscious states

problem,
can be

says Macnabb,
aware of itself as

is how a given perception

a member of a certain

"How

can

be

aware

of

itself as a series?55 The implication is that if any? states, it thing is aware of a series of conscious must be something other than the series itself. A
series as A a of series. of conscious Surely, conscious states this cannot last states be aware of itself observation can not be is correct. aware of

series of perceptions. Again, the implication is that as a member if anything is aware of a perception it must be something of a series of perceptions,
other than a perception. As above, I can only

can not agree with this observation. A perception be aware of itself as a member of a series of per?
ceptions aware be any of more itself than as a a series / series. of perceptions can aware be can of

series

anything at all. / can be aware of things. But a series of conscious states is not the kind ofthing that
can be aware of something?itself or anything else.

But I can find no special problem here for Hume. as an Hume Had offered his bundle-analysis account of the meaning of T5 (in such statements
as "I am aware of myself as a series of perceptions55)

things. But a perception (like a series of per? is not the kind of thing that can be aware ceptions) of anything at all. I can find no problem here for Hume. Again,
/ am aware of a of a certain series member certain perception of perceptions. "An as being Trans? a

he would now be forced to adopt the erroneous can be aware of view that a bundle of perceptions itself as a bundle. But Hume "mind,55 analyzed not T5. Thus if we are to discover what Hume would of the statement: say about the meaning
"I am aware of myself as a series of perceptions,55

lating
mention

this statement
of my of mind,

into one making

we get:

an explicit
of a

awareness

certain perception
series perceptions,

as being
is

a member

of a certain
in my mind.55

occurring of of a

And,
this ception

given Hume's
last means: as being "An

bundle-analysis
awareness a certain

of "mind,"
certain series per? of

we must statement Following

Hume "An

first

it (as it were) into a mention of my mind. making explicit I think the pattern suggested above, "translate55
translate of myself occurring Hume's "An this as in my a statement series as follows: of perceptions This last state? of "mind," as a series the

a member

would awareness

is presently ment, would of given mean:

mind.55

that series of perceptions </>is occurring within within <f>)."I can see no difficulty perceptions (i.e., here. This last statement might mean: "A certain series of perceptions includes a member A which <j> B standing is of another member in relation to
some other members C, D, E, etc." Or, alterna?

bundle-analysis awareness of myself occurring

perceptions the

c/> is presently

within

"A certain series of per? tively, it might mean: includes a member A which is of itself ceptions </>
(i.e., members of A) B, standing C, D, E, in etc." relation On to neither some other interpreta?

series of perceptions
contains term

Of <f>."
"myself55

course
(i.e., my

this last still

"mind55) so

must be applied again. The the bundle-analysis final analysis is then: "An awareness of the series of perceptions is <f> which <f> presented as a series (in of perceptions) is presently the occurring within
series of perceptions not be aware states <f>." This itself last statement is

awkward,
states series can of

but it is intelligible.
of conscious might

A series of conscious
as a series. an But aware? a contain

ness which is of itself presented as a series. Analogy: A collection of pictures cannot paint a picture which is of itself pictured as a collection. But a collection of pictures might contain a picture which is of itself pictured as a collection. Macnabb is yet to says that the real problem
come. Hume need His not Theory say that the whole and Morality series of 14David Hume:

is aware of a tion does it affirm that a perception or that it (itself or another perception) perception it is a member. is aware of the series of which On it says only that the collection both readings, of is of a per? includes a member which <j> perceptions (itself or otherwise) ception standing in relation to some other perceptions. This seems intelligible. includes a picture which is My picture-collection or another picture) of a picture (itself hanging
next to some other pictures in the collection.

Ill
this defense of Hume. I want now to generalize But before I do, I shall consider one more specific
Hutchinson, 1951), pp. 251-252.

of Knowledge

(London,

164

AMERICAN

PHILOSOPHICAL

QUARTERLY

version of the kind been dealing.

In Hume's Intentions,

of charge with
J. A.

which

I have
as

Passmore

writes

follows
The

:
fundamental identity) problem is what of discussion (in Hume's succes? it is which confuses

personal sion with

Let's look at these last two statements. Hume would say that the first affirms that a certain idea which is (i.e., a certain belief-perception and "lively") is occurring in especially "strong" my mind. The second (I think Hume would say) affirms that a second perception (call it a "realiza
tion-of-error-perception") also occurs in my mind.

comes and equally, what it is which identity; to recognize that has been confused with succession . . . If all that is that a series of identity? happened similar (or causally there is no succeed linked) perceptions in which this way possible could the fiction of personal generate once the fiction could this generated, its fictional character. Both the

very one

Given Hume's of "mind," these bundle-analysis last mean that certain kinds of perceptions only in the first case, and a (a belief-perception
"realization-of-error-perception" in the second)

another, series of itself

Nor identity. ever reveal series

the discovery fiction and that it is a fiction original are possible if there is something which is at first only can discover misled by, and then, after consideration, that it was misled by, a series of similar perceptions. ... (It is) at this point. breaks down.15 . . that Hume's psychological

positivism

Hume
distinct But,

held

perceptions

that the (in "Of Personal Identity") the mind are separate and up making
called to Hume, entities continuous, single, an i.e., . . run the to continuous, them the "substances."16 common man

entities?he according and of a (i.e., . distinct single, a

believes,
separate aspects ception to ".

or has a propensity

to believe,
are "moments uninterrupted

that these
in" or per?

uninterrupted

experience).
perceptions,"17 to one, ".

The

common

man
to .

has a propensity
these successive the whole suppose

. ascribe

identity . ".

are included in a certain series of perceptions <f>. There may be difficulties with this view. For there may be difficulties with Hume's example, claim that a belief is simply an idea which is especially "strong" and "lively." But so far as I can see, there is no difficulty of the sort urged by Passmore. Neither a of these claims presuppose self other than a series of perceptions?one which confuses succession with identity and later dis? covers that it has made a mistake. These claims entail only that certain kinds of perceptions are included in a certain collection of perceptions. can now be generalized. I think our findings to Hume, a statement of the form "I According see a chair" is a (where the object perceived is reducible to a statement of the physical object) form "A visual chair-perception is occurring with a certain bundle of perceptions When the <f>." is a physical the per? object perceived object, is ultimately (in this case "see") ception verb
excludable. Statements containing such verbs are

train of perceptions
i.e., into and make

to be united
several them different lose their

by

identity,"18
perceptions characters of

translatable
presence "substance") of

into statements
a certain within

mentioning
(i.e., collection a

only
of

the
per?

are essential to distinction and difference which this belief them."19 Of course, Hume thought it is to be distinguished from the false. Though the belief held by "some philosophers" concerning does not ascribe existence of a self-substance (Hume to the common man), the belief in self-substance is mistaken. it, like the belief in self-substance, that careful Hume Further, supposed clearly of the contents of mind will establish inspection to Hume, / believe this fact. Thus, according (or to believe) that successive per? have a propensity
ceptions are "moments in" a single, continuous,

perception a certain

certain

I think, is clear in Hume's So much, ceptions. texts and has been generally recognized by most on Hume's commentators I think philosophy. intended the same to be true with regard Hume
to such statements as "I observe a chair-percep?

tion"?where object but

state. "I

the object perceived is not a physical an introspectable mental is, instead,

a chair-perception" means "An

observe

uninterrupted experience. belief is in error.

15 Cambridge 16 Treatise, 17 Treatise, 18 Treatise, 19 Treatise, (1952), 233. 253. 269. 259. pp.

And

/ discover

that this

of a chair-perception is perception ("inward") in a certain bundle of perceptions occurring <?." seems to have thought As a general remark, Hume that statements about the activities of mind (such as
observing, remembering, believing, etc.), whether

82-83.

p. p. p. p.

hume's

bundle

theory

of

the

self:

limited

defense

165

are activities to with these activities respect states (i.e., whether it physical objects or mental states which are being is physical objects or mental
observed, remembered, etc.) are ultimately re?

the presence of affirming in the collection of specialized perceptions verbs, up the mind. Mental perceptions making are not to be included in other words, in the finished mental vocabulary. When we turn to Hume texts, we often find him saying that themind perceives, believes, remembers, as conveniences?manners of etc., things. Such statements suggest that there is by Hume speech. a mind which does things. When of such statements via the objects with We get to the real meaning a Humean men? In statements the mind respect to which analysis. analysis, (allegedly) does some? are replaced are perceptions the activities of mind mental critics tioning by states) thing (i.e., statements affirming only the presence of certain have charged that Hume has supposed the existence a certain substances (perceptions) within other than a mere of per? mental of a mind collection no Hume It is hard to see how a mere collection collection. Transcendent presupposes ceptions. of perceptions could be that which perceives, Ego. Given his analysis of "mind" there is nothing the very for such an Ego to do. believes etc., remembers, about, things ducible certain Cornell University Received February 7, ig66

to statements

it is composed. Of course, it of which perceptions is equally hard to see how a mere of collection could be that which perceives, believes perceptions things about, remembers, etc., physical objects too Hume's critics (so far as I know) have ?though not sensed the need for a Transcendent Ego in I think, is these cases. The key to the problem, the mind does not do anything?it that for Hume, includes things. Statements containing mental verbs the objects receiving the action of such (whether verbs be physical objects or mental states) are used