THE O P E R A T I O N A L T E N E T S O F G E W R A L S H E I N Z G U D E R I A N AND GEORGE S. PATTON, JR.

A t h e s i s p r e s e n t e d t o t h e Facult:,

of t h e U . S . Army Command and G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l l m e n t uf the requirements for the degree

MFISTER OF M I L I T F l R Y ART f3NO S C I E N C E

by
GEORGE A . HIGGINS,

MAJ,

US6

B.S.,

U n i t e d S t a t e s M i l i t a r y Academv. 1372
M . A . , U n i v e r s i t y o f V i r g i n i a , 1380

F o r t Leauenworth, I385

Kansas

Approved f o r p u b l i c release; d i s t r i b u t i o n i s u n l i r n i t c d .

85-3240

PIFISTER OF M I L I T A R Y ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS

aPPRcivaL PAGE

Name o f T i t l e of

candidate: Thesis:

M A J G e o r g e F7.

Higgins Generals Patton,

The O p e r a t i o n a l T e n e t s o f

H e i n z G u d e r i a n and George S.

Jr.

%.> ,-

T h e s i r Committee Chairman

h n s o n , I I,

rm

cc/vcM..

Ml R o g e r C i r i l l o , F J
MR

Mernber,

Graduate F a c u l t y

$ i@ & f
C h r i j t o p h e r R. Gabel,

,
Ph.D

Member, G r a d u a t e F a c u l t y

May

1985 b y :

,
P h i l i p J . BrooKes,
Ph.0.

D i r a c t o r , G r i d u l t e Degree

P r o g r am5

The o p i n i o n s a n d c o n c l u n . i o n r e x p r e ? ;sd h e r e i n a r e t h o ? e o f t h e s t u d e n t a u t h o r a n d d c n n t n e c e s s w i ! ? ( . e p r e ~ e n tt h e v i e w s o f t h e U . S . 17rmy Command and G c n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e o r a n y o t h e r a o v e r n r n e n t a l a g e t n c y . ( R s f r r e t ~ c e s t o : h i ? ;tiid:, s5ould include tha foregoing : t r t e w n t . >

ii

THE OPERATIONAL TEFIETS O F GENERALE HEIFIZ GUOERIAN AND GEORGE S . PA+TOPI. J R . : An a n a l y s i s a n d c o m p a r i 3 o n o f t h e o p e r a t i o n a l t e n e t s o f t!do ; u c c e i s f u l b l o r l d War I 1 c o m m a n d e r s , b y M a j o r G e o r g e A . H i g g i n s , lL'Sfl, 2 1 1 pase:. T h i s s t u d y is an h i a t o r i c a l a n a l y s i s o f t h e o p e r a t i o n a l m e t h o d s o f t w o men w h o c o m m a n d e d l a r s e m i l i t a r y f o r m a t i o n s w i t h g r e a t s u c i e ~ s d u r i n g W o r l d War 1 1 : C o l a n e l - G e n e r a l H e i n z W . G u d e r i a n o f t h e G e r m a n A r r n ? ; a n d G e n e r a l G e o r 3 e S. P a t t o n , J r . o f t h e A m e r i c a n A r m y . T h e f o c t u s o f t h e r t u d r is o n e a c h m a n ' s c o n d u c t o f o p e r a t i o n a l a r t , t h e c o n n e c t i n g 1 inK b e t w e e n t a c t i c s a n d s t r a t e g y . T h e s t u d y a n a l y z e s 'the ur i t i n s 5 a n d c a m p a i g n s o f Guder i a n a n d P a t t o n a n d attempts t o i d e n t i f y t h e t e n e t : o r p r i n i i p l e s bj. w h i i h e a c h man g u i d e d h i s c o n d u c t o f o p e r a t i o n a l a r t . The s t u d y t h e n c o m p a r e s t h e t e n e t s e a c h man i p p l i ~ d i n h i s c o n d u c t o f w a r f a r e t o d i ~ c o u e rw h e t h e r t h e r e were a n ? p r i n c i p l e s common t o t h e i r o p e r a t i o n a l m e t h o d s . F i n a l l y , t h e s t u d y s u g g e s t s u h a t imp1 i c a t i o n s common t e n e t s a t t h e o p e r a t i o n a l l e u e l o f war m i s h t h a v e f o r A i r l a n d B a t t l a D o c t r i n e . T h e z t u d ? c o n c l u d e s t h a t G u d r r i a n a n d P a t t o n s h a r e d s i x common t e n e t s i n t h e i r c o n d u c t o f o p e r a t i o n a l a r t a n d s . u g g e s t 5 t h a t ?he R r n e r i c a n Rr my ' 5 c u r r e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n s a t t h e d i u is i o n a n d c o r p s le~vel:. may n o t be s u i t a b l e t o c o n d u c t t h e s o r t o f a g i l e o p e r a t i o n s t h a t u i l l b e r e q u i r e d o n a f u t u r e b a t t l e f i e l d . As w e l l , we m u s t enn.ure t h a t d o c t r i n a l f o u n d a t i o n s f o r j o i n t o p e r a t i o n s i n u o l u i n g a i r and 3round forces--as a minimum--are i n p l a c e b a f o r e war b r e a K s o u t . I t a l i o i a s g e s t : t h a t we n e e d t o g e t t o g e t h e r w i t h o u r E u r o p e a n A 1 1 i e s .>nd a d o p t a common d o c t r i n a l a p p r o a c h t o warf i g h t i n g i n W e i t e r n E u m p e , o n e t h a t ; u p p o r t s a common t h e a t e r s t r a t e g y . F i n a l l y , t h e ~ t u d : , c c n c ? u d e : t h a t ? h e A m e r i c a n Army s h o u l d c o n t i n u e t o s t u d y t h e h i s t o r : , of warfare a n d l e a r n its l e s s o n s .

iii

TABLE CF COtdTEbITS

ABSTRACT

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

i11

L I S T O F MAPS r7FID CHARTS

. .

. . . .

CHAPTER O N E :

INTRODUCTION

Introduction Notes

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1
11

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
GEFIERHL HE IN2 GLIDER I A N
The Man

CHAPTER TbJO: Part Part blGteS

I:
11:

. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tenets

12

. . . . . . . . . 17
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

Operational GENERAL GEORGE S

CHAPTER THREE: Part

PATTON. J R

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
P a r t 11: O p e r a t i o n a l T e n e t ; . . . . . . . . . 99
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176

I:
T h e Plan CHHPTER Part Part FOUR :

cor.icLus rori

Difference;

I:
11:

Operational

. . . . . .

182

. . . . . . . . . P a r t 111: I m p l i c a t i o n s f o r A i r l i n d B a t t l e . . . plot55 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Comrnon T e n a t s

187

193

206

BIBLIOORAPHY

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
iv

207

FIf3PS AND CHHRTS

CHAPTER TWO

Chart Map

1:

Pnnzer Oiuiz.ions Campaign

. . . . . . . . .

20a

. . . . . . . . . . 24a
C h a r t 2: P a n ~ e r - g r e r ~ a d i s R e g i m e n t . r . . . . . 26a
Map 2: F l i n d e r s C a m p a i g n . . . . . . . . . 33a

1: liu-sian Map 3 : D n e i p e r R i u e r C r o s s i n g

. . . . . . . . 53a

CHAPTER THREE

C h a r t 3 : 1J.S. C h a r t 4:
U.S.

Infantry

Division

Armored D i u i s i u n

. . . . . . . . . . . .

18ba
101a
138a

Map 4:

F a l a i s e - A r g e n t a n Gap t h e Bulge

. . . . . . .

Mzp 5 : B a t t l e o f MPP 6 : E i f r l a n d

. . . . . . . . P a l a t i n a t r Campaigns . . . .

139a 140a

CHRPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION

The r e c e n t resurgence o f

interest

in operational art in

t h e A m e r i c a n firmy h a s s p a w n e d h i s t o r i c a l c o r n p a r i s o n s t h a t

suggest u a l id

imp1 i c a t i o n s f o r t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y A m e r i c a n A r m y

preparations f o r t h e conduct o f operational

a r t . Of p a r t i c u l a r

interest i n s u c h Comparisons are t h e o p e r a t i o n a l s t y l e s o f

s u c c e s s f u l c o r n n a n d e r s s u c h as G e n e r a l s H e i n z G u d e r i a n a n d G e o r g e S. P a t t o n ,

J r . To m a n y p r o f e s s i o n a l s o l d i e r s a n d

s t u d e n t s o f r n i l i t a r y h i s t o r y a 1 i K e , t h o s e names h a v e s p e c i a l

meaning.

The r e a s o n f o r t h a t p r o b a b l y l i e s

in t h e f a c t t h a t i n W o r l d War 11.

e a c h man was a n e m i n e n t l y s u c c e s s f u l c o m m a n d e r

B u t t h a t answer, o f c o u r s e , o n l y b e g s t h e f u r t h e r a n d more meaningful question:

M y was e a c h o f

t h e s e men s u c c e s s f u l It

in

c o m m a n d i n g l a r g e f o r m a t i o n s o f men question worth asKing,

it

i n combat?

is n o t onl:) a

is o n e w o r t h t a K i n g t h e t i r n e t o

a n s w e r as w e l l . T h i s t h e s i s r e p r e s e n t s a n a t t e m p t t o p a r t i a l l y

a n s w e r t h a t q u e s t i o n b y a n s w e r i n g t h e q u e s t i o n Were t h e r e a n y

t e n e t s common t o t h e o p e r a t i o n a l m e t h o d s o f Q e n e r a l s H e i n z
G u d e r i a n a n d G e o r g e S. P a t t o n , t o t h i s question will prouide,

Jr.

i n W a r l d Wr I I ? The answer a

in part at least, an explanation

f o r t h e s u c c e s s o f t h e s e t w o men i n cornmandins l a r g e m i l i t a r y formations. t o a s e t of If

it turns out,
for

example,

t h a t e a c h man a d h e r e d

common t e n e t s

in h i s planning and conduct of

- 1 -

operational success

a r t , t h e n t h a t w o u l d s e r v e a s %ome e v i d e n c e t h a t
in part, from the correct

in operational art derives,

a p p l i c a t i o n of certain tenets. Given t h e f o c u s of t h i s t h e s i s , research

i n t o t h e o p e r a t i o n a l rnethods of G u d e r i a n and P a t t o n
c o u r s e , g i v e a f u l l a c c o u n t o f t h e succes%es o f into consideration other

c o u l d n o t , of

t h o s e men b e c a u s e i t f a i l s t o taKe

r e l e v a n t f a c t o r s s u c h a s p e r s o n a l l e a d e r s h i p , mistawes of
o p p o s i n g c o m m a n d e r s , a n d t r a i n i n g s t a t u s o f enemy a n d f r l e n d l y

u n i t s , t o mention j u s t a few. But i t would, n o n e t h e l e s s , h e l p

i l l u m i n a t e t h e p r i n c i p l e d b a s i s f o r t h e employment o f f o r c s s a t

t h e O p e r a t i o n a l l e u e l o f war, a s u b . i e c t o f c o n s i d e r a b l e
i n t e r e s t t o d a y b e c a u s e d o c t r i n a l l y t h e Arner i c a n Arrny is

committed t o f i g h t i n g i n a f a s h i o n remarllably s i m i l a r t o t h e

manner of

C o m b a t i n W o r l d War

1 1 , a% w i l l s o o n b e p o i n t e d o u t .
a5K why

A t this point,

h o w e v e r , o n e may well

Generals

G u d e r i a n a n d P a t t o n were s e l e c t e d f o r t h e p u r p o s e s o f t h i s study. I n p a r t , t h e answer h a s a l r e a d y b e e n g i v e n . Doctrinally,

c o n t e m p o r a r y A i r l a n d B a t t l e e n v i s i o n s t h e commitment o f U.S.
Army f o r c e s t o c o m b a t on a b a t t l e f i e l d

of t h e f u t u r e which

is

liKely t o be f l u i d ,

dynamlc, l e t h a l , and f a s t mouing. Such a

d e s c r i p t i o n of

t h e modern b a t t l e f i e l d g o e s a l o n g way t o w a r d I 1 b a t t l e f i e l d s on which Guderian and aside from temporary reverses suffered immensely s u c c e s s f u l in

d e s c r i b l n g t h e W o r l d War P a t t o n f o u g h t . Moreover,

b y b o t h , e a c h o f t h e s e s o l d i e r s was commanding a t t h e o p e r a t i o n a l above c o r p s leuel.

l e v e l o f war: c o r p s a n d e c h e l o n s is t h e f i n a l

Because 5uccess i n b a t t l e

- 2 -

arbiter

i n war,

there

i s n o t much e l s e t o b e s a i d a b o u t t h e s e
i f any do,

men e x c e p t t h a t t h e y s e r v e . of successful

as p a r a d i g m a t i c examples operational art.

P l a n n e r s and e x e c u t o r s o f

A final
men f o r

p o i n t w o r t h rnaKing a b o u t t h e s e l e c t i o n o f t h e s e of t h i s Study

t h e focus social,

i s that t h e d i v e r s i t y of

their

cultural,

and p o l i t i c a l h e r i t a g e s a s w e l l a s t h e

diverse natures o f the theaters breadth t o this The v a l u e o f

i n Which t h e y f o u g h t

adds a

i n v e s t i g a t i o n t h a t would otherwise be absent. o f the study is that

t h i s feature

if

it should

turn out that t h e r e

operational

i s a shared p r i n c i p l e d b a s i s f o r t h e n a l r e a d y we

a r t b e t w e e n P a t t o n and G u d e r i a n ,

have evidence t h a t such tenet; g e o g r a p h i c a l l y spec i f i c .

are not c u l t u r a l l v o r

Rnother question which n a t u r a l l y suggests do a s t u d y s u c h as t h i s a t a l l ? " answered p a r t i a l l y t h e U.S. This question,

itself too,

i s "Why
has been First,

a l r e a d y b u t dernands

f u l l e r treatment.
in the

A r m y ' s c u r r e n t d o c t r i n e as r e f l e c t e d
FM IBB-5,

1382

v e r s i o n of

Operations,

envisions the necessity for forces--corps lethal, be and

e m p l o y i n g and s u s t a i n i n g o p e r a t i o n a l - l e v e l echelons above c o r p s - - o n

a fluid,

non-1 i n e a r ,

integrated, integrated
fight

and dynamic b a t t l e f i e l d .

Such a b a t t l e f i e l d w i l l

i n t h e sense t h a t opposing f o r c e s w i l l n o t o n l y
light

with

and h e a v y a r m o r e d and m e c h a n i z e d cornbined arms and n u c l e a r

forces fires

i n j o i n t o p e r a t i o n s b u t a l s o employ c h e m i c a l as a m a t t e r of course. And, t h e chemical

and n u c l e a r which

dimensions notwithstanding,

t h e h i s t o r i c a l precedents

- 3 -

most c l o s e l y a p p r o x i m a t e t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f s u c h f u t u r e combat are t h e h i g h l y f l u i d campaigns which o c c u r r e d

i n W o r l d War I 1

in

8 1

lrtual l y every t h e a t e r . Second, and equally important, the current doctrinal

r e q u i r e m e n t is n o t m e r e l y t o e x e c u t e t a c t i c a l o p e r a t i o n s b u t t o
Plan,

execute, and c o n t r o l t h e maneuver of large b o d i e s of

a r m i e s , a n d a r m y g r o u p s . Here t h e r u b is
t h e American A r m y h a s h a d n o o c c a s i o n o r

forces--corps, two-fold:
(1)

requirement t o p l a n and execute o p e r a t i o n a l a r t s i n c e Korea:

a n d as a r e s u l t ,
(2) i t h a s n e i t h e r an o f f i c e r c o r p s well

<I>

schooled in operational

a r t n o r a f i r m d o c t r i n a l g r a s p on t h e
TaKen t o g e t h e r ,
Army

p r i n c i p l e d b a s i s f o r how t o f i g h t l a r g e u n i t s .

these f a c t s present a dilemma.

doctrine--flirland c o r p s and armies,

Although current U.8.

Battle--requires

t h e American Army t o f i g h t

it does n o t have t h e P r o p e r l y t r a i n e d

l e a d e r s h i p t o P l a n and c o n d u c t o p e r a t i o n a l

a r t . Moreover, there
literature

d o e s n o t appear t o be an abundance o f c o n t e m p o r a r y

f o r t h c o m i n g w h i c h a d d r e s s e s t h e p r i n c i p l e d b a s is f o r operat ional t h i s study?"

a r t . C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e answer t o t h e q u e s t i o n "Why
lies

i n a r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e l a r g e vacuum of
i n t h e U.S.
Army a b o u t t h e s u b j e c t and

e x p e r i e n c e and Knowledge t h e absence of any r e c e n t

l i t e r a t u r e on t h e s u b j e c t .

H a v i n g c o n s i d e r e d w h a t t h i s t h e s i s f o c u s e s o n a n d w h y , we n e e d t o e s t a b l i s h some d e f i n i t i o n s a n d o u t l i n e a m e t h o d o l o g y w h i c h s e r v e as t h e l o g i c a l f r a m e w o r K f o r t h e a r g u m e n t s t h a t a r e d e v e l o p e d h e r e i n . F i r s t , f o r a n y d i s c u s s i o n on a t e c h n i c i r l

- 4 -

s u b j e c t s u c h as m i l i t a r y a r t t o b e f r u i t f u l , intelligible,

indeed
So,

a s h a r e d v o c a b u l a r y is a p r e r e q u i s i t e .
the operational

before

l a u n c h i n g i n t o a d i s c u s s i o n of Guderian and P a t t o n , on w h a t

tenets of

i t irould b e uise

t o come t o some a g r e e m e n t

is m e a n t b y s o m e K e y w o r d s a n d c o n c e p t s u s e d t h r o u g h o u t

this thesis.
For example,

if

t h i s s t u d y P r u ~ o s e st o

I d e n t i f y and d e f i n e

operational

t e n e t s e m l o v e d by t h e commanders u n d e r
t h e n o n e must h a v e s o m e i d e a o f w h a t a n
it

consideration,

"operational tenet" is because

is n o t

i m m e d i a t e l y c l e a r how

o n e m i g h t go a b o u t f i n d i n g s o m e t h i n g w i t h o u t h a v i n g some f a i r l y

clear

i d e a a b o u t what

is b e i n g s o u g h t .

In s h o r t ,

"What i s a n itself.

operational

tenet?"

is a q u e s t i o n t h a t r e a d i l y s u g g e s t s

Rnd t h e t e m p t a t i o n h e r e "law," b u t

is t o o f f e r a s y n o n y m s u c h as " r u l e " o r

i t j h o u l d be e v i d e n t t h a t such a s t e p n o t o n l y

c o m p l i c a t e s t h e problem b u t begs t h e quest ion b e s i d e s . P r o c e d u r a l l y , we f i r s t n e e d t o maKe i t c l e a r w h a t

is meant by
level of

terms s u c h a s " o p e r a t i o n a l a r t " a n d " t h e o p e r a t i o n a l

w a r , " a n d t h e n t a C K l e t h e p r o b l e m o f w h a t i s meant b y " t e n e t . "

It
i s g e n e r a l l y a c K n o w l e d g e d by c o n t e m p o r a r y t h e o r i s t s

t h a t any c o m p r e h e n s i v e t h e o r y of

war m u s t

include at least and t a C t i C a l . < 2 >

t h r e e l e v e l s o f war: s t r a t e g i c , o p e r a t i o n a l ,
As. s u g g e s t e d e a r l i e r ,

most R m e r ican Rrmy o f f i c e r s p r o b a b l y h a v e

a f i r m u n d e r s t a n d i n g of c u r r e n t tactical d o c t r i n e and, t o a s i g n l f icantly lesser degree,

an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e a t e r and
is a l m o s t w h o l l y a b s e n t

g l o b a l m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y . What

in our

- 5 -

o f f i c e r c o r p c is a f i r m u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e d i m e n s i o n o f war f i g h t i n g which c o n n e c t s tactical o p e r a t ions t o t h e a t e r and global mil itary strategy--the operational l e v e l o f war. Whereas

t a c t i c a l a r t f o c u s e s on t h e w i n n i n g of t a c t i c a l engagements a n d
b a t t l e s and s t r a t e g i c a r t 5uccess a t t h e t h e a t e r l e v e l , t h e O p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l of

war f o c u s e s o n t h e p l a n n i n g a n d c o n d u c t o f
involves t h e It

campaigns.<3> Simply s t a t e d , operational art

maneuver of

large units such brigades,

d i v i s i o n s , and c o r p s .

may s h a r p e n t h e f o c u s o f

t h e d i s c u s s i o n t o say t h a t g e n e r a l l y

tactical

a r t is p l a n n e d a n d e x e c u t e d a t d i v i s i o n l e v e l a n d

below w h i l e o p e r a t i o n a l art f a l l s t o t h e c o r p s and f i e l d armies.. I t would be f o o l i s h , h o w e v e r , t o draw t h e l i n e between insist that

i t remain

t h e s e t w o l e v e l s o f war t o o s h a r p l y or
where

i n i t i a l l y drawn. mission
may

A division,

f o r e x a m p l e , may be g i v e n a n

operational

i n a p a r t i c u l a r c a s e . The o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l

o f war, t h e n ,

b e d e f i n e d a s ( 1 ) t h e c o n n e c t i n g 1 inK between is 1 2 ) c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e m a n e u v e r uf winning campaigns i n t h e u n i t s which

t a c t i c s and s t r a t e g y which
of large units

13) f o r t h e purpose

s u p p o r t o f t h e a t e r s t r a t e g y . And,

generally,

p e r f o r m t h e s e s o r t s of f u n c t i o n are c o r p s ,

armies, and army

g r o u p s . D i s p o s a l o f t h e tasK o f d e f i n i n g t h e o p e r a t i o n a l

level

o f war s t i l l l e a v e s t h e more d i f f i c u l t a n d d e l i c a t e tasK o f o f f e r i n g an i n t e l l i g i b l e d e f i n i t i o n of

"tenet."

E a r l i e r i t was s u g g e s t e d t h a t a f a c i l e way o f d e f i n i n g

" t e n e t " is s i m p l y t o s a y t h a t a t e n e t
A b e t t e r w a y t o g r a s p what
is m e a n t b y

is m e r e l y a r u l e o r law.

"tenet.

is t o b e g i n by

- 6 -

a d o p t i n g t h e meaning war.
"

implicit

i n t h e phrase " p r i n c i p l e s o f

.. .

Here

" p r i n c i p l e " means

. -.
. c

a general i z a t ion o r general truth

about t h e n a t u r e o f war. ...

~

The p r i n c i p l s o f S u r p r i s e ,

..

for

example,

e n j o i n s m i l i t a r y commanders

t o achieve s u r p r i s e

whenever t h e y

c a n b e c a u s e b y d o i n g s o a commander c a n g a i n a But war.

c r u c i a l ~ s ~ c h o l o g i c a n d m o r a l a d v a n t a g e o v e r h i s enemy. al n o t i c e two First, applies important c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h i s p r inc i p l e of

is universal

the principle

in application

and t h e r e f o r e as t a c t i c a l

at the strategic war.

of

and o p e r a t i o n a l

as w e l l

l e v e l s of

Second.

t h e P r i n c i p l e does level

not address-the
The

1 question

how s u r p r i s e a t a n y

i s t o be achieved. however, is

NJalue i n h a v i n g u n i v e r s a l p r i n c i p l e s ,

i n Knowing
i n t h e case

how t o a p p l y t h e m t o a c h i e v e some d e s i r e d o u t c o m e :
of

military art,

victory.

So a t some p o i n t a b s t r a c t p r i n c i p l e s

such as

" R c h i e u e s u r p r i s e when p o s s i b l e ' ' h a v e t o b e t r a n s l a t e d how Here

i n t o morP c o n c r e t e P r i n c i p l e s or t e n e t s t h a t s u g g e s t s u r p r i s e can be achieved a t a p a r t i c u l a r

l e v e l o f war.

c o n c e p t u a l c l a r i t y a p p e a r s t o demand t h a t we maKe a d i s t i n c t i o n between p r i n c i p l e s t h a t g u i d e o u r decisionmaKing w h i c h s p e c i f y how t o a c c o m p l i s h w h a t e v e r p r i n c i p l e s have suggested. a b s t r a c t and t h e s p e c i f i c , a t t i m e s be operational may impracticable. t e n e t s of and t e n e t s

it i s the

"what"

h e r e t o draw t h e

l i n e between t h e may

b e t w e e n o b j e c t i v e and t e c h n i q u e , Indeed, i t may e v e n b e t r u e t h a t

t h e s o r t t h i s t h e s i s proposes t o uncover as t h e o b j e c t i v e .

i n c l u d e some o f

t h e method as w e l l warf i g h t ing

Because t h e b u s i n e s s o f

i s p a r t s c i e n c e and p a r t

a r t , i t s h o u l d n o t s u r p r i s e us t o s e e t e n e t s t h a t t e l l u s w h a t
is. t o b e d o n e m e l d i n g w i t h t e c h n i q u e s w h i c h s u g g e s t how t h e y should be done.
Flt some p o i n t t h e a b s t r a c t h a s g o t t o b e

translated into the concrete,

into a def in i t ive technique,

p r e f e r a b l y o n e t h a t h a s b e e n v a l i d a t e d b y t h e e x p e r i e n c e s Of history. This discussion, then, suggests that operational

tenets are general i z a t i o n s a b o u t t h e n a t u r e o f o p e r a t i o n a l art

as d e r i v e d f r o m h i s t o r i c a l r e a l i t y .
In essence, o p e r a t i o n a l

t e n e t s are i n d u c t i v e g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s which can b e seen t o a p p l y a t t h e o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l o f war. F o r c o n v e n i e n c e , t h r o u g h o u t t h e

remainder of t h i s t h e s i s
" p r i n c i p l e " and

" t e n e t " w i l l be used

i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y t o r e f e r t o s u c h g e n e r a l i z a t ion?,.

I t r e m a i n s now t o a d d r e s s t h e q u e s t i o n o f m e t h o d o l o g y .
q u e s t i o n t h i s t h e s i s seeKs t o a n s w e r - - W h a t operational

The

were t h e common
the

t e n e t s of G u d e r i a n and P a t t o n - - p r e s u p p o s e s

answers t o t w o p r i o r q u e s t i o n s . F i r s t , were t h e o p e r a t i o n s o f
e a c h c o m m a n d e r g u i d e d by r e c o g n i z a b l e t e n e t s a t a l l ? I f t h e ans.wer t o t h i s q u e s t i o n

is n o ,

t h e n we m u s t g i v e u p t h e p r o j e c t is

r i g h t from t h e beginning. But s u r e l y t h e r a t i o n a l approach t o assume a t t h e b e g i n n i n g t h a t t h e o p e r a t i o n s o f

Guderian and

P a t t o n were g u i d e d b y p r i n c i p l e s o r b a s i c t e n e t s o f s o m e s o r t . Then, if
it turns out that historical

research w i l l n o t s u p p o r t

t h e a s s u m p t i o n , t h e answer t o t h e p r o p o s e d t h e s i s q u e s t i o n w i l l h a v e become e v i d e n t . moreover,

A further

p o i n t worth bearing

i n mind,

is t h a t

if

o n e t a K e s t h e c o n d u c t o f war t o b e a

r a t i o n a l enterprise at a l l , t h e n he s h o u l d n o t b e s u r p r i s e d t o

- 8 -

find

t h a t P r i n c i p l e s o r t e n e t s o f some s o r t s e r v e d a s g u i d e s l e v e l f o r these two

f o r t h e c o n d u c t o f war a t t h e o p e r a t i o n a l h i g h l y successful a s we1 I . Second, W o r l d War

1 1 commanders a n d o t h e r commanders

I n o r d e r t o answer a q u e s t i o n d i r e c t e d a t

c o m m o n a l i t v o f t e n e t 5 between G u d e r i a n and P a t t o n , first

one must Here t h e

u n c o v e r t h e o p e r a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s o f e a c h man.

o b v i o u s aPPPQaCh i s t o r e a d p r i m a r y a n d s e c o n d a r y s o u r c e s a b o u t t h e s e men a n d t h e i r a two-pronged operations i n W o r l d War

11.

T h i s s h o u l d be

a p p r o a c h . E x a m i n a t i o n o f s o u r c e s may s h e d I i g h t art, and

o n w h a t a P a r t i c u l a r commander s a i d a b o u t o p e r a t i o n a l t h a t w o u l d b e some g o o d e v i d e n c e f o r

inferences about t h e More r e v e a l i n g ,

t e n e t s which l a y behind h l s operations. however,

i s t h e f u r t h e r s t e p of

checuing t h e consistency

b e t w e e n w h a t a commander s a i d a n d what h e a n d h i s u n i t s a c t u a l l y d i d i n combat. commander s a i d ,

"X

If research reveals t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r
1 operated,"

i s a t e n e t by which

and h i s that tenet is a

operat ions c o n s i s t e n t l y r e f l e c t the appl i c a t ion of as. w e l l , a g o o d c a s e c a n t h e n b e made f o r

the view t h a t X

t e n e t b y w h i c h t h a t commander p l a n n e d a n d c o n d u c t e d o p e r a t i o n a l art, By now it s h o u l d be e v i d e n t t h a t a general methodology f o r

I S

a n s w e r i n g t h e q u e s t i o n t h i s t h e 5 i s p r o p o s e s t o answer s u g g e s t e d by t h e q u e s t i o n i t s e l f .

First,

i t must b e a s s u m e d

t h a t Guderian and P a t t o n o p e r a t e d by r e c o g n i z a b l e t e n e t s o r principles. 1 3 l t h o u g h i t may p r o v e f a l s e , a case has been

- 9 -

offered for

the t r u t h o f that

assumption.

Second,

o n e must Here t h e

d e t e r m i n s b y what p a r t i c u l a r t e n e t s e a c h man o p e r a t e d . taSK

i s t o s e a r c h h i s t o r i c a l p r i m a r y and s e c o n d a r y s o u r c e s f o r t h e s e men s a i d a b o u t t h e o p e r a t i o n a l leuel of

e v i d e n c e o f what

w a r a n d how t h e y a c t u a l l y c o n d u c t e d t h e i r c a m p a i g n s . case o f Gudorian t h e f o c u s Campaign o f Russian 1939;

In t h e

i s on t h r e e campaigns:

the Polish 134Bi and t h e

F l a n d e r s ( h r d e n n e s ) Carnpaign o f 1341. For Patton, 1942:

(BARBAROSSAI C a m p a i g n u f

the thesis
1943: and

examines h i s N o r t h H f r i c a n Campaign of Northwest Europe, 1944-45. So,

Sicily,

i n order,

C h a p t e r s 2 a n d 3 SeCK

t u answer s u c c i n c t l y t h e q u e s t i o n :

What w e r e t h e o p e r a t i o n a l II? h i r d , T Chapter 4 if

t e n e t s o f G u d e r i a n a n d P a t t o n i n W o r l d War

P u r s u e s t h e n e x t l o g i c a l s t e p b y a s c e r t a i n i n g what t e n e t s , any, w e r e common t o t h e o p e r a t i o n a l r n e t h o d s o f t h e s e t w o i n Chapter 4

c o m m a n d e r s . What s h o u l d f a l l o u t

i s an a n s w e r t o

t h e p r i m a r y q u e s t i o n t h i s t h e s i s SeeKS t o a n s w e r . howeuer,

In addition,

C h a p t e r 4 t r i e s t o . answer t h e f u r t h e r r e l e u a n t

question f o r contemporary s o l d i e r s : s e t of

What d o e s

i t a l l moan? fl
a r t suggests

common o p e r a t i o n a l t e n e t s f o r o p e r a t i o n a l

t h a t such t e n e t s apply t o fiirland battlefield

if

B a t t l e D o c t r i n e on a f u t u r e

historical

e x p e r i e n c e s a r e any u s e f u l g u i d e t o

f u t u r e experiences. implications f o r a stab

C h a p t e r 4 a t t e m p t s t o J K e t c h o u t some battlefield. Even

o p e r a t i o n a l a r t on a f u t u r e

i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n may h e l p f u t u r e cornmanders a n d s t a f f

officers

c o p e w i t h t h e UnKnown a n d d o c t r i n e w r i t e r s t o d e v e l o p
f i g h t i n g a f u t u r e war.

new c o n c e p t s f o r

10

EMNOTES

I H e r s I am t h i n K i n g o f

the

lnchon Landing

in p a r t i c u l a r .

2 See Edward N. L u t t w a K , "The O p e r a t i o n a l L e v e l o f War." I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y , V o 1 . 5 , N o . 3 ( W i n t e r 198Ei) f o r a f u l l e r d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l o f war.

3 U . S . D e p a r t m e n t n f t h e A r m y , O p e r a t i o n s , F i e l d Manual 100-5 < W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . : U . S . Governrnent P r i n t i n g O f f i c e 1 9 8 2 ) , P P . 2-3.

I

11

CHFIPTER 2 : GENERFIL HEINZ GUDERIFIN

,....

PFIRT 18 The Man

E v e n when h e was a y o u n g m a j o r ,

Heinz Guderian's soldiers The r e a s o n f o r

a f f e c t i o n a t e l y c a l l e d him " H u r r y i n g H e i n z . " a p p e l l a t i o n and i t s appropriateness w i l l

this

becorne e v i d e n t as t h i s

chapter on t h e o p e r a t i o n a l t e n e t s o f General Heinz Guderian unfolds. The s t o r y b e h i n d t h e n i c l t n a m e , houeuer, anticipates

t h e h e a r t o f t h e argument c o n c e r n i n g G u d e r i a n ' s p r i n c i p l e s o f operational art, w h i c h a r e d e u e l o p e d i n t h i s c h a p t e r by

' 5

e x a m i n i n g Guder i a n which focuses

operat ions through a prism o f analysis f i v e broad categories: a c t ion, (1)

on t h e f o l l o w i n g

combined arms o p e r a t i o n s , (4) comrnand a n d c o n t r o l ,

(2) offensive

(3) momentum,

and (S) r i s K .

The g e n e r a l a p p r o a c h i s operations
in

t o examine Guderian's the

w r i t i n g s and h i s c o n d u c t o f

1939 P o l i s h ,

1940 F l a n d e r s ,

and

1941 R u s s i a n Campaigns,

and

d e r i v e some s u b s t a n t i u e c o n c l u s i o n s a b o u t t h e b a s i s f o r Guderian's conduct o f operational a r t . The c h a p t e r c o n c l u d e s b y But

summarizing t h e p r i n c i p l e s derived from t h e analysis. b e f o r e launching i n t o t h e substance of methods,

Gudsr i a n ' s o p e r a t i o n a l t h e man who

a brief
' 5

c h a r a c t e r and bacK9round SKetch of

was Germany

l e a d i n g p r o p o n e n t a n d commander o f

armored f o r c e s

i n W o r l d War

I 1 is in order.
H e i n z W i l h e l m G u d e r i a n Mas t h e s o n

B o r n a t K u l m i n 1989,

12

of

a German A r m y o f f i c e r

who t r a c e d h i s a n c e s t r y b a c K t o a He a t t e n d e d b o t h t h e

thoroughly Prussian,

landed g e n t r y .

Karlsruhe cadet school school near B e r l i n ,

i n Baden and t h e G r o s s - L i c h t e r f e l d e

graduating from the l a t t e r Metz,

i n 1307. f l f t e r

a t t e n d a n c e a t t h e War S c h o o l a

h e was c o m m i s s i o n e d a
infantry b a t t a l i o n

s e c o n d l i e u t e n a n t a n d a s s i g n e d t o an Hannover. BY i n t e r - w a r

in

standards t h e progress o f Guderian's career and t h e n h i s r i s e

was o r d i n a r y u n t i l H i t l e r ' s r i s e t o p o w e r ,

was q u i c K . Guder i a n In 1912,

'5

But even

if ordinary

i n i t s e a r l y p r o m o t i o n pace,
i t s d iuers i t y o f

c a r e e r was u n u s u a l f o r example,

assignments.

for

he s e r v e d w i t h t h e 3 r d Telegraph

B a t t a l i o n w h e r e h e became a c q u a i n t e d w i t h t h e l a t e s t w i r e l e s s r a d i o technology War and its tactical applications. D u r i n g World

I he s e r v e d s u c c a s s i v e l y as a s i g n a l s s t a f + o f f i c e r ,
b a t t a l i o n commander, quartermaster

General S t a f f o f f i c e r , officer,

and o p e r a t i o n s o f f i c e r w i t h a u a r i e t v o f u n i t s f r o m Between t h e w o r l d taught

company a n d b a t t a l i o n t o d i v i s i o n a n d c o r p s .

wars Guder i a n c o m a n d e d a m o t o r t r a n s p o r t b a t t a l i o n ,

m o t o r t r a n s p o r t d o c t r i n e a n d t a c t i c s a t t h e B e r l i n War ficademy, a n d a s a c o l o n e l commanded t h e 2 n d P a n z e r O i u i s i o n ThanKs t o H i t l e r , b y

1938 G u d e r i a n uas a G e n e r a l o f

i n 1935. Panzer

Troops and had p l a y e d a l e a d i n g r o l e

A u s t r i a and t h e S u d e t e n l a n d .

in t h e occupation of

D u r i n g W o r l d War carry out operations

I 1 Guderian had t h e unique o p p o r t u n i t y t o

i n accordance w i t h d o c t r i n e he h e l p e d

13

develop

i n t h e pre-war

years.

In e f f e c t , h e t u r n e d t h e o r y i n t o Poland,

practice by p a r t ic i p a t i n s in t h r e e major campaigns--in

F l a n d e r s , and Russia--and s e r u e d in t h o s e campaigns

r e s p e c t i u e l v as an army c o r p s , p a n z e r g r o u p , and p a n z e r army commander. In s p i t e of g r e a t successes

in all t h r e e campaigns,
in

H i t l e r r e l i a v e d G u d e r i a n o f command of h i s p a n z e r a r m y

Decerrber 1 9 4 1 f o r f a i l i n g t o f o l l o w o r d e r s t o h o l d f o r w a r d
p o s i t i o n s o u t s i d e o f Moscow a t a 1 1 c o s t s .

< 1>

B r o u g h t bacK on
of

a c t i v e s e r v i c e i n M a r c h 1 3 4 3 as I n s p e c t o r - G e n e r a l F o r c e s , G u d e r i a n was
appointed

Armored

Chief of t h e Army General Staff in July

t h e day after t h e attempted a s s a s s i n a t i o n of H i t l e r

1 9 4 4 . He s e r v e d a s C h i e f o f t h e Army G e n e r a l S t a f f u n t i l M a r c h 1 9 4 5 when H i t l e r a g a i n d i s m i s s e d h i m . H e was c a p t u r e d b y A m e r i c a n f o r c e s i n May and d i e d

As

1945, h e l d

i n c a p t i v i t y u n t i l June

1948,

in

1954.

i m p r e s s i v e a s t h e s e f e w p a r a g r a p h s maKe G u d e r i a n ' s

career o u t t o b e , t h e y h a r d l y d o j u s t i c e t o t h e m a n ' s f u l l
c h a r a c t e r , p e r s o n a l i t y , and experiences. Guderian himself, f o r e x a m p l e , s h e d s s o m e l i g h t o n h i s own booK P a n z e r L e a d e r . assignment with t h e
WOPKS

intellectual

l i f e in h i s

There he p o i n t s out t h a t while on staff

fwmv T r a n s p o r t Department he s t u d i e d t h e
L i d d e l l Hart, and G i f f a r d Martel. ideas f o r t h e u s e of

o f J.F.C.

F u l l e r , B.H.

Paying special a t t e n t i o n t o L i d d e l l Hart's armored f o r c e s f o r long-range Of c o m n i c a t i o n ,

of

stroKes, operat ions against 1Ines

a n d a r m o r e d d i u Is i o n o r g a n i z a t i o n s c o n s i s t i n g u n i t s . < 2 > While a s s i g n e d t o t h e

Panzer and panzer-grenadier

14

Staff

o f t h e 2nd D i v i s i o n a t S t e t t i n concentrat in9 his

i n 1924,

he t a u g h t
'5

history

and t a c t i c s ,

i n s t r u c t i o n on Napoleon

1806

Campaign and t h e h i s t o r y o f operations of 1914.

German and F r e n c h c a v a l r y t o p i c he sass, "as r e g a r d s

it

O f t h e former

t h e command o f very

troops

in conditions o f mobile warfare

is...a

i n s t r u c t i u e c a m p a i g n . "(3) S t u d i e s o f o r e r a t ions proved valuable,

German a n d F r e n c h because t h e y a i d e d

cavalry

he says,

development o f h i s t h e o r i e s , increasingly of preoccupied

" w h i c h were becoming e v e r use

w i t h t h e t a c t i c a l and o p e r a t i o n a l
in a footnote

mouement."(4>

It

i s noteworthy t h a t

i n Panzer
I'

L e a d e r - - p u b 1 i s h e d i n 1952--Guder i a n d e f i n e s
l y i n g midway

"operational

as

between t h e t a c t i c a l and s t r a t e g i c . ( S >

The p o i n t

of

these observations thought

i s t h a t G u d e r i a n was a man who e d u c a t e d and h a d t h e doctrine for the

himself,

hard about h i s profession.

i n t e l l e c t u a l d e p t h and b r e a d t h t o shape f u t u r e German Arms, art.

i n c l u d i n g c o n c e p t s and t e c h n o l o g i e s

in operational
him:

H i s b i o g r a p h e r K e n n e t h MacKsey s a y s t h i s o f

G u d e r i a n was t h a t r a r e c o m b i n a t i o n o f a man o f i d e a s e q u i p p e d w i t h t h e a b i l i t y and v e r v e t o t u r n i n s p i r a t i o n i n t o r e a l i t y . No o t h e r g e n e r a l i n t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r - - a n d few i n h i s t o r y - - m a n a g e d t o i m p r e s s so w i d e and i n t r i n s i c a change upon t h e m i l i t a r y a r t i n s o s h o r t a t i m e , and l e f t s u c h a t r a i l o f c o n t r o v e r s y i n h i s WaKe. < 6 >

Hau i n g n e v e r e x e r c i s e d

i n d e p e n d e n t command, Lord Wauell's MacKsey

' 5

Guder i a n f a i l s t o for the

m e a s u r e UP t o F i e l d - M a r s h a l g r e a t commanders

standards

in history.

judgment,

nevertheless,

i s t h a t G u d e r i a n ' s t a c t i c a l and o p e r a t i o n a l

acumen a n d

15

i n s p i r i n g combat l e a d e r s h i p p l a c e h i m on a p a r w i t h t h e G r e a t Captains of h i s t o r y . < 7 > Whether h e was o n a p a r w i t h t h e G r e a t H e i n r G u d e r i a n ' s l i f e d e s t r o y s t h e myth o f t h e

Captains o r n o t ,

d i c h o t o m y b e t w e e n t h e t h i n K i n g man and t h e f i g h t i n g man. campaigns i n Poland, Flanders, and R u s s i a show,

Fls h i s

he was b o t h

t h i n K e r and f i g h t e r .

16

PART I I :

Operational

Tenets

C O M B I M O ARMS OPERATIONS

One o f career

t h e supremely

i r o n i c t w i s t s of in

Heinz Guderian's

has t o be h i s assignment t h e Truppenarnt

1327 t o t h e T r a n s p o r t C l a i m i n g he he auoided
it

Department of

i n t h e War M i n i s t r y .
matters o r wished t o ,

Knew n o t h i n g a b o u t t r a n s p o r t t h e a s s i g n m e n t UP t o t h e w i t h an a i r of spent

l a s t moment a n d f i n a l l y Yet

accepted

terminal resignation.

i t was t h e t w o y e a r 5 of troop

i n t h i s assignment

investigating the feasibility

t r a n s p o r t a t i o n by doctrinal

l o r r y t h a t allowed Guderian t o develop the operational art and t h e

base f o r h i s c o n c e p t i o n of

combined arms o r g a n i z a t i o n s w i t h w h i c h t o c o n d u c t o p e r a t i o n s . Once c o m m i t t e d t o t h e t a s K , f i n d on m o t o r i z e d w a r f a r e , Martel, and F u l l e r . < 8 > of

he r e a d a l l

the

l i t e r a t u r e he c o u l d

i n c l u d i n g a r t i c l e s by L i d d e l l Hart, he s t u d i e d c a r e f u l l y t h e Carnbrai

In addition,

errployment

tanKs a t t h e B a t t l e of

i n W o r l d War

I and

t h e e a r l y use o f c a v a l r y

i n t h a t same w a r .

Because o f h i s d e p t h Guderian t h e invited t o

o f Knowledge on t h e s u b j e c t o f s t u d e n t became G u d e r i a n t h e

rnotorized warfare,

i n s t r u c t o r when h e was

l e c t u r e on armored and m o t o r i z e d w a r f a r e on t h e M o t o r T r a n s p o r t Staff o f t h e B e r l i n War Academy.

So,

h i s assignment

t o the

1 7

T r a n s p o r t D e p a r t m e n t of Guderian

t h e Truppenamt

unexpectedly helped

i n a t l e a s t t w o ways.

First,

it forced h i m t o
use of armored

u n d e r s t a n d t h e h i s t o r i c a l and t h e n c o n t e m p o r a r y and rnotor i z e d f o r c e s , firmys thereby

rnaK i n s h i m b y d e f a u l t t h e German Second, h i s teaching duties

e x p e r t on t h e s u b j e c t .

required h i m t o conceive,

develop,

and t e a c h a r m o r e d and war. Unsurprisingly, who e n v i s i o n e d

motorized warfare doctrine f o r g i v e n h i s s t u d y of future forces,

a future

L i d d e l l H a r t and F u l l e r , fast-moving

in

wars t h e c l a s h o f

m e c h a n i z e d and a r m o r e d

Guder i a n 5 o p e r a t i o n a l d o c t r i n e c a l l e d f o r c o m b i n e d cooperation o f the a i r forces. the This,

arms o p e r a t i o n s and clo:e

in turn.

called for

a c o m b i n e d arms o r g a n i z a t i o n ,

c e n t e r p i e c e of

w h i c h l ~ o u l db e t h e t a n K .

13s e a r l y as 1 9 2 3 G u d e r i a n was c o n v i n c e d t a n K s o n t h e i r own

or

merely

i n conjunction w i t h

i n f a n t r y could never achieve

On t h i s t o p i c

decisive tactical or operational results. P a n z e r L e a d e r h e say::

in

MY h i s t o r i c a l s t u d i e s , t h e exet-c i s e s c a r r i e d o u t i n E n g l a n d a n d o u r own e x p e r i e n c e s w i t h mOCK-ups h a d p e r s u a d e d me t h a t t a n K S w o u l d never be able t o produce t h e i r f u l l e f f e c t u n t i l o t h e r w e a p o n s o h whose s u p p o r t t h e y m u s t i n e v i t a b l y r e l y w e r e b r o u g h t up t o t h e i r s t a n d a r d s o f speed and c r o s s - c o u n t r y p e r f o r m a n c e . (3)

Here,

o f course,

Guderians p o i n t

i s t h e need f o r

equal

m o b i l i t y among t h e v a r i o u s a r m s . rnobil i t y d i f f e r e n t i a l s

He saw v e r y e a r l y t h a t

would c r e a t e seuere problems f o r t h e fast-moving

e f f e c t i v e conduct o f operations on a f l u i d ,

18

battlefield.

A more

irnportant p o i n t t o g r a s p , howeuer,

is

G u d e r i a n ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p among t h e u a r i o u s

arms o n t h e b a t t l e f i e l d h e e n u i s i o n e d .
he says:

In a f o l l o w i n g p a s s a g e

I t would b e wrong t o i n c l u d e t a n K s i n i n f a n t r y d i u i s i o n s : w h a t was n e e d e d were a r w u r e d d i v i s i o n s which would i n c l u d e a l l t h e s u p p o r t i n g arms n e e d e d t o a l l o w t h e t a n K s t o f i g h t with f u l l e f f e c t . < l 0 >

U n l i K S t h e F r e n c h , who a s l a t e as May

1340 e r n p l o y e d tanKs b y

P a r c e l i n g them o u t t o

infantry divisions

in b a t t a l ion-sized

s t r e n g t h , G u d e r i a n t h o u g h t arrnored u n i t s s h o u l d b e t h e
c e n t e r p i e c e a r o u n d wh l c h c o m b i n e d arms o r g a n i z a t i o n s s h o u l d b e

built.

Large c o n c e n t r a t ions of tanKS, w i t h t h e i r f i r e p o w e r ,

rnobil i t y , a n d a r m o r p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t s m a l l

arms f i r e , s h o u l d

be used t o p e n e t r a t e t a c t i c a l d e f e n s e s and s p e a r h e a d r a p i d l y i n t o O p e r a t i o n a l d e p t h s of .job l i e s i n a n rapid aduance. enerny d e f e n s e s . Then

"the

infantry

' 5

i m m e d i a t e e x p l o i t a t i o n o f t h e tanK attaCK by a Nor d o e s t h e f o o t s o l d i e r p a u s e u n t i l

t h e ground

s e i z e d b y t h e t a n K S is d e f i n i t e l y c l e a r e d o f t h e e n e m v . " < l l > The a r t i l l e r y ' s r o l e

is t o f i r e a s h o r t , c o n c e n t r a t e d

p r e p a r a t i o n t o d i s o r g a n i z e enemy d e f e n s e s a t t h e po i n t of penetration. ~ i n d s f o B u t t o d o a l l t h i s , G u d e r i a n saw t h e n e e d f o r t w o rnechan i z e d r e c o n n a i s s a n c e

c o m b i n e d arms o r g a n i z a t i o n :

f o r c e s a n d a r m o r e d cornbat f o r c e s . To e n s u r e t h e t l m e l y r e c e i p t o f combat
tactical and o p e r a t i o n a l

information from ground u n i t s , Guderian foresaw t h e need

f o r a n d e m p l o y e d m e c h a n i z e d r e c o n n a i s s a n c e u n i t s w h i c h were

19

f l e x i b l e , mobile,

and e a s i l y c o n t r o l l e d .

In a d d i t i o n , s u c h

u n i t s h a d t o h a v e a wide r a d i u s of o p e r a t i o n and good r a d i o

communications t o report inforrnat ion about enemy un its.

T h e r e f o r e , e v e r y p a n z e r and p a n z e r - g r e n a d i e r d i v i s ion had an o r g a n i c armored o r motorized reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n equipped

w i t h ' J e h i C l e s c a p a b l e of

m a x i m u m s p e e d s of 4 0 m i l e s p e r h o u r on
1 2 0 a n d 200

unimproved r o a d s and a r a d i u s o f a c t i o n between miles.

< 12>

M o r e o v e r , r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t s u c h r e c o n n a i s s a n c e un i t s

ma:,

h a v e t o f i g h t o n c e i n c o n t a c t w i t h t h e enemy, G u d e r i a n

envisioned t h e requirement a t times f o r reconnaissance b a t t a l ions t o be r e i n f o r c e d with engineers, motorized a n d h e a v y arms.

infantry,

< 13)

W i t h s o m e m i n o r mod i f i c a t i o n s , t h e a r m o r e d 1940 c o n s i s t e d of

and rnotor i r e d r e c o n n a i s s a n c e b a t t a l i o n s of
5

i x cornpan i e s : H e a d q u a r t e r s ,

FIrmorrd C a r , A r m o r e d Heavy Weapons,

Reconnaissance,

L i g h t flrmored R e c o n n a i s s a n c e ,

a n d S U P P L Y .I n a d d i t i o n t o a 7 5 - m m

( S P ) G u n P l a t o o n a n d 81-mm

M o r t a r P l a t o o n , t h e H e a v y W e a p o n s Company h a d a n o r g a n i c engineer p l a t o o n of 5 1 men. Altogether, t h e Reconnaissance

B a t t a l i o n was a f o r m i d a b l e a s s e t a t a d i v i s i o n c o m m a n d e r ' s d i s p o s a l , c o n s i s t i n g of motorcycles, 1 3 3 w h e e l e d o r t r a c K e d u e h i c l e s , 22

a n d 342 r n e n . < l 4 > N o t o n l y c o u l d s u c h a u n i t b e

it

employed t o f i n d WeaKnesseS i n e n e m y t a c t i c a l d e f e n s e s , b u t

c o u l d p e n e t r a t e t o o p e r a t i o n a l d e p t h s t o l o c a t e enemy r e s e r v e s and open r o u t e s f o r a d v a n c i n g f r i e n d l y f o r c e s . When n e c e s s a r y ,

Guderian thought, a reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n could a l s o

participate

i n a p u r s u i t , cover a withdrawal,

screen o r protect

20

a f l a n K o r t h e r e a r of

its parent u n i t . < l S > B u t here

it

is

u s e f u l t o remember t h a t a l l o f t h e s e p o t . e n t i a 1 m i s s i o n s o f t h e r e c o n n a i s s a n c e b a t t a l i o n were d i r e c t e d t o w a r d o n e e n d : f a c i l I t a t i n g t h e o p e r a t i o n s o f armored combat f o r c e s , t h e s e c o n d t y p e o f m e c h a n i z e d arm. flccording t o Guderian, armored combat f o r c e s have t h e

mission t o d e l i u e r s u r p r i s e attacKs in c o n c e n t r a t e d s t r e n g t h
with

a view t o g a i n i n g o p e r a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n . < l 6 > For s u c h

f o r c e s t o be e f f e c t i u e , Guderian b e l i e u e d d i u i s i o n - l e u e l c o m b i n e d arms o r g a n i z a t i o n s b u i l t a r o u n d t h e t a n K were n e c e s s a r y . H e saw a r e q u i r e m e n t f o r t w o t y p e s : p a n z e r

d i u i s Ion:.

(armored)

and panzer-grenadier
in

(motor ized

infantry

>

d i u is i o n s .

Panzer d i v i s i o n s

1340 were c o m p o s e d o f

a t a n K b r i g a d e o f two

r e g i m e n t s o f t w o b a t t a l i o n s e a c h , t o t a l I i n g s o m e 400 1 i g h t a n d
rned i u m t a n K s , and a p a n z e r - g r e n a d i e r b r i g a d e o f t h r e e i n f a n t r y infantry

b a t t a l i o n s . < l 7 > These P r i m a r y t a n K and motorized

t h r u s t i n g f o r c e s were s u p p o r t e d by a n a r m r e d r e c o n n a i s s a n c e battalion, signal battalion, b a t t a l ion, a n t i-tanK a r t i l l e r y regiment, anti-aircraft

b a t t a l i o n , e n g i n e e r b a t t a l i o n , and

d i u is i o n s u p p o r t u n i t s
fl

(See C h a r t

>. 1 8 > <

in

glance at Chart

I reflects a f a i r l y comprehensiue, euen

sophisticated,
1940.

c o m b i n e d arms o r g a n i z a t i o n i n t h e G e r m a n A r m y

I t a l s o reflects a seriousness about t h e requirement t o

i n t e g r a t e arms t o a c h i e v e d e s i r e d r e s u l t s i n c o m b a t . What C h a r t

1 d o e s n o t s h o w is t h a t G e r m a n A r m y u n i t s were o r g a n i z e d s o t h a t arms were i n t e g r a t e d at a l e u e l of Organization even lower

21

than division.

Armored p a n z e r - g r e n a d i e r

regiments,

for

example,

w e r e o r g a n i z e d w i t h b o t h an a r m o r e d and r n o t o r i z e d
panzer-grenadier battalion. In addition, the resimental

commander h a d u n d e r h i s and a heavy 75-mm infantry

i r m e d i a t e comrnand an e n g i n e e r company

h o w i t z e r company c o n s i s t i n g o f t w e l v e 150-mrn

(SP)

h G w i t Z e P S and s i x

(SP)

howitzers,

an a m a z i n g

a r r a y of

potent la1 f irepower.

hlthough Chart organization,

I s u g g e s t s a w e l l - i n t e g r a t e d c o m b i n e d arms
5

i t does n o t r e f l e c t t h e panzer d i v i s i o n
potential. A summary

mobility or firepower found

o f t h e m a i n weapons

in t h e panzer d i v i s i o n suggests

i t was b o t h h i g h l y m o b i l e

and f o r m i d a b l y e q u i p p e d t o c o n d u c t c o m b i n e d arms c o m b a t w h i l e o n t h e move. UnliKe a standard infantry diuision, p a n z e r and

Panzer-grenadier were, therefore,

d i v i s i o n s h a d n o h o r s e - d r a w n v e h i c l e s and e n t i r e l y wheel o r tracK-mobile,

their various

u n i t s emjoying roughly comparable m o b i l i t y . t-econna i s s a n c e not,

Wheeled

motorized infantry,

and d i u i s i o n s e r v i c e s d i d m o b i l i t y mechanized t h e r e were

o f course,

enjoy the cross-country

u n i t s and armored b a t t a l i o n s d i d , not great disparities

b u t nonetheless,

i n mob il i t y among t h e s u b o r d i n a t @ diuisions.

e l e m e n t s o f p a n z a r and p a n z e r - g r e n a d i e r d i v i s i o n was a s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t usually f i e l d 75-mm, o v e r 300 t a n K s ,

The p a n z e r

combat o r g a n i z a t i o n w h i c h c o u l d

72 g u n s o v e r 75-mm,

72 g u n s u n d a r

a n d some 3000 m o t o r v e h i c l e s .

< 19)

The p a n z e r - g r e n a d i e r

d i v i s i o n was s i m i l a r l y o r g a n i z e d w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n t h a t o n l y o n e b a t t a l i o n o f 48 t a n K S a n d

it had

12 f e w e r a r t i l l e r y p i e c e s b y

22

T a b 1 e o f O r g a n i z a t i o n . ( 2 0>
fl

final Point worth mentioning

i s t h a t t h e s e combat support to In a p a n z e r

d i v i s i o n s enjoyed a r e l a t i v e l y h i g h combat/combat combat s e r v i c e s u p p o r t , or d i u is i o n , f o r infantrymen, "tooth-to-tail

," r a t i o .

i n s t a n c e , 2 7 % o f a s s i g n e d p e r s o n n e l were
a n d 2 4 . 7 % were t a n K e r s . W i t h e n g i n e e r , a r t i l l e r y , a n d r e c o n n a i s s a n c e e l e m e n t s a d d e d , 36.2% o f in combat/combat support

signal, anti-tanK,
t h e d i v is i o n
'5

s t r e n g t h was e n g a g e d
13.8% o f

a c t i v i t i e s while only

a s s i g n e d p e r s o n n e l were

P e r f o r m i n g c o m b a t s e r u i c e S u p p o r t f u n c t i o n s . ( 2 1 > BY c o m p a r i s o n ,
the

"tooth-to-tail''

r a t i o in American u n i t s

in

1 3 4 5 was 83.6%

t o

16.4%, r e f l e c t i n g o n l y s l i g h t l y m o r e t a i 1 . < 2 2 > ( T o d a y a n

Arner i c a n J - S e r i e s a r m o r e d d i u is i o n h a s a c o m p a r a b l e

combat/combat

support t o combat s e r u i c e s u p p o r t r a t i o of

a p p r o x i m a t e l y 7 0 . 5 % t o 29.5%, r e f l e c t i n s c o n s i d e r a b l y m o r e t a i l t h a n e i t h e r German o r A m e r i c a n a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s i n W o r l d War II.

)

<23>

Predictably,

Guderian d i d not e n v i s i o n t h e employment of

p a n z e r a n d p a n z e r - g r e n a d i e r d i u is i o n s i n s i n g l e d i u is i o n - 5 i z e

u n i t s . R a t h e r , h e a d v o c a t e d e m p l o y i n g s u c h d i u is i o n s i n
c o n c e n t r a t e d s t r e n g t h s of c o r p s a n d m u l t i p l e - c o r p s

o r army-size

tin i t s . H e r e c o g n i z e d t h a t m o b i l e o p e r a t i o n s i n u o l v i n g a t t a C K 5

t o o p e r a t i o n a l d e p t h s would r e q u i r e a great d e a l of

combat

power c o n s i s t i n g o f d i u is i o n s w h i c h c o u l d c o m p l e m e n t e a c h other: p a n z e r d i u is i o n s f o r

penetrations and deep t h r u s t s , and

motorized d i v i s i o n s f o r flanK security, holding terrain, and

23

p r o v i d i n g depth. formation formed of

Consequently,

he argued f o r t h e e a r l y t h e f i r s t of w h i c h was

corps-size

armored f o r c e s ,

in October

1935 a n d c o n s i s t e d o f t h r e e p a n z e r
a s X V I FIrmv C o r p s

diuisions.<24: Commander,

I n March 1938 G u d e r i a n ,

participated lst,

i n the occupation o f 2nd,

fiustria w i t h a

c o r p s composed o f SS-Le i b s t a n d a r t e October,

and 3 r d P a n z e r D i u i s i o n s and t h e

Infantry

Regiment

L a t e r t h a t year,

in

h e e n t e r e d t h e S u d e t e n l a n d w i t h a more f l e x i b l y C o r p s c o n s i s t i n g o f one p a n z e r a n d t w o Throughout these minor p r e l iminary i d e a s about t h e employment

c o m p o s e d X V I firmy

motorized diuisions. operat ions,

of

G u d e r i a n was t e s t i n g h i s

corps-size

armored and m o t o r i z e d f o r m a t i o n s

in preparation

f o r t h e r e a l t e j t h e b e l i e v e d s o o n w o u l d come. E a r l y p r o b l e m s
i n tanK maintenance, fuel supply, By and t r a f f i c management w e r e 1 9 3 3 G u d e r i a n was a n

i d e n t i f i e d and c o r r e c t e d . experienced commander

t r y

I September

o f c o r p s - s i z e armored and m o t o r i z e d
ideas

forces ready t o

out h i s

i n cornbat.
headquarters, when t h e

Because t h e c o r p s u a s p r i m a r i l y a t a c t i c a l

i t was e a s y t o t a s K o r g a n i z e a c o r p s f o r c o m b a t a n d ,
s i t u a t i o n required,

change t h a t o r g a n i z a t i o n b y a t t a c h i n s o r

d e t a c h i n g d i u i s i o n s and s e p a r a t e b r i g a d e s o r r e g i m e n t s operations i n Poland

in

. Our

ing

1339 and

in France

in

1340,

Guderian tasK

U a r i o u s l y commanded a r m y c o r p s a n d a p a n z e r g r o u p , organized f o r beginning o f one p a n z e r t h e p a r t i c u l a r o p e r a t i o n a t hand.

fit t h e

t h e P o l i s h Campaign h i s army c o r p s c o n s i s t e d o f I n a subsequent phase

and t w o m o t o r i z e d d i u i s i o n s .

24

of

t h a t same c a r n p a i g n h i s c o r p s ' c o m p o s i t i o n was c h a n g e d t o one

m o t o r i z e d and two p a n z e r d i u i s i o n s . ( 2 5 ) F o r t h e o p e n i n g phase of t h e campaign i n F l a n d e r s i n May

1948, h i s a r m y c o r p s

consisted of

t h r e e panzer d i u i s i o n s and t h e e l i t e (G-D), left which flanK

Infantry

Regiment Gross-Deutschland

i n i t i a l l y had t h e a n d l a t e r became t h e

rfiission t o P r o t e c t t h e c o r p s ' corps reserue.

S i n c e t h e p a n z e r g r o u p was s u b o r d i n a t e t o a n a r m y , was p r i m a r i l y a t a c t i c a l h e a d q u a r t e r s taSK o r g a n i z e d f o r

it t o o
a

P a r t i c u l a r o p e r a t i o n o r phase of

an o p e r a t i o n and d i s s o l v e d

when n o t n e e d e d . < 2 6 > D u r i n g t h e s e c o n d p h a s e o f t h e c a m p a i g n France, corps, the G u d e r i a n commanded a p a n z e r g r o u p c o n s i s t i n g o f e a c h w i t h t w o p a n z e r and one m o t o r i z e d d i u i s i o n s . two For

in

i n i t i a l phase of

t h e R u s s i a n Campaign G u d e r i a n ' s Panzer an army c o r p s , an and

G r o u p 2 was c o m p o s e d o f t h r e e p a n z e r c o r p s ,
arm!,

troops,

i n c l u d i n g a wing o f c l o s e support planes, r e giment

independent a n t i - a i r c r a f t signal, and a i r

a n d a r t iI l e r y

ens i n e e r s , tasK

reconnaissance u n i t s . < 2 7 > Guderian's this f i r s t phase--crossing

organization for

t h e Bug R i u e r a n d t h a t h e was infantry

s e i z i n g t h e f o r t r e s s c i t y of not the

Brest-LitousK--reueals

l e a s t b i t h e s i t a n t t o s u b o r d i n a t e slow-mouing

d i u i s i o n s t o a panzer c o r p s s h o u l d t h e o p e r a t i o n r e q u i r e such an o r g a n z i a t i o n f o r group's attacK combat. The r i g h t w i n g o f h i s p a n z e r f o r example, was c a r r i e d o u t b y one

i n t o Russia,

X X I V Panzer Corps,

w h i c h c o n s i s t e d of

two panzer d i u i s i o n s , and one infantry

motorized diuision,

one c a v a l r y d i u i s i o n ,

25

d i'J i o n is

( S e e Map

1)

The

infantry

inJ

i s ion secured crossing

t h e panzer

s i t e s o n t h e Bug R i v e r a n d a s s i s t e d t h e c r o s s i n g o f diuisions.

The c a v a l r y d i u i s i o n e x e c u t e d a s c r e e n i n g m i s s i o n

a l o n g t h e edge o f t h e P r i p e t Marshes on t h e p a n z e r g r o u p ' s r i g h t flanK. d iu i s ions, of X I 1 Army Corps, composed o f t w o infantry

attacKed t h e f o r t r e s s of

Brest -LitousK

in the center

Second Panzer G r o u p ' s zone of i n i t i a l phase.

On t h e

a t t a C K and was d e t a c h e d a f t e r
wing

this

left

Guderian employed X L V I I one infantry, one

Panzer Corps, motorized, infantry

w h i c h was c o m p o s e d o f

and t w o p a n z e r d i u i s i o n s .

Again.

the foot-mobile

d i u i s i o n ' s m i s s i o n was t o a s s i s t t h e c r o s s i n g o f t h e Panzer Group Reserue c o n s i s t e d o f

panzer d i v i s i o n s .

XLVI

Panzer and

C o r p s w i t h one p a n z e r d i u i s i o n ,

one m o t o r i z e d d i u i s i o n , about one-fourth of

I n f a n t r y Regiment Gross-Deutschland, Guderian'r mobile forces.<28> fill of

the foregoing obseruations point t o the conclusion

t h a t Guderian p r a c t i c e d abstract, namely, that

i n combat what h e t h o u g h t
armored f o r c e s

in the
in

s h o u l d be employed 1)

concentrations.

H i s main attacr:

( S e e Map

i n t h e opening no l e s s t h a n

phase o f t h e Russian Campaign--the two panzer d i v i s i o n s ,

l e f t wing--had

which were themselves s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t

Similarly, h i s primary supporting

c o m b i n e d arms o r g a n i z a t i o n s . attacK--the support,

r i g h t wing--also

h a d tido p a n z e r d i u i s i o n s . diuision for

In

e a c h w i n g h a d an

infantry

t h e p u r p o s e of

s e i z i n g c r o s s i n g s i t e s and p a s s i n g t h e more m o b i l e f o r c e s through, w h i l e t h e c e n t e r c o r p s war. t a s K o r g a n i z e d f o r t h e

26

Chart 2

26a

slower paced o p e r a t i o n s Brest-LitousK.

i n and a r o u n d t h e b u i l t - u p

area of

F i n a l I Ya c a v a l r y d i v i s i o n p r o t e c t e d t h e ,
w h i l e t h e Panzer Group Reserve

Panzer G r o u p ' s r i g h t f l a n K , followed the l e f t wing, Thus,

w h i c h G u d e r i a n recKoned h i s most from division--the group, smallest

vulnerable flanK. self-sufficient

organ izat ion--to

Guder ian c o n d u c t e d

o p e r a t i o n a l a r t w i t h d i u i s i o n s t h a t Were s e l f - c o n t a i n e d c o m b i n e d arms o r g a n i z a t i o n s . and g r o u p s f o r requirements. Moreover, he tasK o r g a n i z e d c o r p s

combat based o n t h e t e r r a i n and s p e c i f i c m i r s i o n H i s erreloyment o f infantry diuisions f o r the for he d i d

i n i t i a l p h a s e o f t h e R u s s i a n C a m p a i g n was u n u s u a l , n o t employ s u c h d i u i s i o n s f o r
i n May

h i s c r o s s i n g s o f t h e Meuse R i v e r
in July 1941. f i n d a s we s h a l l

1940 o r t h e D n e i p e r R i v e r

see,

t h e h i g h tempo o f

h i s o p e r a t i o n s g e n e r a l l y weighed h e a v i l y infantry diuisions.

a g a i n s t h i s use of

foot-mobile

If we r e g a r d t h e p a n z e r a n d p a n z e r - g r r n a d i e r d i u i s i o n s a s

t h e b a s i c c o m b i n e d arms o r g a n i z a t i o n s Guder i a n u s e d t o f l s x i b l y o r g a n i z e c o r p s and p a n z e r g r o u p s f o r combat, we t h e n h a v e o n l y

p a r t o f G u d e r i a n ' s t o t a l c o n c e p t i o n o f c o m b i n e d arms operations. To g e t a m o r e c o m p l e t e a n d a c c u r a t e p i c t u r e , we

need t o examine h i s employment o f

t h e Key c o m b a t SUP POP^ a r m s

of

a r t i l l e r y and t a c t i c a l The T a b l e o f

air. panzer-grenadier regiments

Organization for

(See C h a r t 2 ) a l r e a d y s h o u l d h a v e a l e r t e d u s t o a Key P r i n C i P l e f o r t h e employment o f a r t i l l e r y : sixty-six a r t i l l e r y tubes decentralization.

Of

the

i n a panzer d i v i s i o n ,

for

instance,

27

24, o r 36%, w e r e o r g a n i c t o t h e p a n z e r - g r e n a d i e r
themselues.

r e g iments

The r e m a i n i n g 42 g u n s a n d h o w i t z e r s w e r e

in the

a r t i l l e r y r e g i m e n t o f t h e d i v i s i o n and were employed as t h e d i v i s i o n commander deemed e s s e n t i a l - - u s u a l 1 y d i u i s i o n ' s main e f f o r t . only t e l l part of artillery

in support of

the

The T a b l e s o f O r g a n i z a t i o n , Generally,

however,

the story. the

Guderian organized h i s

i n t u o phases:
For the

i n i t i a l p e n e t r a t i o n and t h e

exploitation. defenses

i n i t i a l penetration of the tactical

he u s u a l l y c e n t r a l i z e d c o n t r o l o f t h e a r t i l l e r y under who c o o r d i n a t e d t h e c o r p s t h e fast-mouing exploitation

h i s c o r p s a r t 11 l e r y commander, artillery fire plan. Then, for

phase o f h i s o p e r a t i o n s , IooK a t a r t i l l e r y on
13 May

t h e a r t i l l e r y was d e c e n t r a l i z e d . the crossing o f

fl

annexes f o r

t h e Meuse R i v e r
X I X Army Corps

1940 i l l u s t r a t e s t h e p o i n t .

Guderian's

O p e r a t i o n s O r d e r s p e c ifi e s t h e a 1 l o t m e n t o f C o r p s Flrt ill e r y as f o l 1 ows :

2nd Panzer D i v i s i o n ( s u p p o r t i n g a t t a c K on c o r p s f l a n K ) : f l r t i l l e r y R e g i m e n t 74, l e s s 1 1 1 ( H V Y ) B a t t a l i o n . l B t h Panzer O i u i s i o n ( s u p p o r t i n g a t t a c K on c o r p s f lanK A r t i l l e r y R e g i m e n t 90, l e s s I 1 1 ( H V Y ) B a t t a l i o n . 1 s t P a n z e r D i v i s i o n ( M A I N FITTACK i n c e n t e r o f s e c t o r ): finti-infantry units: F l r t i l l e r y R e g i m e n t 73. Artillery corps
):

A n t i - a r t i l l e r y u n i t s and p o i n t o f main e f f o r t : R e g i m e n t 49 a n d 5 o t h e r a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n s . C o r p s A r t 1 1 l e r y Commander D l u i s ion. <29>

loczted with

1 s t Panzer

29

T h i s O r g a n i z a t i o n f o r combat First,
it
15

is r e v e a l i n g i n s e v e r a l w a y s .

o b v i o u s t h a t G u d e r i a n w e i g h t e d h i s main attacK b y 1 s t Panzer D t v i s i o n had

its

a l l o t t i n g a r t i l l e r y as h e d i d .

o r g a n i c f l r t i l l e r y R e g i m e n t 73 a n d C o r p s F I r t i l l e r y R e g i m e n t 43 a s well as s e p a r a t e b a t t a l i o n s f r o m c o r p s a s s e t s and t h e heavy

b a t t a l i o n s o f 2nd and

1 0 t h P a n z e r D i u is i o n s .

Second, art il l e r y

u n i t s h a d s p e c i f i c tasKs t o p e r f o r m . F I r t i l l e r y R e g i m e n t 73, f o r
e x a m p l e , was a s s i g n e d an a n t i - i n f a n t r y role for t h i s operation, rcle. Third,

w h i l e A r t i l l e r y R e g i m e n t 49 h a d a n a n t i - a r t i l l e r y

c o n t r o l of a r t i l l e r y throughout t h e c o r p s f o r t h e f i r s t phase of t h e o p e r a t i o n - - c r o s s i n g t h e Meuse--was exercised by t h e

c o r p s a r t i l l e r y c o m m a n d e r , who was l o c a t e d i n t h e c o r p s ' m a i n zone

Gf

attacK,

1 s t P a n z e r D i v i s i o n ' s Zone.

A f i n a l point which

t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r c o mb a t d o e s n o t show b u t w h i c h t h e a n n e x d o e s s p e c i f y is t h a t t h e a r t i l l e r y o b s e r v a t i o n p o s t s

i n 2nd and

1 0 t h P a n z e r D i v i s i o n s e c t o r s were t o be p o s i t i o n e d so t h a t a t l e a s t one a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n of t h e regiments s u p p o r t i n g t h o s e d i v i s i o n s would b e l o c a t e d so t h a t t h e y c o u l d o b s e r v e 1 s t Panzer D i v i s i o n ' s s e c t o r and d e l ivsr s u p p o r t i n g f i r e s needed.<30> In a d d i t i o n t o wh a t h a s a l r e a d y b e e n s a i d a b o u t G u d e r i a n ' s employment o f a r t i l l e r y ,
it

if

is i n s t r u c t i v e t o n o t e t h a t

a r t i l l e r y annexes t o operation orders rpecified not only t h e t a r g e t s c e r t a i n a r t i l l e r y u n i t s would e n g a g e , b u t t h e t i m i n g of such engagements and t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e f i r e s of o t h e r

29

arms.

The a n n e x t o

i s t Panzer D i v i s i o n ' s o p e r a t i o n o r d e r f o r for example, specif ias the stage o f the infantry, air.

t h e Meuse c r o s s i n g , battle,

the time period, weapons,

and t a r g e t s f o r artillery,

anti-strongpoint

and t a c t i c a l

In t h e

p r e p a r a t o r y s t a g e of

t h e Meuse c r o s s i n g a r t ill e r y m i s s i o n s a l o n g t h e w e s t banK o f t h e Meuse. fires,

included harassing f i r e s anti-Pillbox t o be f i r e d schedule. fires,

and a n t i - a r t i l l e r y

and a n t i - f l a K

all

i n t h a t sequence a c c o r d i n g t o a p r e - a r r a n g e d t i m e
in concert

Moreover,

with tanKs,

anti-tanK,

and artillery

anti-aircraft

weapons e m p l o y e d

i n a d i r e c t f i r e mode,

f i r e s w e r e c o o r d i n a t e d s o t h a t t h e a r t i l l e r y s u p p r e s s e d enemy a r t i l l e r y f i r e s and a n t i - a a s 5 a u l t teams, rcraft fires, cover, enabling the infantry

under close a i r (31)

t o move c l o s e t o t h e

Meuse a n d P r e p a r e t o c r o s s

What a l l t h i s s u g g e s t s
t o ensure h i s a r t i l l e r y f i r e where

i s t h a t Guderian tooK

special pains initially

s u p p o r t was c o n c e n t r a t e d

i t was n e e d e d t o a c h i e v e

a penetration o f tactical

d e f e n s e s and,

more

important,

was s y n c h r o n i z e d w i t h o t h e r
Fllthough c o n t r o l in

supporting f i r e s

t o a c h i e v e maximum e f f e c t .

the e a r l y stages o f

a n o p e r a t i o n g e n e r a l l y was c e n t r a l i z e d , d u r i n g which panzer u n i t s successes,

in

t h e m o r e f a 5 . t -mou i n 9 s t a g e s , exploited the

initial tactical

c o r p s a r t i l l e r y was

a t t a c h e d t o d i v i s i o n s t o supplement SUPPort: a l l otherwise,

d i v i sional organic f i r e for

c o r p s a r t i l l e r y would have remained, in reserve f a r behind attacKing

i n t e n t s and p u r p o s e s , Even so,

panzer columns.

t h e moderate m o b i l i t y d i f f e r e n t i a l

30

between towed a r t i l l e r y - - b o t h battalions left

divisional

and c o r p s - - a n d

panzer

a fire

s u p p o r t g a p t h a t t h e Germans e l e c t e d t o the f i n a l elernent o f Guderian's

f i l l with tactical

a i r power,

c o m b i n e d arms a p p r o a c h t o o p e r a t i o n a l a r t . WorKing corps-size i n cooperation with ground t a c t i c a l t h e German FIir F o r c e , units of

and h i g h e r ,

o r Luftwaffe,

p e r f o r m e d t h r e e Key m i s s i o n s : tactical and s t r a t e g i c a i r ground u n i t s .

ach ievement o f a i r s u p e r i o r i t y , and c l o s e a i r

reconnaissance,

support of aircraft

Doctrinally,

Luftwaffe reconnaissance

were

" p l a c e d under t h e o r d e r s o f each armoured c o r p s i n addition, e v e r y c o r p s o f t h e German about ten

and armoured d i u i s i o n " :

FIrmY

a l s o had

i t s own a i r

r e c o n n a i s s a n c e s q u a d r o n of

p l a n e s . < 3 2 > U n a b l e t o Keep p a c e w i t h t h e e x p a n d i n g German FlrmY, Luftwaffe reconnaissance u n i t s r e v e r t e d t o Luftwaffe c o n t r o l by

1942 and were a l l o c a t e d t o g r o u n d u n i t s as needed. p e r i o d Guder i a n c o n d u c t e d o p e r a t i o n a l w a r f a r e t o December

During the 1939

(September

1941),

b o t h s h o r t and l o n g - r a n g e

a i r reconnaissance

squadrons operated under c o n t r o l of headquarters. ach i e u i n g a i r aircraft After accompl i s h i n g

h i s c o r p s and p a n z e r g r o u p
i r S t

its f

mission of

s u p e r i o r i t y b y d e e p s t r I K e S a g a i n s t enemy support f a c i l i t i e s , their German a i r f o r c e s t u r n e d

and a i r

t o t h e second of reconnaissance. Long-range i n d i c a t i o n s of

ground support miss ions--air

air

r e c o n n a i s s a n c e was s u p p o s e d t o o b t a i n e a r l y

enemy p l a n s w h e r e a s s h o r t - r a n g e r e c o n n a i s s a n c e

was s u p p o s e d t o w a t c h o v e r t h e d e p l o y m e n t a n d e m p l o y m e n t o f

31

enemy g r o u n d f o r c e s u p t o t h e p o i n t i d h e r e g r o u n d f o r c e s made contact. expected. B o t h d a y a n d n i g h t a i r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e was p l a n n e d a n d Short-range r e c o n n a i s s a n c e ernphas i z e d c o o p e r a t i o n a r t ill e r y S P o t t i n g

w i t h mechan i z e d g r o u n d f o r c e s , p h o t o g r a p h i c and v i s u a l

and

r e c o n n a i s s a n c e o f enemy movement . < 3 3 > 1

I n t h e P o l i s h C a r w a i g n German a i r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e e f f o r t s o n September w e r e followed by s u r p r i s e airstriKes against the

P o l i s h FIir F o r c e .

BY 3 S e p t e m b e r ,

two days

i n t o t h e campaign,

t h e L u f t w a f f e m i s s i o n h a d s h i f t e d t o c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h army g r o u n d u n i t s b e c a u s e t h e P o l i s h Fiir F o r c e h a d b e e n s w e p t f r o m t h e SKY--and t h e groundl(34:

To e n h a n c e c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h a r m o r e d g r o u n d f o r c e s , F i e l d - M a r s h a l W. F. von R i c h t h o f e n , Flanders, Commander o f F 1 i e g e r K o r P s introduced

V I I I i n t h e P o l ish, t h e p r a c t i c e of columns.

and R u s s i a n Campaigns,

e m p l o y i n g a TanK L i a i s o n O f f i c e r w i t h a r m o r e d i n c l o s e t o u c h by

T h i s o f f i c e r ' s t a s K was t o Keep

r a d i o w i t h c l o s e - s u ~ ~ ~ irr tc r a f t . < 3 5 > S t a n d a r d c l o s e - s u p p o r t a m i s s i o n s i n c l u d e d bombing and s t r a f i n g artillery batteries, enemy made a s t a n d . o f strongpoints, the

and t r o o p c o n c e n t r a t i o n s w h e r e v e r I n addition t o close-support,

the Luftwaffe dumps,

a t t a c K e d enemy d e f e n s e s barracKs, and f a c t o r i e s

i n depth by h i t t i n g depots,

"in order t o d i s l o c a t e the supply

o r g a n i z a t i o n . "<36>E v e n g r e a t e r d e p t h was a c h i e u e d b y a t t a c K i n g railways, stations, bridges, and r o a d j u n c t i o n s t o p r e c l u d e

In t h e Flanders

enemy r e i n f o r c e m e n t o f Campaign, for instance,

coromitted u n i t s .

German a i r p o w e r was u s e d t o s e a l o f f

- 32

t h e b a t t l e a r e a by a t t a c K i n g F r e n c h r e a r c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a s f a r bacK as a l i n e a l o n g a n a r c r u n n i n g f r o m G i u e t t h r o u g h Hirson-Laon-Reims t o Verdun. I n t h e f i r s t few d a y s o f t h e

F l a n d e r s Campaign T h i r d A i r F l e e t attaCKed t a r g e t s t o a d e p t h of 185 K i l o m e t e r s , w i t h

its matn e m p h a s i s i n G u d e r i a n ' s s e c t o r ,

It
is w o r t h

the Charleuille-Sedan

a r e a o f t h e Meuse R i u e r .

not in9 t h a t t h e s t r a i g h t - 1 ine d i s t a n c e from Sedan, where G u d e r i a n c r o s s e d t h e Meuse w i t h h i s X I X A r m y C o r p s , F r a n c e is a b o u t 85 K i l o m e t e r s , t o Reims,

i l l u s t r a t i n g t h e d e p t h t o which

a i r s t r i K e s were c a r r i e d o u t i n s u p p o r t o f a d v a n c i n g g r o u n d
units.
of

T h r o u g h o u t t h e c a m p a i g n a i r a t t a c K s t o an a v e r a g e d e p t h

76 K i l o m e t e r s b e h i n d e n e m y f o r w a r d t r o o p s S t r u c K m o v i n g and r a i l r o u t e s . < 3 7 > and d e e p interdiction

columns, troop concentrations,

In a d d i t i o n t o t h e s e c l o s e - s u p p o r t

missions, t h e Luftwaffe Prouided attaCKing ground f o r c e s wi t h

f lanK p r o t e c t i o n when

r e i u i r e d . Two e x a m p l e s i n p a r t i c u l a r c o m e
XIX

t o mind. F i r s t ,

i n t h e F l a n d e r s Campaign when G u d e r i a n ' s

Flrmy C o r p s c l e a r e d t h e r u g g e d

Ardennes t e r r a i n and r a c e d f o r

Flbbeuille, he exposed h i s l e f t flanK t o French f o r c e s located s o u t h of t h e A i s n e R i u e r . Later,

i n t h e R u s s i a n Campaign as

G u d e r i a n ' s Second P a n z e r Group a t t e m p t e d t o c o m p l e t e t h e

e n c i r c l e m e n t o f R u s s i a n f o r c e s i n t h e BrYanSK a r e a , h e e x p o s e d
h i s r i g h t flanK t o possible Russian CounterattacKs from along
t h e BryansK-L'gou

R a i l r o a d r o u t e . < 3 8 > In b o t h

instances,

however, Guder i a n employed t a c t i c a l close-support

a i r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e and

a i r c r a f t t o l o c a t e a n d a t t a c K enemy u n i t s w h i c h

33

posed a t h r e a t t o h i s v u l n e r a b l e f l a n K S .

ms b r i e f a s i t i s ,
German a i r f o r c e s close-support

t h i s e x a m i n a t i o n of

G u d e r i a n ' s use of

i n d i c a t e s t h a t b o t h a i r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e and

a i r c r a f t P l a y e d a KeY r o l e fls a n

i n h i s c o n d u c t of
not

operational art.

i n t e g r a l p a r t o f Guder ian ' 5 - - t h o u g h c o m b i n e d arms o p e r a t i o n s ,

o n l y Gilder i a n ' s - - c o n c e p t i o n o f tactical

a i r support enabled h i m t o

l o c a t e enemy u n i t s e a r l y o n for t h e purposes o f isolate the battle f o r w a r d and v i r t u a l l y I n G u d e r i a n ' s own

t o d e l i v e r f i r e s b o t h n e a r and f a r Supporting ground u n i t s area. Moreover,

in contact,

and t o

t h i s a i r s u p p o r t was w e l l

c o n t i n u o u s when o p e r a t i o n s c a l l e d f o r words: "The f l i g h t

it.

wings advanced t h e i r

bases

in rapid

succession close t o t h e f r o n t

l i n e s o f t h e p a n z e r s and

cooperated with them c l o s e l y . " < 3 9 > This for

is n o t m e r e r h e t o r i c ,
in the

i n r e c o u n t i n g h i s c r o s s i n g o f t h e Oneiper R i v e r Guder i a n m e n t i o n s t h a t
f ighter
50

R u s s i a n Campaign, l a i d out just

a i r s t r i p s were

b e h i n d h i s assembly areas

t h a t a i r Support

w o u l d be a v a i l a b l e f o r

impending o p e r a t i o n s . < 4 0 > indicates that

T h i s f i n a l p o i n t on t h e u s e o f a i r s u p p o r t G u d e r i a n p l a c e d a p r e m l u r n on t h e n e e d f o r superiority of

local a i r

that

is,

a i r s u p e r i o r i t y o v e r heavy c o n c e n t r a t i o n s of his

armorded f o r c e s w h i c h c o m p r i s e d t h e main e f f o r t

operations.

S u c h c o n t r o l o f t h e a i r was n e c e s s a r y t o a l l o w a i r c r a f t t o s u p p o r t advancing armored columns.

close-support

R e f l e c t i o n s o n t h e damage German a r m o r e d c o l u m n s s u f f e r e d a t t h e hands of i l l l i e d a i r p o w e r d u r i n g O p e r a t i o n C o b r a and t h e

34

Ardennes c o u n t e r - o f f e n s i v e

i n 1 9 4 4 show how r i g h t G u d e r i a n was

local a i r superiority

t o be concerned about maintenance o f during crucial phases o f operat ions.

Hau i n g e x a m i n e d G u d e r i a n 's c o n c e p t i o n o f c o m b i n e d a r m s o p e r a t i o n s b y l o O K i n s a t t h e c o m b i n e d arms o r g a n i z a t i o n s h e employed, combat,

h i s methods o f o r g a n i z i n g c o r p s and g r o u p s f o r

and h i s u s e o f

a r t i l l e r y and t a c t i c a l

a i r power,

it

r e m a i n s t o d r a w some c o n c l u s i o n s .

Three p r i n c i p l e s t h a t

lay

b e h i n d h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f c o m b i n e d arms o p e r a t i o n s s u g g e s t themselues. First, G u d e r i a n ' s i n s i s t e n c e o n c o m b i n e d arms i m p l i e s h e toOK

o r g a n i z a t i o n s b u i l t around t h e tanK t e n e t t h a t one s h o u l d :

i t as a

C o n d u c t o p e r a t i o n a l a r t w i t h c o m b i n e d arms d i v i s i o n s b u i l t a r o u n d t h e t a n k ; a l l o t h e r arms s h o u l d be i n t e g r a t e d o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l y and t a c t i c a l l y t o support tanKs.

Second,

h i s e m p l o y m e n t o f a r t ill e r y

i n d i c a t e s h i s adherence t o

the tenet: C o n c e n t r a t e and c e n t r a l i z e c o n t r o l o f a r t i l l e r y f o r p e n e t r a t i o n o f t a c t i c a l defenses b u t decentralize control f o r f l u i d exploitation operat ions.

Third,

about a i r

o p e r a t i o n s he h e l d t h a t :

T a c t i c a l a i r c r a f t must s u p p o r t armored o p e r a t ions by m a i n t a i n i n g l o c a l a i r s u p e r i o r i t y over c o n c e n t r a t i o n s o f a r m o r e d f o r c e s , and t h e n s h o u l d p r o u i d e p r o v i d e a l r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e and close-support a i r s t r iKes.

These c o n c l u s i o n s a r e n o t e a r t h s h a K i n g , d e r i v e rnore o r o t h e r t e n e t s

and one c o u l d There a r e

i f h e made t h e e f f o r t .

35

l e s s e r p r i n c i p l e s , perhaps c o r o l l a r i e s ,
Present analysis,
Key

t h a t .jump o u t f r o m t h e

b u t t h e s e t h r e e a p p e a r t o be t h e a b s o l u t e l y

tenets o f

c o r r b i n e d arms o p e r a t i o n s b y w h i c h G u d e r i a n art. G u d e r i a n would have s a i d t h a t one c a n n o t attain in

Right

conducted o p e r a t i o n a l

w i t h o u t adherence t o t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s , O p e r a t i o n a l dec is i u e n e s s .

W h e t h e r Guder i a n was c o r r e c t i s not here a t

t h i n K i n g t h i s about o p e r a t i o n a l a r t

issue.

o r wrong,
the t m K ,

Guder i a n t h o u g h t cornb i n e d arrns d i u i s i o n s b u i l t a r o u n d and f l e x i b l y s u p p o r t e d b y a r t i l l e r y and t a c t i c a l air

i s t h e f i r s t s t e p toward o p e r a t i o n a l success.

36

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

One d o e s n o t h a v e t o

looK f a r

t o support the c l a i m t h a t a r t c a n be c h a r a c t e r i z e d as

Guder i a n ' s c o n d u c t o f o p e r a t i o n a l offen$.iue rather than defensive. article "Armored F o r c e s "

A place t o begin is h i s

1937

i n which he e x p l i c i t l y says:

The m i s s i o n o f a r m o r e d c o m b a t f o r c e s i s t h e d e l i v e r y of s u r p r i s e attacKs w i t h concentrated s t r e n g t h , w i t h t h e view t o gaining t h e d e c i s i o n a t t h e p o i n t d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e command.. . . T h e y a r e , t h e r e f o r e , e x c l u s i v e l y a n o f f e n s i v e a r m whose advantage over o t h e r ground f o r c e s c o n s i s t s i n t h e c a p a c i t y t o f i g h t w h i l e i n motion.<41:

This observation,

o f course,

1 i e s open t o t h e c h a l l e n g e t h a t of And t o t h i s

"Armored F o r c e s " m e r e l y r e f l e c t s Guder i a n ' s t h e o r y operational art, n o t what he p r a c t i c e d

in co&at.

t h e appropriate response War 11.

A l l

i s t o looK a t h i s o p e r a t i o n s
i n Poland,

i n World
or

r e f l e c t t h a t u h e t h e r h e was 1939 and l a t e 1941,

France,

R u s s i a between a t t a c K ing, fact,

H e i n z G u d e r i a n was never defending !

In

a t t a c K ing,

attacK ing--almost

h i s a t t e m p t t o e x e c u t e m o b i l e d e f e n s i v e w a r f a r e .lust
of

southwest

Moscow

i n December

1341 l e d t o h i s r e l i e f .

So,

he

never r e a l l y had t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o conduct defensive operational it art, b u t g i v e n h i s t h e o r e t i c a l v i e w s on t h e s u b j e c t

i s s a f e t o s a y t h a t he w o u l d have been unhappy w i t h t h e conducting defensive operations for any length

Of

prospect of

37

t irne

.
G i u e n t h a t h i s o p e r a t i o n s were o f f e n s i v e i n c h a r a c t e r ,

Glider i a n 's o p e r a t i o n a l a r t c a n b e c h a r a c t e r i z e d a s a t t a C K S o n narrou f r o n t a g e s employing tanKs penetration in t h e s p e a r h e a d t o a c h i e v e

and o p e r a t i o n a l d e p t h q u i c K l y , w h i l e r e t a i n i n g a
SUCCTSS.

f l e x i b l e reserve f o r p r o t e c t i o n and e x p l o i t a t i o n of

F r o m t h i s a n a l y s i s f o u r t e n e t s of o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n w h i c h g u i d e d G u d e r i a n i n t h e c o n d u c t o f h i s o p e r a t i o n s c a n be d e r i u e d . Strangely, the

1336 G e r m a n F i e l d S e r v i c e R e g u l a t i o n s
v i e w t h a t a t t a C K S s h o u l d be

appear t o c o n t r a d i c t G u d e r i a n ' s

c o n d u c t e d on a narrow f r o n t a g e , f o r t h a t m a n u a l s t a t e s : The attacK m u s t b e l a u n c h e d o n a b r o a d e r f r o n t t h a n t h a t i n t e n d e d f o r t h e breaK t h r o u g h , in o r d e r t o t i e a n d h o l d down t h e enemy o n e i t h e r s i d e . <42>

B u t t h i s passage can b e m i s l e a d i n g b e c a u s e

in a subsequent
IS

p a r a g r a p h t h e manual r e f e r s t o t h e d e c i s i v e attacK, Which d i s t i n g u i s h e d by:

( 1 ) narrow

zones,

(2) u n i f i e d

f i r e from all

arms, a n d (3) t h e r e i n f o r c e m e n t o f f i r e s b y s p e c i a l l y a l l o t t e d
heavy manual i n f a n t r y weapons and a r t i l l e r y . < 4 3 > C l e a r l y , here the

is m a K i n g r e f e r e n c e t o a m a i n a t t a c K d e s i g n e d t o

penetrate tactical

defenses rather than a broad offensiue.

Guderian probably thought t h e broad offensive concept e n t a i l e d t h e concept of

a d e c is i u e a t t a C K i o t h e r w i s e , p e n e t r a t i o n w o u l d

n o t o c c u r a n d e n e m y r e s e r v e s would n o t b e t i e d down a l o n g a wide l i n e o f c o n t a c t .

So a t l t h o u g h n o t

inconsistent with t h e

German f i e l d r e g u l a t i o n s of

the day,

h i s c o n c e p t i o n of

38

n !

rd

/--I

38a

operational art confines

i t s e l f t o a d e c i s i v e a t t a c K on a

narrow f r o n t a g e by a c o r p s o r group t o ensure p e n e t r a t i o n of t a c t i c a l d e f e n s e s f o l l o w e d by e x p l o i t a t i o n t o o p e r a t i o n a l

depths.

Guderian's concept

is b e s t c a p t u r e d b y h i s o f t r e p e a t e d

rnax i m :

" K l o t z e n , n i c h t K l e c K e r n ," b y w h i c h h e m e a n t

"Fist, not

F i n g e r s . " To e n s u r e p e n e t r a t i o n , G u d e r i a n t h o u g h t a m a i l e d f i s t

was n e c e s s a r y . A t t h e t a c t i c a l l e v a 1 it r e q u i r e d a t a n K b r i g a d e
of f o u r b a t t a l i o n s which c o u l d c o v e r a z o n e of

attacK of

1 5 0 8 - 4 0 0 0 m e t e r s w i d e a n d 3000-4500 m e t e r s i n d e p t h . < 4 4 > A s h i s o p e r a t i o n s i n F l a n d e r s and R u s s i a show, h e t h o u g h t a r m o r e d heavy c o r p s s h o u l d be s i m i l a r l y c o n c e n t r a t e d f o r t h e purpose of

ach ieu ing breaKthrOugh a n d p e n e t r a t i o n t o o p e r a t t o n a l

depths.

A t t h e opening of

t h e F l a n d e r s Campaign

(See Map 2 ) , G u d e r i a n

c r o s s e d t h e Luxembourg b o r d e r w i t h t h r e e P a n z e r d i u is i o n s

a b r e a s t i n h i s X I X Army C o r p s . 2nd P a n z e r D i v i s i o n i n t h e n o r t h
attacKed through Viandeni 1 s t Panzer Division in the and

center--maKing

t h e main attacK--mOued

through Wallendorf:

10th Panzer Diuision, with

I n f a n t r y Regiment Gross-Deutschland
attacKed through Etternach.
i s a b o u t 20

protecting t h e corps l e + t flanK.

The d i s t a n c e b e t w e e n V i a n d e n a n d E t t e r n a c h

K i l o m e t e r s , g i v i n g e a c h d i v i s i o n a f r o n t a g e o f a b o u t 6.3 K i l o m e t e r s a s s u m i n g no v a r i a t i o n supportins dttaCKS. on Later,

i n w i d t h b e t w e e n main and

i n h i s c r o s s i n g o f t h e Meuse R i v e r

1 3 May G u d e r i a n c o n c e n t r a t e d h i s t h r e e p a n z e r d i u i s i o n s o n a
f r o n t around Sedan t o e n s u r e he p e n e t r a t e d In b o t h t h e s e

ten-Kilometer

quiCKly t h e F r e n c h d e f e n s e s i n h i s s e c t o r .

33

i n s t a n c e s Guder i a n c o n c e n t r a t e d an a r m o r e d c o r p s c o n s i s t i n g o f some 828 t a n K S o n a v e r y n a r r o w f r o n t a g e . < 4 5 > The o p e n i n g p h a s e o f Guderian's view that t h e R u s s i a n Campaign a l s o illustrates

a t t a c K s by armored f o r c e s s h o u l d be H i s Second Panzer Group a t t a c K e d panzer, two motorized,

c o n d u c t e d on n a r r o w f r o n t a g e s . i n t o R u s s i a on 22 J u n e four infantry,

1341 w i t h f o u r

a n d one c a v a l r y d i v i s i o n s a l o n g a l i n e o f

d e p a r t u r e o f a b o u t 88 K i l o m e t e r s . < 4 6 > A l t h o u g h t h e a v e r a g e frontage for this figure the l i n e of S e c o n d P a n z e r G r o u p wa5 8 K i l o m e t e r s p e r d i v i s i o n , i s misleading. departure, f i l l t h e t e r r a i n a l o n g t h e Bug R i v e r , tanKs, which

was n o t s u i t a b l e f o r

Guderian t h o u g h t should conduct t h e main a t t a c K s zones o f attaCK. Nor does

it address t h e depth o f

in narrow
h i s attacK,

which Guderian provided f o r consisting o f

by g i v i n g XLVI Panzer Corps,

1 0 t h P a n z e r D i u i s i o n a n d SS Das R e i c h D i u i s i o n , the mission t o follow his

and t h e G r o s s - D e u t s c h l a n d Regiment, panzer group's Brest-LitousK. l e f t wing,

w h i c h was t o p a s s t o t h e n o r t h o f

As Q i t d e r i a n saw

it,

"the e s s e n t i a l s of surprise

Conducting panzer offensives a n d mass d e p l o y m e n t Unfortunately,

were s u i t a b l e t e r r a i n ,

i n t h e n e c e s s a r y w i d t h and d e p t h . " < 4 7 >

G u d e r i a n n e u e r r e a l l y s t i p u l a t e s what t h e but surely

if p r e s s e d o n

n e c e s s a r y w i d t h and d e p t h m i g h t be,

t h i s p o i n t h e w o u l d r e p l y t h a t t h e w i d t h and d e p t h o f a t t a c K depends

a panzer
in

l a r g e l y o n t h e t e r r a i n a n d t h e enemy d e f e n s e s

t h e a r e a u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n $ t o s a y more w o u l d b e t o demonstrate t a c t i c a l ignorance. The g e n e r a l P r o P o s i t i o n w h i c h

40

emerges,

however,

i s t h a t r e l a t i v e l y narrow attacK sectors are t a c t i c a l zones o f defense. But t h a t

e s s e n t i a l t o p e n e t r a t i o n of i s o n l y P a r t of refer it, for

G u d e r i a n ' s words

"mass d e p l o y m e n t "

s p e c ifi c a l I Y t o a r m o r e d c o n c e n t r a t i o n s . Massing f o r c e s o n n a r r o w f r o n t a g e s does no good u n l e s s t h e and G u d e r i a n c l e a r l y t h o u g h t

r i g h t s o r t s of

f o r c e s a r e massed,

t a n K S s h o u l d b e t h e weapons a c o r p s o r g r o u p commander s h o u l d 5FleK t o c o n c e n t r a t e . subject. First, Two r e a s o n s d r o v e h i s t h i n K i n g o n t h i s

because o f t h e i r h i g h degree o f m o b i l i t y ,

armored u n i t s c o u l d be c o n c e n t r a t e d more r a p i d l y t h a n foot-mobile their

i n f a n t r y d i u i s i o n s . < 4 8 > Second,

o n l y tanKs,

w i t h

a r m o r p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t s m a l l arms f i r e ,

could penetrate

t a c t i c a l defenses

r a p i d l y without s u f f e r i n g unacceptable losses i n t o t h e o p e r a t i o n a l depths o f an one c o u l d say t h a t

and t h e n c o n t i n u e t h e a t t a c K opposing f o r c e .

About t h e f i r s t r e a s o n ,

m o t o r i z e d d i v i s i o n s c o u l d c o n c e n t r a t e j u s t as r a p i d l y as p a n z e r divisions. This

is true,

b u t Guderian understood t h e t h a t c o n c e n t r a t e d armored u n i t s have

p ~ y c h o l o g i c a ls h o c K e f f e c t

a t b o t h t h e l i n r o f c o n t a c t and a g a i n s t t h i n l y h e l d l i n e s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n and r e a r a r e a s . t h e enemy w i t h s p e e d , KnocK t h e enemy o f f euents.

I n h i s booK The B l i t z K r i e g E r a a n d t h e German G e n e r a l

He t h o u g h t

it

imperative t o h i t

surprise,

a n d ShoCK f r o m t h e O u t s e t t o

b a l a n c e a n d t h e n Keep h i m r e a c t i n g t o

Staff,

L a r r y Add i n g t o n d e s c r i b e s G u d e r i a n
13 May a n d

's c r o s s i n g o f t h e

Meuse R i v e r o n

i l l u s t r a t e s how G u d e r i a n e m p l o y e d

41

armored f o r c e s . unfordable;
P ill b o x e s

A r o u n d S e d a n t h e Meuse

i s 60 y a r d s w i d e a n d

F r e n c h d e f e n s e s on t h e west s i d e c o n s i s t e d o f

a n d e n t r e n c h m e n t s w i t h a d e n s It!) o f e i g h t p i l l b o x e s o r o n e e v e r y 200 y a r d s o f infantry

and e i g h t m a c h i n e g u n s e v e r y m i l e , front.

F i e l d a r t i l l e r y b a t t e r i e s were b e h i n d t h e s e To o v e r c o m e t h e s e d e f e n s e s ,

emplacements.

Guder i a n d i r e c t e d

close support a i r c r a f t t o attacK French a r t i l l e r y u n i t s f o r h a l f a day, a n d t h e n h a d German t a n K s r o l l d i r e c t l y t o t h e f i r i n g p o i n t blanK into the pillboxes. t o t h e panzer German

w a t e r s edge,

motorized infantry units--organic d i u i s ion--brought

UP

p n e u m a t i c b o a t s and b e g a n c r o s s i n g t h e

r i u e r . < 4 9 > U n d e r t h e c o m b i n e d s u p p r e s s i v e f i r e s o f t h e tatIK.5, anti-tanK and a n t i - a i r c r a f t weapons, the i n f a n t r y quicK1y

established a bridgehead, Meuse.

enabling engineers t o bridge t h e t h e armored u n i t s

Once t h i s c r u c i a l s t e p h a d b e e n t a K e n ,

were t h e n

i n a p o s i t i o n t o c r o s s t h e Meuse a n d c o n t i n u e t h e passing through other divisions.

attack without later, was

As w i l l

be s e e n

Guder i a n t h o u g h t a v o i d i n s p a s s a g e t h r o u g h o t h e r u n i t s important. The m a i n p o i n t h e r e

immensely

i s t h a t Guderian

c o n c e n t r a t e d h i s a r m r up f r o n t t o a c h i e v e p e n e t r a t i o n a n d ensure t h a t

i t would be i n a p o s i t i o n t o r a c e i n t o t h e

o p e r a t i o n a l d e p t h s o f t h e d e f e n d i n g enemy. One may w e l l wonder what v a l u e t h e r e Considerable, is

i n achieving

o p e r a t i o n a l d e p t h anyway. operations

i f Guder i a n 5

i n Poland,

Flanders,

a n d R u s s i a a r e t o b e t a K e n as

representat iue o f the potential benefits.

In t h e Pol i s h

42

Campaign,

for

instance,

Guderian recounts that

b y 4 September

1939 h i s X I X flrmy

Corps had pushed a c r o s s t h e P o l i s h C o r r i d o r

t o t h e V i s t u l a R i v e r and h a d t o t a l l y d e s t r o y e d t w o o r t h r e e
Pol ish i n f a n t r y d i u i s i o n s and one c a v a l r y b r i g a d e , o f p r i s o n e r s and h u n d r e d s o capturing

thousands of

g u n s . < 5 0 > The e m e r g e n c e

its

G u d e r i a n ' s X I X flrmy

Corps f r o m t h e flrdennes and

s u b s e q u e n t r a c e t o t h e E n 9 1 i s h Channe Campaign forces i s well Known.

dur ins the Flanders l o s s of major Flllied

The c o n s e q u e n t

north of

t h e flisne River proved devastating t o Flllied France, and l e d t o t h e s t r a t e g i c consequence The p o i n t a b o u t o p e r a t i o n a l d e p t h is

a t t e m p t s t o defend

o f F r a n c e 's c a p i t u l a t i o n . i l l u s t r a t e d by t h e f a c t flbbeuille

t h a t t h e d i s t a n c e f r o m Sedan t o a distance Guderian covered in

i s 238 K i l o m e t e r s ,

seven days, (51 > Similarly, Guderian's panzer t h r u s t s t o o p e r a t i o n a l depths tremendous numbers o f Russian forces in the

i n R u s s i a d e s t r o y e d t h e f i g h t i n g power o f Russian u n i t s . Two m a j o r e n c i r c l e m e n t s o f

w h i c h G u d e r i a n ' s S e c o n d P a n z e r G r o u p p a r t i c i p a t e d amp1 i f Y p o i n t about o p e r a t i o n a l payoff. O p e r a t i o n BFlRBflROSSfl, Second Panzer Group, independent infantry B e t w e e n 22 J u n e , 1341--just D-day for

a n d 23 J u n e consisting of regiment,

7 days--Guderian

'5

n i n e d i v i s i o n s and an into the

attacKed 440 K i l o m e t e r s

R u s s i a n h i n t e r l a n d and r e a c h e d t h e c i t y of Beresina River, gigantic thereby

BobruisK along the the

f o r m l n g t h e s o u t h e r n P i n C B r of

MinsK p o c ~ e t . I n t h e MinsK p o c ~ e t ,c l o s e d b y H o t h f r o m

t h e n o r t h and G u d e r i a n f r o m t h e s o u t h ,

32 R u s s i a n r i f l e

43

d i v i s i o n s and 3 tanK d i v i s i o n s were c a u g h t , Russian prisoners,

t o t a l l i n g 290,000 By 16 J u l y 1941

2900 t d n K S ,

and

1 4 0 6 guns.

( 0 + 2 5 ) G u d e r i a n ' s l e a d e l e m e n t s h a d e n t e r e d SmolensK a n d
c o v e r e d some 660 K i l o m e t e r s . < 5 2 > I n t h e S m o l e n s K POCKet G u d e r i a n 's p a n z e r g r o u p p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e c a p t u r e o f prisoners, 2030 tanKs, 185,000

and o v e r 2000 g u n s . < 5 3 > These f a c t s f o r reaching Howeuer, i t must

support t h e understated c l a i m t h a t the payoff o p e r a t i o n a l depths quicK1y can be s i g n i f i c a n t . be remembered t h a t o p e r a t i o n a l success

is m e a s u r e d b y t h e
Unl i K e

operational o r s t r a t e g i c e f f e c t s operat ions b r i n g about. t h e P o l i s h and F l a n d e r s Campaigns operations Played d decisive p a r t goals of
i n which Guderian's

i n achieving the strategic

t h e c o l l a p s e o f armed r e s i s t a n c e and s u r r e n d e r o f t h e i n t h e R u s s i a n Campaign h i s o p e r a t i o n s f a i l e d to

armed f o r c e s ,

a c h i e u e H i t l e r 's e t i ' ~ s i o n e d s t r a t e g i c g o a l s , i t h e y may seem.

A final

howeuer s u c c e s s f u l

p o i n t about the o f f e n s i v e nature o f Guderian's

operational a r t which deserves mention operational reserve. was t h a t reinforce wherever reserve, The f i r s t

i s h i s employment o f

an

p o i n t on w h i c h G u d e r i a n

insisted

i t was l.K3T o n e o f

the functions o f the reserve t o

failure;

rather,

i t s f u n c t i o n was t o e x p l o i t S u c c e s s
important function of the

i t may o c c u r .
which

Another

i s amply d e m o n s t r a t e d b y G u d e r i a n ' s c o n d u c t of
security f o r strung out.

operations,

was t o p r o u i d e f l a n K Both of

a t t a c K i n g panzer colurrns. i m p a c t on G u d e r i a n ' s

t h e s e f u n c t i o n s h a d some

d e c i s i o n about whether t h e r e s h o u l d be a

44

reserve

in a particular situation,

and i f so,

what

i t s s i z e and

Composition s h o u l d be. Generally, t h e course of G u d e r i a n d i d e m p l o y an o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e

in

h i s operations

in Poland,

Flanders,

and R u s s i a .

A t c o r p s l e v e l he u s u a l l y employed a r e g i m e n t - s i z e u n i t such as
the

l n f a n t r v Regiment G r o s s - O e u t s c h l a n d whereas a t t h e p a n z e r
l e v e l he K e p t a c o r p s - s i z e These, however, r e s e r v e whenever t h e

g r o u p o r army

situation permitted.

are o n l y broad The

generalizations t o which there are c ear exceptions. reasons f o r t h e e x c e p t i o n s may h e l p

1 l u m i n a t e G u d e r i a n 's

t h i n K i n s on t h e employment of

operational reserves.

A t t h e beginning of
Campaigns,

b o t h t h e P o l i s h and F l a n d e r s

G u d e r i a n d i d n o t employ a r e c o g n i z a b l e r e s e r v e i n

h i s army c o r p s ,

i n each case f o r good r e a s o n s .

In t h e P o l i s h

Campaign h e a t t a c K e d

i n t o t h e P o l i s h C o r r i d o r e m p l o y i n g one w i t h h i s panzer the

p a n z e r a n d t w o m o t o r i z e d d i u is i o n s a b r e a s t , d i v i s i o n maKing t h e main e f f o r t corps sector. Here,

in t h e southern p o r t i o n of

Guderian d i d n o t erwloy a reserve f o r three First, he r e i n f o r c e d 3 r d Panzer D i v i s i o n , Second,

d i s c e r n i b l e reasons. h i s main e f f o r t ,

w i t h c o r p s t r o o p s such as a r t i l l e r y .

h i s corps southern boundary,

t h e Zempolno R i v e r , And t h i r d ,

p r o v i d e d some Infantry 3rd intents

protection f o r h i s southern flanK. Division, t h e Army r e s e r v e ,

23rd

had t h e m i s s i o n t o f o l l o w a l l

Panzer D i v i s i o n , and p u r p o s e s .

thereby providing a reserve for l a t t e r stages of

In the

t h e P o l i s h C a m p a i g n when

h i s XIX Army Corps a t t a c K e d f r o m East P r u s s i a t o w a r d

45

Brest-LitovsK,

Guder i a n e m p l o y e d t h e s e p a r a t e L o t z e n B r i g a d e ,

w h i c h was a t t a c h e d t o h i s c o r p s a s a r e s e r v e e l e m e n t p r o t e c t i n g the l e f t flanK o f his attacKing divisions. Similarly,

in the

F l a n d e r s Campaign G u d e r i a n a t t a c K e d corps reserve. the l e a s t of But again,

i n t o Luxembourg w i t h no not

t h e r e were good r e a s o n s f o r t h i s ,

w h i c h was t h e f a c t t h a t t h e s i x t y - f i v e

Kilometers

o f fill i e d f r o n t defended by t h e

r u n n i n g t h r o u g h t h e s o u t h e r n F I r d e n n e s was
inconsiderable force of only four French

c a v a l r y d i v i s i o n s a n d some o d d B e l g i a n u n i t s .

So t h e enemy

G u d e r i a n e x p e c t e d t o e n c o u n t e r was n o t f o r m i d a b l e sector.
Army

in his

Hdditionally,

f o l l o w i n g b e h i n d G u d e r i a n ' s c o r p s was X I V Guder i a n '5 p a n z e r

Corps,

p r o u i d i n g d e p t h and s e c u r i t y f o r He d i d , however, withdraw

d iu i s ions.

I n f a n t r y Regiment

Gross-Deutschland

f r o m h i s s o u t h e r n f l a n K a n d move

it

into
in

c o r p s r e s e r v e on t h e e v e n i n g o f t h e second day o f France.

operations

It i s a r g u a b l e t h a t Guderian e n v i s i o n e d Gross-Oeutschland
I n f a n t r y R e g i m e n t ' s r o l e on t h e f l a n K o f X I X A r m y C o r p s a s being a reserve mission,

for

in h i s operations

i n R u s s i a he

f r e q u e n t l y e m p l o y e d a one o r t w o - d i v i s i o n followed

reserve which

t h e main a t t a c K echeloned t o t h e r e a r f o r b o t h depth

it followed.

and f l a n K p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e u n i t

T h i s was

P r e c i s e l y t h e f u n c t i o n o f X L V I Panzer Corps p h a s e o f BARB~IROSSH (See Map 1). That corps, as

i n t h e opening
c o n s i s t i n g of one

P a n z e r a n d o n e m o t o r i z e d d i v i s i o n a5 w e l l Gross-Oeutschland, followed

I n f a n t r y Regiment

Guderian's l e f t - w i n g corps,

46

46a

echeloned just
wing.

i n s i d e of

t h e n o r t h e r n most e l e m e n t s o f t h e l e f t

Note,

first, of

t h a t h i s Army G r o u p R e s e r v e was c o m p o s e d o f under a corps

one-fourth

Guderian's mobile forces Second,

headquarters.

i t s m i s s i o n was t o f o l l o w t h e c o r p s p r o t e c t t h e Army Group's left flanK,

maKing t h e m a i n a t t a c K ,

and be p r e p a r e d t o p a s s t h r o u g h t h e a t t a c K i n g c o r p s directed. As

i f so

i t debJelOPed,

w i t h i n two days Russian

COUntePattacKs a g a i n s t Second Panzer G r o u p ' s n o r t h e r n f lanK f r o m around B i a l y S t o K prompted Guderian t o commit t h e 2 9 t h b l o t o r i z e d D i v i s i o n f r o m Panzer Group Reserve t o s e c u r e t h e
flanK.<54> This f a c t suggests two P o i n t s about G u d e r i a n ' s

left

employment o f o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s First,

i n offens iue operat ions,

a t t h e army g r o u p l e v e l he a p p e a r e d t o c o m m i t r e s e r v e s He p r a c t i c e d t h i s t h r o u g h o u t
in Russia.

in d i v i s i o n - s i z e e l e m e n t s .
remainder o f t h e campaign Second,

the

Seldom d i d he commit a

complete corps.

h e a p p e a r s t o h a v e made a n e f f o r t t o

r e c o n s t i t u t e a r e s e r v e a s soon as p o s s i b l e . aboue,

In t h e case c i t e d
10th P a n z e r

he d i d n o t do t h i s b e c a u s e h e s t i l l h a d

D i v i s i o n and G r o s s - D e u t s c h l a n d an army r e s e r u e . Add i t i o n a l l y

I n f a n t r y Regiment a v a i l a b l e as

Guder ian ' s r e t e n t i o n o f a c o r p s - s i z e d w h i c h h i s PPmaPKS

r e s e r v e had an a n c i l l a r y f u n c t i o n Leader suggest. he says:

i n PanZer
1941

A b o u t o p e r a t i o n s a r o u n d Moscow

i n December

I decided to...assemble

X X I V Panzer Corps

in

47

t h e Ore1 a r e a as army r e s e r v e so as t o g i v e t h e u n i t s o f t h a t c o r p s a s h o r t r e s t and t o c r e a t e a n o p e r a t i o n a l , m o b i l e f o r c e a t my disposal. (55)

It

is c l e a r t h a t G u d e r i a n saw t h e r e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f
r e f i t t i n g and r e s t i n g h i s u n i t s .

a reserve

a s a means f o r throughout

His operations

t h e R u s s i a n C a m p a i g n show t h a t h e c o n t i n u e d t o

r e v i t a l i z e t h e f i g h t i n g power o f h i s u n i t s b y r o t a t ing t h e m i n t o a r e s e r v e s t a t u s when h e deemed a p p r o p r i a t e . t h e a n a l o g y o f r o t a t i n g t h e p o i n t marl Here perhaps

i s a r t : Guderian

recognized t h e p o t e n t i a l hazarards associated w i t h Keeping units i n combat w i t h o u t r e s p i t e . Guderian's statement about

a m o b i l e r e s e r v e h e r e was

e c h o e d l a t e r when h e s e r v e d a s C h i e f o f t h e A r m y A b o u t Rornmel's p l a n f o r says :

General S t a f f .

t h e defense o f t h e A t l a n t i c Wall he

It i s . . . a matter of considerable regret that R o r m l f a i l e d t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e need f o r possessing mobile reserues.<56>

G u d e r i a n ' s s t a n c e on t h e q u e s t i o n o f m o b i l e r e s e r v e s r a i s e s a s u b j e c t which has been i n t e n s e l y debated s i n c e t h e A l l i e d l a n d i n g s on Normandy. This debate about whether a forward

d e f e n s e was b e t t e r t h a n o n e w h i c h r e l i e d o n m o b i l e r e s e r v e s i s not here a t thought issue, b u t G u d e r i a n ' s comment i l l u s t r a t e s t h a t he or

it proper t o conduct operational art--defensively

offensively--employ one-fourth

i n g an o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e c o m p r i s i n g f r o m

t o one-third

of: t h e m o b i l e c o m b a t f o r c e s a v a i l a b l e .

I n defens i v e o p e r a t i o n s Guder ian t h o u g h t o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s

48

s h o u l d b e u s e d t o C o u n t e r a t t a C K t h e flanK.5 enemy.<57> O f f e n s i v e l y ,

o f an a t t a C K i n g

h i s c o n c e p t i o n was t h a t t h e r e s e r v e t h e d e p t h and f l e x i b i l i t y f l a n K S and m a i n t a i n t h e

g a v e t h e c o r p s o r a r m y commander necessary t o p r o t e c t vulnerable

momentum o f o f f e n s i u e o p e r a t i o n s b y c o m i t t whenever defenses. BY t h i s t i m e o f operational and w h e r e v e r

ins t h e r e s e r v e
i n t h e enemy

i t c o u l d e x p l o i t a weaKneSs

it s h o u l d be c l e a r t h a t G u d e r i a n ' s c o n c e p t i o n
though not devoid o f defensive concepts,

art,

was p r i m a r i l y o f f e n s i v e four tenets:

i n c h a r a c t e r and c a n b e summarized by

M a i n a t t a c K s s h o u l d b e c o n d u c t e d on a n a r r o w frontage t o ensure p e n e t r a t i o n : "Klotzen, n i c h t KlecKern. Heavy c o n c e n t r a t i o n s o f a r m o r f o r c e s s u p p o r t e d b y o t h e r a r m s s h o u l d s e r v e as t h e s p e a r h e a d o f main attacKs. Main a t t a c K s s h o u l d have as t h e i r o b j e c t t h e attainment o f operational depth t o cut enemy 1 i n e s o f c o m r n u n i c a t i o n a n d S t o p e m p l o y m e n t o f enemy r e s e r v e s . ( 5 8 )
quiCK

fi m i x e d r e s e r v e o f t a n K s a n d m o t o r i z e d i n f a n t r y should f o l l o w t h e main e f f o r t t o e x p l o i t s u c c e s s and p r o t e c t t h e p a r e n t u n i t ' s most vulnerable flanK.<53>

TaKen t o g e t h e r ,

these four

tenets describe the offensive art. He a p p a r e n t l y b e 1 i e v e d

essence o f Guderian each o f

's

operational

t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s was a Key e l e m e n t for

i n s e t t i n g up t h e
B u t a s we

c o n d i t i o n s necessary

o p e r a t i o n a l dec i s iveness.

49

w i l l now f e e , a l s o K e y t o o p e r a t i o n a l d e c i s i u e n e s s was t h e n e e d

t o g a i n a n d m a i n t a i n t h e momentum o f t h e a t t a c K .

MOMENTUM

P h y s i c i s t s g e n e r a l l y d e f i n e momentum q u a n t i t a t i u e l y a s t h e

mass o f a n o b j e c t m u l t i p l i e d b y

its v e l o c i t y o r s p e e d . For t h e

p r e s e n t p u r p o s e s , t h i s d e f i n i t i o n is u s e f u l b e c a u s e i t
illuminates t h e essential ingredients Guder ian thought

necesSarY f o r o f f e n s i u e o p e r a t i o n s t o a t t a i n t h e d e p t h a n d , u l t i m a t e l y , d e c i s i v e n e s s necessary t o succeed. H i s s t u d y of offensiue operations conducted i n W o r l d War

I,

especially the

B a t t l e of C a m b r a i , l e d h i m a n d o t h e r t h i n K e r s t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n
that

s u f f i c i e n t mobile reseruas--exploitation

forces--were

neuer planned,

a n d as a c o n s e q u e n c e , o p e r a t i o n a l d e c is i u e n e s s

was n e v e r o b t a i n e d .

I n p a r t t h e d i f f i c u l t y was t e c h n o l o g i c a l

b e c a u s e t h e r e were n o t a n K s f o r rnuch o f t h e war a n d , m o r e o u e r . s u p p o r t i n g arms s u c h a s a r t i l l e r y were n o t a s m o b i l e a s t h e

t a n K S a n d s o n o g e n u i n e c o m b i n e d arms team was p o s s i b l e .

advent o f t h e tanK, t h e a i r p l a n e , and t h e s e l f - p r o p e l l e d howitzer changed a1 1 t h a t .
of

The

Guder ian recognized

the

ign if icance men l i K e

the technological

changes a n d melded t h e

ideas of

L i d d e l l Hart, F u l l e r , and d e G a u l l e

i n t o a worKable d o c t r i n e .

O n e of t h e e s s e n t i a l
already seen,

i n g r e d i e n t s of t h a t d o c t r i n e ,

as w h a v e e

i s t h e r e q u i r e m e n t f o r o f f e n s i u e a c t i o n bv

50

c o n c e n t r a t ions o f armored f o r c e s . that, i n very crude terms,

Here t h e p h y s i c i s t m i g h t say panzer d i v i s i o n s

concentrations of

i n n a r r o w z o n e s o f a t t a c K c o n s t i t u t e t h e ma55 v a r i a b l e o f t h e
momentum e q u a t i o n . P r e s s i n g t h e comparison, we s h o u l d r e a d i l v

see t h a t G u d e r i a n t h o u g h t

a l l t h a t remained t o achieue the

d e s i r e d momentum was t o g e t m a s s e s o f t a n K s m o v i n g r a p i d l y toward t h e i r o b j e c t i v e s . thought t h e success of Not s u r p r i s i n s l y , than. Gllderian

a panzer corps o r panzer group attacK

depended g r e a t l y on t h e speed w i t h w h i c h fact, he t h o u g h t t h a t a h i g h tempo o f

i t was c a r r i e d o u t .
a tempo t o

In

operations,

w h i c h t h e enemy was u n a b l e t o r e a c t ,

was a b s o l u t e l y c r u c i a l t o t h i s s e c t i o n on

o p e r a t i o n a l s u c c e s s . < 6 0 > The p u r p o s e o f

momentum i s t o show how G u d e r i a n g a i n e d a n d m a i n t a i n e d momentum and, i n consequence, l a y o u t t h e p r i n c i p l e s of momentum u h i c h

g u i d e d h i s p l a n n i n g and c o n d u c t o f o p e r a t i o n a l a r t .

I t is c l e a r f r o m b o t h h i s w r i t i n g s a n d o p e r a t i o n s t h a t
G u d e r i a n t h o u g h t o n e s u r e m t h o d o f g a i n i n g momentum i n t h e f i r s t place i s b y s u r p r i s i n g t h e enemy. The r e q u i r e m e n t h e r e Guderian is

not for thought,

complete surprise: was a n e l e m e n t o f enemy

a l l t h a t was n e e d e d ,

surprise s u f f i c i e n t t o render the r e a c t i n g i n a manner c a p a b l e o f

defending

incapable of

d i s r u p t i n g t h e a t t a c K i n g commander's p l a n . sufficient merely t o have t a c t i c a l

N o r was

it

surprise,

f o r the effects What

c r e a t e d would n o t have t h e d e c i s i v e n e s s Guderian sought. was n e e d e d was some way o f

achieving o p e r a t i o n a l s u r p r i s e which irrelevant

w o u l d r e n d e r t h e e n e m y ' s r e a c t i o n s t o an a t t a C K

51

because of theoretical

their

laCK o f

timeliness.

Translated from the

into the practical,

t h e q u e s t i o n h e f a c e d was how formations

t o a c h i e v e ? . t l r P r i s e With massed armor tanKS and o t h e r v e h i c l e s . focus, of

with a l l t h e i r

To b r i n g t h e p r o b l e m i n t o c l e a r e r that a panzer d i u i s i o n

we n e e d o n l y t o d i g e s t t h e f a c t

1333 h a d o v e r
OCCUP!~

2600 t r a c K e d a n d w h e e l e d m ~ e h i c l e s a n d c o u l d miles o f r o a d s p a c e . < 6 1 ? The p r o b l e m , of

easily course, with

f i f t y

is

magnif ied

i f o n e wants t o c o n d u c t

a surprise attacK

a corpz. c o n s i s t i n g o f t h r e e s u c h d i u i s i o n s .
Guderian found the

In s p i t e o f

t h e magnitude o f t h e problem, a c h i e v i n g t h e s u r p r i s e and,

t w o rnothods o f

hence,

i n i t i a l momentirm h e

needed t o g a i n dec i s i u e r e s u l t s :
of

n i g h t movements and a v o i d a n c e units.

forward

passage t h r o u g h

infantry

I n e v e r y c a m p a i g n i n w h i c h G u d e r i a n p a r t i c i p a t e d h e made
e x t e n s i v e use of n i g h t movement t o conceal his intentions from

t h e enemy a n d g a i n s u r p r i s e . Pol ish, Flanders,

For t h e opening phases o f t h e a11 attaCK of h i s u n i t s were for instance, i n t o Poland moved into

a n d R u s s i a n Campaign;,

prevarat ions

i n u o l u i n g f o r w a r d movement

conducted a t n i g h t was n o t i f i e d t h e n e x t day

G u d e r i a n 's X I X Flrmy C o r p s ,

on 3 1 Flugust

1333 t h a t

it w o u l d a t t a c K

a t 0445 hours.

H i s corps subsequently

planhed attacK p o s i t i o n s d u r i n g t h e evening of jumped o f f on t i m e

31 Hugust and
preparations f o r
'J

1 September.<62> S i m i l a r l y ,

t h e o p e n i n g p h a s e o f O p e r a t i o n BfiRBfiROSSA r e q u i r e d a l l movement t o b e a c c o m p l i s h e d u n d e r s e t f o r 6415 hours, cover of

irtuall y
with

darltness,

H-hour

22 J u n e

1941.

Guderian thought t h a t

52

t o aid

in achieving surprise

intense but short a r t i l l e r y

' 5

p r e p a r a t i o n s . of fact,

a b o u t one h o u r

d u r a t i o n were a p p r o p r i a t e .

In

he weighed t h e r e l a t i v e m e r i t s o f d i s p e n s i n g w i t h t h e t h e o p e n i n g phase of BARBHROSSA, important

a r t i l l e r y Preparation for

t h i n K i n g t h a t p e r h a p s t h e s u r p r i s e e f f e c t was m o r e than the increase

i n German c a s u a l t i e s w i t h o u t t h e p r e p a r a t i o n . preparation

Ultimately,

h e d e c i d e d t o go w i t h t h e o n e - h o u r

becauz.e h e was

c o n v i n c e d t h e R u s s i a n s were c o m p l e t e l y

in the

d a r K a b o u t German o p e r a t i o n a l operations

i n t e n t i o n s . <63> S u b s e q u e n t i n d i c a t e d t h a t movement

i n t h e R u s s i a n Campaign

under cover of

d a r K n r s s was t h e r u l e r a t h e r t h a n t h e e x c e p t i o n

i n G i l d e r i a n 's c o n d u c t o f o p e r a t i o n s . G u d e r i a n ' s , c r o s s i n g o f t h e D n e i p e r R i v e r on
<0+13' i l l u s t r a t r s n o t o n l y h i s u s e of

10 J u l y

1941

d a r K n e s s t o maSK h i s desire t o

i n t e n t i o n s and a c h i e v e s u r p r i s e b u t a l s o h i s f e r v e n t avoid passing through less mobile would infantry divisions, BY 7 ' J u l y

which
1941

i m p e d e h i s e f f o r t s t o g a i n mornrntum.
' 5

Guderian

Second Panzer Group had r e a c h e d t h e f o r m i d a b l e a n a t u r a l obstacle along which Russian

i f given

One i p e r R i v e r 1 i n e , forces

u o u l d be a b l e t o e s t a b l i s h a coherent defense

t i m e t o do s o . aver

G u d e r i a n ' s panzer t h r u s t s had c a r r i e d h i s u n i t s c o m p l e t e l ~o u t r u n n i n g t h e

450 K i l o m e t e r s i n n i n e t e e n d a y s , infantry

slower moving panzer group. infantry

d i v i s i o n s from t h e armies f o l l o w i n g h i s
i t would taKe

Estimating that

14 d a y s f o r

those

d i v i s i o n s t o c l o s e t o t h e D n e i p e r R i v e r and S e i z e h i s panzer corpz., G u d e r i a n d e c i d e d t o move

bridgeheads f o r

53

u n d e r c o v e r of of t h e D n e i p e r

darKness

i n t o a t t a C K p o s i t i o n s o n t h e west banK

i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r c r o s s i n g s on t h e m o r n i n g o f
his 1 7 t h and 18th Panzer

10 J u l y . T h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f

Divisions s o u t h o f Orsha and t h e

around Mogileu

1 0 t h a n d 3rd P a n z e r O i u i s i o n s

( S e e Map 3 )

tOOK

place smoothly d u r i n g t h e

n i g h t s of 8 and 3 J u l y . G u d e r i a n ' s s u r p r i s e crossing of t h e Dneiper caught t h e Russians off guard,

an advantage Guderian

e x p l o i t e d by o r d e r i n g h i s lead u n i t s t o c o n t i n u e attacKing during the night of

As s u g g e s t e d

10 J u l v . < G J >

e a r l i e r , t h i s exarwle also i l l u s t r a t e s

Guder ian

' 5

avers ion t o p a s s i n g mechan i z e d f o r m a t i o n s t h r o u g h

units.

foot-mobile

General u o n K l u g e , G u d e r i a n ' s

immediate

s u p e r i o r , o b j e c t e d t o G u d e r i a n ' s scheme for c r o s s i n g t h e Dneiprr without the support of wag. t o o r i n K y - - a infantry diuisions, claiming
it

p o i n t t o be addressed

in a later s e c t i o n on

r is^. F o r t h e p r e s e n t d i s c u s s i o n , G u d e r ian ls c o u n t e r - a r g u m e n t
was t h a t w a i t i n g f o r t h e
i n f a n t r y u n i t s t o c a t c h up t o t h e

armor f o r m a t i o n s w o u l d d e s t r o y t h e m o m e n t u r n o f t h e a t t a c K ,
which Guder i a n deemed en.sent ial f o r s u c c e s s . Cons istent with

h i s e a r l i e r a r g u m e r n t s a b o u t c r o s s i n g t h e Meuse a n d f i i s n e R i v e r s i n France t h e p r e v i o u s y e a r , G u d e r i a n t h o u g h t p a s s i n g m o b i l e

units through

infantry units only

impeded g a i n i n g and

m a i n t a i n i n g momentum. he says:

In f a c t , a b o u t t h e c r o s s i n g o f t h e fiisne

1 d i d n o t c a r e for t h e i d e a of attacKing t h r o u g h t h e i n f a n t r y d i u is i o n s , s i n c e t h e i r numerous and l a r g e s u p p l y columns tended t o

54

blOcK t h e r o a d s . . . . < 6 5 :

In b o t h of

those e a r l i e r operations he argued successfully t h a t and horse-drawn 8Jehicles of the infantry and c o n t r o l b u t t o moue

t h e equipment

d i u i 3 i o n s n u t o n l y s e r v e d t o c o m p l i c a t e command a l s o clC8gged t h e r o a d n e t s ,

w h i c h were v i t a l l y n e e d e d

t a n K j a n d a r m o r e d r e c o n n a i s s a n c e u e h i c l a s a l o n g . Flc i n t h o s e
e a r I i e r o p e r a t i o n s , G u d e r ian s s u p e r i o r - - u o n
case--relented, aid of the Kluge

in t h i s

and Gudsrian crossed t h e Oneiper without t h e t h e r e b y r e t a i n i n g t h e h i g h tempo

infantry diuisions,

a n d momenturn o f

o p e r a t i o n s he d e s i r e d . The payoff

later at
and u u e r

S r n o I e n s K , o f c o u r s e , was p h e n o m e n a l :

185,080 p r i s o n e r s

2000 t a n K s c a p t u r e d .
G u d e r i a n s t e c h n i q u e of n i g h t mouement r a i s e s a n worth examining:
words

issue

how d i d h e c o n t r o l s u c h m o u e m e n t ? H i s own

in

FIrmored F o r c e s p r o u i d e p a r t o f t h e a n s w e r .

C a r e f u l d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e u a r ious approaches in friendly territory, especially for night mouements, w i l l add g r e a t l y t o a smooth t r a f f i c f l o w . Gulded by an ample number of r o a d s i g n s a n d t r a f f i c g u a r d s , t h e t P n K S may r e a c h t h e concentrat ion z o n e s q u i e t l y and w i t h o u t t h e use of 1 i g h t s . ( 6 6 )

Here G u d e r i a n
;uccess--study nets.
This

is ~ - 1 i g g e s t i n g t h e o b v i o u s f i r s t s t e p t o w a r d
t h e map, see t h e t e r r a i n a n d

its s u p p o r t i n g r o a d

is e x a c t l y w h a t h e d i d

in h i s operations because

rap i d c o n c e n t r a t ion of

armored format ions and d e e p e x p l o itat ion

i n t o o p e r a t i o n a l d e p t h s require s u p p o r t in9 road networKs, point Gudrrian clearly appreciated.

U s e of

traffic s i g n s and

5s -

g u i d e s a r e o t h e r common s e n s e S t e p s t o t a K e f o r n i g h t rnouement, b u t d e s e r v e arnpl i f i c a t i o n .

control during

Fllthough n o t

established r e g u l a r l y u n t i l t h e beginning o f the Russian Campaign, the Staff of German p a n z e r d i u i i o n s h a d a n o f f i c e r ; O f f i c e r f o r M a r c h S u p e r v i s i o n (STOMFl). d e s i g n a t e d as BY t h e o p e n i n g

BRRBRROSSR, e a c h p a n z e r d i v i s i o n h a d a d e 5 i g n a t e d o f f i c e r i n t h e o p e r a t i o n s s e c t i o n whose ~ o s i t l o n o d a y we m i g h t t R e g u l a t i o n and C o n t r o l O f f i c e r C o n t r o l flnnex f o r an

worKing

c a l l t h e G-3,Traffic (G-B/TRACO).

The TRRCO w r o t e t h e T r a f f i c

D p e r a t iorl o r d e r and,

employ i n g a s s e t s f r o m t h e d i v i s i o n

r n i l i t a r y p o l i c e cornpany a n d d i u i s i o n r n o t o r c y c l e r n e s s e n g e r
platoon, ensured t r a f f i c moved i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h a t a n n e x The c r e a t i o n
in

support of

t h e o v e r a l l concept o f operation.!67> position attests t o the hence,

of this staff traffic

i m p o r t a n c e p l a c e d on n i g h t rnovernent f o r

r e g u l a t i o n and,

secrecy of

purpos.es o f c o n c e n t r a t i o n - - a 1 1 d i r e c t e d t o w a r d a c h i e v i n g o p e r a t i o n a l s u r p r i s e a n d mornenturn s o u i t a l t o o p e r a t i o n a l success. I n a d d i t i o n t o mouernent a t n i g h t t o a c h i e v e u n d e t e c t e d c o n c e n t r a t i o n of armored f o r c e s and auoidance of passage

t h r o u g h o t h e r u n i t s t o g a i n momentum,

Guderian r e t a i n e d

mornenturn b y m o v i n g d i v i s i o n s a l o n g m u l t i p l e p a r a l l e l a x e s , bypass.ing p o i n t 5 o f r e s i s t a n c e , and a l w a y s e x h o r t i n g h i s

3

s u b o r d i n a t e commanders t o m a i n t a i n o p e r a t ions--speed, he t h o u g h t ,

h i g h terrGo o f

was a b s o l u t e l y e s s e n t i a l . immediately

Seldom, d i d G u d e r i a n a l l o w o n e u n i t t o f o l l o w

56

behind another.
Parallel

R a t h e r , he t h o u g h t t h a t m o u e m e n t a l o n g m u l t i p l e
it r e d u c e d t h e

a x e s was rnuch p r e f e r a b l e b e c a u s e

p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t h i s c o r p s o r p a n z e r g r o u p ' s attacKs would s t a l l o u t , and t h i s f o r d

i U

several reasons.

F i r 5 t r with multiple

is i o n s o r c o r p s a t t a c i~ g a l o n g p a r a 1 l e l a x e s , m u t u a l n

SUP POP^ a r r ~ o n g t h o i e f o r m a t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y f l a n K s e c u r i t y , was possible. This point

is c l e a r l y

i l l u s t r a t e d by G u d e r i a n ' s

a t t a c K w i t h X I X A r m y C o r p s i n t h e F l a n d e r s C a m p a i g n . He c r o s s e d
Luxembourg and t h e Meuse R i v e r w i t h t h r e e p a n z e r d i v i s i o n s abreast, with 1st Panzer Division 2nd and i n t h e c e n t e r d e s i g n a t e d as in

t h e main e f f o r t .

1 ' 3 t h P a n z e r D i v i s i o n s were

positions to protect the

attaCK5.

1st P a n z e r D i u i i i o n f r o m f l a n ~

F1 s e c o n d r e a s o n f o r u s e o f p a r a l l e l a x e s was t h a t S h o u l d o n e d i u i s i o n g e t h e l d up b e c a u s e of s t i f f enemy r e s i s t a n c e , t h e main p o i n t of called--could enjoying

attaCK--Or

schwerpunKt as it

is sometimes

b e s h i f t e d t o a n o t h e r d i v i s i o n o r c o r p s w h i c h was T h i s p r o c e s s of s h i f t i n g t h e s c h w e r P u n K t h a d
it

S U C C ~ : . ~ .

t h e a d d i t i o n a l b e n e f i t of c o n f o u n d i n g t h e enemy b e c a u s e cont inuall:, p r e s e n t e d h i m w i t h a new t h r e a t ,

requiring the

enemy commander t o r e a c t r a t h e r t h a n d e l i b r r a t e l y e x e c u t e h i s oidn p l a n . N o w h e r e was t h i ;

e f f e c t more pronounced t h a n i n t h e
i n a b i l i t y t o react

F l a n d e r s Campaign.

The F r e n c h h i g h c o r r r n a n d ' s

t o a changing s i t u a t i o n

i n a t i m e l y enough f a s h i o n i r well
What
iS

d o c u m e n t e d a n d n e e d s no f u r t h e r d e s c r i p t i o n h e r e . important f o r present purposes

i s t o u n d e r s t a n d how G u d e r i a n

57

r e t a i n e d t h e momentum o f
so f l e x i b i l i t y

h i s attacK: advance on m u l t i p l e a x e s

i n t h e p o i n t of m a i n e f f o r t c o u l d b e m a i n t a i n e d .

t h e c o n c e p t o f m u l t i p l e z x e s was n o t

BY i t s e l f , h o w e v e r , s u f f ic i e n t

G u d e r i a n a l s o d i r e c t e d h i s c o m m a n d e r s t o b y p a s s enemy s t r o n g p o i n t s and c e n t e r s o f resistance and l e t follow-on i n f a n t r y u n i t s r e d u c e s u c h p o c ~ e t s . As a n e x a m p l e , R u s s i a n C a m p a i g n G u d e r i a n was

'J

in t h e

iolently opposed t o having h i s

i n pocKet r e d u c t ion
POCKet

P a n z a r d i v is i o n s or c o r p s p a r t i c i p a t e operations. June

A f t e r c l o s u r e of t h e MinsK-BialYstoK

o n 27

1941, G u d e r i a n o p p o s e d

d e l a y i n g panzer elements f r o m

e x e c u t i n g subsequent operat ions which e n t a i l e d c r o s s i n g t h e Beresina River and s e i z i n g the f i r s t o p e r a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e of t h e campaign, t h e area of S m o l e n s K - E l n y a - R o s l a v l . About t h i s

phase o f t h e o p e r a t i o n h e says:

M! v i e w s c o n c e r n i n g t h e n e x t s t a g e o f t h e ! o p e r a t i o n s were a s f o l l o w s : t o d e t a c h t h e minimum a m o u n t of t h e Panzer G r o u p f o r t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e R u s s i a n s i n t h e BialVstOK PocKet, w h i l e l e a v i n g t h e m a j o r P a r t of t h i s o p e r a t i o n f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g i n f a n t r y armies: t h u s our r a p i d l y m o b i l e , m o t o r i z e d forces would b e a b l e t o push forward and seize t h e f i r s t o p e r a t i o n a l o b j e c t iue o f t h e campaign.. C68>

..

E v i d e n t l y , G u d e r i a n ' s c o n c e r n was t h a t v a l u a b l e a n d i r r e p l a c e a b l e c o m b a t power n e e d e d f o r a c h i e v e m e n t of o p e r a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e s would b e d i s s i p a t e d by u s i n g p a n z e r and P a n z e r - g r e n a d ier d i u is i o n s t o r e d u c e e n e m y PocKets of resistance. Moreover, and t h i s
is m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l ,

Guderian

58

t h o u g h t ~ . u c hp a u s e s

i n t h e tempo of o p e r a t i o n s would d e s t r o y allow t h e enemy t o e s t a b l i s h

t h e momentum of t h e a t t a C K ,

c o h e r e n t d e f e n s e s , and ser i o u s l v j e o p a r d i z e t h e a t t a i n m e n t of Key o p e r a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e s ,

As t h i s d i s c u s s i o n i l l u s t r a t e s ,

G u d e r ian

'5

c o n c e p t i o n of

o p e r a t i o n a l a r t demanded a h i g h t e m p o o r s p e e d of o p e r a t i o n s .

I n t h e F l a n d e r s C a m p a i g n h i s army c o r p s c o v e r e d 50 m i l e s i n t h e

f i r s t t w o d a y s of t h e c a m p a i g n ;

o n 20 Flay a l o n e ,

in excellent

t a n K c o u n t r y , h i s l e a d e l e m e n t s c o v e r e d 56 m i l e s . < B 9 > I n t h e seven days between

149 m i l e s , 13 May a n d 20 May

h i s panzer u n i t s covered

an a u e r a g e d i s t a n c e o f 2 1 m i l e s p e r d a y . S i m i l a r l y ,

i n t h e R u s s i a n C a m p a i g n h i s p a n z e r u n i t s C G U e r e d 273 m i l e s i n
the f i r s t 7 days, and by
16 J u l y

1941 < 0 + 2 5 ) h i s f o r c e s h a d

p e n e t r a t e d 413 m i l e s

into the Russian frontier.

Here t h e

s u e r a g e d i s t a n c e ? . a c h i e v e d u e r e 39 m i l e s f o r t h e f i r s t s e v e n d a y s , t h e maxirnurn d i s t a n c e i n a n y o n e d a y h a u i n g b e e n 72 i n T h e War

miles.<70> blriting about Guderian's operations Lords, John Strawson says:

T h e e s s e n c e o f B1 i t z K r i e g was.. . s u r p r i s e , s p e e d a n d c o n c e n t r a t i o n . T h e t h r e e t h i n g s were o f c o u r s e s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g . They f e d u p o n e a c h other. Surprlse f a c i l i t a t e d speed; speed f o s t e r e d surprise; c o n c e n t r a t i o n enhanced b o t h . (71 >

T h i s is a n a p t c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n b o t h o f G u d e r i a n ' s o p e r a t i o n s a n d o f t h e d y n a m i c s a m o n g s u r p r i s e ? . s p e e d , a n d mass. A s s u g g e s t e d a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h i s s e c t i o n o n momentum,

mass

59

m u l t i p l i e d b y s p e e d g i v e s a mornenturn v e c t o r .

In o r d e r t o

act, i e u e t h e

i n i t i a l momentum, G u d e r i a n t h o u g h t s u r p r i s e
illustrate t h a t he

i n d i s p e n s a b l e , and h i s o p e r a t i o n a l methods

went t o great p a i n s t o a c h i e v e o p e r a t i o n a l s u r p r i s e whensver he cciild.

A surprise

armor a t t a c ~ - - s u r p r i s i n g in

its l o c a t i o n , his

f o r c e compos it i o n , c h a n g ing d i r s c t i o n , P a n z e r u n i t s t o p u n c h t h r o u g h We2.K

and speed--enabled

d e f e n s i v e areas

into the

r e a r o f t a c t i c a l d e f e n s e s . TaKen by t h e m s e l v e s , h o w e v e r , s u c h
P r o c e d u r e s w o u l d n o t , G u d e r i a n t h o u g h t , b e s u f f i c i e n t . He t h o u g h t m a i n t e n a n c e o f m o m e n t u r n was e s s e n t i a l o p e r a t ionill objectives and, hence, if

seizure of

operational decisiveness

were t o b e a c h i e u e d .

T h e r e f o r e , h e s o u g h t t o moue Parlzer

d i v i s i o n s and c o r p s a l o n g p a r a 1 l e l axes t o w a r d o p e r a t i o n a l objectives.

I - L I P P O P ~ ne o

P a r a l l e l movement would a l l o w a t t a c K i n g u n i t s t o

a n o t h e r , b y p a s s s t r o n g p o i n t s when n e c e s s a r y , a n d

c o n d u c t c o n v e r g i n g attacK5 when n e c e s s a r y t o s e i z e o p e r a t i o n a l ob.jectives. But

i n o r d e r t o m a i n t a i n a h i g h tempo of

o p e r a t i o n s , c o n g e s t e d a r e a s a n d enemy c e n t e r s of re5 i s t a n c e h a d
t o be bypassed. p o c K e t s of e n ~ e n t u a I:, l And m o b i l e f o r c e s c o u l d n o t b e t i e d U P r e d u c i n g o t h e r w i s e , s p e e d a n d momentum a n d ,

re5 istance:

the

i n i t i a t i u e ~ o u l db e l o s t .

To s u m m a r i z e b r i e f l y

, t h e following f iue tenets guided

G u d e r i a n i n h i s e f f o r t s t o g a i n a n d m a i n t a i n t h e mornenturn i n h i s c o n d u c t of o p e r a t i o n a l art:

Siirpr ise attacKs by

heavy c o n c e n t r a t ions of armored f o r c e s are essential f o r o p e r a t i o n a l success.

60

FIuo i d p a s s i n g t h r o u g h o t h e r f r i e n d l y f o r m a t i o n s b e c a u s e s u c h p a s s a g e s r e d u c e mornenturn.
flttacK o n r n u l t i p l e p a r a l l e l
sxes.

B y p a s s e n e m y s t r o n g p o i n t s w i t h mobile f o r c e s : u s e less m o b i l e f o r c e s t o r e d u c e a r e a s o f re5 i s t a n c e .

Keep m o o i n g a t t h e g r e a t e s t speed--re i n f o r c e s u c c e s s .

PGSSible

It

is a r g u a b l e t h a t o f t h e s e f i u e t s n e t s G u d e r i a n p r o b a b l y elements. flnd

r e g a r d e d s u r p r i s e a n d s p e e d as t h e two e s s e n t i a l s i n c e h e saw t h a t s p e e d o f

o p e r a t i o n s b e 3 e t s s u r p r i s e and

f u r t h e r arnpl i f i e s i t s e f f e c t s t h r o u g h o u t t h e e n e m y c o m m a n d a n d control structure,

it
i5

a l s o probably t r u e t h a t he thought

s p e e d was t h e a b s o l u t e l y Key p r i n c i p l e f o r s u c c e s s operations. It

is n o w o n d e r ,

in rnobile

then, that his troops

a f f e c t i o n a t e l y c a l l e d him "Hurrying Heinz."

61

cor#mrn

a n d CONTROL

Guderian's exercise of divisions

command a n d c o n t r o l

over

panzer

and p a n z e r c o r p s r e v e a l s h i s t e n e t s f o r force:

controlling his

h i g h l y m o b i l e combat leaderzhip style, because

and a l s o a i v e s a g l i m p s e o f and c h a r a c t e r . is This i s so

personality,

a command a n d c o n t r o l p h i l o s o p h y

intimately t i e d t o Guderian's

t h e commander's

l e a d e r s h i p s t y l e and p h i l o s o p h y .

command and c o n t r o l p r o c e d u r e s o f f e r e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e r e were t h r e e t e n e t s f o r control for the s o r t of an a d e q u a t e c o n c e p t o f h e commanded:

he thought
command a n d (1) lead

mobile forces

from the front;

(2) have a s m a l l ,

h i g h l y r n o b i l e cornmand p o s t : t o the greatest

(3) e m p l o y w i r e l e s s - r a d i o
possible extent.

communications

I n h i s booK German G e n e r a l s o f

W o r l d War

I f ,

Major-General

F . W.

von M e l l e n t h i n t e l l s a s t o r y about Heinz Guderian which importance Guderian accorded h i s f i r s t lead from the front. in full. von

aptly reflects the p r i n c i p l e of Me1 l e n t h i n

'5.

command a n d c o n t r o l : story

i w o r t h r e c o u n t in9 :

D u r i n g t h e Campaign i n F r a n c e , C o l o n e l D i n g l e r was d e t a c h e d b y t h e Army H i g h Command t o G u d e r i a n 's P a n z e r C o r p s as a 1 i a i s o n o f f i c e r . I n s e a r c h i n g f o r t h e g e n e r a l ' 5 command p o s t , O i n g l e r r a n i n t o a r t i l l e r y f i r e and g o t t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h e German a t t a c k i n t h a t j e c t o r was n o t g o i n g a c c o r d i n g t o p l a n . I n a d i t c h a t t h e r o a d s i d e he s p o t t e d a d i v i s i o n a l cornmandrr t a K i n g c o v e r w i t h one o f h i s s t a f f

62

o f f i c e r s . He j o i n e d t h e r n a n d a s K e d w h e r e h e c o u l d f i n d General Guderian. With a laugh they t o l d h i m , " I f y o u w a n t t o 5PBa.K t o t h e g e n e r a l , g r a b a r i f l e a n d i n c h y o u r way U P t o t h e c r e s t i n f r o n t o f u s . H e ' s UP t h e r e among t h e men, taKing potshots a t the French."<72>

A l t h o u g h t h i s s t o r y o v e r s t a t e s t h e case and r a i s e s t h e q u e s t i o n u h e t h e r a c o r p s comniander s h o u l d b e s p e n d i n g h i s v a l u a b l e t i m e " t a K i t l 9 p o t s h o t z " a t t h e enemy, Guderian thought

i t s fundamental p o i n t

is c l e a r :

a l l commanders s h o u l d b e w e l l

f o r w a r d so t h e y

c o u l d e x e r c i s e command a n d c o n t r o l t h r o u g h p e r s o n a l p r e s e n c e . Guderian's forces, comments o n t h e cornrnand a n d c o n t r o l o f

1336-37

armored

idhich he r e c o r d e d i n

i n "Flrrnored F o r c e s

,"

r e f l e c t s t h a t h i s s e n t i m e n t j were n o t a f t e r - t h e - f a c t r e f l e c t i o n s on t h e c o n t r o l o f s u c h u n i t s . commanders must p o s t themselves f a r He s t a t e d : '"F111

in f r o n t ,

w h e r e t h e y may

c o n s t a n t l y s u p e r v i s e t h e advance o f t h e i r Personal tenet influence

u n i t s and b r i n g t h e i r into this

t o bear."<73? Guderian p u t t e e t h

as w e l l

b y s p e n d i n g much t i m e down a t r e g i m e n t s ,

battalions,

and companies t r y i n g t o assess t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s o f t h e c h a n g i n g combat it is

"f inger

h i s s o l d i e r s and t h e d y n a m i c s o f

s i t u a t i b n . ( 7 4 ) The German p h r a s e f o r
s p i z e n g e f u e h l ," a n d
LiKe

i t rneans a f e e l

through the fingertips. Guderian believed t h a t for t h e ebb and f l o w Moreover, he

most of

t h e German o f f i c e r

corps,

t h e o n l y way a l e a d e r c a n h a v e a t r u e f e e l of a battle

i s t o be where t h e a c t i o n i s - - f o r w a r d . i n fast-mouing operations,

also

thought t h a t

the only place

63

f r o m w h i c h t h e c o m m a n d e r can e f f e c t i v e l y
by maKing t i m e l y d e c i s i o n s the battlefield.

i n f l u e n c e t h e act i o n
on

is f o r u a r d a t t h e c r i t i c a l s p o t ;
in P o l a n d ,

I n t ~ i r t u a l le ~ e r y o p e r a t i o n v

F l a n d e r s , a n d Russia G u d e r i a n l o c a t e d h i m s e l f

well-forward

with

t h e cornbat u n i t s w h e r e h e t h o u g h t h i s most t h r e a t e n e d formationi were. For example, i n t h e o p e n i n g p h a s e of his XIX

Army C o r p s ' 4 t t a C K

into Poland,

he a c c o m p a n i e d t h e 3 r d P a n z e r

Brigade of

t h e 3 r d Panzer O i u i s i o n , t h e c o r p s main e f f o r t ,

in

a n a r m o r e d command v e h i c l e .

In r e l a t i n g t h i s s t o r y , G u d e r i a n

p r o u d l y p o i n t s o u t t h a t h e was t h e f i r s t c o r p s c o m m a n d e r e v e r t o accompany t a n K s into battle

in t h a t f a s h i o n . < 7 5 > Although he

the

t h o u g h t t h a t many times

i n c o r n b a t t h e mere p r e s e n c e o f

commander m i g h t b e B u f f icient t o m a i n t a i n t h e h i g h tempo of o p e r a t i o n s he b e l i e v e d n e c e s s a r y f o r s u c c e s : , u n d e r s t o o d t h a t commanders, Guderian also had

e v e n i ~ e r ys e n i o r c o m m a n d e r s , immediately should

t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t Y t o taKe c h a r g e

inevitable

f r i c t i o n b e g i n t o s l o w t h e pace o f o p e r a t i o n s a n d j e o p a r d i z e

s u c c e s s . A n o t h e r example i n v o l v i n g t h e 3 r d P a n z e r D i v i s i o n i n
t h e Pol i s h Campaign t o his principle of P o l i;h

illustrates Guderian
leading forward.

' 5

cons istent adherence

fit o n e p o i n t e a r l y

in the

C a m p a i g n t h e 3 r d P a n z e r D i u is i o n 's a t t a C K s t a l l e d o u t
in t h e P o l i s h Corridor

along t h e Brahe River

when

its commander

was c a l l e d bacK t o

firmy

Group H e a d q u a r t e r s .

G u d e r i a n heard

a b o u t t h e s t a l l e d a t t a c K f r o m a y o u n g l i e u t e n a n t who b o l d l y t o l d Guderian the sad s i t u a t i o n at t h e r i v e r l i n e .

He

64

immediatslv

went forward,

p i c K i n g h i s way

among

i d l e German a n d

burned out P o l i s h uehicles, s i t u a t ion,

toOK c h a r g e o f a c o n f u s e d and

ordered reconnaissance u n i t s across t h e r i v e r , i n t o w h i c h he began m o v i n g i s no isolated

e s t i b l ished a bridgehead

anK5 a s inc ident ;

r a p i d l y as h e c o u l d . < 7 6 > This example G u d e r i a n h a d an uncanny c r i t i c a l place--at spizengefuehl he had s t a y e d headquarters. Several factors "lead forward" preached. ability

t o be a t t h e r i g h t P a c e - - t h e he e v i n c e d f i n g e r
50

the r i g h t tirnr:

a t every turn.

B u t h e n e v e r c o u l d h a v e done

if

i n and a r o u n d h i s c o r p s o r p a n z e r g r o u p

allowed Guderian t o p u t h i s p r i n c i p l e o f First, he p r a c t i c e d what he

into operation.

RY g o i n g f o r w a r d h e s e t t h e e x a m p l e ;

he v i r t u a l l y

forced h i s subordinate corps, commanders t o go f o r w a r d a l s o .

d i u i s ion,

and r e g i m e n t a l

One o f h i s m e t h o d s o f o p e r a t i o n forward

was t o m e e t c o r p s a n d d i v i s i o n a l c o m m a n d e r s a t t h e i r command p o c t s . formal There i s no e v i d e n c e t h a t he e v e r

i n s i s t e d on

b r i e f ing;,

preferring

instead t o discuss the current a s i m p l e o p e r a t i o n s map. a

s i t u a t i o n and f u t u r e o p e r a t i o n s o v e r Second, there

i s ample e v i d e n c e t h a t Guderian b e l i e v e d t h a t command a n d c o n t r o l

corollar'/ "Keep

t o h i s three-tenet

p h i l o s o p h y was
5tOt-l'

it s i m p l e . "

On t h i s s c o r e ,

Guderian recounts t h e

of

h i s encounter

with General uon Hindenburr Hindenburg remarKed t h a t

a t t h e c l o s e of
" ' [ i l n war

the

1933 m a n e u v e r s .

o n l y what

i<.m p l e c a n s u c c e e d . si

I v i s i t e d the s t a f f o f the Cavalry

Guderian's r e f l e c t i o n

Curps.

What

I saw t h e r e was n o t s i m p l e . " '

65

on H i n d e n b u r g '

r e m a r K s was:
5

"He was qu i t e r i g h t . " < 7 7 >The i n fast-mov i n g

connect ion between

imp1 i c i t y and s u c c e s s

operations should be c l e a r : c ~ n v e v e dt h e c o m m a n d e r ' s

a simple plan which c l e a r l y o v e r a l l p u r p o s e and w h i c h

intent or

l e a v e s t h e e x e c u t i o n l a r g e l y UP t o s u b o r d i n a t e cornrnanders w i l l have a g r e a t e r p r o b a b i l i t y of any s o r t , s u c c e s s t h a n an e l a b o r a t e p l a n o f i r r e l e v a n t once t h e

W h i c h w o u l d s u r e l y become intervened.

f r i c t i o n o f idar Hfter t h e flrrnv change

t h e war

Guderian lamented t h a t H i t l e r ' s c o n t r o l over

in t h e l a t e r stages o f

H i g h Command

t h e war

led t o a

i n the standard "'procedure of

assigning m i s s i o n s ' by

w h i c h t h e s u b o r d i n a t e commander r e c e i v e d a m i s s i o n w i t h manner o f e x e c u t i o n l e f t t o h i s own

its

i n i t i a t i v e . " < 7 8 > This

p r o c e d u r e g a v e wa!, outdated by events.

t o r i g i d o r d e r s t h a t were f r e q u e n t l y

H t h i r d P o i n t i s t h a t h e a l s o Knew h e c o u l d
fluid o p e r a t i o n s b y r e l y i n g on

n o t command s u c h f a s t ,

i n f o r m a t i o n corning UP f r o m r e g iment t o d i v i s i o n t o c o r p s . Because t h e f r o n t s on w h i c h he advanced were r e l a t i v e l y n a r r o w , h e was a b l e t o f o c u s the o p r r a t ion--the

f i r s t hand. <79>

h i s a t t e n t i o n on t h e c r i t i c a l a s p e c t of get c r i t i c a l informat ion

schwerpunKt--and

A f i n a l f a c t o r must h a v e been t h e degree of

confidence h e was a b l e t o h o l d i n h i s s t a f f ,

t r u s t and

espec i a l l ? h i s Gudrrian

chiefs of staff. maKes Post,

T h r o u g h o u t h i s booK P a n z e r L e a d e r ,

i t c l e a r t h a t h e s p e n t l i t t l e t i m e a t h i s m a i n command
where h i s c h i e f of s t a f f and t h e b u l ~ f h i s s t a f f o

66 -

o f f i c e r s worKed. for instance,

During t h e c r i t i c a l b a t t l e s around S n i o l e n s ~ ,
'5

d u r i n g which Guder i a n

a n d H o t h 's p a n z e r g r o u p s

e n c i r c l e d m o r e t h a n t e n R u s s i a n d i v i s i o n s a n d 2000 t a n K s , G u d e r i a n was a b s e n t f r o r n h i s p a n z e r g r o u p h e a d q u a r t e r s f o r twenty-two h o u r s . C 8 0 > Hence, h e r e 1 i e d h e a v i l y o n t h e

c o m p e t e n c e o f h i s c h i e f o f s t a f f t o r u n o p e r a t i o n s w h i l e h e was forward. An i n t e r e s t i n g f a c t t h a t s u p p o r t s t h i s view is that

G u d e r i a n made e v e r y e f f o r t t o taKe h i s c o r p s a n d g r o u p s t a f f s w i t h h i m a s h e mo'Jed f r o m o i i e c o m m a n d t o a new c o m m a n d . When h e

g a v e u p cornmand o f t h e X I X Flrrny C o r p s a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f t h e P a l i s h Campaign, G u d e r i a n tooK h i s s t a f f Then, with him f o r the

attacK

i n t o France.

when h e t o o K command of P a n z e r g r u p p e
t h e Campaign

G u d e r i a n f o r the s e c o n d p h a s e of
t o o K h i s s t a f f f r o m XI:!

in France, he

Army C o r p s w i t h h i r n . < 8 1 > I n e s s e n c e ,

LO

t h e y b e c a m e h i s new p a n z e r g r o u p s t a f f , z r n o o t h o p e r a t i o n s was b u i l t

t h e mechanism f o r

i n t o G u d e r i a n ' s own e s t a b l i s h e d This

s t a f f p r o c e d u r e s and t h e t h i n K i n g of h i s s t a f f o f f i c e r s .
is a n i m p o r t a n t p o i n t b e c a u s e a s K e n n e t h MacKseY a r g u e s :

N e l t h e r t h e wider f r o n t a g e [of a g r o u p 1 n o r t h e i n c r e a s e d enemy r e s i s t a n c e made a n y d i f f e r e n c e t o G u d e r i a n ' s c o n d u c t o f o p e r a t i o n s . He h a n d l e d a Group as h e h a n d l e d a Corps--by p e r s o n a l l e a d e r s h i p a t t h e f r o n t by w i r e l e s s - - a n d overcame t h e p a u c i t y o f t h e r o a d s b y WorKing h i s s t a f f a n d d r i v e r s t h a t much h a r d e r i n h i s e f f o r t s t o Keep i n t o u c h w i t h t h e t a n K s a t t h e s p e a r h e a d o f t h e a c t i o n . (82)

The salient f e a t u r e of

t h i s comrnent

is t h a t

it r e f l e c t s t h a t

G u d e r i a n commanded a n d c o n t r o l l e d a g r o u p o f

two t o four

COPPS

67

i n t h e sarne m a n n e r h e c o n t r o l l e d a c o r p s o f t h r e e d i u i s i o n s :
led from the front. m a t t e r e d uer!, For Guderian, size of the organization

he

l i t t l e .

Rut

i n order t o apply t h i s f i r s t

tenet o f

h i s command a n d c o n t r o l p h i l o s o p h y , tido o t h e r t e n e t s : emPhy a small,

LIST

Guderian had t o adhere to

h i g h l y r n o b i l e f o r w a r d command

p o s t a n d maKe e x t e n s i v e airplane. Consistent

o f w i r e l e s s cornrnunications and an

i n h i s a p p l i c a t i o n of

the p r i n c i p l e o f equal

mob il i t ? among c o m b i n e d a r m s u n i t % , G u d e r I a n deemed i t e z s e n t i a l t h a t he o p e r a t e o u t o f command p o s t . a zmall, mobile forward "rnaneuuer

a tanK
,

In

"Flrrnored F o r c e s " h e s t a t e s t h a t

b e i n g r a p i d and

i t being necessary f o r
h i s command,"

t h e commander o f

u n i t t o be a t t h e head of uehicler that

o n l y armored s i g n a l

p o z s e s s h i g h m o b i l i t y c a n be u s e d . < S 3 > t h e requ irement f o r h i g h rnob il i t y v i r t u a l l y

Furthermore,

d i c t a t e d t h a t h i s forward otherwise,

command p o s t b e s m a l l a n d a u s t e r e :

h i s cornmand p o s t c o u l d n e v e r d i s p l a c e r a p i d l Y a n d b e

r e s p o n s i v e t o h i s need t o remain w i t h t h e 5chwerpunKt. d e s c r i b e s h i s own command s t a f f

Guderian

a t t h e beginning o f t h e Russian

C a m p a i g n as a command s . t a f f c o n s i s t i n g o f t w o a r m o r e d w i r e l e s s trucKs,

a "number o f cross c o u n t r y u e h i c l e s , "

a n d some

r n o t o r c y c l i s t s . ( 8 4 ) C o m p l e m e n t i n g t h i s command p o s t a r r a n g e m e n t a n d h i s command a n d c o n t r o l p h l l o s O p h y was G u d e r i a n ' s u s e o f

light

l i a i s o n plane,

a Fieseler Storch

(Fl

156).

He f r e q u e n t l y

used t h i s d e d i c a t e d p l a n e t o t r a n s p o r t

h i m s e l f q u i c K 1 7 t o one influence the action.

of

h i s c o r p s so he c o u l d be on hand t o

68

H a v i n g e n h a n c e d m o b i l i t y t h r o u g h t h e use o f ParticularlY beneficial

a plane proved

i n t h e R u s s i a n Campaign b e c a u s e o f t h e

'vast d i s t a n c a s h i s g r o u n d u n i t s c o v e r e d a t a r a p i d p a c e . Frequently, and h a l i e he would leave h i s forward command p o s t b y p l a n e l a n d r o u t e t o meet h i r n

i t moue b y t h e m o s t e x p e d i t i o u s

a t a predetermined location, a r m o r e d command u e h i c l e . The f i n a l operate forward

w h e r e h e w o u l d o n c e a g a i n moue b y

c r i t i c a l element which allowed Guderian t o a5 h e d i d w i t h a s m a l l , C l e x i b l e command p o s t H i s t r a i n i n g and

in signal
unit5

was h i s r e l i a n c e o n r a d i o c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . experiences a s a cornmander a n d s t a f f

officer

d u r i n g W o r l d War

I convinced Guderian t h a t w i r e l e s s
an o p e r a t i o n 1

c o m m u n i c a t i o n s w o u l d be an e s s e n t i a l p a r t of d o c t r i n e Which e n v i s i o n e d t h e employment of a fluid, way fast-moving battlefield. Otherwise,

armored u e h i c es on t h e r e would be no

a c o r p s o r g r o u p commander,

whose p e r s o n a l p r e s e n c e was over

r e q u i r e d a t t h e f o r w a r d edge, some 300,000 men divisions.

c o u l d ever maintain c o n t r o l

i n f o u r c o r p s a n d a s many a s t h i r t e e n

There had t o be L secure, Hence,

w i r e l e s s means o f

cornmun i c a t i o n . diuisions, commander

' 5

Guder i a n e n s u r e d t h a t h i s p a n z e r

i n c l u d i n g most o f h i s t a n K s and a l l h i s s u b o r d i n a t e command p o s t s , were 1 inKed by w i r e l e s s

communications.

In t h e two armored c a r s which comprised h i s

secure w i r e l e s s

m o b i l e command p o s t h e h a d r e d u n d a n t communications, chief

of

e n a b l i n g hirn t o communicate r a p i d l y w i t h h i s and m a j o r s u b o r d i n a t e commanders. For h i s attaCK

staff

63

into France

in

1940 a l m o s t a l l o f

t h e tanKs

in h i s t h r e e panzer

d i v i s i o n s had r a d i o s which e n a b l e d t h e m t o r e c e i u e s h o r t "frag orders" in response t o rapidly changing circumstances. o f t h e F r e n c h tanK5 were in Guderian's judgment
69

cilntrast, o n l y about o n e - f i f t h
similarly outf itted.<85:

Moreover,

Command f a c i l i t i e s o n G e r m a n t a n K s were f i r s t c l a s s , a l w a y s b e t t e r than t h e enemy's.<86: There are,

i t seems, g o o d r e a s o n s t o h o l d t h a t G u d e r i a n

t h o u g h t t h r e e t e n e t s o f c o m m a n d a n d c o n t r o l were o f p a r a m o u n t importance i n t h e conduct of operational art.

F i r s t , a1 1 c o m m a n d e r s - - i n c l u d i n s o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l commanders--MUST l e a d f r o m l o c a t i o n s t h a t a r e well forward.

S e c o n d , a s m a l l , h i g h l y m o b i l e command p o s t , s u p p l e m e n t e d a t times by a n a i r m o b i l e c a p a b i l i t y , is r e q u i r e d t o m a i n t a i n c o n t r o l i n f a5 t -mo ,J i n g w a r f a r e

T h i r d , s e c u r e w i r e l e s s commun i c a t i o n s 1 i n K i n 9 t h e Key h e a d q u a r t e r s a n d a r m o r e d f o r m a t i o n s a r e essential t o d e l i v e r t i m e l y o r d e r s in a r a p i d l y changing situation.

I t s h o u l d a l s o b e c l e a r t h a t o t h e r f a c t o r s p l a y e d an role

important

i n b i n d i n g t h i s command a n d c o n t r o l p h i l o s o p h y t o g e t h e r .
l e a s t anions a r m o r e d a n d

C e r t a i n l y a commonly u n d e r s t o o d - - a t motorized off icers--doctrine forces played an

f o r t h e ernployrnent o f
R r i g o r o u s pre-war

armored training

important part.

P r o g r a m a n d a G e n e r a l S t a f f w h i c h s h a r e d a v i e w o n how t o f i g h t w e r e 3150 i n s t r u m e n t a l

i n a l l o w i n g Guderian and o t h e r

70

c o m m a n d e r s t o cornrnand a n d c o n t r o l
i t m i g h t be s a i d t h a t

i n t h e manner h e d i d .

Today

l e a v i n g t h e m a i n command p o s t a n d t h e plans t o staff officers engenders

formulation an e l e m e n t

and e x e c u t i o n o f of
r i s K

as w e l l

as t r u s t .

Guderiari p r o b a b l y would that war

i 5

h a v e a g r e e d w i t h t h i s b u t gone on t o p o i n t o u t

itself

i a PiSKy b u s i n e s s anyway. ;
subject of thic chapter.

How h e d e a l t w i t h r i s k

the f i n a l

71

R ISK

BY now

it

s h o u l d b e a p p a r e n t t h a t H e i n z G u d e r i a n was n o e1Jen L o r d W a v e 1 1 ' s ! others

from h i s

o r d i n a r y f i e l d commander by any s t a n d a r d s , T h e r e i s e v i d e n c e of foolhardiness,

w h a t some w o u l d c a l l r a s h n e s s ,

on G u d e r i a n ' s p a r t . e b s e n t i n g h i m s e l f twenty-two

m a i n command P o s t f o r

h o u r s while c r i t i c a l b a t t l e s f o r example,

raged d u r i n g t h e c l o s i n g of

t h e SmolensK PocKet,

leaves Guderian open t o c h a r g e s of taKlng unreasonable

opcrat ional
r islc.
Cross i n s t h e

Meuse,

Aisne, and One iper R i v e r s

without t h e support of

i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s m i g h t be t h o u g h t
A m u c h more s e r i o u s c h a r g e m i g h t

f o o l i s h on G u d e r i a n ' s part.

be

l e v i e d a g a i n s t Guderian as r e f l e c t e d

i n G e n e r a l v o n BOCK'S

words t o G e n e r a l H a l d e r , C h i e f
the F l a n d e r s Campaign:

of

t h e General S t a f f , c o n c e r n i n g

YOU w i l l b e c r e e p i n g a l o n g t e n r n i l e s f r o m t h e f l a n K o f t h e M a g i n o t L i n e a s Y O U breaK t h r o u g h , and hoping t h a t t h e French w i l l watch i n e r t l y . You a r e c r a m m i n g t h e mass o f t a n K s t o g e t h e r i n t o t h e n a r r o w r o a d s of t h e A r d e n n e s as if t h e r e were n o s u c h t h i n g a s a i r p o w e r . And t h e n Y O U h o p e t o l e a d a n o p e r a t i o n as f a r as t h e c o a s t w i t h a n o p e n s o u t h e r n f l m K 2E16 r n i l e s l o n g , w h e r e s t a n d s t h e mass o f t h e F r e n c h

F1rrrw. < 8 7 >

T h i s s t a t e m e n t b y v o n BUCK r e p r e s e n t s a s e r i o u s c r i t i c i s m o f

Guderian's operational art because e x t r a o r d i n a r y gambles

it

s u g g e s t s h e was t a K i n g

i n o p e r a t i n g t h e way h e d i d .

72

N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e h i s t o r i c a l e v i d e n c e s h o w s t h a t G u d e r i a n was no g a m b l e r : r a t h e r , h e was a n a b l e p r a c t i o n e r o f t h e appropr iate--tooK

o p e r a t i o n a l a r t who saw, we i g h e d , a n d - - w h e n

c a l c u l a t e d P i s K s and a d o p t e d measures t o m i n i m i z e t h o s e risKs. G e n e r a l 'Jon BOCK ' c c r i t i c i s m o f t h e F l a n d e r s o p e r a t i o n a l concept is a u s e f u l p l a c e t o b e g i n a n a n a l y s i s b e c a u s e

it

p o i n t s t o two c r i t l c a l a r e a s of G u d e r i a n ' s o p e r a t i o n s which e n t a i l e d t h e acceptance of

r isK:

concentrat in9 armored

f o r r n a t i o n s i n t h e p r e s e n c e of e n e m y a i r power a n d a t t a c K i n g with long exposed flanKs. Flccording t o S h e l f o r d B i d w e l l booK F i r e - P o w e r , could

OCCUPY

and DominicK Graham i n t h e i r

t h e f i g h t i n g e c h e l o n s of

a panzer d i v i s i o n

f i + t y miles of

r o a d s p a c e . j u s t i n admin i s t r a t i v e

march c o l u m n . ( 8 8 ) C o n s i d e r i n g t h e f a c t t h a t p a n z e r d i u is i o n s
had over 2600 w h e e l e d a n d t r a c K e d ' J e h i C l e s ,

t h e i r a s s e r t i o n is

p r o b a b l y t r u e , and whether

i n admin i s t r a t i u e o r t a c t i c a l march

o r d e r , armored a n d m o t o r i z e d columns rnoving a l o n g t h e narrow r o a d s of

a p l a c e l i K e t h e Flrdennes a r e l u c r a t i v e t a r g e t s f o r an

enemy w i t h a i r p o w e r . G u d e r i a n s u r e l y r e c o g n i z e d t h i s b u t t h o u g h t s e v e r a l f a c t o r s would o p e r a t e t o r e d u c e t h e
PiSK.

F i r s t , t h e r e were g o o d r e a s o n s t o b e l i e v e n e i t h e r t h e F r e n c h n o r t h e B r i t i s h e x p e c t e d an attaclt
Ardenner-.
in strength through t h e

Moreover, because of t h e g e n e r a l l y poor

in t h e Flrdennes,

trafficability for vehicles

t h e r e was n o

r e a s o n f o r t h e A l l i e s t o t h i n K a n a t t a c K by t a n K 5 w o u l d e v e r come t h r o u g h t h e r e . T h e s e t w o f a c t o r s o f s u r p r i s e

73

alone--1ocat ion o f for

a t t a C K and f o r c e

corr@osi t i o n - - w e r e

reasons
an a t t a c K

Guder i a n t o c o n s i d e r

ma55

in3

armored iolurnns f o r

t h r o u g h t h e Rrdenne;. armored f o r c e s were

Furthermore,

he b e 1 i e v e d h i g h l y m o b i l e achie'Jing a t h i r d of the rate

one n i g h t

inherently capible of

e l e m e r ~ to f s u r p r i s e - - t i m i n g o f t h e

attacK--becau:.e

a t which t h e y c o u l d be c o n c e n t r a t e d .

I n t h e c0ur5.s o f

s e v e r a l p a n z e r and m o t o r i z e d d i v i i i o n s d i s p e r s e d a s s e m b l * / a r e a 5 fatc o n c e a l e d a t t a c ~p o s i t i o n s atticK. Here, than, behirjd t h e

c o u l d be moved f r o m 1 i n 6 o4 d e p a r t u r e t o rnornirg Campaietn i5.e h e that

fGr

a n u n e x p e c t e d e:+rl). i n t h e F1 i n d e r :

w ? r e t h r e e ways

G u d e r i a n t h o u g h t h i s arrinot-rd f o r c e ? . c o u l d g a i n t h e z ! ; r p r thought e s s e n t iil f o r operitiona! 5uiros:. He r l i o !':new

r, i g h t riluverient

i n t o r e l c c t e d a t A : a c K F o : i + ior,?. + h e e ' J e r i i r , ? attacK. priority even

If

before

w o u l d s e r v e t o r e d u c e a n y r i s K o f a n enemy a i r t i r s t

He f u r t h e r r e a s o n e d t h a t s i n c e t h e L u f t w a f f e ' s
i n t h e c a m p a i g n was t h e 5 e i z u r e o f

air superiority,

Just

locally,

h i s p a n z e r coiurnns would have L i t t l e t o f e a r

from

F r e n c h o r B r i t i s h a i r p o w e r a s t h e y moved t h r o u g h t h e r e % t ri c t i v e A r d e n n e s t e r r a i n . Finaiiy, a i r reconnaissance l i g h t l y defended by

s h o w e d t h a t t h e e r d e t i n e s r e g i o n was o n l y four

F r e n c h c a v a l r y d i v i s i o n s a n d some B e l g i a n u n i t s s t r u n g o u t K i l o m e t e r f r o n t . t S S > Hence, t h e most d i r e c t i n the

~n a s i x t y - f i v e

approach toward t h e B r i t i s h - F r e n c h

center o f g r a v i t y

F l a n d e r s C a m p a i g n was t h r o u g h t h e A r d e n n e s , German d i v i s i o n s , di'Jizions,

w h e r e some 45

i n c l u d i n s seven p a n z e r and t h r e e m o t o r i z e d and

w e r e t o a t t a c K . < 3 0 > G u d e r i a n Knew a l l t h i s ,

74

b e c a u s e he be1 i e v e d t h e element of

surprise and c o n c e n t r a t ion

a t n i g h t w o u l d g i v e h i s u n i t s an a d v a n t a g e , h e t h o u g h t t h e
c a l c u l a t e d risK e n t h i l e d b y c o n c e n t r a t i n g a r m o r e d f o r c e s

in t h e

p r e s e n c e of of

a i r p o w e r was r e a s o n a b l e . He a l s o t h o u g h t t h e s i z e

t h e o ~ ~ o s i n nemy f o r c e a n d t h e o v e r w h e l m i n g s i z e of eg

G e r m a n y ' s own f o r c e s w e i g h e d h e a v i l y i n f a v o r o f a c c e p t i n g t h e
risl(, especially cunsidering t h e g i g a n t i c payoff
operation succeed. In o r d e r t o succeed, however, should the

t h o s e 45

d i u is i o n s h a d t o g e t t h r o u g h t h e A r d e n n e s b o t t l e n e c K q u i c ~ l y ,
5 0

s p e e d was e s s e n t i a l . I t was o n t h i s q u e s t i o n o f s p e e d t h a t G u d e r i a n ' s a n d v o n

BocK'z. a n a l y s e s d i v e r g e d .

Notice t h a t

i n h i s v i s i o n of a n

a t t a c K t h r o u g h t h e n r d e n n e s v o n B O C K d e s c r i b e d t h e a t t a c K as
" c r e e p i n g along.'' C l e a r l y , Guderian had no such t h i n g in mind.

I n f a c t , we h a v e a l r e a d y s e e n t h a t h i s w h o l e c o n c a p t i o n o f o p e r a t i o n a l a r t was b u i l t o n t h e p r e m i s e o f g r e a t s p e e d o f o p e r a t i o n z . . And a l l t h a t was r e q u i r e d was a s p e e d o f o p e r a t i o n s

f a s t e r t h a n t h a t w i t h which t h e enemy c o u l d d e a l .

So G u d e r i a n

e n u is i o n e d a c r i t i c a l p e r i o d o f m o v e m e n t t h r o u g h t h e A r d e n n e s d u r i n g idhich h e would b e v u l n e r a b l e : uulnerabilit!, b u t h e a l s o saw t h a t h i s

would be r e d u c e d by t h e L u f t w a f f e ' s SeiZUPe of

l o c a l a i r s u p e r i o r i t y and t h e s p e e d w i t h which h i s panzer f o r m a t i o n s moved t h r o u g h t h e f l r d e n n e s . As

i t t u r n e d o u t , of

c o u r s e , G u d e r i a n was r i g h t o n a l l c o u n t s . G e n e r a l von BOCK'S s e c o n d o b j e c t i o n , t h a t of long exposed

flanK5,

is more d i f f i c u l t t o d e f e n d a g a i n s t .

B i d w e l l and Graham

75

a p t l y describe the risK t h e German

of e x p o s e d f l a n K 5 b y p o i n t i r l g o u t t h a t

panzer u n I t 5 reached o u t 1iKe a t e n t a c l e

" n o more

t h a n 20 m i l e i u i d e a n d 200 m i l e s l o n g o p e n t o a t t a c K f r o m either flanK...."<91> S u c h a t e n t a c l e , o f c o u r s e , was

v u l n e r a b l e t o counterattacK o r a i r s t r a f i n g . And, a r o u n d Flrras o n ZL May

in fact,

1940 a B r i t i s h t a n K c o u n t e r a t t a c K

a g a i n s t t h e CS D i v i s i o n T o t e n K o P f Ciuderian'g

in a corps adjacent t o

sent shivers

UP t h e

German c h a i n o f c o m m a n d . < S 2 >

i n n o t o n l y the

Long e x p o s e d f l a n K s o f t h e s o r t G u d e r i a n h a d

F l a n d e r s C a m p a i g n b u t t h e P o l i s h a n d R u s s i a n C a m p a i g n s as well
were c e r t a i n l y c a u s e s f o r a l a r m a b o u t t h e r i s K s u c h m e t h o d s

entailsd. t o flanK5.

Even

5 0 ,

G u d e r i a n h a d h i s way5 of d e a l i n g w i t h r i s K

O n e way h e d e a l t w i t h t h e r i S K o f c o u n t e r a t t a c K s t o exposed flanK5 h a s a l r e a d y been suggested--security rpeed. through

G u d e r i a n t h o u g h t m a i n t e n a n c e o f momenturn t h r o u g h s p e e d

of o p e r a t i o n s w o u l d p r e v e n t t h e enemy f r o m p u t t i n g t o g e t h e r a n y
c o h e r e n t c o u n t e r a t t a c K p l a n + o r two r e a s o n s .

First, because h i s

a t t a c K s were a l o n g p a r a l l e l a x e s G u d e r i a n c o u l d c o n t i n u a l l y
z.hift the

s c h w e r p u n ~ to f

h i s

attacK t o a new l o c a t i o n , t h e r e b y

c o n f o u n d i n g an:? e n e m y c o u n t e r a t t a c K p l a n s a g a i n s t o n e o f h i s

attacv:i n s c o l u m n s .

S e c o n d , any o r d e r s g i v e n by enemy commanders

u e r e r e n d e r e d i r r e l e v a n t by t h e time e x e c u t i n g u n i t s r e c e i v e d
them because of t h e f a s t pace o f o p e r a t i o n s : t h e s i t u a t i o n had

s i m p l y c h a n g e d - - r e q u i r i n s new o r d e r s - - b y

t h e t irne t h e u n i t

began t o carry o u t its l a t e s t o r d e r s . B u t G u d e r i a n h a d o t h e r

76

ways of

d e a l i n g w i t h t h e t h r e a t of

flanK attaCKS.

During the 10th

campaign

i n France, f o r instance, h e r e f u s e d t o a l l o w

Panzer D i v i s i o n , on t h e corp5 s o u t h e r n flanK, t o be d i v e r t e d f r o m its m i s s i o n on t h e unconfirmed report t h a t French c a v a l r y

were m o v i n g t o w a r d i t s f l a n K .

I n s t e a d of

s t o p p i n g 1 0 t h Panzer

t o d e a l w i t h t h i s t h r e a t t o t h e c o r p s ' f l a n K , Guderian moved t h e d i v i s i o n a l i t t l e n o r t h and had toward

it follow a parallel route

i t s o b j e c t i v e w i t h a l l d u e s p e e d . < Y 3 > As i t t u r n e d o u t ,

t h e r e p o r t was f a l s e , b u t G u d e r i a n 's r e a c t i o n h e r e r e f l e c t s h i s m u s u s l approach: ~ e r p oving t o w a r d t h e o p e r a t i o n a l o b j e c t i u e ! G u d e r i a n a l s o r e d u c e d t h e risK t o h i s f l a n K S t h r o u g h h i s employment o f air power.

H e a l w a y s made w i d e s p r e a d u s e o f h i s
He found

a i r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e assdts t o watch e x p o s e d f l a n K s .

t h i s t e c h n i q u e e s p e c i a l l y u s e f u l d u r i n g BARBAROSSf4 w h e n h e f a r outdistanced t h e follow-on i n f a n t r y armies. In a d d i t i o n t o h i s

air reconnaissance

u n i t s , Guderian used h i s close air s u p p o r t

in ,particular

a i r c r a f t t o p r o t e c t h i s e x p o s e d f l a n K s . Two c a s e s come t o m i n d .
F i r s t , as a l r e a d y n o t e d

in an earlier s e c t i o n on

c o m b i n e d a r m 5 w a r f a r e , as G u d e r i a n c r o s s e d t h e M e u s e R i v e r during operat ion5 in France, L u f t w a f f e u n i t s attacKed F r e n c h France,

t r a n s p o r t a n d r a i l c e n t e r s a+ f a r as R e i m s , o f 85 K i l o m e t e r s . T h e s e air attacKs

a distance

i n d e p t h c o n t i n u e d even

a f t e r G u d e r i a n t u r n e d X I X A r m y C o r p s west t o w a r d A b b e v i l l e a n d
t h e coast.
In f a c t , t h e L u f t w a f f e

pounded French u n i t s a l o n g

t h e A i s n e R i v e r a s G u d e r i a n made h i s s w e e p t o t h e c o a s t , thereby protecting h i s southern flanK from French

77

counterattacuz.

Similarly,

i n O p e r a t i o n BRRBRROSSFI G u d e r i a n
to protect

u i e d h i s a i r assets, b o t h r e c o n n a i s s a n c e and cornbat,

hi:

panzer group

'5

r i g h t f lanK against a p o t e n t i a l R u s s i a n

c o u n t e r a t t a c K d u r i n g h i s e n c irclernent o f R u s s i a n f o r c e s i n t h e BryansK a r e a . < 3 4 > In a d d i t i o n t o a i r a s s e t s , G u d e r i a n u s e d organic unit:

as

well

t o Provide flanK protection. Guderian echeloned h i s operational

W i t h few e x c e p t i o n s , reserves

i n d e p t h so t h e y c o u l d p r o v i d e h i s a t t a C K i n g p a n z e r
FIs s u g g e s t e d e a r l i e r , h i s u s e o f

corps with flanK protection.

t h e Gross-Deutschland

I n f a n t r y R e g i m e n t o n t h e l e f t f l a n K of

XIX R r m y C o r p s f o r t h e attacK

i n t o F r a n c e i n d i c a t e s t h a t he saw

t h e t h r e a t t o h i s l e f t f l a n ~ nd a t t a c h e d t h e Gross-Deutschland a Regiment t o 10th Panzer Division t o p r o t e c t t h a t flanK.

it

In t h e

Russian Campaign,

ir c l e a r h e t o o K m e a s u r e s t o r e d u c e risK
1st Cavalry
is u n m i s t a K a b l e

t o u u l n e r a b l r flanK5. F i r s t , h i s use o f t h e

D i v i s i o n on t h e 2nd P a n z e r G r o u p ' s r i g h t f l a n K e v i d e n c e of a n a t t e m p t t o r e d u c e riSK.

He saw t h e P r i p e t

M a r s h e s o n h i s g r o u p ' s r i g h t f l a n K a s p r o s ~ i d i n g some protection, and he assigned t h e

1st C a v a l r y D i v i s i o n t o XXIV

P a n z e r C o r p s , t h e r i g h t w i n g , b e c a u s e h e Knew t h i s d i v i s i o n was
b e s t s u i t e d t o s c r e e n h i s r i g h t f l a n K . While on t h e r i g h t f l a n K
of

hi<. group h e had marshy t e r r a i n and a c a v a l r y d i v i s i o n

in

hi5 fauor,for good f o r t u n e .

h i s m a i n attacK o n t h e l e f t f l a n K h e h a d no s u c h Consequently, he a s s i g n e d XLVI Panzer Corps,

Group Reserue, t h e mission t o f o l l o w t h e l e f t w i n g , e c h e l o n e d t o t h e rear t o p r o v i d e d e p t h and f l a n K p r o t e c t i o n f o r t h e main

78

attacK. <95> M o r e o v e r ,

i n a1 1 t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s G u d e r i a n was
less

K e e n l y aware t h a t t h e r e were o t h e r u n i t s - - a l b e i t mobile--following

h i s panzerz,

which would p r o v i d e f u r t h e r

d e p t h a n d f l m K p r o t e c t i o n f o r h i s own e x p o s e d u n i t s .
fl f i n a l

t e c h n i q u e Guderian employed t o p r o t e c t h i s f l a n Ks F r e q u e n t l y , he a n c h o r e d

c e n t e r e d on h i s a s t u t e u s e o f t e r r a i n . o n e of

h i s boundaries along a r i v e r l i n e or other obstacle, In P o l a n d h e p r o t e c t e d h i s c o r p s ' main

n a t u r a l o r manmade.

a t t a c K a n d t h e c o r p s ' s o u t h e r n f l a n K by a n c h o r i n g i t a l o n g t h e Zempolno R i v e r . I n F r a n c e t h e A r d e n n e s C a n a l , A i s n e , a n d Sornrne southern flanK.

R i v e r s a f f o r d e d some p r o t e c t i o n f o r G u d e r i a n ' s

H i s n o r t h e r n f l a n K was n o t ae v u l n e r a b l e b e c a u s e e n e m y u n i t s t o

ti i s n o r t h h a d Re i n h a r d t 's p a n z e r c o r p s t o w o r r y a b o u t . < 5 6 >

G u d e r i a n b e g a n t h e Russian Campaign w i t h t h e P r i p e t M a r s h e s Protecting h i s r i g h t flanK, and he used riuerlines wheneuer he

c o u l d t o p r o t e c t h i s f l a n K s , t h o u g h a g l a n c e a t a map o f R u s s i a s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e o r i e n t a t ion of r i v e r l ines d i d n o t especially f a v o r t h i s t e c h n i q u e . G u d e r i a n ' s a n s w e r t o risK o n h i s f l a n K 5

was f o u r - f o l d :

< l >speed of operations;

(2) u s e of

air power

for reconnaissance and

of operational reserves;

i n t e r d i c t ion:

(3) d e p t h a n d e c h e l o n w e n t

and

(4) u s e o f t e r r a i n s u c h a s

riverl ines for protection. a Two o t h e r p o i n t s a b o u t r i s ~ c c e p t a n c e d e s e r v e m e n t i o n . fIn

operat ional t e c h n i q u e of

Guder i a n

' 5

w h i c h e n t a i l e d some r i s K i n f a n t r y armies. This

was h l s h a b i t o f ~ u t d i s t a n c i n g f o l l o w - o n

practice p r e u a i l e a

I n a l l t h r e e o f h i s m a j o r c a m p a i g n s b u t was

79

especiilly

common

i n t h e Rus.sian Campaign.

The t h o u g h t

here

is

t h a t by g r e a t l y separating himself armies,

from the slower

infantry

Guderian put h i s u n i t s out o f

s u p p o r t i n g d i s t a n c e of being

other un:ts, cut off,

s u b j e c t i n g h i s u n i t s t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of Moreover, t h e spec i a l

s u r r o u n d e d and d e s t r o y e d .

capabilities of

i n f a n t r y u n i t s c o u l d n o t be b r o u g h t t o bear Here, Guder i a n

' 5

in

s u p p o r t o f t h e a t t a c K i n g panzer columns cross.ing o f t h e Dneiper River

i n R u s . s i a comes t o m i n d .
1941,

His lead

panzer d i v i s i o n s reached t h e D n e i p e r on 7 J u l y i n f a n t r y d i v i s . i o n s f r o m t h e army follow

but

ng h i s panzer group General von u n t i l those

w e r e n o t t o r e a c h t h e r i v e r f o r f o u r t e e n more d a y s .
Kluge wanted Guderian t o d e l a y c r o s z i n g infantry the Dneiper

dibJiSionS c l o s e d and c o u l d e s t a b l i s h bridgeheads

for a

secure--less none o f t h a t

r i S K Y - - c r o ~ s i n g o f t h e r i u e r . Guderian would have

and a r g u e d s u c c e s ; f u l l y that

i t was m o r e

irnportant
In

t o a t t a i Y : a c r o z . 5 t h e r i v e r w h i l e R u s s i a n d e f e n s e s w e r e weaK.

Panzer Leader he says he weighed c a r e f u l l y t h e r i s K s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h i s move b u t wa5 c o n v i n c e d t h e r i s K was. j u s t i f i e d , e s p e c i a l l y s ince panzer d i v i s i o n s infantry h a d t h e i r own m o t o r i z e d

and e n g i n e e r s w h i c h were e m i n e n t l y c a p a b l e o f inherent

e s t a b l i s h i n g a n d s e c u r i n g b r i d g e h e a d s . <3?> The comb i n e d a r m s o r g a n i z a t i o n o f divislons supporting t h e panzer

and p a n z e r - g r e n a d i e r

helped reduce t h e r i s K o f arms. The o t h e r factor,

s e p a r a t i o n between of course, was G u d e r i a n ' s

standby s o l u t ion--speed,

speed,

s p e e d ! T h i s t e c h n i s u e was mines and

a c c e p t a b l e u n t i l t h e Russ.ians began t o use a n t i - t a n K

80

anti-tanK

guns i n c o n c e r t and in J u l y

i n g r e a t n u m b e r s as t h @ y d i d

in

t h e B a t t l e o f KursK

1343. T h e r e ,

i t u i l l be recalled,

o n e r e a s o n t h e German IX A r m y ' s . f a i l e d was t h a t t m K S a n d in the in

attacK

i n t o t h e KursK s a l i e n t

i n f a n t r y became separated, r e s u l t i n g

i r o l a t i o n a n d d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e t a n ~ s . < 9 8 ?B u t t h a t was

1343, l o n g a f t e r G u d e r i a n h a d f i n i s h e d c o m m a n d i n g f i e l d
Hence, h e n e v e r f a c e d t h e Ru;sians when t h e y h a d

units.

p e r f e c t a d a m e i n s of s e p a r a t i n g t a n K s f r o m s u p p o r t i n g i n f a n t r y . (99:
NO d i s c u s s i o n

of

o p e r a t i o n a l a r t would be complete w i t h o u t in passing, of logistical cons iderat ions,

-ome

m e n t i o n , e ~ e ni f

f o r h i s t o r i c a l l y such c o n s i d e r a t i o n s have p l a c e d c o n s t r a i n t s on t h e c o n d u c t of o p e r a t i o n s w h i c h t h e commander e x c e e d s o n l y at some r i s K . Although t h e r e is no r e a s o n t o be1 i e u e Guderian

' 5

o p e r a t i o n a l a r t was a n e x c e p t i o n

in t h i s r e s p e c t , h e appears

n o t t o have been unduly concerned about t h e l o g i s t i c a l r i s K s h i s r a p i d tanK t h r u s t s e n t a i l e d . ob:.erved, Guderian

Rs K e n n e t h MacKsey

has

"was n o t i n t h e h a b i t o f v i s i t i n g t h e l i n e s

o f cornmun i c a t i o n ,)' w h i c h o f c o u r s e is e n t i r e l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s v i e w t h a t commanders b e l o n g f o r w a r d . < l 0 0 > T h r e e r e a s o n s can b e a d d u c e d w h i c h rnay h e l p e x p l a i n G u d e r i a n ' s a p p r o a c h t o t h e potential p r o b l e m of outrunning h i s logistical support.

F i r s t , p a n z e r a n d m o t o r i z e d d i u i s i o n s rnay h a v e c a r r i e d f u e l s u f f i c i e n t t o allow t h e m t o a c h i e v e t h e i r o p e r a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e s b e f o r e a n o p e r a t i o n a l p a u s e f o r r e s u p p l y was

81

nclcessary.

For t h e Pol i s h Campaign

panzer and m o t o r i z e d
(725 K m S ) a n d

d i v i s i o n s drew f u e l s u f f i c i e n t f o r 456 m i l e s c a r r i e d one basic load of ammunition.

One a d d i t i o n a l

load of

a m m u n i t i o n was K e p t a t f o r w a r d r a i l w a y d e p o t s w h i l e t i d o m o r e w e r e K e p t r e a d y t o go o n r a i l w a y s i d i n g s . < l 6 1 > T h e s e f a c t s

suggeEt t h a t

i n h e r e n t b a s i c l o a d s a n d r a p i d e x p l o i t a t i o n of

c a p t u r e d r a i l r o a d s allowed Guder ian t o a c h i e v e o p e r a t ional objective% without a pause

in operations.
'5

In b o t h t h e P o l i s h

and F l a n d e r s Campaigns, Guder ian objectives--each o p $ r a t i n g ranges.

initial operational well w i t h i n h i s u n i t s '

w i t h i n 250 m i l e s - - w e r e

The wide e x p a n s e o f R u s s i a p r e s e n t e d a Guderian's first operational

d i f f e r e n t c h a l l e n g e , b u t even so,

o b j e c t i v e , t h e a r e a a r o u n d S m o l e n s K , was a b o u t 425 m i l e s f r o m his

1 i n e of
f ?

d e p a r t u r e , MaKing

it a close c a l l t o say t h e least.

s e c o n d r e a s o n w h i c h may a i d

in e x p l a i n i n g G u d e r i a n ' s uncanny a b i l i t y t o

a t t i t u d e t o w a r d l o g i s t i c a l risK read terrain.

l i e s in hi;

In a l l t h r e e of h i s c a m p a i g n s , G u d e r i a n a t t e m p t e d communication centers, railroads, and

t o s e i z e Key r o a d s ,

a i r f i e l d s t o e n s u r e h i s u n i t s c o u l d b e r e s u p p l i e d by r a i l , r o a d , o r a i r . R e f l e c t i n g h i s t h i n K i n g on t h i s s u b j e c t d u r i n g t h e c r i t i c a l b a t t l e s f o r Mojcow
"Our m o s t u r g e n t

in December

1341 he remarked, U n t i l we

t a s K now was t h e c a p t u r e o f T u l a .

were i n possess i o n of t h i s cornmun i c a t i o n 5 c e n t r e Cs i c 1 a n d i t s

a i r f i e l d we h a d n o h o p e o f c o n t i n u i n g t o a d n J a n c e . . . . " < l 0 2 >
if

Even

t h i s s i n g l e example of

Guderian's concern for

logistical

r i % K is p a t h e t i c a l l y

inadequate,

i t d o e s s h o w h e m a d e some

p l a n s t o a m e l i o r a t e what he r e c o g n i z e d as a p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t .

A final
lies

e x p l a n a t i o n of

h i s handling of operational

logistical risK art itself. He

i n Guderian's conception of

seerned t o b e l i e v e t h a t

l o g i s t i c a l r i s K would be M i n i m i z e d by h i s operations. That is, quicK tanK

t h e v e r y speedy n a t u r e o f thrusts

i n t o o p e r a t i o n a l d e p t h s b e f o r e l o g i s t i c s became a factor would minimize t h e r i s K . O f course, such a

significant

m~iew p r e s u p p o s e s enemy c o l l a p s e o r c a p i t u l a t i o n b e f o r e logistical factors have t h e i r i n e v i t a b l e impact. Further,

Guderian had t h e infantry residual

luxury

i n h i s o p e r a t i o n s o f Knowing t h e r e were m o p p i n g u p any

arrnier f o l l o w i n g h i s mobile u n i t s ,

enemy r e s i s t a n c e w h i c h r n i g h t t h r e a t e n h i s 1 i n e s o f I n b o t h t h e P o l I s h and F l a n d e r s Campaigns, which

communication.

were r e l a t i v e l y s h o r t campaigns t h e R u s s i a n Campaign, payoff was t r e m e n d o u s . Guder i a n

' 5

i n space and t i m e cornpared t o

a s s u m p t i o n s h e l d t r u e and t h e Russia, however,

The g r e a t e x p a n s e o f

s w a l l o w e d Glider i a n , following Campaign,

if o n e

h is p a n z e r g r o u p ,

and t h e

i n f a n t r y armies

thern.

In spite of

t h e outcome o f

t h e Russian i s defensible

G u d e r i a n ' s approach t o

lOsiStiCal r i s K

accepts h i s argument t h a t had H i t l e r n o t d i v e r t e d h i s i t s o r i g i n a l o b j e c t i v e of Moscou,

i t would

p a n z e r army f r o m

have had t h e t i m e and combat power s u f f i c i e n t t o cause a decisive Ruzsian collapse. G u d e r i a n ' s argument, on t h e s u b j e c t o f but This i s n o t t h e p l a c e t o Pursue illuminate h i s thinKing bold! three tenets

i t does h e l p

l o g i s t i c a l risK--be
' 5

I n a s s e 5 . s i n g Guder i a n

o p e r a t i o n a l methods,

83

of

r i s K come t o t h e f o r e ,

though others probably suggest

t h e m s e l v e s as w e l l .

F i r s t , t o a c h i e v e t a c t i c a l p e n e t r a t i o n and operational depth, accept r i s K w h i l e c o n c e n t r a t e d and t o e x p o j e d f l a n K s w h i l e m o v i n g : u s e a i r p o w e r , n i g h t mouement, r e s e r v e s and t e r r a i n t o r e d u c e t h i s r i s K . Second, r a p i d ach ievernent o f o p e r a t i o n a l d e p t h r e q u i r e s one t o a c c e p t t h e P i S K o f w i d e s e p a r a t i o n between main a t t a c K and f o l l o w and s u p p o r t f o r c e s : reduce t h i s r i s K t h r o u g h speed o f o p e r a t i o n s , mornenturn, a n d employment o f o r g a n i c combined a r m organ i z a t i o n s . F i n a l 1'1, r e d u c e l o g i s t i c a l r 1 S K t h r o u g h r a p i d s e i z u r e of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n centers t o ensure rssuppl:, by r a i l , road, o r a i r .

These t h r e e t e n e t s r e t u r n t o t h e q u e s t i o n posed a t t h e beginning of t h i s s e c t i o n on P i S K : Was G u d e r i a n f o o l h a r d y or

b o l d i n h i s acceptance o f words on b o l d n e s s quest ion:

r i s K ? Here,

C a r l uon C l a u s e w i t z ' s

i n On War may s h e d some l i g h t or1 t h e

Even f o o l h a r d i n e s s - - t h a t is, boldness without a n y c*bj e c t - - i s n o t t o b e d e s p i s e d . . .Giuen t h e same a m o u n t o f i n t e l l i g e n c e , t i m i d i t y w i l l do a t h o u s a n d t i r n e s m o r e darnage i n war t h a n audacity....Boldness g o v e r n e d by s u p e r i o r i n t e l l e c t i s t h e rnarK o f a h e r o . . . . B o l d n e s s can l e n d w i n g s t o i n t e l l e c t and i n s i g h t ; t h e s t r o n g e r t h e wings t h e n , t h e g r e a t e r t h e h e i g h t s , t h e w i d e r t h e v i e w , and t h e b e t t e r t h e r e s u l t s : though a greater p r i z e , o f course, i n v o l v e s g r e a t e r r i s K s . < 1E3>

R e f l e c t i n g o n C l a u s e w i t z ' s remarl(;,

t h e r e a d e r may j u d g e f o r

54

hirnself

t h e answer t o t h e q u e s t i o n posed.

B u t s i n c e he

i s not

h e r e t o defend h i m s e l f , word:

we m u s t l e a v e G u d e r i a n w i t h t h e l a s t i n 5haping the 5 p i r i t o f

[ O n War1 h a d s l a r g e s h a r e . general staff

generat ions of

Officers..

. .<1E)4>

85

CONCLUSION

Undoubtedly t h e r e

i s much m o r e t h a t c o u l d b e s a i d a b o u t
'5

G e n e r a l He i n z G u d e r ian

o p e r a t i o n a l a r t t h a n has b e e n s a i d

h e r e a l r e a d y , t h o u g h b y now t h e r e a d e r m a y b e p r a y i n g t h a t nothing of t h e Kind

is i n s t o r e .

Indeed,

it

is n o t ;

but

it

would b e u s e f u l t o summarize t h e b r o a d c o n c l u s i o n s t o w a r d which

each o f t h e f i u e s e c t i o n s aboue--combined
operat ions ,offensive

arms
and

a c t i o n , momentum,

corimand a n d c o n t r o l ,

r iSK--Po i n t s .

Without enurnerat ing a g a i n t h e e i g h t e e n tenets operational art,

which d e f i n e G u d e r i a n ' s c o n c e p t of

it

is

a c c u r a t e t o s a y h i s c o n c e p t o f o p e r a t i o n a l a r t was o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s w h o s e o b j e c t was t o e n v e l o p a n d d e s t r o y e n e m y forces. T h e s e o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s were c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y g r e a t

speed of

momentum b o r n o f

a p e r a t i o n s a n d c o n c e n t r a t i o n s of:

a r m o r , o p e r a t i o n a l d e p t h , a n d c o m b i n e d arms o p e r a t i o n s e m p l o y i n g tanK;
the vicinity of

a t t h e s c h w e r p u n K t , w h i c h were c o n t r o l l e d f r o m
t h e forward committed u n i t s , rnd which e n t a i l e d

an acceptance of

r i s ~ o C l a n K s a n d 1 i n e s o f commun i c a t i o n t o t

a c h i e v e o p e r a t i o n a l dec is i u e n e s s . It i c p r o b a b l y n o t a t a l l amaz n g t h a t a r e v i e w o f the

tenets a r r i u e d at bear a remarKable s i m i l a r i t y t o t h e

P r i n c i p l e s o f War. I n f a c t , we s h o u d b e s u r p r i s e d
i f t h e y were

86

n o t s imilar: otherwise,

an

incons i s t e n c y d e s e r v ing of
US.

e x p l a n a t i o n would c o n f r o n t

In some measure,

all the

P r i n c i p l e s o f War a r e r e f l e c t e d

in G u d e r i a n ' s o p e r a t i o n s . He command, economy o f f o r c e , i n one way or

e m p l o y e d mass, s u r p r i s e , u n i t y o f offensive, maneuver,

s i m p l i c i t y , and ob.iective

a n o t h e r . What t h i s a n a l y s i s s h o w s principles even

i s HOW G u d e r i a n p u t t h o s e
l e v e l o f war. F o r

i n t o action at t h e o p e r a t i o n a l

i f o n e a g r e e s t h a t t h e f u n d a m e n t a l p r i n c i p l e s o f war d o
i t r e m a i n s t h e tasK o f

not change,

t h e m i l i t a r y commander t o operational

apply correctly those principles t o a current

problem and a c h i e v e t h e d e s i r e d outcome. t h i s consistently well is more t h a n j u s t i n war, h e

T h e c o m m a n d e r who d o e s
1UcKY.

Considering a l l Whatever e l s e

the obstacles t o success

is b r i l l i a n t .

one might wish t o s a y about Heinz Guderian and h i s o p e r a t i o n a l methods,

i t r e m a i n s t r u e t h a t h e was s u c c e s s f u l

i n war, a n d

b r i l l i a n t l y so.

87

EFRFIOTES

I A c t u a l l y t h e r e i s more t o t h e s t o r y t h a n t h i s . G u d e r i a n ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h u o n K l u g e was a f a c t o r w h i c h c o n t r i b u t s d t o h i s r e 1 i e f . See H e i n z G u d e r i a n , P a n z e r L e a d e r (blew YUPK: O u t t u n a n d Company, 1 3 5 2 1 , p p . 2 6 4 - 2 7 1 .

2 H e i n z G u d e r i a n , Panzer L e a d e r , t r a n s . C. F i t z g i b b o n Y o r K : O u t t o n a n d Coropany, 1 3 5 2 1 , p . 2 0 . H e r e a f t e r c i t e d a ; Panzer Leader. 3 Panzer Leader, 4 Panzer Leader,
P.

(Flew

21. 21. 21.

P.
P.

5 Panzer Leader,

6 K e n n e t h MacKseY, G u d e r i a n , C r e a t o r o f t h e 81 i t z K r i e g (New YUrK: S t e i n a n d D a y , 1375), p . 2 4 4 . H e r e a f t e r c i t e d a s MacKsey.

7 MaCKSeY,
3 MacKseY,

pp.
P.

244-45.

62.
P.

3 Panzer Leader, 10 P a n z e r L e a d e r ,

24. 24.

p.

1 1 He i n z G u d e r i a n , " A r m o r e d F o r c e s , " i n The I ' n f a n t r y J o u r n a l R e a d e r , e d . J.I. G r e e n e ( G a r d e n C i t y , New Y o r K : O o u b l e d a y , D o r a n a n d Company, 1 3 4 3 ) , p . 4 7 3 . H e r e a f t e r c i t e d a s "Armored F o r c e s , " t h i s W O r K i s an a b r i d g e d E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n o f G u d e r i a n ' s " A c h t u n g ! P d n z e r ! ' I w h i c h was p u b 1 i s h e d i n Germany i n t h e W i n t e r o f 1936-137. 12 " A r m o r e d F o r c e s , "
p.
P.

461. 462.

13 " A r m o r e d F o r c e s , "

14 HandbooK a n German M i l i t a r y F o r c e s . War D e p a r t m e n t U. S. T e c h n i c a l M a n u a l , TM-E 30-451 ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: Government P r i n t i n g O f + i c e , 1945), P . 11-84.

15 "Flrrnored F o r c e s , 16 " h r m o r e d F o r c e s , "
17 P a n z e r L e a d e r ,
PP. P.

462. 463.

p.

513-520.

88

18 R i c h a r d O i N a r d o , " T h e f i r m a r e d F i s t , " T a c t i c s (Sep-Oct 5 4 ) , p.32.

i n S t r a t e g y and

13 A c c o r d i n g t o HandbooK o n German M i l i t a r y F o r c e s , 1345 P a n z e r d i v i s i o n s h a d o n l y 103 t a n K S b y T a b l e o f O r g a n i z a t i o n .

G u d e r i a n t h o u g h t t h a t was a U O e f u l l y i n a d e q u a t e n u m b e r . B e f o r e t h e P o l i s h and F l a n d e r s Campaigns, h e argued s u c c e s s f u l l y f o r l a r g e r f o r m a t i o n s of b r i g a d e s i z e . w h i c h he e m p l o y e d i n t h e P o l i s h a n d F l a n d e r s C a m p a i g n s . A f t e r 1340 t h e n u m b e r o f t a n k s i n p a n z e r r e g i m e n t s a n d b r i g a d e s was r e d u c e d f r o m t h e 4 0 0 c i t e d e a r l i e r t o a s few a s 150 b y w a r ' s e n d .

20 R i c h a r d DiFlardo. "The Armored F i s t , " p . 3 2 . HandbooK o n German M i l i t a r y F o r c e s , p . 11-23.

See a l s o

2 1 M a r t i n Van C r e u e l d , F i g h t i n s P o w e r s e r m a n M i l i t a r y P e r f o r m a n c e , 1314-1345 ( W a s h i n g t o n , O.C. : O f f i c e o f N e t A s s e s s m e n t , 1380), P . 6 2 . 22 Van C r e u e l d ,

P.

64.

23 U . S . D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e Army, O r g a n i z a t i o n a l a n d T a c t i c a l R e f e r e n c e D a t a f o r t h e Army i n t h e F i e l d , F i e l d C i r c u l a r 1 0 1 - 1 ( F o r t L e a u e n w o r t h , K a n s a s : U . S . Army Command a n d G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e P r e s s , 1 3 8 4 ) , P P . 5-10 t h r u 5 - 1 4 . 24 P a n z e r L e a d e r , 25 P a n z e r L e a d e r , 26 P a n z e r L e a d e r , 27 P a n z e r L e a d e r ,

P. P.
P. pp.

36.

69.
137. 145-463 147-43. 482-93.
PP.

145-43.

25 P a n z e r L e a d e r ,
23 P a n z e r L e a d e r , 30 P a n z e r L e a d e r , 31 Panzer L e a d e r .

PP.

PP.

P. 452.
pp.482-83.

-. 1345)

3 2 The R i s e a n d F a l l o f t h e German A i r F o r c e ( 1 3 3 3 t o A i r M i n i s t r y P a m p h l e t No. 2 4 5 , ( B r i t i s h A i r M i n i s t r y <fi.C,A.S.l.), 1548, P P . 4 7 - 4 8 . 33 The R i s e a n d F3.11 o f 34 The R i s e a n d F a l l o f 35 The R i s e a n d F a l l o f

t h e tierman A i r F o r c e , t h e German A i r F o r c e , t h e German . i r F o r c e , A
p.

46. 54. 167.

P.
P.

59

36 T h e R i s e a n d F a l l o f

t h e German A-.i. . . r

F o.r c e , -

P.

54.

37 G e n e r a l d e r F 1 i e g e r 0 . P a u l D e i c h m a n n , German A i r F o r c e O p e r a t i o n s i n S u p p o r t o f t h e A r m y , U. S . A i r F o r c i ~ i s t o r i c a l H S t u d i e s : No. 163 ( U . S . F l i r U n i v e r s i t y : R e s e a r c h S t u d i e s I n s t i t u t e , 1 3 6 2 > , P . 106.

38 O e i c h m a n n ,

p.

116.

33 He i n z G u d e r i a n , R e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f A r m o r e d I n t e r e s t s , 1 9 3 3 - 4 5 . E e p a r t r n e n t o f t h e A r m y Spec i a l R e p o r t ( W a s h i n g t o n , O.C.: O f f i c e o f t h e C h i e f o f M i l i t a r y H i s . t o r y , 1 9 5 2 ) , p . 33.

40 Panzer Leader,
P.

163.
P.

41 "Armored Forces,"

463.

42 German F i e l d S e r v i c e R e g u l a t i o n s , U.S. Arrny R e p r i n t < F o r t L e a v e n w o r t h , K a n s a s : U.S. A r m y Corrlmand a n d G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e P r e s s , 19361, P . 5 s .

4 3 German F i e l d S e r v i c e R e g u l a t i o n s , 44 "Flrrnored F o r c e s , "

P.

P.

59.

468.

4 5 F l e l d - M a r s h a l L o r d F.M. C a r v e r , The A p o s t l e s o f M o b i l i t y (New Y o r K : H o l m r s a n d M e i e r P u b l i s h e r s , I n c . , 13791, P . 60. 46 T h i s ketch maps i s a r o u g h e s t i m a t e t a K e n f r o m one o f i n P a n z e r L e a d e r , p . 155. Guderian's

47 J o h n S t r a w s o n . " G e n e r a l H e i n z G u d e r i a n , " i n The War L o r d s , e d . S i r M. C a r v e r ( B o s t o n : L i t t l e B r o w n a n d Co., 13i6), P .300.

4 8 MacKsey,

p.

158.

4 9 L a r r y A d d i n g t o n , The B I i t z K r i e g E r a a n d t h e German G e n e r a l S t a f f (New B r u n r . w i c K , New J e r s e y : R u t g e r s U n i u e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 7 1 ) , P P . 107-08.

50 P a n z e r Lr -,

P.

73.

51 b l a c ~ s e y ,p .
5 2 MacKseY,

161.

p . 161.
PP.

53 F l d d i n g t o n ,

195-198.
P.
p.

54 P a n z e r L e a d e r ,
55 Plnzer Leader,

157.

264.

90

56 Panzer Leader,

p.

331.

57 P a n z e r L e a d e r ,
5 3 See 480.

PP.

377-73.

i n The

"Flrmored F o r c e s , "

I n f a n t r y Journal

Reader,

59 " A r m o r e d F o r c e s , " 6 0 "Armored F o r c e s

P.

430. 430-31.

," p p .

6 1 S h e l f o r d B i d w e l l a n d D o m i n i c ~Graham, F i r e - P o w e r ( B o s t o n : G e o r g e A l l e n a n d U n w i n , 1932>, p . 2 0 9 . 62 P a n z e r L e a d e r ,
P.

68. 153. 169-72. 123.

p.

63 P a n z e r L e a d e r ,
6 4 Panzer Leader, 65 Panzer Leader,

P.
pp.

P.

66 " R r m o r e d F o r c e s , "

467.

6 7 D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e R r m Y Parnp l e t No. 2 0 - 2 4 2 , German Armored T r a f f i c C o n t r o l O u r l n s t h e R u s s i a n Campaign U.S. Government P r i n t i n g O f f l c e , 1952>, P P . ( W a s h i n g t o n , O.C.: 3-9. 6 3 Panzer Leader,
69 A d d i n s t o n .
P.

p.

159.

61.

70 M a c K s e y ,
7 1 Strawson,

P.

161.
P.

i n The War L o r d s ,

303.

7 2 . W. u o n M e l l e n t h i n , German G e n e r a l s o f W o r l d War I 1 F (Norman, OKlahorna: U n i v e r s i t y o f OKlahoma P r e s s , 1977), P . 9 1 .

73 * A r m o r e d F o r c e s , "
P.

468.

74 P a n z e r L e a d e r ,

PP.

257-58. 63.
70-71.

75 P a n z e r L e a d e r ,
76 P a n z e r L e a d e r ,

P.
pp.
P.

77 P a n z e r L e a d e r ,

29.

91

78 H e i n z G u d e r i a n . German G e n e r a l S t a f f , P r o j e c t #6, T r a i n i n g a n d D e v e l o p m e n t o f German G e n e r a l S t a f f O f f i c e r s , V o l u m e X K V I I I ( H i s t o r i c a l O i u i s i o n , E u r o p e a n Command, n o d a t e ) , P .23.

73 B i d w e l l a n d Graham,
30 P a n z e r L e a d e r ,
PP.

P.

219.

181-86. Staff P r o j r c t #6,

P.

81 Guderian,
32 M a c x s e v ,
33

German G e n e r a l
P.

24.

161.
p.

"Rrmored F o r c e s , "
P.

477.

94 Panzer Leader, 85 C a r u e r ,
86 P a n z e r

153.
P.

The A p o s t l e s o f M o b i l i t y , Leader,
P.
P .

60.

31.

a7

Carurr.

60.
P.

88 B i d w e l l

a n d Graham,
p. p.

203.

89 a d d i n g t o n ,
30 f l d d i n g t u n ,

106.

37.
P.

91 B i d w e l l a n d Graham,

208.

32 P a n z e r L e a d e r ,
93 P a n z e r L e a d e r ,

P.
p.

114.
39.

-9 4 5 1 1 ,

94 The R i s e a n d F a l l o f P. 116.
p. p.

t h e German fiir

Force

(1933 t o

95 P a n z e r L e a d e r ,
36 P a n z e r L e a d e r ,

148. 95. 167-63.

37 P s n z e r L e a d e r ,

PP.

98 P a n z e r L e a d e r , p . 3 1 1 . a l s o s e e F.W. ' J G ~M e l l e n t h i n ' s P a n z e r B a t t l e s (Flew ' l a r K : B a l l a n t i n e B O O K S , 1356), P P . 278-283. 99 F o r f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n o n t h i s P O i n t , s e e F i e l d - M a r s h a l L o r d C a r u e r ' s r e r n a r K S i n The f i p o s t l e s o f M o b i l i t y , P . 59.
I B B MacKsev,
P.

164.

32

101 Addinston,

P.

68.

I02 P a n z e r L e a d a r , P . 255.

103 C a r l u o n C l a u s e w i t z , u
r , eds.

M. H o w a r d and P. P a r e t

1976),
PP.

t P r i n c e t o n , New J e r s e y : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s ,
190-92.
104 H e i n z G u d e r i a n ,

German G e n e r a l S t a f f P r o j e c t # 6 , P .

31.

93

CHflPTER 3: GENERf3L GEORGE S. PATTON.JR.

PnRT I :

T h e Man

More t h a n a n y o t h e r A m e r i c a n s o l d i e r , G e n e r a l G e o r g e S . P a t t o n , J r . e p i t o r n i z e s t h e flmr i c a n c o m b a t C o m m a n d e r . H i s fame

requires no e m b e l l i s h m e n t h e r e , n o r

is t h e r e o b v l o u s r e a s o n t o

b e l i e v e P a t t o n was n o t e m i n e n t l y S u c C e s S f u l o p e r a t i o n a l a r t d u r i n g W o r l d War d u r i n g TORCH, w i t h Seventh U.S.

f-lrmy

i n t h e conduct of

11. H i s c o n d u c t of o p e r a t i o n s

I 1 C o r p s a f t e r K a s r e r i n e , a s cornrnander o f

R r m v d u r i n g HUSKY, and ac commander o f T h i r d U . S .

i n d i c a t e h e was a n a b l e In t h i s c h a p t e r , a n a l y s e s o f

on t h e c o n t i n e n t of E u r o p e a l l
t h e operational art.

practioner of

t h e s e c a m p a i g n s a n d P a t t o n ' s own w r i t l n g s s e r v e a s b a s e s o f
e v i d e n c e f r o m which a r e drawn c o n c l u s i o n s a b o u t t h e rnajor

t e n e t s which a p p a r e n t l y g u i d e d P a t t o n operational art.

i n h i s conduct of

In a f a s h i o n s i m i l a r t o t h a t e m l o y e d

in the preceding

c h a p t e r on H e i n z G u d e r i a n , t h i s c h a p t e r a p p r o a c h e s a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g of P a t t o n ' s o p e r a t i o n s , b y f o c u s i n g a t t e n t i o n on f o u r b r o a d c a t e g o r ies o f offensive action, analysis: c o m b i n e d arms o p e r a t i o n s , and r i s K . The d i f f e r e n c e

command a n d c o n t r o l ,

in c a t e g o r i e s between t h e chapters r e f l e c t s t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n e m p h a s i s t h a t P a t t o n a n d G u d e r l a n p l a c e d on w h a t h a s b e e n c h a r a c t e r i z e d a s Momentum. flddit ional l y ,

it

is a r g u a b l e t h a t a

s e p a r a t e c a t e g o r y o n L o g i s t i c s o r S u s t a i n r n e n t is i n o r d e r , b u t

94

t h e f a c t i s , t h i s c h a p t e r is a n a n a l y s i s o f t h e manner

i n which

General P a t t o n conducted o p e r a t i o n a l a r t , and c o n s e q u e n t l y , should be an accurate r e f l e c t i o n o f h i s t e n e t s e v e n

if

those

t e n e t s imply t h a t h e p l a c e d l i t t l e e m p h a s i s on l o g i s t i c a l
matter5 .
Knoun a s " O l d B l o o d a n d G u t s ' a long and i l l u s t r i o u s career
by h i s s o l d i e r s , Patton had flrmy,

i n t h e U.S.

only t h e

h i g h l i g h t s of

which a r e r e c o r d e d h e r e t o s e r u e as a s u i t a b l e

p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e f o r a d i s c u s s i o n o f P a t t o n ' s o p e r a t i o n a l a r t i n W o r l d War
11. Born

i n s o u t h e r n C a l i f o r n i a on I 1 November
P a t t o n grew up w i t h o u t w a n t i n g f o r

1855 t o w e a l t h y p a r e n t s ,

much. H i s a b i l i t y t o q u o t e l o n g p a s s a g e s f r o m c l a s s i c s s u c h a s Homer's

Iliad a t t e s t s

t o hi5 love o f

ideas, but h i 5 inability

t o r e a d o r w r i t e a t t h e a g e o f t w e l v e s u g g e s t s h e was l e s s interested

i n more p r a c t i c a l a f f a i r s .

I t a l s o h e l p s e x p l a i n why f r o m West P o i n t , a

i t toOK P a t t o n f i v e y e a r s t o g r a d u a t e

d e v e l o p m e n t a 1 1 t h e more s u r p r i s i n g c o n s i d e r i n s t h a t P a t t o n attended Virginia Military I n s t i t u t e f o r a year b e fo re going t o

West P o i n t !
In s p i t e of n u m e r o u s c h i l d h o o d i l l n e s s e s , P a t t o n grew
UP

t o b e p h y s i c a l l y s t r o n g a n d a g g r e s s i v e . Flfter g r a d u a t i n g f r o m
West P o i n t i n 1389, h e was p o s t e d t o F o r t S h e r i d a n , Wyoming,
t a K i n g w i t h h i m h i s new b r i d e B e a t r i c e f l y e r P a t t o n . fls

c a v a l r y o f f i c e r , h e h a d t o b e c o m f o r t a b l e on h o r s e b a c K , b u t P a t t o n was a n a c c o m p l i s h e d e q u e s t r i a n . In

1 9 1 2 , h e was t h e

f i r s t A m e r i c a n A r m y o f f i c e r t o c o m p e t e i n t h e O l y m p i c Games o n

35

t h e U.S.

Modern P e n t a t h l o n Team a n d f i n i s h e d a r e s p e c t a b l e

f o u r t h among m i l i t a r y a t h l e t e s o f t h e w o r l d . P a t t o n saw h i s f i r s t c o m b a t a c t i o n i n Mexico a s General J

J. Persh ing
p u r s u i t of

'5

a i d e d u r i n s P e r s h i n g 's p u n i t i v e e x p e d i t i o n

in

Pancho V i l l a .

In c l o s e c o m b a t h e ~ i l l e d ome o f s bodyguard, thereby securing f o r Later, in

V i l l a ' s men,

including Villa';

l i f e t h e a f f e c t i o n and r e s p e c t of General P e r s h i n g . W o r l d War

I P a t t o n s e r v e d as P e r s h i n g ' s a i d e and H e a d q u a r t e r s

Commandant a n d t h e n j o i n e d t h e f l e d 9 1 i n s Flmer i c a n TanK C o r p s . He s u p e r v i s e d t h e t r a i n i n g o f t h e new Flmerican TanK C o r p s a n d l e d t h e 3 0 4 t h TanK B r i g a d e Meuse-Flrgonne into b a t t l e at Saint-Mihiel and t h e

o f f e n s i u e a n d was w o u n d e d s e v e r e l y by rnach i n e g u n
I as a

f i r e i n t h e l a t t e r a c t i o n . He e m e r g e d f r o m W o r l d War colonel

i n command o f a t a n K b r i g a d e , d e c o r a t e d w i t h t h e

D i s t i n g u i s h e d S e r v i c e C r o s s and t h e D i s t i n g u i s h e d Seru i c e Medal.

D u r i n g t h e i n t e r w a r y e a r s P a t t o n a t t e n d e d a number of
s c h o o l s as e i t h e r instructor o r student at t h e Cavalry School,

Command a n d G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e , a n d t h e Flrmy War C o l l e g e . When W o r l d War

I 1 b e g a n P a t t o n was s e r v i n g a t F o r t M y e r ,
i m m e d i a t e l y t o o r g a n i z e a n d command a

V i r g i n i a a n d was s e n t b r i g a d e i n one of

two newly c r e a t e d a r m o r e d d i u i s i o n s . Soon h e

t o o K command o f t h e 2 n d A r m o r e d D i v i s i o n a t F o r t Benning,Georgia, Maneuvers of h i s school i n s trained

i t , and l e d it through the Louisiana

1 9 4 1 . 1911 o f

Patton's experience

i n W o r l d War

I,

in the

inter-war

y e a r s , a n d h i s armured command

96

.just p r i o r t o America's entry well for

A t

i n t o W o r l d War

11 p r e p a r e d h i m

h i s r o l e a s a c o r p s a n d army commander. t h e opening of A r n e r i c a n p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e war i n the North African T h e a t e r as

a g a i n s t Germany,

Patton served

Western Task F o r c e and TORCH, and l a t e r , for

I A r m o r e d C o r p s Commander f o r O p e r a t i o n
a short period, as t h e Commander o f

I1

(US) C o r p s
Pass.

i n the aftermath o f

that corps' defeat a t Kasserine

the

Then E i s e n h o w e r h a d P a t t o n h e l p p l a n O p e r a t i o n HUSKY, a n d a p p o i n t e d P a t t o n t o cornmand S e v e n t h

invasion o f S i c i l y ,

<US) A P w d u r i n g t h e S i c i l y Campaign.

I n b o t h t h o s e campaigns

P a t t o n c l e a r l y d e m o n s t r a t e d h e c o u l d e f f e c t i v e l y Command l a r g e m i l i t a r y u n i t s and a c h i e v e d e c i s i v e r e s u l t s .
SP

Consequently, "slapping

in

ite of

r e s e r v a t i o n s because of on S i c i l y , Army o n c e

the

infarnous

incidents. Third
(US)

E i s e n h o w e r s e l e c t e d P a t t o n t o command

i t became o p e r a t i o n a l o n t h e c o n t i n e n t o f
commander and

E u r o p e . P a t t o n ' s r e p u t a t i o n as a g r e a t f i e l d practioner of successes of

o p e r a t i o n a l a r t r e s t s l a r g e l y on t h e r e p e a t e d T h i r d Army

i n i t s remarKable advance f r o m t h e
CzechoslouaKia.
5

Cotent i n P e n i n s u l a across Europe t o P i l s e n , surpr i s ingly

Not

then,

t h i s c h a p t e r draws heav i l Y on P a t t o n '

o p e r a t i o n s w h i l e h e was

i n command o f
1945.

T h i r d Army

i n Europe f r o m

I August

1944 t o 9 May

Much h a s b e e n w r i t t e n a n d s a i d a b o u t P a t t o n ' s f l a i r showiness and g r a n d s t a n d i n g , uniforms, obscene language, focus ins e s p e c i a l l y and, a t times,

for

on h i s f l a s h y

outrageous behavior. under a l l

Hidden i n such discussions

i s t h e thought that

- 97 -

P a t t o n ' s flamboyance substance, operat ional

t h e r e was r e a l l y

l i t t l e tactical

t h a t p e r h a p s h e was n o t t h e c a p a b l e p r a c t i o n e r o f
a r t the surface evidence suggests. However,

in

s p i t e o f t h e p u b l i c preoccupation u i t h P a t t o n ' s outward form, t h e evidence i n d i c a t e s t h a t he understood s o l d i e r s w e l l , h i s subordinates, Knew

how t o g e t t h e m o s t o u t o f l a r g e m i l i t a r y format ions. was, Pershing s a i d o f him,

a n d how t o f i g h t t h e w a r r i o r he

R e c o g n i z i n g h irn f o r

"This Patton boy! He's a r e a l show, P e r s h i n s uas s u i t e

f i g h t e r ! " < l > Fls t h i s c h a p t e r w i l l

ight.

98

PART II :

Oparat i o n a l Tenets

COMBINED ARMS OPERFITIONS

There

is a certain

i r o n y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h George P a t t o n ' s American p r a c t i o n e r of The irony is that tanK and

r i s e t o fame

as t h e p r e - e m i n e n t

mobile warfare who,

i n W o r l d War
duty

11.

it uas P a t t o n

d u r i n g h i s t o u r of

in the Office o f

t h e C h i e f of

C a v a l r y between effectively

1928 a n d 1931, a r g u e d r r a s t o b s t i n a t e l y a n d

against supplanting t h e horse c a v a l r y by t h e t a n K

In a paper t i t l e d

o r t h e m e c h a n i z e d arm.

"The V a l u e o f

Cavalry"

P a t t o n e x a l t e d t h e c a v a l r y by p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t c a v a l r y could o p e r a t e anywhere, but "Cmlechan i c a l f o r c e s do n o t p o s s e s s t h i s

u n i v e r s a l a v a i l a b i l i t y . " < 2 > He w e n t o n t o s a y : The 1 i m i t a t i o n i n h e r e n t i n . . . u e h i c l e s , s u c h as t h e i r i n a b i l i t y t o operate a t night, t o l i v e o f f the c o u n t r y , or t o p e n e t r a t e wood a n d m o u n t a i n s i n d u b i t a b l y stamp t h e m as a u x i l i a r i e s and n o t as supplanters o f Caualry.<B>

S u r e l y t h e s e a r e s t r a n g e w o r d s f o r a man who w e n t o n j u s t f i f t e e n Years l a t e r t o command some o f t h e American A r m y ' s a1 1 w i t h o u t h o r s e

l a r g e s t armored and m o t o r i z e d f o r m a t i o n s , Cavalry. War

A u t h o r M a r t i n Blumenson a t t r i b u t e s P a t t o n ' s p r e - W o r l d h o r s e s and t h e h o r s e

I 1 c a v a l r y views t o h i s l o v e of

99

c a v a l r y t r a d i t i o n and h i s l o y a l t y t o t h e C h i e f o f whom h e w r o t e .

Cavalry f o r

Had n o t l e s s p a s s i o n a t e t h i n K e r s p r e v a i l e d ,

P a t t o n m i g h t n o t h a v e h a d much d i v i s i o n s t o command and

i n t h e way o f

c o m b i n e d arms b e t w e e n 1920
in the United

i n W o r l d War

XI.

As

i t was,

1935 o n l y t h i r t y - f i u e

tanKs were even b u i l t

S t a t e s . < 4 > I t was n o t u n t i l

1938 t h a t an A m e r i c a n d e s i g n e d t a n K
Moreover, the aPPl icable infantrymen i n the "tanKs are either

was a c c e p t e d a n d s t a n d a r d i z e d .

d o c t r i n e had l o n g been t h a t tanKs a s s i s t t h e attacK. The 1333 d o c t r i n e s i m p l y s t a t e d t h a t

employed t o a s s i s t t h e aduance o f p r e c e d i n g o r accompanying t h e

infantry foot troops,

i n f a n t r y assault echelon. "<5>

is t o set

The p o i n t o f t h e s e re mar^^ discuss ion of Patton

' 5

the stage f o r

c o n c e p t i o n o f combined arms o p e r a t i o n s ,

f o r i t i s c l e a r b y w h a t h e l a t e r w r o t e a n d b y t h e way h e f o u g h t
t h a t h e t h o u g h t c o m b i n e d arms o r g a n i z a t i o n s a n d t h e i r c o r r e c t employment were i m p o r t a n t t o t h e s u c c e s s of operational art,

n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g h i s comments a b o u t c a v a l r y a n d t h e v a l u e o f infantry-armor e m p l o y m e n t .of teams. It i s f a i r t o say t h a t P a t t o n ' s

i n f a n t r y a n d a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s was

in part the

r e s u l t o f h i s own s t u d i e s a n d r u m i n a t i o n s o n t h e s u b j e c t o f combined arms and t h e r e s u l t o f t h e Army's organizations he discussion of tactical Prior t o a

i n h e r i t e d a s a f i e l d commander.

h i s combtned arms employment t e n e t s ,

t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of

it is
the

aPProPr i a t e t o d e s c r i b e b r i e f l y Amer i c a n a r m o r e d a n d i n f a n t r y The 1344 A m e r i c a n

d i v i s i o n s c i r c a 1344. d i v i s i o n was a t r i a n g u l a r

infantry

100

d i u i s i o n , so c a l l e d b e c a u s e

i t was c o m p o s e d o f t h r e e i n f a n t r y

r e g i m e n t s , e a c h o f which c o n t a i n e d t h r e e b a t t a l i o n s , and so on

(See C h a r t 3). T h e d i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r y was c o m p o s e d o f f o u r

battal ions of

f i e l d art i l l e r y , organized

in t h r e e b a t t a l ions of

105-mm

(36 t u b e s ) a n d o n e b a t t a l i o n o f

155-mm ( 1 2 t u b e s ) i t s own

howitzers.

In a d d i t i o n , each i n f a n t r y r e g i m e n t h a d

c a n n o n c o m p a n y o f s i x 1 0 5 - m m h o w i t z e r s t h a t were l i n K e d w i t h t h e division artillery Fire Direction Center In a d d i t i o n t o t h e (FOCI r a d i o n e t .

i n f a n t r y and a r t i l l e r y , t h e p r i m a r y combat combat s u p p o r t u n i t s included a

arms e l e m e n t s o f t h e d i v i s i o n ,
r e c o n n a i s s a n c e company,

ens ineer b a t t a l i o n , antiaircraft

art i l lery/ant itanK weapons b a t t a l i o n , chemical m o r t a r

b a t t a l i o n , and s i g n a l company. Errploying a c o r p s " p o o l i n g "
'

c o n c e p t , a c o r p s comnander c o u l d augment t h e combat c a p a b i l i t Y of

a d i v i s i o n by a t t a c h i n g e x t r a a r t i l l e r y , e n g i n e e r s , o r
t r U C K

q u a r t e r m a s t e r t r u c K s . S i x quartermaster

companies,

for

e x a m p l e , c o u l d maKe a n i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n c o m p l e t e l y m o b i l e .
Generally

, infantry d iv

is i o n s

in t h e European Theater of b a s i s one tanK

Operations battalion

(ETO) c o n t r o l l e d o n a s e m i - p e r m a n e n t

and one tanK d e s t r o y e r b a t t a l i o n , which t h e c o r p s

commander c o u l d a l l o c a t e , e m p l o y i n g t h e p o o l i n s c o n c e p t , a s h e

saw f i t . W e n s u i t a b l y a u g m e n t e d w i t h c o m b a t s u p p o r t u n i t s , a
d i v i s i o n c o m m a n d e r c o u l d f o r m t h r e e f o r m i d a b l e r e g i m e n t a l tasK f o r c e s o r c o m b a t t e a m s e a c h w i t h t h e i r own f i e l d a r t i l l e r y cannon company. In t h e words o f R o b e r t Kent G r e e n f i e l d ,

T h e i n f a n t r y r e g i m e n t was v i r t u a l l y a s m a l l d i u i s i o n . I t s e r v e d i t s e l f : it had a r e c o n n a i s s a n c e p l a t o o n : it

101

101a

had P r o p o r t i o n a t e l v f a r more a n t i a i r c r a f t and a n t i t a n K weapons t h a n t h e d i v i s i o n ; and a f t e r t h e i n c l u s i o n o f h o w i t z e r s i t h a d i t s own a r t i l l e r y . < 6 >

All

things considered, the

i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n w i t h which P a t t o n 14,000 s t r o n g t h a t

f o u g h t was a f l e x i b l e o r g a n i z a t i o n o v e r

c o u l d b e taSK o r g a n i z e d i n t o r e g i m e n t a l c o m b a t t e a m s f o r

spec i f ic m i s s i o n s .
Complementing t h i s basic i n f a n t r y b u i l d i n g b l o c K was a i t s e l f PacKed

h a s t i l y conceived armored d i v i s i o n structure t h a t q u i t e a punch. The 1 9 4 4 a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n was a n

11,000-man

o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h 263 m e d i u m a n d l i g h t t a n K B as i t s p r i m a r y weapon

< S e e C h a r t 4 ) . f l r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s were o r g a n i z e d i n t o t h e

main combat e l e m e n t s of two armored regiments o f t h r e e tanK b a t t a l i o n s each; battalions:

a n armored i n f a n t r y r e g i m e n t composed o f t h r e e
18s-mm

and a d i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r y composed o f t h r e e

( S P ) h o w i t z e r b a t t a l i o n s . < 7 > Combat s u p p o r t e l e m e n t s i n c l u d e d a reconnaissance b a t t a l ion, engineer battal ion, and s ignal

company. D i v i s i o n t r a i n s i n c l u d e d a maintenance b a t t a l i o n , s u p p l y b a t t a l i o n , m e d i c a l b a t t a l i o n , and m i l i t a r v p o l ice platoon. By J a n u a r y 1945, a r m o r e d d i u is I o n s were e q u i p p e d w i t h

all types,

s o m e 2,276 v e h i c l e s o f used t o m v e armored b a t t l e . < 8 > LiKe t h e c o u l d be--and

466 o f w h i c h were h a l f - t r a C K S

i n f a n t r y and reconnaissance elements i n t o i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n , t h e armored d i v i s i o n

by

f r e q u e n t l y was--augmented

an independent tanK

b a t t a l i o n o r tanK d e s t r o y e r b a t t a l i o n .

F o r command a n d c o n t r o l

p u r p o s e s , by T a b l e o f O r g a n i z a t i o n , t h e a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n h a d t h r e e tasK f o r c e h e a d q u a r t e r s c a l l e d C o m b a t Commands A ,

B, a n d

102

Reserve.

T h e s e t h r e e h e a d q u a r t e r s made

it easy f o r t h e d i v i s i o n
s p e c i f i c missions,

commander t o t a i l o r h i s c o m b a t commands f o r terrain, a n d enemy t h r e a t s .

D o c t r i n a l l y , t h e a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n was v i e w e d p r i m a r i l y a s an e x p l o i t a t i o n o r g a n i z a t i o n t o be committed a f t e r d i v i s i o n had c r e a t e d a t a c t i c a l penetration. infantry the infantry

The c o n c e p t o f infantry in

motorizing o r mechanizing a l l t h e

in standard

d i v i s i o n s was e n t e r t a i n e d b u t r e j e c t e d b y t h e War D e p a r t m e n t

1943 i n f a u o r o f

t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f some f i f t e e n

independent

armored i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n s , armored d i v i s i o n t o g i v e

w h i c h c o u l d be p l u g g e d i n t o a n infantry strength. The

it a d d i t i o n a l

War D e p a r t m e n t a l s o p r e s s e d f o r tanK b a t t a l i o n s f o r

the fielding of

independent

close support within the

infantry infantry

d i v i s i o n s . < S > flrmored d i u i s i o n s were t o e x p l o i t t h e breaKthrough, b u t t h e r e remained a fundamental

disparity

in the

o r g a n i c m o b i l i t y between shortage of infantry

i n f a n t r y and armored d i v i s i o n s and a problems f o r

i n t h e armored d i u i s i o n s ,

w h i c h P a t t o n h a d h i s own s o l u t i o n .

Tactical

Employment

In a

1921 p a p e r t i t l e d " T a c t i c a l T e n d e n c i e s " P a t t o n t h e supremacy o f t a c t i c s o v e r s t r a t e g y :

r e v e a l e d h i s v i e w of

C T l a c t i c s i s t h e d a i l y l o t of a l l . S p l e n d i d s t r a t e g y may b e made a b o r t i u e b y p o o r t a c t i c s , w h i l e g o o d t a c t i c s may r e t r i e u e t h e m o s t b l u n d e r i n g s t r a t e g y . < 1 0 )

183

U n s u r p r i s i n g l ~ , b y t h e t i m e h e t o o K command o f t h e c o n t i n e n t of a r m o r e d and t-loreouer, Europe, P a t t o n had d e f i n i t e

T h i r d Flrrny o n

i d e a s a b o u t how

infantry

d i v i s i o n s s h o u l d be employed t a c t i c a l l y

h e d i d n o t h e s i t a t e t o maKe h i s v i e w s Known t o Key t o h i s o p e r a t i o n a l v i e w s

infantry

s u b o r d i n a t e commanders e i t h e r .

were h i s v i e w s on t h e t a c t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s o f armor which f o l l o w . I n War As

and

I Knew I t P a t t o n maKes c l e a r w h a t t h e
and infantryman is

r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e t a n K armored and infantry

in both

d iu i s ions.

He s a y s :

In t h e i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n t h e purpose o f t h e tanK i s t o g e t t h e i n f a n t r y f o r w a r d . I n t h e armored d i v i s i o n t h e i n f a n t r y has t h e tasK o f b r e a K i n g t h e tanKs lOOSe.<ll>

D e m o n s t r a t i n g t h a t h e was d e a d s e r i o u s a b o u t how h e e x p e c t e d h i s d i v i s i o n a n d c o r p s cornmanders infantry and a r m o r ,

i n T h i r d Army t o employ
l e t t e r s of

Patton published a series of

i n s t r u c t i o n t o h i s s u b o r d i n a t e commanders 1944. use of ln'ietter

of

i n t h e S p r i n g of

I n s t r u c t i o n No.3"he tearre.

WKeS c l e a r t h e t a c t i c a l

infantry-arrmr

When o p e r a t i n g a g a i n s t Known o r where

a n t i t a n K guns o r e x t e n s i u e a n t i t a n K m i n e f i e l d s , necessary t o f o r c e a r i u e r c r o s s i n g , by t h e infantry. TanKs,

t h e assault should be l e d l e a d when s m a l l or against

on t h e o t h e r hand,

minef i e l d s o r anti-personnel what P a t t o n t e r m e d 'normal

mines are encountered,

infantry

and armor r e s i s t a n c e . infantry,

"<

12)

Here P a t t o n i s r e f e r r i n g t o armored say t h a t n o r m a l l y t h e armored

t o maKe a h o l e t o

f o r he goes o n t o

i n f a n t r y and a r t i l l e r y a r e used then

a l l o w tanK b a t t a l i o n s t o m v e forward;

104

t h e armored

i n f a n t r y and a r t i l l e r y f o l l o w c l o s e b e h i n d .

Moreover, P a t t o n d i d n o t e n u is i o n a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y r e m a i n i n g
m o u n t e d when t h e y w e n t into action.

H i s t a c t i c a l c o n c e p t , which

he labeled

"marching f i r e , " c a l l e d f o r t h e i n f a n t r y t o dismount

when r e q u i r e d a n d a s s a u l t f o r w a r d f i r i n g f r o m t h e h i p o r b y holding t h e r i f l e b u t t j u s t under t h e armpit. This

infantry

a s s a u l t was t o b e s u p p o r t e d b y e v e r y w e a p o n - - m a c h i n e g u n ,
mortar,

a r t i l l e r y , A T g u n . P a t t o n ' s o p i n i o n was t h a t

.Calny

gun

n o t f i r i n g was n o t d o i n g pointed out t h a t

i t s j o b . " < 1 3 > I n h i s own w o r d s , P a t t o n

a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y is n o t h i n g b u t a f o r m o f
cavalry--that is, i t u s e s its v e h i c l e s t o d e p l o y
mounted, s a v i n g time, avoiding f a t i g u e . I t does n o t
use its u e h i c l e s - - e x c e p t r a r e l y - - f o r a mounted
charge.<14:

TanKs, t h o u g h t P a t t o n , do any c h a r g i n g t h a t n e e d s t o be done

On t h i s s u b j e c t

i n 1927 h e w r o t e :

TanKs a r e i n r e a l l t y a m o d e r n v e r s i o n o f h e a v y c a v a l r y . . .Wlen s a t i s f a c t o r y m a c h i n e s a r e a v a i l a b l e , t h e y s h o u l d be formed i n t o s e p a r a t e c o r p s and u s e d , when t e r r a i n p e r m i t s , f o r t h e d e l i v e r y o f t h e f i n a l ShoCK i n s o m e g r e a t b a t t l e > when s o u s e d t h e y must b e employed r u t h l e s s l y and i n masses.<IS>

Interestingly,

although t h i s

1927 remarK b y P a t t o n may h a v e

b e e n t h o u g h t o f b y some t o b e a n i n d i c a t i o n o f how h e w o u l d u s e

t a n K s i n W o r l d War I f , P a t t o n d i d n o t a t a l l e m p l o y t a n K S i n
t h e m a n n e r t h i s p a s s a g e s u g g e s t s , a p o i n t t o be a d d r e s s e d l a t e r o n . However, h i 5 p h r a s e h ighl ight ing because

'when

t e r r a i n p e r m i t s " is w o r t h important p o i n t s about

i t raises two

105

P a t t o n ' s tactical methods t h a t had an

impact on h i s o p e r a t i o n a l

methods. F i r s t , tanKs cannot go everywhere. P a t t o n recognized this, b u t a p p e a r e d l a t e r t o a d h e r e anyway t o t h e maxim "The

b e s t tanK c o u n t r y

is e n e m y t e r r i t o r y d e v o i d o f A T w e a p o n s . "

It

i l l u s t r a t e s , a5 we1 I , h i s t a c t i c a l a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r t e r r a i n a n d
s u g g e s t s c o r r e c t l y t h a t h e h a d t h e same a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r

t e r r a i n o p e r a t i o n a l l y . S e c o n d , h i s remarK a b o u t t e r r a i n h e l p s
e x p l a i n why P a t t o n t h o u g h t a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n a l reconnaissance

u n i t s were i m p o r t a n t . S i n c e t m K 5 c a n n o t g o e v e r y w h e r e , P a t t o n
thought
it v i t a l t o g e t armored reconnaissance u n i t s far o u t

in

f r o n t o f tanK u n i t s t o o b s e r v e and report on t h e t e r r a i n , routes, and b u i l t

UP

a r e a s as w e l l a s t h e e n e m y .

Such

r e c o n n a i s s a n c e e l e m e n t s were v i t a l b u t , b e c a u s e of t h e f a s t

Pace o f

armored o p e r a t i o n s ,

were o f n o u s e

i f combat

i n f o r m a t i o n d i d n o t g e t bacK t o h i g h e r h e a d q u a r t e r s r a p i d l y . Patton's c o m m l t m e n t t o a c o m b i n e d arms c o n c e p t a t t h e

is f u r t h e r r e f l e c t e d

tactical level

i n h i s remarKs on t h e u s e 1n"Letter of Instruction

of tanKS and t h e o b j e c t i v e of armor.

~ 0 . 3 , " f o r e x a m p l e , h e e x h o r t s h i s c o m m a n d e r s t o Keep t a n K s o u t of v i l l a g e s and towns; dismounted

o f a town,

combat

in built

UP

a r e a s is a tasK f o r

infantry.

If

armor must b e employed f o r t h e capture

i t s h o u l d a t t a C K t h e town f r o m t h e rear, taKing care

w h i l e e n v e l o p i n g o r b y p a s s i n g t o s t a y o u t of

range of f l a n K i n g

anti-tanK

f i r e coming f r o m t h e t o w n . < l 6 > But P a t t o n t h o u g h t

t h a t n e i t h e r t o w n s n o r e n e m y armar were t h e t r u e o b j e c t i v e s o f armored f o r c e s i n any event. In h i s o p i n i o n , "the true

I06

o b j e c t i v e of

armor

i s enemy

i n f a n t r y and a r t i l l e r y ,

and above

a l l his supply

i n s t a l l a t i o n s a n d c o m a n d c e n t e r s . " < l 7 > And

c l e a r l y t h e way t o g e t t o s u c h o b j ~ c t i u e s i s t o a t t a c K t h e enemy's f l a n K s o r r e a r .
flanK

Whenever

a t u r n i n g movement t o g a i n a Patton thought a small

o r r e a r a t t a c K met o p p o s i t i o n ,

p a r t o f t h e e n v e l o p i n g f o r c e s h o u l d be d e t a c h e d and c o n t i n u e

w i t h a w i d e r e n v e l o p m e n t a g a i n s t t h e enemy.
j u s t o n e company o f t a n K S
armored

He b e l i e v e d t h a t by

i n t h e enemy's r e a r - - s u p p o r t e d w i n an engagement.

i n f a n t r y a n d a r t il l e r y - - c a n

P a t t o n 's

q u a 1 ifi e r

" s u p p o r t e d by armored i n f a n t r y and a r t i l l e r y "

i n d i c a t e s h e b e l i e v e d t h a t o n l y when t h e v a r i o u s a r m s a r e i n t e g r a t e d can t a c t i c a l Recognizing t h a t armored d i v i s i o n , success be achieved. infantry division, more s o t h a n t h e

the

was v u l n e r a b l e t o a n enemy t a n K a t t a c K ,

P a t t o n p r e s c r i b e d t h e f o l l o w i n g measures
fill o u t h i s t a n K - i n f a n t r y

i n t h e T h i r d firmy
in infantry

to

team concept

divisions.

First,

he d i r e c t e d t h a t each

infantry division

in the Third

A r m y w o u l d h a v e one s e p a r a t e t a n K b a t t a l i o n p e r m a n e n t l y

attached. stated:

R e f l e c t i n g b o t h h i s c o n c e r n and h i s c o n c e p t ,

Patton

l e a s t one s e p a r a t e infantry d i v i s i o n . T h i s w i l l p e r m i t t h e d i v i s i o n commander t o a t t a c h o n e rnedium t a n K company t o e a c h i n f a n t r y r e g i m e n t and s t i l l r e t a i n B a t t a l i o n H e a d q u a r t e r s , a l i g h t c o w a n y a n d p o s s i b l y a m e d i u m t a n K company as a m o b i l e r e s e r v e t o e x p l o i t a s u c c e ~ so r t o i n t e r v e n e a g a i n s t a C o u n t e r a t t a c K . < 18)

t r y

I n t h i s Army we w i l l

t o Keep a t

tanK b a t t a l i o n p e r m a n e n t l y a t t a c h e d t o e a c h

TanKs,

then,

were t o e x p l o i t

when p o s s i b l e a n d Keep t h e

107

i n f a n t r y o u t of

t r o u b l e when n e c e s s a r y .

fllso, t h e

image t h a t

emerges from t h i s passage

is o n e o f t a n K b a t t a l i o n s s p r e a d f a r

and wide i n l i t t l e penny PacKets, a problem t h a t s u r f a c e s a t the operational

l e v e l as w e l l . S e c o n d , P a t t o n a t t a c h e d o u t f r o m

T h i r d f i r m y a s s e t s t a n K d e s t r o y e r b a t t a l i o n s w h e n t h e y were n e e d e d and d i r e c t e d t h a t t h e y b e p l a c e d f a r e n o u g h f o r w a r d so
t h a t they could prevent tanKs from overrunning

infantry.

F u r t h e r , h e d i r e c t e d t h a t tanK d e s t r o y e r u n i t s n o t b e h e l d

in

r e s e r v e b e c a u s e t h e y were n o t l i K e l Y t o g e t t o t h e f r o n t i n
t i m e t o a f f e c t t h e outcome of a b a t t l e . < l S >
F l r t i l l e r y a l s o was c l e a r l y p a r t o f

P a t t o n s c o m b i n e d arms

c o n c e p t . He t h o u g h t a t t a c K s r m s t b e f u l l y c o o r d i n a t e d t o b e

successful--tanKs,
P a t t 0n t h o u g h t t h a t

i n f a n t r y , a n d g u n s must

WOPK

as a u n i t .

w h e n e v e r P o s s i b l e , i t is d e s i r a b l e t h a t t h e g u n s o p e r a t e u n d e r d i v i s i o n a l c o n t r o l , and w i t h t h e i r f o r w a r d o b s e r v e r s i n t a n K S , i m m e d i a t e l y taKe u n d e r f i r e enemy a n t i - t a n K g u n s . . . . S u c c e s s d e p e n d s upGn t h e c o o r d i n a t e d u s e o f t h e g u n s and t h e t a n K s , w i t h t h e guns paying particular a t t e n t i o n t o h o s t i l e a r t i l l e r y , and above a l l t o anti-tanK guns and o b s e r v a t i o n
POSt5.<20>

Not o n l y d o e s t h i s p a s s a g e r e f l e c t P a t t o n s commitment t o c o m b i n e d arms b u t

it

i l l u s t r a t e s h i s view t h a t massing of

a r t i l l e r y f i r e s c a n b e s t b e a c h i e v e d by l e a v i n g g u n s u n d e r diu isional control. Penetration--this For static situat ions--defense and tactical

a p p r o a c h made g o o d s e n s e , b u t

i n more f l u i d

s i t u a t i o n s r e q u i r i n 9 c o m b a t comrnands o r r e g i m e n t a l c o m b a t t e a m s t o taKe w i d e l y s e p a r a t e d r o u t e s t o s e p a r a t e o b j e c t i v e s

108

centralization did not

WOPK

well.

I n f a c t , i t was common

p r a c t i c e t o a t t a c h o n e f i e l d a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n t o each combat
command o r r e g i m e n t f o r m o b i l e o p e r a t i o n s . < 2 1 > N e v e r t h e l e s s , Patton's belief

i n m a s s i n g a r t i l l e r y f i r e s was s u p p o r t e d i n
During Third Flrmy's c o u n t e r a t t a c K
108 b a t t a l i o n s o f

Practice wheneuer p o s s i b l e . in t h e B a t t l e of t h e Bulge, s u p p o r t e d attacK i n g u n i t s . rounds

field artillery

35 b a t t a l i o n s a l o n e , f i r i n s 94,230
111 C o r p s '

in f i v e d a y s , supported

attacK t o r e l i e v e

B a s t o g n e . < 2 2 > C o l o n e l R o b e r t A l l e n on P a t t o n ' s G-2 t h a t t h e a r t i l l e r y made t h e d i f f e r e n c e

staff s a i d

i n t h e B u l g e by s m a s h i n g

German a s s a u l t s a n d C l e a r i n g t h e way f o r a s t e a d y , a l b e i t s l o w ,
advance.
The t e r r a i n

i n t h e A r d e n n e s c a n a l i z e d German movements

a n d r e d u c e d a r t i l l e r y t a r g e t s t o a f e w Key h i g h w a y b o t t l e n e c K s , enabling t h e a r t i l l e r y t o f i r e a program of

h a r a s s i n g and

long-range
PO

i n t e r d i c t i n g f i r e s o n t h o s e Key

i n t s . <23>

In t h e L o r r a i n e Campaign,

a r e l a t i v e l y s t a t i c p e r i o d of
1944, t h e a r t i l l e r y ' s

o p e r a t i o n s f r o m S e p t e m b e r t o November a b i l i t y t o mass

i t s f i r e s a t c r i t i c a l p o i n t s a n d t i m e s wa5
For X I 1 C o r p s '
attaCK

t a c t i c a l l y d e c i s i v e time a f t e r time.

on 8

Muember, and

for

instance, t h e s u p p o r t i n g artillery f i r e d a one

I/E

h o u r p r e p a r a t i o n a g a i n s t p i n p o i n t t a r g e t s e m p l o y i n g 42 i n c l u d i n g 5 f r o m XX C o r p s . Those targets included

battalions,

221 artillery p o s i t i o n s , and 12 d e f i l e s .

40 command p o s t s ,

14 assembly areas,

Not o n e r o u n d o f enemy a r t i l l e r y f i r e was

f i r e XI1 Corps

r e c e i v e d b e c a u s e of t h e massed c o u n t e r - b a t t e r y d e l i v e r e d . < 2 4 > FInother e x a m p l e of

t h e t a c t i c a l e f f e c t of massed

109

artillery

is i l l u s t r a t e d b y 3 0 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n ' s a s s a u l t
On 8

a c r o s s t h e M o s e l l e River d u r i n g t h e L o r r a i n e Campaign. Nouember

1944, e l e m e n t s o f two r e g i m e n t s o f t h e 9 0 t h

Infantry

O i u i s i o n i n WalKer's X X C o r p s c o n d u c t e d a n a s s a u l t c r o s s i n g o f t h e rain-swollen b e c a u s e of Moselle R i u e r and

i n i t i a l l y achieved surprise

an e l a b o r a t e d e c e p t i o n plan and t h e f a c t t h a t t h e

G e r m a n s were n o t e x p e c t i n g o f f e n s i u e o p e r a t i o n s
w e a t h e r . Severe German
COUnterattaCKS

i n s u c h bad
10 N o u e m b e r

on 9 and

threatened t h e 30th Diuision's toehold across t h e Moselle, t h e

e f f e c t s o f w h i c h were a m p l i f i e d b e c a u s e t h e M o s e l l e b e g a n t o
rile, cutting off committed infantry units from other

d i ~ J l S i o n a 1e l e m e n t s . S e u e n t e e n a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n s f i r i n g a r o u n d t h e c l o c K were u s e d t o b r e a K u p G e r m a n C o u n t e r a t t a c K s

until divisional
EmJentUaly l

armor u n i t s c o u l d cross t h e Mosells.<25>

, t h e 3 0 t h D i u is i o n s u c c e e d e d i n e s t a b l i s h i n g a
its tactical success r e s t e d
l a r g e l y on t h e

bridgehead, but

massed employment of f i e l d a r t i l l e r y u n i t s . examples--the Bulge and Lorraine--poor

In b o t h of t h e s e impeded t h e

weather t h a t

u s e of

s u p p o r t i n g a i r power f o r c e d P a t t o n a n d h i s s u b o r d i n a t e

c o m m a n d e r s t o r e l y h e a u i l y o n t h e a r t i l l e r y a s a Key m e m b e r o f t h e c o m b i n e d arms team. B u t w h e n e v e r p o s s i b l e P a t t o n made e x t e n s i v e u s e o f s u p p o r t i n g a i r a s s e t s t h a t were a v a i l a b l e t o h i m , thereby

r o u n d i n g o u t h i s c o m b i n e d arms c o n c e p t i o n w i t h a n a l m o f i t f u l l y integrated air-ground

team. P a t t o n r e c o g n i z e d t h e v a l u e o f a i r

ii0

p o w e r and worKed h a r d t o e s t a b l i s h a g o o d W O P K i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h G e n e r a l Wevland, (TflC), w h i c h was Commander o f

% I % T a c t i c a l A i r Command

i n s u p p o r t o f T h i r d Army t h r o u g h o u t o p e r a t i o n s
1i a i s o n o f f i c e r t o Patton's headquarters and P a t t o n d i d n o t h e s i t a t e
if h e n e e d e d a i r s u p p o r t .

i n Europe.
sat

Weyland's

i n on a l l o p e r a t i o n s b r i e f i n g s ,

t o c a l l G e n e r a l Weyland p e r s o n a l l y

X I X TAC o p e r a t i o n s i n c l u d e d a i r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e ,
interdiction, great use. and c l o s e a i r support,

deep

a l l o f w h i c h P a t t o n made

He was p a r t i c u l a r l y p l e a s e d w h e n e v e r X I X TAC p l a n e s On
14 flugust

worKed c l o s e l y w i t h g r o u n d u n i t s . after

1944,

t w o weeKs

t h e b r e a K o u t f r o m t h e Normandy b e a c h h e a d , of such air-ground

P a t t o n observed

the effects thoughts:

c o o p e r a t i o n and r e c o r d e d h i s

J u s t e a s t o f LeMans was o n e o f t h e b e s t e x a m p l e s o f armor and a i r c o - o p e r a t i o n 1 have e v e r seen. F o r about t w o m i l e s t h e r o a d was f u l l o f enemy m o t o r t r a n s p o r t a n d a r m o r , many o f w h i c h b o r e t h e U n m i s t a K a b l e c a l l i n g c a r d o f a P-47 f i g h t e r - b o m b e r - - n a m e l y , a group o f fifty-caliber holes....<26>

I n t h a t same p a s s a g e P a t t o n g o e s o n t o e x p l a i n w h a t t w o
ingredients a r e necessary f o r Intimate confidence successful air-ground teamworK: and

and f r l e n d s h i p

between a l r and ground, His

r u t h l e s s d r i v i n g o n t h e p a r t o f t h e g r o u n d commander. operations

i n d l c a t e t h a t P a t t o n was a d e p t a t m e e t i n g b o t h

requirements. E v i d e n c e t h a t P a t t o n e m p l o y e d % I % TAC a s s e t s d e e p l y t o i n t e r d i c t movement o f flanKs of is e n e w r e s e r v e s and t o p r o t e c t h i s a r m y ' s recollections

i l l u s t r a t e d by Colonel Robert A l l e n ' s

o p e r a t i o n s w h i l e s e r v i n g as P a t t o n ' s d e p u t y 0-2.

In

LUCKY

111

F o r w a r d , A l l e n p o i n t s o u t t h a t d u r i n g T h i r d F I r m y ' s sweep t o t h e L o i r e R i v e r a f t e r t h e b r e a K o u t f r o m t h e Normandy l o d g e m e n t

early August

in

1 3 4 4 , t h e G e r m a n s were h a v i n g g r e a t d i f f i c u l t y
allied airpower's

moving r e s e r v e s b e c a u s e of battlefield.
On 8 A u g u s t

i s o l a t i o n of t h e

1 9 4 4 , f o r e x a m p l e , X l X TAC f l e w 717 dropping t h r e e

s o r t i e s i n s u p p o r t o f T h i r d Army o p e r a t i o n s , b r i d g e s , d e s t r o y i n g 23 l o c o m o t i v e s , vehicle:., additional

137 f r e i g h t c a r s , 505 m o t o r

a n d 23 t a n K S . < 2 7 > On 3 A u g u s t X I X TAC f l e w a n

780 s o r t i e s w i t h s i m i l a r r e s u l t s .

I n h i s own m e m o i r s

P a t t o n maKes i t c l e a r t h a t h e r e l i e d h e a v i l y o n X I X TAC b o t h t o watch and p r o t e c t h i s f l a n K s and h e l p him advance

t a c t i c a l l y . < 2 8 > The number o f v e h i c l e s d e s t r o y e d o r b r i d g e s

dropped does not of itself

illustrate the operational

What
is

s i g n i f i c a n c e o f XIX T A C ' s a i r s u p p o r t . Know

important t o

is w h a t e f f e c t s u c h a i r attacKs h a d on G e r m a n a b i l i t y t o
o r , equally

moue r e s e r v e s o r r e a c t t o T h i r d A r m y ' s m o v e m e n t s ,

i m p o r t a n t , how s u c h a i r a t t a c K s e n a b l e d P a t t o n t o m a n e u v e r h i s

army t o a p o s i t i o n o f a d v a n t a g e .

In t h e l a t t e r r e s p e c t ,

it

is

p l a u s i b l e t o s u p p o s e t h a t XIX T A C ' s r e c o n n a i s s a n c e a n d d e e p i n t e r d i c t i o n o p e r a t i o n s 80 m i l e s o u t t o t h e L o i r e R i v e r were what a l l o w e d Patton t o leave h i s s o u t h e r n f l a n K s t r u n g o u t and e x p o s e d a l o n g t h e L o i r e f o r o v e r 300 m i l e s , c o v e r e d o n l y b y a n i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n a n d t w o c a v a l r y g r o u p s . XIX TAC p r o v i d e d h i m t h e eyes t o s @ e deeply and, consequently, t h e time needed t o

react t o potential t h r e a t s t o T h i r d Army's f l a n K s .

I n t h e B u l g e C a m p a i g n X I X TAC f l e w f r o m d a w n u n t i l d u s K

e v e r y d a y t h e w e a t h e r p e r m i t t e d . A t n i g h t a P-61 N i g h t F i g h t e r

112

S q u a d r o n attacKed German s u p p l y r o u t e s .

I n f i v e d a y s X I X TAC
1806

c l a i m e d 3200 u e h i c l e s , 293 t a n K s a n d a r m o r e d u e h i c l e s ,

f r e i g h t cars, and I 1 b r i d g e s . < 2 9 > Although t h e precise e f f e c t

X I X TACs o p e r a t i o n s h a d d u r i n g t h e B u l g e

is i n c a l c u l a b l e ,

c o n t i n u o u s d a y 1 i g h t a i r o p e r a t i o n s f o r c e d t h e G e r m a n s t o moue

a t n i g h t , m a K i n g t h e i r t a c t i c a l a n d s u ~ p l yo p e r a t i o n s m o r e
d i f f i c u l t a n d s l o w i n g t h e momentum o f t h e G e r m a n a t t a c K . T h e s e

few e x a m p l e s i l l u s t r a t e a m e t h o d o f o p e r a t i o n t h a t P a t t o n
adhered t o throughout h i s series o f campaigns d u r i n g t h e L o r r a i n e Campaign, in Europe. Even

when t h e w e a t h e r was p a r t i c u l a r l y

p o o r f o r a i r o p e r a t i o n s , X I X TAC m a n a g e d t o g e t a i r c r a f t

into

t h e air in s u p p o r t of P a t t o n s o p e r a t i o n s , a t t e s t i n g t o t h e e x c e l l e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p h i s command e n j o y e d w i t h h i s s u p p o r t i n g

air component.
P a t t o n s p u b l i s h e d l e t t e r s of i n s t r u c t i o n and t h e time he

s p e n t w i t h f r o n t l i n e u n i t s a n d c o m m a n d e r s i n d i c a t e h e was b o t h s e r i o u s a n d s i n c e r e i n i m p o s i n g h i s t a c t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s on h i s c o r p s a n d d i u is i o n c o r r m a n d e r s

W i t h i n h is g u i d e l i n e s t h e r e was innouat ion and in i t iat i u e ,

c e r t a i n l y enough room f o r t a c t i c a l

w h i c h P a t t o n was a l w a y s q u i c K t o r e c o g n i z e a n d a p p r e c i a t e . B u t

t a c t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s a n d p r i n c i p l e s were o n l y b u i l d i n g b l o c K s
f o r P a t t o n l s c o n c e p t i o n o f o p e r a t i o n a l a r t . What n e e d s e l u c i d a t i o n now in combat. A c c o r d i n g t o U.S.
Army d o c t r i n e

is t h e way P a t t o n o r g a n i z e d a n d e m p l o y e d c o r p s

in

1939, d i v i s i o n s were t o

be l e a n and s i m p l e o r g a n i z a t i o n s , o f f s n s i u e l y o r i e n t e d ,

to

w h i c h a t t a c h m e n t s o f c o m b a t s u p p o r t e l e m e n t s c o u l d b e made a s

113

n e c e s s a r y I C o r p s were p u r e l y t a c t i c a l h e a d q u a r t e r s t h a t were
s t r u c t u r e d t o h a n d l e a n y mix o f
When o r g a n i z e d f o r c o m b a t ,

infantry and armored d i v i s i o n s .

each c o r p s had a h e a d q u a r t e r s with t w o or t h r e e

s u p p o r t elernents, a c o r p s a r t i l l e r y h e a d q u a r t e r s ,

i n f a n t r y and one o r two armored d i u i s i o n s , one o r two c a v a l r y g r o u p s of t w o s q u a d r o n s e a c h , and a c o r p s a r t i l l e r y g r o u p composed o f f o u r o r f i v e a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n s . The c o r p s F i r e Direction Center e i t h e r controlled o r allocated f i e l d artillery b a t t a l i o n s a n d was t i e d into divisional

a r t i l l e r y FDCs, maKing

it p o s s i b l e t o c o o r d i n a t e e v e r y f i e l d a r t i l l e r y t u b e in t h e
corps,

a technique Patton rather 1iKed.<30>

allocating divisions t o corps

F i e l d armies h a d t h e t a S K o f

and ass i g n ing s u p p o r t i n 9 combat s u p p o r t and combat s e r u ice support u n i t s where needed. Patton
5

T h i r d Flrmy a l s o c o n t r o l l e d
tan^

six e n g i n e e r g r o u p s , o n e a n t i - a i r c r a f t b r i g a d e , a n d o n e
destroyer brigade,

i n a d d i t i o n t o i t s many l o g i s t i c a l s u p p o r t
l o g i s t i c s flowed from t h e

units.<ZIi> Doctrinally,
communications zone

(COMMZ) t h r o u g h t h e f i e l d a r m i e s t o In p r a c t i c e , c o r p s commanders and

d i u is i o n s , b y p a s s i n s c o r p s . t h e i r staffs did get

involved

i n s o m e l o g i s t i c a l m a t t e r s . Fl

d i v i s i o n s l i c e i n t h e E u r o p e a n T h e a t e r was 1S,000 o r g a n i c divisional troops,

CQMMZ t r o o p s ,

1 5 , 0 0 0 c o r p s a n d army t r o o p s ,

and

10,000

f o r a t o t a l o f 40,000.<32> i n t h e European Theater of

During tactical operat i o n s

O p e r a t i o n s P a t t o n s T h i r d Flrmy c o n t r o l l e d a s few a s t w o c o r p s w i t h s e v e n d i v i s i o n s a n d as m a n y as f o u r c o r p s w i t h e i g h t e e n d i u ision+--540,0B0 m e n . G e n e r a l i z a t i o n s t h a t d e s c r i b e how a n d ,

114

more i m p o r t a n t ,

why P a t t o n o r g a n i z e d T h i r d A r m y

f o r combat a r e for he

as h a z a r d o u s t o maKe a s t h e y a r e d i f f i c u l t says uery enemy, l i t t l e a b o u t what s p e c i f i c

t o support,

factors

among m i s s i o n ,

terrain,

a n d f o r c e s a v a i l a b l e h e c o n s i d e r e d i n taSK One s a f e g e n e r a l i z a t i o n t h a t c a n

organ i z in9 a p a r t i c u l a r corps. b e made

i s t h a t he t r i e d t o o r g a n i z e c o r p s so t h a t e a c h
l e a s t one arrrmred d i v i s i o n .

controlled at

I n War A s I Knew It

P a t t o n r e c a l l s that on 7 Ftpril Patton t o operation. l e n d F i r s t Army t h e

1345 G e n e r a l B r a d l e y a s K c d

13th Armored D i v i s i o n f o r an

A t the time,

the

1 3 t h A r m o r e d D i v i s i o n was a s s i g n e d t o replace 13th He

t o XX C o r p s ,

a n d P a t t o n deemed i t e s s e n t i a l

A r m o r e d D i v i s i o n i n XX C o r p s w i t h a n o t h e r a r m o r e d d i u i s i o n . remarKS,

I n o r d e r t o r e p l a c e t h e 1 3 t h Armored D I u i S i o n , I t r a n s f e r r e d t h e 4 t h Armored D i v i s i o n f r o m t h e V I I I C o r p s t o t h e XX, l e a v i n g t h e V I I I C o r p s t e m p o r a r i l y w i t h o u t a n a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n , b u t t h i s was n o t t o o d i s a d v a n t a g e o u s , as t h e c o u n t r y i n i t s zone o f a c t i o n was n o t s u i t a b l e f o r a r m o r . : 3 3 >

P a t t o n ' s comment

i m p l i e s he w a n t e d t o e n s u r e e a c h o f h i s c o r p s even
if t h e t e r r a i n

h a d an a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n , zone o f

in that corps'

a c t i o n was n o t s u i t a b l e f o r
is f u r t h e r

tanKs.

T h i s approach t o

tasK o r g a n i z i n g corps

supported by t h e simple f a c t infantry divirions

t h a t u s u a l l y P a t t o n o r g a n i z e d c o r p s w i t h two

a n d o n e a r m o r e d d i u i s i o n . Ft c o u p l e o f e x a m p l e s point.

illustrate the

F o r O p e r a t i o n COBRA i n w h i c h P a t t o n ' s T h i r d Army made debut

its

i n Europe,

Patton controlled four

corps,

nine divisions,

and t h r e e c a v a l r y g r o u p s ,

o r g a n i z e d a s shown b e l o w . < 3 4 >

115

V I I I Corps

8 t h I n f Oiu
83rd I n f Diu
6 t h Armd O i u
4 t h Armd O i u
X I 1 Corps (Not o p e r a t i o n a l u n t i l 4 hug)
8 0 t h I n f Oiu

XV Corps
79th Inf Oiu
90th Inf Diu
5 t h Armd D i u

XX Corps (Not o p e r a t i o n a l u n t i l 4 hug)

2nd ( F r ) Armd O i u

A s shown,
effect

t h e army taSK O r g a n i z a t i o n u a s t h a t w h i c h was 1944.

Flt t h e t i m e ,

in

1 August

n e i t h e r X I 1 n o r XX C o r p s was 1944.

operational
So,

b u t became o p e r a t i o n a l on o r a b o u t 4 ' A u g u s t

on

1 A u g u s t P a t t o n ' s army was o r g a n i z e d i n t w o c o r p s , one infantry diuisions, By

w i t h t w o a r m o r e d and t w o a r m o r e d and t w o infantry

t h e o t h e r w i t h one

diuisions.

14 A u g u s t X I 1 C o r p s and assigned d i u i s i o n s ,

XX C o r p s were f u l l y o p e r a t i o n a l w i t h t h e i r

r e f I e c t i n g t h e f o l l o w i n g t a s K o r g a n i z a t i o n . (35)

V I I I Corps ( S t i l l i n B r i t t a n y )
8 t h I n f Oiu
83rd I n f Diu
6 t h Armd O i u
80th I n f D i u elements
TF A l p h a ( 1 s t TK D e s t B d e )

X I 1 Corps
3 5 t h I n f Oiu
4 t h Armd D i u

116

XV C o r p s
79th Inf

Oiv
9 0 t h Inf Diu
5 t h nrmd O i u
2 n d ( F r ) hrmd O i u

XX C o r p s

5 t h Inf D i u
8 0 t h Inf Oiu(-)
7 t h Armd D i u

T h i s taSK o r g a n i z a t i o n also r e f l e c t s P a t t o n ' s p r o c l i v i t y t o spread h i s armored d i v i s i o n s t h r o u g h o u t h i s army r a t h e r t h a n

r e t a i n them in one separate c o r p s t o be "used...for

d e l i u e r y o f t h e f i n a l shocK

the The p o i n t

i n some great b a t t l e . . . . "

is t h a t P a t t o n n e v e r e m p l o y e d h i s a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s

in one

a r m o r e d c o r p s as h e h a d s a i d
way h e a c t u a l l y

i n 1927 t h e y s h o u l d b e u s e d . T h e
l e a v e P a t t o n open

taSK o r g a n i z e d h i s a r m y may

t o t h e charge t h a t h e d o l e d o u t h i s armored assets

in penny

paCKets, t h e r e b y l o s i n g h i s a b i l i t y t o d e l i v e r c r u s h i n g armored t h r u s t s a g a i n s t t h e enemy. Even so, P a t t o n ' s t h i n K i n g on t h i s s u b j e c t may b e open t o a f a v o r a b l e o r g a n i z a t i o n of interpretation.

His

XV C o r p s f o r t h a t c o r p s ' m i s s i o n t o c l o s e t h e XV C o r p s h a d t w o a r m o r e d and

F a l a i s e Gap m a y h a v e b e e n c o r r e c t . two

i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s with which t o c l o s e t h e gap a g a i n s t

German p a n z e r a n d s u p p l y t r a i n s u n i t s a t t e m p t i n g t o escape t o
t h e e a s t . His i n s t r u c t i o n s t o M a j o r - G e n e r a l
Haislip,
XV C o r p s

c o m m a n d e r , were t o l e a d w i t h h i s a r m o r e d d i u i s i o n s a n d f o l l o w
w I t h h is i n f a n t r y d i u is i o n s .

Recogn i z in9 t h e o r g a n i c s h o r t a g e

of

infantry

in t h e armored d i v i s i o n s b u t a l s o t h e i r c a p a b l l i t y

t o d e l i v e r shocK a c t i o n , P a t t o n d i r e c t e d H a i s l i p t o

117

u t i l i z e a l l a v a i l a b l e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , including tanKa, t o m a i n t a i n one i n f a n t r y combat team in t h e immediate rear o f e a c h armored d i u i s i o n : t h e r e m a i n i n g combat t e a m s o f t h e t w o i n f a n t r y d i u i s i o n s t o p r o c e e d by marching.<36>

Here

i s e v i d e n c e t h a t P a t t o n was t h o r o u g h l y

f l e x i b l e in h i s

approach t o o r g a n i z i n g and f i g h t i n g h i s u n i t s and t h a t h e had a f a i r l y c l e a r v i s i o n o f w h a t was r e q u i r e d t a c t i c a l l y . B u t t h e

Key p o i n t

is t h a t g i u e n h i s m a t u r e c o n c e p t i o n o f how

infantry

and armor f i g h t t o g e t h e r , h i s a s s i g n m e n t of t o each corps--for

an armored d i u i s i o n

e x p l o i t a t i o n a t t h e corps level--maKes

s e n s e . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , w h a t i t u l t i m a t e l y l e d t o was f u r t h e r
" P e n n y pacKet i n g " by c o r p s c o m m a n d e r s .
t h e c o m b a t commands o f

For

i n s t e a d of Keeping

t h e armored d i u i s i o n s t o g e t h e r , c o r p s

commanders f r e q u e n t l y p a r c e l e d o u t c o m b a t commands across t h e c o r p s f r o n t . One is r e m i n d e d h e r e o f G u d e r i a n ' s m a x i m " K l o t z e n , n i c h t KlecKern" because Patton

' 5

manner u f u r g a n i z i n g and

f i g h t i n g more c l o s e l y a p p r o x i m a t e s t h e maxim " K l e c K e r n , n i c h t Klotzen." Consequently, P a t t o n can be accused of f a i l i n g t o S p r e a d o u t on a

e c o n o m i z e a n d mass h i s f o r c e s a p p r o p r i a t e l y .

f r o n t s o m e 490 m i l e s a s h i s a r m y was i n i t s sweep a c r o s s F r a n c e

after t h e breaKout at Avranches, Patton attempted t o be strong

i n a r m o r e v e r y w h e r e w i t h t h e r e s u l t t h a t h e was s t r o n g n o w h e r e . F o r t u n a t e l y , P a t t o n c o r r e c t l y r e c o g n i z e d t h a t t h e Germans were o f f b a l a n c e a f t e r h i s breaKout and t h e i r d e f e a t a t M o r t a i n , and

mass was n o t t h e c r i t i c a l a s p e c t f o r s u c c e s s i n p u r s u i t
operat ions; s p e e d was !

A similar c h a r g e , h a r d e r t o r e f u t e , can be l e v i e d against

118

Patton concerning h i s conduct of operations Campaign.

in t h e Lorralne

I n t h a t c a m p a i g n X I 1 C o r p s ' f i g h t t o s e c u r e N a n c y was in September

1944.

Third Army's big b a t t l e

I n November

1944 X X
yet

C o r p s ' s e i z u r e o f Metz was T h i r d f i r m y ' s d e c i s i v e b a t t l e , P a t t o n d i d n o t r e i n f o r c e e i t h e r of

t h e s e c o r p s w h i l e t h e y were

e n g a g e d i n t h e A r m y 's d e c i s i v e o p e r a t i o n s . <37> I n L o r r a i n e T h i r d firm? fought dispersed because of Patton's tendency t o The real

a s s i g n m i s s i o n s beyond t h e c a p a b i l i t e s of h i s u n i t s .
f a i l i n g at t h e operational

level

Is t h a t s e p a r a t e c o r p s a n d

d i v i s i o n b a t t l e s were n o t l i n K e d t o g e t h e r u n i f i e d campaign p l a n .

in a c o h e r e n t and

The o n l y p l a n a p p e a r e d t o b e t o attacK

east and g e t t o t h e Rhine River b e f o r e any o t h e r A l l i e d u n i t s .

What w o r K e d d u r i n g t h e h a l c y o n d a y s o f r a p i d m o v e m e n t a c r o s s
F r a n c e a g a i n s t a r e t r e a t i n g e n e m y d i d n o t w o r K well a t a l l

against a d e t e r m i n e d , dug-in enemy i n L o r r a i n e .

For P a t t o n ,

what a p p l i e d t a c t i c a l l y a l s o a p p l i e d two infantry in

operationally.

With corps g e n e r a l l y corwosed of

and one armored d i v i s i o n s , mind o p e r a t i o n a l l y .

it

is e a s y t o s e e w h a t P a t t o n h a d

1n"Letter

of

I n s t r u c t i o n bl0.2:'

he directed

h i s c o r p s and d i v i s i o n commanders t o h o l d t h e enemy f r o n t a l l y and maneuver fire i n t o h i s rear, pointing out t h a t f l m K o r rear

is t h r e e times m o r e e f f e c t i v e t h a n f r o n t a l f i r e . H e w e n t

on t o s a y ,
H i t h a r d s o o n , t h a t is w i t h t w o b a t t a l i o n s U P I n a r e g i m e n t , o r t w o d i v i s i o n s u p i n a c o r p s , o r two c o r p s up i n an army--the i d e a b e i n g t o d e v e l o p y o u r maximum f o r c e a t o n c e b e f o r e t h e e n e m y can d e v e l o p h i s . < 3 3 >

Patton's

i m a g i n a t i v e "two UP-and-one

b a c ~ 'advice f i t s n i c e l y

119

with t h e two

i n f a n t r y a n d o n e a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s taSK The i n f a n t r y d i v is i o n s , h e t h o u g h t ,

organ izat ion f o r h i s c o r p s .

were p a r t i c u l a r l y w e l l s u i t e d t o a t t a C K f r o n t a l l y , p e n e t r a t i n g
o r f i x i n g t h e enemy, so t h a t t h e

more m o b i l e a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n

c o u l d pass t h r o u g h o r a r o u n d a n d S t r i K e i n some d e p t h a g a i n s t t h e enemy

'5

artillery

, command
view

p o s t s , and supply s e r v ices.

is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e

Moreover, t h i s operational d o c t r i n a l v i e w t h a t saw t h e

i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n as t h e

o r g a n i z a t i o n c a p a b l e o f t a c t i c a l p e n e t r a t i o n b u t n o t well suited for exploitation or pursult operations. a b o u t S e v e n t h Army point.

' 5

Patton's rsmarKs

o p e r a t i o n s on S i c i l y i l l u s t r a t e s h i s

I f e e l t h a t t h e f u t u r e s t u d e n t s o f t h e Command a n d General S t a f f S c h o o l w i l l s t u d y t h e c a m p a i g n o f Palermo as a classic example of t h e u s e of t a n K s . I h e l d t h e m bacK f a r e n o u g h so t h a t t h e e n e m y c o u l d n o t

t e l l w h e r e t h e y were t o b e u s e d : t h e n w h e n t h e i n f a n t r y h a d f o u n d t h e h o l e , t h e t a n K S went t h r o u g h l a r g e numbers and fast.<39:

in

In t h i s p a s s a g e , P a t t o n e x p l o i t a t ion after lines

is r e f e r r i n g t o 2 n d A r m o r e d D i v i s i o n ' s

i n f a n t r y p e n e t r a t i o n of t h e German-Ital ian

i n t h e s o u t h w e s t c o r n e r o f S i c i l y o n 22 J u l y 1943. U n d e r
Hugh G a f f e y , 2 n d f w m o r e d moved

t h e command o f Major-General

r a p i d l y u p t h e west c o a s t o f S i c i l y , c o n d u c t i n g c o n v e r g i n g t a n K

a t t a c K S a g a i n s t w h a t s l i g h t r e s i s t a n c e e n e m y u n i t s were a b l e t o
offer. In t h i s a c t i o n 2nd fwmored p a s s e d b e t w e e n elements o f

t h e 3rd I n f a n t r y and 82nd Airborne D i v i s i o n s , a r m o r e d e x p l o i t a t i o n as P a t t o n e n v i s i o n e d t e c h n i q u e was f o l l o w e d t i m e a n d t i m e a g a i n

a c l a s s i c case of

i t . < 4 0 > This same

in Third firmy's

128

o p e r a t i o n s on t h e c o n t i n e n t . after

I n one o f X V C o r p s ' a t t a c K s h o r t l y

t h e b r e a K o u t t h r o u g h Fluranches

i n e a r l y Flusust 1944, 5 t h

a r m o r e d D i v i s i o n f r o m t h a t c o r p s was o r d e r e d t o p a s s t h r o u g h 90th I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n and a t t a C K t o s e c u r e t h e c i t y o f i t s surrounding roadnet, which

F o u g k r e s and

it did.

Colonel w h i c h began in late

R o b e r t F l l l e n d e s c r i b e s T h i r d F l r m y ' s E i f e l Campaign, Immediately a f t e r January says : t h e B u l g e Campaign came t o a c l o s e

1945, a s c l a s s i c P a t t o n b r e a K t h r o u g h o p e r a t i o n s . He

[ P a t t o n e m p l o y e d I a r m o r e d - m o t o r i z e d i n f a n t r y teams, w i t h c l o s e a i r s u p p o r t K n i f i n g t h r o u g h t h e enemy; o t h e r i n f a n t r y f o l l o w i n g c l o s e behind t h e spearheads, m o p p i n g UP b y - p a s s e d e n e m y f o r c e s and p o c K e t s and strengthening t h e shoulders o f t h e breaKthrough.<41>

A l l e n says such o p e r a t i o n s were t y p i c a l o f fighting, and b y a l l a c c o u n t s he

P a t t o n ' s way o f

i s correct.
on

Most o f t h e t e c h n i q u e s d e s c r i b e d t h u s f a r have focused offensiue operations,

s o a word o r t w o

is

i n o r d e r on P a t t o n ' s The s h o r t

c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e employment o f and l o n g o f

corps defensively.

i t is t h a t P a t t o n d i d n o t v i e w d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s
at all. Even when he was f o r c e d t o g o o n t h e

very favorably

d e f e n s i v e a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f September

1944, P a t t o n e x h o r t e d

h i s c o r p s and d i v i s i o n conunanders t o c o n d u c t a g g r e s s i v e p a t r o l 1ing, reconnaissances i n force, and 1 i m i t e d o b j e c t i u e i n h i s soldiers. In

attacKs t o maintain the offensive

spirit

'Letter

of

I n s t r u c t i o n No.3"Patton

d e v o t e s o n l y one s m a l l

paragraph t o t h e use o f operat ions. He s a y s :

armored d i u i s i o n s

in defensive

121

I n d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s , armored d i u i s i o n s s h o u l d be p l a c e d t o c o u n t e r a t t a c K enemy a s s a u l t s . C o u n t e r - a t t a c K s s h o u l d be r e h e a r s e d and l i n e s o f a p p r o a c h r e c o n n o i t e r e d so t h e enemy c a n be v i o l e n t l y destroyed.<42>

The

l i t t l e he s a y s

i n t h i s p a s s a g e i n d i c a t e s he t h o u g h t t h e
i n defensive p o s i t ions

i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s s h o u l d be f o r w a r d

w h i l e a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s s h o u l d be h e l d bacK as m o b i l e r e s e r v e s i n a CounterattacK r o l e . FIn a n a l y s i s o f warfare

t h e L o r r a i n e Campaign,

the nearest t h i n g t o defensive

P a t t o n was

involved in,

s u g g e s t s a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s were g e n e r a l l y u s e d i n t h i s f a s h i o n . Perhaps t h e b e s t example i n support of 1944. the 35th

is 6 t h FIrmored D i u i s o n s C o u n t e r a t t a c K

Infantry Division

o n 29-30 September

B o t h t h e 3 5 t h D i v i s i o n and t h e 4 t h FIrmored D i v i s i o n o f Eddy were b e i n g a t t a c K e d e a s t o f 1 5 t h and 5 3 9 t h

X I 1 Corps under Major-General

Nancy, France,

b y e l e m e n t s o f t h e German

Divisions,

w h i c h were h a v i n g some l o c a l s u c c e s s a g a i n s t X I 1 P a t t o n o r d e r e d 6 t h Ftrmored D i v i s i o n , i n support of a XX C o r p s

Corps u n i t s . unit,

t o CounterattacK

X I 1 C o r p s and 3 5 t h

D i v i s i o n a t once.

This story

i s memorable b e c a u s e Eddy g o t

WhaK K n e e s and o r d e r e d t h e 3 5 t h D i v i s i o n t o w i t h d r a w r a t h e r than hold; further, he d i d n o t o r d e r 6 t h Ftrmored t o When P a t t o n h e a r d a b o u t

c o u n t e r a t t a c K as P a t t o n had d i r e c t e d . Eddys act ions, he

immediately countermanded E d d y s o r d e r , as p l a n n e d , and went t o

d i r e c t e d 6 t h FIrmored t o C O U n t e r a t t a C K

t h e s c e n e t o e n s u r e t h e a c t i o n he h a d d i r e c t e d t o o K p l a c e . < 4 3 > Even t h i s e x a m p l e i s n o t f u l l y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o + t h e manner

in

w h i c h armored d i v i s i o n s w e r e employed d e f e n s i v e l y .

122

Because o f

the

i n h e r e n t command o r g a n i z a t i o n o f

the

armored d i v i s i o n - - t w o

c o m b a t a n d o n e r e s e r v e command--the

t e n d e n c y was t o e m p l o y c o m b a t commands r a t h e r t h a n w h o l e divisions

in countattacK roles.

The m a n n e r

i n w h i c h 9th Armored

D i v i s i o n was d i s p e r s e d a t t h e o p e n i n g o f t h e B u l g e C a m p a i g n i s f u r t h e r evidence o f t h e tendency t h r o u g h o u t t h e Europ@an Theater o f Operat i o n s t o d i s p e r s e armored d i v i s i o n s s e p a r a t e l y e m p l o y e d c o m b a t commands. the clear focus not operational Consequently, into defensively level,

i n P a t t o n ' s command was a t t h e t a c t i c a l

.
"two

m a t P a t t o n was s e r i o u s a b o u t e m p l o y i n g h i s up-and-one below

b a c K " c o n c e p t a t t h e army l e v e l a s w e l l a s c o r p s a n d

i s revealed 1 Knew

i n h i s war d i a r y ,

published under t h e t i t l e

War Fls

~ t While v i s i t i n g General B r a d l e y ' s headquarters .

o n 20 S e p t e m b e r

1944,

P a t t o n saw a map s t u d y t h a t , t h a t o n e army composed o f

he says,

confirmed h i s b e l i e f

three corps

c o u l d have a t t a c K e d s t r a i g h t H i s c o n c e p t was t o

i n t o Germany t o w a r d s F r a n K f u r t .

d r i v e t h r o u g h w i t h t w o c o r p s a b r e a s t and t h e t h i r d one echeloned t o t h e r i g h t r e a r on t h e general a x i s , N a n c y - C h a t e a u S a l I n s - S a a r g u e m i n e s - M a i n z o r Worms, t h e n northeast through FranKfurt.<44>

Patton's thinKing here r e f l e c t s quite a simple Plan operationally, though it

i s n o t c l e a r how h e t h o u g h t t h i s

p a r t i c u l a r o p e r a t i o n would have supported t h e o v e r a l l t h e a t e r strategy. Presumably, s e i z u r e o f a bridgehead over t h e Rhine i n d u s t r i a l r e g i o n around Germany t o s u r r e n d e r

River followed by seizure o f the

FranKfurt-Kassel-Coblenz

would force

123

unconditionally.

B e 1 i e v i n g t h e R u h r was m o r e v i t a l ,
i t t h e way P a t t o n d i d ,

Eisenhower

and Montgomery d i d n o t see

which
in support

s u g g e s t s t h a t P a t t o n ' s a b il i t y t o c o n d u c t o p e r a t i o n s o f theater later. s t r a t e g y was q u e s t i o n a b l e ,

a p o i n t t o be d i s c u s s e d

The m o r e

imrnediate q u e s t i o n P a t t o n '5 o p e r a t i o n a l c o n c e p t i s h i s concept of operational

f o r seizure o f FranKfurt raises art itself.

I n Uar fls

1 Knew

It P a t t o n rnaKes a d i s t i n c t i o n He s a y s :

between s t r a t e g y and t a c t i c s .

Use s t e a m r o l l e r s t r a t e g y ; t h a t i s , maKe UP y o u r m i n d on c o u r s e a n d d i r e c t i o n o f a t t a c K , a n d S t i C K t o i t , B u t i n t a c t i c s , do n o t s t e a m r o l l e r . AttaCK weaKness. (45)

P r e c i s e l y what P a t t o n meant b y clear, for he does n o t d e f i n e

" s t r a t e g y " and e i t h e r term.

"tactics"

i s not
is

What h e

implies

t h a t s t r a t e g y s e t s t h e end o r o b j e c t i v e , fixed,

which

is f a i r l y well
achieving

a n d t a c t i c s a r e t h e v e r y f l e x i b l e means f o r How o p e r a t i o n a l a r t ,

strategic goals. f i t s

a t e r m P a t t o n never used, What

i n t o this conception i s n o t clear.

is c l e a r is t h a t
concept

P a t t o n ' s scheme f o r s e i z i n g F r a n K f u r t r e f l e c t i n g t h e s t e a m r o l l e r approach. t o operational art, however,

i s an o p e r a t i o n a l

This s t e a m r o l l e r approach

i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h P a t t o n ' s own
F o r example,
his turning

most s u c c e s s f u l conduct o f o p e r a t i o n s . movement w i t h X V C o r p s Falaise-flrgentan Gap

i n an e f f o r t

t o close the 1944 i s a p e r f e c t e x a m p l e o f f l a n K s and r e a r . Patton

i n mid-flugust

a t t a c K i n g t h e enemy's weaKness--his

b e l i e v e d h i s XV C o r p s u n i t s e a s i l y c o u l d h a v e c l o s e d t h e g a p , t h e r e b y e n c i r c l i n g m o s t o f e i g h t e e n German d i u i s i o n s c a u g h t b e t u e e n F i r s t and T h i r d Armies. Similarly,

in the Palatinate

124

Campaign T h i r d Army e x e c u t e d an e n v e l o p m e n t a c r o s s t h e Palatinate region i n March 1945 t h a t smashed German A r m y Group Here i s o p e r a t i o n a l a r t a t its

0 a g a i n s t t h e Rhine R i v e r .

best--or

w o r s t c o n s i d e r i n g t h a t many o f t h e

18 d i v i s i o n s a t

F a l a i s e escaped f r o m t h e e n c i r c l e m e n t , t h e i r equipment.

a l b e i t w i t h o u t most o f

" O p e r a t i o n a l a r t " may n o t h a v e b e e n p a r t o f b u t h i s somet imes a r t f u l maneuver o f corps

Patton's vocabulary,

t o a c h i e v e a d e c i s i v e a d v a n t a g e o v e r t h e ensmy as h e d i d a t
Falaise, t h e Bulge, and

i n t h e P a l a t i n a t e i n d i c a t e s he
art.

u n d e r s t o o d how t o c o n d u c t o p e r a t i o n a l

Conclusions

F r o m t h i s s e c t i o n on Combined Arms O p e r a t i o n s

it

is fair

t o draw t h r e e b r o a d c o n c l u s i o n s - - c a l l
P a t t o n ' s conduct of Patton believed operational a r t .

them tenets--about First,

it i s quite clear

i n an i n t e g r a t e d c o m b i n e d arms c o n c e p t a t t h e
I n f a n t r y and a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s were which suggest a f i r s t t e n e t :

d i v i s i o n and c o r p s l e v e l .

h i s c o m b i n e d arms b u i l d i n g b l o c K S ,

Corps s h o u l d l e a d w i t h i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s t o achieve t a c t i c a l p e n e t r a t i o n : t h e n armored d i v i s i o n s s h o u l d pass t h r o u g h o r around t o e x p l o i t o r pursue.

Second,

P a t t o n ' s method o+ t a s K o r g a n i z i n g c o r p s e m p l o y i n g a i n f a n t r y and a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s i n a 2:1 ratio implies

mix o f

the tenet:

TasK o r g a n i z e c o r p s t o be i n f a n t r y heauy and employ c o m b i n e d arms teams w i t h t m K S d i s p e r s e d , n o t concentrated.

12s

T h i s t e n e t may b e h a r d t o a c c e p t ,

but Patton's failure t o

o r g a n i z e an a r m o r e d c o r p s o r e v e n a n a r m o r e d h e a v y c o r p s a n d

his,

at

least,

t a c i t a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e d i s p e r s e d employment of

armored d i v i s i o n s

i n combat command-size
Third,

u n i t s support this Patton believed

t e n e t a s one b y w h i c h h e o p e r a t e d . massed a r t i l l e r y

f i r e s under c e n t r a l i z e d c o n t r o l a r e an Hence, a

i n t e g r a l p a r t o f a c o m p l e t e c o m b i n e d arms c o n c e p t . t h i r d tenet:

C o n t r o l o f a r t i l l e r y s h o u l d be c e n t r a l i z e d whenever p o s s i b l e t o e n s u r e i t i s massed a n d c o o r d i n a t e d w i t h i n f a n t r y - a r m o r attaCKS.

T h a t P a t t o n f o u g h t e m p l o y i n g a c o m b i n e d arms c o n c e p t should n o t be s u r p r i s i n g , t h e use of the tanKs f o r h e was a c a v a l r y m a n who p i o n e e r e d 1. He a l s o w o r K e d c l o s e l y w i t h

i n W o r l d War

i n W o r l d War

infantry

a l l h i s c a r e e r and

I saw t h e

devastat ion a r t i l l e r y could

i n f 1i c t .

There

i s no eu i d e n c e

P a t t o n e v e r t h o u g h t one a r m a l o n e c o u l d b e d e c i s i v e .
of

in s p i t e in the
even

h i s o b s t i n a t e a r g u m e n t s a b o u t c a v a l r y w h i l e h e was o f t h e Chief o f Cavalry. What

Office

is of

interest--maybe

surprising--is

t h e manner

in which P a t t o n a c t u a l l y p u t t h e

various a r m together

i n h i s c o r p s a n d demanded t h e y b e u s e d .
far
instance, i s especial I y

H i s d i s p e r s i o n o f armor a s s e t s ,

c u r i o u s because P a t t o n i s w i d e l y r e g a r d e d as t h e p r e - e m i n e n t fimerican armor advocate

in World W a r
11.

In fast-moving

operat ions the dispersion o f

a r m r had no obu i o u s d e t r i m e n t a l

126

effects.

But

i n more s t a t i c s i t u a t i o n s , L o r r a i n e f o r i n s t a n c e , German

t h e d i s p e r s i o n o f a r m o r e u e n s u r p r i s e d soma h i g h - l e u e l commanders. In d e f e n s e o f P a t t o n ,

i t can b e a r g u e d t h a t s u c h

d i s p e r s i o n of

a r m o r e d u n i t s was t h e l o g i c a l o u t c o m e o f linear
all

E i s e n h o w e r ' s b r o a d f r o n t s t r a t e g y . FI f u n d a m e n t a l l y

b a t t l e f i e l d 956 K i l o m e t e r s l o n g a n d a l i m i t e d n u m b e r o f
t y p e s of

d i u is i o n s u i r t u a l l y d i c t a t e d t h a t a r m o r e d d i u is i o n s and h o l d l a r g e f r o n t a g e s , and c o u l d n o t ,

had t o

OCCUPY

t h e r e f o r e , b e h e l d i n r e s e r v e o r m a s s e d . P a t t o n ' s own d e f e n s e on t h i s c r i t i c i s m would p r o b a b l y h a v e b e e n t o p o i n t o u t t h a t h e had i n t e n d e d n e i t h e r t o s t o p n o r d e f e n d i n any case, which

analysis:

s u g g e s t s a n o t h e r t o p i c of

O f f e n s i u e flct i o n .

127

OFFEWIVE flCTION

AttacK

G e o r g e P a t t o n d i d n o t much c a r e f o r d e f e n s i v e w a r f a r e . W i l e h i s command p o s t was a t E t a i n , Verdun, France, Patton v i s i t e d Pointing mnument t o

e s p e c i a l l y t h e b a t t l e f i e l d a t F o r t Douamont.

o u t t h a t F o r t D o u a m o n t was a m a g n i f i c e n t b u t f u t i l e heroism, defensive Chief of h e rernarKed t h a t

"Douamont e p i t o m i z e s t h e f o l l y o f P a t t o n ' s Deputy

warfare."<46> Colonel Paul HarKins, S t a f f throughout World War warfare

11, e c h o e s P a t t o n ' s
i n one o f h i s prefaces in

sentiments about defensive War As

I Knew I t :

He C P a t t o n l c o n d u c t e d A m e r i c a n t r o o p s t h r o u g h t h r e e y e a r s o f s u c c e s s f u l o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e enemy. He n e v e r i s s u e d a d e f e n s i v e o r d e r . H i s theory--ATTACK, f l T T f l C K , ATTACK, and, when i n d o u b t , flTTflCK a g a i n - - s h o r t e n e d t h e war b y n e v e r g i v i n g t h e enemy a c h a n c e t o o r g a n i z e o r r e o r g a n i z e e n o u g h t o maKe a concerted attacK a g a i n s t him.<47>

HarKins t h e war

'

c l a i m t h a t Patton's operational technique shortened i s debatable.

What

i s not debatable

is that

Patton

t h o u g h t a t t a c K was o n e K e y e l e m e n t o f art. Undoubtedly,

if P a t t o n h a d h a d

successful operational

his way, t h e r e n e v e r w o u l d
l e a s t P a t t o n would never and

have been a L o r r a i n e Campaign, have been p a r t o f

it. C l e a r l y ,

or at

his conception o f t a c t i c a l

128

O p e r a t i o n a l a r t was c o n t i n u o u s o f f e n s i v e B e a t r i c e Flyer P a t t o n ,

action.

FIccnrding t o

h i s w i f e and most a r d e n t s u p p o r t e r .

P a t t o n ' s o p i n i o n o n t h i s s u b j e c t was n o t t h e r e s u l t o f untutored conjecture. says: FIbout t h e s u b j e c t o f o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n she

From h i s r e a d i n g o f h i s t o r y he b e l i e v e d t h a t no d e f e n s i v e a c t i o n i s e v e r t r u l y s u c c e s s f u l . He o n c e a s K e d me t o l o o K UP a s u c c e s s f u l d e f e n s i v e action...any s u c c e s s f u l one. I f o u n d t h r e e , b u t t h e y w e r e a 1 1 P v r r h i c v i c t o r i e s . (48)

Fllthough she does n o t m e n t i o n w h i c h t h r e e d e f e n s i v e a c t i o n s she had i n mind o r what t h e c r i t e r i a a r e f o r Beatrice Patton's point
i s c l e a r enough.

"successful" action,

P a t t o n was a g r e a t it, p r a c t i c e d h i s

s t u d e n t o f m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y who, hobby of

a s she p u t s

warf i g h t i n g b y s t u d y i n s "h i s t o r y s e a s o n e d w i t h

i m a g i n a t i o n and a p p l i e d t o t h e p r o b l e m i n hand.. Evidentally,

. ."<49>
in

w h a t h i s t o r y h a d l e d P a t t o n t o b e l i e v e was t h a t

the f i n a l analysis engage

i n o r d e r t o win on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d one must

n a m e l y FITTFICK! E v e n a c u r s o r y l o o K

i n offensive action,

a t P a t t o n ' s campaigns c o n f i r m s t h i s o p e r a t i o n a l t e n e t .

To b e g i n ,

P a t t o n h a d some b r o a d

i d e a o f w h a t was g o i n g t o

b e r e q u i r e d o n t h e c o n t i n e n t o f E u r o p e o n c e T h i r d Army became operational.

In h i s mind,

t h e lessons o f h i s t o r y , and S i c i l y ,

a n d rrmre

r e c e n t l y those of due t o o f f e n s i v e enemy.

N o r t h flfrica

w e r e t h a t s u c c e s was

a c t i o n and t h e use o f maneuver a g a i n s t t h e p i e c e m e a l a t t a c K s a r e n o t t h e way t o g o ; a r e what p r o d u c e

fldditionally,

coordinated--synchron ized?--attacKs

12s

s u c c e s s . < 5 0 > I n a s p e e c h t o S e v e n t h Flrmy s o l d i e r s a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e S i c i l y Campaign, P a t t o n s a i d t h a t t h e enemy

w i l l be t r u e t o h i s p r i n c i p l e s and w i l l

attacK. S t o p p i n g h i s

Initial

a t t a c K w i l l t h e n p r o m p t t h e enemy t o C o u n t e r a t t a c K w i t h
i n an e f f o r t t o c r e a t e large s a l i e n t s i n

several d i v i s i o n s

f r i e n d l y l i n e s and t h e n o p e r a t e l a t e r a l l y . P a t t o n went on t o say:

The a n s u e r t o s u c h attacKs is t o attacK h i m o n t h e f l a n K o f h i s s a l i e n t . F o r s u c h o p e r a t i o n s armor a n d g u n s C a r t i l l e r y l a r e t h e s u r e s t a n s w e r . To m a K e s u c h a t t a c K s a g a i n s t l a r g e c o u n t e r a t t a c K s , w m u s t Know e w h e r e we a r e g o i n g , a n d we m u s t a t t a C K w i t h v i o l e n c e , speed and precis ion. (51 >

Two a s p e c t s . o f of

t h i s p a s s a g e d e s e r v e comment.

First,

by t h e e n d

t h e S i c i l y Carwaign P a t t o n had a f a i r l y clear

i d e a a b o u t how

h i s p r inc iPal adversary conducted o p e r a t i o n a l

a r t . H e was,

t h e n , w e l l S t u d i e d a n d Knew h i s e n e m y ' s o p e r a t i o n a l m e t h o d s .
Second, he had an idea--even
if

unref ined--about

how h e

i n t e n d e d t o d e a l w i t h German o p e r a t i o n a l m e t h o d s and what t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s would b e : c o m b i n e d arms c o n d u c t i n g o f f e n s i v e

o p e r a t i o n s w i t h s p e e d a n d p r e c is i o n . P a t t o n made e v e r y e f f o r t t o commanders w i t h h i s b e l i e f infect h i s subordinate Once

t h a t o n e s h o u l d a l w a y s attacK. in August

d u r i n g X I 1 C o r p s ' attacKs a r o u n d Nancy

1944 P a t t o n

went f o r w a r d t o u l s l t G e n e r a l Eddy a t h i s c o r p s h e a d q u a r t e r s
a n d f o u n d Eddy t o b e d i s p i r i t e d . Elements of the 35th Infantry

D i v i s i o n had j u s t been pushed o f f a h i l l n o r t h e a s t of Nancy, S u r r e n d e r i n g a t a c t i c a l a d v a n t a g e t o t h e Germans t h a t a l l o w e d

130

them t o f i r e

i n t o t h e town.

The 4 t h A r m o r e d O i u i s i o n was a l s o for

XI1

being h e a v i l y attacKed;
COPPS.

things were j u s t n o t g o i n g w e l l

P a t t o n t o l d E d d y t w o s t o r i e s d e s i g n e d t o h e l p h i m Keep
in perspective.

things

First,

h e r e m i n d e d Eddy o f

U.S.

Grant's

words

"In

e v e r y b a t t l e t h e r e comes a t i m e when b o t h s i d e s t h e n h e who c o n t i n u e s t h e a t t a c K L e e ' s PemaPK a t

c o n s i d e r themselves beaten; wins."' Second,

h e r e c o u n t e d R o b e r t E.

Chancellorsuille:

" ' I was t o o weaK t o d e f e n d ,

so

a t t a c K e d . "'<52> As P a t t o n r e m e m b e r s i t , 3 5 t h D i u i s i o n r e t o O K t h e h i l l a t once. T h i s example and t h e d i s c u s s i o n t h u s f a r it. Patton

s u g g e s t s one o p e r a t i o n a l t e n e t a n d one c o r o l l a r y t o clearly believed

i n and o p e r a t e d b y t h e p r i n c i p l e :

A corollary t o this principle of

attacK

i s " N e u e r g i u e UP

ground.

In h is'letter

of

I n s t r u c t i o n No . 2 " t o

corps and

d i u i s i o n commanders P a t t o n f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e s t h i s c o r o l l a r y ,
saying,

" i t i s c h e a p e r t o h o l d what you have t h a n t o r e t a K e

The c o r o l l a r y a l s o s u g g e s t s t h a t

what you have l o s t . ' < 5 3 >

P a t t o n d i d n o t have a u e r y f i r m U n d e r s t a n d i n g o f d e f e n s i v e operational a r t .
If the true objectiue o f operational a r t

is

t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of

enemy f o r c e s ,

t h e n g i v i n g UP g r o u n d

in order

t o d e s t r o y t h e m w i t h m u l t i p l e d i v i s i o n c o u n t e r a t t a c K s may b e necessary. Guder i a n ,

It i s n o t c l e a r t h a t P a t t o n u n d e r s t o o d ,
Manste in, a n d o t h e r German g e n e r a l s d i d ,

i n t h e way
that

131

d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n a l m a n e u v e r may b e n e c e s s a r y a n d d e s i r a b l e a t times. The m o s t g e n e r o u s r e a d i n g o f P a t t o n ' s o p e r a t i o n s a r t but that

c o u l d suggest he u n d e r s t o o d d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n a l

he d i d n o t want h i s s u b o r d i n a t e s t h i n K i n g a n y t h i n g o t h e r t h a n offensively. This offensive a t t i t u d e about t a c t i c s and o p e r a t i o n s

P a t t o n p r e s s e d o n h i s s o l d i e r s u n r e m i t t i n g l y . One t e c h n i q u e h e i n s i s t e d o n was f o r a l l d i v i s i o n a n d c o r p s commanders t o s e c u r e P a t t o n ' s p u r p o s e was

a b r i d g e h e a d as s o o n a s c o m i n g t o a r i v e r . at least three-fold s e i z u r e of

i n demanding t h i s o p e r a t i o n a l t e c h n i q u e .
i s o f f e n s i v e l y o r i e n t e d and,
as

First, such,

a bridgehead

does n o t g i v e f r i e n d l y s o l d i e r s t i m e t o t h i n K about Second,

s t o p p i n g and g o i n g o v e r on t o t h e d e f e n s i v e . d i s r u p t s t h e enemy's p l a n ,

it

steals or retains the

initiative,

a n d c a u s e s t h e enemy t o r e a c t r a t h e r t h a n d e l i b e r a t e l y p r o c e e d w i t h h i s own p l a n . Third, a b r i d g e h e a d a c r o s s an o b s t a c l e ions. Even d u r i n g t h e

f a c i l i t a t e s future--offensive--operat

L o r r a i n e C a w a i g n P a t t o n i n s i s t e d t h a t h i s e n t i r e army r e m a i n offensively o r i e n t e d by conducting reconnaissances

i n force,

active patrolling, future

and l i m i t e d a t t a c K s t o s e i z e t e r r a i n f o r Patton's act ions

offensive operations. a way o f

in the Lorraine

Campaign r e f l e c t the reader. tactical Y

l o o K i n g a t war t h a t s h o u l d n o t e s c a p e

Fln o f f e n s i v e s p i r i t

i s c r u c i a l t o success
a n d P a t t o n s p e n t much o f

as w e l l a s o p e r a t i o n a l l y ,

h i s t i m e a s a commander
W i t h thi

i m b u i n g h i s commanders a n d s o l d i e r s To w h a t e x t e n t t h i s o f f e n s i v e

offensive

spirit.

132

s p i r i t made U P f o r t a c t i c a l of

o r o p e r a t i o n a l errors on t h e p a r t

P a t t o n o r h i s c o m n a n d e r s remains U n K n O w n . P a t t o n a l s o r e c o g n i z e d t h a t t h e t i m i n g o f a t t a c K s is

crucial t o success. R e f l e c t i n g h i s v i e u t h a t a good p l a n

executed at t h e r i g h t t ime--usually immediately--is better than

a " f l a w l e s s " p l a n e x e c u t e d a t some f u t u r e t i m e , P a t t o n i n u a r i a b l y d i r e c t e d h l s corps and d i v i s i o n s commanders t o

attaCK

even i n t h e most o b s c u r e of s i t u a t i o n s . A t t h e b e g i n n i n g
instance, Eisenhower c a l l e d a
13 D e c e m b e r 1344 t o

of

t h e Bulge Campalgn, f o r

m e e t i n g o f s e n i o r commanders a t Verdun on

d i s c u s s what s h o u l d b e d o n e a b o u t t h e German c o u n t e r - o f f e n s i u e . M e n a s K e d w h e n h e c o u l d maKe a s t o n g a t t a C K w i t h s i x divisions, P a t t o n r e p l i e d t h a t h e c o u l d maKe a s t r o n g a t t a c K in t h r e e days, but t h a t he could not some d a y s l a t e r . In s p i t e of

with three divisions

a t t a C K w i t h more t h a n t h a t u n t i l

Eisenhower

' 5

resistance t o t h e idea, P a t t o n convinced

in t h r e e days with t h r e e

Eisenhower t h a t a s t r o n g a t t a C K

d i v i s i o n s was b e t t e r t h a n w a i t i n g t o a t t a c K w i t h s i x b e c a u s e o f
t h e s u r p r i s e g a i n e d . <S4> P a t t o n ' s
PO

int

of

c o u r s e , was t h a t

t h e t i m i n g o f t h e attacK w o u l d s u r p r i s e t h e Germans a n d 1 i K e l Y upset their timetable. further revealed Patton's seriousness about t h i s point
K

is

i n h i s i n s i s t e n c e t h a t General M i l 1 i

in

'5

III
fls

C o r p s attacK a s s o o n as i t c o u l d d u r i n g t h e B u l g e C a m p a i g n .
it turned out,

I 1 1 C o r p s was a b l e t o attacK o n 22 D e c e m b e r , what l a y

wholly

ignorant of

i n f r o n t of

i t and o n e day a h e a d of

P a t t o n ' s p r e d i c t ion.

Patton remained convinced t h a t t h e timing

133

of

this attacK materially aided

in the early r e l i e f of

Bastogne.<SS> L a t e r Middleton,

i n t h e B u l g e C a m p a i g n when G e n e r a l
asKed t o d e l a y h i s c o r p s ' Patton

commanding V I I I C o r p s ,

attaCK because h i s t r o o p s were t i r e d f r o m a l o n g march, d e n i e d t h e r e q u e s t and o r d e r e d M i d d l e t o n t o a t t a c K . event, Corps'

In t h e

t h e t i m i n g c o u l d n o t have been b e t t e r because V I I I a t t a c K o n 29 D e c e m b e r "ran d i r e c t l y into the flanK o f a

German c o u n t e r - a t t a c K diuisions:<56>

c o n s i s t i n g o f two and a h a l f P a t t o n was e x u b e r a n t o v e r t h i s t h a t t h e t i m i n g of

Needless t o say,

s u c c e s s and c l a i m e d ,

probably correctly,

V I I I C o r p s ' C o u n t e r a t t a c K h e l p e d Keep o p e n t h e t e n u o u s c o r r i d o r
between f w l o n and Bastogne.

Speed o f O p e r a t i o n s

There

i s n o d o u b t t h a t a s e c o n d Key o p e r a t i o n a l t e n e t o f

P a t t o n ' s u n d e r t h e c a t e g o r y o f O f f e n s i v e A c t i o n was1

Speed o f o p e r a t i o n s

i s e s s e n t i a l t o success.

E v i d e n c e t h a t s u p p o r t s t h e c l a i m t h a t t h i s t e n e t o n s p e e d was c r u c i a l t o Patton's conception o f operational a r t a n d comes f r o m a v a r i e t y o f s o u r c e s .

First, i s abundant

Patton's advice t o P a t t o n on

h i s son which he r e c o r d e d i n a l e t t e r t o t h e j u n i o r 2 1 August 1944--Just

a t t h e e n d o f P a t t o n ' s r a p i d sweep a c r o s s He w r i t e s :

western France--is

revealing.

I have one p r i n c i p l e i n t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s . . . a n d

this

is

134

t o - - " F i l l t h e unforgiving minute with s i x t y seconds w o r t h o f d i s t a n c e r u n . " T h a t is t h e w h o l e a r t o f war, a n d when y o u g e t t o b e a g e n e r a l , r e m e m b e r i t . < S 6 >

I t r e q u i r e s no g r e a t powers of

a n a l y s i s t o s e e w h a t P a t t o n was

P r o c l a i m i n g i n t h i s passage, and it relates t o P a t t o n ' s thinKing about t i m e and t i m i n g d i s c u s s e d above. Because time
is

i r r e t r i e v a b l e , Patton thought t h a t t o be successful tactically a n d o p e r a t i o n a l l Y a commander must

"go a l l

out" with the time

a v a i l a b l e s i n c e t h e c o m m a n d e r n e v e r Knows f o r s u r e how much

t i m e i s a v a i l a b l e . P a t t o n ' s o p i n i o n was t h a t

i n war

o p p o r t u n i t e s are always f l e e t i n g and m u s t be r u t h l e s s l y e x p l o i t e d o r c r e a t e d t o t h e maximum e x t e n t . he d e c l a r e s , I n War A s I Knew It

" I n s m a l l o p e r a t i o n s a s i n l a r g e , s p e e d is t h e

essential element o f success. "<58>

P a t t o n h a d d e f i n i t e i d e a s a b o u t how s p e e d o f o p e r a t i o n s could be a t t a i n e d and r e t a i n e d . can be acquired According t o him, one way speed

is b y MaKing t h e n e c e s s a r y r e c o n n a i s a n c e . H i s

c o n c e p t was t o g e t a r m o r e d r e c o n n a i s s a n c e u n i t s a u t

in f r o n t

f a r e n o u g h t o m a i n t a i n c o n t a c t w i t h enemy u n i t s a n d t o f i n d s u i t a b l e r o a d nets t h a t w i l l s u p p o r t armored o r mechanized columns. Reconnaissance elernents n o t o n l y can f i n d where t h e enemy not.
is, b u t ,

equally

important, t h e y can f i n d where he

is

When r e l a y e d

in a t i m e l y manner t o h i g h e r commanders, s u c h commanders t o p e n e t r a t e , Speed can

i n f o r m a t i o n can e n a b l e t a c t i c a l

e n v e l o p , o r s e n d enemy u n i t s i n t o h e a d l o n g f l i g h t .

a l s o b e g a i n e d by p r o v i d i n g p r o p e r a r t i l l e r y a n d a i r s u p p o r t and by u s i n g e v e r y a v a i l a b l e man. P a t t o n ' s p o i n t was t h a t

135

prOperl!J

i n t e g r a t e d c o m b i n e d a r m s c a n o v e r c o m e enemy d e f e n s e s the shortest

and e n s u r e t h a t s o l d i e r s a r e e x p o s e d t o f i r e f o r porsible time. P a t t u n a l s o t h o u g h t speed o f operation: the operational level

was e s s e n t i a l Many t i m e ;

at

as w e l l as t h e t a c t i c a l .

t h r a u g h o u t o p e r a t ions.
had t o r e i g n

i n E u r o p e G e n e r a l s B r a d l e y and E i s e n h o w e r

i n P a t t o n b e c a u s e t o t h e m h e a p p e a r e d t o b e ouerl:, prone t o accept unwarranted operational t h o u g h t speed of

hacty or

i n h i s mouements,

logistical risK.

Patton,

on t h e o t h e r hand,
it alrnoit

o p e r a t i o n s was e s s e n t i a l commander who

because

ensured t h e initiatiue. One

attacKed faster

would r e t a i n t h e

e x a m p l e o f h i s t h i n K i n g c e n t e r s o n t h e Normandy b r e a K o u t operation. into P a t t o n was a f r a i d conrequently, t h e war w o u l d end b e f o r e he g o t

i t and,

h e was n o t s a t i s f i e d w i t h
'5

E i s e n h o w e r I s , B r a d l e y ' 5 , o r Montgomery
COBRR.

t h i n K i n g on O p e r a t i o n

He 2 a y s :

I was a l s o c e r t a i n t h a t , b y p u z h i n g h a r d e r , we c o u l d advance f a s t e r . I s t a t e d a t t h e t i m e , snd s t i l l be1 i e v e , t h a t two armored d i v i s i o n s , preceded by a heavy a r t i l l e r y c o n c e n t r a t i o n u s i n g a i r b u r s t s , and f o l l o i i e d b y two i n f a n t r y dilJi%iOn%, c o u l d haue c u t s t r a i g h t down t h e w e s t c o a s t t o f l u r a n c h e s w i t h o u t t h e n e c e s s i t y o f w a i t i n g f o r an a i r b l i t z . < 5 9 \

It

i s notable t h a t Patton

i s a d v o c a t i n g n o t o n l y speed of
b u t t h e use o f c o n c e n t r a t i o n s o f s o m e t h i n g he n e v e r a c t u a l l y Patton believed that a did

operations armor

i n t h i s passage,

t o p e n e t r a t e and e x p l o i t ,

i n any o f h i 5 o p e r a t i o n s . . r a p i d c ingle-army

Similarl?,

t h r u s t t h r o u g h t h e Saar r e g i o n of

Germany

I3G -

i n t o the FranKfurt-Coblenz t h e c a p i t u l a t i o n of

a r e a of

Germany w o u l d p r e c i p i t a t e

Germany.

He b e l i e v e d t h a t h e c o u l d h a v e crossing the

a c c o m p l i s h e d t h i s maneuver w i t h i n t e n days a f t e r S e i n e R i v e r o n 2 1 Augu5.t almost a year. there As

1944,

t h e r e b y S h o r t e n i n g t h e war b y

i m p l a u s i b l e a s P a t t o n ' s c l a i m s may s o u n d , impatience w i t h

i s some e v i d e n c e t h a t P a t t o n ' s

E i s e n h o w e r ' s a n d B r a d l e y ' s c a u t i o u s n e s s was n o t u n f o u n d e d . Major-General Richard Schimpf, c o m m a n d i n g t h e German 3 r d

5

Paratroop O i u i s ion,

says t h i s o f P a t t o n '

operat ions:

W a l w a y s c o n f i d e n t l y r e l i e d on A l l i e d h e s i t a n c y t o e e x p l o i t s u c c e z s t o g i v e u s t i m e ' t o w i t h d r a w and r e g r o u p i n o r d e r t o s l o w UP t h e n e x t t h r u s t . B u t w i t h y o u r G e n e r a l P a t t o n i t was d i f f e r e n t . He was v e r y aggressive i n e x p l o i t i n g a penetration. His b r e a K t h r o u g h a t f l u r a n c h e s was a n o u t s t a n d i n s e x a m p l e o f t h i s . So was h i s p h e n o m e n a l c a m p a i g n i n t h e Palat inate. (60)

Schimpf

is simply pointing out t h a t unliKe other A l l i e d

P a t t o n r e a l i z e d t h e advantages t o be accrued f r o m balance, steal ins the initiative, and and

commanders,

K n O c K i n g t h e enemy o f f

then Keeping him o f f

balance by developing t a c t i c a l

o p e r a t i o n a l dilemmas f a s t e r Supporting Patton

' 5

t h a n t h e enemy c a n c o p e w i t h t h e m .

a n a l y s is on t h e s i n g l e - a r m y

t h r u s t Concept,

Schimpf goes on t o s a y t h a t

t t l h e r e i s n o q u e s t i o n t h a t if y o u r T h i r d Army h a d n o t been h a l t e d b e f o r e Metz i n September, it c o u l d have p e n e t r a t e d t h e S i e g f r i e d L i n e v e r y q U l C K l Y and b e e n on t h e R h i n e i n a s h o r t t i m e . A t t h a t t i m e we w e r e powerless t o cope w i t h t h e s i t u a t i o n i n t h a t p o r t i o n o f t h e F r o n t . B u t when Y o u r T h i r d Army was h a l t e d , we o b t a i n e d t h e t i m e t o r e g r o u p and ue used t h a t opportunity t o the utmost.<61>

137

Even

if

S c h i m p f and P a t t o n are wrong i n t h e i r assessments of Schimpf

' 5

t h i s speculative argument, t h e essential f e a t u r e s of

remarKs r i n g t r u e : s p e e d o f o p e r a t i o n s d e v e l o p s f a v o r a b l e
operational

s i t u a t i o n s w h i c h , t o b e o p e r a t i o n a l l y d e c is i u e ,
in a t i m e l y fashion. Patton had a g r e a t feel

must be e x p l o i t e d

f o r t h e value of speed t a c t i c a l l y and o p e r a t i o n a l l y , though he

may h a v e b e e n o n l y v a g u e l y aware t h a t t h e r e a r e o t h e r

conaiderations

i n war. W h a t , f o r e x a m p l e , w o u l d h a v e b e e n t h e
if Patton, Knife-liKe, had t h r u s t

e f f e c t on t h e a t e r s t r a t e g y
h i s army into the

industrial

Saar a s h e p r o p o s e d ? C h a p t e r 4

examines t h i s q u e s t i o n and its i m p l i c a t i o n s n o t o n l y f o r P a t t o n , b u t G u d e r i a n as w e l l . Suffice

it h e r e t o s a y t h a t

P a t t o n thought speed of o p e r a t i o n s success at t h e operational

is a b s o l u t e l y e s s e n t i a l f o r

l e v e l o f war.

E n v e l o p t h e Enemy

I t h a s a l r e a d y been pointed o u t t h a t P a t t o n thought frontal

a t t a c K s a l o n e made 1 i t t l e s e n s e t a c t i c a l l y . H e f o r e s a w in meeting

t h a t f o r w a r d movement would p r o b a b l y r e s u l t

e n g a g e m e n t s , which t h e t a c t i c a l commander s h o u l d d e v e l o p i m m e d i t a t e l y by m a n e u v e r i n g a p o r t i o n o f h i s f o r c e a r o u n d t o o n e f l a n K o f t h e enemy. Should t h i s tactical envelopment be met

w i t h y e t a n o t h e r enemy f o r c e , a s t i l l wider envelopment s h o u l d be e f f e c t e d . There

is e v i d e n c e t h a t P a t t o n t h o u g h t t h a t

138

operations

d e s i g n e d t o e n v e l o p t h e enemy w e r e a l s o a p p r o p r i a t e level.
A few

a t the operational

examples f r o m h i s o p e r a t i o n s First,

in

E u r o p e show t h i s t o b e t h e c a s e .
XV C o r p s
i n a t u r n i n g movement

P a t t o n ' s employment o f

a g a i n s t F i f t h P a n z e r Army, illustrates

Panzer Group Eberbach, Patton's operational thought--before i s reflected Commander.

a n d S e v e n t h Army a t A r g e n t a n ( S e e Map 4). T h a t P a t t o n

style

the fact--such

a n e n v e l o p m e n t m i g h t come a b o u t Haislip,
XV C o r p s

i n h i s remarK t o General

A f t e r s e t t i n g t h a t corps flanK

in motion i n t o t h e 80-mile
France, and t h e

g a p b e t w e e n t h e German l e f t L o i r e River t o t h e south, surprised

a t Mortain,

P a t t o n t o l d H a i s l i p n o t t o be h e r e c e i v e d o r d e r s t o move Patton

if,i n s h o r t o r d e r ,

n o r t h e a s t or d u e n o r t h t o w a r d A r g e n t a n . < 6 2 > E u i d e n t a l l y ,

h a d s t u d i e d t h e map a n d h a d s e e n t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f e n v e l o p i n g F i f t h P a n z e r FIrmy b e t w e e n t h e B r i t i s h a t F a l a i s e a n d t h e Amer I c a n s a t A r g e n t a n .

A s i m i l a r account can be g i v e n f o r

Patton's conception of

t h e Bulge c o u n t e r a t t a c K plan.

His

i n i t i a l reaction t o reports

t h a t t h e Germans h a d l a u n c h e d a s i z a b l e a t t a c K t h r o u g h t h e FIrdennes, o v e r r u n n ins M i d d l e t o n

'5

V I 1 I C o r p s , was t h a t A11 i e d
t o allow the Then,

commanders s h o u l d h a v e t h e

intestinal fortitude

German a t t a c K t o d e v e l o p a n d r e a c h

i t s culminating point.

p a t t o n ' s T h i r d Army s h o u l d c o u n t e r a t t a c ~ t h e German a t t a c K b u t do s o b y c r o s s i n g t h e O u r a n d S u r e R i v e r s a n d e n v e l o p i n g t h e German t h r u s t a t a g r e a t e r d e p t h t h a n E i s e n h o w e r e n u i s i o n e d . (63) S u c h an e n v e l o p m e n t - - i n conjunct ion w i t h a

139

MILLS

rnt7-C

s i m i l a r . t h r u s t f r o m Montgomery

' 5

forces--would

not only striKe b u t would

t h e WeaKest e l e m e n t s o f t h e a t t a C K i n g German a r m i e s ,

e n c i r c l e m o r e German u n i t s t h a n w o u l d a t h r u s t a c r o s s t h e w a i s t of the Bulge toward Houffalize (See Map 9 ) . M o r e o v e r , Patton

t h o u g h t a deeper e n v e l o p i n g c o u n t e r - t h r u s t Prum would P u t A l l i e d armies, better position for subsequent

t o w a r d B i t b u r g and course,

~ a r t i c u l a r l yh i s o f operations

in a

i n t o Germany.

Eisenhower, he t h o u g h t , plan,

would never have agreed t o such

risKY

a n d h e p r o b a b l y was r i g h t . P a t t o n ' s P a l a t i n a t e Campaign, which so i m p r e s s e d M; C enuelop

Schimpf,

best r e f l e c t s h i s attempts t o operationally ( S e e Map 61. After

enemy f o r c e s

piercing the Siegfried Line t h e Bulge

n e a r B i t b u r g and Prum i n t h e Campaign,

immediate a f t e r m a t h of

P a t t o n ' s army p u n c h e d t h r o u g h t h e E i f e l r e g i o n o f H i s army's r a p i d

Germany t o w a r d C o b l e n z o n t h e R h i n e R i u e r . s e i z u r e of

bridgeheads a c r o s s t h e M o s e l l e R i v e r p u t Thir*d Army i n the Siegfried Line that

i n a p o s i t i o n t o t a K e enemy f o r c e s
w e r e h o l d i n g up S e v e n t h Army.

H i t t i n g e l e m e n t s o f t h e German and f l a n K , T h i r d Army

F i r s t and S e v e n t h R r m i e s i n t h e r e a r

e n v e l o p e d a n d c r u s h e d Rrmy G r o u p G a g a i n s t t h e R h i n e R i v e r .

W i t h W a l t o n ' s XX C o r p s o n t h e r i g h t f l a n K ,
the center,

E d d y ' s X I 1 Corps

in

and M i d d l e t o n ' s V I I I Corps on t h e l e f t ,

T h i r d Army

swept t h r o u g h t h e P a l a t i n a t e , commands, Rhine. b y p a s s i n g p o c K e t s of

l e a d i n g w i t h armored cowhat r e s i s t a n c e and c h a r g i n g t o t h e

I n t e n d a y s P a t t o n ' s a r m y d e s t r o y e d German Army G r o u p G o v e r 70,000 Germans i n one f o u r - d a y

and f o r c e d t h e s u r r e n d e r of

140

EIFEL A 3 PALATINATE C!JPAIGNS N

(Feb-Mar 1945)

Nap 6

- 140a

p e r i o d a l o n e . < 6 4 > The e f f e c t o f P a t t o n ' s e n v e l o p m e n t G r o u p G was t h a t , surrendered locally, w i t h few e x c e p t i o n s ,

o f Army

German s o l d i e r s

in droves,

German command a n d c o n t r o l e v a p o r a t e d

and s e r i o u s r e s i s t a n c e c o l l a p s e d . the operational payoff for

As P a t t o n

recognized,

bold--even

r isKy--rapid

envelopments,

employing whole c o r p s as t h e e n v e l o p i n g f o r c e , dec i s i u e . T h i s c a r w a i g n and P a t t o n

' 5

can be o p e r a t i o n a l l y

a t t e m p t s t o envelop F i f t h Panzer Army

at Argentan-Falaise

imply

t h a t he a t t e m p t e d t o adhere t o t h e P r i n c i p l e :

O p e r a t i o n a l l y e n v e l o p t h e enemy w h e n e v e r p o s s i b l e i t h a t i s , maneuver r a p i d l y i n t o t h e enemy's r e a r .

In fact,

s o r a p i d was P a t t o n ' s movement t h r o u g h t h e P a l a t i n a t e

G e n e r a l P a t c h ' s S e v e n t h A r m y g o t c a u g h t UP At
in

t h a t e l e m e n t s of

Patton's race t o t h e Rhine. Campaign, Gerow, said,

the conclusion o f the Palatinate

Patton received a telegram from Lieutenant-General 1 5 t h U.S. Army,

Commanding G e n e r a l o f

i n w h i c h Gerow
o n e 0.F t h e m

" C o n g r a t u l a t i o n on e n v e l o p i n g t h r e e Armies,

A m e r i c a n . "(65) The c o n c l u s i o n t o b e d r a w n a t t h i s p o i n t conceived of offensive i s that Patton

o p e r a t i o n a l a r t as e s s e n t i a l l y a s e r i e s Of

actions.

To b e d e c i s i v e , s u c h o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s
incessant s e r i e s o f t a c t i c a l and

s h o u l d be c h a r a c t e r i z e d by an operational culminating, level attacKs,

if p o s s i b l e ,

executed w i t h g r e a t speed,

i n an e n v e l o p m e n t o f

l a r g e enemy

f o r c e s t o ensure t h e i r

defeat.

141

COMMfWdl a n d CONTROL

I n e a r l y August i n T h i r d Flrmy,

1944,

General H a i s l i p ,

commanding XV C o r p s

and P a t t o n g o t

i n t o a v i c i o u s argument because command P o s t . P a t t o n a n d when

Patton could not f i n d H a i s l i p ' s forward

c o m p l a i n e d t h a t H a i s l i p was r u n n i n g away f r o m h i r n , told

i t was T h i r d A r m y ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o m a i n t a i n

communications w i t h Finally,

i t s corps,

P a t t o n was n o t m o l l i f i e d .

Haislip said,

A l l r i g h t . TaKe y o u r c h o i c e . Do y o u w a n t me t o s i t
bacK and w a i t f o r y o u r l o u s y u n i t s t o g e t i n t h e i r
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , o r d o Y O U want me f o r w a r d w h e r e t h e
f i g h t i n g is? You c a n ' t h a v e b o t h . < 6 6 >

When H a i s l i p f i n i s h e d ,

P a t t o n c a l m e d down a n d a l l o w e d as how The s t o r y is interesting not only

H a i s l i p h a d s o m e t h ng t h e r e . because it is mild y

amusing--Patton it

g e t t i n g a dose of

h i s own

med i c i n e - - b u t

a l s o because art:

i l l u m i n a t e s a c e n t r a l t e n e t of

P a t t o n 's o p e r a t i o n a l

Command a n d l e a d a t t h e f r o n t .

P a t t o n f i r m l y b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e r e was n o g o o d s u b s t i t u t e f o r t h e p e r s o n a l p r e s e n c e o f t h e comnander o r o f leaders generally.

In 'Letter

of

I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 " t o

d i u i s i o n a n d c o r p s commanders

P a t t o n spec i f i e d that lead i n person."<67>

"Ce l a c h , i n h i s a p p r o p r i a t e s p h e r e ,

w ill

I n t h a t same d o c u m e n t h e made i t c l e a r
of

t h a t h e e x p e c t e d e i t h e r t h e commanding g e n e r a l o r h i s c h i e f

142

staff

a n d o n e member o f

each s t a f f

section t o v i s i t frontline medical,

u n i t s every day. ordnance,

T h i s p o l i c y aPPl i e d t o s i g n a l ,

engineer,

a n d q u a r t e r m a s t e r s e c t i o n s as we1 1 as Moreover, i n h i s own

combat and combat s u p p o r t u n i t s . headquarters

i n d i v i d u a l s who v i s i t e d f o r w a r d staff briefing

u n i t s would be

present a t the next day's

t o r e p o r t o n any

s i g n ifi c a n t o b s e r v a t i o n s t h a t r n i g h t b e n e f i t t h e w h o l e cornrnand. P a t t o n had good r e a s o n s f o r policies. i n s i s t i n g on c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e s e

One r e a s o n was t o e n s u r e t h a t s t a f f o f f i c e r s who d o

t h e p l a n n i n g a t t h e h i g h e r e c h e l o n s o f command d o n o t l o s e t o u c h w i t h t h e r e a l i t i e s cornbat u n i t s h a v e t o f a c e a plan.

in executing

A s e c o n d r e a s o n was t h e s i m p l e f a c t t h a t m o r e s e n i o r Patton thought, h a v e mclre t i m e ; hence,

it i s t h e y who

officers,

s h o u l d go f o r w a r d t o s e e t h e j u n i o r

officers.

An e x c e p t i o n t o
i s necessary

t h i s g e n e r a l r u l e o c c u r s when a c o o r d i n a t e d P l a n and r e q u i r e s a m e e t i n g o f One o f response of several junior

and s e n i o r commanders.

t h e r e a s o n s P a t t o n was w i l l i n g t o e n d u r e t h e t e s t y G e n e r a l H a i s l i p was t h a t h e h a d n o p a t i e n c e f o r

commanders who w e r e u n w i l l i n g t o go f o r w a r d w h e r e t h e a c t i o n t o personally decisions. i n f l u e n c e e v e n t s a n d rnaKe t i m e l y critical

is

On t h e h a z a r d s o f

comnanding t o o f a r t o t h e r e a r ,

P a t t o n says:

It i d i l l be remembered t h a t on J a n u a r y 8 [ d u r i n g t h e B u l g e C a r n p a i g n l , I was u r g e d b y h i g h a u t h o r i t y t o a t t a c K . A t 1030, o n t h e t e n t h , t w o d a y s l a t e r , 1 r e c e i v e d a d i r e c t o r d e r t o p u l l o u t an a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n and p u t It i n r e s e r v e s o u t h o f t h e c i t y o f L u x e m b o u r g as a p o s s i b l e c o u n t e r - m e a s u r e t o t h e s u p p o s e d l y impend i n s b r e a K - t h r o u g h . These t w o

143

instances.. indicate the f r o m t o o f a r bacK.<68>

i n a d u i s a b i l i t y o f commanding

T h i s b i t t e r comment was d i r e c t e d a t E i s e n h o w e r , who

in Patton's

e s t i m a t i o n was t o o f a r t o t h e r e a r t o h a v e any r e a l s e n s e o f w h a t was g o i n g o n Campaign and,

i n and a r o u n d Bastogne d u r i n g t h e B u l g e
a t b e s t was a m b i v a l e n t a b o u t w h a t issue contradictory orders.

consequently,

t o do and a t w o r s t p r o n e t o f a i r n e s s t o Eisenhower,

In

i t s h o u l d be p o i n t e d o u t t h a t

in the

a f t e r m a t h o f t h e German B u l g e o f f e n s i v e Staff

t h e Combined C h i e f s o f and

d i r e c t e d Eisenhower t o r e t a i n an o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r u e ,

E i s e n h o w e r was t r y i n g b o t h t o h a u e P a t t o n a t t a c K a n d g i v e UP a d i v i s i o n a s a SHAEF r e s e r u e . notwithstanding, These s a l i e n t f a c t s intact: command

P a t t o n ' s main p o i n t remains

c a n b e f a c i l i t a t e d if c o m m a n d e r s a r e w i l l i n g t o g o f o r w a r d . example t h a t t h e manner illustrates the application of the principle into effect

is

An

i n which Patton put

Eisenhower's order To

t o s e n d an a r m o r e d d i u i s i o n t o t h e c i t y o f L u x e m b o u r g . arrange f o r t h e r e l i e f and w i t h d r a w a l o f

4 t h Armored D i v i s i o n ,

P a t t o n went f o r w a r d

t o B a s t o g n e a n d met w i t h t h e commanders o f l0lst Airborne Divisions. Although

4th and 6th Armored and t h e

the affected

commanders o n l y r e c e i v e d t h e o r d e r t o r e l i e v e 4 t h 1030 h o u r s on

Armored D i u i s i o n a t a b o u t

10 J a n u a r y

1945,

before

d a r K t w o c o m b a t commands o f t h e 4 t h A r m o r e d D i v i s i o n s t a r t e d f o r Luxembourg u i a A r l o n . < 6 9 > B o t h t h i s a c t i o n and P a t t o n ' s remarKs about E i s e n h o w e r ' s f a i l u r e amount o f h i s t i m e w i t h f o r w a r d t o spend a s i g n i f i c a n t

a r m i e s and c o r p s s u g g e s t s an

144

o p e r a t i o n a l t e n e t b y w h i c h P a t t o n e x e r c i s e d command a n d control:

Commanders s h o u l d i d e n t i f y a h e a d o f t i m e c r i t i c a l e v e n t s , t h e i r l o c a t i o n s , and t i m e s o f o c c u r r e n c e and b e t h e r e t o maKe d e c i s i o n s a n d o v e r c o m e f r i c t i o n .

The o f t - r e p e a t e d

and amusing s t o r y t h a t r e c o u n t s P a t t o n ' s of a n unnamed a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n j u s t

encounter with t h e o f f i c e r s before

t h e breaKout a t fivranches f u r t h e r r e v e a l s P a t t o n ' s The s t o r y g o e s t h a t w h i l e France, o n 29 J u l y

A l l

t h i n K i n g o n commanding f o r w a r d . v i s i t i n g t r o o p s near Coutances, found

1944 P a t t o n
the officers

a n a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n 1 i n e d UP o n a r o a d .

f r o m d i v i s i o n h e a d q u a r t e r s w e r e s t u d y i n g a map f o r t h e p u r p o s e ,

so t h e y s a i d ,
Riuer.

of

f i n d i n g a s u i t a b l e place t o cross t h e Sienne "One looK i s worth a hundred reports,"

RemarKing t h a t

P a t t o n i n f o r m e d t h e m a l l t h a t h e h a d j u s t waded a c r o s s t h e river, hampered o n l y by t h e inaccurate f i r e i s clear: of o n e enerrtf i s no good

machinegun.<70> P a t t o n ' s p o i n t substitute for whether personal forward

or

there

r e c o n n a i s s a n c e b y commanders,

tactical

aperat ional

a s h i s comment a b o u t

Eisenhower shows. P a t t o n a p p e a r s t o h a u e made i t h i s b u s i n e s s t o be a t find t h e s e locations

c r i t i c a l locations a t the c r i t i c a l time.

w e r e u s u a l l y f o r w a r d w h e r e some c r u c i a l p h a s e o f
was o n g o i n g .

an o p e r a t i o n

F o r example,

r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t t h e p o t e n t i a l was

high for

t h i n g s t o go wrong

i n and a r o u n d Avranches w h i l e h i s
P a t t o n made

two o p e r a t i o n a l c o r p s passed t h r o u g h t h a t town,

145

s u r e h e was t h e r e t o p r e v e n t o r r e d u c e f r i c t i o n .

His traffic

d i r e c t i n g i n A v r a n c h e s t o u n t a n g l e t r a f f i c j a m s seems l a u g h a b l e until it
is realized that

German g e n e r a l s d i d t h e same t h i n g i l l u s t r a t i n g t h e need t o a n t i c i p a t e it even

if

in

b o t h Ardennes o f f e n s i v e s ,

f r i c t i o n and h a v e a p l a n t o d e a l w i t h turning traffic cop f o r a while.

i t means

Another example,

w h i c h has a l r e a d y b e e n d e s c r i b e d ,

is
33th

P a t t o n ' s h a n d l i n g o f General Eddy's d e c i s i o n t o withdraw I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n d u r i n g t h e L o r r a i n e Campaign. As P a t t o n remembers i t , he had o r d e r e d t h e 6 t h Armored D i v i s i o n t o

CounterattacK

i n support of

the 35th

Infantry D i v i s i o n f r o m X I 1

C o r p s b e c a u s e t h e 3 5 t h D i v i s i o n was u n d e r t r e m e n d o u s p r e s s u r e from a t l e a s t t w o German d i v i s i o n s . Staff, visited When G e n e r a l G a f f e y , Corps t h e n e x t day t o see he discovered t h a t

P a t t o n ' s Chief of

XII

how 6 t h A r r m r e d D i v i s i o n ' s a t t a c K was g o i n g ,

n o t o n l y had t h e 6th Armored n o t been c o m m i t t e d b u t t h a t Eddy,

X I 1 C o r p s commander,

h a d o r d e r e d t h e 35th D i v i s i o n t o w i t h d r a w . and he

P a t t o n t o l d G a f f e y t o countermand t h e w i t h d r a w a l o r d e r ,

w e n t f o r w a r d t o t h e command p o s t o f t h e 6 t h A r m o r e d D i v i s i o n t o have a t e t e - a - t e t e w i t h t h e c o r p s a n d t w o d i v i s i o n commanders.

He f o u n d t h a t a l l t h r e e g e n e r a l o f f i c e r s w e r e f a t i g u e d a n d 5 h a K e n b y a n e a r m i s s f r o m German a r t i l l e r y e a r l i e r

i n t h e day.

P a t t o n t h e n d i r e c t e d 6th Armored t o a t t a c u t h e n e x t day and left, t e l l i n g Eddy h e h a d p e r f e c t c o n f i d e n c e i n h i m .

6th f w r m r e d ' s

As

it

turned out, tactical

a t t a c K went o f f w e l l

and p r o d u c e d a

success.

Here a g a i n P a t t o n e x e m p l i f i e s h i s b e 1 i e f t h a t

146

n o t h i n g c a n s e r v e as a n a d e q u a t e s u b s t i t u t e f o r t h e commander a t t h e c r i t i c a l p o i n t .

t h e p r e s e n c e of

And P a t t o n c l e a r l y as

b e l i e v e d t h e p r i n c i p l e a p p l i e s a t t h e o p e r a t i o n a l as w e l l the tactical l e v e l o f command.

C o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s P r i n c i p l e t h a t commanders s h o u l d b e located forward, (CPs): P a t t o n o p e r a t e d t w o f o r w a r d command p o s t s

a F o r w a r d E c h e l o n and an Advanced T a c t i c a l H e a d q u a r t e r s
i t was P a t t o n ' s p o l i c y

o f t h e Forward Echelon.<71> In f a c t ,

t h a t a l l d i v i s i o n s a n d c o r p s h a v e a CP c o n s i s t i n g o f a t these two echelons, which roughly corresponded t o t h e

least

contemporary American c o n f i g u r a t i o n of CP.

a m a i n CP a n d T a c t i c a l

P a t t o n f u r t h e r s t i p u l a t e d t h a t t h e A d v a n c e d T a c t i c a l CP

" s h o u l d be as s m a l l as p o s s i b l e and m o b i l e w l t h minimum r a d i o t r a f f i c . " < 7 ? > According t o Patton,

a t army and c o r p s t h e
Chief

F o r w a r d E c h e l o n s h o u l d c o n s i s t o f t h e commanding G e n e r a l , of Staff, Engineers, Secretary o f t h e General S t a f f , Field Artillery, Antiaircraft

G-1, G-2,

3 .

G-3,
Signal, and

Artillery,

cooperating a i r . Marshal,

I n add i t i o n ,

representat ives from the Provost

1i a i s o n

S p e c i a l Troops,

H e a d q u a r t e r s Commandant, Medical

o f f i c e r s f r o m 6-4,

Ordnance,

, Quartermaster,

and 0-5

Sections should also be present. The A d v a n c e d T a c t i c a l H e a d q u a r t e r s t h e Cornmanding G e n e r a l , (ATH) s h o u l d c o n s i s t o f and a

I?,

forward echelon Chief o f S t a f f , Field

s m a l l o p e r a t i o n s s e c t i o n o f 0-2, 0-3, E n g i n e e r s , Artillery, and S i g n a l .

T h i r d A r m y a l s o m a i n t a i n e d a R e a r CP w h e r e t h e G-4,

commanded b y t h e 0-4,

0-5,

Chemical Warfare,

147

Finance,

Medical,

Quartermaster,

Ordnance,

Signal,

Engineers,

Adjutant General, Special Services, b u s i n e s s . <73>

The ideal

Inspector General,

Judge Advocate G e n e r a l ,

and C h a p l a i n p e r f o r m e d t h e i r main

location for

a c o r p s CP was w i t h i n o n e - h a l f Such p r o x i m i t y

h o u r ' s d r i v e f r o m t h e f a r t h e s t d i v i s i o n CP.

would c e r t a i n l y f a c i l i t a t e t h e use o f w i r e communications, w h i c h P a t t o n much p r e f e r r e d o v e r r a d i o .

In fact,

Patton never

u s e d t h e r a d i o t o t a l K t o h i s commanders. preference, telephone.

In order o f
o r by

he communicated o r d e r s t o them f a c e - t o - f a c e He much p r e f e r r e d t o as he p u t issue orders v e r b a l l y ,

general-to-general

i t , and t h e n f o l l o w w i t h a w r i t t e n

memorandum c o n f i r m i n g w h a t was t r a n s m i t t e d o r a l l y . < 7 4 > T h i s technique o f Patton's amplifies what h a s a l r e a d y b e e n s a i d :

P a t t o n b e 1 i e u e d p e r s o n a l l e a d e r s h i p was a n a b s o l u t e r e q u i r e m e n t f o r s u c c e s s f u l commanders. Evidently, h e was n e r u o u s a b o u t f o r he s a y s t h a t in a l l

P l a c i n g t o o much r e l i a n c e o n r a d i o s ,

a t t a c K s o n e s h o u l d maKe t h e maximum u s e o f

w i r e as t h e p r i m a r y

m e a t i i o f c o m n u n i c a t i o n a n d u s e r a d i o as a s e c o n d a r y means. h i g h l y mobile warfare an r e l i a n c e on w i r e

In
In

is d i f f i c u l t a t best.
1944,

i n t e r e s t i n g l e t t e r w r i t t e n t o h i s son on 2 1 August sweep a c r o s s w e s t e r n F r a n c e , He s a y s ,

during Third Army's c o n f irrns t h i s p o i n t .

Patton

The g r e a t d i f f i c u l t y we h a v e e x p e r i e n c e d h e r e i s t h a t we h a v e moved so f a s t a n d s o f a r t h a t we a r e n e a r l y always o u t o f cormunication.<75>

148

Unfortunately, communication.

P a t t o n d o e s n o t m e n t i o n w i t h whom h e was o u t o f But h i s fear o f enemy a i r a t t a c K s a g a i n s t CPs large

may h a v e b e e n P a r t o f

t h e p r o b l e m b e c a u s e he s a y s t h a t

r a d i o s s h o u l d n o t be Kept

i n t h e u i c i n c i t y o f a command p o s t .

They s h o u l d b e s e p a r a t e d f r o m t h e CP a n d r e m o t e d i n w i t h telephone: "toltherwise, t h e enemy a i r w i l l home o n t h e m a n d Remoting r a d i o s there i n t o a CP t a K e s

i s n o t much t i m e t o

g e t t h e command p o s t . ' < 7 6 > time, and

i n highly f l u i d operations,

l a y wire a n d e s t a b l i s h e i t h e r r a d i o o r t e l e p h o n e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s
w i t h h i g h e r h e a d q u a r t e r s o r anyone e l s e f o r

that matter.

As

it

was.

T h i r d Army's

F o r w a r d E c h e l o n ( M a i n ) moved a n a u e r a g e o f
1 flugust
1944 a n d O c t o b e r

once e u e r y t h r e e days between when u n i t s s e t t l e d i n for

1944,

t h e L o r r a i n e Campaign.<77> Thus, face-to-face

i t i s no

given P a t t o n ' s preference t o r e l y on verbal

c o m m u n i c a t i o n s and h i s r e l u c t a n c e t o use r a d i o a t a l l ,

w o n d e r h e was o u t o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h o t h e r e c h e l o n s o f command. L i K e Guder i a n , P a t t o n a t t e m p t e d t o a1 l e u i a t e h i s a small

command and c o n t r o l p r o b l e m s b y m a K i n g e x t e n s i u e u s e o f plane t o trauel, the radio.<78> Another t e c h n i q u e t h a t P a t t o n used t o f a c i l i t a t e and c o n t r o l a l s o e m u l a t e d G u d e r i a n ' s approach. Patton l e f t Army, command o f one u n i t , s u c h as though, u n l i K e Guderian,

he d i d n o t r e l y on

command when

Inuar iably,

I 1 Corps o r Seventh
These

h e t o o K w i t h h i m some K e y m e h e r s o f h i s s t a f f .

w e r e men whose j u d g m e n t P a t t o n t r u s t e d a n d who o b v i o u s l y h a d been b a t t l e t e s t e d . When P a t t o n l e f t S e v e n t h Army t o f o r m T h i r d

149

Army

i n England,

for

instance,

h e toOK w i t h h i m s i x t e e n a T h i r d Army

o f f i c e r s f r o m h i s S e v e n t h Army s t a f f . < 7 9 > O u t of staff s t r e n g t h o f 450 o f f i c e r s ,

s i x t e e n o f f i c e r s i s n o t many.

However, but,

t h e men P a t t o n s e l e c t e d f i l l e d n o t o n l y K e y s l o t s , w e r e r e g u l a r o f f i c e r s who h a d l o n g Consequently, h e l p i n g h i m p l a n and

w i t h few exception,

c a u a l r y and armored s e r u i c e . control operations,

P a t t o n had a s m a l l c o r e o f b a t t l e w i s e s t a f f

o f f i c e r s who s h a r e d a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g a b o u t how o p e r a t i o n s s h o u l d be conducted. Furthermore, P a t t o n tooK t i m e t o t r a i n h i s

i n c o m i n g c o r p s commanders a n d t h e i r s t a f f s b y h a v i n g t h e m perform duty for

a p e r i o d o f t i m e o p p o s i t e t h e i r army

c o u n t e r p a r t . < S 0 > The r e s u l t was t h a t n e w c o m e r s qu i C K l Y P i c K e d

up o n how T h i r d Army

o p e r a t i o n s were p l a n n e d and c o n d u c t e d and

l a t e r l e d t o smoother o p e r a t i o n s

in the corps.
u n i t s and

General P a t t o n a l s o mandated t h a t d i u i s i o n - s i z e higher i n T h i r d Army w o u l d c o n d u c t a d a i l y s t a f f

briefing to

ensure c o o r d i n a t i o n o f e f f o r t Army t h e d a i l y s t a f f

within t h e organizat ion.

In T h i r d

b r i e f i n g t o o K p l a c e a t 0830 i n t h e m a i n CP The b r i e f i n g b e g a n w i t h t h e 0-3

according t o a fixed routine. operations officer

d e s c r i b i n g t h e f r i e n d l y s i t u a t i o n on t h e
The G-3 a i r o f f i c e r t h e n g a v e t h e

whole o f t h e Western F r o n t . friendly air situation, officer,

a n d was f o l l o w e d b y t h e G - 2

operations

who g a v e a d e s c r i p t i o n o f strengths,

t h e enemy s i t u a t i o n , mouements,
pr

including d ispost ions, figures,

i s o n e r of

war

c a p a b i l i t i e s and t e r r a i n a n a l y s i s .

The 0 - 2 was

followed by the Public Relations Officer,

who h i g h l i g h t e d t h e

150

w o r l d news.

The C h i e f o f

Staff

c l o s e d w i t h announcements and who e i t h e r SpOKe o r d l s m i s s e d lasted only 15-20

turned the floor

over t o Patton,

e u e r Y o n e . < 8 1 > The w h o l e a f f a i r minutes,

usually

n o t much t i m e t o maKe a n y intended f o r

important decisions. any important decisions t o important

HOWe8Jer, P a t t o n n e u e r

b e made d u r i n g t h i s 0830 d a i l y b r i e f i n g b e c a u s e t h e

d e c i s i o n s c o n c e r n i n g f u t u r e o p e r a t i o n s a l r e a d y h a d b e e n made a t a m e e t i n g w h i c h d a i l y p r e c e d e d t h e f o r m a l 0830 s t a f f b r i e f i n g .
A t

a r o u n d 0808 e u e r y d a y P a t t o n h e l d a m e e t i n g w i t h Key t o have an exchange o f ideas. Included in of and

members o f h i s s t a f f this informal 6-2,

m e e t i n g were t h e C h i e f o f S t a f f , Chief of Staff

deputy Chief of
X I X TfiC,

Staff, Patton.

a s s i s t a n t G-2, G - 3 ,

I t was a t t h i s m e e t i n g t h a t P a t t o n u s u a l l y made Key

impend i n s o p e r a t i o n s ,
is

decisions about

and t h e u i s i b i l i t y and indicative o f Pattons

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e 6-2 s e c t i o n interest
in i n t e l l i g e n c e rnattilrs

i n planning o p e r a t i o n s and

maK i n g d e c i s i o n s . In fact, Flllen, a c c o r d i n g t o P a t t o n s d e p u t y 0-2, Colonel Robert

P a t t o n n e u e r made a moue w i t h o u t f i r s t c o n s u l t i n g G-2.

G-2

In planning,

always had t h e f i r s t say.<82> P a t t o n s

in

intense interest firmys G-2,

i n t e l l i g e n c e i n f o r m a t i o n i s echoed by T h i r d who p o i n t s o u t t h a t P a t t o n w e n t intelligence, including the This

C o l o n e l Oscar Koch,

t o great

lengths t o obtain timely t h e T h l r d firmy

c r e a t i o n of

Information Seruice.

organization, C o l o n e l E.M.

h e a d e d b y t h e commander o f FicKett, had t h e tasK of

t h e 6th C a v a l r y Group,

m o n i t o r i n g t h e T h i r d firmy

151

radio traffic

f r o m b a t t a l i o n t o d i v i s i o n and t h e i r t h e purpose o f g a i n i n g c r i t i c a l combat

reconnaissance u n i t s f o r i n f o r m a t i o n and r e l a y i n g Headquarters r a p i d l y . traffic,

it t o T h i r d Army Advanced T a c t i c a l

In a d d i t i o n t o monitoring f r i e n d l y r a d i o

C o l o n e l F i c K e t t 's u n i t a l s o e s t a b l i s h e d o f f i c e r f r o n t 1 i n e b a t t a l i o n and r e g i m e n t a l t h e purpose o f timely exchanging inforrnat ion. Because

patrols. along a l l headquarters for P a t t o n saw t h a t

r e p o r t i n g was a b s o l u t e l y c r u c i a l ,

he

" t e l e s c o p i c a l l y " e m p l o y e d 6 t h C a u a l r Y Group a s h i s e y e s and ears, b y p a s s i n g normal r e p o r t i n 9 channels.:S3> In a d d i t ion t o h i s i n c r e a s i n g use of "telescope" technique, P a t t o n made

a i r p h o t o g r a p h y a5 h e became rnore e x p e r i e n c e d

a s a n o p e r a t i o n a l commander.. command o f flown

I n T u n i s i a w h i l e P p t t o n was

in

X I Corps o n l y t w o a i r p h o t o g r a p h y m i s s i o n s were
I 1 Corps d u r i n g t h e 30-day
period from

i n support o f

January-February

1943.

D u r i n g o p e r a t i o n s on S i c i l y , i n support of

140 a i r

p h o t o g r a p h y m i s s i o n s were f l o w n d u r i n g t h e 38-day campaign.

S e v e n t h Army

I n September

1 9 4 4 a l o n e 223 a i r i n support of in sortie rates Seventh

r e c o n n a i s s a n c e p h o t o g r a p h y m i s s i o n s were f l o w n T h i r d firmy operations.<84> In part, differences

can be e x p l a i n e d by o r g a n i c o r a t t a c h e d a i r firmy, of

capability.

for

example,

had a p h o t o g r a p h i c r e c o n n a i s s a n c e squadron

ten planes

i n d i r e c t s u p p o r t o n c e HUSKY b e g a n :
it

I 1 Corps had

no such a s s e t s . < 8 5 > B u t intelligence staff capabilities of

i s also clear

t h a t P a t t o n and h i s

m r e a n d m o r e came t o r e l y o n t h e

a i r photography t o a i d

in operational planning.

152

P a t t o n ' s 6 - 2 , C o l o n e l Koch, i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Bulge attacK before

claims t h a t

largely through the had t h e

a i r photography, as he P u t s

t h e T h i r d Army s t a f f

"pegged."

i t , b e f o r e t h e a t t a c K and
inKling the

any o t h e r a l l i e d h e a d q u a r t e r s h a d a n

attacK

w o u l d o c c u r . < S S > K o c h m a i n t a i n s t h a t o n e r e a s o n T h i r d Army Knew a s much as

it d i d about

the

i m p e n d i n g German o f f e n s i v e for

was t h a t

i t was s t a n d a r d p r a c t i c e overlap other

i n T h i r d firmy

t h e 0-2 S e c t i o n t o O u e r l app i n g intelligence

a r e a s o u t s i d e T h i r d firmy

boundaries.

couerage ensured t h a t P a t t o n ' s s t a f f

had adequate

i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e a r m y '5 f l a n K s a n d p r e c a u t i o n a r y s e c u r i t y measures c o u l d be taKen of

i f n e e d e d . < S 7 ? B o t h t h e weaK

strength a

V I I I Corps on T h i r d A r m y ' s n o r t h f l a n K and t h e e v i d e n c e of

t h e Ardennrs l e d Koch t o b e l i e v e t h e Patton could a t

German b u i l d u p e a s t o f

Germans c o u l d l a u n c h a n o f f e n s i u e .
get

Hence,

least

his staff

t o b e t h i n K i n g a b o u t an o p e r a t i o n a l

concept t o is that

deal w i t h such a c a p a b i l i t y . P a t t o n ' s G-2 his left focused

A point worth noting here

on t h e enemy's c a p a b i l i t i e s r a t h e r t h a n estimates.

i n t e n t i o n s when m a K i n g G - 2

I t was a p p a r e n t l y
in

t o P a t t o n t o j u d g e w h a t t h e enemy

i n t e n d e d t o do

p a r t i c u l a r cases. suggests

The o p e r a t i o n a l t e n e t t h a t t h i s d i s c u s s i o n

is:

E s t a b l i s h an i n t e l l igence channel t h a t ensures irapid and t i m a l y i n p u t o f combat i n f o r r n a t i o n , b y p a s s i n g normal channels.

Patton'r.

r e l i a n c e on h i s G-2

and t h e e f f o r t s 0.F C o l o n e l according t o

F i c K e t t ' s 6 t h C a v a l r y G r o u p h e l p e x p l a i n why,

153

P a t t o n ' s d e p u t y G-2,

" T h i r d Flrmy was n e v e r s u r p r i s e d a n d why

' 5

it

was a l w a y s s m a s h i n g t h r o u g h v u l n e r a b l e s e c t o r s i n t h e e n e m y
1 i n e s . "':33> Although P a t t o n d i d h a v e access t o Ultra d u r i n g h i s European operat i o n s , there
is c o n f 1 i c t i n s e u i d e n c e

o n how

e x t e n s i v e l y h e u s e d t h i s s o u r c e of

information.

I t was

i n t e l l igence f r o m Ultra t h a t p r o m p t e d P a t t o n t o h a l t t h e 3 5 t h

Infantry, 30th

I n f a n t r y , a n d 2 n d F r e n c h A r m o r e d D i u is i o n s near

St. Hilaire j u s t a f t e r t h e p a s s a g e t h r o u g h Avranches

in early

hugust

1944. A t t h e time P a t t o n t h o u g h t word of

' 5

an i m e n d i n g

German C o u n t e r a t t a c K t o c u t h i s a r m y
b l u f f . < Z S > In t h e e v e n t ,

cornmun i c a t i o n s was a and h a l t i n g

i t was n o t a b l u f f

e l e m e n t s o f X I I , X V , a n d XX C o r p s t u r n e d o u t t o b e f o r t u i t o u s ,
f o r t h e y h e l p e d h a l t t h e German c o u n t e r a t t a c K s in and around

M o r t a i n , F r a n c e . B u t b e c a u s e of t h e d e s i r e t o s a f e g u a r d U l t r a
as a s o u r c e o f
intell igence,

i t s i n t e l l i g e n c e p r o d u c t s were
consequently,

d i s t r i b u t e d on a p u s h r a t h e r t h a n dernand b a s i s ;
it

is. q u e s t i o n a b l e w h e t h e r P a t t o n was a b l e t o r e l y o n i t On t h e o t h e r h a n d , Major WarracK W a l l a c e , an U l t r a in August and September

1944,

heauily.

r e c i p i e n t on P a t t o n ' s s t a f f

c l a i m s t h a t a l t h o u g h P a t t o n i n i t i a l l y was S K e P t i c a l o f U l t r a ' s
ualue,
a5 i t p r o v e d

its r e l i a b i l i t y o v e r t i m e , P a t t o n came t o
p r e c i s e l y how m u c h

r e l y o n U l t r a more a n d m o r r . < S B > H o w e u e r , Ultra

influenced Patton's operational planning remains unclear.

A r e a s o n t h a t h e l p s e x p l a i n Why P a t t o n ' s T h i r d Flrmv was

" n e u e r s u r p r i s e d " may b e t h e use h e made o f his dally

informal

154

staff

briefing.

Koch Says P a t t o n used t h i s s e s s i o n t o exchange i n t e l l i g e n c e b r i e f i n g t o those

ideas a f t e r present.

Koch gave a q u i c K Koch d e s c r i b e s

fis

it,

[ t l h i s e a r l y - h o u r b r i e f i n g l e d t o a most f r u i t f u l exchange o f i d e a s . B u t euen o f g r e a t e r i m p o r t a n c e , i t made e v e r y o n e t h e r e a w a r e o f w h a t t h e commander h a d i n m i n d , what h e w o u l d do u n d e r v a r i o u s c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t m l g h t a r I s e . The s t a f f was K e p t UP t o d a t e w i t h P a t t o n ' s t h i n K i n g on a d a i l y b a s i s . F u t u r e p l a n s were l a i d a n d made Known a n d a n i n t i m a c y o f t h i n K i n g developed. (91 >

K o c h ' s comment s u g g e s t s f o u r

point5 worth elucidation. informal

First,

he appears t o be s a y i n g t h a t t h e s e P a t t o n h e l p e d t o convey P a t t o n ' s future operations. Second,

sessions w i t h c u r r e n t and

intentions f o r

Koch i m p l i e s t h a t P a t t o n used t h e o r wargaming o u t loud; this

b r i e f i n g t o d o some

'what-iffing"

undoubtedly got P a t t o n ' s s t a f f a l r e a d y were n o t ,

t o s t a r t thinKing, plans f o r

if t h e y

about contingency

various

operational scenarios t h a t might develop, counterattacK contingency. Third, focus h i s s t a f f ' s

s u c h a5 t h e B u l g e

P a t t o n used these sessions t o plans, indeed whole points out that d e v e l o p and

t h i n K i n g on f u t u r e

c amp a i9 n I
maps c a n where t h e

In'ketter

of

I n s t r u c t I o n No. ? ' P a t t o n

n d i c a t e where c r i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s w i l l commander s h o u l d b e . P a t t o n says: Moreover,

from the operational

perspect iue,

firmy a n d c o r p s commanders a r e n o t s o much i n t e r e s t e d i n how t o b e a t t h e enemy f r o m a t a c t i c a l s t a n d p o i n t a s i n w h e r e t o t e a t h i m . The w h e r e is l e a r n e d f r o m a c a r e f u l s t u d y o f r o a d , r a i l w a y , a n d r i v e r maps. The q u e s t i o n o f t h e t a c t i c a l means t o b e u s e d b y d i u i s i o n s in securing these p o i n t s is, o f necessity, studied

155

from large-scale

maps.(92>

T h i s s u o t a t i o n r e v e a l s more a b o u t P a t t o n s u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d c o n c e p t i o n o f t a c t i c a l and o p e r a t i o n a l a r t t h a n p e r h a p s any o t h e r o f h i s rernarKs.

I t a 1 5 0 h e l p s e x p l a i n w h y h e made a s m u c h

u s e a s h e d i d o+ a 1:1,000,08D

M i c h e l i n t o u r i n g map.

I t was

J u s t s u c h a s m a l l - s c a l e map t h a t e n a b l e d P a t t o n t o d e t e r m i n e
where,

from t h e operational perspective, t h e critical b a t t l e s

w o u l d p r o b a b l y taKe p l a c e d u r i n g a c a m p a i g n . T h i s is o n e w a y P a t t o n r a i s e d t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t h e would be a t t h e l o c a t i o n s
that critical
5ays

e v e n t s o r b a t t l e s w o u l d l i K e l y taKe p l a c e . Koch
1944 T h i r d A r m y e n g i n e e r s h a d

that

a5 e a r l y a s S e p t e m b e r

p r e p a r e d a p r e l i m i n a r y t a c t i c a l t e r r a i n estimate of Ardennes r e g i o n . Included i n t h a t a n a l y s i s were t h e

th@

riuers,

c a n a l s , road networKs, r a i l r o a d s and--as commands--an

always i n P a t t o n s

a n a l y s i s of t h e t e r r a i n s s u i t a b i l i t y f o r

m e c h a n i z e d r n a n e u u e r s . (93) h l t h o u g h many o f t h e f u t u r e o p e r a t i o n s P a t t o n s s t a f f s t u d i e d a n d p l a n n e d were n e v e r e x e c u t e d , h e was a l w a y s f o r c i n g h i s s t a f f t o t h i n K a h e a d a n d plan f o r f u t u r e operations.

H i s t e c h n i q u e i n d i c a t e s t h a t h e was
linKage

a b l e t o e n v i s i o n f u t u r e t a c t i c a l b a t t l e s and t h e i r c a m p a i g n p l a n a n d rnaKe t h e f u r t h e r s t e p o f together

i n a n a p p r e c i a t i o n of

in a

l i n K i n g CarWaignS

t h e a t e r s t r a t e g y , which s u g g e s t s

h e o p e r a t e d by t h e t e n e t :

S u c c e s s . i n o p e r a t i o n a l a r t c o m e s f r o m an i n t e n s e s t u d y o f s m a l l - s c a l e maps t o e n v i s i o n t h e c o u r s e o f t h e campaign as a whole a n d its linKed b a t t l e s .

156

Neuertheless,
well

it

i s a r g u a b l e t h a t P a t t o n d i d n o t do t h i s as
H i s h a n d l i n g of t a c t i c a l b a t t l e s during t h e Nancy

as h e z h o u l d .

L o r r a i n e Carnpaign

i m p l i e s he d i d n o t see t h e b a t t l e s f o r find t h e manner

and Fletz as c o n n e c t e d i n any way. "dragged"

i n which he

1 2 t h HrmY O P O U p a c r o s s E u r o p e s u g g e s t s h e d i d n o t , s e e how h i s o p e r a t i o n s s u p p o r t e d

a l o n g w i t h many o t h e r s , E i s e n h o w e r 's t h e a t e r The f i n a l

PO

strategy. 1i g h t
is

i n t K o c h 's r e m a r K P a b o v e b r i n g t o

Koch's perception t h a t P a t t o n ' s e a r l y morning briefings of fostered "an

lnformal

staff

i n t i m a c y o f t h i n K i n g " among ~ e y embers m

i t was immensely

Patton's s t a f f .

Patton' apparently thought

i m p o r t a n t t h a t K e y members o f h i s s t a f f

s h a r e h i s v i e w o f how

t h e P l a n n i n g and e x e c u t i o n o f o p e r a t i o n s s h o u l d be conducted; hence, t h e G-2,

6-3, C h i e f o f S t a f f ,

and C h i e f o f S t a f f o f X I X

TAC w e r e a l w a y s p r e s e n t a t t h e s e

informal sessions.

Consequently,

the fact

t h a t P a t t o n was f r e q u e n t l y a b s e n t f r o m h e was f o r w a r d w i t h c o r p s a n d on s t a f f o p e r a t i o n s . h i s staff could, rmre

h i s cornmand p o s t - - b e c a u s e diuisions--had Knowing what

no d e p r e c a t i n g e f f e c t

a n d how P a t t o n t h o u g h t ,

often than not,

d o what P a t t o n w a n t e d d o n e d u r i n g o b s c u r e

s i t u a t i o n s o r when P a t t o n was o u t o f t o u c h w i t h t h e m .
In theory,

P a t t o n t h o u g h t commanders s h o u l d n e v e r r o b
i n i t i a t i u e b y o u e r - c o n t o l l i n s thern.

subordinates of

He i n s i s t e d

t h a t s u b o r d i n a t e s b e t o l d w h a t t o d o b u t n o t how t o d o t h i n g s .
To g u a r d a g a i n s t o u e r - c o n t o l ,

he t h o u g h t

"a general should

command one e c h e l o n down,

a n d Know t h e p o s i t i o n o f u n i t s t w o

- 157 -

e c h e l o n s down. " ( 9 4 )

an

a r m y g r o u p commander,

f o r example,

s h o u l d command h i s a r m i e s a n d K n O W t h e l o c a t o n 5 o f h i s armies and t h e i r c n r p s .

way

Patton thought t h i s p r inc i p e applied a l l t h e

n y c o m m a n d e r who

down t h e h i e r a r c h y o f c o m m a n d , a n d t h a t

p o s t e d on h i s own rnap l o c a t i o n s o f u n i t s t h r e e o r f o u r e c h e l o n s down w o u l d s o o n f a l l

and

i n t o t h e h a b i t of

cornrmnding t h o s e u n i t s

lose efficiency.

In practice, Patton himself

was n o t

e n t i r e l y a b l e t o a d h e r e t o h i s own p r i n c i p l e .

M a n y tirnes h e

d l r e c t e d d i u is i o n c o m m a n d e r s t o s e n d c o r n b a t c o m m a n d s o r r e g i m e n t s on s p e c i f i c m i s s i o n s .
H5

an example, t h e d e t a i l e d

T h i r d firmy f i f t e r A c t i o n R e p o r t r e c o r d s t h e f o l l o w i n g a c t i o n :

The firmy commander C P a t t o n l v e r b a l l y o r d e r e d t h e X X C o r p s t o rnove o n e r e g i r n e t i t a l c o m b a t t e a m f r o m t h e 5 t h I n f a n t r y O i v i s i o n t o f i n g e r s , t o move one i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n frorn 5 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n t o Nantes [ F r a n c e l a n d t o moue 5 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n , l e s s a t t a c h r n e n t s , f r o m s o u t h o f V i t r e t o t h e v i c i n i t y of

S e g r e . (35)

G i v e n P a t t o n ' s own p r i n c i p l e s f o r
control--mission orders--it

e x e r c i s i n g command a n d

is d i f f i c u l t t o j u s t i f y h i s t e l l i n g
Even s o , it is p o s s i b l e by P o i n t i n g

a c o r p s c o m m a n d e r t o move a b a t t a l i o n .
t o d e f e n d P a t t o n against t h e c h a r g e of out t h a t

over-control

i n t h e h i g h l y f l u i d and fast-mouins

m o b i l e warfare in

w h i c h h e was a t h i s b e s t , P a t t o n h a d a d u t y t o g i v e o n - t h e - s p o t o r d e r s when h e saw t h l n s s g o i n g a w r y o r w h e n h e saw a n o p p o r t i i n i t y t h a t dernanded

irnmed i a t e e x p l o i t a t i o n .

H i s cornrnent

t h a t o n e company of t a n K s on t h e o b j e c t i v e can c a r r y t h e day comes t o m i n d h e r e . H e o n c e rernarKed t h a t T h i r d A r m y f a c e d

15s

three enemies:

t h e Germans,

t h e weather, and t i m e . irretrieuable;

The l a s t of

these--time--is

u n f o r g i v i n g and

hence, h i s

c o n t i n u a l c o n c e r n t h a t v a l u a b l e time n o t b e w a s t e d o r t h a t f l e e t i n g o p p o r t u n i t i e s s h o u l d n o t go u n e x p l o i t e d .

Given h i s

a g g r e s s i u e p e r s o n s 1 i t y and h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e n a t u r e of combat o p e r a t i o n s ,
it

is n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t P a t t o n was u n a b l e

a t t i m e s t o a d h e r e t o h i s own g u i d a n c e c o n c e r n i n g o u e r - c o n t r o l
of subordinates.

159

RISK

I n h i s booK M e c h a n i z e d

I n f a n t r y R i c h a r d SimpKin s a y s t h a t in t h e

two f a c t o r s m i l i t a t e d a g a i n s t b o l d and s w e e p i n g maneuuer European Theater:

Bradley;

t h e broad f r o n t d o c t r i n e of

Eisenhower and

a n d t h e f u n d a m e n t a l American c o n c e p t s o f t h e v a l u e of

firepower

and t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a f i r e b a s e . However,

SimpKin g o e s on t o s a y t h a t

Cals G e n e r a l S p e i d e l , RGrnmel's C h i e f o f S t a f f , p u t s i t , P a t t o n was " t h e o n l y e l l i e d g e n e r a l w h o d a r e d exceed t h e s a f e t y l i m i t s i n t h e endeavor t o w i n a decision."<SS>

As

i n t h e c a s e o f G u d e r i a n , a n a n a l y s i s of P a t t o n ' s c o n d u c t of high

o p e r a t i o n a l a r t r e v e a l s t h a t h e e l e c t e d t o a c c e p t risK--a
degree a c c o r d i n s t o Spe i d e l --in

o r d e r t o a c h ieue o p e r a t i o n a l

d e c i s i o n . T h e r e f o r e , a n exarninat ion of P a t t o n ' s approach t o

r i s K a c c e p t a n c e a n d r is.^ r e d u c t i o n

is a p p r o p r i a t e ,

and t h e

present d i s c u s s i o n f o c u s e s on t h r e e areas i n which P a t t o n

accspted riSK: exposed f l a n K s , r e s e r v e employment, and

l o g i s t ical sustainment.

FlanKs

Patton's operations

i n Europe a l l

indicate t h a t he adhered

in h i % o p e r a t i o n s t o t h e f o l l o w i n g o p e r a t i o n a l t e n e t :

Accept r i s ~o exposed f l a n K s t o a c h i e v e o p e r a t i o n a l t d e p t h and d e c i s i o n .

166

E v i d e n c e t h a t P a t t o n o p e r a t e d b y t h i s p r i n c i p l e abounds b o t h i n h i s w r i t i n g and o p e r a t i o n s . flavor for flanKs.

It i s

instructive,

first,

t o get a

P a t t o n ' s whole a t t i t u d e about r i S K t o exposed b r i e f i n g on 31 J u l y 1944, t h e Patton

R f t e r h i s morning s t a f f

d a y b e f o r e T h i r d Army became o p e r a t i o n a l

in Europe,
of

d e l i v e r e d t h e f o l l o w i n g remarlcs on t h e :ub.ject

flanKs:

F o r g e t t h i s goddamned b u s i n e s s o f w o r r y i n g a b o u t o u r f l a n K s . W must guard o u r f l d n K S , b u t n o t t o t h e e e x t e n t t h a t we d o n ' t do a n y t h i n g e l s e . Some goddamned f o o l once s a i d t h a t f l a n K s must be secured, and s i n c e t h e n s o n s - o f - b i t c h e s a l l o v e r t h e w o r l d haue been . F l a n ~ sa r e g o i n g c r a z y g u a r d i n g t h e i r f lanlcs.. s o m e t h i n g f o r t h e enemy t o w o r r y a b o u t . N o t u s . < 9 7 >

Beneath t h e e a s i l y - i m a g i n e d remarKS,

t h e a t r i c s t h a t accompanied P a t t o n ' s

t h e r e was u n d o u b t e d l y s e r i o u s n e s s o f t h e f i r s t o r d e r .

E v e n t h o u g h t h i s s t a t e m e n t was made b e f o r e T h i r d Army became engaged i n p u r s u i t o p e r a t i o n s a c r o s s F r a n c e , t h a t P a t t o n had a v i s i o n o r it

i s probable

c o n c e p t i o n o f how f a s t - m o u i n s Included in that

if

m o b i l e o p e r a t i o n s s h o u l d be conducted. c o n c e p t i o n were exposed f l a n K s ,

b u t t o l e r a b l y expobed f l a n K s

r e a s o n a b l e p r e c a u t i o n s were t a K e n and o p e r a t i o n s were e x e c u t e d a t g r e a t speed. Patton himself,

in fact,

c i t e s o n l y two

examples o f h i s acceptance o f r i s K : t h r o u g h Avranches

in twenty-four

h i s passage o f two c o r p s and h i s d e c i s i o n t o

hours:

leave h i s army's r i g h t f l a n K

open d u r i n g h i s sweep f r o m

A v r a n c h e s t o t h e M o s e l l e R i v e r . <98> B o t h e n t a i l e d an a c c e p t a n c e of r i s K t o an e x p o s e d f l a n K , and t h e passage t h r o u g h Auranches as w e l l .

e x p o 5 e d P a t t o n ' s army t o d e s t r u c t i o n f r o m t h e a i r

161

These examples r a i s e t h e q u e s t i o n o f h i s flanKs.

how P a t t o n r e d u c e d r i S K t o

The P i S K o f b e i n g c o n c e n t r a t e d i n a n a r r o w c o r r i d o r a n d sub.ject t o a i r b o m b a r d m e n t a s o c c u r r e d w h i l e T h i r d Army was t h e C o t e n t i n Peninsula in Rusust

1944 was

breaKins o u t of unique of

in Patton's operations.

It i s a r g u a b l e t h a t d u r i n g r m s t

h i s operations and,

i n Europe h i s c o r p s and d i v i s i o n s were s p r e a d

therefore, were n o t s u b j e c t t o t h e t h r e a t or corridor. But

out too far

associated with being concentrated i n a d e f i l e a t Auranches, a single,

narrow road about f i v e m i l e s long B r i d g e and f u n n e l e d a l l t r a f f i c

c o n v e r s e d a t t h e f+Jranches

t h r o u g h t h e town and o u t t h e s o u t h e r n s i d e f o r t w o and o n e - h a l f traffic miles or so.

a distance o f
if a

P a t t o n was w o r r i e d t h a t

jam should occur w h i l e elements of

t w o arrnored and t w o l o s s e s would

i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s were f i l i n g t h r o u g h Rvranches, be t e r r i f i c , especially among t r u c K - b o r n e

infantry.

E s s e n t i a l l y , h i s p l a n t o c o p e w i t h t h i s r i S K was t w o - f o l d : ( 1 ) Keep t h i n g s m o v i n g f a s t ; your f e a r s . and

(2) do n o t taKe c o u n s e l of

R e c o g n i z i n g t h a t passage t h r o u g h Rvranches would Patton

p r o v e t o be a c r i t i c a l because high P i S K event, positioned himself traffic jam.

i n Avranches t o e n s u r e t h e r e w o u l d be no

The p a s s a g e o f

V I I I a n d XV C o r p s w i t h i n
P a t t o n says,

twenty-four

h o u r s was o n e o f t h o s e t h i n g s , b u t was.

that

t h e o r e t i c a l l y c o u l d n o t be done, because o f t h e officers a n d b, :

I t was s u c c e s s f u l

"extremely e f f e c t i v e use of t h e a c t i v e p a r t taKen on occas i o n ,

veteran 5taff

i n i t b y c o r p s and
p e r s o n a l IYi r e c t e d d

d i u i s i o n c o m m a n d e r s who,

182

traffic."C99? ingredient

Thus,

speed of

o p e r a t i o n s p r o v e d t o be t h e ~ e y i n this operation. B u t s p e e d was

in reducing risK

f a c i l i t a t e d by employing a b a t t l e wise s t a f f close c o n t r o l by s e n i o r o f f i c e r s . The German S e v e n t h Army France,

' 5

and t h r o u g h t h e

c o u n t e r a t t a c ~t o w a r d M o r t a i n , T h i r d Rrmy f r o m t h e r e s t

w i t h t h e o b j e c t of

cutting off

of

e l l i e d forces

on t h e c o n t i n e n t r a i s e s t h e f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n and m e a s u r e s t a K e n t o r e d u c e t h a t
PiSK.

o f r i s K t o flanKs Certainly speed o f

o p e r a t i o n s was one way t o r e d u c e r i s K t o

exposed f l a n K s . sufficient

I f c o r p s move f a s t e n o u g h a n d a c h i e v e enough,

depth quiCKly

i t i s t h e enemy who w i l l b e

w o r r y i n g a b o u t his- f lanKS. t h a t fast-paced initiative,

P a t t o n t h o u g h t t h i s b e c a u s e h e saw the

o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s r o b t h e enemy o f

c a u s i n g h i m t o r e a c t t o a s e r i e s of

rapidly

changing t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s . infantry leading,

He a l s o t h o u g h t t h a t when infantry

and armored d i v i s i o n s W O r K t o g e t h e r w i t h "there

is l f t t l e

r i S K

from successful

enemy

c o u n t e r a t t a c K s on t h e division

infantry

f l a n K because t h e armored

i s t h e mo%t i d e a l ueapon f o r C o u n t e r a t t a c K i n g a

counterattacK. "<10B> P a t t o n corps

is s u g g e s t i n g t h a t d e p t h i n t h e
His

i s a n o t h e r way t o r e d u c e r i % K t o e x p o s s d f l a n K s .
i n t h i s v e i n a t t h e army

thinKing

level

is reflected

i n his

concept ion f o r area.

a one-army

thrust

i n t o the FranKfurt-Kassel

It w i l l

be r e c a l l e d t h a t h i s concept c a l l e d f o r two c o r p s

t o advance a b r e a s t and a t h i r d e c h e l o n e d t o t h e r i g h t r e a r . Hence,

in P a t t o n ' s opinion r i s K t o flanKs

can b e r e d u c e d b y

advancing

in depth,

quicK1y.

R t Rvranches P a t t o n h e l d elements

163

Map 4

163a

of

XII,

XV,

and XX C o r p s

[one d i v i s i o n each) on h i s l e f t f l a n K

t o guard against

F i f t h P a n z e r A r m y ' s c o u n t e r a t t a c ~ . And

a l t h o u g h P a t t o n b e l i e v e d t h e p r e d i c t e d German a t t a c K was a bluff,

it turned out

n o t t o b e a n d XX C o r p s ' 3 5 t h D i v i s i o n b u t T h i r d Army p a s s e d t h r o u g h fluranches

became h e a v i l y e n g a g e d : without difficulty.

Patton's efforts flanK

t o reduce r i s K t o T h i r d Army's

right

along the L o i r e River while h i s forces

swept t o t h e

Meselle River

<See Map 4) s h o w s e v i d e n c e o f a m o r e First,

s o p h i s t i c a t e d approach t o r i S K r e d u c t ion. t h a t P a t t o n used t h e L o i r e R i v e r flanK. 35th Second, itself

it is notable

t o protect h i s southern Patton l e f t

a l t h o u g h h e was r e l u c t a n t t o d o s o , D i v i s i o n t o cover

Infantry

h i s a r m y ' s ClanK between V i t r y

and C h a l o n s . German f o r c e s

P a t t o n d i d n o t b e l i e v e t h e r e were any s i g n i f i c a n t south o f the Loire River, b u t he c o m p l i e d w i t h guard f o r his

B r a d l e : ? ' ~o r d e r t o e m p l o y a d i v i s i o n a s f l a n K army.<l01> In f a c t , LeMans t o N a n c y , infantry howeuer,

P a t t o n ' s f l a n K was e x p o s e d f r o m Hence, an

France,

some 4 0 0 K i l o m e t e r s .

d v i r i o n was h a r d l y a d e q u a t e t o c o v e r anK i n any e u e n t .

T h i r d Army's

southern f efforts

P a t t o n supplemented h i s p r o t e c t i o n g r o u p s a l o n g t h e L o i r e and French g u e r r i l l a forces.

F1

by employing h i s cavalry groups of Maquis,

maKing use o f

t h i r d and p e r h a p s t h e most s i g n i f i c a n t t e c h n i q u e P a t t o n u s e d t o p r o t e c t h i 2 f l a n K s was t o r e l y h e a v i l y o n X I X TeC.

TF1C s q u a d r o n s p e r f o r m e d d e e p

Several

XlX

i n t e r d i c t i a n a g a i n s t Key b r i d g e s howeuer, were t h e a i r south

and r a i l

lines.

Of

more

importance,

r e c o n n a i s z a n c e and a i r

p h o t o g r a p h y m i s s i o n s X I X TAC f l e w

164

of

the Loire River

i n s u p p o r t o f T h i r d Army.

P a t t o n ' s G-2

S e c t i o n and X I X TAC worKed o u t b o t h a n a i r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e and r o a d and r a i l c u t t i n g p l a n t h e M o s e l l e . < l 0 2 > It i n s u p p o r t of T h i r d A r m y ' s sweep t o

i s n o w o n d e r P a t t o n was n o t t e r r i b l y h i s G-2 was t e l l i n g h i m t h a t

in retreat from

w o r r i e d about h i t army's f l a n K s : t h e German 6 4 t h C o r p s s o u t h o f

t h e L o i r e was

S e v e n t h A r m y ' s a d v a n c e UP t h e Rhone V a l l e y a n d c o u l d n o t a f f e c t
Th i r d Arrny
' 5

f 1 anK

operat ional l y

. The

ev i d e n c e

then,

indicates

that

i n a d d i t i o n t o s p e e d o f o p e r a t i o n s and d e p t h ,

Patton

thought that r i s K t o flanKs cavalr:,

c o u l d be minirnized by employing air as w e l l

g r o u p s and b y maKing e x t e n s i v e use o f

r e c o n n a i s s a n c e and deep natural

i n t e r d i c t i o n operat ions,

as

t e r r a i n o b s t a c l e s such as r i v e r l i n e s .

Reserves

P a t t o n ' s v i e w s on t h e a c c e p t a n c e o f r i s K

i n t h e employment

o f o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s is m o r e d i f f i c u l t
handling of flanKs. This

t o assess than h i s l i t t l e

i s so because he says v e r y

a b o u t how h e e n v i s i o n e d t h e e r n p l o y m e n t o f r e s e r u e s .

A
the

c o n v i n c i n g c a s e c a n b e made t h a t h e d i d n o t t h i n K much o f idea of r e t a i n i n g an o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r u e .

A c o u p l e o f examples

illustrate Patton's

i n c l i n a t i o n e i t h e r t o r e t a i n no r e s e r v e o r D u r i n g X X a n d X I 1 C o r p s ' 21 flugust France, Patton committed

t o r e t a i n a v e r y s m a l l one. a t t a c K s on Melun, h i s entire force

Monteresy and Sens,

w i t h o u t r e t a i n i n g any r e s e r v e . < l 0 3 > P a t t o n

r e c a l l s t h i s a c t i o n b e c a u z e he remembers n o t r e t a i n i n g a

165

r e z . e r u e a n d a g a i n h a d t o r e s i s t t h e u r g e t o taKe c o u n s e l o f h i s

fears.
A second example.

revealing

in

i t s own w a y ,

occurred j u s t

a f t e r t h e b r e a K o u t t h r o u g h f l u r a n c h e s . Because o f t h e s p e e d o f movement o f T h i r d A r m y a n d t h e d i v e r g i n g a t t a c K s i t s c o r p s were

maKing a s t h e y d e b o u c h e d f r o m t h e f l v r a n c h e s a r e a , a l a r g e h o l e i n t h e FImerIcan l i n e s d e v e l o p e d b e t w e e n S t . H i l a i r e a n d

M a v e n n e , F r a n c e . T h e n a s e c o n d g a p o p e n e d U P west o f f l l e n c o n ,
a n d P a t t o n P e m a r K S t h a t a l l h e c o u l d d o was t o a s s e m b l e t h e 8 t h A r m o r e d D i u i s i o n a t F o u g \ e r e s t o f i l l t h i s s e c o n d g a p . < 1 8 4 > What
is s i g n i f i c a n t

is P a t t o n ' s a d m i s s i o n t h a t h e had t o a s s e m b l e a i m p l i e s h e h a d no s u c h u n i t earmarKed

d i v i s i o n , which c l e a r l y

f o r j u s t such a contingency. b e e n a b l e t o move s t r a i g h t

an

i d e n t i f i e d r e s e r v e would h a v e

into t h e gap.
X I 1 C o r p s became

D u r i n g t h e B u l g e C a m p a i g n when MG Eddy o f

concerned about an a t t a C K only army reserve--a

i n t o h i s f l a n K , P a t t o n s e n t Eddy h i s

company of

t a n K d e s t r o y e r s ! < l m > The

p i c t u r e t h a t e m e r g e s is o n e o f P a t t o n h a b i t u a l l y o p e r a t i n g w i t h

a small r e s e r v e o r without one a t a l l . T h e r e f o r e , a t e n e t of

1 Patton's

was:

Accept t h e o p e r a t i o n a l P l S K e n t a i l e d b y a small r e s e r v e t o g e t maximum c o m b a t p o w e r f o r w a r d .

Evidence t h a t Patton thought t h i s p r i n c i p l e appl led o p e r a t i o n a l l y 1 ies i n h i s a n g e r a t SHflEF's d e c i s i o n t o r e t a i n a

reserve during t h e Bulge Campaign. Claiming t h a t at t h a t period

o f t h e war n o r e s e r v e was n e e d e d , P a t t o n
"attaCKS

insisted that violent

everywhere w i t h e v e r y t h i n g " w i t h a l l a v a i l a b l e f o r c e s

166

would

l e a d t o s u c c e s s . < l 0 6 ~To K e e p h i g h e r h e a d q u a r t e r s f r o m

t a K i n g d i v i s i o n s f r o m h i m f o r an7 r e a s o n , P a t t o n and h i s s t a f f
e x h o r t e d c o r p s commander:
engaged.

to get a l l their units decisively

HOWeUer

t h i s should not be s u r p r i s i n g

, f o r P a t t o n 's

' J e r 7 c o n c e p t i o n o f O p e r a t i o n a l a r t was t h a t
s e r i e s of balance.

i t consisted o f a

o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n s d e s i g n e d t o Keep t h e enemy o f f

N t t h e corps level t h i s meant penetrating t h e enemy's

i n f a n t r y a n d t h e n e x p l o i t i n g w i t h armor.

line with the

In a

s e n s e , a n a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n was a r e s e r v e u n i t t h e purpose of protecting t h e

in t h e c o r p s f o r

infantry against a counterattacK

and e x p l o i t i n g a t a c t i c a l s u c c e s s .

In order t o operate in t h a t

f a s h i o n , P a t t o n had t o s p r e a d h i s armored d i v i s i o n s around, r e t a i n i n g nothing a t t h e army l e v e l f o r e x p l o i t a t i o n o r CounterattacK.

It

is p o s s i b l e t o s e e i n P a t t u n ' s d e c i s i o n n o t

t o r e t a i n a r e s e r v e a t a r m y l e v e l a w i l l i n g n e s s t o a c c e p t an
e l e v a t e d o p e r a t i o n a l risK w h i l e lowering t h e riSK a t t h e

t a c t i c a l l e v e l . Hence, P a t t o n ' s d i s p e r s e d armor, w h i c h c o u l d h a v e p r o v i d e d h i m w i t h a n a r m y l e v e l r e s e r u e , was e m p l o y e d tactically

p l a c i n g most of T h i r d Nrmy

'5

a r m o r e d combat power

forward and r e d u c i n g t a c t i c a l r i s K .

Patton compensated f o r t h e

I n c r e a s e d o p e r a t i o n a l risK b y e m p l o y i n g a i r and c a v a l r y a s s e t s
t o s u r v e y a n d g u a r d h i s a r m y ' s f l a n K S . H i s a p p r o a c h t o risK r e d u c t i o n p l a c e d h e a v y r e l l a n c e on h i s a b i l i t y t o f l e x i b l y a s s e m b l e a r e s e r v e or f l a n K p r o t e c t i o n e l e m e n t
air reconnaissance
if

long-range

i n d i c a t e d s u c h a u n i t were n e e d e d l h e

c o u n t e d on s u c h r e c o n n a i s s a n c e t o prov i d e him w i t h t h e c r i t i c a l

t i m e h e n e e d e d t o taKe d e f e n s i v e m e a s u r e s .

167

Logistical

Sustainment

LiKe Heinz Guderian,

G e o r g e P a t t o n d i d n o t s p e n d much o f

h i s t irne c o n s i d e r i n 9 l o g i s t i c a l m a t t e r s . And 1 iKe G u d e r i a n , P a t t o n ' i . l o g i s t i c a l n e g l e c t came t o h a u n t h i m . guess t h i s t o be t h e case, f o r P a t t o n SPOKC

One would n e v e r
i n glowing

only

t e r m s a b o u t h i s own l o g i s t i c a l a r r a n g e m e n t s .
s y s t e m of
administration

He thought t h e

i n T h i r d A r m y , f o r e x a m p l e , was

e x c e l l e n t . The s y s t e r n t h a t a l l o w e d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e m a t t e r s t o

p a s s f r o m a r m y t o d i v i s i o n , b y p a s s i n g c o r p s , was t h e w a y t o d o
b u s i n e s s s i n c e t h e c o r p s was a t a c t i c a l unit.

He s a y s t h a t
in

"Cblecause o f t h i s arrangement w had p e r f e c t f a c i l i t y e

s h i f t i n g diuir.ions without l o s i n g a moment's t i m e .

We never had
in

t o r e g r o u p , w h i c h s e e m e d t o b e t h e c h i e f f o r m o f arnusernent
t h e B r i t i s h armies

."< 107)

Becau2.e l o g i s t i c s a n d r e p l a c e m e n t s

f l o w e d f r o m t h e Cummun i c a t i o n s Z o n e

(COFIMZ) t h r o u g h f i e l d
in

armies t o d i v i s i o n s , f i e l d armies had a l a r g e r o l e t o p l a y l ogi st i c al sustainment.

C a m p a i g n T h i r d firm!)

In f a c t , b y t h e time o f

the Lorraine

had two q u a r t e r m a s t e r g r o u p s t o t a l 1 i n g

s i x t y c o m p a n i e s a n d two o r d n a n c e g r o u p s w i t h e l e v e n b a t t a l i o n s

between t h e m t o c a r r y o u t
However,

its l o g i s t i c a l responsibil ities.<lEI8>

i n s p i t e o f P a t t o n ' s s m u g PemarK a b o u t B r i t i s h
is 1 i t t l e ev i d e n c e t h a t s h o w s P a t t o n

regroupment, there

p e r s o n a l l y h a d a f irrn u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n

168

t h e a t t a i n m e n t of capabil itles, relationship.

o p e r a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e s and l o g i s t i c a l investigating this i n d i c a t e s he l e f t most

o r s p e n t much t i m e

The e v i d e n c e a v a i l a b l e i n T h i r d firmy

l o g i s t i c a l matters

to his logisticians. 1 i t t l e w r i t t e n g u i d a n c e on h e s a i d was c o n f i n e d t o b r o a d

P a t t o n g a v e h i s commanders l o g l s t i c a l matters. Most o f what

g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s such a s : equally," and

" s u p p l y r e s t s on g i v e and t a K e

" s u p p l y u n i t s must a n t i c i p a t e t h r o u g h

r e c o n n a i s s a n c e t h e needs o f users and g e t s u p p l i e s u p b e f o r e t h e y a r e c a l l e d f o r . " < l 0 9 > H e r e P a t t o n i s d i s p l a y i n g a measure of s o p h i s t i c a t i o n because a l t h o u g h d o c t r i n a l l y t h e Flmerican s y s t e m i n W o r l d War suggesting a

logistical

I 1 was a " d e m a n d " s y s t e m , P a t t o n

The "demand" s y s t e m i n

is a l m o s t

"push" system.

p l a c e w h e n h e b e g a n h i s sweep a c r o s s F r a n c e was a b l e t o s u p p l y h i s army w i t h s u f f i c i e n t i n i t i a l phases o f supply fuel, ammunition, and p e r s o n n e l

in the

operations.

Fuel,

o f course,

was t h e c l a s s o f

i n g r e a t e s t demand as T h i r d firrw

swept toward t h e

Moselle River.

To Keep h i s a r m y a d e q u a t e l y s u p p l i e d d u r i n g operations, P a t t o n r e l i e d m a i n l y o n 2-1/2 ton

these fast-moving
trUCKS.

P a t t o n c l a i m s t h a t t h e s u c c e s s e s o f T h i r d Army r e s t e d equipment. He s a y s :

l a r g e l y on two p i e c e s o f

The war not its

a n d t h e 2-1/2 t o n t r u c K d i d m o r e t o w i n t h i s t h a n a n y o t h e r e q u i p m e n t we h a d . T h i r d % y m could have e x e c u t e d i t s h i s t o r y - m a K i n g sweeps and w i n g r e a t v i c t o r i e s w i t h o u t t h a t p l a n e and t P U C K . < 1 1 0 >

C-47

There

i s e v i d e n c e t h a t P a t t o n made g r e a t u s e o f

both the trucK

a n d t h e p l a n e t o Keep h i s a r m y s u p p l i e d . airplane
is.,

H i s use o f t h e illustrate

perhaps,

ouerstated,

b u t a few examples

169

his point. T h i r d FlrmY f i r s t 1 3 4 4 when 77 t o n s o f France, August made u s e o f a i r r e s u p p l y o n 21 A u g u s t i n t o t h e LeMans, From 21

r a t i o n s were f l o w n

a r e a a n d 5 1 wounded s o l d i e r s w e r e f l o w n o u t . on, T r o o p C a r r i e r Command ITCC),

w h i c h f l e w t h e C-47

missions

i n support of

P a t t o n ' s army,

made

it a practice t o

establish airstrips effect resupply.

immediately behind forward b a t t l e 1 ines t o

TCC h a d d e l i v e r e d 500 t o n s o f

6:) 25 A u g u s t ,

supplies, flew

e m p l o y i n g 207 C - 4 7 a i r c r a f t . 100,000 g a l l o n s of after fuel

I n o n e d a y a l o n e TCC
vehicles

i n over

t o Keep P a t t o n ' s

running.<lll> Later, was a t t h e f a r d e l i v e r what About t h a t flying end o f

T h i r d Army h a d c r o s s e d t h e R h i n e a n d tether, TCC was a b l e t o

i t s logistical

amounted t o emergency f u e l

r a t i o n s t o T h i r d Army.
i t n o t been f o r

a c t i o n P a t t o n says t h a t had

TCC

planes

i n t o t h e Lirnburg [Germany1 a i r p o r t a t t h e r a t e o f plane containing

60 a i r c r a f t a n h o u r - - e a c h cans--Third

115 f i u e - g a l l o n

Army w o u l d h a v e r u n o u t o f

gasoline.<ll2> Colonel

R o b e r t F l l l e n maKes a much s t r o n g e r s t a t e m e n t a b o u t t h e r o l e o f a i r resupply t h a t t h e war Spring o f

i n t h e European Theater of

Operations.

He c o n t e n d s in the

i n Europe c o u l d n o t have been concluded

1 3 4 5 had i t n o t b e e n

for TCC's a i r r e s u p p l y e f f o r t s .

He s a y s t h a t t h e d a y a f t e r

t h e 4 t h Flrmored D i v i s i o n a t t a c K e d
for

o u t o f t h e Oppenheim b r i d g e h e a d , began d e l i v e r i n g e s s e n t i a l M a r c h C-47s

example,

TCC c a r r i e r s

s u p p l i e s t o advanced u n i t s . gallons o f gasoline; gallons.

On 2 3

u n l o a d e d 435,000

t h r e e days flew
is

l a t e r TCC d e l i v e r e d 5 2 6 , 0 0 0 out over 13,000

O n r e t u r n t r i p s C-47s

c a s u a l t i e s between

1-8 May

1 9 4 5 . < 1 1 3 > What

170

i n t e r e s t i n g a b o u t t h e s e comments h a d t o maKe g o t awa!, i n c r e a s i n g use of

i s that

it appears that

Patton

a i r r e s u p p l y t h e f a r t h e r h i s army And t h i s
i s so b e c a u s e

f r o m t h e Norrnandy b e a c h h e a d .

Patton's tactical

and o p e r a t i o n a l pace 9 U i C K l Y o u t s t r i p p e d h i s Consequently, he a c c e p t e d l o g i s t i c a l

logistical capabilities.
r i S K

which had p o t e n t i a l l y d i s a s t r o u s r e s u l t s . The g r e a t b u l K o f T h i r d R r m y ' s l o g i s t i c s was t r a n s p o r t e d

n o t b y a i r b u t b y 2-1./2 Express are f a m i l i a r ,

ton trUCK.

S t o r i e s a b o u t t h e Red B a l l at
i t s peaK t h e Red

and

it i s t r u e that

B a l l h a d some 6000 t r u c K s o p e r a t i n g d a y a n d n i g h t a n d p e r f o r m e d monumental l o g i s t i c a l f e a t s . e v e n 6000

trUCKS

B u t as P a t t o n l e a r n e d ,

i n t h e end to

o p e r a t i n g n i g h t and day were n o t s u f f i c i e n t

Keep h i s a n d ' t h e o t h e r f i e l d r a t e of

armies adequately suppl ied a t h i s Dur i n g p u r s u i t o p e r a t i o n s a f t e r

gal Ions

advance a c r o s s Europe.

t h e breaKout a t Ruranches, o f g a s o l i n e a day, c o n s u m e d 300,000

T h i r d Army c o n s u m e d 350,000

and t h e t r u c K s o f

t h e Red B a l l t h e m s e l u e s

g a l l o n s a day.

The p r o v i n c e o f L o r r a i n e l i e s a

a b o u t 800 K i l o m e t e r s o u e r l a n d f r o m t h e Normandy b e a c h h e a d ,

f a c t t h a t n e l t h e r SHAEF's n o r P a t t o n ' s l o g i s t i c i a n s w e r e a b l e t o change, b u t w h i c h had more t o say a b o u t t h e c o n d u c t o f For although there

o p e r a t i o n s t h a n P a t t o n was w i l l i n g t o a d m i t . were s u f f i c i e n t StocKs o f g a s o l i n e t h e r e were

i n t h e Normandy b e a c h h e a d ,

i n a d e q u a t e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n a s s e t s t o moue t h a t when P a t t o n ' s August lead units a

gasoline t o u s e r s . < l l 4 > Consequently, finally came t o a h a l t a t t h e e n d o f

1344 b e c a u s e o f
two

lacK o f f u e l ,

o n l y n i n e German i n f a n t r y

battalions,

artillery battalions,

and t e n tanKS were d e f e n d i n g i n L O r r a i n e .

171

BY t h e t i m e e n o u g h g a s o l i n e a r r i v e d t o c o n t i n u e h i s o f f e n s i v e
o n 5 S e p t e m b e r , G e r m a n u n i t s h a d r e i n f o r c e d L o r r a i n e a n d were prepared t o put up a stubborn defense.<ll5> P a t t o n ' s violation
of

l o g i ~ t i c a lp r i n c i p l e s c a u g h t U P w i t h h i m i n L o r r a i n e , f o r tactical p r i n c i p l e s , t h e e f f e c t of is c u m u l a t i u e

u n l i K e t h e v i o l a t i o n of

neglecting l o g i s t i c a l matters

in nature.

< 116:

In a n e f f o r t t o a l l e v i a t e h i s g a s o l i n e s h o r t a g e , P a t t o n a t v a r i o u s times used c a p t u r e d g a s o l i n e o r hiJacKed g a s o l i n e f r o m o t h e r a l l i e d armies, a n d r e l i e d o n a i r P ~ S U P P ~oY g a s o l i n e , f n o n e o f w h i c h u l t i m a t e l y s o l v e d t h e p r o b l e m . He a l s o s w i t c h e d more a n d more t r u c K s i n h i s army f r o m a m m u n i t i o n t r a n s p o r t a t i o n t o gasoline transportation. F l l t h o u g h t h i s move s o m e w h a t

improved t h e g a s o l i n e d e f i c i t

in t h e short run,

i t had o t h e r

deleterious effects in t h e long run.

Switching transportation

a s s e t s t o t h e tasK of

f u e l r e s u p p l y caused an acute s h o r t a g e of

h e a u v c a l i b e r a r t i l l e r y ammunition and p r e c l u d e d t h e b u i l d i n g
o f s t o c ~ so f C l a s s V a l t h o u g h t h e a m m u n i t i o n was

a u a i l a b l e . < l l 7 > To h e l p a l l e v i a t e s u c h s h o r t a g e s P a t t o n r e s o r t e d t o r a t i o n i n g d u r i n g t h e L o r r a i n e Campaign. Third Arrw

was so s h o r t o f

l a r g e c a l i b e r a r t i l l e r y ammunition t h a t tanKs In a d d i t i o n ,

a n d t a n K d e s t r o y e r s were s u r v e y e d i n a s a r t i l l e r y . T h i r d A r m y made u s e o f

c a p t u r e d G e r m a n a m m u n i t i o n . One X X C o r p s

TOT was f i r e d w i t h c a p t u r e d G e r m a n 1 0 5 - m m h o w i t z e r , R u s s i a n m a d e 7 6 . 2 mm g u n s , F r e n c h
155-mm

h o w i t z e r s , and German 88-mm

anti-tanK
Corps

guns;

88% o f

t h e a r t i l l e r y a m m u n i t i o n e x p e n d e d b y XX
1944 was G e r m a n . < l l B > T h e

i n t h e l a s t weeK o f O c t o b e r

clear p o i n t of

t h e s e f a c t s is t h a t P a t t o n s e e m e d t o b e o n l y

172

diml!)

a w a r e t h a t b u r n i n g UP g a s o l i n e r e s e r v e s t o Keep h i s a r m y

m o v i n g a n d t h e n n e g l e c t i n g a m m u n i t i o n StoCKS u l t i m a t e l y h a v e t h e i r curnulat i u e e f f e c t s on o p e r a t I o n a l c a p a b i l i t y . T h i r d A r m y was f o r c e d Finally,

t o s h i f t t o railroads f o r transportation

a n d l o c a l r e q u i s i t i o n f o r r e s u p p l y b e c a u s e t h e Red B a l l E x p r e s s c o u l d n o t Keep UP w i t h h i s a r m y . < l l S j P a t t o n a l m o s t r e l i s h e s t e l l i n g t h e s t o r y a b o u t how h i s c o r p s commanders l o c a t ion of inuariably got i n t o heated arguments over t h e The s u b j e c t o f those

corps boundaries.

< 120)

d i s c u s s i o n s was a l w a y s t h e a s s i g n m e n t o f r o a d n e t s w i t h i n t h e army z o n e o f a c t i o n . E a c h c o r p s commander w a n t e d t o maKe s u r e i t needed t o e n s u r e h i s c o r p s c o u l d Similarly, P a t t o n i m p l i e s t h a t army

h i s corps got the road nets be l o g i s t i c a l l y s u p p o r t e d . b o u n d a r i e s were d e t e r m i n e d

i n g r e a t p a r t on t h e b a s i s o f m a j o r

r o a d a n d r a i l n e t s . < l 2 1 > The s p e e d w i t h w h i c h F r e n c h r a i l r o a d s w e r e r e p a i r e d a n d made o p e r a t i o n a l h e l p e d a l l a u i a t e T h i r d Army's logistical shortages. Fortunately f o r Patton, the

railroads and were

i n c e n t r a l a n d e a s t e r n F r a n c e w e r e n o t b a d l y damaged left i n t a c t b y t h e r e t r e a t i n g Germans. Additionally,

d u r i n g October

1944 T h i r d R r m y l o g i s t i c a l u n i t s w e r e a b l e t o

e s t a b l i s h s u p p o r t i n g r a i l h e a d s as f a r f o r w a r d a s Nancy, F r a n c e . < l 2 2 > By A p r i l 1945, the bulK o f Third Army's gasoline

was t r a n s p o r t e d b y r a i l r o a d t a n K c a r s f r o m a c o n t i n e n t a l
p ipel ine ending a t

Th i o n u 11 l e , F r a n c e ,

t o Mainr, i n t o tanK

Germany,
trUCKS

where

i t was pumped a c r o s s t h e R h i n e R i v e r

and

t r a n s p o r t e d t o f o r w a r d tin i t s .
Rn examinat ion of

< 123>

P a t t o n ' s l o g i s t i c a l operations suggests

173

t h a t he n e g l e c t e d t h i s v i t a l a s p e c t o f o p e r a t i o n a l a r t and b r o u g h t o n h i s command n o t o n l y a g r e a t d e a l o f a l s o a r e d u c e d o p e r a t i o n a l c a p a b il i t y . they ran out o f fuel, anguish but

D r i v i n g h i s tanKs u n t i l and

n e g l e c t i n g ammunition StocKs,

d i v e r t i n g t r a n s p o r t a t i o n a s s e t s a l l had t h e i r c u m u l a t i v e effects.

In defense

of Patton,

i t can be s a i d t h a t he t r i e d by p r e s s i n g

d e s p e r a t e l y t o d e f e a t enemy f o r c e s o p e r a t i o n a l l y h i s o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s t o and b e y o n d t h e i r s u p p o r t a b l e means.

logistically

P a t t o n d i d t h i s because he be1 ieued t h a t t o

" f i l l t h e u n f o r g i u i n g m i n u t e w i t h s i x t y seconds w o r t h of
distance r u n " would reflection, of Lorraine,
it

i n t h e l o n g r u n save s o l d i e r s '

lives.

On

is a b i t t e r

irony that t o capture the province air

T h i r d A r m y t o o K t h r e e m o n t h s t o move 4 0 - 6 0 casualties, one-third of the total

m i l e s a n d c o s t 50,000

c a s u a l t i e s T h i r d Army s u f f e r e d OPerat i o n s .

i n t h e whole European Theater of

< 124>

Conclusions

O e s p i t e w h a t has j u s t b e e n s a i d a b o u t P a t t o n ' s assessment and h i s a t t e m p t s t o reduce r i s K ,

risK

Patton can r i g h t l y

b e a c c l a i m e d a n a b l e p r a c t i t i o n e r o f t h e o p e r a t i o n a l a r t . He

was c l e a r l y a n a g g r e s s i v e commander who t h o u g h t t h a t t h e w h o l e

of O D e r a t i o n a l a r t was t h e o f f e n s i v e . Consequently, he e x h o r t e d

a l l h i s commanders t o a t t a C K a l l t h e t i m e w i t h a l l u n i t s u n d e r command t o t h r o w t h e enemy o f f b a l a n c e a n d Keep h i m t h e r e u n t i l

174

attaCKing u n i t s a c h i e v e o p e r a t i o n a l d e p t h and e n v e l o p t h e e n e m y . He a p p e a r e d w i l l i n g t o d i v e s t h i m s e l f operational reserve of any s i z a b l e

in o r d e r t o g e t maximum combat power level, thereby trading off tactical for s p e e d a n d t imel i n e s s o f o p e r a t i o n s f e a t u r e s of t h e s u c c e s s f u l is m e a s u r e d o n l y

forward at t h e t a c t i c a l operational
P

i5K.

For h i m ,

were t h e a b s o l u t e l y e s s e n t i a l o p e r a t i o n a l commander.

If succese

i n terms of

tactical

o r operational

outcomes, w i t h o u t c o n s i d e r a t ion of

c o s t s incurred t o achieve t h o s e outcomes, t h e n George P a t t o n

was c l e a r l y a s u c c e s s . Y e t ,
conditional

it

t5 d o u b t f u l

t h a t t h e preceding

is t r u e , and an a c c u r a t e e v a l u a t i o n o f P a t t o n a s a o p e r a t i o n a l a r t must t u r n , a t l e a s t
i n waging war.

p r a c t i t i o n e r of

i n p a r t , on

t h e q u e s t ion of h i s means

175

ENDNOTES

Sons,

1 E d i t o r s o f firmy T i m e s , 1 9 6 7 > , P . 39.

Warrior

(New 'YorK:

G.P.

Putnam's

2 M a r t i n B l u m e n s o n , The P a t t o n P a p e r s , V o l . 1 H o u g h t o n M i f f 1 i n Company, 1 9 7 2 ) , P P . 8 6 0 - 8 6 1 .
3 The P a t t o n P a p e r s ,
4 The P a t t o n P a p e r s ,
5 Jhe

(Boston:

Vol.1,
Vol.1,

P.
P.

861.
960. 953-960.

P a t t o n Papers,

Vol.1,

PP.

6 K e n t G r e e n f i e l d , R. P a l m e r , B. W i l e y , U n i t e d S t a t e s firmy i n W o r l d War I!: The O r g a n i z a t i o n o f G r o u n d Combat U.S. flrmv H i s t o r i c a l D i u i s i o n , 1 9 4 7 1 , T r o o p s ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: p . 307.

7 C h r i s t o p h e r R. G a b e l , T h e L o r r a i n e C a m p a i g n : fln O v e r u i e w , S e p t e m b e r - D e c e m b e r 1944 ( F o r t L e a u e n w o r t h , K a n s a s : Combat S t u d i e s I n s t i t u t e , U . S . firmy Command a n d G e n e r a l S t a f f as The L o r r a i n e C a m p a i g n . C o l l e g e , 1385), p.13. H e r e a f t e r ~ i t e d

8 K.
P.

Greenfield,

The O r g a n i z a t i o n o f G r o u n d Combat T r o o p s .

321.
9 K. G r e e n f i e l d , 324-326.

The O r g a n i z a t i o n o f G r o u n d Combat T r o o p s ,

pp.

I 0 The P a t t o n P a p e r s ,

Vol.1,

P.

758.

1 1 G e o r g e S. P a t t o n , Jr., W r Fls I Knew a H o u g h t o n M i f f l i n Company, 1 9 4 7 ) , P . 337.

It ( B o s t o n :

12 G e o r g e 5 . P a t t o n , J r . , " L e t t e r o f I n s t r u c t i o n No .3!' HQ, T h i r d U.S.Army, d a t e d 20 May 1 9 4 4 , p . 1 . H e r e a f t e r c i t e d a s L O 1

N0.3.

13 L O 1 No.3,

p.7.

14 L O 1 No.3,

p.3.

15 The P a t t o n P a p e r s , 16 L O 1 N o . 3 ,
17 L O 1 N o . 3 ,
p.2.
p.4.

Vol.1,

PP.

833-834.

I76

1 8 G e o r g e S . P a t t o n , J r . , " T a c t i c a l Use o f S e p a r a t e TanK B a t t a l i o n s , " T h i r d Army L e t t e r d a t e d 15 A p r i l 1 9 4 4 , p . 1 . 1 9 LO1 No.3, p.6.

p.1.

20 L O 1 No.3,

2 1 U.S. D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e Army F i e l d M a n u a l 1 0 0 - 5 , S e r v i c e R e g u l a t i o n s : O p e r a t i o n s ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: U.S. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1941), pp.3-4.

Fielj

22 R o b e r t A l l e n ,
Inc., 19471, p.238. Forward,

LUCKY Forward

(New

YOPK:

Vanguard

Press,

23 LUCK:,

p.263.
P . 167.

24 LUCKY Forward,

25 H.M. C o l e , U.S.flrmv i n W o r l d War 1 1 : The L o r r a i n e C a m p a i g n ( W a s h i n g t o n ,D.C. : H i s t o r i c a l D i u i s i o n , D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e A r m y , 1950), p p . 3 8 0 - 3 9 6 . See a l s o L o r r a i n e O u e r u i e w , p . 2 5 .

26 War A s

I Knew It, p . 105.

P . 106.

27 L U C K Y F o r w a r d ,
22 F a r As

I Knew I t , p . 9 6 .
pp.240-241. p.11. p.10. p.14.

29 L U C K Y F o r w a r d ,

30 The L o r r a i n e C a m p a i g n ,

3 1 The L o r r a i n e C a m p a i g n ,

32 The L o r r a i n e C a m p a i g n ,

33 War As

I Knew I t , p . 2 7 1 .
HQ, T h i r d U.S.Army,

34 A f t e r H c t i o n R e p o r t , 1 9 4 4 - 9 May 1 9 4 5 , P . 16.

1 flugust

35 p f t e r

Action Report,

HQ,

T h i r d U.S.Army,

P.31.
YOPK:

36 H a r r y H. Semrnes, Appleton-Century-Crofts,

P o r t r a i t o f P a t t o n (New Inc., 1955), p.197. p.33.

37 The L o r r a i n e C a r w a i g n ,
38 L O 1 N o . 2 , p.3.

177

39 P o r t r a i t o f P a t t o n ,

p.163.

4 0 War A s

I Knew I t , p p . 5 8 - 6 0 .
P P .296-297.

41 LUCKY Forward, 42 L O 1 No.3, 4 3 War A s 4 4 War A s

45 War
p.5.

I Knew

It, pp.136-140.

I Knew I t , p p . 1 2 9 - 1 3 0 .
I h e w
I t , p.5.

As

4 6 War As
47 War
As

I Knew I t , p . 1 2 7 . I Knew
It, p.232.

4 8 B e a t r i c e 6. P a t t o n , (Nou-Oec 1 9 5 2 1 , P . I I . 4 9 '"A S o l d i e r ' s

" A S o l d i e r ' s Reading,''

in

Reading,"

p.11.

50 P o r t r a i t o f P a t t o n ,

pp.170-17 pp.170-17

.
.

51 P o r t r a i t o f
52 W a r

Patton,

6s

I Knew
p.3.

I t , P . 123.

53 L I O
54 War

r.io.2,

As As

I Knew

It, P . 181.

55 War

I Knew I t , p . 3 6 4 . I Knew I t ,
P

56 War A s

.364.
V o l .2,
P .523.

57 The P a t t o n P a p e r s ,

58 War
59 W a r

As
As

I Knew I t , p . 3 2 3 .
I Knew

I t , P .93.
p.30.

60 L U C K ?

Forward,

6 1 LtlCKy F o r u a r d ,

p.30. (New Y0i-K:

62 H. Essame, P a t t o n : A S t u d y i n Command C h a r l e s S c r i b n e r ' s Sons, 1974), pp.153-154.

63 C h a r l e s 8. M a c O o n a l d , A T i m e f o r T r u m p e t s W i l I i a r n M o r r o w a n d Company, I n c . , 1 9 8 5 ) , p .599.

(New

YorK:

17s

64 P a t t o n :

A Study

i n Command,
p.337.

p.208.

p.242.

65 L U C K Y F o r w a r d ,
66 P o r t r a i t o f

Patton,

67 L O 1
63 War

No.1, p . 1 .

As
I Knew

It, p.207.

69 War A s
70 War

I Knew I Knew

I t , p.207.

It, p.94.

As

7 1 L O 1 No.1,

p.2.

p.2.

7 2 LO1 No.1,
73 War A s
7 4 War As

I Knew

I t , p.339.

I Knew I t , p . 3 3 3 .

Vo1.2,
p.523.

75 The P a t t o n P a p e r s ,
76 War

As

I Knew

I t , P .327.
p.218.

77 P o r t r a i t o f P a t t o n ,

78 War A s

I Knew

I t , p.98.

P .47.

79 L U C K Y F o r w a r d ,

30 War

As

I Knew

It, p.149.

p.68.

P .68.

81 LUCKY Forward, 32 L U C K Y F o r w a r d ,

83 O s c a r W. K o c h , G - 2 : Intelligence f o r Patton
( P h i l a d e l p h i a : W h i t m o r e P u b 1 i s h i n g Company, 1 9 7 1 1 , p . 5 8 .
84 G - 2 :

Intelligence for

Patton,

p.140. pp.45-46. pp.80-84. p.110.

85 G - 2 :
86 6-2: 37 G - 2 :

Intelligence f o r Patton, Intelligence for Patton, Intelligence f o r Patton,

p.68.

33 L U C K Y F o r w a r d ,

179

83 War As

I Knew

It, p.39.

90 WarraCK W a l l a c e , " R e p o r t o n f l s s i s n m e n t w i t h T h i r d U n i t e d S t a t e s Army, 15 A u g u s t - 1 8 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 4 , " NFlRS R e c o r d s G r o u p # Nb.13-457-81-12 (Washington, D.C.: National flrchiues R e c o r d S e c t i o n > , PP - 2 - 4 .
9 1 G-2: Intrllisence for As Patton, 7.148.

32 War
93 G - 2 : 34 War

I Knew

It, p.339.

Intelligence for As

Patton,

p.105.

I Knew I t ,

P . 141.

55 A f t e r

A c t i o n Report,

Vo1.2,

HQ, T h i r d U.S.f%-my,

p.22.

96 R i c h a r d E. SirnpK i n , M e c h a n i z e d I n f a n t r y B r a s s e y ' s P u b l i s h e r s L i m i t e d , 1980), p.21.

<N@wYOrK:

37 L U C K Y
98 War 93 War

Forward,

P .85.

Fls
As

I Knew
I Knew
P.5.

It, p.361.
It, p.36.

I 0 LO1 Fl0.3, 0

1 0 1 The P a t t o n P a p e r s , 162 L U C K Y F o r w a r d , 103 W a r As

Vol.2,

P.523.

p p . 133-134.

I Knew I Knew

I t , P . 108.
I t , P . 100.

104 W a r A s 1 0 5 War 1 0 6 War 1 0 7 War

As

I Knew
I Knew I Knew

I t , p.205.

f3s

It, p.196,223.

Fls

I t , P . 104.
p.10.

1 0 8 The L o r r a i n e C a m p a i g n , 1 0 3 L O 1 No.1, 110

LUCK),

p.4. p.363.
p p . 124-125;

Forward,

1I 1 LUCKY Forward, 1 1 2 War As

p . 126.

I Kneu I t , p.265.

180

113 L U C K Y F o r w a r d ,

pp.360-361.
p.6.

114 The L o r r a i n e C a m p a i g n ,
115

u.,
pp.7-3,

116
117

u.,
p.34.

m.,p . 7 .
p.22.

11s I U . ,
119

w . ,p . 3 6 .
I Knew

120 M a r As

It, p . 2 7 6 .

121

m.,p . 1 4 8 .
p.22.
P .375.

I22 The L o r r a i n e Campaign,

123 L U C K Y F o r w a r d ,

124 The L o r r a i n e Campaign,

p.36.

131

CHAPTER 4:

CONCLUSIUN

Part

I:

Operational Differences

Although t h e fundamental

purpose o f t h i s t h e s i s

is t o

u n c o v e r any common t e n e t s b y w h i c h t w o s u c c e s s f u l
of

pract it loners
in

the operational

a r t operated,

there

is u t i l i t y

d i s c o v e r i n g h o u t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s were d i s i m i l a r

Hence,

before Gudrr i a n

d i s c u s s i n g t e n e t s common t o t h e o p e r a t i o n a l m e t h o d s o f and P a t t o n , First, a c o n t r a s t between t h e i r methods it

is i n o r d e r .

i s t r u e t h a t b o t h P a t t o n and G u d e r i a n b e l i e v e d

i n a combined arms c o n c e p t b u t d i s a g r e e d on t h e c o m p o s i t i o n o f c o m b i n e d arms o r g a n i z a t i o n s a t t h e o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l of war.

G u d e r i a n t h o u g h t t h a t a c o m b i n e d arms t e a m b u i l t a r o u n d t h e tanK--the panzer d i u ision--was the appropriate instrument corps

and g r o u p commanders s h o u l d h a v e a t t h e i r d i s p o s a l t o a c h i e v e t h e o p e r a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n s Guder i a n s o u g h t . Moreouer

he

b e l i e v e d s u c h p a n z e r d i v i s i o n s s h o u l d b e ernployed i n heavy concentrations of corps-size u n i t s both t o achieve t a c t i c a l Patton, on t h e o t h e r

p e n e t r a t i o n and o p e r a t i o n a l e x p l o i t a t i o n . hand,

e n v i s i o n e d a more b a l a n c e d employment o f armored w h i c h h e o b t a i n e d b y d i s p e r s i n s ti i s a r m o r e d

d i v i s ions,

182

diuisions throughout h i s corps.

Ostensibly,

t h i s gave each o f

h i 5 c o r p s commanders t h e c a p a b i l i t y t o e x p l o i t w i t h a r m o r e d forces tactical p e n e t r a t i o n s achieved by assigned infantry

diuisions.

It i s a r g u a b l e t h a t

in doing t h i s Patton traded the

o p e r a t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t y t o e x p l o i t d e e p l y w i t h an a r m o r e d c o r p s for the capability t o e x p l o i t t a c t i c a l l y a t the corps leuel.

It

a l s o s u g g e s t s t h a t P a t t o n ' s c o r p s p e r f o r m e d more o f a t a c t i c a l r o l e t h a n an o p e r a t l o n a l r o l e t h r o u g h o u t h i s E u r o p e a n operations. And s i n c e P a t t o n s e l d o m r e t a i n e d a s i z a b l e

o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e a t army,

it i s doubtful t h a t Patton's

a p p r o a c h t o ach i e u ing o p e r a t i o n a l dec i s i u e n e s s w o u l d have been e f f e c t i v e a g a i n s t s t r o n g enemy r e s i s t a n c e . successful campaigns--Falaise-Wgentan, P a l a t inate--were R e c a l l t h a t h i s most

p u r s u i t t u t h e Seine,
in

waged a g a i n s t a r e t r e a t i n s enerny w h e r e a s

troth t h e B u l g e and L o r r a i n e Campaigns, defended staunchly, costly.

In part,

i n w h i c h t h e enemy

P a t t o n ' s a p p r o a c h was b o t h l a b o r i o u s a n d

t h e d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n Guder i a n ' s and P a t t o n

'5

a p p r o a c h e s t o cornbined arms u a r f a r e a t t h e o p e r a t i o n a l can be a t t r i b u t e d t o d o c t r i n a l d i f f e r e n c e s . command o f f i m e r i c a n combat f o r c e s , he

leuel

When P a t t o n assumed

inherited a doctrine that

regarded the well

i n f a n t r y d i u i s l o n a s an o r g a n i z a t i o n p a r t i c u l a r l y tactical p e n e t r a t i o n and t h e armored d i v i s i o n Moreover, there are h i s t o r i c a l

suited for

appropriate for political,

exploitation,

and g e o g r a p h i c a l r e a s o n s t o be1 i e v e t h a t A m e r i c a had a r t a t t h e b e g i n n i n g of

no m a t u r e c o n c e p t i o n o f o p e r a t i o n a l

183

W o r l d War

I!.

I n e s s e n c e , flmer i c a n c o m m a n d e r s e n t e r e d t h e war

w i t h b o t h a t a c t i c a l a n d a s t r a t e g i c c o n c e p t i o n b u t n o mature understsnding a b o u t how t o l i n K t a c t i c s a n d s t r a t e g y w i t h i n a

t h e a t e r , p r e c i s e l v t h e f u n c t i o n o f o v e r a t i o n a l a r t . Unl iKe P a t t o n , G u d e r i a n e n t e r e d t h e war n o t o n l y w i t h a d o c t r i n e o f o p e r a t i o n a l a r t b u t w i t h an o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e w i t h which

t o e x e c u t e t h a t d o c t r i n e . More t h a n t h i s , h o w e v e r , G u d e r i a n
helped deuelnp t h e d o c t r i n e and t h e panzer o r g a n i z a t i o n s needed t o execute t h e doctrine,
t h a t doctrine a n d h e was
it

instrumental

in putting

i n t o e f f e c t . Hence,

is n o w o n d e r t h a t G u d e r i a n arms c o n c e p t i o n , t h o u g h

and P a t t o n d i f f e r e d

i n t h e i r combined

it r e m a i n s b o t h t r u e and s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t t h e y

saw t h e n e e d f o r

a c o m b i n e d arms a p p r o a c h t o o p e r a t i o n a l a r t . S e c o n d , w h e r e a s Guder i a n a t t a c l t e d w i t h p a n z e r c o r p s on r e l a t i v e l v n a r r o w f r o n t s , P a t t o n a t t a c K e d on b r o a d f r o n t s w i t h
h i s armor d i s p e r s e d . figair,, d o c t r i n a l d i f f e r e n c e s h e l p e x p l a i n

t h e i r d i f f e r e n t m e t h o d s . What is s i g n i f i c a n t

is t h a t b o t h

P a t t o n a n d G u d e r i a n saw t h e v a l u e i n s e i z i n g t h e

i n i t i a t i v e and

i n K e e p t n g t h e enemy o f f b a l a n c e , b u t P a t t o n ' s o p e r a t i o n s
f o c u s e d more on r e t a i n i n g t h e t a c t i c a l

i n i t i a t i v e and
i n i t iat iue

Guder i a n ' s o p e r a t i o n s S o u g h t t o r e t a i n o p e r a t i o n a l
try

StpiKing

i n great depth with panzer Corps.

edditionally,

in

o r d e r t o g a i n t h e t a c t i c a l and o p e r a t i o n a l s u r p r i s e needed t o

seize the operational

i n i t i a t i u e and a c h i e v e t h e d e p t h

n e c e s s a r y f o r o p e r a t i o n a l d e c i s i u e n e s s , G u d e r i a n was w i l l i n g t o g o t o great length:.

In p a r t i c u l a r , h e placed s t r o n g emphasis

194

o n d e c e p t i o n a n d secrecy g a i n e d t h r o u g h movement a t n i g h t a n d o n c o n t i n u o u s o p e r a t i o n s o n c e a n attacK s t a r t e d . A l t h o u g h P a t t o n m a d e 5ome u s e o f d e c e p t i o n a n d n i g h t m o u e m e n t , h e d i d n o t P l a c e much e m p h a s i s o n e i t h e r t e c h n i q u e , remarKing t h a t

it

is b e t t e r t o h a l t t w o h o u r s b e f o r e d W K , r e s t t h e s o l d i e r s , a n d
3 t t a C K

before davn.

Moreover,

he thought

" n i g h t attacKs by

a r m o r were n o t e c o n o m i c a l .
fl t h i r d p o i n t

"< 1>

on w h i c h P a t t o n ' s a n d G u d e r i a n ' s t h i n K i n g

a p p a r e n t l y d i v e r g e d was i n t h e e m p l o y m e n t o f t h e r a d i o . G u d e r i a n saw g r e a t v a l u e i n h a v i n g a s e c u r e means o f r a p i d l y It

t r a n s m i t t i n g fragmentary orders t o forward committed u n i t s .

was i m p o r t a n t f o r h i m t o b e a b l e t o a f f e c t t a c t i c a l o p e r a t i o n s
q u i C K I y b e c a u s e h i s t e c h n i q u e p l a c e d g r e a t r e l i a n c e on t h e s u c c e s s of t a c t l c a l o p e r a t i o n s at t h e schwsrpunKt, which had t o
least

c h a n g e r a p i d l y t o r e i n f o r c e s u c c e s s a g a i n s t p o i n t s of resistance.
To d o t h i s ,

G u d e r i a n n e e d e d a r a p i d means of

communication,

and t h e r a d i o p r o v i d e d j u s t s u c h a means.

P e r h a p s b e c a u s e of

h i s Knowledge of U l t r a a n d t h e a t t e n d a n t

s e c u r i t y r i s ~ s s s o c i a t e d w i t h r a d i o cornmun i c a t I o n s , P a t t o n d i d a

n o t p l a c e much e m p h a s i s o n t h e u s e o f

radio.

UnliKe Guderian,

t h e n , he p r e f e r r e d w i r e o v e r r a d i o a n d p e r s o n a l
wire.

c o n t a c t Over

F i n a l l y , w h i l e G u d e r i a n made s p e c i a l e f f o r t s t o m a i n t a i n momentum b y a u o i d i n g f o r w a r d passage t h r o u g h c o m m i t t e d u n i t s a n d b y p a s s i n g c e n t e r s o f r e s i s t a n c e , P a t t o n d i d n o t p l a c e much emphasis on e i t h e r o f t h e s e methods. In f a c t . Patton appeared

IS5

committed t o t h e uiew that t a c t i c a l l y or f i x , e x p l o i t and p u r s u e . panzer d i u i s ions

infantry diuisions penetrate

and armored d i u i s i o n s p a s s t h r o u g h t o Guderian, it w i l l be r e c a l l e d , employed

i n b o t h t h e p e n e t r a t i o n and e x p l o i t a t i o n r o l e ,

a n d d i d so b e c a u s e he b e l i e v e d t h e o r g a n i c p a n z e r - g r e n a d i e r infantry
i n t h e panzer d i u i s i o n s c o u l d p e r f o r m t h e tasK of

penetration: would

moreover,

he be1 ieued a t t a c K i n g m o b i l e f o r c e s

l o s e momenturn if t h e y a t t e m p t e d t o p a s s t h r o u g h l e s s
I t may b e s a i d o f

mobile infantry formations. d i d be object ieue

P a t t o n t h a t he as h i s

i n b y p a s s i n g enemy c e n t e r s o f r e s i s t a n c e ,

ons t o G e n e r a l O e u e r s ' e f f o r t s t o r e d u c e t h e C o l m a r

P o c K e t a t t e s t . < 2 > Two r e s p o n s e s , First, such a view

however,

are

in order here.

i s inconsistent with Patton's decisions t o

Nancy and Metz, Second, o p e r a t i o n s w h i c h were C o s t l y

taKe the c i t i e s of a n d t irne c o n s u m i n g .

a n u n d e r l y i n 9 u l t r r l o r mot i u e f o r

P a t t o n ' s o b j e c t i o n t o e m p l o y i n g f o r c e s t o r e d u c e t h e Colmar P o c K e t was t h a t some o f t h e f o r c e s t o r e d u c e t h a t POcKet w e r e t o come f r o m P a t t o n ' s T h i r d f i r m y .

186

Part

XI:

Common T e n e t s

As

significant

as t h e d i f f e r e n c e s t o be,

i n P a t t o n ' s and
appreciated of

G u d e r i a n ' s o p e r a t i o n s appear t h e y need t o be viewed the s i m i l a r i t i e s basis for Guderian's

t o be f u l l y

i n a perspective t h a t taKes account opera a r t ions..

in t h e i r

especially the principled P a t t o n ' s and in

t h e i r Operational

Indeed,

o p e r a t i o n a l a r t c l e a r l y 5.hared a p r i n c i p l e d b a s i s centralized control of artillery;

six a r e a s :
of

close cooperation or encircle the

g r o u n d and a i r e f f o r t s :

attacKs t o envelop execution o f

enemy a t o p e r a t i o n a l d e p t h s ; speed: acceptance of flanK

operations

at high

and l o g i s t i c a l r i s K : Each o f even

and p e r s o n a l

leadership a t f r o n t l i n e

units.

these s i m i l a r i t i e s
if s i m i l a r

d e s e r v e s some a m p l i f i c a t i o n , t h e r e w e r e some d i f f e r e n c e s each t e n e t . Though t h e y employment of differed

for

in principle

i n how P a t t o n a n d G u d e r i a n a p p l i e d

i n t h e c o m p o s i t i o n and d o c t r i n a l b o t h P a t t o n and G u d e r i a n art is

combined arms u n i t s ,

t h o u g h t a combined arms a p p r o a c h t o o p e r a t i o n a l essential. control art of

In p a r t i c u l a r ,
artillery

they

b o t h thought that

centralized

assets

is crucial an o p e r a t i o n Flfter

in execut in9 operational

when t a c t i c a l tactical penetration,

in t h e e a r I y stages of i s t h e tasK

penetration

a t hand.

187

t h e requirement

is f o r a r t i l l e r y t o b e d e c e n t r a l i z e d so t h a t

e x p l o i t i n g and p u r s u i n g u n i t s c a n have a r t i l l e r y f i r e s u p p o r t immediately a v a i l a b l e . C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e r e q u i r e m e n t b o t h men

s o u g h t was h i g h l y m o b i l e a r t i l l e r y a n d a f l e x i b l e s y s t e m o f
a r t i l l e r y command a n d c o n t r o l

t h a t would a l l o w a r t i l l e r y f i r e s

t o be massed a t c r i t i c a l p o i n t s of p e n e t r a t i o n and t h e n a l l o w
a r t i l l e r y u n i t 5 t o moue b e h i n d f o r w a r d c o m m i t t e d u n i t s a n d

del iver

i m m e d i a t e l y r c s p o n s i u e f i r e s i n ~ x p l o i t a t i o na n d

P u r s u i t o p e r a t i o n s . Guder i a n , more t h a n P a t t o n , t r i e d t o
s u p p l e m e n t o r g a n i c a r t i l l e r y f i r e s u p p o r t by e m p l o y i n g t a c t i c a l aircraft i n c l o s e s u p p o r t m i s s i o n s . The d i f f e r e n c e

in their
tried to

o p e r a t i o n s on t h i s p o i n t

is t h a t G u d e r i a n a p p a r e n t l y

a c h i e v e a h i g h e r degree of

i n t e g r a t i o n between ground and air

u n i t s t h a n P a t t o n . But t h e r e q u irement f o r c o n c e n t r a t e d
a r t i l l e r y c a n n o t b e s o l v e d by a r e l i a n c e

on t a c t i c a l

aircraft

f o r the obvious reason t h a t air support Hence, P a t t o n ' 5 conduct of operational It

is w e a t h e r d e p e n d e n t .

a r t depended on massed

a r t i l l e r y , and l o t s of
T h i r d flrrny c o n d u c t e d b a t t a l i o n s of

it.

is u s e f u l t o r e c a l l t h a t P a t t o n ' s employing
108

its Bulge c o u n t e r - o f f e n s i v e

f i e l d a r t i l l e r y , s u g g e s t i n g an a r t i l l e r y r i c h

cnu ironment

.
i n t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a

S e c o n d , b o t h men saw g r e a t v a l u e

g o o d WorK i n s r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n g r o u n d a n d a i r f o r c e s . Guderian formed a warm, personal r e l a t i o n s h i p with th e air his

c o m m a n d e r s who s u p p o r t e d h i s o p e r a t i o n s i n a l l t h r e e o f major campaigns.

Similarly,

P a t t o n SpOKe

i n g l o w i n g terms of

188

t h e cooperation and a s s i s t a n c e

XI% TfiC r e n d e r e d t o T h i r d a r m y
B o t h P a t t o n a n d G u d e r i a n Knew

throughout o p e r a t i o n s in Europe. t h a t t h e s u c c e s s of
their

o p e r a t i o n s depended

in large measure

on t h e q u a n t i t y and q u a l i t y of units.

a i r support given to t h e i r

find b o t h q u a n t i t y a n d q u a l i t y o f

support depended on t h e

d e g r e e o f c o o p e r a t i o n a n d c o o r d i n a t i o n e x t a n t b e t w e e n t h e two services. UnmistaKably,

of

a t h i r d t e n e t common t o t h e o p e r a t i o n a l in t h e i r e f f o r t s t o attacK into

art

e a c h man

is r e f l e c t e d

o p e r a t i o n a l d e p t h s o f enemy d e f e n c e s a n d e i t h e r e n v e l o p o r e n c i r c l e e n e m y f o r c e s . fi1 1 o f G i r d e r ian

' 5

operat ions

indicate

t h a t h e t h o u g h t t a c t i c a l p e n e t r a t i o n f o l l o w e d by r a p i d

e x p l o i t a t i o n i n t o enemy t e r r i t o r y would p r e c i p i t a t e a n
o p e r a t i o n a l c o l l a p s e w i t h i n t h e e n e m y command a n d c o n t r o l structure. In b o t h t h e P o l i s h and F l a n d e r s Campaigns h i s In t h e Russian

thinKing on t h i s s u b j e c t proved correct. Campaign, i n s p i t e of

t h e c a p t u r e of w h o l e armies a n d masses o f

equipment, h i s attaCKS i n t o o p e r a t i o n a l depths d i d n o t have t h e

desired strategic e f f e c t . new m e a n i n g t o of timing Failure i n t h e R u s s i a n Campaign g i v e s importance

" o p e r a t i o n a l d e p t h " a n d amp1 i f ies t h e

i n t h e c o n d u c t of

operational art. Guderian,

remember,

t h o u g h t t h a t H i t l e r 's three- wee^ d e l a y o f O p e r a t i o n d i v e r s i o n of G u d e r i a n ' s Panzer

BfiRBflROSSfi a n d h i 5 t h r e e - w e e K
Army

f r o m i t s f i n a l o p e r a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e o f Moscow p r o v e d

f a t a l t o t h e s t r a t e g i c alms o f BeRBaROSSA. P a t t o n , t o o , be1 ieved t h a t s u c c e s s at t h e o p e r a t i o n a l

183

l e v e l of

idar

r e q u i r e s t h a t t a c t i c a l p e n e t r a t i o n be f o l l o w e d by forces are

r a p i d a n d u n r e m i t t i n g p u r s u i t o p e r a t i o n s u n t i l enemy e i t h e r e n c i r c l e d or e n v e l o p e d and d e s t r o y e d . trouble in finding a

Because he h a d

" H o t h " o n t h e A l l i e d s i d e who w o u l d

cooperate

in p u t t i n g together great encirclement operat ions,

P a t t o n r a l i e d on envelopment o p e r a t i o n s t o a c h i e v e o p e r a t i o n a l decision. B o t h t h e F a l a i s e - A r g e n t a n and t h e P a l a t i n a t e Patton's style

C a m p a i g n s a r e t h e b e s t examples. o f respect.

in t h i s

Ta some e x t e n t ,

P a t t o n was h a m p e r e d i n h i s e x e c u t i o n

o f O p e r a t i o n a l a r t b e c a u s e n e i t h e r h i s s u b o r d i n a t e commander5

n o r h i s s u p e r i o r s s h a r e d t o any g r e a t d e g r e e h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f how m o b i l e a r m o r e d w a r f a r e s h o u l d h e c o n d u c t e d t o b e d e c i s i v e . Good men t h o u g h t h e y w e r e , t h a t Patton's there i s l i t t l e evidence t o suggest

c o r p s commanders h a d a f i r r n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e operational s u c c e s s a g a i n s t German f o r c e s ; than operational the

requirements f o r

e v i d e n c e shows t h a t t h e y h a d m o r e t z c t i c a l acumen. This d iscursion of operational r a i s e s an Guderian's

d s p t h and dec i s i v e n e s s

i m p o r t a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n a b o u t b o t h P a t t o n ' s and operational a r t t h a t h e r e t o f o r e has been l a r g e l y

ignored or 3lossed over. defined together t h e n an!, as t h a t

If t h e o p e r a t i o n a l

l e v e l of

war

IS

l e v e l u h i c h ernploys t a c t i c a l e v e n t s

linKed

i n a campaign p l a n t o a c h i e v e t h e a t e r s t r a t e g i c g o a l s ,
judgment about t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of a commander's

operational

a r t must r e s t ,

at least in part,

on how w e l l h i s
into desired

o p e r a t i o n a l methods p a r l a y e d t a c t i c a l e v e n t s

198

strategic r e s u l t s . The s u e s t i o n r a i s e d
b e c a u s e t o answer

is d i f f i c u l t t o answer

it i n t e l l i g e n t l y o t h e r e q u a l l y important
The q u e s t i o n , f o r example,

questions must f I r s t be ansuered.

~ r e s u ~ ~ o a eKsn o w l e d g e o f t h e s t r a t e g i c t h e a t e r o b j e c t i u e s a n d s what Clausew i t 2 c a l l e d

"Centers of grau i t y

"

There

is p r o b a b l y

g e n e r a l a g r e e m e n t t h a t b o t h P a t t o n a n d G u d e r i a n saw t h e
o p p o s i n g enemy f o r c e s as t h e c e n t e r of g r a u i t y , the immediate

o p e r a t i o n a l o b j e c t i u e . D e s t r o y enemy f o r c e s i n large
p r o p o r t i o n s a n d t h e enemy armies w i l l opposing p o l i t i c a l collapse, forcing

leaders t o sue f o r peace.

' 5

Patton c l e a r l y

b e 1 i e u e d t h i s , a n d G u d e r ian Moscow n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g ,

preoccupation with t h e s e i z u r e of

h e t o o s o u g h t t h e d e s t r u c t ion o f enemy

f o r c e s on a g r a n d scale. H i s o p e r a t i o n s i n P o l a n d in France in

i n 1939 a n d

1948 a p p e a r t o b e c l a s s i c e x a r n p l e s o f t h e

a p p r o p r i a t e 1 inKage of t a c t i c a l engagements

in a campaign plan

f o r t h e purpose of bringing about desired s t r a t e g i c results within a theater of operations.

S i m i l a r l y , P a t t o n ' s operations

i n N o r t h FIfrica a n d o n S i c i l y a p p e a r e d t o s u p p o r t t h e t h e a t e r commander
'5

s t r a t e g ic g o a l s .

Howeuer,

a p l a u s i b l e c a s e can b e made t h a t b o t h G u d e r i a n
i n a n i m p o r t a n t way

a n d P a t t o n f a i l e d t o m e a s u r e up

in t h e i r

later campaigns. Both f a i l e d t o understand t h a t t o be

e f f e c t i u e , o p e r a t i o n a l campaign p l a n s m u s t b e p r e d i c a t e d on
theater strategy: Guder i a n
' 5

t h e y have no

l i f e of

t h e i r own! B u t

great operational

"successes" in Russia a p p e a r t o

h a v e t a K e n on a l i f e of t h e i r own, d r a g g i n g t h e t h e a t e r

191

commander's s t r a t e g y after them.

Certainly, t h i s charge

is t r u e

o f P a t t o n , who a t t a c K e d s o f a r a n d s o f a s t a c r o s s F r a n c e t h a t he outran him.

1 2 t h firmy G r o u p ' s a n d SHFIEF's c a p a b i l i t y t o s u p p o r t

Ft e v e r y t u r n P a t t o n a t t e m p t e d t o t u r n a t h e a t e r s e c o n d a r y l
into not only the primary theater e f f o r t b u t t h e ONLY

effort

t h e a t e r e f f o r t ! Both Bradley and Eisenhower had great difficult:, Patton

' 5

reigning

i n P a t t o n as h e r a c e d a c r o s s E u r o p e .

scheme t o a t t a c K s t r a i g h t t o w a r d F r a n K f u r t w i t h o n e
t h r e e corp s , f o r example, f a i l e d e n t i r e l y t o

a r m y compor.ed o f

taKe a c c o u n t o f E i s e n h o w e r ' s t h e a t e r s t r a t e g y w i t h

its myriad

of p o l i t i c a l

and

logistical considerations.

Analytically,

strategic art g iues s h a p e t o o p e r j t ional a r t , b u t

t h e d y n a m i c s are t h a t one a f f e c t s t h e o t h e r

in practice
and

interactiuely,

t h e real c h a l l e n g e f o r o p e r a t i o n a l t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p in balance. were,

it

l e v e l c G m m a n d e r s is t o Keep

A s c a p a b l e a s b o t h t h e s e men

is f a i r t o s a y t h & t n e i t h e r h a d a f i r r n e n o u g h

understanding of t h e dynamics between o p e r a t i o n a l

and

strategical art.
A f o u r t h t e n e t P a t t o n and Guderian s h a r e

in their

c o n c e p t i o n of

how o p e r a t i o n a l a r t s h o u l d b e c o n d u c t e d c e n t e r s Every b i t of relevant evidence shows

is a b s o l u t e l y

on s p e e d o f o p e r a t i o n s .

t h a t b o t h men t h o u g h t a h i g h t e m p o o f

operations

essential t o success
speed
is a r e l a t i o n a l

i n t h e c o n d u c t of o p e r a t i o n a l

art. Because
is t h a t

t e r m , w h a t b o t h men r e a l l y meant

t o b e s u c c e s s f u l f r i e n d l y commanders m u s t e x e c u t e o p e r a t i o n s a t a speed r e l a t i v e l y greater t h a n t h e speed of t h e enemy's

192

operations.

I n G u d e r i a n ' s c a s e , t h e c l a s s i c e x a m p l e is h i s

a t t a c K a c r o s s t h e Meuse R i v e r a n d s u b s e q u e n t d r i v e t o t h e
coast. In hi: boOK
TO

L o s e a B a t t l e , A l i s t a i r Horne v i v i d l y

d e s c r i b e s n o t o n l y t h e F r e n c h H i g h Command's b u t a l s o t h e l o w e r l e v e l t a c t i c a l commanders' i n a b i l i t y t o act o r react drive.

in a

t i m e l y enough manner t o s t o p G u d e r i a n ' s p a n z e r

C

=lmilarly,

Patton's

high-speed

d a s h e s o u t o f t h e Normandy

beachhead,

across France t o t h e S e i n e R i v e r , t h r o u g h t h e E i f e l ,
in a

a n d a c r o s s t h e P a l a t i n a t e a l l Kept o p p o s i n g German f o r c e s

p e r p e t u a l l y r e a c t i v e s t a t e t r y i n g t o a d j u s t t o a new t a c t i c a l situation rendered i r r e l e v a n t b y a n e v e n newer s i t u a t i o n , B o t h

men came t o s e e t h a t a h i g h r a t e o f o p e r a t i o n s s t e a l s t h e i n i t i a t i v e f r o m t h e enemy, f o r c e s him t o react r a t h s r t h a n

deliberately

a c t , and d e s t r o y s h i s a b i l i t y t o f o c u s combat

p o l d e r a t a d e c i s i v e p o i n t b e c a u s e h i s Command a n d c o n t r o l s y s t e m is i n d i s a r r a y . In essence,

a r e l a t i v e l y h i g h e r speed of

o p e r a t i o n s s e r v e s t o fragment t h e enemy's combat powsr and d e s t r o y h i s c o l l e c t i v e and individual will t o fight. Guderian

a t t e m p t e d t o a c h i e v e a high tempo of o p e r a t i o n s ,

f i r s t , by

t a c t i c a l l y s . u r p r i s i n g t h e e n e m y t h r o u g h d e c e i v i n g h i m as t o t h e l o c a t ion, t irning, composition, and direct ion

Of

t h e attacK.

Then h e e x h o r t e d h i s commanders t o Keep moving d a y a n d n i g h t , b y p a s s i n g p o c K e t s o f enemy r e s i s t a n c e , p o i n t of and attacKing t o t h e

exhaust ion, Patton characteristically p i t t e d one Corps

commander a g a i n s t t h e o t h e r , e x h o r t i n g e a c h t o b e t h e f i r s t t o r e a c h some o b j e c t i v e s u c h a s a r i v e r l i n e . Each Corps and

133

d i u is i o n commander a t t a C K e d a c r o s s a r e a l t i v e l y b r o a d f r o n t , e m p l o y i n g m u l t l p l e p a r a l l e l a x e s t o e n s u r e m a x i m u m c o m b a t power

was f o r u a r d a n d m i n i m a l c o r ~ g e s t i o n o c c u r r e d o n a x e s o f a d v a n c e .
T h u s , d b s p i t e some d i f f e r e n c e s

i n t e c h n i q u e , P a t t o n and

G u d e r i a n saw s p e e d o f

o p e r a t i o n s as o n e o f t h e Key t e n e t s o f

success in o p e r a t i o n a l a r t .
f f i

i f t h t e n e t by which P a t t o n and Guderian g u i d e d t h e i r is r e f l e c t e d

conduct of operational art

in each man's
in order

w i l l i n g n e s s t o a c c e p t g r e a t f l a n K a n d l o g i s t i c a l risK t o p e n e t r a t e enem)
PiSK

defense;

t o o p e r a t ional depths. Concerning

t o exposed flanKs, t h e r e

is a g r e a t d e a l o f e v i d e n c e t h a t

b o t h men were f u l l y aware o f t h e r i S K t h e y were t a K i n g , a n d t h e y employed air power,

speed of

riuerl ines, cavalry u n i t s ,

and great

operations t o minimize t h a t PiSK.

I n f a c t , b o t h men phenomenon

seemed t o a c c e p t o p e n f l a n K 5 as q u i t e a n a t u r a l high-speed
regarding

in

m o b i l e o p e r a t i o n s a n d 90 t h e f u r t h e r s t e p of
a non-linear

l i n e of

c o n t a c t a s a n o p p o r t u n i t ~t o b e

e x p l o i t e d whenever p o s s i b l e .

Since t h e open f l a n K argument

e n t a i l s r 1 s . K ~a s w e l l a s o p p o r t u n i t i e s , G u d e r i a n a n d P a t t o n saw that
i t was

imperative t o have a clear o p e r a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e o r

c e n t e r o f g r a v i t y i d e n t i f L e d , a t t a c K w i t h s u f f i c i e n t mass, a t
great s p e e d t o produce t h e tactical and o p e r a t i o n a l moral
c a s c a d i n g e f f e c t t h a t would l e a d t o o p e r a t i o n a l That, however, decisiveness.

oenarally required that friendly forces attaCK

i n great d e p t h and s p e e d , e x p o s i n g a f r i e n d l y f l a n K somewhere.

B o t h m e n a c c e p t e d e x p o s e d f l a n K s as t h e p r i c e t o b e p a i d f o r

194

o p e r a t i o n a l success.

I t i s m o r e d i f f i c u l t t o maKe a p l a u s i b l e c a s e f o r e i t h e r
G u d e r i a n o r P a t t o n t h a t would show t h e y had a f i r m understanding of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between o p e r a t i o n a l filthough n e i t h e r man h a d

c a p a b i l i t y and l o g i s t i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y .

rnuch t o s a y a b o u t h i s own l o g i s t i c a l
t o stretch h i s logistical tether t o
of

o p e r a t i o n s , e a c h was p r o n e

i t s v e r y 1 imits. I n S P i t e
and air r e s u p p l y ,

h e a v y r e l i a n c e on

t r U C K S r

railroads,

each

man, e s p e c i a l l y P a t t o n ,

a t t a c K e d s o f a s t a n d so f a r t h a t h e logistical systern t o t h e p r o b l e m was

exceeded t h e c a p a b i l i t y of h i s u n i t ' s s u p p o r t h i s f u r t h e r operat ions. n o t one of shortage.

Consistently,

materiel shortage but one of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n Moreouer, a l o g i s t i c a l pause i n e v i t a b l y occurred J u s t If such a pause

is

w h e n s u c h a p a u s e was l e a s t d e s i r a b l e . inevitable, comrnander

so t h a t

then

i t may b e t h a t t h e o u t s t a n d i n g o p e r a t i o n a l

i s o n e who p l a n s f o r a n d t i m e s a p a u s e

in operations

i t m o s t b e n e f i t s h i m a n d h i s command.

G u d e r i a n appears pauses than

t o ha'Je b e e n b e t t e r a t t i m i n g a n y s u c h l o g i s t i c a l Patton,
if

i n d e e d P a t t o n was. e v e n aware t h a t s u c h p a u s e s n e e d S u f f i c e i t t o s a y , by d e s i g n o r n e g l e c t , increased logistical

t o be considered.

P a t t o n and Guder ian a c c e p t e d

r iSK to

ach ieve t h e i r operational object iues.

A final

t e n e t b o t h men c l e a r l y b e l i e v e d

in and adhered t o

w i t h o u t f a i l was t h e p r i n c i p l e o f forward locations.

commanding o r l e a d i n g f r o m is

P a t t o n and Guderian understood t h a t t h e r e

n o w o r t h u h i l e s u b s t i t u t e f o r t h e p e r s o n a l Presence of t h e

19s

c o m m a n d e r , e s p e c i a l l y when a c r i t i c a l d e c i s i o n , battle is t a K i n g p l a c e .

e v e n t , or
invariably

T h e r e f o r e , e a c h man a l m o s t

t u r n e d UP

a t some f o r w a r d L o c a t i o n a t a c r u c i a l time and

p e r s o n a l l y d i r e c t e d t h e a c t i o n , g o t a s t a l l e d *ttacK m o v i n g a g a i n , or w h e n t h e r e w e r e n o r e s e r v e s l e f t , a d d e d w e i g h t t o t h e

m a i n a t t a c K m e r e l y by b e i n g o n s i t e . To a i d i n c o n t r o l l i n 9 t h e
l a r g e f o r m a t i o n s t h e y c o m m a n d e d , b o t h men o p e r a t e d o u t o f

a
a

small m o b i l e f o r w a r d command p o s t a n d made e x t e n s i v e u s e o f

small p l a n e t o e x p e d i t e t h e i r m o v e m e n t a r o u n d t h e b a t t l e f i e l d . A l t h o u g h P a t t o n p r e f e r r e d wire c o m m u n i c a t i o n s o v e r r a d i o a n d G u d e r i a n made f a r g r e a t e r use o f s e c u r e r a d i o t h a n d i d P a t t o n , b o t h men c o m m u n i c a t e d m o s t o f t h e i r c o m b a t o r d e r s t h e i r subordinates. command p o s t s . F i n a l I',

in person a t
the

, n e i t h e r m a n was

least b i t h e s i t a n t t o g i v e on-the-spot

o r d e r s t o committed

c o m b a t u n i t s t w o e c h e l o n s b e l o w t h e i r own l e v e l o f c o m m a n d . Much t o e a c h m a n ' s c r e d i t , t h e y b o t h were c a r e f u l

always t o

i n f o r m any i n t e r m e d i a t e C o m m a n d e r s c o n c e r n e d w h e n d i r e c t i n g t h e
a c t i o n s of It

a u n i t s u b o r d i n a t e t o t h a t commander.
p o s s i b l e t o see in t h e o p e r a t i o n s of

is c e r t a i n l y

Patton and Guderian o t h e r aspects o f t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s t h a t bear

s i m i l a r i t y t o some d e g r e e .

I n some

instances t h e d i f f e r e n c e s in

their operations

is o n e o f e m p h a s i s r n o r e t h a n a n y t h i n g e l s e .

P a t t o n , f o r e x a m p l e , p l a c e d g r e a t e r e m p h a s i s on r e c e i v i n g
t i m e l y combat

information and e s t a b l i s h e d a special

mechanism--Colonel got t h a t

FicKett

' 5

informat ion service--to

ensure he

information.

There

is n o t h i n g , o f c o u r s e , w h i c h s h o w s

196

t h a t G u d e r i a n was n o t
but

interested

i n t imelv combat

informat ion, lengths t o

it

is e q u a l l y t r u e t h a t h e d i d n o t g o t o s p e c i a l information i n t h e way P a t t o n d i d .

get such

W h a t t h i s t h e s i s h a s e n d e a v o r e d t o d o is u n c o v e r t h o s e

aspects of Patton appeal t o

d

'5

and Guder i a n

'5

o p e r a t i o n a l methods which

t e n e t o r P r i n c i p l e b y w h i c h e a c h man g u i d e d h i s

t h i n K i n g about t h e art of

war a t t h e o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l o f
i n v e s t i g a t i o n can be summarized

command.
by

The c o n c l u s i o n o f t h i s

s t a t i n g t h a t G u d e r i a n and P a t t o n s h a r e d a v i e w o f

o p e r a t i o n a l a r t t h a t h e l d t h e f o l l o w i n g s i x t e n e t s as Key t o s u c c e s ~i n t h e a r t o f war a t t h e o p e r a t i o n a l level:

( 1 ) F l r t i l l e r y needs t o b e o r g a n i z e d and c o n t r o l l e d i n such a f a s h i o n t h a t its f i r e s can be c o n c e n t r a t e d r a p i d l y a n d y e t b e f l e x i b l e e n o u g h t o move a n d s h o o t during f l u i d , mobile, high-speed operations.

( 2 , S u c c e s s a t t h e o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l o f command
dernands t h a t a i r a n d g r o u n d o p e r a t i o n s b e c l o s e l Y
coordinated and mutually supporting.

(3) 3eeK t o c o n d u c t o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s t h a t e n u e l o p or e n c i r c l e enemy force5 a t operational depths.

( 4 ) To b e s u c c e s s f u l , o p e r a t i o n s m u s t b e c o n d u c t e d a t g r e a t s p e e d - - r e l a t i v e l y greater t h a n t h e enemy ' 5 speed of o p e r a t ions.

( 5 ) Success a t t h e operational level requires t h a t

c o m m a n d e r s b e w i l l i n g t o taKe c a l c u l a t e d f l a n K a n d
l o g i s t i c a l r i s K i b o t h t h e d e p t h and s p e e d o f
o p e r a t i o n s appear t o r e q u i r e acceptance of t h e s e
risK5.

( 6 ) S u c c e s s f u l o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l c o m m a n d e r s command and l e a d f r o m f o r w a r d l o c a t i o n s , us i n s t h e i r P e r s o n a l p r e s e n c e t o i n f l u e n c e t h e outcome of o p e r a t i o n s .

Having a r r i v e d a t t h e s e c o n c l u s i o n s a b o u t t h e n a t u r e of

197

Patton

' 5

and Guder i a n

' 5

operational art,

i t Pernairas t o e x p l a i n

Why t h e r e f i n d i n g s a r e i m p o r t a n t t o t h e f l m e r i c a n firmy t o d a y .

198

Part

111:

Implications for

Airland Battle

It

i s arguable t h a t a t t h e beginning of

W o r l d War

I1 the

R m e r i c a n Army d i d n o t P r a c t i c e a n d h a d n o d o c t r i n e f o r operational tactics. art, b u t d i d have a c o n c e p t i o n o f s t r a t e g y and p o l i t i c a l aversion t o large, standing and a

Given Americas armies, her

professional

i n s u l a r geograph i c pos it i o n ,

h i s t o r i c a l t e n d e n c y t o r e l y on h e r economic S t r e n g t h t o w i n wars, this

i s a p l a u s i b l e view

t o hold.

For t h e development o f
large

an o p e r a t i o n a l

doctrine that

e n v i s i o n s t h e maneuver o f
in a theater

m i l i t a r y formations operations

i s only necessary

of

t h a t has t h e r e q u i s i t e space a c r o s s which t o P r i o r t o W o r l d War

m a n e u v e r 1a r a e f o r m a t i o n s .

I I the h e r ican
it is

A r m y h a d no s u c h o p e r a t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s t o meet b e c a u s e

d i d n o t have world-wide quite different. t o fighting

As

commitments.

Today t h e s i t u * t i o n

a matter of

p o l i c y A m e r i c a now

is committed
i n Western
important

a c o n v e n t i o n a l o r t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r war This f a c t i m p l i e s two

Europe s h o u l d t h e need a r i s e . considerations. well-developed theater First,

t h e Arner i c a n Army n e e d s a c o h e r e n t operational a r t t h a t supports w h a t e v e r t h a t s t r a t e g y may b e . though it remains i t s we

doctrine for
i n Europe,

strategy

R i r l a n d B a t t l e a p p e a r s t o be t h a t d o c t r i n e , problernat i c because of requirement for

t h e n a t u r e o f t h e NRTO A l l i a n c e a n d strategy. Doctrlnally,

a coal it ion theater

199

m u s t g e t t o g e t h e r w i t h o u r a l l i e s i f we a r e s e r i o u s a b o u t
w i n n i n g a war a g a i n s t t h e Warsaw P a c t Second, t o have a d o c t r i n e doctrine i n Western E u r o p e .
is n o t t o h a v e a

in p r i n t only

i n t h e rele9,ant s e r , s e . W m u s t e n s u r e t h a t e v e r y e
corps understands Airland Battle
it is r e s p o n s i b l e ,

s t r a t u m of o u r o f f i c e r

d o c t r i n e a n d can e x e c u t e t h e p a r t f o r w h i c h whether tactical or operational d e s e r v e amp1 if i c a t i o n . T h e r e q u i r e m e n t f o r a we1 1 - d e v e l o p e d

. Both

of t h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s

coherent doctrine

is

a t a l l o r d e r b u t n o t beyond reach.
h i s t o r y h a s any u t i l i t y at a l l ,
it

If the s t u d y of m i l i t a r y

is t h a t

it helps

illuminate

w h a t f u n d a m e n t a l s o f t h e a r t a n d s c i e n c e o f war r e m a i n unchanged t h r o u g h time. Such s t u d i e s h e l p u n c o v e r t h e p r i n c i p l e d b a s i s f o r t h e c o n d u c t o f war a n d , h e n c e , h e l p establish the theoretical warfighting. and d o c t r i n a l foundations for

This s t u d y o f t h e o p e r a t i o n a l a r t o f P a t t o n a n d

G u d e r i a n c o n t r i b u t e s t o t h a t b a s e o f Knowledge by maKing e x p l i c i t some o f t h e K e y t e n e t s o r p r i n c i p l e s b y w h i c h t h e s e

two c o m m a n d e r s c o n d u c t e d o p e r a t i o n a l a r t . T h o u g h t h e b a s e o f
evidence
is n a r r o w b e c a u s e t h e s t u d y o n l y f o c u s e s on t w o
the operational

s u c c e s s f u l p r a c t i o n e r s of time period, operational

art during a limited

i n l a r g e p a r t its c o n c l u s i o n s are r e f l e c t e d
d o c t r i n e of America's p r i n c i p a l

in the

potential adversary
180-5.

a n d o u r own c u r r e n t d o c t r i n e as r e c o r d e d

i n F i e l d Manual

In s p i t e o f s o m e e v e r l i n g e r i n g b r a n c h p a r o c h i a l i s m i n t h e
A m e r i c a n Flrmy, d o c t r i n a l l y we a r e c o m m i t t e d t o f i g h t i n g as a

200

combined arms team.

Howeuer,

i t w i l l n e v e r b e s u f f i c i e n t merely

t o s a y we a r s c o m m i t t e d t o s u c h a c o n c e p t i o n o f w a r f a r e . F o r a
complete combined arms c o n c e r t ion at t h e o p e r a t i o n a l

level

requires t h a t air and ground o p e r a t i o n s be i n t e g r a t e d in such a

f a s h i o n t h a t t h e maximum e f f e c t o f j o i n t o p e r a t i o n s b e p r o d u c e d when a n d w h e r a n e e d e d . This point

is e s p e c i a l l y i m p o r t a n t

c o n s i d e r i n s t h a t t h e requirement

in Western Europe and o t h e r

t h e a t e r s a s well w i l l b e t o f i g h t o u t n u m b e r e d a n d w i n . Consequently, t h e l e s s o n f r o m Patton and Guderian commanders and s t a f f o f f i c e r s a t a l l

is t h a t
WOrK

leuels m u i t

c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y t o a c h i e v e t h e h i g h d e g r e e of c o o p e r a t i o n a n d i n t e g r a t i o n t h a t s e r v ice separateness, p a r o c h i a l i s m , fights, and poor l e a d e r s h i p at t h e t o p f r e q u e n t l y however, budgetary

i m p e d e . More

than this,

we m u s t s t r i v e t o a c h i e v e t h i s c l o s e

w a r K i n g r r l a t i o n s h i p NOW b e f o r e Flmerica g e t s c o m m i t t e d t o a mid-to-high

i n t e n 5 i t y c o n f l ict anywhere because t h e t r a n s i t i o n

is I i K e l y t o b e s h o r t

f r o m p e a c e t o war

in duration.

In P a r t , Ideal

joint doctrine can a i d

i n moving t o w a r d what

is s u r e l y a n

never t o b e f u l l y r e a l i z e d .
T h i s d i s c u s s i o n l e a v e s unanswered o t h e r q u e s t i o n s which do not fall i n t o t h e . j o i n t a r e n a . How, f o r e x a m p l e , s h o u l d US

c o r p s be c o n f i g u r e d f o r o p e r a t i o n s

i n Western E u r o p e t o d a y ? W e

taKe

i t as a g i v e n t h a t t h e y s h o u l d b e c o n f i g u r e d t h e way t h e y

are. S h o u l d corpz. be
be p u r e l y t a c t i c a l

in t h e l o g i s t i c s business o r should they

headquarters?

Is i t p l a u s i b l e t o t h i n K t h a t ,
and l o g i s t i c a l l y s u p p o r t e d ,

as c u r r e n t l y o r g a n i z e d , c o n t r o l l e d ,

201

a US a r m o r e d o r

m e c h a n i z e d d i v i s i o n c o u l d move a t t h e s p e e d a r t as G u d e r i a n o r P a t t o n

required t o execute operational

c o n d u c t e d i t ? 1 c a s e c a n b e made t h a t b o t h t y p e s o f d i v i s i o n 3 have t o o l a r g e of t o o cumbersome an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and l o g i s t i c a l ouerhead and

a command a n d c o n t r o l a p p a r a t u s t o p e r m i t t h e
o p e r a t i o n s Guder i a n and P a t t o n t h o u g h t to
S U C C ~ P .a ~

s o r t o f high-speed

absolutely essential war.

t the operational

level of

Ftn o b v i o u s r e s p o n s e t o t h e s e s p e c u l a t i o n s
G u d e r i a n and P a t t o n d i d w i l l i n W o r l d War 11 i s

i s t h a t what

i r r e l e v a n t t o d a y and this

b e t o o on t o m o r r o w ' s

battlefield.

The s u b s t a n c e o f

c l a i m is t h a t t e c h n o l o g i c a l c o n d i t i o n s h a v e c h a n g e d r e m a r K a b l y s i n c e t h e t i m e P a t t o n a n d G u d e r i a n waged ' w a r , a p p r o a c h t o o p e r a t i o n a l a r t no l o n g e r a p p l i e s . chemical/nuclear battlefield, of for instance, and t h e i r The integrated

r e n d e r s a W o r l d War

I 1 approach t o t h e conduct

operational a r t archaic. high technology

Ftlternatiuely,

i t may b e m a i n t a i n e d t h a t

i n f o r m a t i o n and c o m m u n i c a t i o n systems o b v i a t e t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r s e n i o r cornmanders t o g o f o r w a r d and t o lead. t o e x e r c i s e command a n d c o n t r o l

is that

The r e j o i n d e r t o t h e s e a r g u m e n t s from the truth. place, there

nothing

c o u l d be f u r t h e r In the f i r s t

i s an abundance o f e v i d e n c e even integrated

w h i c h shows t h a t f u t u r e chemical/nuclear/EW

battlefields,
w i l l

battlefields,

be remarKably s i m i l a r t o

t h e b a t t l e f i e l d s on w h i c h P a t t o n and G u d e r i a n f o u g h t . Operations w i l l be fast-moving, fluid, and r a p i d l y c h a n g i n g .

282

Exposed f l a n K s frequently isolated.

a r e 1 i K e l Y t o be t h e normal c o n d i t i o n ,

and and be

Unit5

w i l l be c u t o f f ,

temporarily encircled, information w i l l

Confusion w i l l

1iKely reign, be

intermittent,

and u n i t s w i l l

intermingled.

These words

describe nicely j u s t during the

the sort o f conditions that prevailed

1973 A r a b - I s r a e l i

War.

But this description o f the

m o d e r n b a t t l e f i e l d a l s o s o u n d s v e r y much I i K e t h e s o r t o f b a t t l e f i e l d a c r o s s which Guderian swept Russia

i n F r a n c e i n 1940,
The n u c l e a r a n d

I n 1941 and P a t t o n a t t a c K e d i n 1944.

c h e m i c a l d i m e n s i o n of

t h e m o d e r n b a t t l e f i e l d o n l y amp1 i f i e s t h e

necessity f o r maintaining dispersion u n t i l concentrat Ion i s required, purpose5. even more and t h e n r a p i d l y c o n c e n t r a t i n g f o r Hence, operational is

t h e r e q u i r e m e n t f o r speed o f o p e r a t i o n s
i t wa5

important than

i n G u d e r i a n and P a t t o n ' s day.

C o n s i d e r i n g t h e emphasls t h e S o v i e t s p l a c e on t h e speed o f operat ions, essential t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t high-tempo success a t the o p e r a t i o n a l operat ions are

for

level rises

considerably. Under s u c h b a t t l e f i e l d c o n d i t i o n s a g a i n s t a n u m e r i c a l l r s u p e r i o r enemy, important.

r i s K

a s s e s s m e n t a n d a c c e p t a n c e a r e a l l t h e more

I n o r d e r t o w i n d e c i s i v e engagements and m a j o r
commanders

b a t t l e s t h a t a r e l i n K e d as p a r t s o f a campaign p l a n ,

m u s t be a b l e t o s e e a h e a d i n t i m e a n d s p a c e a n d b e w l l l i n 9 t o accept a t t h e r i g h t t i m e c a l c u l a t e d r i s K s t o t h e i r own f o r c e s .

I t may e v e n b e t r u e t h a t t h i s t h e s i s c o n f i r m s w h a t we h a v e
always i n t u i t i v e l y Known a b o u t s u c c e s s f u l o p e r a t i o n a l art:

283

speed of

operat ions,

c o n c e n t r a t e d and

integrated fires, depth i n t i m e and space,

envelop i n 2 maneuver,

iSK

acceptance,

i n it i a t i u e r e t e n t i o n ,
edge a r e a l l

and p e r s o n a l

leadership at t h e c u t t i n g ingredients for success a t

absolutely essential l e v e l of war.

the operational

B u t even Knowledge of requires the further where,

the various

ingredients
KnOW

in a recipe
when,

e x p e r t i s e and j u d g m e n t t o each

a n d how much o f

i n g r e d i e n t t o mix t o produce t h e b o l d n e s s as w e l l as r e f i n e d level

desired result.

A c e r t a i n amount o f

m i l i t a r y judgment o f command.

i s what

i s required a t the operational

B o t h G u d e r i a n and P a t t o n e x e r w l i f i e d r e f i n e d m i l i t a r y judgment,

b o l d n e s s and a

h i g h degree o f for their

which helps account

successes

in b a t t l e .

It i s a l s o easy t o a p p r e c i a t e

in

b o t h men t h e i r

warr i o r qua1 i t i e s . juncture of

Each r e 1 i s h e d t h e t h o u g h t o f a b a t t l e and t o o K p a i n s t o b e w h i c h shows t h a t G u d e r i a n and

being at t h e c r i t i c a l there. And t h e r e

i s much e v i d e n c e

Patton developed t h e i r l o n g - t e r m procesz. o f s e l f -educat ion, teaching, and

r e f i n e d m i l i t a r y judgment through a included

g r o w t h and m a t u r a t i o n t h a t experiences,

a broad range of

r e f l e c t ion,
u t i l i t y

intellectual

self-discipline. then, lies

F? f u r t h e r

t o t h e s t u d y of

military history,

i n t h e broadened
who

Perspect i v e such a study a f f o r d 5 t h e contemporary s o l d i e r , must be p r e p a r e d t o d e a l w i t h an u n c e r t a i n f u t u r e

a n d o n whose

s h o u l d e r s and c o n s c i e n c e t h e b u r d e n of begins. Airland Battle doctrine w i l l

s u c c e s s f a l l s when w a r if,

l i K e l Y come t o n o u g h t

when t h e t i m e comes t o

l i v e o r d i e by t h e p r i n c i p l e s

it

204

i m p l i e s , w d o n o t h a v e i d a r r i o r s who c a n a p p l y t h o s e p r i n c i p l e s e t o t h e circumstances at hand. If such heady sounding idealism

is, i n p a r t ,

the stuff

of which w a r r i o r s 1iKe Heinz Guderian

its

a n d G e o r g e P a t t o n a r e m a d e , t h e n we w o u l d d o w e l l t o f o s t e r

g r o u t h b y c o n t i n u i n g t o s t u d y t h e l . e men a n d t h e i r o p e r a t i o n a l methods.

205

ENDNOTES

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Jr., War As I Knew I t ( B o s t o n :

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2 War As

I Knew

It, p.214.

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I NIT1 A L 0 1STR I B U T I U r l L I T S

1 . C o m b i n e d Arms

Research L i b r a r y U . S . Army Command a n d G e n e r a l S t a f f F o r t L e a u e n w o r t h , K a n s a s 66827

College

2. D e f e n z a T e c h n i c a l I n f o r m a t i o n C e n t e r Cameron S t a t i o n A l e x a n d r i a , V i r g i n i a 22314

3 . M a j o r R o g e r C i r i l l o Combat S t u d i e s I n r t i t u t e U . S . Rrrny Command a t i d G e n e r a l S t a f f F o r t L e a u e n w o r t h , K a n s a s 66027

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4 . D r . C h r i s t a p h c r R. G a b a l Combat S t u d i e s I n s t i t u t e U . S . Flrmv Command a n d G e n e r a l S t a f f F o r t L e a u e n w o r t h , K a r l i a s 66027

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5. L T C D o u g l a s V . J o h n s o n , X I S c h o o l o f Advanced M i l i t a r y S t u d i e s
U.S.

R r m v Command a n d G e n e r a l S t a f f College F o r t L e a u e n w o r t h , K a n s a s 66027