UC-NRLF

IMS 517

BERKELEY

JBRARY
JNIVERSITY

OF CALIfORNU

^
/

ELEMENTS OF

LOGIC.

BY THE SAME AUTHOR,

ELEMENTS OF RHETORIC.
Crown Octaro.

Reprinted from the SeveTith {Octa/vo) Edition,

ELEMENTS
OF

LOGIC.

9^1

RICHARD WHATELY,
ARCHBISBUP
OJf

D.D.

DUBLIN,

KEPRINTED FllOM THE NINTH (oCTAVO) EDITION.

LONDON JOHN W. PAEKER AND SON, WEST STRAND.

1857.

18 7
ADVERTISEMENT.

In the present edition, a few insertions, and alterations of expression,

in

some

places,

have been introduced.

In this and in the preceding

edition, several

passages have been transferred from the places they

formerly occupied, to others which appeared more suitable.

but, I trust, clear exposure has

And

a brief,

been added

(in Introd. i,

and B. IV.

Ch.

I. 1,

2) of the untenable character of

in

some objections which have

been of late years revived,

of Science generally,

a somewhat new form, against the utility

the syllogistic theory,

against

and against the

points,

explanations given in this treatise, of reasoning from Induction.

These answers (and also additional remarks on some of the same

in

4 of the Introduction

to the

" Memeiits of Rhetoric") have been

;

before the Public

now some

years

and as no attempt

at a reply has

been made, even

in

subsequent editions of the very works containing the

is

objections, a strong presumption

thus afforded of the soundness of

my

views.

The reader
word

is

to observe that the angular [brackets] denote that the

is

so enclosed

equivalent in meaning to that which precedes

it.

955

CONTENTS.
PAGE

DEDICATION PREFACE INTRODUCTION

v
viiitoxxii
1

BOOK

I.

ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF THE SCIENCE

15

BOOK
SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM
Chap. Chap,
I.

II.

86
ib.

II.

Chap. Chap. Chap.

III.

Of the Operations of the Mind, and of Terms .... Of Propositions Of Arguments

.
.

41 51

IV.Supplement
V.

to Chap. Ill

Supplement to Chap. 1
BOOK
III.

64

80

OF FALLACIES

101

BOOK
Chap
Chap.

IV.
.

DISSERTATION ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING

I.Of Induction
II. On the discovery of Trath Chap. III. Of Inference and Proof Chap. IV. Of Verbal and Real Questions Chap, v. OfRealism

.150
151

156
173

177 182

APPENDIX.
No. No.
I.

II.

to be On certain Terms which are peculiarly ambiguously ... Miscellaneous Examples the Exercise of Learners
liable

used
191
. .

for

240 252

No. III. Example of Analysis

INDEX

263

; ;

TO

IUCtHT

reverend EDWARD COPLESTON, D.D

LORD BISHOP OF LLANDAFF,
&c. &c.

My Dear

Lord,
the advantages I have derived from your instructions,

To enumerate

both in regular lectures and in private conversation, would be needless to

those acquainted with the parties, and to the Public, uninteresting.
object at present
is

My

simply to acknowledge

how

greatly

am

indebted to

you

in respect of the present

Work;
and

not merely as having originally

imparted to

me

the principles of the Science, but also as having contriillustrations,

I

buted remarks, explanations,

relative

to

the most

important points, to so great an amount that

as the

can hardly consider myself

treatise as are

Author of more than half of such portions of the

I

not borrowed from former publications.

could have wished, indeed, to

distinc-

acknowledge

this

more

explicitly,

by marking with some note of

tion those parts

which are least

my
is

own.

But

found

it

could not

be done.

In most instances there

in those parts

somethhig belonging to each of us

is

and -even
fair that

where your share

the largest,

it

would not be
is

you should be made responsible

for

any thing that

not entirely

your own.
distinctly

Nor

is it

possible, in the case of a Science, to

in

remember
to

how

far one has been,

each mstance,

indebted

the

suggestions of another.

Information, as to matters of fact,

may

easily
:

be referred in the mind to the person from

scientific truths,

whom we have derived it but when thoroughly embraced, become much more a part
were
;

of the mind,
instructor,

as

it

since they rest, not on the authority of the

but on reasoning from data, wliich

we

ourselves furnish;'

they are scions engrafted on the stems previously rooted in our

own

soil

and wc arc apt

to

confound them with

1

its

indigenous productions.
'

Sec B. IV. Ch.

II. 5

VI

DEDICA.TION.

You

youi'self also, I

have reason to believe, have forgotten the greater

part of the assistance you have afforded in the course of conversations on

the subject;
distinctly

as

have found, more than once, that ideas which

to have received

remembered
is

from you, have not been recogfar,

nized by you

when read

or repeated.

As

however, as

can

recollect,

though there
or less,

no part of the following pages in which I have not, more

I

received valuable suggestions from you,

believe

you have

contributed less to the Analytical Outline, and to the Treatise on Fallacies,

and more, to the subjoined Dissertation, than to the rest of the

Work.
I

take this opportunity of pubhcly declaring, that as, on the one hand,
for

you are not responsible

any thing contained

in this

Work,

so,

on the

other hand, should you ever favour the world with a publication of your

own on
with
as

the subject, the coincidence which will doubtless be found

as

it

many things here brought forward

at least

my own,

is

not to be regarded

any indication of plagiarism,

Believe

on your

side.

me

to be.

My

dear Lord,
affectionate

Your obUged and

Pupil and Friend,

RICHARD WHATELY.

PREFACE.

The

following Treatise contains the substance of the Article

It

" Logic*'
that a some who

in the Encyclopoedia Metropolitana.

was suggested

to

me
;

separate publication of

it

might prove acceptable, not only

to

are not subscribers to that work, but also to several

for convenience of reference,

who

are

but wht..
In

would prefer a more portable volume.

fact a

number

of individuals

had actually formed a design (prevented

only by this publication) of joining together to have the article reprinted

for their

own

private use.
it,

I accordingly revised

and made such additions,

its utility.

chiefly in the

form

of Notes, as I thought likely to increase

When

applied to to contribute the Article, I asked and obtained

permission from Dr. Copleston (now Bishop of LlandaiF) to

make

use of

manuscripts compiled in great measure from what I had heard from him
in conversations on the subject, or

which he had read to me from his common-place book, interspersed with observations of my own. These
I

manuscripts
use of

had drawn up and was

pupils.

in the habit of

employing, for the

my own

In throwing them into a form suitable for the Encyclopaedia, and in

subsequently enlarging the Article into the present volume, I have taken

without scruple whatever appeared most valuable from the works of

former writers
of Aldrich.

especially the concise, but in general accurate, treatise

I

But while

acknowledge

my obligations to my predecessors,
;

of whose labours I have largely availed myself, I do not profess to be altogether satisfied with any of the treatises that have yet appeared

nor

have

I accordingly

judged

it

any unreasonable presumption

to point out

what seem to me the errors they contain. Indeed, whatever deference an Author may profess for the authority of those who have preceded him,
the very circumstance of his publishing a work on the same subject,

proves that he thinks theirs open to improvement.

ever, as I

In censuring, howhave had occasion to do, several of the doctrines and explananot from

tions of logical writers,

and of Aldrich in particular, I wish it to be my having formed a low estimate of the merits of the Compendium drawn up by the Author just mentioned^ but.
understood that this
is

Viu

PREFACE.

on the contrary, from its popularity, (it being the one commonly used at Oxford) from the impossibility of noticing particularly all the points and from the consideration that errors are the in which we agree, more carefully to be pointed out in proportion to the authority by which

they are sanctioned.

I have to acknowledge assistance received from several friends who have at various times suggested remarks and alterations. But I cannot aA^oid particularizing the Rev. J. Newman, Fellow of Oriel College, who

aciuaily

composed a considerable portion of the work as

it

now

stands,

from manuscripts not designed for publication, and who

author of several pages.

is

the original

Some

valuable illustrations of the importance

of attending to the ambiguity of the terms used in Political Economy,

were furnished by the kindness of

of Magdalen College, and

my friend and

former pupil, Mr. Senior,

now Master in Chancery, who preceded me in the office of Professor of Political Economy at Oxford, and afterwards was appointed to the same at King's College, London. They are printed
in the

Appendix.

far more,

and

that, iu the

But the friend to whom it is inscribed has contributed most important parts, than all others together

so much, indeed, that, though there is in the treatise nothing of his which has not undergone such expansion or modification as leaves me solely
responsible for the whole, there
is

not a

little

of which I cannot fairly

claim to be the Author.

Each successive edition has been revised with the utmost care. But though the work has undergone not only the close examination of myself and several friends, but the severer scrutiny of determined opponents, I am happy to find that no material errors have been detected, nor any
considerable alterations found necessary.

many writers have said much in which I cannot and which has tended to bring the study into unmerited disrepute. By representing Logic as furnishing the sole instrument for the discovery of truth in all subjects, and as teaching the use of the intellectual facuUies in general, they raised expectations which could not be The whole system, realised, and which naturally led to a re-action.
On
the utility of Logic
coincide,

whose unfounded pretensions had been thus blazoned forth, came to be commonly regarded as utterly futile and empty like several of our most
:

valuable medicines, which,

when

first

introduced, were proclaimed, each,

;

as a panacea, infallible in the most opposite disorders

sequently, in

and which con;

many

instances, fell for a time into total disuse

though,

after a long interval, they

were established

in their just estimation,

and

emi;loyed conformably to their real properties.

rKEFACE.

IX

?f

In one of Lord Dudley's (lately published) letters to Bishop Copleston, the date of 1814, he adduces a presumption against the study of
it

was sedulously cultivated during the dark periods in which mankind seemed nearly paralyzed, when no discoveries were made, and when various errors were wide-spread and deep-rooted and that when the mental activity of the world revived, and
Logic, that the intellectual powers of

philosophical inquiry flourished and bore

its fruits, logical

studies fell into

**

decay and contempt.

And

this I
2,)

have introduced

in the

Elements of
st,

Rhetoric," (Part IL Ch. IIL

presumption.

among

other examples of

presump-

tion not in itself unreasonable, but capable of being rebutted

by a counter-

to the neglect of others,

there

is

any study has been unduly or unwisely cultivated and has even been intruded into their province, a presumption that a re-action^ will ensue, and an equally

When

excessive contempt, or dread, or disgust, succeed.

instance, the mistaken

And

in the present

great intellectual

and absurd cultivation of Logic during Ages ot darkness, might have been expected to produce, in a

subsequent age of comparative light, an association in men's minds, of

Logic, with the idea of apathetic ignorance, prejudice, and adherence to
error; so that the legitimate uses,

and just value of the science (suppos-

ing

Our have any) would be likely to be scornfully overlooked. ancestors having neglected to raise fresh crops of corn, and contented themselves with vainly threshing over and over the same straw and
it

to

winnowing the same

chaff,

it

might have been anticipated that their

to

descendants would, for a time, regard the very operations of threshing

and winnowing with contempt, and would attempt

and chaff
all

grmd

corn, straw,

together.

The

revival of a study

which had for a long time been regarded as an

to

obsolete absurdity,

would probably have appeared

difficult

many persons,
life

thirty

years ago, as an undertaking far more

than the introduction of

to one into

some new study

a
tree.

as resembling rather the attempt to restore

of the antediluvian fossil-plants, than the rearing of a

young seedling

It is

a curious circumstance that the very person to

wham

the letter

just alluded to

was addressed should have

(in

lived to witness so great a

change of public opinion brought about

a great degree through his

own

instrumentality^) within the short interval-

portion of the interval

cation, that the

between the writing

During that

indeed

within a small
its

of that letter and

publi-

whole ground of the presumption alluded to has been

interval, the treatise

completely cut away.

which was with

See " Charge," 1843.

See Dedication.

X
his aid composed,

PREFACE.
and by his permission inserted
in tlie Encyclopaedia,

attracted so

much

attention as to occasion its separate publication, in a

the United States of America

volume which has been frequently reprinted, not only in England, but in where it is in use, I believe, in every one
;

of their Colleges.

Add

to which, the frequent allusions

(compared with
to the subject

what could have been met with twenty or thirty years ago) And moreover of Logic, by writers on various subjects.
treatises

several other

on the subject, either original works or abridgments, have been

their appearance with

making
years.

continually increased frequency of late

little

Some ihdeed

of these have
title.

or nothing in

common with
is

the

present work except the

But even that very circumstance

is

so far

encouraging, as indicating that the Tiame of this science instead of exciting,

as formerly, an almost universal prejudice,

considered as likely to prove

a recommendation.

Certainly Lord Dudley, were he

now
;

not speak of the general neglect and contempt of Logic

living, would though every

branch of Science, Philosophy, and Literature, have flourished during

the interval.

what can be done only in the One preliminary observation only (for the original suggestion of which I am indebted to the same friend to whom this work is inscribed) it may be worth while to offer If it were inquired what is to be regarded as the most in this place.
explain fully the utility of Logic
is

To

course of an explanation of the system

itself.

appropriate intellectual occupation of

MAN,

as man, what would be the

answer?

The Statesman
;

is

engaged with

political affairs; the Soldier

with military

the Mathematician, with the properties of numbers and

;

magnitudes
are
all

but in what and each of these employed? employed, I mean, as men; for tliere are many modes of exercise of the faculties, mental as well as bodily, which are in great measure common to us with the lower animals.
;

the Merchant, with commercial concerns, ka.

Evidently, in Reasoning.

They

are

all

occupied in deducing, well or

111,

Conclusions from Premises; each, concerning the subject of his

particular business.
daily, in
If,

own

therefore,

it

be found that the process going on

is, in any respect, the samet and if the principles on which it is conducted can be reduced to a regular system, and if rules can be deduced from that system, for the better

each of so

many

different minds,

conducting of the process, then,

the

it

can hardly be denied that such a

system and such rules must be especially worthy the attention,

members
is

of this or that profession merely, but

not of
who
is

of every one

desirous of possessing a cultivated mind. that which

To understand
will

the theory of
in general,

the appropriate intellectual occupation of

Man

and

to learn to do that well,

which every one

and

mu^

do, whether

PREFACE.
well or
ill,

ad

may

siirely

he cousidered as an essential part of a liberal

education.

Even supposing that no practical improvement in argumentation resulted from the study of Logic, it would not by any means follow that it is unworthy of attention. The pursuit of knowledge on curious and interesting subjects, for
time
;

its

own

sake,

is

usually reckoned no misemployment of

if

and

is

considered as, incidentally,

not directly, useful to the

individual,

by the

exercise thus afforded to the mental faculties.

All

who

study Mathematics are not training themselves to become Surveyors

;

or Mechanics

expected in a

man

some knowledge of Anatomy and Chemistry is even liberally educated, though without any view to his

practising Surgery or Medicine.

And

the investigation of a process

which

is

peculiarly autl universally the occupation of

Man, considered as
than those just

Man, can hardly be reckoned a

instanced.
It has usually

less philosophical pursuit

subject, that a theory

is

been assumed, however, in the case of the present which does not tend to the improvement of practice
;

utterly

unworthy of regard

and then,

it is

contended that Logic has

reason correctly

no such tendency, on the plea that

%vithout it:

men may and do

fcc.,

an objection which would equally apply in the case of Gramin all of

mar, Music, Chemistry, Mechanics,

practice

which systems the

must have existed previously

to the theory.

But many who allow the use of systematic principles in other things, Common-Sense as the sufficient and only safe guide in Reasoning. Now by Common-Sense is meant, I apprehend, (when the term is used with any distinct meaning,) an exercise of the judgment unaided by any Art or system of rules such an exercise as we must necessarily employ in numberless cases of daily occurrence in
are accustomed to cry up
:

which, having no established principles to guide us,

as
it

^no line

of procedure,

were, distinctly chalked out,

we

must needs act on the best

extemporaneous conjectures we can form. He who is eminently skilful in doing this, is said to possess a superior degree of Common-Sense. But
that

Common-Sense

is

only our second-best guide

that the

rules of Art,
is an man-

if judiciously

framed, are always desirable when they can be had,

assertion, for the truth of

which
so

kind in general

which

is

may appeal much the more

I

to the testimony of

valuable, inasmuch as

it

may

For the generality have a strong predilection in favour of Common-Sense, except in those points in which they, respectively, possess the knowledge of a system of rules : but in these points they deride any one who trusts to unaided Commonbe accounted the testimony of adversaries.
Sense.

Sailor e.g.

Tfillj

perhaps, despise the pretensions of medical

xii

PREFACE.
:

men, and prefer treating a disease by C ommon- Sense but he would ridicule the proposal of navigating a ship bv Common-Sense, without
art. A Physician, again, will perhaps contemn Systems of Political-Economy,^ of Logic, or Metaphysics, and insist on the superior wisdom of trusting to Common-Sense in such

regard to the maxims of nautical

matters

but he would never approve of trusting to Common-Sense in

Neither, again, would the Architect recomalone, in building, nor the Musician, in

the treatment of diseases.

mend
arts,

a reliance on

Common-Sense

music, to the neglect of those systems of rules, which, in their respective

have been deduced from

scientific

reasoning aided by experience.

And

the induction might be extended to every department of practice.

Since, therefore, each gives the preference to unassisted

Common-Sense
to,

only in those cases where he himself has nothing else to trust

and

invariably resorts to the rules of art, wherever he possesses the knowledge

of them,
it is

plain that

mankind

universally bear their testimony, though

unconsciously and often unwillingly, to the preferableness of systematic

knowledge
There

to conjectural

judgments.

is,

however, abundant room for the employment of

Common-

Sense in the application of the system.

To

bring arguments, out of the

form

in

which they are expressed

for such

in conversation

and

in books, into the

regular logical shape, must be, of course, the business of Common-Sense,

aided by practice

arguments

are,

by

supposition, not as yet

within the province of Science; else they would not be irregular, but

would be already strict syllogisms. To exercise the learner in this operation, I have subjoined in the Appendix, some examples, both of insulated arguments, and (in the later editions) of the analysis of argumentative works.
It should

be added, however, that a large portion of

what is usually introduced into Logical treatises, relative to the finding of Arguments, the different kinds of them, <fcc., I have referred to the head of JRketoric, and treated of in a work on the Elements of that Art.

It Avas doubtless

tages, direct

and

indirect, accruing

from a strong and deliberate conviction of the advanfrom an acquaintance with Logic,

that the University of Oxford,

when

re-modelling their

system, not

only retained that branch of study, regardless of the clamours of

of the half-learned, but even assigned a prominent place to
it
it,

many
This

by making

an indispensable part of the Examination for the

however,
I

first

Degree.

last circumstance,

am

convinced, has, in a great degree, proIt

duced an

effect opposite to

what was designed.

Political

has contributed to

See Senior's Introductory Lecture on

Economy,

p. 28.

PREFACE.
lower instead of exalting,
tlie

XlU
;

estimation of the study

and

to withhold
it

from

it

the earnest attention of

I

many who might have

all

applied to

with

profit.

am

not so

weak

as to imagine that any

System can ensure

students, or in a

great proficiency in any pursuit whatever, either in

very large proportion of them:

flowers:" hut
it

"we sow many

seeds to obtain a few

might have been expected (and doubtless was expected)

that a majority at least of successful candidates would derive some benefit

worth mentioning from their logical pursuits and that a considerable proportion of the distinguished candidates would prove respectable, if not
;

eminent logicians.

Such expectations

do not censure as unreasonable,

had I been called upon to judge at that period when our experience was all to come. Subsequently, however, experience has shown that those expectations have been very
or such as I might not have formed myself,

inadequately realized.

The

truth

is,

that a very small proportion, even

proficients in Logic
;

of distinguished students, ever

become
do not
;

far the greater part pass through the University without

and that by knowing any

thing at

all

of the subject.

mean

that they have not learned by

rote a string of technical terms

but that they understand absolutely

nothing whatever of the principles of the science.

I

am aware

that some injudicious friends of Oxford will censure the

I

frankness of this avowal.

have only to reply that such

is

the truth

and that I think too well of, and know far too well, the University in which I have been employed in various academical occupations above a
quarter of a century, to apprehend danger to her reputation from declaring the exact truth.

With

all its defects,

and no human

institution is

perfect, the University

would stand,
it,

am

convinced, higher in public

estimation than

it

does, were the whole truth,

in all points respecting

more fully known. success of the measures employed to promote

quence,
I
will,

and nothing but the truth, But the scanty and partial
is

logical studies

the conse-

apprehend, of the universality of the requisition.

That which
;

must be done by every one,

of course, often be done but indiiferently

and when the belief is once fully established, which it certainly has long been, that any thing which is indispensable to a testimonial, has little or
nothing to do with the attainment of honours,* the lowest standard sotya

becomes the established one

from
is

in the

minds of the greater number

ami

provided that standard be once reached, so as to secure the candidate

rejection, a greater or less proficiency in

any such branch of study

regarded as a matter of indifference, as far as any views of academical

distinction are concerned.

* In the last-framed Examination-statute express declaration has been inserted,

fin

that proficiency in Looric is to have weight in the assignment of honours.

XiV

PREFACE.

Divinity Is one of these branches, and to this also most of what has been said concerning Logic might be considered as equally applicable;
but, In fact, there are several Important differences between the
cases.

two most of the students who are designed for the Church, and many who are not, have a value for theological knowledge,
In the
first place,
;

independently of the requisition of the schools and on that ground do not confine their views to the lowest admissible degree of proficiency:

whereas

this

can be said of very few In the case of Logic.

And

more-

over, such as design to

another examination in

become candidates for holy Orders, know that Theology awaits them. But a consideration,
is,

which

is still

more

to the present purpose,

that Theology, not being

a Science, admits of

infinite degrees of proficiency,

from that which

is

is

within the reach of a child, up to the highest that

attainable

by the

most exalted genius

as far as
it

every one of which degrees

is

inestimably valuable

goes.
it,

If any one understands tolerably the Church-catechism,

or even half of

he knows something of

divinity,
it

and that something

Is

incalculably preferable to nothing.

But

is

not so with a Science:

one who does not understand the principles of Euclid's demonstrations,

whatever number of questions and answers he may have learnt by rot, knows absolutely nothing of Geometry: unless he attain this point all
his labour is utterly lost
;

worse than

lost,

perhaps,

if

he

Is

led to believe

that he has learned something of Mathematics, when, in truth, he has

not.

And

the same

Is

the case with Logic, or any other Science.

It

does not admit of such various degrees, as a knowledge of religion.

course I

Of

am

far

from supposing that

all

who understand any

same

thing,

much

or

little,

of a certain Science, stand on the

level; but I

mean, what is surely undeniable, that one who does not embrace the fundamental principles, of a Science, whatever he may have taken on authority, and learned by rote, knows, properly speaking, nothing of that
science.

And

such, I have no hesitation in saying,

is

the case with a

considerable proportion even of those candidates

including

who

obtain testimonials,

not so

many who gain distinction. There are some persons (probably many as one in ten, of such as have in other respects tolerable abilities,) who are physically incapable of the degree of steady abstracScience, whatever pains

tion requisite for really

embracing the principles of Logic or of any other may be taken by themselves or their teachers.

But there

is

much

greater
;

though not an impossibility

standard.

number to whom and who having,

this is a great difficult]/,

of course, a strong dis-

inclination to such a study, look naturally to the very lowest admissible

And

the example of such examinations in Logic as must be

expected in the case of

men

of these descriptions, tends, in combination

PREFACE.
witli

XV

popular prejudice, to degrade the study altogether in the minds of

the generality.
It

was from these considerations, perhaps, that

it

was proposed, a few

years ago, to leave the study of Logic altogether to the option of the
candidates
;

but the suggestion was rejected; the majority appearing to

think (in which opinion I most fully coincide) that, so strongly has the
tide of popular opinion set against the study, the result

would have been,

Matters^

within a few years, an almost universal neglect of that science.

were accordingly
former footing
;

left,

at that time, in respect of this point, on their

I

which

am

convinced,

was

far preferable to the pro-

posed alteration.

But a middle course between these two was suggested, which

persuaded would be
I
infinitely preferable to either
;

was

a persuasion which

had long entertained, and which is confirmed by every day's obserand reflections of which, few persons, I believe, have bestowed more on this subject. Let the study of Logic, it was urged, be made
vations
;

optioned to tJwse

who are merely candidates for a

degree,

but indis-

pensable to the attainment of academical Iwnours ; and the consequence would be, that it would speedily begin and progressively continue, to
rise in estimation and to be studied with real profit. The examination might then, it was urged, without any hardship, be made a strict one since no one could complain that a certain moderate degree of sciertific ability, and a resolution to apply to a certain prescribed study, should be the conditions of obtaining distinction. The far greater part would
still

study Logic
but

since there

be willing
tinction;

to exclude themselves
it

would be (as before) but few who would from the possibility of obtaining disdifferent

would be studied with a very

to

mind, when

by being made part honours, and when a proficiency in it came

ennobled, as
it

were,

of the passport to University

be regarded generally as an

honourable distinction.
those

And

in proportion as the

who

really understood the science, the

it

number,

number increased of it was contended,

by
all

would increase of such as would value

It

on higher and better grounds.

better appreciated
in

would

in

time come to be better

:

known and

the well-informed part of society

and lectures

Logic at the University

would then, perhaps, no longer consist exclusively of an explanation of the mere elements. This would be necessary indeed for beginners but
;

to the

more advanced students, the

tutors would

no more think of

lecturing in the bare rudiments, than of lecturing in the Latin or

Greek

Grammar; but, in the same manner as they exercise their Grammar, by reading with them Latin and Greek authors with
reference to grammar-rules, so, they would exercise

pupils in

continual

them

in

Logic by

xvi

PREFACE.
it

reading some argumentative work, requiring an analysis of

principles.

on logical
to

These

effects could not indeed,

till

it

was acknowledged, be expected

;

show themselves j^z^%

four years,

after a considerable lapse of time

but that the

change would begin to appear, (and that very decidedly,) within three or was confidently anticipated. To this it was replied, that it was most desirable that no one should

be allowed to obtain the Degree of B.A. without a knoAvledge of Logic. This answer carries a plausible appearance to those unacquainted with tho
actual state of the University
it
;

though

in fact

it is

totally irrelevant.

For
;

goes on the supposition, that hitherto this object has been accomplished
that every one

who passes
is

his examination does possess a

knowledge

of Logic; which

notoriously not the fact, nor ever can be, without

in

some important change

fore
is,

not, as the above objection

some part of our system. The question therewould seem to imply, whether a real,
shall

profitable

knowledge of Logic

be

strictly required of

every candidate
in the

for a Degree, (for this in fact never has

been done,) but whether,

attempt to accomplish this by requiring the form of a logical examination

from every candidate without exception, we shall continue to degrade the science, and to let this part of the examination be regarded as a mere form, by many who might otherwise have studied Logic in earnest, and
with advantage:
too of a

whether the great majority of candidates, and those more promising description, shall lose a real and important

benefit, through the attempt, (which, after all, experience has proved to be a vain attempt,) to comprehend in this benefit a very small number,

and of the least promising. Something of an approach

to the proposed alteration,

was introduced

into the Examination-statute passed in

1830;

in which, permission Is

for Logic a portion of

will

granted to such as are candidates merely for a testimonial, to substitute Euchd. I fear, however, that little or nothing

be gained by this ; unless indeed the Examiners resolve to make the For since every examinations in Logic far stricter than those in EucHd. one who Is capable of really understanding EucHd must be also capable

for Science

of Logic, the alteration does not meet the case of those whose inaptitude is Invincible ; and these are the very description of men whoso
(so called) logical-examinations tend to depress the science.

Those few

who really are physically incapable of scientific reasoning, and the far greater number who fancy themselves so, or who at least will rather run
a risk than surmount their aversion, and set themselves to study in earnest, all these will be likely, when the alternative Is proposed, to prefer Logic to Euclid; because in the latter, it is hardly possible, ,fc

PREFACE.

xvii

least not near so easy as In Logic, to present the semblance of prepara-

tion

by learning questions and answers by

rote

in the cant phrase of

undergraduates, by getting crammed.

Experience has proved this, in the case of the Responsion-examinations, where the alternative of Logic
or Euclid has always been proposed to the candidates
;

of

whom

those

most averse
prefer Logic.

to Science, or incapable of

it,

are almost always found to

forth, that all

The determination may indeed be formed, and acted on from hencewho do in reaUty know nothing, properly speaking, of any Science, shall be rejected: all I know is, that this has never been the
Still, it is

case hitherto. a satisfaction to me, that attention has been called to the

evil in question,

and an experimental measure adopted

is

for its abatement.

confident hope

thus afforded, that in the event (which I

much

fear)

of the failure of the experiment,

some other more

effectual

measure

may

be resorted
I

to.^

am

sensible that

many may

object, that this is not the proper place

:

for such

remarks as the foregoing

fairly

what has the Public

all

at large, they

may
it

say, to do Avith the statutes of the University of

Oxford?

To

this

might

be replied, that not only

who think

of sending their

sons or other near relatives to Oxford, but all likewise who are placed under the ministry of such as have been educated there, are indirectly

But the what I have, is, that the vindication of Logic from the prevailing disregard and contempt under which it labours, would have been altogether incomplete For let it be remembered that the science is judged of by without it.
concerned, to a certain degree, in the system there pursued.
consideration which

had the chief share

in inducing

me

to say

the Public in this country, in a very great degree, from the specimens
displayed, and the reports made,

by those whom Oxford sends

forth.

Every
feels

one, on looking into the University- Calendar or

Statute-Book,

himself justified in assuming, that whoever has graduated at Oxford

:

must be a Logician

not, indeed, necessarily, a first-rate Logician

but

such as to satisfy the public examiners that he has a competent knowledge of the science.

Now,

if

a very large proportion of these persons

all benefited by their (so called) and if many of them treat the study with contempt, and represent it as a mere tissue of obsolete and empty jargon, which it is a mere waste of time to attend to, let any one judge what conclusions

neither are, nor think themselves at

logical education,

Since this was written, the experiment has been tried. In the first Examinationunder the new Statute, (Easter, 1831,) of 125 candidates who did not aspire to the
list

higher classes, hcenty-five presented Euclid for their examination, and one hu7idre4t Logic !

XVIU
respecting the utility of
tlie

PREFACE.
study, and the

wisdom of the University

in

upholding

it,

are likely to be the result.

That prejudices so deeply-rooted as those I have alluded to, and supported by the authority of such eminent names, especially that of Locke,
and
(as is

commonly, though not very correctly supposed) Bacon, should

treatise, I

be overthrown at once by the present

expect
;

am

not so sanguine as to

but

if I

have been successful

in refuting

lar objections,

and explaining some principles

some of the most popuwhich are in general ill-

understood,
(as they
It

it

may be hoped

that just notions on the subject

may continue

have begun) to gain ground more and more.

be permitted

have addressed myself most uninstructed tyro, to the furthest-advanced Logician, and have touched accordingly both on the most elementary principles, and on some of the most remote deductions from them, it must be expected that readers of each class will find some
to mention, that as I

may

me

to various classes of students, from the

parts not well calculated for them.

Some

explanations will appear to the

one too simple and puerile

will

and

for another class,

be at first too abstruse.

it is

If to each description

some of the disquisitions some portions are found

it

interesting,

as

much

as I can expect.

With regard

to the style, I

have considered perspicuity not only, as

always must be, the

explanation,

first point,

but as one of such paramount importance

Prolixity of

in such a subject, as to justify the neglect of all others.

homeliness

in illustration,

and baldness
of,

of expression, I

have regarded as blemishes not worth thinking

to be gained in respect of clearness.
difficulty

when any thing was

a temporary

To some

of

my readers

may

occasionally occur from the use of some technical terms

different, or differently applied,

to.

from what they have been accustomed

They must

consider, however, that the attempt to conform in this

point to the usage of every logical writer, would have been, on account of
their variations

from each other, utterly hopeless.

have endeavoured,

in the terms employed, to

generally to
objection to

make no wanton innovations, but to conform established usage, except when there is some very strong it where usage is divided, to prefer what may appear in
;

each case the most convenient term and, above all, to explain distinctly the sense in which each is employed in the present work. If any should complain of my not having given a history of aU the
;

senses in which each technical term has been used by each writer from
its first

introduction, and a review of the

works of each,

can only reply

that

my design

was not

to write

a Logical Archajology, or a Commentary

See Book

II.

Chap.

I. 1.

PREFACE.

XIX

on the works of former Logicians, but an elementary introduction to the And few, I suppose, woidd consider a treatise, for instance, science.

on Agriculture, as incomplete, which should leave untouched the questions what successive alterations of, who was the inventor of the plough, and from what region wheat was first tliat implement has imdergone,

introduced.

And
mind
by me
I

if

again any should complain of the omission of such metaphysical

disquisitions

generally,

on the laws of thought, and the constitution of the human as they have been accustomed to include under the

head of Logic,
in

my

a different sense

answer must be, that that term has been employed for reasons which I have stated in several
;

parts of this treatise, and especially in

Book IV. Chap.

III.

and that

am
I

therefore only to be censured, at the utmost, as not having under-

taken a work of a different kind, and on a different subject.

would

not, on the other hand,

be understood as complaining of those

who have used

the

word Logic

in a

more extended
I

sense, or as under-

rating the value of their works.

against the mistake

^much

Only, the reader should be cautioned

believe,

thought

commoner,

than

is

generally

of confounding the extension of the application

of a name, with
**

the enlargement of the boundaries of a science.

It is proper hoAvever to

mention that the

first

Part of the

Elements

of Rhetoric" contains a discussion of such points as

many
is,

writers have

treated of under the department of Logic.

The

technical language employed in this treatise,

throughout, with

the exception of a very few cases, where some departure from ancient

usage appeared indispensable, that of the older works on the subject. Some degree of prejudice perhaps might have been, in the outset,
avoided, and a far greater appearance of originality produced,

by adopting

novel forms of expression.

fault Avith
ing.
its

There are also many writers who have found the established technical language, as cumbrous and perplex-

stead consists of far

;

have always found however that the phraseology they adopt in more tedious circumlocution than that which
while
it is

they censure
It should

often less clear and less correct.

all

be observed however that

technical language (as

weU

as

must be expected to present, at first, a difficulty for the learner to surmount; though in the end, it will greatly facihtate his procedure. But with this view it is necessary that such language and rules should be not only distinctly understood, but also learnt, and remembered as familiarly as the Alphabet, and employed constantly, and with scrupulous exactness. Otherwise technical language wiU prove an encumbrance instead of an advantage just as a suit of clothes would be.
al^ rules of art)
;

XX
if

PREFACE.
instead of putting

them on and wearing them, one should carry them

about in his hands.

Of the
work,
I

correctness of the fundamental doctrines maintained in the

may be

allowed to feel some confidence

not so

much from
it,

the

length of time that I have been more or less occupied with

enjoying

at the same time the advantage of frequent suggestions and corrections from several judicious friends, as from the nature of the subject. In works of taste, an author cannot be sure that the judgment of the Public

will

coincide with his

or most appropriate object.

scientific

and if he fail to give pleasure, he fails of his sole But in the case of truths which admit of demonstration, it is possible to arrive by reasoning at as full an
;

own

assurance of the justness of the conclusions established, as the imperfection

will admit and experience, accompanied with attenand with repeated trials of various methods, may enable one long accustomed to tuition, to ascertain with considerable certainty

of the

human faculties

tive observation,

what explanations are the best comprehended.

however,

Many parts of the detail, may probably be open to objections but if, (as experience now authorizes me the more confidently to hope) no errors are discovered,
;

which materially

affect the substantial utility of the

work, but only such

as detract from the credit of the author, the object will have been attained which I ought to have

had

principally in view.

No

credit,

am

aware,

is

given to an author's

own

disclaimer of

personal motives, and profession of exclusive regard for public utility

since even sincerity cannot, on this point, secure

him from deceiving

one whose object was

himself; but

it

may

be allowable

to observe, that

the increase of his reputation as a writer, could hardly have chosen a subject less suitable for his purpose than the present. At the time of

the

first

publication the study

was neither popular,

nor,

apparently,

likely soon to
its

become

so.

Ignorance, fortified by prejudice, opposed

minds of those who are considered as both And as, on the one hand, a large class of modern philosophers might be expected to raise a clamour against
reception, even in the

candid and well-informed.

*' **

obsolete prejudices ;"

*'

bigoted devotion to the decrees of Aristotle ;"

in the

confining the

human mind
all

trammels of the Schoolmen," &c.,

it

so,

on the other hand, were

such as really are thus bigoted to every thing that

has been long established, merely because

has been long established,

likely to exclaim against the presumption of

an author, who pre-

sumes to depart in several points from the track of his predecessors. There is another circumstance, also, which tends materially to diminish the credit of a writer on this and some other kindred subjects. We can make no discoveries of striking novelties: the senses of our

PREFACE.
readers are not struck, as with the retuni of a

XXI

Comet which had been

gas
:

foretold, or the extinction of a taper in carbonic-acid

the materials

we work upon
to be well

common and familiar to all, and, And not only is any understood by all.
are
is

therefore, supposed

one's deficiency in

the use of these materials, such as

generally unfelt by himself, but

when it is removed by satisfactory explanations when the notions, which had been perplexed and entangled, are cleared up by the introduction of a few simple and apparently obvious principles, he will generally forget that any explanation at all was needed, and consider all that has
been said as mere truisms, which even a child could supply to himself. Such is the nature of the fundamental principles of a science they are

most evident and well-known truths, that the moment they are fully embraced, it becomes a difficulty to conceive that we could ever have been not aware of them. And hence, the more
so fully implied in the

simple, clear,
its

and obvious any

CA'cr

principle

is

rendered, the more likely

of course
!

is

exposition to elicit those

common remarks, "

is

of course

"
!

"no

one could

doubt that;" "this

;

all

nothing new brought to light

verbose,
mystical,

nothing
tell

very true, but there

is

that

was not familiar

I

to every

one," " there needs no ghost to

us that."

am

convinced that a

and

partially obscure

way
**

of writing

on such a

subject, is the

most

likely to catch the attention of the multitude.

The
miri-

generality verify the observation of Tacitus,

fico:" and

omne ignotum pro

that they
likely, for

when any thing knew it already

;

is

made very

plain to them, are apt to fancy

so that the explanations of scientific truths are

a considerable time at least, to be, by most men, underrated

the more, the more perfectly they accomplish their object.

very slow progress, therefore, towards popularity (far slower indeed

in fact

than has
treatise

taken place)

is

the utmost that I expected for such a

as I have endeavoured to

bound, however, not only as a

object which to

make the present. I felt myself member of Society, but more especially as

a Minister of the Gospel, to use

my

endeavours towards promoting an

is much more) whose importance was appreciated by very few besides. The cause of Truth universally, and not least, of religious Truth, is benefited by every thing that tends to promote sound reasoning, and faciHtate the detection

me

appears highly important, and (what

of fallacy. The adversaries of our Faith would, I am convinced, have been on many occasions more satisfactorily answered, and would have had fewer openings for cavil, had a thorough acquaintance with Logic been a more common qualification than it is. In lending my endeavours,
therefore, whether with greater or less success, towards this object, I trust that I

am

neither uselessly nor unsuitably employed.

XXli

PREFACE.
in,

Those who are engaged

all

or designed for the Sacred Ministry, and

is
is

others

who

are sensible that the cause of true religion

not a con-

cern of the Ministry alone,

should remember that this

no time to

forego any of the advantages which that cause

active

may

derive from an

and judicious

cultivation of the faculties.

Among

the enemies of

Christianity in the present day, are included, if I mistake not,

diiferent description of persons

a very from those who were chiefly to be met with

a century, or even half a century ago: what were called

and pleasure about town;"

dull

"men

of wit

ignorant,

shallow, flippant declaimers, or

and powerless pretenders

to Philosophy.

Among

the enemies of

the Gospel now, are to be found

men

not only of learning and ingenuity,

but of cultivated argumentative powers, and not unversed in the principles

of Logic.
help,

If the advocates of our religion think proper to disregard this

find,

they will
let

on careful inquiry, that

their opponents

do

not.

And
it

them not
suffer a

trust too carelessly to the strength of their cause.

all

Truth

will,

indeed, prevail, where

other points are nearly equal

if

but

may

temporary discomfiture,

hasty assumptions, unsound

arguments, and vague and empty declamation, occupy the place of a

train of close, accurate,
It is not,

and luminous reasoning.

is

however, solely, or chiefly, for polemical purposes, that the

of the

cultivation

reasoning-faculty

desirable;

in

persuading, in

investigating, in learning, or teaching, in all the multitude of cases in

which
them,

it is it

our object to arrive at just conclusions, or to lead others to

is

most important.

indeed supply the want of other knowledge

knowledge of logical rules wiU not nor was it ever proposed, by

;

any one who really understood this science, to substitute it for any other but it is no less true that no other can be substituted for this that it is valuable in every branch of study and that it enables us to use to the
;

greatest advantage the knowledge

that those Academical Bodies,

we possess. It is to be hoped, therefore, who have been wise enough to retain this
abandon
it,

science, will, instead of being persuaded to

tion rather to its

give their attoi-

improvement and more

effectual cultivation.

It
last

may be needful here to mention that there are some passages in the and in the present edition of this work (especially in the part relat-

my

ing to Induction) inserted in answer to certain objections which many of Eeaders may have never seen or heard of, even though having in

their

hands the very book in ihejirst

edition of

which those objections

objections

appeared.
(doubtless,

For from

in a subsequent edition of that book, those

their

having been
:

fully

answered, and found untenable)

were
to

silently suppressed

and hence,

I might, but for this notice, appear

some of my readers

to be combating a shadow.

ELEMENTS OF LOGIC

LOGIC.

INTRODUCTION.
Logic, in the most extensive sense in which it has been thought employ the name, may be considered as the Science, and also as the Art, of Reasoning. It investigates the principles on which argumentation is conducted, and furnishes such rules as may be derived from those principles, for guarding against erroneous deductions. Its most appropriate office, however, is that of instituting an analysis of the process of the mind in Reasoning ; and in this point of view it is, as I have said, strictly a Science : while, considered in reference to the practical rules above-mentioned, it may be called the Art of Reasoning. For it is to be remembered, that as a science is conversant about speculative knowledge only, and art is the application of knowledge to practice, hence, Logic (as well as any other system of knowledge) becomes, when applied to practice, an art ; while confined to the theory of reasoning, it is strictly a science : and it is as such that it occupies the higher place in point of dignity, since it professes to develop some of the most interesting
?
]
.

Definition

Cidvisahle to

^^^^'

and curious

intellectual

phenomena.^

early Logic attracted the attention of philoso- Prevailing phers, it may appear surprising that so little progress should have l^specUng been made, as is confessedly the case, in developing its principles, J-'Osic-

Considering

how

and perfecting the detail of the system and this circumstance has been brought forward as a proof of the barrenness and futility of the study. But a similar argument might have been urged with no less plausibility, at a period not very remote, against the study of Natural Philosophy and, very recently, against that of Chemistry. No science can be expected to make any considerable progress, which is not cultivated on right principles. Whatever may be the inherent vigour of the plant, it will neither be flourishing nor fruitful till it meet with a suitable soil and culture and in no case is the remark more applicable than in the present the greatest mistakes having always prevailed respecting the nature of Logic and its province having in consequence been extended by many writers to subjects with which it has no proper connexion. Indeed, with the exception perhaps of Aristotle, (who is himself, however, not
; ; : ;

^ It is surely strange, therefore, to find *n a treatise on Logic, (Aldrich's,) a

an Art, aud

distinct dissertation to prove that ko^ a Science!

ii

\%

2
entirely

INTRODUCTION.

[1.

exempt from the errors in question,) hardly a writer on Logic can be mentioned who has clearly perceived, and steadily kept in view throughout, its real nature and object. Before his time, no distinction was drawn between the science of which we are speaking, and that which is now usually called Metaphysics a circumstance which alone shows how small was the progress made in earlier times. Indeed, those who first turned their attention to the subject, hardly thought of inquiring into the process of Reasoning itself, but confined themselves almost entirely to certain preliminary points, the discussion of which is (if logically considered) subordinate
;

to that of the
History of
disti'nct

main

inquiry.

To
^^^

givo cven a very condensed account of the lives and works of

^^^ principal writers on Logic,

of the technical terms introduced

from the
the science,

and of the improvements or corruptions that were from time to time introduced, in short, to write the History and Antiquities of Logical Science, would be foreign to my present design. Such a work, if undertaken by a competent writer, would be, though not of a popular character, yet highly interesting and instructive to a limited class of students. But the extensive research which would form one indispensable qualification for such a task, would be only one out of many, even less common, qualifications, without which such a work would be worse than useless. The author should be one thoroughly on his guard against the common error of confounding together, or leading his readers to confound, an intimate acquaintance with many hoohs on a given subject, and a clear insight into the subject itself. With ability and industry for investigating a multitude of minute particulars, he should possess the power of rightly estimating each according to its intrinsic importance, and not (as is very commonly done,) according to the degree of laborious research it may have cost him, or the rarity of the knowledge he may in any case have acquired. And he should be careful, while recording the opinions and expressions of various authors on points of science, to guard both himself and his readers against the mistake of taking any thing on authority, that ought to be evinced by scientific reasoning or of regarding each technical term as having a sort of prescriptive right to retain for ever the meaning attached to it by those who first introduced it. In no subject, in short, is it more important for an author to be free from all tinge of antiquarian pedantry. But if I felt myself as fully competent to the task of writing such a history of Logic as I have alluded to, as I am conscious of not being so, I should still decidedly prefer keeping such a work altogether distinct from a treatise on the science because the combination of the two in a single volume would render it the more difiicult to avoid the blending of them confusedly together and also because, VQ such a plan, the distinction could not be so easily preserved between Logic, in the sense in which I am here using that title, and
l^y

each, and the senses in which each employed them,

5 2.]

INTRODUCTION.

various metaphysical disquisitions to wliicli several writers have

given the same name. For these reasons I have thought it hest to take only a shght and rapid glance of the series of logical writers down to the present day, and of the general tendency of their labours. 2. Zeno the Eleatic, whom most accounts represent as the earliest Early systematic writer on the subject of Logic, or, as it was then called, Jogh}?**" Dialectics, divided his work into three parts: the first of which (upon Consequences) is censured by Socrates [Plato, Parmen.] for In his second part, however, he furnished obscurity and confusion. that interrogatory method of disputation [e^arrta/;,] which Socrates The third part of adopted, and which has since borne his name. his work was devoted to what may not be improperly termed the art of wrangling [s^/o-t/^i),] which supplied the disputant with a collection of sophistical questions, so contrived, that the concession of some point that seemed unavoidable, immediately mvolved some glaring absurdity. This, if it is to be esteemed as at all falling within the province of Logic, is certainly not to be regarded (as some have ignorantly or heedlessly represented it) as its principal or proper business. The Greek philosophers generally have unfortunately devoted too much attention to it but we must beware of falling into the vulgar error of supposing the ancients to have regarded as a serious and intrinsically important study, that which The disputants in fact they considered as an ingenious recreation. diverted themselves in their leisure hours by making trial of their own and their adversary's acuteness, in the endeavour mutually to perplex each other with subtle fallacies much in the same way as men amuse themselves with propounding and guessing riddles, or with the game of chess to each of which diversions the sportive They were disputations of the ancients bore much resemblance. closely analogous to the wrestling and other exercises of the gymnasium these last being reckoned conducive to bodily vigour and activity, as the former were to habits of intellectual acuteness ; but the immediate object in each was a sportive, not a serious contest; though, doubtless, fashion and emulation often occasioned an undue importance to be attached to success in each. Zeno, then, is hardly to be regarded as any further a logician Zeno. than as to what respects his erotetic method of disputation a course of argument constructed on this principle being properly an hypothetical Sorites, which may easily be reduced into a series of
;

syllogisms.
pupils of Socrates.
tlie

To Zeno succeeded Euclid of Megara, and Antisthenes both The former of these prosecuted the subject ol
;

Euclid and

third part of his predecessor's treatise, and is said to have been the author of many of the fallacies attributed to the Stoical school. Of the writings of the latter nothing certain is known; if, however,-

we suppose

the above-mentioned sect to be his disciples in this stuly^


INTRODUCTION.
and
to

CJi

have retained his principles, he certainly took a more correct The Stoics divided all >xr, view of the subject than Euclid. into three classes; 1st, the Simple every thing that could be said,

Term
tical
;

2d, the Proposition

for they

3d, the Syllogism

viz. the hypothe-

Archytas.

seem to have had little notion of a more rigorous analysis of argument than into that familiar form. We must not here omit to notice the merits of Archytas, to whom

we

are indebted (as he himself probably was, in a great degree,

to older writers) for the doctrines of the Categories.

distinct
;

(as well as the other writers on the subject,) appears to

He, however, have had no

Aristoy^

view of the proper object and just limits of the science of but to have blended with it metaphysical discussions not strictly connected with it, and to have dwelt on the investigation of the nature of Terms and Propositions, without maintaining a conto which all the rest stant reference to the principles of Reasoning should be made subservient. The state, then, in which Aristotle found the science, (if, indeed, it can properly be said to have existed at all before his time,) appears to have been nearly this the division into Simple Terms, Propositions, and Syllogisms, had been slightly sketched out the doctrine of the Categories, and perhaps that of the Opposition of and, as some believe, the anaPropositions, had been laid down lysis of Species into Genus and Differentia had been introduced by Socrates. These, at best, were rather the materials of the system, than the system itself; the foundation of which indeed he distinctly claims the merit of having laid, and which remains fundamentally the same as he left it. It has been remarked, that the logical system is one of those few theories which have been begun and completed by the same indivi-

Logic

dual.

The
;

history of

its

discovery, as far as the

of the science are concerned, properly

main principles commences and ends with

Aristotle and this may perhaps in part account for the subsequent perversions of it. The brevity and simplicity of its fundamental truths (to which point indeed all real science is perpetually tending,)

has probably led many to suppose that something much more complex, abstruse, and mysterious, remained to be discovered. The vanity, too, by which all men are prompted unduly to magnify their cwn pursuits, has led unpliilosophical minds, not in this case alone, but in many others, to extend the boundaries of their respective scieifces, not by the patient development and just application of the principles of those sciences, but by wandering into irrelevant subjects. The mystical employment of numbers by Pythagoras, in matters utterly foreign to arithmetic, is perhaps the earliest instance of the kind. A more curious and important one is the degeneracy of Astronomy into judicial Astrology but none is more striking than the misapplication of Logic, by those who have treated of it as **trie Art of rightly employing the Rational Faculties," or who
;

5 3.]

INTRODUCTION.

have intruded it into the province of Natural Philosophy, and regarded the Syllogism as an engine for the investigation of nature
;

while they overlooked the extensive field that was before them within the legitimate limits of the science and perceived not the importance and difficulty of the task, of completing and properly filling up the
;

masterly sketch before them.

The

writings of Aristotle were not only for the most part abso-

two centuries, but seem to have been but little studied for a long time after their recovery. An art, however, of Logic, derived from the principles traditionally preserved by his disciples, seems to have been generally known, and to have been employed by Cicero in his philosophical works; but the pursuit of the science seems to have been abandoned for a long time. As early in the Christian era as the second and third centuries, the Peripatetic doctrines experienced a considerable revival; and we meet wuth the names of Galen, Ammonius, (who seems to have Gaien. taken the lead among the commentators on Aristotle,) Alexander of Akxande"!' Aphrodisias, and Porphyry, as logicians ; but it is not till the close Porphyry, of the fifth century, or the beginning of the sixth, that Aristotle's logical works were translated into Latin by the celebrated Boethius.^Bocthius. Not one of these seems to have made any considerable advances in developing the theory of reasoning. Of the labours of Galen (who added the insignificant fourth Figure to the three recognised by Aristotle) little is known and Porphyry's principal work is merely on the predicahles. We have little of the science till the revival of learning among the Arabians, by whom Aristotle's treatises on this as well as on other subjects, were eagerly studied. Schoolmen, I 3. Passing by the names of some Byzantine writers of no great importance, Ave come to the times of the Schoolmen whose waste of ingenuity, and frivolous subtlety of disputation, have been often made the subject of complaints, into the justice of which it is unnecessary here fully to inquire. It may be sufficient to observe, that their fault did not lie in their diligent study of Logic, and the high value they set upon it, but in their utterly mistaking the true nature and object of the science and by the attempt to employ it for the purpose of physical discoveries, involving every subject in a mist of words, to the exclusion of sound philosophical investigation.^ Their errors may serve to account for the strong terms in which Bacon Bacon, sometimes appears to censure logical pursuits but that this censure was intended to bear against the extravagant perversions, not the legitimate cultivation, of the science, may be proved from his own observations on the subject, in his Advancement of Learning. " Had Bacon lived in the present day, I am inclined to think he would have made his chief complaint against unmethodized inquiry and
lutely lost to the world for about
;
;

2 Born about A. D. 475, and died about A.D. 524. * 01 the character of the School-dirzm-

ty.

Dr. Hampden's Bampton Lectures

furnish the best view that has, perhaps, ever appeared.

.6
illogical

INTRODUCTION.
reasoning.

[ 3.

Locke.

would not have complained of To guard now against the evils prevalent in his time, would be to fortify a town against battering-rams, instead of against cannon."* His moderation, however, was not imitated in other quarters. Even Locke confounds in one sweeping censure the Aristotelic theory, with the absurd misapplications and perversions of it in later years. His objection to the science, as unserviceable in the discovery of truth, (which has of late been often repeated,) while it holds good in reference to many (misnamed) logicians, indicates that, with regard to the true nature of the science itself, he had no clearer notions than they have, of the just limits of logical science, as confined to the theory of Reasoning and of the distinct character of that operation from the observations and experiments which are essential to the study of Nature. For instance, in chap. xvii. ** on Reason," (which, by the way, he perpetually confounds with Reasoning^) he says, in 4, "If syllogisms must be taken for the only proper instrument of reason and means of knowledge, it will follow, that before Aristotle there was not one man that did or could know any thing by reason and
Certainly
lie

Dialectics as corrupting Philosophy.

that since the invention of syllogisms there is not one in ten thousand that doth. But God has not been so sparing to men to make them barely two-legged creatures, and left it to Aristotle to make them rational, i.e. those few of them that he could get so to examine the grounds of syllogisms, as to see that in above threescore ways that three propositions may be laid together, there are but fourteen wherein one may be sure that the conclusion is right,"
*' &c. God has been more bountiful to mankind than so: He has given them a mind that can reason without being instructed in methods of syllogizing," (kc. All this is not at all less absurd than if any one, on being told of the discoveries of modern chemists respecting caloric, and on hearing described the process by which it is conducted through a boiler into the water, which it converts into a gas of sufficient elasticity to overcome the pressure of the atmosphere, <kc., should reply, " If all this were so, it would follow that before the time of these chemists no one ever did or could make

any

liquor boil."

presently after inserts an encomium upon Aristotle, in which be is equally unfortunate he praises him for the " invention of syllogisms:" to which he certainly had no more claim than Linnseus to the creation of plants and animals; or Harvey, to the praise of having made the blood circulate; or Lavoisier, to that of having
;

He

formed

consist!*,

who

atmosphere we breathe. And the utility of this invention according to him, in the great service done against *' those were not ashamed to deny any thing :" a service which never
the
* Tel.

Econ. Lect.

ix. p. 237.


1 3.]

INTRODUCTION.

could have been performed, had syllogisms heen an invention or discovery of Aristotle's for what sophist could ever have consented to restrict himself to one particular kind of arguments^ dictated hy
;

opponent? In an ordinary, obscure, and trifling wTiter, all this confusion of thought and common-place declamation might as well have been left unnoticed but it is due to the general ability and to tlie celebrity of such an author as Locke, that errors of this kind should be exposed. An error apparently diiferent, but substantially the same, pervades Watts, the treatises of Watts, and some other modern writers on the subject. Perceiving the inadequacy of the syllogistic theory to the vast purposes to which others had attempted to apply it, he still craved after the attainment of some equally comprehensive and all-powerful which he accordingly attempted to construct under the system which was to be a method of title of The right use of Reason, invigorating and properly directing all the powers of the mind: a most magnificent object indeed, but one which not only does not fall under the province of Logic, but cannot be accomplished by any one science or system that can even be conceived to exist. The attempt to comprehend so wide a field. Is no extension of science, but a mere verbal generalization, which leads only to vague and barren declamation. It is not perhaps much to be wondered at, that in still later times several ingenious writers, forming their notions of the science itself from professed masters in it, such as have just been alluded to, and judging of its value from their failures, should have treated the Aristotelic system with so much reprobation and scorn. The vague aspirations of some of these writers after a *' true" Extravagant "rational" "philosophical system of Logic," which, year after ^^^p^^^^*'""* year, and generation after generation, is talked of, and hoped for, writers, and almost promised, but which is acknowledged to have never yet existed,^ may recall to one's mind the gorgeous visions which floated before the Imagination of the Alchemists, of the Philosopher's Stone, and the Universal Medicine and which made them regard Avith impatience and with scorn the humble labours of existing Metallurgy
his
; ;

and Pharmacy. I believe that in respect of the present subject, the views I am alluding to arise in great measure from men's not perceiving that Language,^ of some kind or other, is (as will be more fully shown hereafter) an indispensable instrument of all Reasoning that properly deserves the name. And hence it is that
fi

have

even

seen

complaint

that the introduction of some perfect system has been prevented by the application of the term Logic to that which is commonly so called. do not find, however, that the application of the names of Astronomy and Cliemistry to the studies formerly so called, prevented the

niade,
sr.ch

We

origination of naore philosophical systems. * Hobbes, who has very clearly pointed this out, has unhappily* diminished the benefit tiiat might have been derived from much that he has written, by the prejudice he has raised against himself througli his exceptionable doctrines ic Morals, Politics, and Religion.

: ;

8
Tendency
Realism.
to 0116
<j

INTRODUCTION.

[ 4.

find siicli Writers as I allude to speaking disdainfully of applicable merely to reasoning in words;" representing Language as serviceable only " in conveying arguments to another;"

may

rules

and even as "limiting the play of our faculties;" and again as *' rendering the mental perception of all abstract truths obscure and confused, in so far as the rude symbol of each idea is taken in the stead of the idea itself;" with other such expressions, emanating from that which is in truth the ancient and still prevalent doctrine of
*'

Realism."

Incorrect

nature o^he ^^j^^^^' ^^

science.

theory has usually been considered by these professing to furnish a peculiar method of reasoning, instead of a method of analyzing that mental process which must and accordingly they invariably take place in all correct reasoning have contrasted the ordinary mode of reasoning with the syllogistic, and have brought forward with an air of triumph the argumentative
Syllogistic
; ;

The

a mistake no less skill of many who never learned the system gross than if any one should regard Grammar as a peculiar Language, and should contend against its utility, on the ground that many speak correctly who never studied the principles of grammar. For Logic, which is, as it were, the Grammar of Reasoning, does not bring forward the regular Syllogism as a distinct mode of argubut as mentation, designed to be substituted for any other mode the form to which all correct reasoning may be ultimately reduced and which, consequently, serves the purpose (when we are employing Logic as an art) of a test to try the validity of any argument in the same manner as by chemical analysis we develop and submit
;'^

to a distinct examination the elements of

is

which any compound body composed, and are thus enabled to detect any latent sophistication
I 4.

and impurity.
misconceptions not very dissimilar to those of Locke, to prevail, more or less, in the present day, will be hereafter noticed, as far as is needful, in appropriate places. In this Litroduction it would be unsuitable to advert to them except very briefly, and that, only with a view to caution the learner, unused to these studies, against being disheartened in the outset, by hearing, generally, that objections have been raised against the leading prinobjections ciples of the science, by writers of considerable repute wh'ch he will hardly suppose to be, in so great a degree as they really are, either founded on mistake, or unimportant, and turning,

Many

which continue

in reality, on
J"

mere verbal

questions.

Strange as it may seem, there are some, (I suspect not afew,) who even go a step further, and consider Logic as something oji>poA'ed to riglit reasoning. I have seen a Review of a work, which the Reviewer characterised as tiie production of an able Logician, and which he there/ore concluded was likely to have intiuence with such as will not reason I

The "not" might naturally have been

regarded as a misprint, but that thecontext shows that such was the reviewer's real meaning. On seeing such a passage written in the 19th century, who can wonder that in the Middle Ages, Grammar (" Crramarye") was i-egarded as a kind of magical arti

1 4.]

INTRODUCTION.

For he may be told, have maintained that men from a single premiss, without any reason, or that they may reason, that men may, and do, other being either expressed or understood

instance, some,

reason from one individual case to another, without the intervention of any general [universal] proposition, whether stated or implied; that the inferences from Induction are not drawn by any process that the conclusion of a Syllogism that is, in substance, Syllogistic that a Syllogism is is not really inferred from the Premises; nothing but a kind of trap for ensnaring the incautious and that it necessarily involves the fallacy of " begging the question;" with other such formidably-sounding objections ; which, when simply spoken of as being afloat, and as maintained by able men, are likely to be supposed far more powerful than they will be found on a closer examination. Of those who speak of a single premiss being sufficient to warrant a conclusion, some, it will be found, were confining their thoughts to such flat and puerile examples as Logical writers are too apt to employ exclusively; as " Socrates is a man; therefore he is a living creature, &c. ;" in which the conclusion had been already stated in

the one premiss, to any one who does but understand the meaning of the words; *' living-creature" being a part of what is signified in the very term *' Man." But in such an instance as this; '* He has swallowed a cup of laurel-water, therefore he has taken poison,"

the inference
rant

is one which no one could draw who should be ignoas every body was, less than a century ago, (though using the

word

in the

same sense as now,

to signify a "liquor distilled

is

from

laurel leaves,") that this liquor

poisonous.

Others again, when they speak of reasoning from one individual

instance to another, without any universal premiss, mean sometimes, that no such premiss is expressed, (which is the case oftener than
not)

and that perhaps even the reasoner himself, if possessed of no command of language, might be at a loss to state it correctly. And indeed it continually happens that even long trains of reasoning will flash through the mind with such rapidity that the process
great
8 It may be added, that in inward solitary reasoning, many, and perhaps most persons, but especially those not much

to himsell'"

means
he

to read or speak concerning the subjects that occupy their thoughts, use, partly, of signs that are not arbitrary and conventional, but which consist of mental conceptions oi'mdxxidwaX objects; taken, each, as a i-epresentative of a Class. .(?. person practically conversant with mechanical operations, but not with discussions of them in words, may form a conception of in colloquial Ehrase, "figure to himself" a certain eld or room, with whose shape he is

accustomed

" figure ; or he may a man raising a weight by of a pole, and may use this conception as a general sign, in place of the term " lever;" and the terms themselves
or "trapezium," &c.

make

may

be unacquainted with; in which

case he will be at a loss to impart distinctly to others his own reasonings; and in the attempt, will often express liimself (as one may frequently observe in practi-

familiar,

and may employ

this

in

his

inward

trains of thought, as a Sign, to ^present, for instance, " parallelogram"

men unused to reading and speaking) not only indistinctly, but even erroneously. See below, 5. Hence, partly, may have arisen the belief in those supposed *' abstract ideas" which will be hereafter alluded to, and in the possibility of reasoning without the use of any Signs at all.
cal

iO
is

INTRODUCTION.
performed unconsciously, or at least leaves no trace
in

[ 4.

the

memory, any more than the motions of the muscles of the throat and mouth in speaking, or the judgments hy which we decide as to
the distances of visible objects:^ so that a conclusion may be supposed to be seized by intuition, which in reality is the result of rapid
inference.

Some, again, appear to include under the title of *' reasoning" every case in which a person believes one thing in consequence of his believing another thing; however far he may be from having any good grounds to warrant the inference: and they accordingly include those processes which take place in the minds of infants and of brutes; which are apt to associate with the appearance of an object before them the remembered impression of son thing that formerly accompanied it. Such a process is alluded to in the familiar proverbs that *' burnt child dreads the fire;" or as it is expressed in another form, " The scalded cat fears cold water;" or again in the Hebrew proverb, " He who has been bitten by a serpent is afraid of a rope. " Most logical writers, however, have confined the name of " reasoning" to valid argument; which cannot exist without a universal premiss, implied, if not expressed. For whenever there are not two premises which, taken jointly, do imply, and virtually assert, the conclusion, the alleged premiss or premises being such that a person may without inconsistency believe them true and yet then, we have what Logicians have not believe the conclusion, been accustomed to call an apparent, but not real argument. Some, however, have denied that the conclusion is inferred from But then, they acknowledge that the truth the universal premiss. of that premiss is an indispensable condition of such inference: an admission which would satisfy most*Logicians. For if any botanical physiologist, for instance, were to deny that the branches of a tree derive nourishment from the roots, saying that the branches are nourished by the juices of the earth, but admitting that the roots are an indispensable condition, and that if they are destroyed, the branches will wither, this would not be reckoned as substantially any new doctrine. And so also if any one choose to maintain that the conclusion is drawn from the one premiss, by, or through, the other premiss, this would be accounted merely a needless and unimportant innovation in phraseology. So also when inferences from induction are spoken of as not being or not necessarily being substantially Syllogistic, the learner might at first sight be startled and perplexed, till he found it at the same time admitted that we have to decide, in each case of Induction, the question, whether the instances adduced be " suffi-

cient" to warrant the inference; whether it be ** allowable" to draw the conclusion. And the decision of this question in tho

The
till

distance of an

been,

a comparatively

obiect having late period,

supposed to be directly perceived by the

eye.


8 5.]

INTRODUCTION.
i.e.

11

the decision that the procedure is not a mere expressed in words, tlievery premiss necessary to complete the Syllogism. (See B. IV. Ch. I. 1.)
affirmative,

random guess,
So also

is, if

be seen that the alleged entrapping character of a merely amounts to this; that whoever perceives the validity of an argument, has no mode of escape from the " snare" (so called) except by the way he entered, viz. the premises. He has only the alternative of allowing one of them to be false, or else, the conclusion to be true. And it is a matter of daily occurrence, that a man is undeceived as to some principle he had incautiously admitted, by perceiving what it would lead to. 8 5. Complaints have also been made that Logfic leaves untouched the greatest difficulties, and those which are the sources of the chief errors in reasoning; mz. the ambiguity or indistinctness of Terms, and the doubts respecting the degrees of evidence in various Propositions: an objection which is not to be removed by any such attempt as that of Watts to lay down ** rules for forming clear ideas," and, for "guiding the judgment;" but by replying that no art is to be censured for not teaching more than falls within its province, and indeed more than can be taught by any conceivable art. Such a system of universal knowledge as should instruct us in the full meaning or meanings of every term, and the truth or falsity,
it will

Syllogism,

Complaints
Logic,

of every proposition, thus superseding all other studies, it is most unphilosophical to expect, or even to imagine. And to find fault with Logic for not performing this, is as if one should object to the science of Optics for not giving sight to the blind or as if (like the man of whom Warburton tells a story in his Div. Leg.) one should complain of a reading-glass for being of no service to a person who had never learned to read. In fact, the difficulties and errors above alluded to are not in the process of Reasoning itself, (which alone is the appropriate province of Logic,) but in the subject-matter about which it is employed. This process will have been correctly conducted if it have conformed to the logical rules, which preclude the possibility of any error creeping in betiveen the principles assumed, and the conclusions we deduce from them. But still that conclusion may be false, if the principles we start from are so and the known falsity of a conclusion will often serve (as has been above remarked) to correct a mistake made in the outset. In like manner, no arithmetical skill will secure a correct result to a calculation, unless the data are correct from which we calculate; nor does any one on that account undervalue Arithmetic; and yet the objection against Logic rests on no better foundation. There is in fact a striking analogy in this respect between the two sciences. All Numbers (which are the subject of Arithmetic)
; ;

certainty or uncertainty,

must be numbers of some things, whether coins, persons, measures, or any thing else; but to introduce into the science any notice of

12

INTRODUCTION.

[J 5.

the things respecting which calculations are made, would be evidently irrelevant, and would destroy its scientific character: we proceed therefore with arbitrary signs, representing numbers in the abstract. So also does Logic pronounce on the validity of a regularly-constructed argument, equally well, though arbitrary symbols may have been substituted for the Terms; and, consequently, without any regard to the things signified by those Terms. And the possibility of doing this (though the employment of such arbitrary symbols has been absurdly objected to, even by writers who understood not only Arithmetic but Algebra,) is a proof of the But many professed strictly scientific character of the system. logical writers, not attending to the circumstances which have been just mentioned, have wandered into disquisitions on various branches of knowledge; disquisitions which must evidently be as boundless as human knowledge itself, since there is no subject on which Reasoning is not employed, and to which, consequently, Logic may not be applied. The error lies in regarding every thing as the proper province of Logic to which it is applicable}^ Many, however, who do not fall altogether into that error, yet censure any logical treatise which, like the present, professes to be wholly conversant about Language; and speak of the science as treating, properly, of the comparison of '* abstract Ideas,'' of which, Language, they say, merely supplies the names. It may be Bufiicient at present to reply, that, supposing there really exist in the mind or in some minds certain " abstract ideas," by means of which a train of reasoning may be carried on independently of Common-terms [or Signs of any kind,] for this is the real point and that a system of. Logic may be devised, having at issue supposing this, still, as I profess reference to such reasoning, not to know any thing of these *' abstract ideas," or of any " Universals" except Signs, or to be conscious of any such reasoningprocess, I at least must confine myself to the attempt to teach the Many, again, who speak only Logic I do pretend to understand. slightingly of Logic altogether, on the ground of its being *' conversant only about words,'' entertain fundamentally the same views as the above; that is, they take for granted that Reasoning may be carried on altogether independently of Language; which they regard (as was above remarked) merely as a means of communicating it to others. And a Science or Art which they suppose to be confined to this office, they accordingly rank very low. Such a view I believe to be very prevalent. The majority of men would probably say, if asked, that the use of Language is peculiar to Man ; and that its office is to express to one another our thoughts and feelings. But neither of these is strictly true.

W A similar

error

is

complained of by

Aristotle, as having taken place with respect to Rhetoric; of which, indeed,

we find specimens in the arguments of several ot the interlocutors in Cic, de Oratore.

1 6.]

INTRODUCTION.

13

Brutes do possess in some degree the power of being taught to understand what is said to them, and some of them even to utter But they all sounds expressive of what is passing within them. seem to be incapable of another, very important use of language, which does characterize Man; viz. the employment of " Commonterms" ('* general-terms") formed by Abstraction, as instruments of thought; by which alone a train of Beasoning may be carried on. And accordingly, a Deaf-mute^ before he has been taught a Language, either the Finger-language, or Reading, cannot carry on a train of Reasoning, any more than a Brute. He differs indeed from a Brute in possessing the mental capability of employing Language; but he can no more make use of that capability till he is in possession of some System of arbitrary general-signs, than a person born blind from Cataract can make use of his capacity of Seeing, till the Cataract is removed. Hence, it will be found by any one who will question a Deafmute who has been taught Language after having grown up, that no such thing as a train of Reasoning had ever passed through his mmd before he was taught. If indeed we did reason by means of those ** abstract ideas*' which some persons talk of, and if the Language we use served merely to communicate with other men, then, a person woidd be But able to reason who had no knowledge of any arbitrary Signs. there are no grounds for believing that this is possible; nor consequently, that ** abstract ideas" (in that sense of the word) have

any existence at all." 6. From what has been said, it will be evident that there is hardly any subject to which it is so difficult to introduce the student in a clear and satisfactory manner, as the one we are now engaged in. In any other branch of knowledge, the reader, if he have any
11 There have been some very interesting accounts published, by travellers in America, and by persons residing there, of a girl named Laura Bridgeman, who lias been, from birth, not only Deaf-andDumb, but also Blind. She lias however been taught the finger-language, and even to read what is printed in raised characters, and also to write. The remarkable circumstance in reference to the present subject, is, that when

she is alone, her fingers are generally observed to be movi?ig, though the signs are so slight and imperfect that others cannot make out what she is thinking of. But if they inquire of her, she will tell

them. It seems

in the case of Laura Bridgeman) see the operation : nor, in general, can it be heard; though some few persons have a habit of occasionally audibly talking to themselves; or as it is called, *' thinking aloud." But the Signs we commonly use in silent reflection are merely mental cowceptions, usually of uttered words and these, doubtless, are such as could be hardly at all understood by another, even If uttered audibly. For we usually think in a kind of short-hand, (if one may use the expression,) like the notes one sometimes takes down on paper to help the memory, which consist of a word or two. or even a letter, to suggest a whole sentence; so that such notes would be
:

that, having once learnt the use of Signs, she finds the necessity of them as slu Instrument of thought, when thinking of any thing beyond mere individual objects of sense. And doubtless every one else does the same ; though in our case, no one can (c&

unintelligible to
It has

any one else. been observed also that this

girl,

when asleep, and doubtless dreaming, has

her fingers frequently in motion: beiriif in fact talking in her sleep. See above*
{ 4.

,K

INTRODUCTION.

[8 0,

previous acquaintance with tlie subject, will usually be so far the better prepared for comprehending the exposition of the principles; or if he be entirely a stranger to it, will at least come to the study with a mind unbiassed, and free from prejudices and misconceptions: whereas, in the present case, it cannot but happen, that many who have given some attention to logical pursuits (or what are usually considered as such) will have rather been bewildered by fundamentally erroneous views, than prepared, by the acquisition of just principles, for ulterior progress; and that not a few who pretend not to any acquaintance whatever with the science, will yet have imbibed either such prejudices against it, or such false notions
respecting
of
DifflcuUy attending abstract
pursuits.
it.

its

nature, as cannot but prove obstacles in their study

difficulty

There

is,

however, a

which

exists

more or

less in all

abstract pursuits; though it is perhaps more felt in this, and often occasions it to be rejected by beginners as dry and tedious; viz. the
difficulty of perceiving to

interesting application

the

what ultimate end

he
will often

to

what practical or

abstract principles lead, which are first

laid before the student; so that

have to work his way

patiently through the most laborious part of the system, before he can gain any clear idea of the drift and intention of it.

This complaint has often been made by chemical students; who are wearied with descriptions of Oxygen, Hydrogen, and other invisible Elements, before they have any knowledge respecting such And accordbodies as commonly present themselves to the senses.
Analytical
synthetical
' " procedure.

ingly some teachers of chemistry obviate in a great degree this objection, by adopting the analytical instead of the synthetical mode ^^ proccdure, whcu they are first introducing the subject to beginners;
i.e.

instead

of

synthetically
to

enumerating the
simplest

elementary
of these,

combinations proceeding next the and concluding with those more complex substances which are of
substances,

the most

common

occurrence, they begin

by analyzing these

last,

and resolving them step by step

into their simple elements; thus at

once presenting the subject in an interesting point of view, and

The synthetical fonn of clearly setting forth the object of it. teaching is indeed sufficiently interesting to one who has made considerable progress in any study; and being more concise, regular, and systematic, is the form in which our knowledge naturally arranges itself in the mind, and is retained by the memory; but the analytical is the more interesting, easy, and natural kind of introduction; as being the form in which the first invention or dis* covery of any kind of system must originally have taken place. It may be advisable, therefore, to begin by giving a slight sketch, in this form, of the logical system, before we enter regularly upon The reader will thus be presented with a kind ot the details of it. imaginary history of the course of inquiry by which that system may be conceived to have occurred to a philosophical mind.

BOOK

I.

ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF THE SCIENCE.

In every instance in which we reason, in the strict sense of the word, i.e, make use of arguments, (I mean real, i.e. valid arguments,) whether for the sake of refuting an adversary, or of conveying instruction, or of satisfying our own minds on any point, whatever may be the subject we are engaged on, a certain process takes place in the mind which is one and the same in all cases, provided it be correctly conducted. Of course it cannot be supposed that every one is even conscious of this process in his own mind much less, is competent to explain This indeed is, and cannot the principles on which it proceeds. but be, the case with every other process respecting which any system has been formed the practice not only may exist independently of the theory, but must have preceded the theory. There must have been Language before a system of Grammar could be devised and musical compositions, previous to the Science of Music. This, by the way, wiU serve to expose the futility of the popular objection against Logic, that men may reason very well who know nothing of it. The parallel instances adduced, show that such an objection might be applied in many other cases, where its absurdity would be obvious; and that there is no ground for deciding thence, either that the system has no tendency to improve practice, or that even if it had not, it might not still be a dignified and
; ;
;

interesting pursuit.

One of the chief impediments to the attainment of a just view of Reasoning the nature and object of Logic, is the not fully understanding, or^fmulfrinall not sufficiently keeping in mind, the sameness of the reasoning- subjects, process in all cases. If, as the ordinary mode of speaking would
seem to indicate, Mathematical reasoning, and Theological, and Metaphysical, and Political, <fcc., were essentially different from each other, i.e. different hinds of reasoning, it would follow, that supposing there could be at all any such science as we have described Logic, there must be so many different species, or at least different branches, of Logic. And such is perhaps the most
prevailing notion.

Nor

is

this

much

to

be wondered at

since

it is

evident to

all,

that some

men

converse and write, in an argumenta-

16
live

ANALYTICAL OUTLINE.
way very
justly on

[Book

I.

one

subject,

and very erroneously on

another; in which again others excel, who fail in the former. This error may be at once illustrated and removed, by considering the parallel instance of Arithmetic ; in which every one is aware that the process of a calculation is not affected by the nature of the objects, whose numbers are before us: but that {e.g.) the multiplication of a number is the very same operation, whether it be a number of men, of miles, or of pounds; though nevertheless persons may perhaps be found who are accurate in the results of their calculations relative to natural philosophy, and incorrect in those of political economy, from their different degrees of skill in the subjects of these two sciences not surely because there are different arts of Arithmetic applicable to each of these respectively. Others again, who are aware that the simple systenl of Logic may be applied to all subjects whatever, are yet disposed to view it as a peculiar method of reasoning, and not, as it is, a method of unfolding and analyzing our reasoning: whence many have been led {e.g. the author of the Philosophy of Rhetoric) to talk of comparing Syllogistic-reasoning with Moral-reasoning; taking it for granted that it is possible to reason correctly without reasoning logically; which is, in fact, as great a blunder as if any one were to mistake grammar for a peculiar language, and to suppose it They possible to speak correctly without speaking grammatically. have in short considered Logic as an art of reasoning; whereas (so far as it is an art) it is the art of reasoning; the logician's object being, not to lay down principles by which one may reason, but, by which all must reason, even though they are not distinctly aware of them: to lay down rules, not which may be followed with advantage, but which cannot possibly be departed from in sound reasoning. These misapprehensions and objections being such as lie on the very threshold of the subject, it would have been hardly possible, without noticing them, to convey any just notion of the nature and design of the logical system.
;

2.
Origin of
^**^^''

Supposing Reasoning is

it

then to have been perceived that the operation of

in all cases the same, the analysis of that operation

could not fail to strike the mind as an interesting matter of inquiry. And moreover, since (apparent) arguments which are unsound and inconclusive, are so often employed, either from error or design; and since even those who are not misled by these fallacies, are so often at a loss to detect and expose them in a manner satisfactory it could not but appear desirable to others, or even to themselves to lay down some general rules of reasoning apphcable to all cases ; by which a person might be enabled the more readily and clearly to state the grounds of his own conviction, or of his objection to the arguments of an opponent ; instead of arguing at random, without
;

{ 2.]

ANALYTICAL OUTLINE.

17

any fixed and acknowleged principles to guide his procedure. Such rules would he analogous to those of Arithmetic, which ohviate the tediousness and uncertainty of calculations in the head wherein, after much labour, different persons might arrive at difi"erent results, without any of them being able distinctly to point out the error of
;

system of such rules, it is obvious, must, instead of the rest. deserving to be called the ** art of wrangling," be more justly characterised as the ** art of cutting short wrangling," by bringing the parties to issue at once, if not to agreement, and thus saving a waste of ingenuity. In pursuing the supposed investigation, it will be found that Analysis of every Conclusion is deduced, in reality, from two other propositions;**^^"'""* (thence called Premises;) for though one of these may be, and commonly is, suppressed, it must nevertheless be understood as admitted; as may easily be made evident by supposing the denial of the suppressed premiss; which will at once invalidate the argu-

marks

any one, from perceiving that "the world exhibits must have had an intelligent author," though he may not be aware in his own mind of the existence of any other premiss, he will readily understand, if it be denied that " whatever exhibits marks of design must have had an
ment;
e.g.

if

of design," infers that "it

author," that the affirmative of that proposition is Or again, if any one on necessary to the validity of the argument.^ meeting with " an animal which has horns on the head" infers that *' it is a ruminant," he will easily perceive that this would be no argument to any one who should not be aware of the general fact that " all horned animals ruminate." An argument thus stated regularly and at full length is called a Syllogltm. Syllogism which therefore is evidently not a peculiar kind of argument, but only a peculiar form of expression, in which every argument may be stated.^ When one of the premises is suppressed, (which for brevity's ^^ sake it usually is,) the argument is called an Enth ymeme., And
intelligent
;

1 Some choose to call this proposition not apremisshutmerely a,condition. This however is, substantially, (as has been formerly remarked) just what Logicians mean. Whoever has any good ground for believing his inference to be a just one, must believe this condition to exist. 2

deed it be a writer in the Edinburgh Review, (in 1839,) who in deprecating and deriding all attempts to adduce evidences of the truth of Christianity, as useless, and even dangerous, for the mass of mankind, (a discovery, by the way,
its first promulgators were not enlightened enough to make) gives as a reason, that " the Gospel has been the stay of countless millions who never framed a syllogism." And very probable

which

others,
call

Some writers, and Locke among who profess to despise what they

" syllogistic reasoning," distinctly admit as Locke does,e..igr. in ch. xvii. that *'aW right reasoning may be reduced to the form of Syllogism:" (which is admitting the utmost that I conceive any Logicianmaintains)only, there are, he says, other and better " ways of reasoning':" that is, as he proceeds to explain, people do not always, or usually, eccpress their reasoning in . syllogistic form; as if any one had ever doubted ^/joi/ Except in-

for instance, and said that thou art a teacher sent for no man can do these miracles that thou doest except God be
it is,

that

Nicodemus

those

" we know from God;

who deputed him, when he

with him," though he spoke grammatically and reasoned conclusively, may have never heard of syllogisms, or eTen
of

nouns and verbs.

18

ANALYTICAL OUTLINE.

[Book

I.

KMscn.

Proof and cause

it may be worth while to remark, that when the argument i3 in this state, the objections of an opponent are (or rather appear to be) of two kinds viz. either objections to the assertion itself, or E.G. In one of the above objections to its force as an argument. instances, an atheist may be conceived either denying^ that the world does exhibit marks of design, or denying* that it follows from Now it is important to thence that it had an intelligent author. keep in mind that the only difference in the two cases is, that in the one, the expressed premiss is denied, in the other the suppressed; for the force as an argument of either premiss depends on the other premiss: if both be admitted, the conclusion legitimately connected with them cannot be denied. It is evidently immaterial to the argument whether the Conclusion be placed first or last; but it may be proper to remark, that a Premiss placed after its Conclusion is called the Reason^ of it, and is introduced by one of those conjunctions which are called causal; viz. *' since," "because," <fcc. which may indeed be employed to designate a Premiss, whether it came first or last. The illative conjunctions, "therefore," &c. designate the Conclusion. It is a circumstance which often occasions error and perplexity, that both these classes of conjunctions have also another signification, being employed to denote, respectively. Cause and Effect, as well as Premiss and Conclusion: e.g. If I say, " this ground is rich, because the trees on it are flourishing," or " the trees are flourishing, and therefore the soil must be rich,' I employ these conjunctions to denote the connexion of Premiss and Conclusion; for it is plain that the luxuriance of the trees is not the cause of the soil's fertility, but only the cause of my knowing it. If again I say, " the trees flourish, because the ground is rich," or " the ground is rich, and tlierefore the trees flourish," I am using the very same conjunctions to denote the connexion of cause and effect; for in this case, the luxuriance of the trees, being evident to the eye, would hardly need to be proved^ but might need to be accounted for. There are, however, many cases in which the Cause is employed to prove the existence of its Efl"ect ; especially in arguments relating to future events; as e.g. when from favourable weather any one argues that the crops are likely to be abundant;* the cause and the reason, in that case, coincide. And this contributes to their being fio often confounded together in other cases.
;

3.
In an argument, such as the examples above given, it is, as has "been said, impossible for any one, who admits both Premises, to
avoid admitting the conclusion.
3 As the ancient atheists did. * As the modem atheists do. ^ The Major-premiss is often called the Principle: and the word Jieason is confined to the Mi Mmor See Appendix, No. I. art. Reason See also Rhetoric, Part I. ch. 2, ii.

i]

ANALYTICAL OUTLINE.
man may

19

perhaps deny, or doubt, and require proof, that all animals that are horned do ruminate. Nay, it is conceivable that he may even not clearly understand what " ruminanf means; but still it will be not the less clear to him, that, supposing these Premises granted, the Conclusion must be admitted. And even if you suppose a case where one or both of the Premises shall be manifestly false and absurd, this will not alter the conclu" siveness of the Reasoning; though the conclusion 'tself may perhaps be absurd also. For instance, '* All the Ape-tribe are originally descended from Reptiles or Insects: Mankind are of the Ape-tribe; therefore Mankind are originally descended from Reptiles or Insects:'* here, every one ^ would perceive the falsity of all three of these
propositions.
also.

But

it is

from those premises, and that if they were

not the less true that the conclusion follows true, it would be true

But there will be frequently an apparent connexion of Premises Apparent "'^"'"*^"*** with a Conclusion which does not in reahty follow from them, though to the inattentive or unskilful, the argument may appear to be valid. And there are many other cases in which a doubt may exist whether the argument be vahd or not: i.e. whether it be possible or not to admit the Premises, and yet deny the Conclusion. It is of the highest importance, therefore, to lay down some regular form to which every valid argument may be reduced, and to devise a rule which shall show the validity of every argument in that form, and consequently the unsoundness of any apparent argument which cannot be reduced to it. E. G. If such an argument as this be proposed, " every rational agent is accountable; brutes are not rational agents; therefore they are not accountable:" or again, '* all wise legislators suit their laws to the genius of their nation; Solon did this; therefore he was a wise legislator:" there are some, perhaps, who would not perceive any fallacy in such arguments, especially if enveloped in a cloud of words; and still more, when the conclusion is true, or (which comes to the same point) if they are disposed to believe it: and others might perceive indeed, but might be at a loss to explain, the fallacy. Now these (apparent) arguments exactly correspond, respectively, with the following, the absurdity of the conclusions from which is manifest: "every horse is an animal; sheep are not horses; therefore they are not animals;" and, *' all vegetables grow; an animal grows; therefore it is a vegetable." These last examples, I have said, correspond exactly (considered as arguments) with the former; the question respecting the validity of an Argument, being, not whether the conclusion be true, but whether it follows from the premises adduced. This mode of exposing a fallacy, by bringing forward a similar
'

Except certain French Naturalists.

20

ANALYTICAL OUTLINE.

[Book

I.

Analysis
of

an

albumen t

one whose conclusion is obviously absurd, is often, and very advantageously resorted to in addressing those who are ignorant of Logical rules; ^ but to lay down such rules, and employ them as a test, is evidently a safer and more compendious, as well as a more To attain these, it would plainly philosophical mode of proceeding. be necessary to analyze some clear and valid arguments, and to observe in what their conclusiveness consists. Let us then examine and analyze such an example as one of those first given: for instance, ** Ev-ery animal that has horns on the head is ruminant; the Elk has horns on the head; therefore the Elk is ruminant." It will easily be seen that the Vcilidity [or ** conclusiveness," or " soundness"] of the Argument does not at all depend on our conviction of the truth of either of the Premises; For if we or even on our understanding the meaning of them. substitute for one of the things we are speaking about, some unmeaning Symbol, (such as a letter of the alphabet,) which may stand for any thing that may be agreed on, the Reasoning remains the same. For instance, suppose we say, (instead of ** animal that has is ruminant; the Elk is X; therehorns on the head,") '* Every fore the Elk is ruminant;" the Argument is equally valid. And again, instead of the word "ruminant," let us put the is Y; the Elk is X; letter **Y:" then the argument " Every therefore the Elk is Y;" would be a valid argument as before. And the same would be the case if you were to put '* Z" for is Y; Z is X; therefore "the Elk:" for the syllogism ''Every Z is Y," is completely valid, whatever you suppose the Symbols X, Y, and Z to stand for. Any one may try the experiment by substituting for X, Y, and

Z, respectively,

any words he pleases; and he

will find that, if

he

does but preserve the same form of expression, it will be impossible to admit the truth of the Premises, without admitting also the

An
Argument may be
understood though its

truth of the Conclusion. And it is worth observing here, that nothing

to that

Terms
not.

are

though seemingly strange error, of supposing ourselves to understand distinctly what in reality we understand but very imperfectly, or not at all, as the want of attention to what has been just explained. A man reads or even writes many pages perhaps, of an argumentative work, in which one or more of the terms employed

very common,

is

so likely to lead

An exposure of some of Hume's falla-

existence of that extraordinary person

cies in hi3

" Essay on Miracles" and

elsewhere, was attempted, on this plan, a few years ago, in a pamphlet (published anonymously, as the nature of the argument required, but which I see no reason against acknowledging) entitled " His-

could not, on Hume's principles, be received as a well authenticated fact; since rests on evidence less strong than that which supports the Scripture-histories.
it

Doubts relative to Napoleon Buonaparte;" in which it was shown that the

toric

For a clear development of the mode which this last evidence operates on most minds, see " Hinds on Inspiration," pp. 30-46.
in

1 3.]

ANALYTICAL OUTLINE.
distinct to his

21

mind: and yet lie is liable to overlook from finding that he clearly understands the Arguments. He may be said, in one sense, to understand what he is reading; because he can perfectly follow the train of Reasoning, itself. But this, perhaps, he might equally well do, if he were to substitute for one of the words employed, X, or Z, or any other But a man will such unknown Symbol; as in the examples above. often confound together, the understanding of the Arguments, in themselves, and the understanding of the words employed, and of the nature of the things those words denote. It appears then, that valid Reasoning, when regularly expressed, has its validity [or conclusiveness] made evident from the mere form of the expression itself, independently of any regard to the

convey notliing

this circumstance,

sense of the words. In examining this form, in such an example as that just given, is Y,") it is assumed you will observe that in the first Premise (" universally of the Class of things (whatever it may be) which " X'* denotes, that ** Y" may be affirmed of them: and in the other Premise, (" Z is X,") that '* Z" (whatever it may stand for) ia Now it is evident referred to that Class, as comprehended in it. that whatever is said of the whole of a Class, may be said of any thing that is comprehended [or "included," or "contained,"] in that Class: so that we are thus authorized to say (in the conclusion) that "Z"is"Y." Thus also, in the example first given, having assumed universally, of the Class of ** Things which exhibit marks of design," that they "had an intelligent maker," and then, in the other Premise, having referred "The world" to that Class, we conclude that it may be asserted of "The world" that "it had an intelligent

maker."

And
Class.
is

the process is the same when any thing is denied of a whole are equally authorized to deny the same, of whatever comprehended under that Class. For instance, if I say, " No

We

liar is

deserving of trust; this man is a liar; therefore he is not deserving of trust;" I here deny " deserving of trust," of the whole Class denoted by the word " liar;" and then I refer " this man" to that Class; whence it follows that "deserving of trust" may be denied of him. This argument also wiU be as manifestly valid, if (as in the former case) you substitute for the words which have a known meaning, any undetermined Symbols, such as letters of the alphabet. " No is Y; Z is X; therefore Z is not Y," is as perfect a syllogism as the other with the affirmative conclusion. And here it is to be observed, that by " Class'* is meant through- Meaning out this treatise, not merely a " Head" or "general description" cias*. to which several things are actually referred, but one to which an indefinite number of things might conceivably be referred; viz. as

of

4f|^Ji|||J|!ll^

ANAT.YTICAL OUTLINE.
[Book
1.

22

many as (in the colloquial phrase) may " answer to the description.''* E. G. One may conceive that when the first-created man existed alone, some superhuman Beings may have contemplated him not merely as an individual bearing the proper-name of Adam, but also, by Abstraction, simply, as possessing those attributes which wo call collectively ** humanity" ["human-nature;"] and may have such as *' Man" implying those attributes, applied to him a name,

[that description] and which would consequently suit equally well any of his descendants. When then any thing is said to be ** referred to such and such
Class'* this is to be understood either of an actual, or what may be called a potential Class: i.e. the word Class is used whether there actually exist, or not, several things to which the description will For it is evident, that, in any case, we refer something to apply. a certain Class in consequence of that thing's possessing certain And this being kept in mind, there attributes, and not, vice versa. is a convenience in employing the word " Class" instead of introducing circumlocution by always speaking of " description."

Meanfng of

re^nfng.

be found, then, on examination, that all valid arguments may be easily reduced to such a form as that of the foregoing syllogisms; and that consequently the principle on which they are constructed is the UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLE of Reasoning. So elliptical, indeed, is the ordinary mode of expression, even of those who are considered as prolix writers, i.e. so much is implied and left to be understood in the course of argument, in comparison of what is actually stated, (most men being impatient, even to excess, of any appearance of unnecessary and tedious formality of statement,) that a single sentence will often be found, though perhaps considered as a single argument, to contain, compressed into a short compass, a chain of several distinct arguments. But if each of these be fully developed, and the whole of what the author intended to imply be stated expressly, it will be found that all the steps even of the longest and most complex train of reasoning may be reduced into the above form.^ It is a mistake (which might appear scarcely worthy of notice, had not so many, even esteemed writers, fallen into it) to imagine that Aristotle and other logicians meant to propose that this prohx form of unfolding arguments should universally supersede, in argumentative discourses, the common forms of expression; and that, ** to reason logically," means, to state all arguments at full length in the syllogistic form; and Aristotle has even been charged It has been said that '* in his with inconsistency for not doing so. Treatises of Ethics, Politics., &c. he argues like a rational creature, and never attempts to bring his own system into practice. "^*^ As
It will

whatever

One

of the ancients

is

reported^ to

it

have compared Logic to the closed fist, Mtd Rhetoric to the open haud. To me

parison
^^

appears that the reverse of this com would be more correct. Lord Kaiues.

4.]

ANALYTICAL OUTLINE.

23

well might a chemist be charged with inconsistency for making use of any of the compound substances that are commonly employed, without

previously analyzing and resolving as well might

it

them

into their simple elements;

be imagined that, ** to speak grammatically,'* means, to parse %\qyj sentence we utter. The chemist (to pursue the illustration) keeps by him his tests and his method of analysis, to be employed when any substance is offered to his notice, the composition of which has not been ascertained, or in which adulteration is suspected. Novr' a fallacy may aptly be compared to some adulterated compound; " it consists of an ingenious mixture of truth
*' **

"
*'

and falsehood, so entangled, so intimately blended, that the falsehood is (in the chemical phrase) held in solution: one drop of sound logic is that test which immediately disunites them, makes
the Foreign substance visible, and precipitates
it

to the bottom.

"^^

But to resume the investigation of the principles of Reasoning: Aristotle's ''^'""^ the Maxim resulting from the examination of a syllogism in the foregoing form, and of the application of which, every valid argument is in reahty an instance, is, " that whatever is predicated [i.e. affirmed or denied) universally, of any Class of things, may be predicated, in like manner, [viz. affirmed or denied) of any thing comprehended in that Class." This is the principle, commonly called the dictum de omni et nullo, for the indication of which we are indebted to Aristotle, and which is the keystone of his whole logical system. It is remarkable that some, otherwise judicious writers, should have been so carried away by their zeal against that philosopher, as to speak with scorn and ridicule of this principle, on account of its obviousness and simplicity; though they would probably perceive at once, in any other case, that it is the greatest triumph of philosophy
to refer many, and seemingly very various, phenomena to one, or a very few simple principles; and that the more simple and evident such a principle is, provided it be truly applicable to all the cases in question, the greater is its value and scientific beauty. If, indeed, any principle be regarded as not thus applicable, that is an objection to it of a difi'erent kind. Such an objection against Aristotle's Dictum, no one has ever attempted to establish by any kind of proof; but it has often been taken for granted; it being (as has been stated) very commonly supposed, without examination, that the syllogism is a distinct kind of argument, and that the rules of it accordingly do not apply, nor were intended to apply to all reasoning whatever. Dr. Campbell ^^ endeavours, under this misapprehension, with some

11

This excellent illustration

is

cited

from a passage in an anonymous pamphlet, *' An Examination of Kett's Logic." The author displays, though in a hasty

production, great reach of thought, as well as knowledge of his subject.

12

" Philosophy of Rhetoric.'*

24:

ANALYTICAL OUTLINE.

[Book

I.

ingenuity, and not without an air of plausibility, to show that every syllogism must be futile and worthless, because the Premises virtually assert the Conclusion: objections, however specious,
itself,

little
lie

dreaming, of course, that his against the process of reasoning

universally; and will, therefore, of course, apply to those very arguments which he is himself adducing. He should have been reminded of the story of the woodman, who had mounted a tree, and was so earnestly employed in lopping the boughs, that he imconsclously cut off the bough on which he was standing. '' It is still more extraordinary to find other eminent authors adopting, expressly, the very same objections, and yet distinctly admitting the possibility of reducing every course of argument to a series of syllogisms. Mistake One of these writers brings an objection against the Dictum of thl^meinfng Arlstotle, whlch It may be worth while to notice briefly, for the of the sake of setting in a clearer light the real character and object of Its apphcation being, as has been seen, to a that Principle. regular and conclusive Syllogism, he supposes it Intended to prove and make evident the conclusiveness of such a syllogism; and remarks how unphilosophical it is to attempt giving a demonstration of a demonstration. And certainly the charge would be just, if we could imagine the logician's object to be, to increase the certainty of a conclusion which we are supposed to have already arrived at by the clearest possible mode of proof. But it is very strange that such an idea should ever have occurred to one who had even the slightest tincture of Natural philosophy: for it might as well be imagined that a natural philosopher's or a chemist's design is to strengthen the testimony of our senses by a, priori reasoning, and to convince us that a stone when thrown will fall to the ground, and because they show that that gunpowder will explode when fired according to their principles those phenomena must take place as they do. But it would be reckoned a mark of the grossest ignorance and stupidity not to be aware that their object is not to prove the existence of an individual phenomenon, which our eyes have
;

witnessed, but (as the phrase is) to account for it: i.e. to show to refer, in short, the according to what principle it takes place; individual case to a general law of nature. The object of Aristotle's Dictum is precisely analogous; he had, doubtless, no thought of adding to the force of any individual syllogism; his design was to point out the general principle on which that process is conducted which takes place in each syllogism. And as the Laws^* of nature (as they are called) are in reality merely genera' ized facts, of which all the phenomena coming under them are particular instances; so, the proof drawn from Aristotle's Dictum is not a distinct demonstration brought to confirm another demonstration, but is merely a

^ AsDugald Stewart:

Philosophy, vol.

ii.:

1*

Appendix, No.

1, art.

and Locke, Law.

vol.

ii.

ch. 17, f 4,

? 4.]

ANALYTICAL OUTLINE.

25

generalized and abstract statement of all demonstration whatever; and is, therefore, in fact, the very demonstration which {mutatis mutandis) accommodated to the various subject-matters, is actually employed in each particular case. In order to trace more distinctly the different steps of the

Jst\?emeilt'

abstracting process, by which any particular argument may be of argument brought into the most general form, we may first take a syllogism abstract. [i.e. an argument stated accurately and at full length), such as the example formerly given, " whatever exhibits marks of design, &c.," and then somewhat generalize the expression, by substituting (as in algebra) arbitrary unmeaning symbols for the significant terms that

were originally used; the syllogism will then stand thus; ** every B is A; C is B; therefore C is A." The reasoning, when thus stated, is no less evidently valid, whatever terms. A, B, and C, Such terms may respectively, may be supposed to stand for. indeed be inserted as to make all or some of the assertions /aZse; but it will still be no less impossible for any one who admits the truth of the premises, in an argument thus constructed, to deny the conclusion; and this it is that constitutes the conclusiveness of an argument. Viewing then the syllogism thus expressed, it appears clearly, that " A stands for any thing whatever that is afiirmed of a certain entire Class," {viz. of every B,) "which class comprehends or contains in it something else,'' viz. C, (of which B is, in the second premiss, affirmed) and that, consequently, the first term (A) is, in
;

the conclusion, predicated of the third C. Now to assert the validity of this process, now before us, is to state the very Dictum we are treating of, with hardly even a verbal
alteration: viz.:

thing whatever, predicated of a whole class, class something else is contained, 3. May be predicated of that which is so contained. The three members into which the Maxim is here distributed, correspond to the three propositions of the Syllogism to which they are intended respectively to apply. ^^ The advantage of substituting for the terms in a regular syllogism, Utility of arbitrary unmeaning symbols, such as letters of the alphabet, is crnt*'*^"* much the same as in Geometry: the Reasoning itself is then con- ^y^^^o^* sidered, by itself, clearly, and without any risk of our being misled by the truth or falsity of the conclusion; which is, in fact, accidental and variable; the essential point being, as far as tbe argument is concerned, the connection between the premises and the conclusion. are thus enabled to embrace the general principle of all reasoning, and to perceive its applicabihty to an indefinite number of individual That Aristotle, therefore, should have been accused of cases.
1.

Any

2.

Under which

We

w See Book

IV. Ch.

m.

1.

26

ANALYTICAL OUTLINE.

[Book

I.

making use

of these symbols for the purpose of darJcening his demonstrations, and that too by persons not unacquainted with Geometry and Algebra, is truly astonishing. If a geometer, instead of designating the four angles of a square by four letters, were to

chTr^acter

of the
ic

um.

them north, south, east, and west, he would not render the demonstration of a theorem the easier; and the learner would be much more likely to be perplexed in the application of it. It belongs then exclusively to a Syllogism, properly so called {i.e. a valid argument, so stated that its conclusiveness is evident from the mere form of the expression), that if letters, or any other unmeaning symbols, be substituted for the several terms, the validity of the argument shall still be evident. Whenever this is not the case, the supposed argument is either unsound and sophistical, or else may be reduced (without any alteration of its meaning) into the syllogistic form; in which form, the test just mentioned may be applied to it. Some persons have remarked of the ** Dictum" (meaning it as a disparagement) that it is merely a somewhat circuitous explanation ^y ^ji^f jg meant by a Class. It is, in truth, just such an explanation of this as is needful to the student, and which must be kept before his mind in reasoning. For we should recollect that not only every Class [the Sign of which is a *' Common-term"] comprehends under it an indefinite number of individuals, and often of other Classes, differing in many respects from each other, but also most of those individuals and classes may be referred, each, to an indefinite number of classes according as we choose to
call

abstract this point or that,

from each. remind one on each occasion, that so and so is referable to such and such a Class, and that the class which happens to be before us comprehends such and such things, this is precisely all

Now

to

that is ever accomplished

by Reasoning. For one may plainly perceive, on looking at any of the examples above, that when we assert both the Premises taken in conjunction,
have, virtually, implied the Conclusion. Else, indeed, it would not be impossible (as it is) for any one to deny the Conclusion, wha admits both Premises.^^

we

'^^

unsound"
arguments,

What is called an unsound or fallacious argument {i.e. an apparent argument, which is, in reality, none) cannot, of course, be reduced into this form; bst when stated in the form most nearly approaching to this that is possible, its fallaciousness becomes more evident, from its nonconformity to the foregoing rule: e.g. ** whoever is capable of deliberate crime is responsible; an infant is not capable
18 Hence, some have considered it as a disparagementtoa Syllogism (which they imagine to be one kind of Argument) that you can gain no new truth from it; the Conclusions it establishes being in fact known already, by every one who bos admitted the Premises.

Since, however, a Syllogism is not a certain distinct kind of argument, but any argument whatever, stated in a regur lar form, tlie complaint, such as it is, Tiea against Reasoning altogether. In B. iv. cu. 2, this point is more fully explained,

1 4.]

ANALYTICAL OUTLINE.

27

of deliberate crime; tlierefore, an infant is not responsible," (see 3): here the term " responsible" is affirmed universallj of " those capable of deliberate crime;" it might, therefore, according to Aristotle's Dictum, have been affirmed of any thing contained mider that class; but, in the instance before us, nothing is mentioned as contained under that class; only, the term " infant" is excluded from that class; and though what is affirmed of a whole class may be affirmed of any thing that is contained under it, there is no ground for supposing that it may be denied of whatever is not so contained; for it is evidently possible that it may be applicable to a whole class and to something else besides. To say, e.g. that all trees are vegetables, does not imply that nothing else is a vegetable; nor, when it is said, that '* all who are capable of deliberate crime are responsible," does this imply, that *' no others are responsible;" for though this may be very true, it has not been asserted in the premiss before us; and in the analysis of an argument, we are to discard all consideration of what might be asserted; contemplating only what actually is laid down in the premises. It is evident, therefore, that such an apparent argument as the above does not comply with the rule laid down, nor can be so stated as to comply with it; and is consequently invalid. Again, in this instance, "food is necessary to life; com is food; therefore, corn is necessary to life:" the term "necessary to life" is affirmed of food, but not universally; for it is not said of every hind of food: the meaning of the assertion being manifestly that *' some food is necessary to life;" so that, expressed in symbols, the is Y; Z is X; apparent argument might stand thus; " Some therefore Z is Y." Here again, therefore, the rule has not been complied with, since that which has been predicated, [affiraied or denied] not of the whole, but of a part only of a certain class, cannot be, on that ground, predicated of whatever is contained under that class. There is an argument against miracles by the well-known Mr. Hume, which has perplexed many persons, and which exactly corresponds to the above. It may be stated thus " Testimony is a kind of evidence more likely to be false, than a miracle to be true;" (or, as it may be expressed in other words, we have more reason to expect that a witness should lie, than that a miracle should occur) '* the evidence on which the Christian miracles are believed, is testimony; therefore the evidence on which the Christian miracles are believed is more likely to be false than a miracle to be true." Here it is evident that what is spoken of in the first of these Premises, is, "some testimony;" not "all testimony," [or any whatever,'] and by " a witness" we understand " some witness, " not, *' every witness:" so that this apparent argument has exactly the B^me fault as the one above. ^^

15'

See Appendix II. Example No.

26.

28

ANALYTICAL OUTLINE.
5.

[Book

I.

The
logical

fallacy in these last cases

is,

what

is

usually described in

Distribution erms. -^ j^

language as consisting in the *' non-distribution of the middle term:" i.e. its not being employed to denote all the objects In order to understand this phrase, it is to which it is applicable. necessary to observe that a Proposition being an expression in which one thing is said, i.e. affirmed or denied of another, [e.g. *' A is B,") both that of which something is said, and that which is said of it {i.e. both A and B), are called '* terms;" from their being (in their nature) the extremes or boundaries of the Proposition: and there are, of course, two, and but two, terms in a proposition (though it may so happen that either of them may consist either of one word, or of Several); and a term is said to be " distributed," when
taken universally, so as to stand for every thing it is capable of being applied to; and consequently "undistributed," when it stands for a portion only of the things signified by it: thus, " all food," or every kind of food, are expressions which imply the distribution of the term "food;" "some food" would imply its

And it is also to be observed that the term of which, in one premiss, something is affirmed or denied, and to which, in the other premiss, something else is referred as contained in it, is called the " middle" term in the syllogism, as standing between the other two {viz. the two terms of the conclusion), and Now it is plain, that if in each premiss being the medium of proof. a part only of this middle-term is employed, i.e. if it be not at all distributed, no conclusion can be drawn. Hence, if, in the example formerly adduced, it had been merely stated that " something" (not " whatever/' or " everything'') " which exhibits marks of design is the work of an intelligent author," it would not have followed, from the world's exhibiting marks of design, that that is the work of
non-distribution.

an

intelligent author.
It is to

be observed, also, that the words "all" and "every," which mark the distribution of a term, and " some," which marks
are not always expressed: they are frequently understood, and left to be supplied by the context; e.g. "food is necessary;" viz. "some food;" "man is mortal;" w^. "every man.' Propositions thus expressed are called by logicians "indefinite,'^ Propositfons because it is left undetermined by the form of the expression whether the " subject " (the term of which something is affirmed or denied being called the " subject " of the proposition, and that which is Nevertheless it said of it, the " predicate ") be distributed or not. is plain that in every proposition the Subject either is, or is not, meant to be distributed; though it be not declared whether it is or Consequently, every proposition, whether expressed indefinitely not. or not, must be understood as either " universal " or "particular;'* those being called Universal in which the predicate is said of the
its non-distribution,

^6.1

ANALYTICAL OUTLINE.

29

whole of the subject (or, in other words, where the subject is distributed); and those, Particular, in which it is said only of a part of
the subject: e.g. **A11 men are sinful," is universal; "some men And this division of propositions is, in are sinful," particular. ^^ logical language, said to be according to their ** quantity. But the distribution or non-distribution of the predicate is entirely Quantity and quality independent of the quantity of the proposition; nor are the signs of propositions *'all" and "some" ever affixed to the predicate; because its distribution depends upon, and is indicated by, the ''quality'' of the proposition; i.e. its being affirmative or negative; it being a universal rule, that the predicate of a negative proposition is distribuThe reason of this may ted, and of an affirmative, undistributed. easily be understood, by considering that a term which stands for a whole Class may be applied to {i.e. affirmed of) any thing that is comprehended under that class, though the term of which it is thus affirmed may be of much narrower extent than that other, and may, Thus it may therefore, be far from coinciding with the whole of it. be said with truth, that *' the Negroes are uncivilized," though the term uncivilized be of much wider extent than " Negroes," comprehending, besides them, Hottentots, &c.; so that it would not be allowable to assert, that '' all who are uncivilized are Negroes;" it is evident, therefore, that it is a part only of the term "uncivilized " that has been affirmed of " Negroes;" and the same reasoning applies to every affirmative proposition; for though it may so happen that the subject and predicate coincide; i.e. are of equal extent, as, e.g. "all men are rational animals;" "all equilateral triangles are equiangular;" (it being equally true, that "all rational animals are men," and that "all equiangular triangles are equilateral;) yet this is not implied by the form of the expression; since " even it would be no less true, that " all men are rational animals, if there were other rational animals besides Man. It is plain, therefore, that if any part of the predicate is applicable to the subject, it may be affirmed, and, of course, cannot be denied, of that subject; and consequently, when the predicate is denied of the subject, this implies that no part of that predicate is applicable to that subject; i.e. that the whole of the predicate is denied of the subject; for to say, e.g. that "no beasts of prey ruminate," implies that beasts of prey are excluded from the whole class of ruminant animals, and consequently that "no ruminant animals are beasts of prey." And hence esults the above-mentioned rule, that the distribution of the predicate is implied in negative
propositions,

and

its

non-distribution, in affirmatives.

perhaps be startled at being told that the Nonpredicate of an affirmative is never distributed; especially as Aldrich qJ-^*^?"*'*^ has admitted that accidentally this mm/ take place: as in such a Predicate in but this proposition as "all equilateral triangles are equiangular; is not accurate; he might have said that in such a proposition as
learner

The

may

30
tlie

ANALYTICAL OUTLINE.
above
tlie

[Book

I.

predicate
it

distributed:

i.e.

but not that it is actually so happens that "all equiangular triangles oro
is

distributable,

is not implied in the previous assertion; and the point to be considered is, not what might be said with truth, but what actually has been said. And accordingly mathematicians give distinct demonstrations of the above two propositions. If it happen to be my object to assert that the Predicate as well as the Subject of a certain affirmative proposition is to be understood and if I say, for instance, " all equilateral triangles, as distributed and no others, are equiangular," I am asserting, in reality, not And this is the case whenever one proposition, merely, but two. the proposition I state is understood (whether from the meaning of the words employed, or from the general drift of the discourse) to imply that the whole of the Predicate is meant to be affirmed of the Subject. Thus, if I say of one number suppose 100 that it is the Square of another, as 10, then, this is understood by every one, from his knowledge of the nature of numbers, to imply, what are, in reality, the two propositions, that 100 is "the Square of 10," and also that *' the Square of 10 is 100." So also, if I say that " Romulus was the first king of Rome," this implies, from the peculiar signifcortion of the words, that '* the first king of Rome was Romulus." Terms thus related to each other are called in technical language, "convertible" [or *' equivalent "] terms. But then, you are to observe that when you not only affirm one term of another, but also affirm (or imply) that these are " convertible " terms, you are making not merely one assertion, but two. i^'stribution It is to be remembered, then, that it is not sufficient for the middle term to occur in a Universal-proposition; since if that proposition terms. be an affirmative, and the middle-term be the predicate of it, it will not be distributed; e.g. if in the example formerly given, it had been merely asserted, that " all the works of an intelligent author show marks of design," and that ** the universe shows marks of design,'* nothing could have been proved; since, though both these propositions are universal, the middle-term is made the predicate in each, and both are affirmative; and accordingly, the rule of Aristotle is not here complied with, since the term '* work of an intelligent author," which is to be proved applicable to "the universe," would not have been affirmed of the middle-term ("what shows marks of design") under which "universe" is contained; but the middleterm, on the contrary, would have been affirmed of it. If, however, one of the premises be negative, the middle-term may then be made the predicate of that, and will thus, according to the above remark, be distributed; e.g. "no ruminant animals are predacious; the lion is predacious; therefore the lion is not ruminant:'* this is a valid syllogism; and the middle -term (predacious) is distributed by being made the predicate of a negative proposition.

equilateral;" but this

'=

1 6.]

ANALYTICAL OUTLINE.
indeed, of the syllogism
it

31

not that prescribed by the by stating the first proposition thus: **no predacious animals are ruminant;" which is manifestly implied (as was above remarked) in the assertion that **no ruminant animals are predacious." The syllogism will thus

The form,

is

Dictum, but

may

easily be reduced to that form,

form to which the Dictum applies. argument, indeed, that can be reduced to this The DJctnm form by so short and simple an alteration as in the case before us: applicable^ a longer and more complex process wiU often be required; and rules will hereafter be laid down to facilitate this process in certain cases: but there is no sound argument but what can be reduced into this form, without at all departing from the real meaning and drift of it; and the form will be found (though more prolix than is needed for ordinary use) the most perspicuous in which an argument can be
appear
in the

It is not every

exhibited.

All Reasoning whatever, then, rests on the one simple Principle down by Aristotle, that "what is predicated, either affirmatively or negatively, of a term distributed, may be predicated in like manner {i.e. affirmatively or negatively) of any thing contained under that term." So that when our object is to prove any proposition, i.e. to show that one tenn may rightly be affirmed or denied of another, the process which really takes place in our minds is, that we refer that term (of which the other is to be thus predicated) to some class ^ [i.e. middle term) of which that other may be affirmed, or denied, as the case may be. Whatever the subject-matter of an argument may be, the Reasoning itself, considered by itself, is in every case the same process; and if the writers against Logic had kept this in mind, they would have been cautious of expressing their contempt of what they call *' syllogistic reasoning," which is in truth a/^ reasoning; and instead of ridiculing Aristotle's Principle for its obviousness and simplicity, would have perceived that these are, in fact, its highest praise: the easiest, shortest, and most evident theory, provided it answer the purpose of explanation, being ever the best.
laid

6.

conceive an inquirer to have reached, in his Investigation of the theory of Reasoning, the point to which we have now arrived, a question which would be likely next to engage his attention, is that of Predication; i.e. since in reasoning we are to find a middle-term
If

we

which may be predicated affirmatively of the Subject in question, we are led to inquire what terms may be affirmed, and what denied, of

what

others.

proper-name, or any other term which denotes Common H but a single individual, as "Caesar," "the Thames," "the Con- ?eS^
It is evident that a

That

is,

either

an

actual^ or

a potential

class.

See above,

3.

32

ANALYTICAL OUTLINE.

[Book L

Abstraction
^eneraiizaiion.

queror of Pompey," **tliis river " (hence called in Logic a ** Singularterm") cannot be affirmed of any thing besides that individual, and may therefore be denied of any thing else; we may say, "this river is the Thames," or ** Caesar was the conqueror of Pompey;'* but we cannot say of any thing else that it is the Thames, &c. On the other hand, those terms which are called " Common,^ as denoting anyone individual of a whole class, as "river," "conqueror," may of course be affirmed of any, or all that belong to that class: [of anything answering to a certain description] as, "the Thames is a river;" "the Rhine and the Danube are rivers." Common-terms, therefore, are called " predicables " {vis.ajirmatively-'pYedicahle), from their capability of being affirmed of others: a Singular-term, on the contrary, may be the Subject of a proposition, but never the Predicate, unless it be of a negative proposition; (as e.g. the first-born of Isaac was not Jacob;) or, unless the Subject and Predicate be only two expressions for the same individual object; as in some of the above instances. The process by which the mind arrives at the notions expressed " ^J ^hcse " common (or in popular language, " general ") terms, is properly called "Generalization;" though it is usually (and truly)
^

said to be the business of abstraction; for Generalization is one of the purposes to which Abstraction is applied. When we draw of, and contemplate separately any part of an object presented to the mind disregarding the rest of it, we are said to abstract that part. Thus, a person might, when a rose was before his eyes or mind, make the scent a distinct object of attention, laying aside all thought of the colour, form, &c.; and thus, even though it were the only rose he had ever met with, he would be employing the faculty of Abstraction; but if, in contemplating several objects, and finding that they agree in certain points, we abstract the circumstances of agreement, disregarding the differences, and give to all and each of these objects a name applicable to them in respect of this agreement, i.e. a common name, as "rose," or again, if we give a name to some attribute wherein they agree, as "fragrance " or "redness,'* we are then said to generalize. Abstraction, therefore, does not necessarily imply Generalization, though Generalization implies Abstraction. Much needless difficulty has been raised respecting the results of this process; many having contended, and perhaps more having taken for granted, that there must be some really-existing thing,^^ corresponding to each of those " general " [or " common "] terms, and of which such term is the name, standing for and representing it: e.g. that as there is a really existing Being corresponding to the proper name, "iEtna," and signified by it, so, the common- term, ** mountain," must also have some one really existing thing corre-

IJ*

See the subjoined Dissertation, Book IV. Cliap. V,


6.]

ANALYTICAL OUTLINE.

33

spondiug to it; and of course distinct from eacH Individual mountain (since the term is not Singular but Common), yet existing in each, since the term is applicable to each of them. *' When many different men," it is said, " are at the same time thinking or speaking about
a mountain, generally,' i.e. not any particular one, but minds must be all employed on something; which must also be one thing, and not several, and yet cannot be any one individual.'* And hence a vast train of mystical disquisitions about Ideas, &c. has arisen, which are at best nugatory, and tend to obscure our view

a 'mountain,'

'

their

of the process wliich actually takes place in the mind. The fact is, the notion expressed by a Common-term is merely an ^*jj" p^^y inadequate [incomplete] notion of an Individual; and from the very commou ^^^'^'^ circumstance of its inadequacy, it will apply equally well to any one

number of individuals of the same description; any one, in short, possessing the attribute or attributes that have been abstracted, and which are designated by that Common-term. E. G. If I omit the mention and the consideration of every circumstance which distinguishes ^tna from any other mountain, I then form a notion (expressed by the Common-term ** Mountain ") which inadequately designates ^tna {i.e. which does not imply any of its peculiarities, nor its numerical singleness), and is equally applicable to any one of several other individuals. Generalization, it is plain, may be indefinitely extended by a further abstraction applied to common-terms: e.g. as by abstraction from the term Socrates we obtain the common-term '* Philosopher;'* so, from "philosopher," by a similar process, we arrive at the more general-term " man;" from " man" we advance to ** animal," And so also you may advance from any " ten" objects before <kc. you, (for instance, the fingers; from which doubtless arose the custom of reckoning by tens) to the general-term, the number , "ten;" and thence again, to the more general-term, "number;" and ultimately to the term " quantity."^ We are thus enabled, not only to separate, and consider singly DiflFerent one part of an object presented to the mind, but also to fix arbi- from the same object, trarily upon whatever part we please, according as may suit the Any Individual person 1. G. purpose we happen to have in view. to whom we may direct our attention, may be considered either in a political point of view, and accordingly referred to the class of Merchant, Farmer, Lawyer, <fc;c. as the case may be; or physioof an indefinite
to

20 The employment of this faculty at pleasure has been regarded, and perhaps with good reason, as the characteristic distinction of the human mind from that ef the Brutes. Accordingly, even the most intelligent Brutes seem incapable of forming any distinct notion of number: to do which evidently depends on Abstraction. For, in order to coM7i< any objects, you must withdraw jour thoughts from

all

diferences between them,

as units.

and regard

them simply

And

accordingly,

the Savage Tribes (who are less removed than we are from the Brutes) are remarked for a great deficiency in their notions of number. Few of them can count beyond ten, or twenty; and some of the rudest Savages have no words to express any numbers beyond five. SeeDr,

Taylor's

*'

Natural-history of Society."

34
logically,

ANALYTICAL OUTLINE.
as Negro, or Christian,

[Book
as

White-man; or

theologically,

Pagan,

Different
cirstfitica-

*ifa

&c.; or geographically, as Em^opean, American, <fec. And so, in respect of any thing else that may be the subject of our reasoning: we arbitrarily fix upon and abstract that point which is essential to the purpose in hand; so that the Bame object may be referred to various different classes, according Not, of course, that we are allowed to refer any to the occasion. thing to a class to which it does not really belong; which would be pretending to abstract from it something that was no part of it but that we arbitrarily fix on any part of it which we choose to abstract from the rest. It is important to notice this, because men are often disposed to consider each object as really and properly belonging to some one <;lass alone ;^^ from their having been accustomed, in the course of their OAvn pursuits, to consider, in one point of view only, things which may with equal propriety be considered in other points of view also: i.e. referred to various Classes, (or predicates.) And this is that which chiefly constitutes what is called narrowness-ofmere botanist might be astonished at hearing such mind. B. G. plants as Clover and Lucerne included, in the language of a farmer, under the term *' grasses," which he has been accustomed to limit to a tribe of plants widely different in all botanical characteristics; and the mere farmer might be no less surprised to find the troublesome *' weed," (as he has been accustomed to call it,) known by the name of Couch-grass, and which he has been used to class with nettles and thistles, to which it has no botanical affinity, ranked by And yet the botanist as a species of Wheat, ( Triticum Repens.) neither of these classifications is in itself erroneous or irrational; though it would be absurd, in a botanical treatise, to class plants according to their agricultural use; or, in an agricultural treatise, according to the structure of their flowers. So also, a Diamond would be classed by a jeweller along with the ruby, emerald, kc, as a precious stone : while the chemist classes it, along with plumbago and coal, as one of the forms of carbon. The utility of these considerations, with a view to the present subject, will be readily estimated, by recurring to the account which has been already given of the process of Reasoning; the analysis of which shows that it consists in refen-ing the term we are speaking of to some class, ri^^. a middle tersf., which term again is referred to, or excluded from (as the caei ^ay be) another class, viz. the term which we wish to affirm or deny of the Subject of the Conclusion. So that the quality of our reasoning in any case must depend on our being able correctly, clearly, and promptly, to abstract from the Subject in question that which may furnish a Middle- term suitable to the occasion,
;

Mahometan,

See the subjoined Dissertation, Book lY. Chap. Y.

 6.]

ANALYTICAL OUTLINE.

35
utility of th

The Imperfect and irregular sketcli whicli has here been attempted, of the logical system, may suffice (even though some parts of it should not be at once fully imderstood by those who are entirely strangers to the study) to point out the general drift and purpose of the science, and to render the details of it both more interesting and more intelligible. The Analytical form, which has here been adopted, is, generally speaking, better suited for introducing any science in the plainest and most interesting form; though the Synthetical, which will henceforth be employed, is the more regular, and the more compendious form for storing it up in the memory. It is to be observed, however, that technical terms and rules will be rather an encumbrance than a help, unless we take care not only to understand them thoroughly, but also to learn them so perfectly that they may be as readily and as correctly employed as the names of the most familiar objects around us. But if any one will take the trouble to do this once for all, ho will find that in the end much trouble will have been saved. For, the explanations given of such technical-terms and general rules, when thoroughly learnt, once, will save the necessity of going through nearly the same explanation, over and over again on each separate occasion. In short, the advantage of technical-terms is just like what we When, for derive from the use of any other Common-terms. instance, we have once accurately learnt the definition of a ** Circle,'* or have had iully described to us what sort of creature an ** Elephant" is, to say " I drew a Circle," or, ** I saw an Elephant," would be sufficiently intelligible, without any need of giving the description or definition at full length, over and over again, on every separate occasion*

fornJ"*^

BOOK

IL

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.
Mind and of Terms.

CiiAP. I.

Of

ike Operations

of

the

1.
Operations of the Mind,

There
writers

are three operations [or states] of the

1st.

inimecllately concerned in

mind wliicli are Argument; which are called by logical Simple-apprehension; 2d. Judgment; 3d. Discourse

or Reasoning.^
Simple- p.p.

Judgment

Discourse.

Simple-apprehension they define to be that act or condition mind in which it receives a notion of any object and which is analogous to the perception of the senses. It is either Incomplex or Complex:^ Incomplex-apprehension is of one object, or of several without any relation being perceived between them, as of **a man," "a horse," "cards:" Complex, is of several with such a relation, as of '* a man on horseback," *' a pack of cards." 2d. Judgment is the comparing together in the mind two of the notions [or ideas] which are the objects of Apprehension, whether complex or incomplex, and pronouncing that they agree or disagree with each other: [or that one of them belongs or does not belong to Judgment, therefore, is either affirmative or negative. the other.] 3d. Reasoning [or "discourse"] is the act of proceeding from certain Judgments to another founded upon them, [or the result of them.]
1st.

of the

2.
Language.

Language afibrds the signs by which these operations of the mind are not only expressed, and communicated to others, but even, The notion obtained in for the most part, carried on by ourselves.
Logical writers have in general begun that there are, in all, three operations of the mind: (in univer'
1

by laying down

The opening of a treatise with a statement respecting- the operations of the mind universally, tends to foster the
prevaiHng error (from which probably the minds of the writers were not exempt) of supposing that Logic professes to teach "the use of the mental faculties in general ;" the " right use of reason," according to Watts. 2 With respect to the technical terms employed in this work, see the Preface.

sum tres) an assertion by no means incoritrovertible, and which, if admitted, is nothing to the present purpose. Our
business
is

with argumentation, expressed

in words, and the "operations of the mind implied in that ; what others there may be, or whether any, are irrelevant questions.

Chap.

I, 2.]

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.
is

37

expressed in language, a teiin; an act oi judgment is expressed by a proposition; an act of reasoning, by an argument; (which, when regularly expressed, is a

an act of appreliension,

called,

"v^'llen

syllogism;) as
*'

e.g. is

Every dispensation of Providence

Therefore they are beneficial:"

beneficial;

Afflictions are dispensations of Providence,

is

a Syllogism; the act of reasoning being indicated by the word ** It consists of three propositions, each of which has therefore.'' (necessarily) U\o terms, as "beneficial," "dispensations of Provi-

dence," &LC. In introducing the mention of language previously to the definition of Logic, I have departed from established practice, in order that it may be clearly understood, that Logic is entirely conversant about language. If any process of reasoning can take place, in the mind, without any employment of language, orally or mentally, (a metaphysical question which I shall not here discuss) such a process does not come within the province of the science here treated of.' This truth, most writers on the subject, if indeed they were fully aware of it themselves, have certainly not taken due care to impress on their readers. Language is employed for various purposes. It is the province Purposes of the historian, for instance, to convey information by means of La^nsua^e is employed, language, of the poet, to aff"ord a certain kind of gratification, while it belongs to the arguof the orator, to persuade, <kc. kc. mentative writer or speaker, as such, to convince the understanding. And as Grammar is conversant about language universally, for whatever purpose it is employed, so, it is only so far as it is employed for this last purpose, viz. that of reasoning, that it falls under the cognizance of Logic. And whereas, in reasoning, terms are liable to be indistinct, {i.e. Terms, without any clear, determinate meaning,) propositions to be/a?se, syUogUmT*" and arguments inconclusive. Logic undertakes directly and completely to guard against this last defect, and, incidentally, and in a certain degree, against the others, as far as can be done by the proper use of language. It is, therefore, (when regarded as an art) *' the Art of employing language properly for the purpose of Reasoning and of distinguishing what is properly and truly an Argument from spurious imitations of it." The importance of such a study no one can rightly estimate who has not long and attentively considered how much our thoughts are influenced by expressions, and how much error, perplexity, and labour are occasioned by a faulty use of language and many who are not unaware of that, have yet failed to observe that " signs'' (such as Language supplies) are an indispensable instrument of all Reasoning, strictly so called.

St

See Introduction,

&

38
Degree and

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.

[Book

II.

manner

in

which the
several defects are to be

In reference however to the ahove-mentloned defects, two important distinctions are to be observed. 1 st, It is to be remembered that that which is, really, a Term, may be indistinctly apprehended

by the person employing

guarded
against.

it, or by his hearer and so also, a Proposition which is false, is not the less a real Proposition: but, on the other hand, any expression or statement which does not
;

any thing, is not, really, an Argument at all, though it be brought forward and passed off as such. 2dly, It is to be remembered that (as it is evident from what has been formerly said) no rules can be devised that will equally guard against all three of the above-mentioned defects. To arrive at a distinct apprehension of every thing that may be expressed by any Term whatever, and again, to ascertain the truth or falsity of every conceivable Proposition, is manifestly beyond the But on the other hand, it is possible reach of any system of rules. to exhibit any pretended Argument whatever in such a form as to be able to pronounce decisively on its validity or its fallaciousness. So that the last of the three defects alluded to (though not, the two former) may be directly and completely obviated by the applicaBut the other two defects can be guarded tion of suitable rules. against (as will presently be shown) only indirectly, and to a certain
really prove

may

degree. In other words, rules

may be framed

what

is,

really,

" Term," an "Argument:" and to do

or
is

not, really a

really,
this,

that will enable us to decide, a ** Proposition" or

is

to

guard completely

clusive,

against the defect of inconclusiveness ; since nothing that is inconis, really, an "Argument;" though that maybe really a ** Term" of which you do not distinctly apprehend the meaning; and that which is really a " Proposition,'' may be false Proposi2^.

tion.
AnaTysTP of Syllogism

nd
tioo.

I'loposl

tions,

Syllogism being, as aforesaid, resolvable into three Proposiand each Proposition containing two Terms of these terms, that which is spoken of is called the subject; that which is said of it, the predicate; and these two are called the terms [or extremes] because, logically, the Subject is placed first, and the Predicate last;'^ and, in the middle, the Copula, which indicates the act of Judgment, as by it the Predicate is affirmed or denied of the Subject. The Copula must be either is or is not; which expressions indicate simply that you affirm or deny the Predicate, of the Subject. The substantive-verb is the only verb recognised by Logic inasmuch as all others are compound; being resolvable, by means of the verb, ** to be," and a participle or adjective: e.g. "the Romans conquered:" the word conquered is both copula and predicate, being equivalent to " were (Cop.) victorious " (Pred.)
;
;

It is proper to observe, that the Copula, as such, has

4

no relation
"great

In Greek and

in Latin, very often,

tlie

predicate
is

is,

actiially,))ut first: as

unu, not unirequentiy, in English,

Diana

of tiie Ephesians."

Chap.

I. 3.]

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.

39

merely the agreement or disagreement of two given terms : hence, if any other tense of the substantive-verb besides the present, is used, it is either understood as the same in sense, (the difference of tense being regarded as a matter of grammatical propriety only;) or else, if the circumstance of time really do modify the sense of the whole proposition, so as to make the use of that tense an essential, then, this circumstance is to be regarded as a part of one of the terms: *' at that time,'' or some such expression, being understood: as "this man was honest;" i.e. "he is one formerly-honest." In such cases, an emphasis, accompanied with a peculiar tone, is usually laid on the substantive-verb.^ Sometimes the substantive-verb is both Copula and Predicate; i.e. where existence ojAj \& predicated: e.g. Deus est, "there is a God." "One of Jacob's sons is not." And observe, that the Copula, merely as such, does not imply real existence: e.g. "a faultless man is a Being feigned by the Stoics, and which one must not expect to meet with."
to time; but expresses

3.
It is evident that a

Term may

consist either of one

Word

or of
Cafegore.
"^^^^'^

and that it is not every word that is categorematic, i.e. capable of being employed by itself as a Term. Adverbs, Prepositions, kc. and also Nouns in any other case besides the nominative, are syncategorematic, i.e. can only form part of a term. A nominative Noun may be by itself a terra. A Verb (all except the substantive-verb used as the copula) is a mixed word, being resolvable into the Copula and Predicate, to which it is equivalent and, indeed, is often so resolved in the mere rendering out of one language
several
; ;

f^^at?^^"*

Mixed,

into another; as
It is to

^'

ipse adest,"

"he

is

present."
infinitive*,

be observed, however, that under "verb," we do not include the Infinitive, which is properly a Noun-substantive, nor the Participle, which is a Noun-adjective. They are verbals ; being
related to their respective verbs in respect of the things they signify: but not verbs, inasmuch as they differ entirely in their mode of
signification.

It is

worth observing, that an

the Subject
:

Infinitive

(though

it

often

comes

last in the sentence) is never the predicate^ except

is

when

another Infinitive

e.g.
subj,

pred.
is

"I hope
to advance

to succeed*"
is

i.e.

"to succeed

what

hope."

"Not

to fall

back."

It is to be observed, also, that in English there are two infinitives, one in ^'ing,'' the same in sound and spelling as the Participle* Strange to say, there are persons who thus understand our Lord's declaration to Pilate : " my kingdom is not of this

that

world;" viz. ^''noio;" meaning (secretly) it was to become so hereafter, when his followers should have attained

What can be the greater strength ! morai sentiments of those who can believe such to have been the secret sense of the words of a divine messentjer who is to b3 our model of truth and oi" all virtue 1

40

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.

[Book

II.

e.g.

present; from wliich, however, it should he carefully distinguished; "rising early is healthful," and " it is healthful to rise early," are equivalent.

Grammarians have produced much needless perplexity hy speaking oi i\iQ jparticiple in *' ing/' hemg employed so and so; when it is manifest that that very employment of the word constitutes it, to all intents and purposes, an infinitive and not a participle. The advantage of the infinitive in ing, is, that it may he used either in the nominative or in any ohlique case; not (as some suppose) that it necessarily implies a A6zi ; e.^. "Seeing is helieving:" "there is glory in dying for one's country:" " a habit of observing," &c. If I say "he is riding," and again "riding is pleasant," in the fonner sentence "riding " is an Adjective, and is the Predicate; in the latter it is a Substantive and is the Subject; the sentence being equivalent to "it is pleasant to ride." In this, and in many other cases, the English word IT serves as a representative of the Subject when that is put last: e.g.
pred.
*

subj.

It is to

be hoped that we shall succeed."

by itself, be made the Subject of a proposition; but is often employed as a Predicate: as ** Crassus was rich;" though some choose to consider some substantive as understood in every such case, {e.g. rich man) and con. sequently do not reckon adjectives among Simple-terms; [i.e. words which are capable, singly, of being employed as terms.] This, however, is a question of no practical consequence; but I have thought it best to adhere to Aristotle's mode of statement. (See his Categ.) Of Simple-terms, then, (which are what the first part of Logic s'mpTe. terms. treats of) there are many divisions; of which, however, one will be viz. into singular and common: sufficient for the present purpose because, though any term whatever may be a subject, none but a common term can be affirmatively predicated of several others. isinguiar and Singular-term stands for one individual, as "Csesar," "the Thames:" these, it is plain, cannot be said [predicated] affirmatively, ^rma'^"' Common-term is of any thing but those individuals respectively. one that may stand for any of an indefinite number of individuals, which are called its signijicates : i.e. can be applied to any of them,
adjective (including participles) cannot,
;

An

as

comprehending them

in

its

single

signijication

as

"man,'*

"river," "great."

The learner who has gone through the Analytical Outline, will now be enabled to proceed to the Second and Third Chapters either
with or without the study of the remainder of what is usually placed in the First Chapter, but which I have subjoined as a Supplement. See Chap. V,

Chap.

II. 1.]

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.

41

Chap.

II.

Of

Propositions.

1second part of Logic treats of the Proposition ; which is, in words." Proposition is defined logically ^* a Sentence indicative^" [or Jefi"'t'o.no<' '^^^''^'^""' ''asserting"] i.e. which ''affirms or denies.''^ It is this that distinguishes a Proposition from a Question, a Command, &c. Logical Writers are accustomed to add, in explanation of this definition, that a " Proposition" must not he ambiguous; inasmuch as that which has more than one meaning, is in reality not one, hut several propositions. And they also add that it must not he imperfect or ungrammatical; which is only saying that any comhination of words that does not really form a " Sentence" cannot he a " Proposition;" though one may perhaps conjecture from it what it was that the speaker meant to assert. Propositions considered merely as Sentences, are distinguished Categorical into " Categorical" and " Hypothetical." hypothetical proposiThe Categorical asserts simply that the Predicate does, or does tions. not, apply to the Subject: as " The world had an intelligent maker:" " Man is not capable of raising himself, unassisted, from the savage to the civilized state." The Hypothetical [called by some writers, " Compound"] makes its assertion under a Condition, or with an Alternative; as *' If the world is not the work of chance, it must have had an intelligent maker:" "Either mankind are capable of rising into civilization unassisted, or the first beginning of civilization must have come from above." The former of these two last examples is of that kind called "Conditional-propositions;"^ the ''condition* being denoted by "if," or some such word. The latter example is of the kind called "Disjunctive;" the alternative being denoted by "either"
**

The

Judgment expressed

and "or."
is,

division of Propositions into Categorical and H\^othetical, has been said, a division of them considered merely as Sentences; for a like distinction might be extended to other kinds of Sentences also. Thus, " Are men capable of raising themselves to civilization?" "Go and study books of travels," are what might be called categorical sentences, though not propositions. " If man is incapable of civilizing himself, whence came the first beginning of civihzation ?" might be considered as a conditional question: and " Either admit the conclusion, or refute the argument," as a

The
as

disjunctive
6

command.
T Or " hypothetical," according to those writers who use the word " compound" where we have used " hypothctical."

" Sentence " being, in logical Iangiiage, the Genus, and " indicative " the " Differentia," [or distinguishing-quality.] See Ch. V. 6.

42

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.

[Book IL

Substance
Proposition,

Categorical propositions are subdivided into the pure, wliieh asserts simply [purely] that the subject does or does not agree with the predicate, and the modal, which expresses in what mode [or manner] it agrees; e.g. "An intemperate man will be sickly;'* tire pure. "An intemperate man will *' Brutus killed Caesar;" probably be sickly;" "Brutus killed Csesar justly;" are modal. At present we speak only of pure categorical propositions. The above division of Propositions (into Categorical and Hypothetical) is called in the phraseology of Logical writers, a " division of them according to their substance;'' i.e. considered simply as
sentences.

Quality.

characteristic-5'Ma7%" [Differentia] of a Proposition being i.e. "affirming or denying" something, hence Propositions are divided, according to their " Quality," into " affirmative" and " negative." The division of them again, into " true"
its

The "

"asserting,''

and " false," is also called a division according to their " quality;" namely, the " quality of the Matter:" (as it has relation to the subject-matter one is treating of) while the other kind of quality (a proposition's being affirmative or negative) is " the quality of the
expression." The " quality of the matter"
is considered (in relation to our present inquiries) as accidental, and the " quality of the expression'* For though the truth or falsity of a proposition for as essential. instance, in Natural-history, is the most essential point in reference to Natural-history, and of a mathematical proposition, in reference this is merely accidental to Mathematics, and so in other cases, in reference to an inquiry (such as the present) only as to forms of In reference to that, the essential difference is that expression. between affirmation and negation. And here it should be remarked by the way, that as, on the one hand, every Proposition must be either true or false, so, on the other hand, nothing else can be, strictly speaking, either true or false. In colloquial language however, " true" and " false" are

often more loosely applied; as when men speak of the " true cause" the " true heir," that of any thing; meaning, " the real cause;" a "false prophet," that is, a pretended is, the rightful heir; prophet, or one who utters falsehoods; a " true" or " false" argument; meaning a valid, [real] or an apparent-argument;

"true," or "false" to his friend; i.e. faithful or unfaithful, (kc. Proposition, it is to be observed, is Affirmative or Negative, According to its Copula; i.e. according as the Predicate is affirmed or denied of the Subject. Thus, " Not to advance, is to fall back," is affirmative: " No miser is truly rich" [or "a miser is not truly rich"] is a negative. few of the sailors were saved," is an affirmative; " Few of the sailors were saved," is properly a negative; for it would be understood that you were speaking of " most

man

"A

of the sailors," and denying that they were saved,

>

Chap.

II. 2.]

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.

43

Another
[or extent.]

division of propositions is according to tlieir quantity QiAntlty.

If tlie Predicate is said of the whole of the Subject, the proposition is Universal: if of part of it only, the proposition is Particular (or partial:) e.g. "Britain is an island;" "all tyrants are miserable;" "no miser is rich;" are C/Jiz'uersa/ propositions, and their subjects are therefore said to be distributed; being understood to stand, each, for the whole of its Significates: but, " some islands are fertile;" "all tyrants are not assassinated;" are Particular, and their subjects, consequently, not distributed, being taken to stand for a part only of their Significates. As every proposition must be either Affirmative or Negative, and must also be either universal or particular, we reckon, in all, four kinds of pure categorical propositions, [i.e. considered as to their quantity and quality both;) viz. Universal Affirmative, whose symbol (used for brevity) is A ; Universal Negative, E; Particular Affirmative, /; Particular Negative, 0.

2.
the subject of a proposition is a Common-term, the universal signs (" all, no, every") are used to indicate that it is distributed, (the proposition being consequently then universal;) the particular signs (" some, <fec.") the contrary. Should there be no

When

sign at

term, the quantity of the proposition is ascertained by the matter; i.e. the nature of the connexion between the extremes: which is either Necessary, Impossible, or Contingent. In necessary and in impossible Matter, an Indefinite is understood as a universal: e.g. " birds have wings;" i.e. all: " birds are not quadrupeds;" i.e. none: in contingent matter, {i.e. where the terms partly [sometimes] agree, and partly not) an Indefinite is understood as a Particular; e.g. "food is necessary to life;" i.e. some food; " birds sing;" i.e. some do; "birds are not carnivorous;" i.e. some are not, or, all are not. It is very perplexing to the learner, and needlessly so, to reckon indefinites as one class of propositions in respect of quantity.^ They must be either universal or particular, though it is not declared which. The person, indeed, Avho utters the indefinite proposition, may be mistaken as to this point, and may mean to speak imiverBally in a case where the proposition is not imiversally true. And the hearer may be in doubt which was meant, or ought to be meant; but the speaker must mean either the one or the other. Of course the determination of a question relating to the " matter," i.e. when we are authorized to use the universal, and when, the particular sign, when, an affirmative, and when a negative, is what cannot be determined by Logic,
all

to the

common

(which

is

called

an Indefinite proposition)

indef nite.

See
9
tlie

Chap. V. 3. Such a mode of classification resembles that of some grammarians, who, among Genders, enumerate the doubtful genderl

44
Singular

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.

[Book

II.

tiS!^^'

As for Singular propositions, {viz. those whose subject is either a proper name, or a common term with a singular sign) they are reckoned as Universals, (see Book IV. Ch. lY. 2.) because in them we speak of the whole of the subject; e.g. when we say, ** Brutus was a Roman," we mean the whole of Brutus. This is but some Singular-propositions may fairly be the general rule reckoned particular; i.e. when some qualifying word is inserted, which indicates that you are not speaking of the whole of the subject; e.g. "Caesar was not wiholly a, tyrant;" **this man is occasionally intemperate;" " non omnis moriar." It is not meant that these may not be, and that, the most naturally, accounted Universals; but it is only by viewing them in the other light, that we can regularly state the Contradictory to a
;

Distribution erms.

Strictly speaking, when we regard such proSingular proposition. as admitting of a variation in Quantity, they are not properly considered as Singular; the subject being, e.g. not Ccesar, but the parts of his character. It is evident that the subject is distributed in every universal proposition, an(\. never in particular : (that being the very difference between universal and particular propositions:) but the distribution 01^ non-distribution of the predicate, depends (not on the quantity, but) on the quality, of the proposition; for, if anj part of the predicate agrees with the Subject, it must be affirmed and not denied of the Subject ; therefore, for an Affirmative-proposition to be true, it is sufficient that some part of the predicate agrees with the Subject ; and (for the same reason) for a Negative to be true, it is necessary that the whole of the predicate should disagree with the Subject: e.g. it is true that "learning is useful" though the whole of the term *' useful" does not agree with the term *' learning" (for many things are useful besides learning;) but " no vice is useful," would be false if any part of the term "useful" agreed with the term " vice;" i.e. if you could find any one useful thing which was a vice. And this holds good equally whether the negative proposition be is not ** universal" or "particular." For to say that " Some Y" (or which is the same in sense that " All is not Y") is to imply that there is no part of the term " Y" [no part of the Class which 'Y" stands /or] that is applicable to the whole without in short, that there is some part of exception, of the term " X;" " to which " Y" is wholly inapplicable. the term " Thus, if I say, " some of the men found on that island are not Bailors of the ship that was wrecked there," or, in other words, ** the men found on that island are not, all of them, sailors of the ship, &c." I imply that the term " sailors, cfcc." is wholly inapplicable to some of the "men on the island;" though it might perhaps be applicable to others of them.

positions

si,

Again,

if I

say " some coin

is

made

of silver,"

and " some coin

Chap.
is

II. 3.]

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.

45

made

made of silver," (or in other words, that "all coin is not of silver") in the former of these propositions I imply, that in some portion (at least) of the Class of " things made of silver," is found [or comprehended] "some coin:" in the latter proposition I
not

imply that there is " some coin" which is contained in no portion of the Class of " things made of silver;" or (in other words) which is excluded from the whole of that Class. So that the term " made of silver" is distributed in this latter proposition, and not, in the former. The two practical rules then to be observed respecting distribution,
are,
1st, All universal propositions

(and no particular) distribute the

subject.

2. All negative (and

no affirmative) the predicate.'"

may happen indeed, that the whole of the predicate in an affirmative may agree with the subject; e.g. it is equally true, that "all men are rational animals;" and "all rational animals are
It

men;" but this is merely accidental, and is not at all implied '^ form of expression, which alone is regarded in Logic.

in the

Of

Opposition.

3.

Two

propositions are said to be opposed to each other, when,

having the same Subject and Predicate, they differ, in quantity, or It is evident, that with any given subject and predicate, you may state four distinct propositions, viz. A, E, I, and 0; any two of which are said to be opposed;^^ hence there are four different kinds of opposition, viz. 1st, the two universals (A
quality, or hoth}^
10 Hence, it is matter of common remark, that it is difficult to prove a Nega-

tive.

sight this appears very obvious, from the circumstance that a Negative has one more Term distributed than the corresponding Afhrmative. But then, again, a difRculty may be lelt in accounting for this, inasmuch as any
first

At

" All his measures are wise." And niiraberless such examples are to be found, But it will very often happen that there shall be negative propositions much more easily established than certain Affirmative ones on the same subject,

Negative

may be

expressed (as

we

shall

see presently) as an Affirmative, and vice versd. The proposition, e.g. that such a one is not in the Town," might \e expressed by the use of an equivalent

"The cause of animal-heat is not respiration," is said to have been established by experiments; hut what the cause is remains doubtful. See Note to
E.G. That

Chap.

^ When,

III. 5.

however, a Singular

Term

is

term, " he

is

absent from the

Town."

The fact is, however, that in every the observation as to the difficulty of proving a Negative holds good, it will be foundthat the proposition
case where
in question is contrasted with one which has really a term the less, distributed; or a term of less extensive sense. E.G. It is easier to prove that a man has proposed wise measures, than that he has never proposed an unwise measure, fn fact, the one would be to prove that *' Some of his measures are wise;" the other, that

the Predicate, it must, of course, be coextensive with the Subject; as " Romulus was the founder of Rome." In this and also in some other cases (see B. I. 5.) we judge, not from the/orm of the eccpression, but from the signification of the terms, that they are " equivalent" convertible''^] terms. i' For Opposition of Terms, see Chap,
[_'"''

V.
i'

In ordinary language however, and

some logical treatises, propositions which do not differ in Quality (viz. Sub' alterns) are not reckoned as " opposed."
in

A6
Contraries,

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.

[Book

II.

Subcontraries.

Subalterns.

Contradictories.

and E) are called contraries to each other; 2d, the two particular, (I and 0) subcontraries ; 3d, A and I, or E and 0, subalterns; A and 0, or E and I, contradictories. As it is evident, that the truth or falsity of any proposition (its quantity and quality being known) must depend on the matter of it, we must hear in mind, that, *' in necessary matter, all affirmatives
true, and negatives false; in impossible matter, vice versa; in contingent matter, all universals, false, and particulars true;'' e.g. *' all islands (or some islands) are surrounded by water," must he true, because the matter is necessary: to say, ** no islands, or some not, (fcc." would have been false: again, *' some islands are

are

"some are not fertile," are both true, because it is Contingent Matter: put " alV or "no" instead of *' some,'' and the propositions will be false. Hence it will be evident, that Contraries will be both false in Contingent matter, but never both true: Subcontraries, both true in Contingent matter, but never both false: Contradictories, always one
fertile;"

true and the other false, &c. with other observations, which will be immediately made on viewing the scheme; in which the four propositions are denoted by their symbols, the different kinds of matter by the initials, n, i, c, and the truth or falsity of each proposition

[Every
n. V.
i.

is

Y]

[No

is

Y]

f.

c.f.

n. V.
i.

f.

C. Y.

[Some

X is

Y]

[Some

is

not

Y]

Chap.
in

II. 3.]

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.
v. for

47
f.

each matter, by the letter

{verum) true,

for

(/ahum)

false.

You may substitute for the unmeaning Symbols X, Y, (which stand for the Terms of the above Propositions) whatever significant Terms you will; and on their meaning, of course, will depend the truth or falsity of each proposition. For instance, Naturalists have observed that "animals having horns on the head are universally ruminant;" that, of " carnivorous animals " none are ruminant; and that, of "animals with hoofs," some are ruminant, and some, not. Let us take then instead of ** X," " animals with horns on the head," and for " Y," " ruminant:" here, the real connexion of the Terms in respect of their meaning which Connexion is called the " matter " of a proposition is such that the Predicate may be affirmed universally of the Subject; and of course the affirmatives (whether Universal or Particular) will be true, and the "negatives " false. In this case the "matter" is technically called "necessary;" inasmuch as we cannot avoid believing the Predicate to be applicable to the Subject. '* Again, let represent " carnivorous -animal," and " "ruminant:" this is a case of what is called "impossible matter;** {i.e. where we cannot possibly conceive the Predicate to be applicable to the Subject) being just the reverse of the foregoing; and, of course, both the Affii'matives will here be false, and both Negatives

"X"

true.
lastly, as an instance of what is called "contingent matter," where the Predicate can neither be affirmed universally, nor denied universally, of the Subject, take "hoofed-animal" for "X" and " ruminant " for " Y;" and of course the Universals will both be false, and the Particulars, true: that is, it is equally true that "some hoofed-animals are ruminant," and that " some are not." By a careful study of the above Scheme, bearing in mind and

And
i.e.

applying the rule concerning matter, the learner will easily elicit all maxims relating to " Opposition;" as that, in the Subalterns, the truth of the Particular (which is called the subaltemate) follows from the truth of the Universal {subaltemans), and the falsity of the Universal from the falsity of the Particular: that Subalterns differ in quantity alone; Contraries, and also Subcontraries, in quality alone; Contradictories, in both: and hence, that if any proposition is known to be true, we infer that its Contradictory is false; if false, its Contradictory true, &c. " Contradictory-opposition " is the kind most frequently alluded to, because (as is evident from what has been just said) to deny, or to disbelieve, a proposition, is to assert, or to believe, its Contradictory; and of course, to assent to, or mxxintain a proposition, is to reject its Contradictory. Belief therefore, and Disbelief, are not two different states of the mind, but the same, only considered in reference to two Contradictory propositions. And consequently,
the

Belief aud
coincide,

48

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.

[Book

II.

Credulity and Incredulity are not opposite habits, but the same; in reference to some class of propositions, and to their contradictories. For instance, he who is the most incredulous respecting a certain person's guilt, is, in other words, the most ready to beheve him not guilty; he who is the most credulous^* as to certain works being within the reach of Magic, is the most incredulous [or "slow of heart to believe "] that they are not within the reach of Magic; and
so, in all cases.

The reverse of believing this or that individual proposition, is, no doubt, to disbelieve that same proposition: but the reverse of belief generally, is (not disbelief; since that implies belief; but) doubt}^
Of course the learner must remember, as above observed, that the determination of the "matter" is out of the province of Logic. The rules of Opposition merely pronounce on the truth or falsity of each proposition, given, the " matter."

Of

Conversion.

4.

A proposition is said to be converted when its Terms are transposed;

%.e.

when

the Subject
is

is

made

Subject.
riative ^^ conversion.

When nothing more

when
the truth

is

the Predicate, and the Predicate the done, this is called simple conversion,
for
the

No

conversion

employed
of

any

logical purpose, unless

is

it

be

converse of the Exposita, (or proposition given;) e.g.

,

illative ;^^ i.e.

implied by the truth

1* As the Jews, in the time of Jesus, in respect of his works. 15 And there may even be cases in which doubt itself may amount to the most extravagant credulity. For instance, if any one should " doubt whether there Egypt," he is any such Country as

would be

in fact believing this most incredible proposition ; that ''''it is possible for many thousands of persons, unconnected with each other, to have agreed, for successive Ages, in bearing witness to the existence of a fictitious Country, without being detected, contradicted, or

neither pronounce that the plaintiff Aas a just title to the property he claims, nor as^ain that he has o^ a just title, nor yet, that there is no sufficient evidence to show Avhether his title is just or not; but we disregard the whole question. Hence we may perceive that "privateJudg7nent," the riffht, and the d7itp of
is

which have long been warmly debated, a thing ujiavoidable, in any matter concerning which one takes an interest,

For

if

man

resolves that he will impli-

citly receive, e.g. in Religious points, ail

suspected." All this, though self-evident, is, in practice, frequently lost sight of: the

more, on account of our emplo;^ing, in

reference to the Christian Religion, the " C7wbeliever ; words ^Believer and whence, unthinking persons are led to take for granted that the rejection .- of Christianity implies a less easy belief aan its reception. The only way to be safe from credulity on a given subject, is, either to examine carefully and dispassionately, and decide according to the evidence, or else to

the decisions of a certam Pastor, Church, or Party, he has, in so doing, performed one act of private-judgment, which ineludes all the rest; just as if a man, distrusting his own skill in the management of property, should make over his

whole estate to trustees in doing which he Ms exercised an act of ownership; for whichact, generally, and for the choice .^^ of such and such particular trustees, he
;
..

is

responsible. (See Essj Kingdom of Christ, 2(j.)

withdraw your thoughts from it altocetlier. E.G. In some legal trial which
does not

i* The reader must not suppose from the use of the word "illative," that this conversion is a process of reasoninn: it is in fact only stating the same Judgment in another form,

concern or interest us,

we

CiiAP. 11.

4.]
*'

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.

49

Xo No
No

virtuous
rebel
is

man
is

is

a rebel,

tlierefore

a virtuous man."

**iSro

Christian

an astronomer, therefore
is

astronomer

a Christian."

^^

**

Some boasters Some cowards

are cowards, therefore are boasters."

The " conversion " of such a proposition as this, " No one [is happy who] is anxious for change," would be effected by altering the arrangement of the words in brackets, into "who is happy." Strictly speaking, that is not a real "conversion," but only an
apparent conversion " which is not "illative." For, (as has been above said) there is not a mere transposition of the terms, but a new term introduced, when a term which was undistributed in the "exposita," is distributed [taken universally] in the Converse. But as it is usual, in common discourse, to speak of "an unsound argument," meaning "an apparent-avgwoi^iii, which is in reality not an argument," so, in this case also, it is common to say, for
*'

instance, that

"Euclid proves first that all equilateral triangles are and afterwards he proves the Converse, that all equiangular triangles are equilateral:" or again, to say, " It is true that all money is wealth; but I deny the Converse, (in reality, the apparent-coiiXQY&o) that all wealth is money." Conversion then, strictly so called, that is, " illative-conversion,"
equiangular,

only take place when no term is distributed in the Converse, which was undistributed in the "Exposita."
[Universal-negative] distributes both terms, and may both be simply-converted illatively; as in the examples above. But as does not distribute the Predicate, its simple-conversion would not be illative; {e.g. from "all birds are animals," you cannot infer that "all animals are birds,") as there would be a term distributed in the Converse, which was not before. must therefore limit its quantity from universal to particular, and the Conversion will be illative: {e.g. "some animals are birds;") this might be fairly named conversion by limitation; but is commonly called " Conversion per Conversion accidens." E may thus be converted also. But in 0, whether the P^accidens. quantity be changed or not, there will still be a term (the predicate of the converse) distributed, which was not before: you can therefore only convert it illatively, by changing the quality; i.e. considering the negative as attached to the predicate instead of to the copula, and thus regarding It as I. One of the terms will then not be the same Cor.traposl^^""^ as before; but the proposition will be equipollent {i.e. convey the
I,

can

Hence, since

[Particular-affirmative] neither, these

We

17 When Galileo's persecutors endeavto bi-inir about tlie former of these, they forgot that it implied the latter. And

cured

the same may be said of some opponents of Geology at the present day.

50

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.

[Book

II.

same meaning); e.g. *'some who possess wealtli are not happy:" you may consider ''not-happy'' as the predicate, instead of "happy ;'^ the proposition will then be I, and of course may be simply converted; " some who are not happy possess wealth: " or, (as such a
proposition
it is

is

often expressed)
'^

being happy."

This

may be named
by

"one may possess wealth without conversion by negation; or as

commonly

called,

contraposition}^

A may
**

also be fairly converted in this way, e.g.

is a man of genius; therefore not a man of genius is not a poet:" (or, *' None but a man of genius can be a poet:" man of genius alone can be a poet:" or, *' or, *' One cannot be a poet without being a man of genius.'*)

Every poet

He who

is

For

(since

it is

the same thing to affirm some attribute of the sub-

ject, or to

deny the absence of that attribute) the original proposition

is

[Exposita]

precisely equipollent to this.

subj.

pred.
is

" No poet

not-a-man-of-genius;"

Convertible

Thus, in one which, being E, may of course be simply converted. of these three ways, every proposition may be illatively converted: Limitation. viz. E. /, Simply; A, 0, by Negation; A, E, Note, that as it was remarked that, in some affirmatives, the whole of the Predicate does actually agree with the Subject, so,

Ambiguity

18 It is

of the words ^^^^ j^ gy^h examples as the above, the ^|may. words, "may," "can," " cannot," &c. must, &c. Y^g^yQ no reference (as they sometimes have) to power, as exercised by an agent; but merely to the distribution or non-distrihution of Terms: or to the confidence or doubtfulness we feel respecting some supposition. To say, for instance, that " a man who has the plague may recover," does not mean that " it is in Yns power to recover

worth remarking by the way,

that it is as much out of our power to conceive a virtuous man who should be a traitor, as to conceive "a Square with unequal sides;" that is, a square vvhich is not a square. The expression therefore is merely a way of stating the Universal-

he chooses;" but it is only a form of stating a particular-proposition: [I] namely, that ''''Some who have the plague recover." And again to say, " there 7nay be a bed of coal in this district," means merely " The existence of a bed of coal in this district is a thing which I cannot confidently deny or affirm." So also to say " a virtuous man cannot betray his Country" [or "it is wposii6;e that a virtuous man should betray, &c."] does not mean that he lacks the porcer, (for there is no virtue in not doin^ what is out of one's power) but merely that " not betraying one's country " forms an essentiid part of the notion conveyed by mean in short the term " virtuous."
if

We

proposition [E] " No virtuous man betrays his Country." iSo again, to say, "a weary traveller in the deserts of Arabia must eagerly drink when he comes to a Spring," does not mean that he is compelled to drink, but that I cannot avoid believing that he will ; that there is no doubt in my mind, In these and many other such instances, the words "may," "must," "can," "impossible," &c. have reference, not to power or absence of power in an agent, but only to universality or absence of universality in the eocpression; or, to doubt or absence of doubt in our own mind, respecting what is asserted. See Appendix, No. J, Art. May. lojvjo mention is made by Aldrich of this kind of conversion; but it has been thought advisable to insert it, as being in frequent use, and also as being employed in this treatise for the direct reduction of Baroko and IJokardo.

Chap.

III. 1.]

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.

51

when

be true: but

heing converted simply, the Converse will truth does not follow from that of the original proposition ["exposita"] the Conversion is not illative. Many propositions in mathematics are of this description: e.g,
this is the case,
still,

as

its

**

"All equiangular

All equilateral triangles are equiangular;" and triangles are equilateral."

Though both these propositions are true, the one does not follow from the other; and mathematicians accordingly give a distinct
proof of each. can then only be true when the subAs the simple converse of ject and predicate are exactly equivalent (or, as they are called, convertible terms); and as this must always be the case in a just definition, so the correctness of a definition may be tried by this good government is tliat which has the happiness test. E.G. *' of the governed for its object;" if this be a right definition it will follow that " a government which has the happiness of the governed But to assert a proposition, and to for its object is a good one." add, or imply, that it is a just definition, is to make, not one assertion, but two.

Chap.

III.

Of Arguments.
1.

The

third operation of the mind, viz. reasoning, [or "discourse"]

expressed in words, is argument; and an argument stated at full length, and in its regular form, is called a syllogism. The third part of liOgic therefore treats of the syllogism. Every Argument^

syiiogismv

two parts; that which is proved; and that hy means of which it is proved. The former is called, before it is proved, the question; ichen proved, the conclusion, [or inference;] that which is used to prove it, if stated last (as is often done mcomrnon discourse,) is called the reason, and is introduced by " because,'' or some other causal conjunction; e.g. " Caesar deserved death, because he was a tyrant, and all tyrants deserve death." If the Conclusion be stated last (which is the strict logical form, to which all Reasoning may be reduced) then, that which is employed to prove it is called the premises,'^ and the Conclusion is then introduced by some illative
consists of

conjunction, as "therefore," e.g.

20 I mean, in the strict technical sense; for in popular use the word Argument is often employed to denote the latter ot

conclusion
ment:^^
i.e.

is

established by the ArguPremises. See Appendix,

No.

these two parts alone: Arguvient to prove so

e.g.

"This is an and so;" "this

I. Art. Arrjume/d. 21 Both the premises tosrether are sometimes called the atoede^

52

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.
**

[Book

II.

All tyrants deserve death Cresar was a tyrant; "^ tJierefore lie deserved death.
is

Definition of

Since, then, an
^/^^'^^^

argument

an expression in which
as true
this
[i.e.

"from
to

some-

Arguuient.

i^^^

down and granted

the Premises) something

else {i.e. the Conclusion)

beyond

must he admitted

he true, as

following necessarily \resulting^ from the other ;'^ and since Logic is wholly concerned in the use of language, it follows that a Syllogism (which is an argument stated in a regular logical form) must Definition of be "an argument so expressed, that the conclusiveness of it is
Syllogism,

jjianifest

from the mere force of the expression,'' i.e. without considering the meaning of the terms: e.g. in this Syllogism, "Every is X, Z is Y, therefore Z is X:" the Conclusion is inevitable,

whatever terms X, Y, and Z respectively are understood to stand And to this form all legitimate Arguments may ultimately be for.
brought. One circumstance which has misled some persons into the notion that there may be Reasoning that is not, substantially, syllogistic, is this; that in a Syllogism we see the Conclusion following certainly \_^^ nccessarily] from the Premises; and again, in any apparent-syllogism which on examination is found to be (as we have seen in some of the examples) not a real one [not " valid"] the Conclusion does not follow at all; and the whole is a mere deception. And yet we often hear of Arguments which have some weight, and yet are not quite decisive; of Conclusions which are rendered prohahle, but not absolutely certain, &c. And hence some are apt to imagine that the conclusiveness of an Argument admits of degrees; and that sometimes a conclusion may, probably and partially, though not certainly and completely, follow from its Premises. This mistake arises from men's forgetting that the Premises themselves will very often be doubtful; and then, the Conclusion also

Necessary

conclusions^

will

be doubtful.
one or both of the Premises of a perfectly
not always, employs the term "syllogism" in the very sense to which I have confined to denote an argument stated in regular logical form; as e.g. in a part of his work (omitted in the late editions) in which he is objecting to a certain pretended syllogism in the work of another
it: viz.

As was shown formerly,

_

be observed tbat the definian argument, is in the Logic laid down as the definition of a syllogism; a word which I have confined to a more restricted sense. There cannot evidently be any argument, whether regularly or irregution here given of

22 It

may

common

treatises of

larly expressed, to wliich tlie definition given by Aldrich, for instance, would not apply; so that he appears to employ "syllogism" as synonymous with" argument." But besides that it is clearer and

more convenient, when we have these two words at hand, to employ them in the two senses respectively which we want to express, the truth is, that in so
doinjj
I

writer, he says, " valet certear^/M^new/M/w; syllogismus tamen est falsissinms," &c. (waiving the exception that might be taken at this use ot falsissimus," nothing being, strictly, true or false, but a, proposition) \t is x)\a\n that he limits the word "syllogism" to the sense in which it is here defined, and is conseciuently inconsistent with his own definition of

Now

^''

have actually conformed

practice:

to
if

it.

Aldnch's

for

he generally,

Chap.

III.

2.]

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUJVI.

53

valid Syllogism

and absm-d: and then, the Conclusion, though inevitably, following from them, may be either
utterly false

may be

we cannot tell which. And if one or both of the Premises be merely probable, we can infer from them only a prothat is, the connexion hahle Conclusion; though the conclusiveness, between the Premises and the Conclusion is perfectly certain. For instance, assuming that *' every month has 30 days" (which is palpably false) then, from the minor-premise that " April is a
true or false,

month," it follows (which happens to be true) that " April has 30 days:" and from the minor premiss that ** February is a month,'* it follows that " February has 30 days;" which is false. In each
case the conclusiveness of the Argument is the same; but in every case, when we have ascertained the falsity of one of the Premises,

we know nothing

(as far as that

argument

is

concerned) of the truth

or falsity of the Conclusion.

When
false;

we may,

however we are satisfied of the falsity of some Conclusion, of course, be sure that (at least) one of the Premises is since if they had both been true, the Conclusion would have

been true.

And this which is called the employed (even in Mathematics)

that

*'

indirect'^

mode

of proof

is

often

for establishing

what we maintain:

is, we prove the falsity of some Proposition (in other words, the timth of its contradictory) by showing that if assumed as a Premiss, along with another Premiss known to be true, it leads to a Conclusion manifestly false. For though, from a false assumption, either falsehood or truth may follow, from a true assumption, truth only can follow.

2.

The Rule or Maxim (commonly called " dictum de omni et nullo*^) by which Aristotle explains the validity of the above Argument (every Y is X, Z is Y, therefore Z is X), is this: whatever is predicated of a term distributed, whether affirmatively or negatively, may he predicated in like manner of every thing contained under it. Thus, in the examples above, X is predicated of Y distributed, and Z is
contained imder Y {i.e. is its Subject;) therefore is predicated of Z: so " all tyrants," &c. (1.) This rule may be ultimately apphed to all arguments; (and their validity ultimately rests on their conformity thereto) but it cannot be directly and immediately applied to all even of pure categorical syllogisms ; for the sake of brevity,
'

Aristotle's
^^'^^"'"*

therefore,

some other Axioms are commonly applied

in practice, to

avoid the occasional tediousness of reducing all syllogisms to that form in which Aristotle's dictum is apphcable.^^
23

mneement, in laying down first the Canons wliieh apply to all the figures of categorical syllogisms, and then going back to the dictum of Aristotle" which

Instead of following the usual ar-

applies to only one of them, I have pur-

sued what appears a simpler and more philosophical arrangement, and more likely to impress on the learner's mind a just view of the science: viz. 1st, to give

54
Canons of
syllogisms.'

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.

[Book

II.

We
first,

will

speak

first

of pure

categorical

syllogisms;

and the

Axioms

or Canons

by which

their validity is to be explained: viz.

if two terms agree with one and the each other: secondly, if one term agrees

same third, they agree with and another disagrees with

one and the same third, these two disagree with each otJier. On the former of these Canons rests the validity of affirmative conclusions; on the latter, of negative; for no categorical syllogism can be faulty which does not violate these Canons; none correct which does: hence on these two Canons are built the rules or cautions which are to be observed with respect to syllogisms, for the purpose of ascertaining whether those Canons have been strictly observed or not.
1st. Every syllogism has three, and only three terms: viz. the middle-term, and the two terms (or extremes, as they are commonly called) of the Conclusion [or Question]. Of these, 1st, the subject of the Conclusion is called the m,inor-term; 2d, its predicate, the major-term; and 3d, the middle-term, (called by the older logicians ** Argumentum,") is that with which each of them is separately compared, in order to judge of their agreement or disagreement with each other. If therefore there were two middle-terms, the extremes {or terms of conclusion) not being both compared to the same, could not be conclusively compared to each other. 2d. Every syllogism has three, and only three propositions; viz. 1st, the major-premiss (in which the major term is compared with the middle:) 2d, the minor-premiss (in which the minor-term is compared with the middle;) and 3d, the Conclusion, in which the Minor-term is compared with the Major.^ 3d. Note, that if the middle-term is ambiguous, there are in reality two middle-terms, in sense, though but one in sound. An ambiguous MidcUe-term is either an equivocal term used in different senses in the two premises [e.g.
:

**

Light is contrary to darkness; Feathers are light; therefore Feathers are contrary to darkness:")

or a term not distributed: for as it is then used to stand for a part only of its significates, it may happen that one of the Extremes may have been compared with one part of it, and the other with another part of it ; e.g.
the rule (Aristotle's Dictum) which applies to the most clearly and regularly-constructed argument, the Syllogism in the first Figure, to which all reasoning may

every kind of argument which

syllogistic

is

of a

be reduced: then, the canons applicable

to a.\\ caiegoricals ; then, those belonging to the hppot helicals ; and lastly, to treat of the Sorites; which is improperly placed by Aldrich before the hypotheticals. By this plan the province of strict Logic is extended as tar as it can be;

character, and accordingly, directly cognizable by the rules of Logic, being enumerated in natural order, 24 Jn some logical treatises the Major premiss is called simply Propositio-^* and the Minor '' AssumpHo." In ordinary discourse, the word " Principle" ia often used to denote the Major-premiss,
''''

and " Reason," the Minor.

Chap.

III.

2.]

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.

55

*'

White Is a colour, Black is a colour; therefore Again, Black is white."

**

Some animals are beasts. Some animals are birds; therefore * Some birds are beasts."

The middle-term therefore must he distributed once, at least, in the premises; {i.e. by being the Subject of an Universal, or Predicate of a Negative, Chap. II. 2,) and once is sufficient; since if one extreme has been compared to a part of the middle-term, and another to the whole of it, they must have been both compared to the same. 4th. iVb term must he distributed in the conclusion which was not
process, either of the

distributed in one of the premises ; for that (which is called an illicit Major or the Minor term) would be to employ

the whole of a term in the Conclusion, when you had employed only a part of it in the Premiss; and thus, in reality, to introduce a fourth term e.g.
:

**

All quadrupeds are animals, is not a quadruped; therefore It is not an animal." Illicit process of the major.

A bird

Again, ** What is related in the Talmud is unworthy of credit: Miraculous stories are related in the Talmud; therefore Miraculous stories are unworthy of credit." If this conclusion be taken as A, there will be an "illicit process of the Minor-term;" (since every one would understand the Minor-premiss as particular) but a particular conclusion may fairly be inferred. In the case of an iUicit-process of the Major, oil the contrary, the premises do not warrant any
conclusion at
5th,
all.

For in them negative premises you can infer nothing. the Middle is pronounced to disagree with both extremes; not, to agree with both; or, to agree with one, and disagree with the other; therefore they cannot be compared together; e.g.

From

" "
6th.

A fish is not a quadruped;" A bird is not a quadruped,"

proves nothing.

must he negative; pronounced to disagree with one of the Extremes, and in the other pvemiss (which of course is affirmative by the preceding rule) to agree wuth the other extreme; therefore the Extremes disagreeing with each other, the Conclusion In the same manner it may be shown, that to prove a is negative. negative conclusion one of the Premises must be a negative. If one premiss he negative,
the conclusion' for in that premiss the middle-term is

5Q

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.

[Book

II.

^^By these six rules all categorical Syllogisms are to be tried; and from tliem it will be eviderxt; 1st, that nothing can he proved from two particular Premises ; (since you will then have either the middle Term undistributed, or an illicit process. For if each premiss were I, there would be no distribution of any term at all: and if the premises were I and 0, as
*'

Some animals are sagacious; Some beasts are not sagacious Some beasts are not animals."

there would be but one term the predicate of distributed and supposing that one to be the Middle, then, the conclusion (being of course negative, by rule 6th) would have its predicate, the Major;

term

**

distributed,

which was undistributed

;

in the premiss.

And,

same reason, 2dly, that if one of the Premises be the Conclusion must be particular e.g.
for the

particular,

All who fight bravely deserve reward Some soldiers fight bravely;" you can ** Some soldiers deserve reward:"

only infer that

would be an " illicit-process of the Minor." But from two universal Premises you cannot always infer a imiversal Conclusion; e.g.
for to infer a universal Conclusion

" All gold

is precious; All gold is a mineral ; therefore Some mineral is precious."

And

even when

we can

infer a imiversal,

to infer a particular; since

what

is

we are always at liberty predicated of all may of course be

predicated of some.^*

Of Moods.
3.

When we
order,
25

designate the three propositions of a syllogism In their according to their respective ** Quantity" and *' Quality"
of the Logical-writers summed up the foregoing rules, were, " Distribus Medium, nee quartus ter**

Others have given twelve rules, which found might more conveniently be reduced to six. No syllogism can be faulty which violates none of these six rules. It is much less perplexing to a
I
learner not to lay down as a distinct rule, that, e.g. against particular premises: which is properly a resM^^ of the foregoing; since a syllogism with two particular premises would offend against either It. 3. or R. 4. The memorial-lines in which some

**

minus adsit ;^' Vtraqtie nee prcemissa negans, nee parficularis ;" Sedetur partem Conclusiodderiorem;''''
{i.e.

the Particular being regarded

"

as inferior to the Universal ; and the Negative, to the Affirmative) Et non distribuat nisi cum Prcemissa^ negetve."

Chap.

III.

4.]

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.

57

by tlieir symhols) we are said to determine the mood of the E.G. The example just above, "all gold, &e." is in tiie Mood A, A, I. As there are four kinds of propositions, and three propositions in each syllogism, all the possible ways of combining these four, (A, E, I, 0,) by threes, are sixty-four. For, any one of these four may
(indicated

syllogism.

be the major-premiss; each of these four majors may have four different minors and of these sixteen pairs of premises, each may have four different conclusions. This (= 16) X 4 64. is a mere arithmetical calculation of the Moods, without any regard
;

4x4

to the logical rules

practice,

for

many

of these

Moods
;

are inadmissible in

from violating some of those rules e.g. the Mood E, E, E, must be rejected as having negative premises; I, 0, 0, for particular premises; and many others for the same faults to which must be added I, E, 0, for an "illicit-process of the major," in every Figure since the Conclusion, being negative, would distribute the Major-term, while the Major-premiss, being I, would distribute no term. By examination then of all, it will be found that, of the sixty-four there remain but eleven Moods which can be used in a legitimate syllogism, viz. A, A, A, A, A, I, A, E, E, A, E, 0, A, I, I, A, 0, 0, E, A, E, E, A, 0, E, I, 0, I, A, I, 0, A, 0.
;

Of Figure,

4.
of a syllogism consists in the situation of the Middleterm with respect to the Extremes of the Conclusion, \i.e. the major and minor term. ] When the Middle-term is made the subject of the major premiss, and the predicate of the minor, that is called the first Figure; which is far the most natural and clear of all, as to this alone Aristotle's dictum may be at once applied. In the SecondFigure the Middle-term is the predicate of both premises: in the

The Figure

Third, the subject of both: in the Fourth, the predicate of the Major premiss, and the subject of the Minor. This Figure is the most awkward and unnatural of all, being the very reverse of the first. Note, that the proper order"^ is to place the Major premiss ^r5^ and the Minor second; but this does not constitute the Major and

Minor premises for that premiss (wherever placed) is the Major, which contains the major te^-m. and the Minor, the minor (v. R. 2.
;

2.)

Each
in every

of the allowable

Figure

since

it

moods mentioned above will not be allowable may violate some of the foregoing rules, in
intelligent, fall into the strange

27 Proper, i.e. in a Treatise on Logic or in a logical analysis ; not, necessarily in ordinary discourse. This remark may appear superfluous, but that I have known a writer, generally acute a^d

misap-

to. The proper collocation of plants in a botanical herbarium, and in a flower-garden, and again,

prehension alluded

on a farm, would be widely

different.

58
one Figure,

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.
thoiigli

[Book

II.

not in another: e.g. I, A, I, is an allowable Figure but in the first it would have an undistributed middle.^^ So A, E, E, would in the first Figure have an illicit process of the major., but is allowable in the second and A, A, A, which in the first Figure is allowable, would in the third have an illicit process of the minor: all which maj be ascertained by trying the different Moods in each figure, as per scheme. represent the Major term, Z the Minor, Y the Middle. Let

mood

in the third

1st Fig.

Chap.
T..

III. 4.]

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.
<

59

Ei?. 2.

(cEsArE, cAmEstrEs, fEsfInO, bArOkO/' ' ' '

ftertia,

dArAptI,

dIsAmIs,

Fig. 3.

AptOn,

bOkArdO/"

dAtlsI, fElfErlsO, babet

quarta insuper addit.

^.
^^'

jbrAmAntIp, cAmEnEs, dImArlS;, fEsA\

PO, frEsIsOn.

a careful study of these mnemonic lines (which must he can only he proved to memory) you will perceive that in the First-Figure, in which also every other proposition may he proved; that the Second proves only negatives: the Third only particulars: that the First-Figure requires the major-premiss to he universal, and the minor, affirmative, <fec.; with many other such

By

committed

which will readily he made, (on trial of several Syllogisms, in different Moods) and the reasons for which will be E.G. To show why the Second-Figure found in the foregoing rules. has only Negative Conclusions, we have only to consider that in it the middle-term being the predicate in both premises, would not he distributed unless one premiss were negative; (Chap. II. 2.) thereobservations,
fore the Conclusion
6.

One Mood
First,

in

must be negative also, by Chap. III. 2, Rule each figure may suffice in this place by way of

example
therefore

Barbara, viz. (bAr.) ''Every Y is X; (bA) every Z is Y; (rA) every Z is X:" e.g. let the major-term (which is represented by X) be ** one who possesses all virtue;" the minorterm (Z) " every man who possesses one virtue;" and the middleterm (Y) " every one who possesses prudence;" and you will have the celebrated argument of Aristotle, Eth. sixth hook, to prove that the virtues are inseparable; mz.
**

He who He who He who

Z

possesses prudence, possesses all virtue; possesses one virtue, must possess prudence; therefore possesses one, possesses all."

** no Z is Y; is Y; (Es) every the major-term (X) be " true philosophers," the minor (Z) " the Epicureans;" the middle (Y) " reckoning virtue a good in itself;" and this will he part of the reasoning of Cicero, Off. book first and third, against the Epicureans. is Z; Third, Darapti, viz. [dA) " Every is X; {rAp) every

Second,

Camestres,
is

(cAm)

(trEs) no

X," Let

therefore {tl)

some Z

is

X:"

e.g.

Or, Fakoro, see

7.

30

Or,

Dokamo,

see S 7.

;:

60
**

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.

[Book

II.

Prudence has for its object the benefit of individuals; but prudence is a virtue: therefore some virtue has for its object
the benefit of the individual,"

part of Adam Smith's reasoning [Moral Sentiments) against Hutcheson and others, who placed all virtue in benevolence. Fourth, Camenes, viz. (cAm) " every X is Y (En) no Y is Z; therefore (Es) no Z is X:" e.g.
is
;

**

Whatever Whatever

is
is

expedient, is conformable to nature conformable to nature, is not hurtful to society

is

therefore

What
is

is

hurtful to society

never expedient;"
;

but it is an inverted part of Cicero's argument in Off. Lib. iii. and clumsy way of stating what would much more naturally fall into the First-Figure for if you examine the Propositions of a Syllogism in the Fourth-Figure, beginning at the Conclusion, you will see that as the major term is predicated of the minor, so is the minor of the so that the major appears to middle, and that again of the major be merely predicated of itself. Hence the five Moods in this Figure some one of the fourteen (moods with are seldom or never used names) in the first three Figures, being the forms into which all arguments may most readily be thrown but of these, the four in the First-Figure are the clearest and most natural; as to them Aristotle's Dictum will immediately apply. With respect to the use of the first three Figures (for the Fourth is never employed but by an accidental awkwardness of expression) it may be remarked, that the First is that into which an argument will be found to fall the most naturally, except in the following
; ; ; :

Use of the
Figura'

First, When we have to disprove something that has been cases maintained, or is likely to be believed, our arguments will usually be found to take most conveniently the form of the Second-Figure viz. we prove that the thing we are speaking of cannot belong to STich a Class, either because it has something of which that Class is destitute, (Cesare) or because it wants what belongs to the whole (rf that Class ; (Camestres) e.g. " No impostor would have warned his followers (as Jesus did) of the persecutions they would have to submit to;" and again, "An enthusiast would have expatiated (which Jesus and his followers did not) on the particulars of a future
:

state."

The same observations will apply, mutatis m.utandis, when a Particular Conclusion is sought as in Festino and Baroko. The arguments used in the process called the " Abscissio Infiniti," will in general be the most easily referred to this Figure. (See Chap. V. 1. subsection 6.) The phrase was applied by some logical writers to a scries of arguments used in any inquiry in which we go on excluding, one by one, certain suppositions, or certain
;
^

;;

CiiAP. III.

5.]

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.

61

classes

of things,

from that whose real nature we are seeking to

ascertain.

Thus, certain symptoms, suppose, exclude *' small-pox ;'^ that is, prove this not to he the patient's disorder ; other symptoms, suppose, exclude ** Scarlatina,'' <fec., and so one may proceed hy gradually Hence, the Secondnarrowing the range of possible suppositions. Figure might be called the " exclusive Figure. The Third-Figure is, of course, the one employed when the Use of the Middle-Term is Singular, since a Singular term can only be a Figure. Subject. This is also the form into which most arguments will naturally fall that are used to establish an objection (Enstasis of Aristotle) to an opponent's Premiss, when his argument is such as It might be called, thereto require that premiss to be Universal. astatic'' Figure. E. G. If any one contends that *' this or fore, the " that doctrine ought not to be admitted, because it cannot be explained or comprehended," his suppressed major-premiss may be refuted by the argument that ** the connexion of the Body and Soul cannot be Thus again you might prove by the explained or comprehended." example of a certain individual, ^^ the contradictory of a Proposition (which would seem to most persons a very probable conjecture) that a deaf and dumb person, born blind, cannot be taught language. great part of the reasoning of Butler's Analogy may be exhibited in this form. As it is on the Dictum above-mentioned that all Reasoning ulti- ReductJonof "Sisms. mately depends, so, all arguments may be in one way or other ^ brought into some one of the four Moods in the First-Figure : and a Syllogism is, in that case, said to be reduced: [i.e. to tlie first-figure.) These four are called the perfect moods, and all the rest imperfect.
'

Ostensive Reduction.

5.
In reducing a Syllogism, we are not, of course, allowed to introduce any new Term or Proposition, having nothing granted but the truth of the Premises but these Premises are allowed to be illatively converted (because the truth of any Proposition implies that of its illative Converse) or transposed: by taking advantage of this liberty, where there is need, we deduce (in Figure 1st,) from the Premises
;

same Conclusion as the original one, or another from which the original Conclusion follows by illative Conversion. JS.G. Darapti,
originally given, either the very

" All

wits are dreaded All wits are admired

Some who
't

are admired are dreaded,'*

to above.

Laura Bridgeman, alluded

62
is

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.
reduced into Darii, hj converting

[Book

II.

"by

limitation" (per accldens]

the minor Premiss.

**

All wits are dreaded Some who are admired are wits therefore Some who are admired are dreaded."
;

And

Camestres,
**

e.g.

All true philosophers account virtue a good in itself; The advocates of pleasure do not account, &,c. Therefore they are not true philosophers,"

is

reduced to Celarent, by simply converting the Minor, and then

transposing the Premises.

**

Those who account virtue a good

in itself, are not advocates

of pleasure All true philosophers account virtue, <fec. : therefore No true philosophers are advocates of pleasure."

This Conclusion may be illatwely converted into the original one. So, Bar oho \^^ e.g.
Reduction
con^ersion'^ by negation.
**

Every true

patriot

is

a friend to religion;

Some Some
to Ferio,

great statesmen are not friends to religion great statesmen are not true patriots,"
negatioUf [''contraposition,"]

Tide

by converting the major hy Chap II. 4.

**

He who

is

not a friend to religion,

<fcc.

is

not a true patriot

Some great statesmen,"

and the rest of the Syllogism remains the same; only that the minor Premiss must be considered as affirmative, because you take *' not-a-friend-to-religion," as the middle term. In the same

manner Bokardo^

to Darii; e.g.

**Some slaves are not discontented; All slaves are wronged; therefore Some who are wronged are not discontented/*
Convert the major ** by negation " (** contraposition ") and then transpose them ; the Conclusion will be the converse hy negation of the original one^ which therefore may be inferred from it; e.g.
*2 Or Fakoro, considered i.e. as Festino. See note at the end of this chapter.
33

Qr Dokamo,

considered

i.e.

as Di?a-

mis.

See note at the end of this chapter.

Chap.

III.

7.]

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.
are not discontented are slaves; are not discontented are wronged."
is

63

"All slaves are wronged;

Some who Some who

In these ways (by what

called Ostensive Eeduction^ because

either the very

you prove,

in the first figure,

same Conclusion as

before, or one ichich implies it) all the imperfect Moods may be But there is also another way, reduced to the four perfect ones.

called Indirect-reduction, or

Beductio ad impossihile.

6.

By

the First-Figure) not, directly, that the original Conclusion is true, but that it cannot he false; i.e. that an absurdity would follow from the supposition of its being false; e.g.

which we prove

(in

"All true

patriots are friends to religion;

Some Some
if this

great statesmen are not friends to religion; great statesmen are not true patriots:"
its

Conclusion be not true,

contradictory must be true; via,

"All great statesmen are true patriots:"

let this

original Syllogism,

then be assumed, in the place of the minor Premiss of the and a false conclusion will be proved; e.g.

bAr, "All true patriots are friends to

religion;

bA,
rA,

All great statesmen are true patriots; All great statesmen are friends to religion:^

for as this Conclusion is the Contradictory of the original

minor

Premiss, it must be false, since the Premises are always supposed to be granted; therefore one of the Premises (by which it has been correctly proved) must be false also; but the major Premiss (being one of those originally granted) is true; therefore the falsity must be in the minor Premiss; which is the contradictory of the originalThis Conclusion; therefore the original-Conclusion must be true. is the indirect mode of Reasoning. (See Rhetoric, Part I. Ch. II.

!)

7.
This kind of Reduction is seldom employed but for Baroho and Boli'ardo, which are thus reduced by those who confine tliemselvos to simple Conversion, and Conversion by limitation, (per accidens;) G

64
siprnification

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.
tliGj

[Book

II.

ottheMoods^ the

framed the names of their Moods, with a view to point out in which each is to he reduced; viz. B, C, D, F, which are the initial letters of all the Moods, indicate to which Mood of the first-figure {Barbara, Celarent^ Darii, and Ferio) each of the others is to be reduced m indicates that the Premises are to be transposed; s and p, that the Proposition denoted by the vowel immediately preceding, is to be converted; s, simply, p, per accidens, [by limitation:] thus, in Camestres, (see example,) the C indicates that it must be reduced to Celarent; the two ss, that the minor Premiss and Conclusion must be converted simply; the m, that the Premises must be transposed. The P, in the mood Bramantip, denotes that the Premises warrant a Universal-conclusion in place of a Particular. The /, though of course it cannot be illatively converted per accidens, viz.: so as to become A, yet is thus converted in the Conclusion, because as soon as the Premises are transposed (as denoted by m,) it appears that a Universal Conclusion follows from them.
and

manner

K (which indicates the reduction ad impossibile)

Proposition, denoted
left out,

is

a sign that the

it, must be and the contradictory of the Conclusion substituted; viz. for the minor Premiss in Baroho and the major in Bokardo. But it has been already shown ( 5) that the Conversion by "contraposition," [by "negation"] will enable us to reduce these two Moods, ostensively.^

by the vowel immediately before

Chap. IV.

SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP.
Of Modal
Syllogisms^

III.

and of all Arguments besides regular and pure- Categorical Syllogisms.

Of Modals.

1.
Hitherto we have treated of pure categorical Propositions, and the Syllogisms composed of such. pure categorical proposition is styled by some logicians a proposition " de inesse,'' from its asserting simply that the Predicate is or is not (in our conception) contained in the Subject; as " John killed Thomas." modal proposition asserts that the predicate is or is not contained in the

If any one should choose that the names of these moods should indicate this, he might malie K the index of con*'*

version by negation and then the names would be, by a slight change, faAroro and Dokamo.
;

Chap. IV.

1.]

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.
a
certain

65
"accidentally,"

Subject

in

mode,

or

manner;

as,

'wilfiillv," etc.

Modal proposition may be stated as a pure one, by attacJiing mode to one of the Terms: and the Proposition will in all respects fall under the foregoing rules; e.g. ** John killed Thomas luilfuUi/
the
maliciovslif;'' here the Mode is to be regarded as part of the " It is probable that all knowledge is useful;" "proPredicate. bably useful " is here the Predicate. But when the Mode is only used to express the necessary, contingent, or impossible connexion

and

it may as well be attached to the Subject: e.g. "man necessarVy mortal;" is the same as "all men are mortal:" "injustice is in no case expedient," corresponds to "no injustice is expedient:" and "this man is occas2owa% intemperate," has the It is thus, and force of a particular: (vide Chap. II. 2. note.) thus only, that two singular Propositions may be contradictories; e.g. "this man is never intemperate," will be the contradictory of the foregoing. Indeed every sign (of universality or particularity) may be considered as a Mode. Since, however, in all IVfodal Propositions, you assert that the dictum {i.e. the assertion itself) and the Mode, agree together, or disagree, so, in some cases, this may be the most convenient way of stating a Modal, purely:

of the Terms,

is

subj. cop.

pred.

subject

e.g.

"

It

is

impossible

that

all

men

should

be

virtuous."
sub.

cop.
is

Such

is

proposition

of

the

Apostle

Paul's:

"This

prep.

subject.
<fec.

faithful

saying,

that

Jesus

Christ

came

into the world to

subj.

save sinners."^
itself

In these cases one of your Terms (the subject)

is

an

entire Proposition.

In English the word IN is often used in expressing one proposicombined with another in such a manner as to make the two, one proposition: e.g. "You will have a formidable opponent to encounter in the Emperor:" this involves two propositions; 1st, " You will have to encounter the Emperor;" 2d, " He will prove a formidable opponent:" this last is implied by the word in, which denotes (agreeably to the expression of Logicians mentioned above when they speak of a proposition " de inesse") that that Predicate is contained in that Subject.
tion
It may be proper to remark meet with a Proposition whose
5

in this place, that

we may

often
'^"""^'

^^^J^J^^^^^Xf, rropositioTJ

"

drift

and force
II. 2.

'will

be very

dif-

See Rhetoric, Part III. Ch.

66

SYNTHETICAL COIVIPENDIUM.

'

[Book

IT.

ferent, according as we regard tliis or that as its Predicate.^' Indeed, properly speaking, it may be considered as several different Propositions, each indeed implying the truth of all the rest, but each having a distinct Predicate; the division of the sentence being varied in each case and the variations marked, either by the collocation of the words, the intonation of the voice, or by the designation of the emphatic words, \_rAz.: the Predicate,] as scored
;

under, or printed in
3 4

italics,

E.G. "The Organon of Bacon was

5
6

not designed to supersede the Organon of Aristotle:" this might be regarded as, at least", six different propositions : if the word numbered (1) were in italics, it would leave us iit liberty to suppose that Bacon might have designed to supersede by some work of his, the Organon of Aristotle; but not by his own Organon; if No. 2 were in italics, we should understand the author to be contending, that whether or no any other author had composed an Organon with such a design. Bacon at least did not: if No. 3, then, we should understand him to maintain that whether Bacon's Organon does or does not supersede Aristotle's, no such design at least was entertained and so with the rest. Each of these is a distinct Proposition; and though each of them implies the truth of all the rest, (as may easily be seen by examining the example given) one of tliem may be, in one case, and another, in another, the one which it is important to
insist on.

Emphatic

should consider in each case what Question it is that is proposed, and what answer to it would, in the instance before us, be the most opposite or contrasted to the one to be examined. E. G. ** You will find this doctrine in Bacon," may be contrasted, either with, '* You will find in Bacon a diferent doctrine," or with, " You will find this doctrine in a different author." And observe, that when a proposition is contrasted with one which has a diferent predicate, the Predicate is the emphatic word; as "this man is a murderer;'' i.e. not one who has slain another accidentally, or in self-defence: " this man is a murderer," with the Copula for the emphatic word, stands opposed to " he is not a murderer;" a proposition with the same terms, but a different Copula. "^
8<5 On the logical analysis of propositions Mr. Greenlaw has founded a very ingenious, and as it appears to me, correct and useful gi-aminatical theory, of the use of

We

steal;''

den : and the answer is " Thou shalt not " ThoushaltnotcommitaciMZ^eri/,"
&c.

The connexion between

Lo.aic

and

the Latin Subjundive. His work is well worth the notice of Students ot Logic as well as of Latinity. 37 Thus if any one reads (as many are

aptto(lo)"Thoushaltwo<

steal,

""Thou

shalt not commit adiiiti-ry," he implies the qiK'stion to be, whether we are coiniii;u!(W>d to steal or to forbear: but the Quystion really is, whai things are forbid-

correct delivery is further pointed out in Rhet. App. 1. Strictly speaking, the two cases I have mentioned coincide; for when the " is" or the "not" is emphatic, it becomes properly the Predicate; viz. "the statement of this man's being a murderer, is fnte," or " is/aise."

Chap. IV.

2.]

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.

67

It will often happen tliat several of the Propositions which are thus stated in a single sentence, may require, each, to he distinctly e.g. the Advocate may have to prove, first tlie stated and proved *' John killed Thomas;" and then, the character of the fact, that See Praxis, at act, that *' the kiHing- was wilful and mahcious." See also Elements of Rhetoric, Part I. Ch. III. the end of the vol.
:

5.

Of Hypothetkals.
2.
Hypothetical^ Proposition is defined to be ttco or more cafegoricals muted hy a Copula [conjunction]: and the diff'ercnt kinds of Hypothetical Propositions are named from their respective
conjunctions; mz. conditional, disjunctive, causal, (fee. When a liypothetical conclusion is inferred from a hypothetical Premiss, so that the force of the Reasoning does not turn on the

hypothesis, then the Hypothesis (as in Modals) must be considered as part of one of the Terms; so that the Reasoning will be, in
effect, categorical:

e.g.
predicate.

" Every conqueror

is either a hero or a villain: Csesar Avas a conqueror; therefore

predicate.

He was
*'

either

a hero or a villain.'^
is

Whatever comes from God

subject.

entitled to reverence;

If the Scriptures are not wholly false, they

must come from God

If they are not wholly false, they are entitled to reverence."

way

on the hypothesis (in which a hypothetical Premiss,) this is what is called a hypotJietical Syllogism; and rules have been devised for ascertaining the validity of such Arguments (And at once, without bringing them into the categorical form. note, that in these Syllogisms, the hypothetical Premiss is called the major, and the categorical one the minor.) They are of two
itself rests

But when the Reasoning

a categorical Conclusion

may be drawn from

kinds, conditional and disjunctive.

38

Compound, according

to

some writew.

68

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.

[Book

II.

Of

Conditionals,

3.
Conditional^ Proposition has in it an illative force; i.e. it contains two, and only two categorical Propositions, whereof one results from the other [or follows from it,] e.g.
antecedent.

"

If the Scriptures are not wholly false,

consequent.

they are entitled to respect."

That from which the other results is called the Antecedent; that which results from it, the Consequent [consequens ;) and the connexion between the two (expressed by the word "if'*) the Consequence [consequentia.) The natural order is, that the Antecedent should come before the Consequent; but this is frequently reversed e.g. "The husbandman is well off if he knows his own advantages." (Virg. Geor.) Every Conditional-proposition maybe considered as an Universalaffirmative, whether the members of which it consists be Universal And the truth or falsity or Particular, Negative or Affirmative. of a Conditional-Proposition depends entirely on tlic consequence: eg> "if Logic is useless, it deserves to be neglected;" here both Antecedent and Consequent are false: yet the whole Proposition is true; i.e. it is true that the Consequent /o/Zoits from the Antecedent. ' If Cromwell was an Englishman, he was an usurper," is just the reverse case: for though it is true that " Cromwell was an Englishman," and also that " he was an usurper," yet it is not true that the latter of these Propositions depends on the former the whole Proposition, therefore, is false, (or at least absurd, see next section) though both Antecedent and Consequent are true. It is to be observed, however, that a false, or at least nugatory, Conditional-Proposition of this kind, r>iz.: in which each member is is such, that, though itself absurd, no false a true categorical, conclusion can be drawn from it ; as may be seen from the instance
:

just given.

Conditional Proposition, in short,

may be
;

considered as an
since to assert that

assertion of the validity of a certain

results

Argument

an argument is valid, is to assert that the Conclusion necessarily from the Premises, whether those Premises be true or not. The meaning, then, of a Conditional Proposition, which is, that the antecedent being granted^ the consequent is granted, may be con-

so Called Hypothetical by those writers wliat I have called Hypothetical.

who

use the word Comi^ound to denote

Chap. IV.

5 3.]

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.
if

69

sidered in two points of view: first, '* Consequent must be true ;" hence the

the Antecedent he true, the first rule the antecedent being

;

granted, the consequent may he inferred: secondly, '* if the Antecedent were true, the Consequent would be true;" hence the second rule; the consequent heing denied, the antecedent may he denied; for the Antecedent must in tkat case be false since if it were true, the
;

consequent (which is granted to be false) would be true '* If this man has a fever, he is not fit to travel ;" here
the antecedent, the first rule applies,

also.
if

E.G.

you grant

and you infer the truth of the " he has a fever therefore he is not fit to travel." If Constructive A is B, C is D but A is B, therefore C is D and this is called a destructive. But if you deny the consequent covs'ructive Conditional Syllogism. (i.e. grant its contradictory) the second rule applies, and you infer the contradictory of the antecedent; " he is fit to travel; therefore he has not a fever;" this is the destructive Conditional Syllogism. Again, " If If A is B, C is D; C is not D, therefore A is not B.
Consequent
;

must be cheap," for a major; then, but the crops are not bad, therefore corn must be cheap," is " Corn is not cheap, therefore the crops are bad," Constructive. " If every increase of population is desirable, some is Destructive. misery is desirable; but no misery is desirable; therefore some increase of population is not desirable," is Destructive. But if you affirm the consequent or deny the antecedent^ you can for the same Consequent may follow from other infer nothing Antecedents: e.g. in the example above, a man may be unfit to therefore it does not travel from other disorders besides a fever follow, from his being unfit to travel, that he has a fever ; or (for the same reason) from his not having a fever, that he is not unfit to
the crops are not bad, corn
**
; ;

travel.

tively with those

be observed that these fallacies correspond respecmentioned in treating of Categorical Syllogisms, The assertion of the Consequent, and inferring thence the truth of the Antecedent, answers to the fallacy of ''undistributed-Middle," JE.G. *' He who has a fever is or to that of ** negative-premises." " This man is unfit" unfit to travel;" (or, ** is not fit to travel.") The fallacy (or, " is not fit") " to travel; therefore he has a fever." again of denying the Antecedent, and thence inferring the Contradictory of the Consequent, corresponds either to that of negativepremises, or to " iUicit-process of the Major," or that of introducing, palpably, *' more than three terms." E.G. *' He who has a fever is unfit to travel; this man has not a fever," ka.^^ There are, then, two, and only two, kinds of Conditional Syllogisms the constructive, founded on the first rule, and answering to dit-ect Reasoning and the destructive, on the second, answering to indirect; being in fact a mode of throwing the indirect form of
it is

And

to

Fallacies in
'

and In
JoTj^!*^^*^*^*^

correspond.

40

Virtually, all these fallacies do really

2.

amount to the introduction

of a fourth term.

See

Ch. III.

70

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.

[Book

II.

Conversion
tiouuis.'"

reasoning into the direct: e.g. If C be not the centre of the circle, some other point must be which is impossible : therefore C is the (Euclid, B. III. Pr. 1.) centre. ^nd note, that a Conditional Proposition maj (like the categorical A) be converted by negation; i.e. you may take the contradictory of
;

the conseqiicfit, as

dent, as a consequent: e.g.

an antecedent, and the contradictory of the antece" If this man is fit to travel, he has not

a fever." By this conversion of the major Premiss, a Constructive Syllogism may be reduced to a Destructive, and vice versa. (See 6. Ch. III.)

0/ Disjunctives.
4.
Disjunctive Proposition is one that consists of two or more by the conjunctions ** either" and " or," the force of which is, to state an alternative; i.e. to imply that some one of the categoricals thus connected must be true: e.g. "either is
categoricals, connected

B, or C

is

D"
it

will not

be a true proposition unless one of the two

true,

members

of

be true.

On the other hand, one of the members may be they may have no such natural connexion together
their being proposed as an alternative
island, or a triangle is a square."
;

and yet

as to warrant

as " either Britain is an Such a proposition would rather be called nugatory and absurd, than false since no false conclusion could be deduced from it as was remarked in the last section concerning such a Conditional as this might be reduced to: e.g. *' If Such propositions are often colloBritain is not an island," &c.
; ;

quially uttered in a kind of jest.

If, therefore, one or more of these categoricals be denied [i.e. granted to be false) you may infer that the remaining one, or (if B.G. " Either the several) some one of the remaining ones, is true. world is eternal, or the work of chance, or the work of an intelligent Being; it is not eternal, nor the work of chance, therefore it is *' It is either spring, summer, the work of an intelligent Being." autumn, or winter but it is neither spring nor summer therefore is B, or C is D Either it is either autumn or winter." but is not B, therefore C is D. Observe, that in these examples (as well as in most others) it is implied not only that one of the members (the categorical Propositions) must be true, but that only one can be true so that, in such cases, if one or more members be affirmed, the rest may be denied; [the members may then be called exclusive:] e.g. "It is summer, '* ^}^(.j.gfQj.e it is neither spring, autumn, nor winter;" either A is B, but A is B, therefore C is not D." But this is by no or C is D means universally the case e.g. " Virtue tends to procure us either the esteem of mankind, or the favour of God:" here both members
;

Exclusive
di^unctives.

Chap. IV.

5.]

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.

71

are true, and consequently from one being affirmed we are not Of course we are left to conjecture authorized to deny the other. in each case, from the context, whether it is meant to be implied
that the members are or are not *' exclusive." It is evident that a disjunctive Syllogism may easily be reduced to a conditional, by taking as an Antecedent the contradictory of one
nisjunctivei

eonditionaL

more of the members e.g. either autumn or winter, &c.

or
:

if it is

not spring or summer,

it is

It is to be observed of Hypothetical [compound] Propositions, Hypothetiwhether Conditional or Disjunctive, that they are always affirmative: propositions always i.e. it is always affirmed, not denied, that the connexion between the affirmatiire. several categorical members, denoted, respectively, by the conjuncAccordingly, the contradiction of any tions employed, does exist.
is not made by a hypothetical. If I assert D," you might deny that, by saying " it does A is B, C must be D;" or in some such expression. So the contradiction of this, "either A is B or C is D," would be "neither is A, B, nor is C, D:" or, "h J two categorical negatives; it is possible that neither A is B, nor C, D. The conjunctions

hypothetical proposition
is B, that " if not follow that if

is

"neither" and "nor,"

tive,

it

their nature with "either "

should be observed, do not correspond in and "or;" since these last are disjuncnot.

which the others are

The Dilemma,

5,
a complex hind of Conditional Syllogism. The account usually given of the Dilemma in Logical treatises is singularly perplexed and unscientific. And it is remarkable that all the rules they usually give respecting it, and the faults against which they caution us, relate exclusively to the Subject-matter: as if one were to lay down as rules respecting a Syllogism in Barbara, "1st. Care must be taken that the major Premiss be true: 2dly. that the minor Premiss be true !" *. Most, if not all, writers on this point either omit to tell us whether the Dilemma is a kind of conditional, or of disjunctive argument; or else refer it to the latter class, on account of its having one disjunctive Premiss though it clearly belongs to the class of Conis
;

ditionals.
1st. If you have in the major Premiss several antecedents all with the same consequent, then, these Antecedents, being (in the minor) disjunctively granted [i.e. it being granted that some one of them is true,) the one common consequent may be inferred, (as in the case of a simple Constructive Syllogism:) e.g. if is B, C is D; and if is Y, C is D; but either is B, or "If is Y: therefore C is D. the blest in heaven have no desires, they will be perfectly content

72

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.

[Book

II.

SO they will, if their desires are fully gratified; but either they will have no desires, or have them fully gratified therefore they will be content." Note, in this case, the two Conditionals which cKAictive P^^'^^^% make up the major Premiss may be united into one Proposition by Dilemma, means of the word ''whether:'' e.g. ** whether the blest, &c. have no desires, or have their desires gratified, they will be content." '^^' ^^* ^^ *^^^ several antecedents have each a different consequent. ?o tJuctive Dilemma, then the Antecedents, being, as before, disjunctively granted, you can only disjunctively infer the consequents: e.g. if A is B, C is D; and if X is Y, E is F; but either A is B, or X is Y; therefore ** If iEschines joined either C is D, or E is F. in the pubhc rejoicings, he is inconsistent; if he did not, he is unpatriotic: but he either joined, or not: therefore he is either inconsistent or unpatriotic."*^ This case, as well as the foregoing, is evidently
;

constructive,
tha^"aTln*\ properly Diiemiuas.
'

In the Destructive form, whether you have one Antecedent with

Several Consequents, or several Antecedents, either with one, or with several Consequents; in all these cases, if you deny the whole of

the Consequent, or Consequents, you may in the conclusion deny the whole of the Antecedent or Antecedents : e.g. " If the world were eternal, the most useful arts, such as printing, &c. would be of unknown antiquity: and on the same supposition, there would be records long prior to the Mosaic; and likewise the sea and land, in all parts of the globe, might be expected to maintain the same relative situations now as formerly : but none of these is the fact therefore the world is not eternal." Again, " If the world existed from eternity, there would be records prior to the Mosaic; and if it were produced by chance, it would not bear marks of design there are no records prior to the Mosaic: and the world does bear marks of design: therefore it neither existed from eternity, nor is the work of chance." These are sometimes called Dilemmas, but hardly differ from simple conditional Syllogisms; two or more being expressed together. Nor is the case different if you have one antecedent with several consequents, which consequents you disjunctively deny; for that comes to the same thing as wholly denying^them since if they be not all true, the one antecedent must equally fall to the ground and the Syllogism will be equally simple: e.g. ** If we admit the popular objections against Political Economy, we must admit that it tends to an excessive increase of wealth; and also, that it tends to impoverishment: but it cannot do both of these; {i.e. either not the one, or, not the other) therefore we cannot admit the popular objections," &c.; which is evidently a simple Destructive. The true Dilemma is, "a conditional Syllogism with several*^ antecedents in the major^ and a disjunctive minor;'* hence,
: : ; ;

<i

42 Tlie

two antecedents ; and hence

DemosL For the Crotvn. name Dilemma implies precisely it is common

to

speak of "the horns of a dilemma;" but it is evident there may be either two or more.

Chap. IV.

5.]

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.
-

73
.

od. That is most properly called a destructive Dilemma, which destructive Dilemma. '. ^ ^ ,,., ,. Ti has (hke the constructive ones) a msjunctwe minor Jrremiss; i.e. when joii have several Antecedents with each a different Consequent; which consequents (instead of wholly denying them, as in the case lately mentioned) you disjunctively/ denj; and thence, in the Conclubion, deny disjunctively the Antecedents: e.g. if A is B, C is D; and if X is Y, E is F: but either C is not D, or E is not F; there"If this man were wise, he fore, either A is not B, or X is not Y. would not speak irreverently of Scripture in jest; and if he were good, he would not do so in earnest; but he does it, either in jest, or earnest; therefore he is either not wise, or not good." Or again, you may have a Dilemma partly constructive and partly destructive: as the above example would be, if you were to convert one of the conditionals, (see 3.) into "if C is not D, A is not B:" for the Minor-Premiss would then assert that either the Antecedent of one of the Conditionals is true, or the Consequent of the other, false. Every Dilemma may be reduced into two or more simple Condi- Resolution tional-Syllogisms e.g. " If -/Eschines joined, &c. he is inconsistent; Dilemma, he did join, &;c. therefore he is inconsistent;" and again, "If -^schines did not join, &lc. he is unpatriotic; he did not, &C. therefore he is unpatriotic." Now an opponent might deny either of the minor Premises in the above Syllogisms, but he could not deny both; and therefore he must admit one or the other of the Conclusions; for, when a Dilemma is employed, it is supposed that some one of the Antecedents must be true (or, in the destructive kind, some one of the Consequents false), but that we cannot tell which of them is so; and this is the reason why the argument is stated in the form of a Dilemma. Sometimes it may happen that both antecedents may be true, and that we may be aware of this; and yet there may be an advantage in stating (either separately or conjointly) both arguments, even when each proves the same conclusion, so as not to derive any additional confirmation from the other; still, I say, it may sometimes be advisable to state both, because, of two propositions equally true, one man may deny or be ignorant of the one, while he admits the other; and another man, vice versa. From what has been said, it may easily be seen that all Dilemmas are in fact conditional Syllogisms ; and that Disjunctive Syllogisms may also be reduced to the form of Conditionals but as it has been remarked, that all Reasoning whatever may ultimately be brought to the one test of Aristotle's " Dictum," it remains to show how a Conditional Syllogism may be thrown into such a form, that that test vrill at once apply to it ; and this is called the
,
,
.
. .

74

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.
Beduction of Ilypotlieticah^^

LBook

II.

6.
For
tills

purpose we must consider every Conditional Proposition

as a Universal-affirmative categorical Proposition, of wiiich the Terms are entire Propositions, mz. the antecedent answering to the

E. G. The Proposibe considered as amounting to this ** The case [or supposition] of A being B, is a case of X being Y." And then, to say (as in the Minor-premiss and the Conclusion, of a and therefore X is Y," constructive-conditional syllogism) " A is B is equivalent to saying " the present [or the existing] case is a case
Subject, and the consequent to the Predicate.
"

tion

if

is

B,

is

Y" may

being Y." Again, is a case of a good king, France is likely to prosper," is equivalent to saying, ** The case of Louis being a good king, is a case of France being likely to prosper :" and if it be granted as a minor Premiss to the Conditional Syllogism, that *' Louis is a good king ;" that is equivalent to saying, " the present case is the case of Louis being a good king ;" from which you will draw a conclusion in Barbara, {viz. " the present case is a case of France being likely to prosper,") exactly equivalent to the original Conclusion viz. " France is likely to prosper." of the Conditional Syllogism As the Constructive Conditional may thus be reduced to Barbara, so may the Destructive, in like manner, to Celarent: e.g. *' If the Stoics are right, pain is no evil but pain is an evil ; therefore the "The case of the Stoics Stoics are not right;" is equivalent to being right, is the case of pain being no evil ; the present case is
of

being
'*

therefore this
is

to say,

if

Louis

43

Aldrich has stated, somewhat rashly,

that Aristotle utterly despised Hypothetical Syllogisms, and thence made no cannot, however, mention of them. considering how large a portion of his works is lost, draw any conclusion from the mere absence of a treatise on this branch, in the portion which has come

We

down

to us.

Aldrich observes, that no hypothetical argument is valid which cannot be reduced to a categorical form and this is evidently agreeable to what has been said
;

at the beginning of Chap. III.; but then

have not each the same subject, (as in the very example he gives, "If A is B, C is D,") he gives no rule for reducing such a Syllogism as has a Pi-emiss of this kind and indeed leads us to suppose that it is to be rejected as invalid, though be has just before demonstrated its validity, And this is likely to have been one among the various causes which occasion many learners to regard the whole system of Logic as a string of idle reveries, having nothing true, substantial, or practically useful in it; but of the same ciiaracter with the dreams of Alchymy, Demonology.

he has unfortunately omitted to teach us to reduce Hypotheticals to this form except in the case where the Antecedent and Consequent chance to have each the same Subject; m which case, he tells us to take the minor Premiss and Conclusion as an Enthymeme, and fill that up categorically e.g. "If Cajsar wasatyrant, he deserved death; he was a tyrant, therefore he deserved death;" which may easily be reduced to a categorical form, by taking as a major Premiss, "all tyrants deserve death." But when (as is often the case) the Antecedent and Consequent

and judicial-Astrology.
is

Such a

how

mistake

surely the less inexcusable in

his master first demonstrates the validity of a certain argument, and then tells him that after all it is good for nothing; (prorsus repudiandian.) In the late editions of Aldrich's Logic,

a learner, when

that he says of the reduction of I lypois omitted; which certainly would have been an improvement, if more correct one had been substituted;
all

theticals

but as

it is,

there

is

a complete hiatus in

the system.

Chap. IY.

7.]

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.
;

75

not the case of pain being no evil therefore the present ease is not This is Camestres, which, of the case of the Stoics being right." course, is easily reduced to Celarent. Or, if you will, all Conditional Syllogisms may be reduced to Barbara, by considering them all as Constructive; which maybe done, as mentioned above, by "converting by negation" [contraposition] the major Premiss. (See 3.) The reduction of Hypotheticals may always be effected in the Abridged

but as it produces a circuitous awkwardness a more convenient form may in some cases be substituted. E. G. In the example above, it may be convenient to take " true" for one of the Terms " that pain is no evil is not true ; that pain is no evil is asserted by the Stoics therefore something asserted by the Stoics is not true." Sometimes again it may be better to unfold the argument into two Syllogisms e.g. in a former example; first, Louis is a good king the governor of France is Louis; therefore the governor of France is a good king." And then, second, " every country governed by a good king is likely to prosper," <fec. Dilemma may of course (see 5,) be reduced into two or more categorical Syllogisms. When the Antecedent and Consequent of a Conditional have each the same Subject, you may sometimes reduce the Conditional by merely substituting a categorical Major-Premiss for the conditional one e.g. instead of " if Ciusar was a tyrant, he deserved death he "Nvas a tyrant, therefore he deserved death ;" you may put for a major, "all tyrants deserve death;" ka. But it is of no great consequence, whether Hypotheticals are reduced in the most neat and concise manner or not since it is not intended that they should be reduced to Categoricals, in ordinary practice, as the readiest way of trying their validity, (their own rules being quite sufficient for that purpose;) but only that we should he able, if required, to subject any argument whatever to the test of Aristotle's Dictum, in order to show that all reasoning turns upon one simple principle.
stated
;

manner above

reduction

ot

of expression,

c^g"*^^*^^'

Of Enthymeme,
7.

Sorites, Sc.

There are various abridged forms of Argument which may be easily expanded into regular Syllogisms; such as, 1st. The Enthy- Enthymema meme,** which is a Syllogism with one Premiss suppressed. As all the Terms will be found in the remaining Premiss and Conclusion, it will be easy to fill up the Syllogism by supplying the Premiss that is wanting, whether Major or Minor e.g. " Caesar was a tyrant; therefore he deserved death." "A free nation must be happy therefore the English are happy."
:

44
_

m a dilierent sense from this, by Aristotle,

The word Knthymeme

is

employed

in Rhet. B.

I.

See Elements of

JRhetoric,

Part

I.

Ch.

II. 2.

76

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.

[Book

II.

Tills Is tlie ordinary form of speaking and writing. It Is evident that Entliymemes may be filled up hypothetlcally. It Is to be observed, that the Enthymeme is not strictly syllo-

gistic;

expression,

is not apparent from the mere form of the suppressed Premiss shall have been, either The expressed Premiss may be true, actually or mentally supplied. and yet the Conclusion false. The Sorites, on the other hand, is strictly Syllogistic as may be
i.e. its

conclusiveness

tiU

Sorites,

If the Premises stated be true, the concluseen by the examples". sion must be true. For, 2d. When you have a string of Syllogisms, In the first figure, in which the Conclusion of each is made the Premiss of the next, till you arrive at the main or ultimate Conclusion of all, you may sometimes state these briefly. In the form called Sorites; in which the Predicate of the first proposition Is made the Subject of the next and so on, to any length, till finally the Predicate of the last of the Premiseslspredicated(lnthe Conclusion) of the Subject of the first: e.g. (either every A, or some A) is B, every B is C, every C is D, every Is not D is E ; therefore is E ; or else *' no D is E therefore E." *' The English are a brare people a brave people are free a free people are happy, therefore the Enghsh are happy." Sorites, then, has as many Middle-terms as there are intermediate and consequently, it Propositions between the first and the last may be drawn out into as many separate Syllogisms of which the first will have, for Its major Premiss, the second, and for its minor^ as may be seen by the the first, of the Propositions of the Sorites The reader will perceive also by examination of that example. example, and by framing others, that the first proposition in the Sorites is the only minor premiss that is expressed ; when the whole is resolved into distinct syllogisms, each conclusion becomes Hence, in a Sorites, the minor premiss of the succeeding syllogism. ihQ first proposition, and that alone, of all the premises, may be particular ; because in the first Figure the minor may be particular, but not the major ; (see Chap. III. 4.) and all the other proposiIt is also tions, prior to the conclusion, are major premises. evident that there may be, in a Sorites, one, and only one, negative premiss, xiiz. the last for if any of the others were negative, the result would be that one of the Syllogisms of the Sorites would have a negative minor premiss which is (in the 1st Fig.) incompatible

See Chap. III. 4. Am.ncation To the Sorltes the ** Dictum" formerly treated of may be applied, " Whatever is Dicfum to with one small addition, which is self-evident. the Sorites, affirmed or denied of a whole Class, may be affirmed or denied of whatever Is comprehended In [any Class that is wholly comprehended in] that Class. This sentence, omitting the portion enclosed
with correctness.
in brackets,

down

you will recognise as the ** Dictum" originally laid and the words in brackets supply that extension of it which

Chaf. IV.

7.]

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.

77
il

makes
is

** Sorites," of whatever lengtli; since it applicable to a manifest that that clause might be enlarged as far as you will, into ** a Class that is wliolly comprehended in a Class, which again is wholly comprehended in another Class," &c. string of Conditional Syllogisms^ may in hke manner be is B, C is D; if C is D, E is F; abridged into a Sorites; e.g. if "If the Scripif E IS F, G is H; but A is B, therefore G is H. tures are the Avord of God, it is important that they should be well explained; if it is important, kc. they deserve to be diligently Btudied; if they deserve, &c. an order of men should be set aside for that purpose; but the Scriptures are the word, <fec.; therefore an In a order of men should be set aside for the purpose, &c." destructive Sorites, you, of course, go back from the denial of the ** G is not H; last consequent to the denial of the first antecedent:

J^r[P?JJl^*'g"
""^

therefore

is

not B."
are all the forms in which Reasoning can be i.e. so that its validity shall be manifest

The foregoing

exhibited syllogistically ;

from the mere form of expression. Those who have spoken of Induction or of Example, as a distinct ^"jf^'J^^'jQ"* kind of Argument in a Logical point of view, have fallen into the common error of confounding Logical with Bhetorical distinctions, and have wandered from their subject as much as a writer on the orders of Architecture would do who should introduce the distincLogic takes no tion between buildings of brick and of marble. cognizance of Induction, for instance, or of a priori reasoning, &c., as distinct Forms of argument; for when thrown into the syllogistic form, and when letters of the alphabet are substituted for tlie Terms (and it is thus that an Argument is properly to be brought under the cognizance of Logic), there is no distinction between them. E.G. "A Property which belongs to the ox, sheep, deer, goat, and antelope, belongs to all horned animals; rumination This, which is an inductive belongs to these; therefore to all." argument, is evidently a Syllogism in Barbara. The essence of an inductive argument, as well as of the other kinds which are distinguished from it, consists not in the form of the Argument, but in the relation which the Subject-matter of the Premises bears
to that of the Conclusion. **

3d. There are various other abbreviations commonly used, which Abbreviaare so obvious as hardly to call for explanation as where one of the Premises of a Syllogism is itself the Conclusion of an Enthy:

**

Hence

it is

evident

how injudicious

an arrangement has been adopted by former writers on Logic, wlio have treated of the Sorites and Enthynieme before they entered on the subject of
llvpotheticals. *6 Hee Rhetoric, Parti. Ch. II.
5

Nothing probably has tended more to foster the prevailing error of considering Syllogism as a particular kind of argtimerit,

which appears works extant.

6.

than the inaccuracy just noticed; in all or most of the logical See Dissertation on the Province of Reasoning, Ch. 1,

78

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.
:

[Book

II.

meme,

wlilcli is expressed at the same time e.g. " All useful studies deserve encouragement; Logic is sucli {since it helps us to reason accurately;) therefore it deserves encouragement;" here the Minor-

elsihxT^'
arguuients,

premiss is what is "^"^ ^* ^^^^ ^^ the form, not of a or a Command;

called an

Enthymematic

sentence.^''

added, that such a sentence will sometimes he in Proposition, but of an Exclanriation, a Question^ and yet will he such as readily to suggest to the

some of the examples lately given, one might say (in place of one of the Propositions) " Choose which you will of these two suppositions;" or " Who can doubt that so and so follows?" The message to Pilate from his wife*^ furnishes an instance of a single word {''just'') suggesting a Major-premiss, while the Conclusion is stated in the form of an exhortation: " Have thou nothing to do with that just man." And the succeeding sentence must have been designed to convey a hint of Arguments for the Proof of each of the Premises on which that Conclusion rested. And here it may be observed that the usual practice of selecting for examples, in Logical treatises, such arguments as hardly even an ignorant clown, or a child, would need to state at full length, and which the slightest hint would sufficiently suggest to any one, has contributed to the prevailing mistake of supposing that Syllogisms, universally, are mere trifling; the fact, that all arguments Things are, substantially, syllogistic, being overlooked. It is worth remarkproof"to one ing however in this place, that the further any one advances, in SeTideiu intellectual cultivation, generally, or in any particular department, to another, he will have less and less need, (not, of argumentation altogether, but) of such arguments as are needful for a beginner. To this last, many propositions may need to be proved at full length, which, to one further advanced, require only to have the proofs hinted at, and which to one still more advanced need merely to be stated as propositions, or, ultimately, not even that; being sufficiently suggested to the mind by the mere mention of one of the terms. And hence the proverbial expression, that " a word is enough to the wise." Equivalents. It is evident that you may, for brevity, substitute for any term an equivalent: as in an example above, *' if' for '* Logic;" *' such," for "a useful study," (fee. The doctrine of Conversion, laid down in the Second Chapter, furnishes many equivalent propositions, since each is equivalent to its illative Converse. The division of nouns also (for which see Chap. V.) supplies many equivalents; e.g. if is the genus of B, B must be a species of A: if is the cause of B, B must be the efect of A, <kc. 4th. And many Syllogisms, which at first sight appear faulty,
instance, in

mind a For

proposition.

*7
is

The

antecedent in that Minor-premiss .. that

lv .Arisiotle tlie

which makes

it

Enthymematic)

oalicd
<8

Prusylloyism.

Matt, xxvii. IS.

Chap. IV.
will often

7.]

SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.

79

be found, on examination, to contain correct reasoning, Syllogisms to be reducible to a regular form e.g. when you \Svt&S have, apparently, negative Premises, it may happen, that by considering one of them as affirmative, (see Chap. II. 4,) the Syllogism will be regular: e.g. "no man is happy who is not secure: no tyrant is secure; therefore no tyrant is happy," is a Syllogism in Celarent. If this experiment be tried on a Syllogism which has really negative Premises, the only eifect will be to change that fault into another: viz. an excess of Terms, or (which is substantially the same) an undistributed Middle; e.g. " an enslaved people is not happy; the English are not enslaved therefore they are happy:" if ** enslaved" be regarded as one of the Terms, and " not enslaved" as another, there will manifestly be four. Hence one may see how very little difference there is in reality between the different faults which are enumerated. Sometimes there will appear to be too many terms; and yet there will be no fault in the Reasoning, only an irregularity in the expression e.g. *' no irrational agent could produce a work which manifests design; the universe is a work which manifests design; therefore no irrational agent could have produced the universe." Strictly speaking, this Syllogism has five terms; but if you look to the meaning, you will see, that in the first Premiss (considering it as a part of this argument) it is not, properly, "an irrational agent" that you are speaking of, and of Avhich you predicate that it could not produce a work manifesting design; but rather it is this "work," <fec. of which you are speaking, and of which it is predicated that it could not be produced by an irrational agent; if, then, you state the Propositions in that form, the Syllogism will be perfectly regular.

and consequently,

(See above, 1.) Thus, such a Syllogism as this, " every true patriot is disinterested few men are disinterested therefore few men are true patriots ;" might appear at first sight to be in the second Figure, and faulty; whereas it is Barbara, with the Premises transposed: for you do not really predicate of "few men," that they are "disinterested," but of " disinterested persons,'' that they are " few." Again, "none but candid men are good reasoners; few infidels are candid; few infidels are good reasoners. In this it will be most convenient to consider the Major-premiss as being, " all good reasoners are candid," (which of course is precisely equipollent to its illative converse by negation;) and the Minor-premiss and Conclusion may in like manner be fairly expressed thus "most infidels are not candid; therefore most infidels are not good reasoners:" which is a regular Syllogism in Camcstres.^ Or, if you would state it in the first Figure,
; ;
'

'

*o The reader is to observe that the term ejnployed as the Subject of the Minorpremiss, and of the conclusion, is " mostinfidels: "he is not to suppose that "most"

is

a si^n of distribution;

it

is

compendious expression
part of."

lor

"

merely a

the greater


80

SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP.

I.

[Book II

thus: "those who are not candid [or imcandid] are not good reasoners: most infidels are not candid; most infidels are not good reasoners."

Chap. V.

SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP.
[This Supplement

I,

may

Be studied either before or after the preceding three Chapters.}

1^nivocai,

The usual divisions of nouns

^^^
into

into univocal, equivocal,

and analogous^
strictly

Analogous.

nouns of the

Jirst

and second

intention, are not,

speaking, divisions of words, hut divisions of the manner of employ^ ing them; the same word may he employed either univocally, equivocally, or analogously; either in the First-intention, or in the Second. The ordinary logical treatises often occasion great perplexity to the learner, hy not noticing this circumstance, hut rather leading him to suppose the contrary. (See Book III. 8.) Some of those other divisions of nouns, whi(ih are the most commonly in use, though not appropriately and exclusively helonging to the Logical system, i.e. to the theory of reasoning, it may he worth while

briefly to notice in this place.

Let it he ohserved, then, that a term expresses the view we take And its heing viewed as an ohject, i.e. as one, or of an ohject. again as several, depends on our arbitrary choice e.g. we may consider a "troop of cavalry" as one ohject; or we may make any single "horse with its rider," or any " separate man" or horse, or any limb of either, the subject of our thoughts. 1. When then any one object is considered according to its actual Singularand existence, as numerically one, the name denoting it is called Singular; Sms!**" When it is conas, "this tree," the "city of London," &c. sidered as to its nature and character only, as heing of such a description as might equally apply to other single objects, the inadequate or incomplete view (see B. L 3, and 6,) thus taken of an individual, is expressed by a Common-term; as "tree," "city,"
;

**

minister-of-state."

Absolute
lieiativa.

2. When any object is considered as a part of a whole, viewed in reference to the whole or to another part, of a more complex object of thought, the name expressing this view is called Relative: and to Kelative-term is o-p^osed Absolute ; as denoting an object considered as a whole, and without reference to any thing of which it is a part, or to any other part distinguished from it. Thus, " Father," and "Son,"
**

Rider," "Commander,"

<kc.

are Relatives; being regarded, each as


Chap. V.
5 1.]

SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP.

I.

81

a part of the complex objects, Father-and-Son, <tc.; the same object designated absolutely, Avould be termed a Man, Living-Being, <tc. Nouns are Correlative to each other, which denote objects related to each other, and viewed as to that relation. Thus, though a King is a ruler of men, "King" and "Man" are not correlative, but

Correlative,

Subject, are. there are two views which cannot be taken of one single Compatihie object at the same time, the terms expressing these views are said
3.

"King" and

When

to be Opposite, or Inconsistent [repugnantia];

as, "black," and "white;" when both may be taken of the same object at the same

time, they are called Consistent, or Compatible [convenientia]; as ** white," and "cold." Relative terms are Opposite, only when

applied with reference to the same Subject : as, one may be both at the same time to the same person. 4. When the notion derived from the view taken of any object, is Concrete ^"'^^ ^^' expressed with a reference to, or as in conjunction with, the object that furnished the notion, it is expressed by a Concrete term ; as,

Master and Servant; but not

"foolish," or "fool;" when without any such reference, by an Abstract^ term, as "folly." 5. When a term applied to some object is such as to imply in its signification some "attribute'' belonging to that object, such a terna is called by some of the early logical writers " Connotative ;^' but

AttributJv

trve^TnT**" Absolute or
uaive.""^

would perhaps be more conveniently called " Attributive.^' It "connotes," i.e. "notes along with" the object [or implies] something considered as inherent therein: as " The capital of France;"

"The

founder of Rome."

The founding

of

Rome,
it is

is,

by that

appellation, "attributed" to the person to

whom

applied.

A
same

term which merely denotes an object without implying any

is

attribute of that object,

called "Absolute'' or "Non-connotative;" as

"Paris;"

"Romulus."

The

last

terms denote respectively the

two former; but do not, like them, connote [imply in their signification] any attribute of those individuals. Every Concrete-common-term is "attributive," [connotative] whether in the adjective ^^ or substantive form; as "Man," "human," "triangle," "triangular," "saint," "holy:" for, "man" e.g. or "human," are appellations denoting, not the attribute itself which we call "human-nature," but a Being to which such a term is applied in reference to, and by virtue of, its possessing that attribute. An Abstract-common-term, being the name of an Attribute-itself
objects as the

as "hiunan-nature," "triangularity," "holiness," is "Absolute" [non-connotative] except where there is an attribute of an attribute impUed in the term ; as the term " fear " e.g. may be considered a3

*" It is

unfortunate that some ^Titers

a^i

essential difference in reference to the

have introduced the fashion of calling " Common terms" ^6s/rrtc^-ternis.

^i

Some

word

logical writers confine the to adjectives; but there seems no

present subject. Indeed, in Greeli and in Latin it often happens that a word may be reckoned either adjective or substantive; as*'stultus;" "hospes.'*

82

SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP.
;

I.

[Book

II.

implying some hope of escape without wliicli the apprehension of evil would he called *' despair." It is to be observed that many a term is employed and to a certain degree, correctly employed, i.e. not m^5applied by persons who do not clearly and fully take in its signification who do not know, or do not bring before their minds, exactly what is implied " [connoted] by it. E. G. A child learns to apply the term " money
;

Positive, ^riva ive

negative.

to the bits of metal he sees pass from hand to hand, long before he has any clear notion (which some never fully attain) of what it is that constitutes "money," and is zV/pZiec? [connoted] by the term. So also it is conceivable that a person might, under certain circumstances, know perfectly what individuals are Aldermen, Senators, &c. while he had but a very vague and imperfect notion of the Office which such a term implies. And such a familiarity as this with any term, (together with one's being able to comprehend processes of reasoning in which it occurs) tends to conceal from men their imperfect apprehension of its signification, and thus often leads to confusion of thought, and error. (See B. IV. Ch. IV. 2.) 6. A term which denotes a certain view of an object as being actually taken of it, is called Positive: as "speech,'' "a man sjpeaking :" a term denoting that this view might conceivably be taken of the object, but is not, is Privative; as " dumhness," a "man silent,'' &c.^^ That which denotes that such a notion is not and could not be formed of the object, is called Negative; as, " a dumb statue," a "lifeless carcase," &c. Many negative-terms which are such in sense only, have led to confusion of thought, from their real character being imperfectly perceived. E.G. "Liberty," which is a purely negative term, denoting merely " absence of restraint," is sometimes confounded with " Power." ^^ It is to be observed that the same term may be regarded either

as Positive, or as Privative or Negative, according to the quality or character which we are referring to in our minds: thus, of "happy"

and "miserable," we may regard the former as

latter (imhappy) as Privative
;

Positive,

and the

or vice versa; according as

is also

we

are

thinking of enjoyment or of suffering.

7.

Privative or Negative term

called Indefinite [infini-

*2 Many Privative epithets are such that by a little in^jenuity the application of them may be represented as an absurdThus, Wallis's remark (introduced ity. in this treatise) that a jest is generally a mock-fallacy, i.e. a fallacy not designed to deceive, but so palpable as only to furnish amusement, might be speciously condemned as involving a contradiction: for " the design to deceive,''^ it might be said, " is essential to a fallacy." In the sauie way it might be argued that it is absurd to speak of "a dead man;" e^.

" every man

dead
is

man
^3

is a living creature; nothing a living creature; therefore no dead !" An extension of a man's power (as
is

Tucker has observed in his ''Light of Nature") may be the means of diminishing his "liberty;" as the liberty of a helpless paralytic is not abridged by locking the door of his room; though it would be, if he were to recover the use of his limbs. See a notice of the word

"aperture"

in 5. Essay 1. 1st Series,

Chap. V.

2.]

SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP.

I.

83
Definite and
^" ^ ""'

turn] in respect of its not defining and marking out an object ; in contradistinction to this, the Positive term is called Definite [finitum]

Thus, " organized Being," because it does thus define or mark out. or " Csesar," are called Definite, as marking out, and limiting our

view to, one particular class of Beings, or one single person "unorganized," or "not-Csesar," are called Indefinite, as not restricting our view to any class, or individual, hut only excluding one, and leaving it undetermined, what other individual the thing so spoken of may he, or what other class it may belong to. It is to be observed, that the most perfect opposition between terms Contradio exists between any two which differ only in respectively wanting JJfpo^^itioa and having the particle not (either expressly, or in sense) attached of terms. to them; as, *' organized," and "not-organized;" "corporeal," and "incorporeal." For not only is it impossible for both these views to be taken at once of the same thing, but also, it is impossible but that one or other should be applicable to every object as there is nothing that can be both, so there is nothing that can be neither. Every thing that can be even conceived, must be either " Csesar," And either "corporeal," or "incorporeal." or "not-Csesar;" in this way a complete twofold division may be made of any And subject, being certain (as the expression is) to exhaust it. the repetition of this process, so as to carry on a subdivision as far as there is occasion, is thence called by Logicians " abscissio infiniti;" i.e. the repeated cutting ofi' of that which the object to be examined is not; e.g. "1. This disorder either is, or is not, a dropsy; and for this or that reason, it is not; 2. Any other disease this is not then, 3. It either is, or is either is, or is not, gout This procedure is very common in Arisnot, consumption, &;c." totle's works. (See B. II. Ch. III. 4.) Such terms may be said to be in Contradictory-opposition to each
;

other.

On

the other hand,

class,

Contrary terms,

i.e.

under some one

are the most diff'erent of all that belong to

those which, coming Contrary ^^^^

that class, as "wise" and "foolish" both denoting mental habits, are opposed, but in a difierent manner: for though both cannot be applied to the same object, there may be other objects to which
ne?//ier

can be applied: nothing can be at once both "foolish;" but a stone cannot be either.

"wise" and

2.
by Common-terms, we are enabled (as hr.s been remarked in the Analytical Outline) to form, by the faculty of abstraction: for by it, in contemplating any object (or objects,) we can attend exclusively to some particular circumstances belonging
notions expressed
it, [some certain parts of its nature as it were,] and quite withhold our attention from the rest. When, therefore, we are thus contemplating several individuals which resemble each other in some ^avt of their nature, we can (by attending to that part alone, and not

The

to

Generaiiza.
*^"*

84

SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP.

I.

[Book

II.

to those points wlierein tliey differ) assign them one common name, which will express or stand for them merely as far as they all agree;
will he applicable to all or any of them; (which process is called generalization) and each of these names is called a common-term, from its belonging to them all alike; or a predicahle, because it may be predicated-affirmatively of them, or (See B. I. 3.) of any of them. Generalization (as has been remarked) implies Abstraction but for there may be abstraction without it is not the same thing When we are speaking of an Individual, it is generalization. usually an abstract notion that we form e.g. suppose we are speaking of the present King of France he must actually he either sitting, standing, or in some other posture at Paris or elsewhere and in such and such a dress, kc. Yet many of these circumstances, (which are separable Accidents,^* and consequently) which are regarded as non-essential to the individual, are quite disregarded by us and we abstract from them what we consider as essential thus forming an abstract notion of the Individual. Yet there is here no
; ;

and which, of course,

Predicabies.

generalization.

3.
the account usually given in logical treatises of the different kinds [heads] of Predicabies but it cannot be admitted without some considerable modifications, explanations and corrections, which will be subjoined. Whatever Term can be affirmed of several things, must express either their whole essence, which is called the Species ; or a part of their essence {viz. either the material part, which is called the Genus,
following
is
;

The

Species.

Genus,
Ditferentia.

in

Froperty.

Accident,

formal and distinguishing part, which is called Diferentia, or discourse, characteristic) or something joined to the essence; whether necessarily {i.e. to the whole species, or, in other words, universally, to every individual of it), which is called a Property: or contingently {i.e. to some individuals only of the species), which is an Accident.
or the

common

Every predicable expresses either

The
of

7vhole essence
its

subject
/'

or part of its essence

I

viz.: Species.

or something joined to its essence. \

Genus Difference.
Property

Accident

universal

but not peculiar

[peculiar out not universal]**

universal and pe<!uhar

-^

inseparable separable.

w See

6.

w See below,

Chap. V.

3.]

SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP.

I.

85

Of tliese predicables, genus and species are commonly said, in the language of logicians, to be predicated in quid; (ri) i.e. to answer to the question, '* what ?" as, " what is Csesar ?" Answer, ** a man ;" ** what is a man ?" Answer, " an animal ;" Difference, in '* quale quid;'' {-ttoiov n) Property and Accident in quale [ttoIov.) It is evident from what has been said, that the Genus and Genus and ^.6r. ** Rational " eSra' Difference put together make up the Species.
animal" constitute " man ;" so that, in reality, the Species different* Genus [i.e. implies it;] and when the Genus is called senses. a whole, and is said to contain the Species, this is only a metaphorical expression, signifying that it comprehends the Species in its own more extensive signification. If for instance I predicate the term "animal" of an individual man, as Alexander, I speak truth indeed, but only such a portion of the truth that I might equally If I predicate predicate the same term of his horse Bucephalus. the terms " Man" and ** Horse" of Alexander and of Bucephalus respectively, I use a more full and complete expression for each than the term "animal;" and this last is accordingly the more extensive., as it contains, [or, more properly speaking, comprehends] and may be applied to, several different Species; viz.: "bird," "beast," "fish," &c. In the same manner the name of a species is a more extensive [i.e. comprehensive] but less fall and complete term than that of an individual [viz. a Singular-term ;) since the Species may be predicated of each of these. " The impression produced on the mind by a Singular Term, may be compared to the distinct view taken in by the eye, of any object (suppose some particular man) near at hand, in a clear light, which enables us to distinguish the features of the individual: in a fainter light, or rather further off, we merely perceive that the object is a man: this corresponds with the idea conveyed by the

and

*'

contains the

of the Species yet farther off, or in a still feebler light, we can distinguish merely some living object; and at length, merely some object these views corresponding respectively with the terms "^^ denoting the Genera, less or more remote. Hence it is plain that when logicians speak of "Species" as "expressing the whole essence of its subjects," this is not strictly correct, unless we understand by the " whole essence" the " whole that any commow-term can express;" the "nearest approach to the whole essence of the individual that any term (not synonymous with the Subject) can denote." No predicate can express, strictly, the whole essence of its Subject, unless it be merely another name, of the very same import, and co-extensive with it; as " Csesar was

name

the conqueror of Pompey."

But when

logicians

speak of Species as a " whole,"

Rhet. Part III. Chap. II.
5 1.

this is,


8G

^SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP.

I.

[Book

II.

properly, in reference to the Genus and the Difference ; each of which denotes a " part" of that Species which we constitute hy

But then, it should be remembered joining those two together. that a Species is not a predicahle in respect of its Genus and Difference (since it cannot be predicated of them) but only in respect
of the Individuals, or lower Species, of which
it

can be predicated.

Suhaltern

genus and
gpecies.

Hiffhest

Genus and
lowest
Species.

Specific

Difference

and
Property.

Generic
Ditierence

and
Property.

Species then, it is plain, when predicated of Individuals, stands in the same relation to them, as the Genus to the Species and when predicated of other (lower) Species, it is then, in respect of these, a Genus, while it is a Species in respect of a higher Genus; as "quadruped," which is a species of "animal," is a Genus in respect of " horse ;" which latter again may be predicated Such a term is called of Bucephalus and of other individuals. a subaltern Species or Genus ; being each, in respect of different other terms, respectively. Genus that is not considered as a species of any thing, is called summum (the highest) Genus ; a Species that is not considered as a i.e. is regarded as containing under it only genus of any thing, is called infima (the lowest) Species. individuals, When I say of a Magnet, that it is "a kind of iron-ore,^^ that is called its proximum-gQim%, because it is the closest [or lowest] genus that is predicated of it: " mineral" is its more remote genus. When I say that the Differentia of a magnet is its " attracting iron,'' and that its Property is ^'polarity,'' these are called respectively a Specific Difference and Property ; because magnet is (I have supposed) an infima species [i.e. only a species.] When I say that the Differentia of iron ore is its "containing iron,'' and its Property, *' being attracted by the magnet," these are called respectively, a generic Difference and Property, because " iron-ore" is a subaltern Species or Genus; being both the genus of magnet, and a species of mineral. It should be observed here, that when logicians speak of Property and Accident as predicables expressing, not the Essence, or part of the Essence of a subject, but something united to the Essence, this must be understood as having reference not to the nature of things as they are in themselves, but to our conceptions of them. *' Polarity" for instance is as much a part of the real nature of the substance we call "Magnet," as its "attraction of iron;" and again, a certain shape, colour, or specific gravity, as much belongs in reality to those magnets which are of that description, as either But our modes of conceiving, and of polarity, or attraction. expressing our conceptions, have reference to the relations in which and are influenced in each instance objects stand to our own minds by the particular end we have in view. That, accordingly, is

accounted a part of the Essence of any thing, which

is

essential td

Chap. V.

4.]

SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP.

I.

87

of it formed in our minds. Thus, if we have annexed such a notion to the term, Man, that ** rationality" stands prominent in our minds, in distinguishing Man from other Animals, we call this, the " Difference," and a part of the " Essence" of the term
the notion
*' risibility" be an attribute which does not less really So, the primary and prominent distinction in our belong to Man. minds of a Triangle from other plane rectilineal Figures, is its having three sides though the equality of its three angles to two right angles, be, in reality, no less essential to a triangle. But that this last is the fact, is demonstrated to the learner not till long after he is supposed to have become familiar with thp notion
;

Man; though

of a Triangle.

Hence,
that
in.
is

in different sciences or arts, different attributes are fixed

on, as essentially characterising each species, according as this or

the most important in reference to the matter we are engaged In Navigation, for instance, the polarity of the ]\Iagnet is the essential quality since if there could be any other substance which could possess this, without attracting iron, it would answer the same purpose but to those manufacturers who employ Magnets for the purpose of more expeditiously picking up small bits of iron, and for shielding their faces from the noxious steel-dust, in the grinding of needles, the attracting power of the Magnet is the essential
; :

point.

Under the head of Property,

be seen

logicians have enumerated, as

may

in the preceding table, not only such as are strictly called

Properties, as belonging each to the whole Species of which it is predicated, and to that alone, but also, such as belong to the whole Species, and to others besides in other words. Properties which
;

are universal, but not peculiar; as ** to breathe air" belongs to every man; but not to man alone and it is, therefore, strictly speaking, not so much a Property of the Species " man," as of the higher,
;

{i.e.

more comprehensive,) Species, which

is

the Genus of that, viz,

of "land-animal."
property.

And

it

is this

that logicians

mean by ^e/imcPecniiar
^*'*'^'^'^"**

Other Properties, as some logicians call them, are peculiar to a do not belong to the whole of it e.g. man alone can be a poet, but it is not every man that is so. These, however, are more commonly and more properly reckoned as accidents. Some have also added a fourth kind of Property viz. that which is pecuhar to a Species, and belongs to every Individual of it, but not at every time. But this is, in fact, a contradiction since whatever does not always belong to a Species, does not belong to it universally. It is through the ambiguity of words that they have fallen into this confusion of thought; e.g. the example commonly given is, *'homini canescere;" *'to become grey" being, they say, (though it is not) peculiar to man, and belonging to every individual, t^ugh not always, but only in old age, (fee. Now, if by " canescere"
species, but
;
;

"
;

88

SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP.

I.

[Book

II.

be meant tlie very state of becoming grey, this manifestly does not belong to every man if again it be meant to signify the liability to become grey at some time or other, this does belong always to man. And the same in other instances. Indeed the very Proprium fixed on by Aldrich, "risibility," is nearly parallel to the above. Man is ** always capable of laughing;'' but he is not *' capable of laughing
:

always.'"
Accidents
separa
le

inseparable,

most properly called an "Accident," which may be same ^s, for a man to be " walking,'' or a ** native of Paris." Of these two examples, the former is what logicians call a separable Accident, because it may be separated from the individual: {e.g. he may sit down;) the latter is an inseparable Accident, being not separable from the individual, {i.e. he who is a native of Paris can never be

That

is

^i^gent or present, the essence of the Species continuing the

the individual," I say, because every accideiit ^"^ species, else it would be a property. This seems to me a clearer and more correct description of the two kinds of Accident than the one given by Aldrich vi%. that a Separable-Accident may be actually separated, and an Inseparable, only in thought, " ut Mantuanum esse, a Virgilio." For surely " to

otherwise;)

"from

must be separable from the

be the author of the ^Eneid" was another Inseparable- Accident of the same individual; "to be a Roman citizen" another; and "to live in the days of Augustus" another; now can we in thougM separate all these things from the essence of that individual To We can do so would be to form the idea of a different individual. indeed conceive a man, and one who might chance to bear the name of Virgil, without any of these Accidents but then it would plainly But Virgil, whether sitting or standing, <fcc. not be the same man. we regard as the same man; the abstract notion which we have formed of that individual being unaltered by the absence or presence
.<*

Predicabies

(See above, 2.) of these separable accidents. Let it here be observed, that both the general name " Predicable,

SiedL^^^*^

and each of the

are relative;
i.e.

classes of Predicabies, {vi%. Genus, Species, &c.)

any term is, or be specified of what it is to be predicated: e.g. the term "red" would be considered a genus, it might be regarded relation to the terms " pink," " scarlet," <fec. as a property of as the differentia, in relation to "red rose;" "blood," as an accident of "a house," &c. And in all cases accordingly, the Diff'erences or Properties of any lower species will E.G, be Accidents in reference to the class they come under.
whaJt predicable

we cannot say
all,

whether

it is

any at

unless

it

In the Portuguese language there are estar, both answering to the English "to be;" and foreigners, I have been told, are often much perplexed about the proper use of each. I soon found, however, that the rule is a logical one, easily remembersd
7

two words, " ser" and "

"estar" furnishes the copula when the predicate is a separable-accident, and

*' ser" in a^i of^er cases. E.G." Estar '\n Inghilterra" is "to be in England;" " Ser Inglez" is " to be an Englishman ;" *' Qu^m e?" " who is he ?" " Quern es^a la r ' '' who is there r' &c.

Chap. V.
**

5.]

SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP.
**

I.

89

malleability"
it is
it,

but
of

is an accident" in reference to the term "metal;" a "property" of gold and most other metals ; as the absence ^brittleness, is of Antimony and Arsenic, and several others,

formerly called Semimetals.

And universally, it is to be steadily kept in mind, that no A common. common-terms" have, as the names of Individuals [" singular- rfame'of one teiins"] have, any real thing existing in nature corresponding to"^^*^^"S' each of them,^ but that each of them is merely a sign denoting a certain inadequate notion which our minds have formed of an Individual, and which, consequently, not including the notion of "individuality" \iiumericcd-\m\tj^ nor any thing wherein that indi*'

vidual differs from certain others,

or any of them.

is

applicable equally well to

all,

Thus " man" denotes no

real thing (as the sect of

any man, viewed

the Realists maintained) distinct from each individual, but merely inadequately, i.e. so as to omit, and abstract from, all that is peculiar to each individual ; by which means the term becomes applicable alike to any one of several individuals, or (in the
plural) to several together.

The unity [s-mgleriess] or sameness of what is denoted by a common- unity of a term, does not, as in the case of a singular-term, consist in the object S^beiongs itself being (in the primary sense) one and the same,^^ but in the fo *f^^^^j^'[ oneness of the Sign itself which is like a Stamp (for marking bales of goods, or cattle,) that impresses on each a similar mark; called, And just thence, in the secondary sense, one and the same mark. such a stamp, to the mind, is a Common-term ; which being, itself, one, conveys to each of an indefinite number of minds an impression precisely similar, and thence called in the transferred sense, one and the same Idea. And we arbitrarily fix on the circumstance which we in each instance choose to abstract and consider separately, disregarding all the rest so that the same individual may thus be referred to any of
;

several different Species,

as suits our purpose.

his cattle with his

and the same Species, to several Genera, it suits the Farmer's purpose to class ploughs, carts, and other possessions, under the
Thus,

Different
dasslfica*^"'

name them

of "stoc^;" the Naturalist, suitably to Azs purpose, classes as *^ quadrupeds,'" which term would include wolves, deer,

&c., which to the farmer would be a most improper classification: the Commissary, again, would class them with corn, cheese, fish, &c., as ''provision;'' that which is most essential in one view, being subordinate in another.

5.

An hulividuol Division; which

is

is

so called because it is incapable of logical a metaphorical expression, to signify " the

Division,

53 TflSe T/, as Aristotle expresses it ; though he has been represented aa the ch-impion of the opposite opinion vide Catag. o. 3. > See Book IV. Chap. V. 2. and Append. Art. " Same."
:

'

90

SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP.

I.

[Book

II.

distinct [i.e. separate] enumeration of several things signified by one common name." This operation is directly opposite to generalization, (which is performed by means of " Abstraction ;") for as, in that, you lay

to call

Loiricai

metapiiori-

^^n^-i

by which several tilings are distinguished, so as by one common name, so, in Division, you add on the Differences, so as to enumerate them by their several distinct names. Thus, " mineral" is said to be divided into " stones, metals," &c.; and metals again into " gold, iron," (fee; and these are called the Parts [or members] of the division. "Division," in its primary sense, means separating from each otlicr (either actually, or in enumeration) the parts of which some as when you divide " an really-existing single object consists animal" (that is, any single animal) into its several members or
aside the differences

them

all

again, into
so,

its

"bones, muscles, nerves, blood-vessels," &c.

And

with any single Vegetable, &c. of the parts into which you thus "physically" (as it is called) divide " an animal," is strictly and properly a " part," and is really less than the whole for you could not say of a bone, for instance, or of a limb, that it is " an Animal." But when you " divide" in the secondary sense of the word (or, " Animal," that is, the Genus as it is called, " metaphysically") ** Animal," into Beast, Bird, Fish, Reptile, Insect, &c. each of the parts [or " members"] is metaphorically called a " part," and is, in another sense, more than the whole [the Genus] that is thus divided. For you may say of a Beast or Bird that it is an " Animal and the term " Beast" implies not only the term " Animal," but something more besides; namely, whatever "Difference" chara/i' terizes " Beast," and separates it from " Bird," " Fish," &c. And so also any Singular-term [denoting one individual] implies not only the whole of what is understood by the Species it belongs namely, whatever distinguishes that single object to, but also more from others of the same Species as " London" implies all that is denoted by the term " City," and also all that distinguishes that

Now, each

; '

individual-city.

we

The " parts" ["members"] in that figurative sense with which are now occupied, are each of them less than the wJiole, in another
;

sense that is, Singular-term "

less

of less

comjDreliensive

signification.

Thus,

the
is

Romulus" embracing only an

individual-king,

Species "King;" and that, again, less extensive than the Genus " Magistrate," &c. " /^dividual" then is so called from its being incapable of
extensive than the

An

being (in this figurative sense) divided. And though the two senses of the word " Division" are easily distinguishable when explained, it is so commonly employed in each sense, that through inattention, confusion often ensues.

We

speak as famiharly of the " division" of Mankind into the


Chap. V.
5.]

SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP.
*'

I.

91

Europeans, Tartars, Hindoos, Negroes," <fec. as of the *' division" of the Earth into " Europe, Asia, Africa," (fee. though *' the Earth" [or "the World"] is a Singular-term, and And it is plain we could not denotes what we call one individual. say of Europe, for instance, or of Asia, that it is " a World." But we can predicate " Man" of every individual European, Hindoo, &,c.
several races of

here observe that there is a common colloquial incorrectness the liability to confusion) in the use of the word " division," in each of these cases, to denote one of the ^' parts,'' into Thus you will sometimes hear a which the whole is divided. person speak of Europe as one " division" of the Earth or of such and such a " division" of an Army meaning ''portion." And so again a person will sometimes speak of " animals that belong to the feline division of the Carnivora" [flesh-eating-animals] meaning, that portion of the Class " Carnivora." It is usual when a long and complex course of Division is to be Schemes of *^*^***'^ stated to draw it out, for the sake of clearness and brevity, in a form like that of a genealogical " Tree.-^^ And by carefully examining any specimen of such a " Tree" (going over it repeatedly, and comparing each portion of it with the explanations above given) you will be able perfectly to fix in your mind the technical terms
(increasing
; :

And

we have been
Take

explaining.

for instance as a

" Summum-genus" the mathematical-term

"
Mixed Figure and Curv.)

Plane-superiicial-figure"

Rectilinear

Curvilinear

(of Rect.

Figure
I

Figure
I

Triangle; Quadrilateral,

<fec.

Circle; Ellipse,

<fec.

himself.

Tree of division" the Student may easily fill up for the employment of such a form will be found exceedingly useful in obtaining clear views in any study you are engaged in. For instance, in the one we have been now occupied with, take for a Summum-Genus, ''Expression;" {i.e. " expression-in-

Such a

**

And

language" of any sucn :nental-operatio:i as those formerly noticed)

you may then

exhibit, thus, the

divisio-:-

and subdivision of
3

See the Division of Fallacies, Book III.

4,

92

SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP.

I.

IBOOK

II.

1
'So
<^
fcJD

^ '3

-<
rt

G'^ CO

to
i-

'S)"

^'^
2 'S
CO

-M
J3

Ph

p-(

n3

J2
CO
<

CUAP. V.

5 5.]

SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP.
them short of
all,

I.

93
each of the have a 2d. All the Parts
:

The

rules orclmarily given for Division are three

1st.

Ordinary

Parts, or any of

must contain

less

(i.e.

dSon!

narrower signification) than the thing divided. together must be exactly equal to the thing divided therefore we must be careful to ascertain that the summum genus may be predicated of every term placed under it, and of nothing else. 3d. The Parts or Members must be opjJOsecl [contradistinguished] i.e. must not be contained in one another: e.g. if you were to divide "book" into "poetical, historical, folio, quarto, french, latin," <fcc. the members would be contained in each other; for a french book may be a quarto, or octavo, and a quarto, french, english, <fec. &:c. You must be careful, therefore, to keep in mind the principle of division with which you set out: e.g. whether you begin dividing books according to their matter, their language, or their size, <fec. all these being so many cross-divisions. And when any thing is capable (as c^rossin the above instance) of being divided in several different ways, we are not to reckon one of these as the true, or real, or rigJd one, without specifying what the object is which we have in view: for one mode of dividing may be the most suitable for one purpose, and another for another as e.g. one of the above modes of dividing books would be the most suitable to a bookbinder ; another in a philosophical, and the other in a philological view. It is a useful practical rule, whenever you find a discussion of any subject very perplexing, and seemingly confused, to examine whether some " Cross-division" has not crept in unobserved. For this is very apt to take place; (though of course such a glaiing instance as that in th(i above example could not occur in practice) and there is no more fruitful source of indistinctness and confusion of thought. When you have occasion to divide any thing in several different ways, that is, " on several principles-of-division" you should take care to state distinctly how many divisions you are making, and on what principle each proceeds. For instance, in the "Tree" above given, it is stated, that "Propositions" are divided in different ways, " according to' this and that, &lc. And thus the perplexity of Cross-division is avoided. Two other rules in addition to those above given, are needful to Additional ^^^^^^^ be kept in mind viz. 4thly, Division should not be *' arbitrary;'" that is, its ]\Iembers should be distinguished from each other by "Differences" either expressed or readily understood; instead of being set apart from each other at random, or without any sufficient ground. For instance, if any one should divide "coins" into "goldcoins," " silver," and " copper," the ground of this distinction woidd be intelligible but if he should, in proceeding to subdivide silvercoin, distinguish as two branches, on the one side, " shillings," and on the other "all silver-coins except shillings," this would be an arbitrary Division. 5thly, Division should be clearly arranged as to its Members
; :


94

SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP.

I.

[Book

II.

that is, there should be as much subdivision as the occasion may require; and not a mere catalogue of the " lowest-species," omitting
['' suhaltern"'\ between these and the "highestnor again an intermixture of the *' subaltern," and "lowestspecies," so as to have, in any two branches of the division. Species contradistinguished and placed opposite, of which the one ought naturally to be placed higher up [nearer the " Summum"] and the other, lower down in the Tree. For instance, to divide "plane-figure" at once, into "equilateraltriangles, squares, circles, ellipses," &c., or again " vegetable," into

intermediate classes

genus

:"

**Elms, pear-trees, turnips, mushrooms," <kc., or again to divide "Animal" into "Birds, Fishes, Reptiles, Horses, Lions," &c. would be a transgression of this rule. And observe that, (as has been formerly remarked) although such glaidng cases as are given by way of examples could not occur in practice, errors precisely corresponding to them, may, and often do occur; and produce much confusion of thought and error.

6.
Denfinition.

Essential
accidental
definitions.

another metaphorical word, which literally signifies, "laying down a boundary;" and is used in Logic to signify "an expression which explains any term, so as to separate it from every thing else," as a boundary separates fields. In reference to the several modes adopted for furnishing such explanation. Logicians distinguish [divide] Definitions into essential
Definition
is

^^^ accidental. They call that an " es5e72^Z(2Z-definition" which states what are regarded as the " constituent parts of the essence" of that which is to be defined; and an acac?e?2/aZ-definition" \^oy Description^ one which lays down what are regarded as "circumstances belonging
to it;" viz. Properties or Accidents; such as causes, effects,
<fec.

Accidents in the narrowest sense, (as defined above, 3) cannot, it is plain, be employed in a Description [accidental-definition] of any Species ; since no Accident (in that sense) can belong to the whole of a Species, nor consequently furnish an adequate .Definition
thereof.
DefinitioTi of iOQlVluUfilS

Jn the "description" of an individual, on the contrary, we employ, ' V not Pro2oerties, (which as they do belong to the whole of a Species, cannot serve to distinguish one individual of that Species from another) but Accidents generally, inseparable-accidents in con1.

junction with the Species: as " Philip was a king of Macedon,

who

subdued Greece;" "Britain

Physical

is

an Island, situated so and so," &e.

is

The
&m\

Essential-definition again

divided

mio 2^hysical [natural]

being

dSfinUionl

logicol [metaphysical] definition: the physical-definition

hull, masts,

made by an enumeration
such as are the

of such parts as are actually separable,

&c. of a "Ship;"

the root, trunk,

Chap. V.

6.]

SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP.
"Tree;"

I.

95

brandies, barL:, 6lc. of a Copula of a " Proposition."

the Subject, Predicate, and

The *' Zo^/caZ-definition " consists of the *' Genus " and " Difference ;" which are called by some writers the *' metaphysical " [ideal] parts as being not two real parts into which an imiivklual-ohject can (as in the former case) be actually divided, but only different views taken [notions formed] of a class of objects, by one mind.
;

Geniis.

E.G.

"A

Proposition " would be defined, logically, *'a sentence

G.
:

Difference.

affirming-or-denying "
D.
tion for iron ;"

"Magnet" "an

Iron-ore having attrac-

a " Square," a " Rectangle " [right-angled paralleloD.

gram] having equal

Definitions

sides.

again have been divided by Logicians into the Nominal Nominal, w^hich explains merely the meaning of tlie term defined ^^ definition*. and Real, which explains the nature of the tiling signified by that term. This division is evidently according to the object designed to he effected by each Definition: the former division, on the other hand into Accidental, Physical, and Logical being a division according ,to the means employed by each to effect its object. These therefore are evidently two "cross-divisions;"^^ a circumstance which has been generally overlooked by Logical writers, who have thus intro;

duced confusion and perplexity.

whether

And here the question may naturally occur to the reader, whether there be properly any distinction between nominal and reaZ-definition ;
;

the meaning of a Common-term, and the nature of the thing signified by it, are not one and the same since the object of our thoughts when we employ a Common-term, is not any such

" abstract idea" as some talk of, but the Term itselfi, regarded as a Sign ka. as was formerly explained. And in truth there are many cases in which there does exist this exact coincidence between the meaning of the term and the nature of the thing so that the same definition which would be rightly styled "nominal,'' as explaining nothing beyond the exact meaning of the term, might also be considered as entitled to be called a
;

ii Aldrich, having given as an instance of a Nominal Definition the absurd one of " homo, qui ex humo," has led some to conclude that the Nominal definition must be founded on the eti/molony; or at least that such was his meaning. But that it was not, is sufficiently plam from the circumstance that Wallis (.from whose

work
it

his

is

almost entirely abridged)

expressly says the contrary.

Be

this as

may, however, it is plain that the etymology of a term has nothing to do wi.h any logical consideration of it. bee 3,

Book
<^

III.
.

See preceding

96
'*

SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP.

I.

[Hooi; rr.

Technical
terms.

real-definition," as implying every attribute that can belong to the Such are all definitions of mathematical and thing signified.

logical terms,
e.g.

and other technical terms of Science. There cannot be any property of a "Circle," or a ** Square," that is not

Logic is concerned with

Nominal
definitions alone.

Some of these properties implied in the definitions of those terms. not indeed at once occur to a beginner in Mathematics ; and others, not even to one somewhat further advanced: but they must and it would be reckoned an all be implied in the definitions: impropriety to add e.g. to the definition of a Square that it is bisected by its diagonal: because though this might not at once occur to a beginner, and needs to be demonstrated, it is demonstrated yr07?^ the definition: to speak of "a Square divided by its diagonal into unmeaning, inconceivable. unequal parts," would be absurd, And the same, with other mathematical terms. But it is otherwise with terms of a difi'erent character, which are There may be attributes the names of actually existing substances. of the thing signified that are not at all implied in the signification of the term. E.G. The term ** laurel- water " is used by us in the same sense as by our ancestors, to signify ** a liquor distilled from laurel-leaves;" though the poisonous quality of it was unknown a And so also many discoveries have been made, and century ago. others probably will be made, respecting several metals, heavenlybodies, &c. though the words "iron," "gold," "star," are employed in the same sense as formerly ; a sense which does not imply the properties that have been discovered. And any Definition which goes beyond a "nominal-definition," i.e. which explains any thing more of the nature of the thing than is implied in the name, may be regarded, strictly speaking, as, so far, a "real-definition." The very word " Definition" however is not usually employed in this sense; but rather, *^ Description.''^ Logic is concerned with ^ommci^-definition alone with a view to guard against ambiguity in the use of terms. ^^ To ascertain fully the various properties of animals and vegetables, of metals, earths, &c. to Chemistry ; and belongs to Physiology so, with other things. It is to be observed that the word " Definition " is sometimes used to denote the wlwle sentence, in which the term defined is conjoined with the explanation given of it as when we say, a triangle is a three-sided figure " sometimes it is used to signify merely thai which gives the explanation; as when we say "three-sided figure" is the

may

'

c?e/^i^io7i of
3

" triangle."
should however carefully guard against the common mistake, of supposing that any one who applies a term correctly in several instances, must of course

And for this purpose it will often that a dpHnition will be sufficient in reference to tlie ejiisting occasion, even thouf^h it may fall short of expressing all that is implied by the term. See Book III. lU.
happen

We

understand fully

its

signitication.

CiiAP. V.

6.1

SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP.

I.

97

In the former case, the sentence has the form of a Proposition; hut what it is that such a proposition asserts, is not always imphed in the mere expression, hut is left to he collected from the supposed
intention of the speaker.
"bird

Phoenix is a Real existerice is not necessarily implied: e.g. fahled to live a thousand years," &c. implies merely that this not asserted is the meaning in which the word Phoenix has been used ; not that definition,

Real

"A

any such bird ever did or could exist. Sometimes again it is not implied even that the
ordinary, sense of the term
is is

given

hut merely that such

it.

universal, or the such as corresponds to the definition the sense in which the author intends

to employ

alive instead of the indicative

sometimes stated in the imper- imperative form as is frequently done in the definitions* works of Aristotle, who is accustomed thus to waive, in some cases, all questions as to the ordinary employment of a term by others Baying "Xei so and so be taken to signify this or that." In mathematical and other scientific definitions, whether expressed in the form of Propositions, or in the Imperative (or, as it might be called. Postulate) form, it is understood to be implied that the definition involves no self-contradiction, .no absurdity but that the thing denoted by the term defined whether believed actually to exist or not^ is conceivable, and may, not irrationally, be made a subject of thought. B.G. Though a "mathematical-line" cannot be conceived to be actually drawn on paper, though nothing could be exhibited to the senses as having length and 7io breadth, every one can make the distance e.g. between two towns, a separate subject of his thoughts, having his mind wholly withdrawn from the width
in this case, the definition is
;

And

of the road.

mathematical Definition accordingly may be considered as involving a Postulate; and it would be very easy to express any of them in the form of Postulates. E.G. " Let a plane-figure bounded by a curve-line everywhere equidistant from a certain point within it, be called a Circle ;" this would be understood to imply
that such a figure is conceivable, and that the writer intended to employ that term to signify such a figure which is precisely all that is meant to be asserted in the Definition of a Circle.
;

The Rules or Cautions usually laid down by Logical writers for framing a Definition, are very obvious viz. 1st. The definition must be adequate; i.e. neither too extensive nor too narrow for the thing defined e.g. to define " fish," *' an animal that lives in the water,"
:
;

K"^es fop

would be too
to define
it,

because many insects, <fcc. live in the water animal that has an air-bladder," would be too narrow; because many fish are without any. Or again, if in a definition of " Money" you should specify its being "made of metal," that would be too narrow, as excluding the shells used as money in some parts of Africa : if again you define it as an " article of value
extensive,

"an

m
it

SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP.

I.

[Book

f I.

Arbitrary
exceptions.

given in exchange for something else," that would be too midey as would include things exchanged by barter; as when a shoemaker who wants coals, makes an exchange with a collier who wants shoes. And observe, that such a defect in a Definition cannot be remedied by making an arbitrary exception; (such as was alluded to above, 5) as if for instance (and it is an instance which actually occurred) a person should give such a definition of " Capital" as should include (which he did not mean to do) " Land;" and should then propose to remedy this by defining " Capital," any " property of such and Buch a description, except Land." 2d. The Definition must be in itself plainer than the thing defined, else it would not exp)lain it: I say, ** in itself," [i.e. generally) because, to some particular person, the term defined may happen to be even more familiar and better understood, than the language of the Definition. And this rule may be considered as including that which is usually given by Logicians as a third rule viz. that a Definition should be couched in a convenient number of appropriate words (if such can be found suitable for the purpose) since figurative words (which are opposed to appropriate) are apt to produce ambiguity or indistinctness too great brevity may occasion obscurity; and too great prolixity, confusion. But this perhaps is rather an admonition with respect to Style, than a strictly logical rule nor can we accordingly determine with precision, in each case, whether it has been complied with or not there is no drawing the line between ** Nor would a definition too long" and " too concise," &c. unnecessarily prolix be censured a^ incorrect, but as inelegant,
,

Tantology.

inconvenient, &,c. If however, a definition be chargeable with Tautology, (which is a distinct fault from prolixity or verbosity) it may justly be called incorrect,

two rules. Tautology much, not in mere words, but in sense; yet not so as too much to narrow the definition (in opposition to Rule 1.) by excluding some things which belong to the class of the thing defined but only, so as to state something which has been already implied. Thus, to define a Parallelogram " a four-sided figure whose opposite sides are parallel and equal,'' would be tautological because, though it is true that such a figure, and such
oft'ending against the first
consistij

though without
3n

inserting too

a parallelogram, the equality of the sides is implied in their Now the insertion of being parallel, and may be proved from it. the words ** and equal," leaves, and indeed leads, a reader to suppose that there may be a four-sided figure whose opposite sides are Though therefore such a definition asserts parallel but not equal. nothing false, it leads to a supposition of what is false and consequently is to be regarded as an incorrect definition. The inference just mentioned, viz. : that you implied that a quadwould rangle might have its opposite sides parallel, andnot equal,
alone,
is
;

Ghaf. v.
"be
*'

5 6.]

SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP.

I.

99

drawn from such a definition, according to the principle of exceptio probat regulam," an exception proves a rule.^ The force of the maxim (which is not properly confined to the case of an

strictly so called) is this; that "the mention of any circumstance introduced into the statement either of a definition, or of a precept, law, remark, kc. is to he presumed necessary to be inserted; so that the precept, ha. would not hold good if this circumstance were absent." In short, the word " only,'' or some such expression, is supposed to be understood. If e.g. it be laid down that he who breaks into an empty house shall receive a certain punishment, it would be inferred that this punishment would not be incurred by breaking into an occupied house if it were told us that some celestial phenomenon could not be seen hy the naked eye, it would be inferred tbat it would or might be visible through a telescope : if we are told that we are not to teach doctrines unwarranted by Scripture, and which were not held hy the early Fathers, this would usually be understood to imply that any doctrine they did hold, might be taught, on their authority, even though not scriptural :^ &c.

exception,

And much is often inferred in this manner, which was by no means in the Author's mind from his having inaccurately inserted what chanced to be present to his thoughts. Thus, he who says
;

that

it is a crime for people to violate the property of a humane Landlord who lives among them, may perhaps not mean to imply that it is no crime to violate the property of an absentee-landlord, or of one who is not humane but he leaves an opening for being so understood. Thus again in saying that " an animal which breathes through gills and is scaly, is a fish," though nothing false is asserted, a presumption is afi'orded that you mean to give a definition such as would be too narroiv; in violation of Rule 1. And Tautology, as above described, is sure to mislead any one who interprets what is said, conformably to the maxim that " an
:

exception proves a rule."

it has been inferred, and not reason, that the occasional of Prayer and Thanksf^ivings which are put forth from time to time under the authority of" Orders in Council," are illegal, and at variance with the "Act of Uniformity;" inasmuch as in that Act (prefixed to our Prayer-books) not only is conformity to the Book of Common-prayer enjoined, and no authority to make alteiations or additions to the service recognised, but there is an Exception, which, it is maintained, provesthe rule : the King in Council being expressly authorized to insert and alter from time to time the " names of such of the Royal-family as are to be prayed for :" which plainly implies that no other alterations made by that authority were contempiated as allowable. See "Ap-

5*

Thus

without

Forms

peal on behalf of Church Government." Hoiilston and Co. ^'> '* The maxim of ' abundans cautela

nocet nemini' is by no means a safe one if applied without'limitation. Itissometimes imprudent (and some of our Divines have, I think, committed this imprudence) to attempt to 'make assurance doubly sure' by brinp-ing forward confirmatory reasons, which, though in themselves perlectly fair, may be interpreted unfairly, by'representing tlieai as an acknowledged indispensable foundation

; by assuming

for instance, that

an

appeal to such and such of the ancient Fathers or Councils, in confirmation of some doctrine or practice, is to be understood as an admission that it would fall to
the ground
if

not so

confirmed." iCiw^jfII. 23, note.

do/o/C%ns<, Essay

100
Acr-identai

SUPPLEMENi TO CHAP.

I.

[Book
is

II.

It often

happens that one or more of the above rules

violated

through men's proneness to introduce into their definitions, along stlnc^* mistaken for -with, or instead of, essential circumstances, such as are in the strict
I mean, that the notion they attach to each sense, accidental. term, and the explanation they would give of it, shall embrace some circumstances, generally, hut not always, connected with the thing they are speaking of ; and which might, accordingly, (by the strict account of an " Accident") be ** absent or present, the essential character of the subject remaining the same." definition framed from such circumstances, though of course incorrect, and likely at some time or other to mislead us, will not unfrequently obtain reception, from its answering the purpose of a correct one, at a particular time and place. ** For instance, the Latin word Iferidies, to denote the soutfiern quarter, is etymologically suitable (and so would a definition founded on that etymology) in our hemisphere; while in the other, it would be found just the reverse. Or if any one should define the North Pole, that which is * inclined towards the sun,' this would, /or half the year, answer the purpose of a correct definition ; and would be the opposite of the truth for the other half. " Such glaring instances as these, which are never likely to occur in practice, serve best perhaps to illustrate the character of specimen of that introduction of such mistakes as do occur. accidental circumstances which I have been describing, may be found, I think, in the language of a great number of writers, respecting Wealth and Value who have usually made Labour an Now it is true, it so essential ingredient in their definitions. happens, by the appointment of Providence, that valuable articles are in almost all instances obtained by Labour but still, this is an accidental, not an essential circumstance. If the aerolites which occasionally fall, were diamonds and pearls, and if these articles could be obtained in no other way, but were casually picked up, to the same amount as is now obtained by digging and diving, they would be of precisely the same value as now. In this, as in many other points in Political Economy, men are prone to confound cause and effect. It is not that pearls fetch a high price because men have dived for them; but on the contrary, men dive for them "^ because they fetch a high price.

W Pol. Econ. Lect. IX. pj). 251253.

; ;

BOOK

III.

OF FALLACIES.
Introduction,

Although sundry instances of Fallacies have been from time to time noticed in the foregoing Books, it will be worth while to devote a more particular attention to the subject. By a Fallacy is commonly understood, ** any unsound mode of 1 1 if J 1 XJ argumg, winch appears ^ demand our conviction, and X to to be decisive of the question in hand, when in fairness it is not." Considering the ready detection and clear exposure of Fallacies to be both more extensively important, and also more difficult, than many are aware of, I propose to take a Logical view of the subject referring the different Fallacies to the most convenient heads, and giving a scientific analysis of the procedure which takes place in each. After all, indeed, in the practical detection of each individual Fallacy, much must depend on natural and acquired acuteness nor can any rules be given, the mere learning of which will enable us to apply them with mechanical certainty and readiness : but still we shall find that to take correct general views of the subject, and to be familiarized with scientific discussions of it, will tend, above all things, to engeiider such a haUt of mind^ as will best fit us for

^.?|!"\*'^'*
<*^

Fallacy,

practice.

Indeed the case is the same with respect to Logic in general. Scarcely any one would, in ordinary practice, state to himself either his own or another's reasoning, in Syllogisms in Barbara at full length ; yet a familiarity with Logical principles tends very much (as all feel, who are really well acquainted with them) to beget a habit of clear and sound reasoning. The truth is, in this, as in many other things, there are processes going on in the mind (when we are practising any thing quite familiar to us) with such rapidity as to leave no trace in the memory ; and we often apply principles which did not, as far as we are conscious, even occur to us at the time. It would be foreign, however, to the present purpose, to investiJ"ngu"*J* gate fully the manner in which certain studies operate in remotely former ^"^^^"^ producing certain effects on the mind it is sufficient to establish the
:

fad, that habits of aud dignity of such

scientific analysis (besides

the intrinsic beauty

It is

studies) lead to practical advantage.

oa

102

OF FALLACIES.

[Book

III.

Logical principles therefore that I propose to discuss the subject of and it may, indeed, seem to have been unnecessary to make any apology for so doing, after what has been formerly said, but that the generality of Logical generally, in defence of Logic writers have usually followed so opposite a plan. Whenever they have to treat of any thing that is beyond the mere elements of Logic, they totally lay aside all reference to the principles they have been occupied in establishing and explaining, and have recourse to a loose, vague, and popular kind of language ; such as would be the best suited indeed to an exoterical discourse, but seems strangely incongruous in a professed Logical treatise. What should we think of a Geometrical writer, who, after having gone through tne Elements, with strict definitions and demonstrations, should, on proceeding to Mechanics, totally lay aside all reference to all use of technical terms, scientific principles, and treat of thesubject in undefined terms, and with probable and popular arguments ? It would be thought strange, if even a Botanist, when addressing those whom he had been instructing in the principles and the terms of his system, should totally lay these aside when he came to describe plants, and should adopt the language of the vulgar. Surely it affords but too much plausibility to the cavils of those who scoff at Logic altogether, that the very writers who profess to teach it should never themselves make any application of, or reference to, its principles, on those very occasions, when, and when only, such application and reference are to be expected. If the principles of any system are well laid down, if its technical language is judiciously framed, then, surely, those principles and that language will afford (for those who have once thoroughly learned them) the best, the most clear, simple, and concise method of treating any subject connected with that system. Yet even winters generally acute, in treating of the Dilemma and of the Fallacies, have very much forgotten the Logician, and assumed a loose and rhetorical style of writing, without making any application of the principles they had formerly laid down, but, on the contrary, sometimes departing widely from them.^ The most experienced teachers, when addressing those who are familiar with the elementary principles of Logic, think it requisite, not indeed to lead them, on each occasion, through the whole detail of those principles, when the process is quite obvious, but always to put them on the road, as it were, to those principles, that they may plainly see their own way to the end, and take a scientific
Fallacies
; ;

1 Aldrich (and the same may be said of several other writers) is far more confused in his discussion of Fallacies than in any other part of his treatise; of which this one instance may serve: after having distinguished Fallacies into those in the ewpressiotit and those in the matter (" in

dictione," and "extra dictionem,") he observes of one or two of these last, that they are not properly called Fallacies, as not being Syllogisms faulty in form; (Syllogisimi forma peccantes:") as if any one, that was such, could be " Fallacia extra dictionem."


Intro.]

OF FALLACIES.
the same manner

103
as matliematlcal writers

riew of tlie siiLject: in avoid indeed the occasional tediousness of going all through a very simple demonstration, which the learner, if he will, may easily supply hut yet always speak in strict mathematical language, and with reference to mathematical principles, though they do not I would not profess, therefore, always state them at full length. any more than they do, to write (on subjects connected with the science) in a language intelligible to those who are ignorant of its first rudiments. To do so, indeed, would imply that one was not taking a scientific view of the subject, nor availing one's-self of the principles that had been established, and the accm-ate and concise technical language that had been framed. The rules already given enable us to develop the principles on which all reasoning is conducted, whatever be the Subject-matter of it, and to ascertain the validity or fallaciousness of any apparent argument, as far as the form of expression is concerned that being alone the proper province of Logic. But it is evident that we may nevertheless remain liable to be deceived or perplexed in Argument by the assumption oi false or
; ;

Mistakes as
of Logic

doubtful Premises, or by the employment of indistinct or ambiguous Terms; and, accordingly, many Logical writers, wishing to make their systems appear as perfect as possible, have undertaken to give rules " for attaining clear ideas," and for "guiding the judgment;" and fancying or professing themselves successful in this, have consistently enough denominated Logic, the " Art of using the Reason;" which in truth it would be, and would nearly supersede all other studies, if it could of itself ascertain the meaning of every Term, and the truth or falsity of every Proposition; in the same manner as it actually can, the validity of every Argument, And they have been led into this, partly by the consideration that Logic is concerned about the *' three Operations" of the mind simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reasoning; not observing that it is not equally concerned about all the last Operation being alone its appropriate province ; and the rest being treated of only in reference to that.
:

fallen

justly due to such pretensions has most unjustly on the Science itself; much in the same manner as Chemistry was brought into disrepute among the unthinking, by the extravagant pretensions of the Alchymists. And those Logical writers have been censured, not (as they should have been) for making such professions, but for not fulfilling them. It has been objected, especially, that the rules of Logic leave us still at a loss as to the most important and difficult point in reasoning viz. the ascertaining the sense of the terms employed, and removing their ambiguity: a complaint resembling that made (according to a story told by Warburton,^ and before alluded to) by a man who found fault
;

The contempt

Discredit

uporfLogic

2 In his Div. Leg.

104

OF FALLACIES.

[Book

III.

with all the reading-glasses presented to him by the shopkeeper In the present the fact being that he had never learnt to read. case, the complaint is the more unreasonable, inasmuch as there neither is, nor ever can 2^osslUy he, any such system devised as will effect the proposed object of clearing up the ambiguity of Terms. It is, however, no small advantage, that the rules of Logic, though they cannot, alone, ascertain and clear up ambiguity in any Term, yet do point out in which Term of an argument it is directing our attention to the 7niddle-Term, as to be sought for the one on the ambiguity of which a Fallacy is likely to be built. It will be useful, however, to class and describe the different and also the various kinds of ambiguity which are to be met with ways in which the insertion of false, or, at least, unduly assumed. And though the Premises, is most likely to elude observation. remarks which will be offered on these points may not be considered as strictly forming a part of Logic, they cannot be thought out of place, when it is considered how essentially they are connected with the application of it.
: ;

1.
Division of FaUacies.

words (IN DICTIONE,) ^^^ ^^^^^ .^ ^^^ MATTER (EXTRA DICTIONEM) has not been, by any writers hitherto, grounded on any distinct principle: at least, not on any that they have themselves adhered to. The confounding together, however, of these two classes is highly

The division

of Fallacies into those in the

being obviously detrimental to all clear notions concerning Logic allied to the prevailing erroneous views which make Logic the art of employing the intellectual faculties in general, having the discovery of truth for its object, and all kinds of knowledge for its proper subject-matter ; with all that train of vague and groundless speculations which have led to such interminable confusion and mistakes, and afforded a pretext for such clamorous censures. It is important, therefore, that rules should be given for a division of Fallacies into Logical and Non-logical, on such a prin;

ciple as shall

keep clear of

all this indistinctness

and perplexity.

If any one should object, that the division about to be adopted

is in

some degree arbitrary, placing under the one head. Fallacies which many might be disposed to place under the other, let him

consider not only the indistinctness of all former divisions, but the utter impossibility of framing any that shall be completely secure from the objection urged, in a case where men have formed such various and vague notions from the very want of some clear principle of division. Nay, from the elliptical form in which all reasoning is usually expressed, and the peculiarly involved and oblique form in which Fallacy is for the most part conveyed, it must of course be often a matter of doubt, or rather, of arbitrary choice, not only
to

which genus each kind of fallacy should be referred, but even to

i 2.1

OF FALLACIES.

105
indetermicharacter of
^^'ai^acies.

For, since, in any to refer any one individuat Fallacy. Argument, one Premiss is usually suppressed, it frequently happens,

which kind

in the case of a Fallacy, that the hearers are left to the alternative

of supplying either a Premiss which is not true, or else, one which E.G. If a man expatiates on the does not prove the Conclusion. distress of the country, and thence argues that the government is tyrannical, we must suppose him to assume either that " every
distressed country is under a tyranny," which is a manifest falsehood, or, merely that " every country under a tyranny is distressed," which, however true, proves nothing, the Middle-term heing undistributed. Now, in the former case, the Fallacy would he referred to the head of *' extra dictionem ;" in the latter to that of "in dictione." Which are we to suppose the speaker meant us Surely just whichever each of his hearers might to understand ? happen to prefer some might assent to the false Premiss others, allow the unsound Syllogism to the Sophist himself it is indifferent, as long as they can hut he brought to admit the Conclusion. Without pretending, then, to conform to every one's mode of speaking on the subject, or to lay down rules which shall be in themselves (without any call for labour or skill in the person who
:

employs them) readily applicable to, and decisive on, each individual case, I shall propose a division which is at least perfectly clear in its main principle, and coincides, perhaps, as nearly as possible, with the established notions of Logicians on the subject.
_2.
n/^t follow the Conclusion does not follow from the Premises, it is manifest that the fault is in the Beasoning, and in that alone; these, therefore, we call Logical Fallacies,* as being properly, violations of those rules of Reasoning wliich it is the

In every Fallacy, the Conclusion either does, or does

the Premises.

from

Where

Lo?!cai *"^'* '^'

province of Logic to lay down.

Of

these, however, one kind are

their fallaciousness

regard to Undistributed Middle; 2d. Illicit Process; 3d. Negative Premises, or Affirmative Conclusion from a Negative Premiss, and vice versa: to which may be added 4th. those which have palpably {i.e. expressed) more than three Terms. The other kind may be most properly called semi-logical; viz. all the cases of ambiguous middle-Term except its non-distribution: for though in such cases the conclusion does not follow, and though the rules of Logic show that it does not, as soon as the ambiguity of the middle-Term is ascertahied, yet the discovery and ascertainment of this ambiguity requires attention to the soise of tlie Term, and
3 In the samfe

more purely Logical, as exhibiting by the bare form of the expression, without any the meaning of the Terms: to which class belong: 1st.

Semi-Loei^^

manner

as

we

call that

a criminal court in which crimes are judged.

106

OP FALLACIES.
Jioiv to

[Book

III.

knowledge of the Subject-matter;

not

so that here, Logic teaches us

to

find the Fallacy, but only where

it

search for

it,

and on

what

principles to

subject of bitter complaint against presupposes the most difficult point to be already accomphshed, viz. the sense of the Terms to be ascertained. similar objection might be urged against every other art in existence; e.g. against Agriculture, that all the precepts for tlie cultivation of land presuppose the possession of a farm or against Perspective, that its rules are useless to a blhid man. The objection is indeed peculiarly absurd when urged against Logic, because the object which it is blamed for not accomplishing cannot possibly be within the province of any ojie art whatever. Is it indeed possible or conceivable that there should be any method, science, or system, that should enable one to know the full and exact meaning of every term in existence? The utmost that can be done is to give some general rules that may assist us in this work; which is done in the first two chapters of Book IL* ramiliarity Nothing perhaps tends more to conceal from men their imperfect with a term conception of the meaning of a term, than the circumstance of their distinct from clear being able fully to comprehend a process of reasoning in wliich it is apprehension of its involved, M^ithout attaching any distinct meaning at all to that term; meaning. as is evident when Y Z are used to stand for Terms, in a regular Syllogism. Thus a man may be familiarized wdth a term, and never find himself at a loss from not comprehending it from which he will be very likely to infer that he does comprehend it, when perhaps he does not, but employs it vaguely and incorrectly; which leads to fallacious Reasoning and confusion. It must be owned, however, that many Logical writers have, in great measure, brought on themselves the reproach in question, by calling Logic '* the right use of Reason," laying down *' rules for gaining clear ideas," and such-like d'hu^aviix, as Aristotle calls it; [Jxliet. Book I. Chap. II.)

Accordingly
it

condemn it. has been made a

Logic, that

3.
Material
Fallacies.

The remaining

class [viz.

where the Conclusion does follow from

:

the Premises) may be called the Material, or Non-logical Fallacies of these there are two kinds ;^ 1st. when the Premises are such as ought not to have been assumed; 2d. when the conclusion is not the one required, but irrelevant; which Fallacy is commonly called 'Hgnoratio denchi,'' because your Argument is not the **elenchus " [i.e. proof of the contradictory) of your opponent's assertion, which it should be; but proves, instead of that, some other proposition resembling it.
* The very author of the object" on says, " This (the comprehension of the meaning of g:eneral lerms) is a study

sity."
II.
s.

D. Stewart, Phil. Vol.

2.
it is

II.

Chap.

which every individual must carry on for himself; and of which no rules of Logic (how useful soever they may he in directing our labours) can supersede the neces-

manifest that the fault, if there be any, must be either 1st. in the Premises, or 2dly. in the Conclusion^ or 3dly. in the Connexion between them.

For


5 4.]

OF FALLACIES.

107

Hence, since Logic defines what Contradiction is, some may choose rather to range this with the Logical Fallacies, as it seems, so far, to come mider the jurisdiction of that Art. Nevertheless, it is perhaps better to adhere to the original division, both on account of its clearness, and also because few would be inclined to apply to the Fallacy in question the accusation of being inconclusive, and consequently "illogical" reasoning; besides which, it seems an artificial and circuitous way of speaking, to suppose in all cases an opponent and a contradiction; the simple statement of the matter being this, I am required, by the circumstances of the case, (no matter why) to prove a certain Conclusion I prove, not that, but one which is likely to be mistaken for it;^in this lies the Fallacy. It might be desirable therefore to lay aside the name of "ignoratio If^^^^y^*^ elenchi,'^ but that it is so generally adopted as to require some mention to be made of it. The other kind of Fallacies in the Matter will comprehend (as far as the vague and obscure language of Logical writers will allow us to conjecture) the fallacy of ''nx)n causa Non causa causa. pro causa,'' and that of " petitio jyrincijm.'' Of these, the former is ^^ by them distinguished into " a non vera pro vera,'' and " a non tali pro tali;'^ this last would appear to mean arguing from a case nx)t parallel as if it were so; which, in Logical language, is, having the suppressed Premiss false; for it is in that the parallelism is affirmed; and the '' non vera pro vera" will in like manner signify the expressed Premiss being false; so that this Fallacy will turn out to be, in plain terms, neither more nor less than falsity (or unfair assumption) of a
;

Premiss. The remaining kind, " petitio prindpii," ["begging the question,"] Begging the ^^"* takes place when one of the Premises (whether true or false) is either ^"^^ plainly equivalent to the conclusion, or depends on that for its own reception. I have said " one of the Premises," because in all correct reasoning the two Premises taken together must imply and virtually assert the conclusion. It is not possible, however, to draw a precise line, generally, between this Fallacy and fair argument; since, to one person, that might be fair reasoning, which would be, to another, "begging the question;" inasmuch as, to the one, the Premiss might be more evident than the Conclusion; while, by the other, it would not be admitted, except as a consequence of the admission of the conclusion. The most plausible form of this Fallacy is arguing Arguing ia in a circle; and the greater the circle the harder to detect.

4.
There is no Fallacy that may not properly be included under some of the foregoing heads those which in the Logical treatises are separately enumerated, and contradistinguished from these, "being in reality instances of them, and therefore more properly enumerated in the subdivision thereof; as in the scheme annexed:
:

108

OF FALLACIES.

[Book IIL

Si
^

( 5,]

OF FALLACIES.
5.

10^

On each of the Fallacies which have heen thus enumerated and hut distinguished, I propose to offer some more particular remarks hefore I proceed to this, it will he proper to premise two general
;

ohservations, 1st. on the importance, and 2d. the difficulty, of detectBoth have heen already shghtly ing and describing Fallacies.

alluded to

more

fully
It

1st.

Fallacy is hy a skilful sophist

hut it is requisite that they should here he somewhat and distinctly set forth. seems hy most persons to he taken for granted that a to he dreaded merely as a weapon fashioned and wielded
;

J^.^gTectin* Fallacies.

or, if

they allow that a

man may

with honest

intentions slide into one unconsciously, in the heat of argument, still they seem to suppose that where there is no dispute, there is no

cause to dread Fallacy whereas there is much danger, even in what he called solitary reasoning, of sliding unawares into some Fallacy, hy which one may he so far deceived as even to act upon By "solitary reasoning" I mean the the conclusion thus obtained. case in which one is not seeking for arguments to prove a given question, hut labouring to elicit from one's previous stock of knowledge some useful inference.^ To select one from innumerable examples that might he cited, and of which some more will occur in the subsequent part of this essay; it is not improbable that many indiiferent sermons have heen produced by the ambiguity of the word *' plain.'' young divine perceives the truth of the maxim, that **for the lower orders one's language cannot be too plain:'' [i.e. clear and perspicuous, so as to require no learning nor ingenuity to understand it,) and when he proceeds to practice, the word "plain" indistinctly flits before him, as it were, and often checks him in the use of ornamerds of style, such as metaphor, epithet, antithesis, (kc, which are opposed to ** plainness" in a totally different sense of the word; being by no means necessarily adverse to perspicuity, but rather, in many cases, conducive to it ; as may be seen in several of the clearest of our Lord's discourses, which are the very ones that are the most richly adorned with figurative language. So far indeed is an ornamented style from being unfit for the vulgar, that they are pleased with it even in excess. Yet the desire to be "plain," combined with that dim and confused notion which the ambiguity of the word produces in such as do not separate in their minds, and set before themselves, the two meanings, often causes them to write in a dry and bald style, which has no advantage in point of perspicuity, and is least of all suited to the taste of the vulgar. The above instance is not drawn from mere conjecture, but from actual experience of the fact. Another instance of the strong influence of words on our ideas may
;

may

influence of

thought*.

'^

tation

See the diapter on " inferring and proving," (Book IV. Ch. III.) in the Disseron tiie Province of Reasoning.

110

OF FALLACIES.
:

[Book lU.

be adduced from a widely different subject most persons feel a certain degree of surprise on first bearing of tlie result of some late experiments of tbe Agricultural-Chemists, by which they have ascertained that universally what are called heavy soils are specifically th and vice versa. Whence this surprise ? for no one ever lightest distinctly believed the established names to be used in the literal and primary sense, in consequence of the respective soils having been weighed together indeed it is obvious on a moment's reflection that
; ;

tenacious day-soils (as w^ell as muddy roads) are figuratively called heavy, from the difficulty of ploughing, or passing over them, which

produces an effect like that of bearing or dragging a heavy weight yet still the terms "light" and "heavy," though used figuratively, have most undoubtedly introduced into men's minds something of the ideas expressed by them in their primitive sense. The same words, when applied to articles of diet, have produced important errors ; many supposing some article of food to be light of digestion from its being specifically light. So true is the ingenious observation of Hobbes, that " words are the counters of wise men, and the

money
"

of fools."

says Bacon, *' that their minds have the command often happens that Language bears rule over their mind." Some of the weak and absurd arguments which are often urged against Suicide may be traced to the influence of words on thoughts. When a Christian moralist is called on for a direct Scnpturol precept against suicide, instead of replying that the Bible

Men imagine,"
;

of Language

but

it

not meant for a complete code of laws, but for a system of motives principles, the answer frequently given is, "thou shalt do no murder ;^^ and it is assumed in the arguments drawn from Reason, as well as in those from Revelation, that Suicide is a species of Murder vijZ. because it is called Belf-murder; and thus, deluded by a name, many are led to rest on an unsound argument which, like all other fallacies, does more harm than good, in the end, to the cause of truth. Suicide, if any one considers the nature and not the name of it, evidently wants the most essential characteristic of murder, viz. the hurt and injury done to one's neighbour, in depriving him of life, as well as to others by the insecurity they are in consequence liable to feel. And since no one can, strictly speaking, do injustice to himself, he cannot, in the literal and primary acceptation of the words, be said either to rob or to murder himself. He who deserts the post to which he is appointed by his great Master, and presumptuously cuts short the state of probation graciously allowed him for " working out his salvation," (whether by action or by patieni endurance,) is guilty indeed of a grievous sin, but of one not tlie least analogous in its character to murder. It impHes no inliumanity. It is much more closely allied to the sin of wasting life in indolence, that life which is bestowed as a seed-time or in trifling pursuits, for the harveat of immortality. What is called in familiar phrase,
is
dindi
; ;

5.3

OF FALLACIES.
is,

Ill
it

"killing time,"

in truth,

an approach, as far as
for
*'

goes, to the

destruction of one's

own

life

Time

is

the stuff

life is

made

of."

Is suicide,

" Time destroyed where more than blood is spilt." Young J

Errors
the^u"se of'

More especially deserving of attention is the influence of Analogical Terms in leading men into erroneous notions in Theology where the
;
;

most important terms are analogical and yet they are continually Jerm^^^*^*^ employed in Reasoning, Avithout due attention (oftener through want and of caution than by unfair design) to their analogical nature most of the errors into which theologians have fallen may he traced,
;

in part, to this cause.

name

In speaking of the importance of refuting Fallacies, (under which Twofold I include, as will be seen, any false assumption employed as a any faLe Premiss) this consideration ought not to be overlooked that an assumption, unsound Principle, which has been employed to establish some mischievously false Conclusion, does not at once become harmless, and too insignificant to be worth refuting, as soon as that Conclusion is given up, and the false Principle is no longer employed for that particular use. It may equally well lead to some other no less misfalse premiss, according as it is combined with chievous result. ** this, or with that, true one, wdll lead to two different false conclusions. Thus, if the principle be admitted, that any important religious errors ought to be forcibly suppressed, this may lead either to persecution on the one side, or to latitudinarian indifference on the other. Some may be led to justify the suppression of heresies by the civil sword and others, whose feelings revolt at such a procedure, and who see persecution reprobated and discountenanced by those around themj may be led by the same principle to regard religious errors as of little or no importance, and all religious persuasions as equally acceptable in the sight of God."* It ought however to be observed on the other hand, that such Overeffects are often attributed to some fallacy as it does not in fact pro- the effect uf duce. It shall have been perhaps triumphantly urged, and repeated faiS,cie8. again and again, and referred to by many as irrefragable and yet shall have never convinced any one but have been merely assented to by those already convinced. To many persons any two well-sounding phrases, which have a few words the same, and are in some manner connected with the same subject, will serve for Premiss and Conclusion and when we hear a man profess to derive conviction from
;

7 It is surely wiser and safer to confine ourselves to such arguments as will bear the test of a close examination, than to resort to such as may indeed at the first glance be more specious and appear stronger, but which, when exposed, will

thing that can be urged ; to snatch up the first weapon that comes to hand; ("furor arma mmistrat;") without waiting to consider what is TRUE, 8 gee the notes to Ch, V. 1 of theDiasertation subjoined,
5>

toooftenleaveamanadupetotne fallacies on the opposite side. But it is especially

the error of controversialists to urge every

See Essays, 3d Series, Ch. Y. {

2.

p. 228.

112

OF FALLACIES.

[Book IIL

such arguments, we are naturally disposed to regard his case as But it will often happen that in reality his reasoning faculties shall have been totally dormant ; and equally so perhaps in another case, where he gives his assent to a process of sound reasoning, leading to a conclusion which he has already admitted. *' The puerile fallacies which you may sometimes hear a man adduce on some subjects, are perhaps in reality no more his own than the sound arguments he employs on others he may have given an indolent unthinking acquiescence to each and if he can be excited to exertion of thought, he may be very capable of distinguishing the sound from the unsound." ^
hopeless.
; ;

Thus much, as to the extensive practical influence of Fallacies, and the consequent high importance of detecting and exposing them.
6.
DiflRcuity of

FaiSef.

that while sound reasoning is ever the more readily admitted, the more clearly it is perceived to be such, Fallacy, on the contrary, being rejected as soon as perceived, will, of course, be the more likely to obtain reception, the more it is obscured and disguised by obliquity and complexity of expression. It is thus that it is the most likely either to slip accidentally from
2dly.
is,

The second remark

Fallacies
eiiipilcai

language,

the careless reasoner, or to be brought forward deliberately by the Sophist. Not that he ever wishes this obscurity and complexity to be perceived ; on the contrary, it is for his purpose that the expression should appear as clear and simple as possible, while in reality it is the most tangled net he can contrive. Thus, whercas it is usual to express our reasoning elliptically, so that a Premiss (or even two or three entire steps in a course of argument) which may be readily supplied, as being perfectly obvious, shall be left to be understood, the Sophist in like manner suppresses what is not obvious, but is in reality the weakest part of the argument and uses every other contrivance to withdraw our attention (his art closely resembling the juggler's) from the quarter where the fallacy lies. Hence the uncertainty before mentioned, to which class any individual Fallacy is to be referred : and hence it is that the difficulty of detecting and exposing Fallacy, is so much greater than that of comprehending and developing a process of sound argument. It is like the detection and apprehension of a criminal in spite of all his arts of concealment and disguise ; when this is accomplished, and he is brought to trial with all the evidence of his guilt produced, his conviction and punishment are easy ; and this is precisely the case with those Fallacies which are given as examples in Logical treatises they are in fact already detected, by being stated in a plain and regular form, and are, as it Averc, only Or again, fallacious reasoning may brought up to receive sentence.
:
;

Pol.

Econ. Lect.

I. p.

15

6]

OF FALLACIES.

113

be compared to a perplexed and entangled mass of accounts, which attention to clear up, and it requires much sagacity and close display in a regular and intelligible form though when this is once accomplished, the whole appears so perfectly simple, that the unthinking are apt to imdervalue the skill and pains which have been employed upon it. Moreover, it should be remembered, that a very long discussion ^o^^^^'f^^^ Sophistry, like poison, lengthy is one of the most effectual veils of Fallacy. ^^"^"^^^o"* is at once detected, and nauseated, when presented to us in a concentrated form but a Fallacy which when stated barely, in a few sentences, would not deceive a child, may deceive half the world, if For, as in a calculation, one single diluted in a quarto volume. figure incorrectly stated will enable us to arrive at any result whatever, though every other figure, and the whole of the operations, be correct, so, a single false assumption in any process of reasoning, though every other be true, will enable us to draw what conclusion we please and the greater the number of true assumptions, the more likely it is that the false one will pass unnoticed. But when you single out one step in the course of the reasoning, and exhibit it as a Syllogism with one Premiss true and the other false, the sophistry is easily perceived. I have seen a long argument to prove that the potato is not a cheap article of food in which there was an elaborate, and perhaps correct, calculation of the produce per acre, expense of of potatoes, and of wheat, the quantity lost in bran grinding, dressing, kc, and an assumption slipped in, as it were
; ; ; ;

incidentally, that a given quantity of potatoes contains hut one-tenih part ofnvirUive matter equal to bread: from all which (and there is probably but one groundless assertion in the whole) a most triumphant result was deduced." To use another illustration it is true in a course of argument, as in Mechanics, that "nothing is stronger than its weakest part;" and consequently a chain which has ons faulty link will break but though the number of the sound links adds nothing to the strength of the chain, it adds much to the chance oi the faulty one's escaping In such cases as I have been alluding to, one may observation. often hear it observed that " there is a great deal of truth in what such a one has said:" i.e. perhaps it is all true, except one essential
; ;

'.

point.

To speak, therefore, of all the Fallacies that have ever been enumerated as too glaring and obvious to need even being mentioned, because the simple instances given in logical treatises, and
11 This, however, gained the undoubtiiig assent of a Review by no means friendly to the author, and usually noted more for scepticism than for ready "All things," says an apocryassent! phal writer, "are double, one against another, and nothing is made in vain :"

Error of
au'rafiacies

*
detectloru

unblushing assertors of falsehood seem to have a race of easy believers provided on purpose for their use men \vho will not indeed believe the best established truths of religion, but are ready to believe any
:

thing

else,

114

OF FALLACIES.

[Book IH.

there stated in the plainest and consequently most easily detected form, are such as would (in that form) deceive no one this,
;

shows extreme weakness, or else unfairness. It may readily he allowed, indeed, that to detect individual Fallacies, and bring them under the general rules, is a harder task than to lay down those general rules hut this does not prove that the latter office is trifling or useless, or that it does not essentially conduce to There may be more ingenuity shown the performance of the other. in detecting and arresting a malefactor, and convicting him of the fact, than in laying down a law for the trial and punishment of such persons hut the latter office, i.e. that of a legislator, is surely
surely,
;

neither unnecessary nor trifling. It should he added that a close observation and Logical analysis of Fallacious arguments, as it tends (according to what has been

already said) to form a habit of mind well suited for the practical detection of Fallacies ; so, for that very reason, it will make us the more careful in making allowance for them i.e. to bear in mind how much men in general are liable to be influenced by them. J. G.Arefuled argument ought to go for nothing, (except where there is some ground for assuming that no stronger one could be adduced :)^^ but in fact it will generally prove detrimental to the cause, from the Now, no one is more Fallacy which wiU be presently explained. likely to be practically aware of this, and to take precautions accordingly, than he who is most versed in the whole theory of Fallacies for the best Logician is the least likely to calculate on men in general being such.
: ;

7.

0/ Fallacies inform,
enough perhaps has already been said in the preceding Compendium and it has been remarked above, that it is often left to our choice to refer an individual Fallacy to this head or to another. It may be worth observing, however, that to the present class we may the most conveniently refer those Fallacies, so common in practice, of supposing the Conclusion false, because the Premiss is and of inferring the false, or because the Argument is unsound truth of the Premiss from that of the Conclusion. E.G. If any one argues for the existence of a God, from its being universally believed, a man might perhaps be able to refute the argument by producing an instance of some nation destitute of such belief; the argument ought then (as has been observed above) io go for nothing: but many would go further, and think that this refutation had disproved the existence of a God; in which they would be guilty
;

>

See Essay

II.

on Kingdom of Christ,

22, note.

8.]

OF FALLACIES.
illicit

115

of an

process of the Major-term: viz. *' whatever is univermust be true the existence of a God is not universally believed; therefore it is not true." Others again, from being convinced of the truth of the Conclusion, would infer that of the
sally believed
;

Premises which would amount to the Fallacy of an undistributed Middle: viz. "what is universally believed is true; the existence of a God is true; therefore it is universally believed. " Or, these Fallacies might be stated in the hypothetical form since the one evidently proceeds from the denial of the Antecedent to the denial of the Consequent; and the other from the establishing of the Consequent to the inferring of the Antecedent which two Fallacies will usually be found to correspond respectively with those of Illicit process of the major, and Undistributed Middle. Fallacies of this class are very much kept out of sight, being seldom perceived even by those who employ them but of their practical importance there can be no doubt, since it is notorious
; ; ; ;

''*^<?a^

practically

^^etnmeniai.

always, in practice, detrimental; and that there is no absurdity so gross which men will not readily admit, if it appears to lead to a conclusion of which they are already convinced. Even a candid and sensible writer is not unlikely to be, by this means, misled, when he is seeking for arguments to support a conclusion which he has long been fully convinced of himself;
that a
is
i.e.

weak argument

he

will often use

such arguments as would never have convinced

himself, and are not likely to convince others, but rather (by the

operation of the converse Fallacy) to confirm in their dissent those

w4io before disagreed with him.
It is best therefore to

endeavour to put yourself in the place of

an o^jponent to your own arguments, and consider whether you could not find some objection to them. The applause of one's own party is a very unsafe ground for judging of the real force of an argumentative work, and consequently of its real utility. To satisfy those 'who were doubting, and to convince those who were opposed, are much better tests ^^ but these persons are seldom very loud in their
;

applause, or very forward in bearing their testimony.

Of Ambiguous

Middle,

which the Middle is undistributed belongs of course head the fault being perfectly manifest from tlio mere form of the expression: in that case the Extremes are compared with two parts of the same term but in the Fallacy which has been called semi-logical, (which we are now to speak of) the
in

That case

to the preceding

13 The strongest, perhaps, of all external indications of the strength of an argunient, is, the implied admission of those

who nevertheless resolve not to admit the conclusion. iSee Appendix ; Art. Person,
last clause.

116

OF FALLACIES.

[Book

III.

Extremes are compared with two different terms, the Middle being in two different senses in the two Premises.^* And here it may be remarked, that when the argument is brought into the form of a regular Syllogism, the contrast between these two senses will usually appear very striking, from the two Premises h&mg placed together; and hence the scorn with which many have
used
treated the very mention of the Fallacy of Equivocation, deriving it from the exposure of it in Logical treatises ; whereas, in practice it is common for the two Premises to be placed very far apart, and discussed in different parts of the discourse ; by
their only notion of

Importance
disUncUons.

which means the inattentive hearer overlooks any ambiguity that exist in the Middle-term. Hence the advantage of Logical habits, in fixing our attention strongly and steadily on the impoHant terms of an argument. And here it should be observed, that when we mean to charge any argument with the fault of " equivocal-middle," it is not enough to say that the Middle-term is a word or phrase which admits of more than one meaning (for there are few that do not) but we must show, that in order for each premiss to be admitted, the Term in question must be understood in one sense (pointing out what that sense is) in one of the premises, and in another sense, in the other. And if anyone speaks contemptuously of "over exactness" in fixing the precise sense in which some term is used, of attending to minute and subtle distinctions, <fec. we may reply that these minute distinctions are exactly those which call for careful attention since it is only through the neglect of these that Fallacies ever escape

may

detection.

For, a very glaring and palpable equivocation could never mislead one. To argue that *' feathers dispel darkness, because they are light j^^ or that " this man is agreeable, because he is riding, and riding is agreeable," is an equivocation which could never be employed but in jest. And yet however slight in any case may be the distinction between the two senses of a Middle-term in the two premises, the apparent-argument will be equally inconclusive;

any

more likely to escape notice. want of attention to minute points, that houses are robbed, or set on fire. Burglars do not in general come and batter down the front- door: but climb in at some window whose fastenings have been neglected. And an incendiary, or a careless servant, does not kindle a tar-barrel in the middle of a room, but leaves a lighted turf, or a candle snuff, in the thatch, or in a heap of
its

though

fallaciousness will be

Even

so, it is for

shavings.

In many cases, it is a good maxim, to " take care of little things, and great ones will take care of themselves." One case, which may be regarded as coming under the head of
1^

For some

instances of important ambiguities, see

Appendix.


5 8.]

OF FALLACIES.

117
*'

Ambii^uous middle, is, (what I believe loo-ical writers mean by Paronymous words *' Fallada Figurce Dictionis,'') the Fallacy built on the grammatical structure of language, from men's usually taking far granted that loaronymous [or conjugate] words i.e. those belonging to each
other, as the substantive, adjective, verb,
;

&c., of the

same

root,

have a precisely correspondent meaning which is by no means universally the case. Such a fallacy could not indeed be even exhibited in strict Logical form, which would preclude even the attempt at it, since it has two middle terms in sound as well as But nothing is more common in practice than to vary consense. tinually the terms employed, with a view to grammatical convenience nor is there any thing unfair in such a practice, as long as the ??2mmn^ is preserved unaltered e.g. *' murder should be punished with death; this man is a murderer; therefore he deserves to die,'* Here we proceed on the assumption (in this case just) that <fcc. <fcc. to commit murder and to be a murderer, to deserve death and to be one who ought to die, are, respectively, equivalent expressions and it would frequently prove a heavy inconvenience to be debarred this kind of liberty but the abuse of it gives rise to the Fallacy in question: e.g. ''projectors are unfit to be trusted; this man has formed a. project, therefore he is unfit to be trusted :"^^ here the Sophist proceeds on the hypothesis that he who forms o. project must be a pvjedor: whereas the bad sense that commonly attaches to
:

the latter word, is not at all implied in the former. This Fallacy may often be considered as lying not in the Middle, but in one of the terms of the Conclusion so that the Conclusion drawn shall not be, in reality, at all warranted by the Premises,
;

though it will appear to be so, by means of the grammatical affinity of the words e.g. " to be acquainted with the guilty is a, pi^esump:

tion of guilt

this man is so acquainted therefore we may pi^esimie guilty:" this argument proceeds on the supposition of an exact correspondence between '' p)resume'' and "j^j7'e5wmj9i/cm,'* which, hoAvever, does not really exist; for "presumption" is commonly used to express a kind of slight suspicion; whereas " to
;
;

that he

is

presume" amounts to act.ucd belief. The above remark will apply to some other cases of ambiguity of term viz. the Conclusion will often contain a term, which (though
;

not, as here, difi"erent in expression

from the corresponding one in the Premiss, yet) is liohle to be understood in a sense different from what it bears to the Premiss ; though, of course, such a Fallacy is less common, because less likely to deceive, in those cases than in this; where the term used in the Conclusion, though professing to correspond with one in the Premiss, is not the very same in expression,
is

and therefore is more ceHain what the Sophist wishes.

15

to

convey a different sense

which

Adam

Smith's Wealth of Nations: Usury,

118

OF FALLACIES.

[Book IIL

There are innumerable instances of a non-correspondence in paronymous words, similar to that above instanced as between art and artful, dedgn and designing, faith and faithful, (fee. and the more slight the variation of meaning, the more likely is the Fallacy for when the words have become so widely to be successful removed in sense as "pity" and "pitiful," every one would perceive such a Fallacy, nor could it be employed but in jest. This Fallacy cannot in practice be refuted, (except when you are addressing regular logicians,) by stating merely the impossibility of You must reducing such an argument to the strict logical form. find some ^vay of pointing out the non-correspondence of the terms in question; e.g. with respect to the example above, it might be
;

remarked, that we speak of strong or faint " presumption," but we use no such expression in conjunction with the verb " presume," because the word itself imjolies strength. No fallacy is more common in controversy than the present since in this way the Sophist will often be able to misinterpret the propositions which his opponent admits or maintains, and so employ them against him. Thus in the examples just given, it is natural to conceive one of the Sophist's Premises to have been borrowed from his opponent. ^^ Etymology. The present Fallacy is nearly allied to, or rather perhaps may be regarded as a branch of that founded on etymology; viz. when a term is used at one time, in its customary, and at another, in its Perhaps no example of this can be found that etymological sense. is more extensively and mischievously employed than in the case of the word representative: assuming that its right meaning must correspond exactly with the strict and original sense of the verb, ** represent," the Sophist persuades the multitude, that a member bf the House of Commons is bound to be guided in all points by the opinion of liis constituents and, in short, to be merely their spokesman: whereas law, and custom, which in this case may be considered as fixing the meaning of the Term, require no such thing, but enjoin the representative to act according to the best of his own judgment, and on his own responsibility. Home Tooke has furnished a whole magazine of such weapons for any Sophist who may need them and has furnished some specimens of the employment of them. He contends, that it is idle to speak of eternal or immutable " Tritth," because the word is derived from to '* trow," i.e. believe. He might on as good grounds have censured the absurdity of speaking of sending a letter by the ''post,'' because a post, in its primary sense, is a pillar; or have insisted that ** Sycophant" can never mean any thing but '* Fig-shewer."
; : ;

1* Perhaps a dictionary of such paroas do not reguiarly correspond in meaning, would

be nearly as useful as one of synonyms;

i.e.

nymous [conjugate! words

properly speaking, of psaudo-synonyms.

tO-Z

OF FALLACIES.
9.

119

It IS to he observed, that to the head of Amhiguous middle should Fallacy of he referred what is called " Fallacia plwium LUerrogationum," tioas^.^^^' which may be named, simply, *' the Fallacy of Interrogation " viz. the Fallacy of asking several questions which appear to he but one so that whatever one answer is given, being of course applicable to one only of the implied questions, may be interpreted as applied to the other the refutation is, of course, to reply separately to each
; :

question,
I

i.e.

to detect the ambiguity.

" questions which appear to he hut one^^' for no Fallacy; such an example, therefore, as "estne homo animal et lapis ?" which Aldrich gives, is foreign to the matter in hand for there is nothing unfair in asking two distinct questions (any more than asserting two distinct propositions) distinctly and
have
said, several
is

else there

avoioedly.

This Fallacy

may be
In

referred, as has
all

been

said, to the

head of
to state

Ambiguous middle.

Reasoning

it is

very

common
:

one of the Premises in form of a, question, and when that is admitted, or supposed to be admitted, then to fill up the rest if then one of the Terms of that question be ambiguous, whichever sense the opponent replies to, the Sophist assumes the other sense of the Term in the remaining Premiss. It is therefore very common to state an equivocal argument, in form of a question so worded, that there shall be little doubt which reply will be given but if there he such doubt, the Sophist must have two Fallacies of equivocation ready e. g. the question *' whether any thing vicious is expedient," discussed in Cic. Off. Book III. (where, by-the-by, he seems not a little perplexed with it himself) is of the character in question, from the ambiguity of the word, '' expedient y'' which means sometimes, *' conducive to temporal prosperity," sometimes " conducive to the greatest good:" wljichever answer therefore was given, the Sophist might have a Fallacy of equivocation founded on this term viz. if the answer be in the negative, his argument. Logically developed, will stand thus, "what is vicious is not expedient; whatever conduces to the acquisition of wealth and aggrandizement is expedient therefore it cannot be vicious " if in the affirmative, then thus, "whatever is expedient is desirable; something vicious is expedient, therefore desirable."" Again, a witness was once asked by a Parliamentary Committee (in 1832) whether he knew " how long the practice had ceased in Ireland of dividing the tithes into four portions, one for the poor," This resembles the hackneyed instance of asking a man &c.
;
; ;

17 Much of the declamation by which popular assemblies are often misled, against what is called, without any distinct meaning, the " doctrine of expediency," (as if the "rigiit" and the "ex-

silenced

"

pedient" were in opposition) might be by asking the simple question, Do you then admit that the course yoa
is

recommend

iwexpedientf

120

OF FALLACIES.

[Book IIL

** whether he had left o^heating his father." [See Vol. of Charges and Tracts, p. 379.] King Charles II. 's celebrated inquiry of the Royal Society (noticed below, 14) may be referred to this head. He asked the cause why a dead fish does not (though a live This implies tioo fish does) add to the weight of a vessel of water.

Distribution
drstributioa

; the first of w^hich many of the philosophers for a time overlooked: viz. 1st. is it a. facf? 2dly, if it be a fact, what can cause \iV^ This kind of Fallacy is frequently employed in a such a manner, ^^^^^ ^^6 uncertainty shall be, not about the meaning, but the extent B in of a Term, i.e. whether it is distributed or not: e.g. "did this case act from such and such a motive?" which may imply either, *' was it his sole motive?" or " was it one of his motives?" in the former case the term ["that-which-actuated-A B"] is distributed in the latter, not : now if he acted from a mixture of motives, whichever answer you give, may be misrepresented, and your conclusion thus disproved. Again, those who dispute the right of a State to enforce the profession of a certain religion, have been met by the question, "has a If we answer in the negative, we State a right to enforce Laws?" may be interpreted as denying that any laws can rightfully be enforced ; which would of course go to destroy the very existence of a Political-community if, in the affirmative, we may be interpreted as sanctioning the enforcement of any laws whatever that the Legislature may see fit to enact: whether enjoining men to adore a Crucifix, or to trample on it; to reverence Christ, or Mahomet, ha. The ambiguity of the question lies in "Laws;" understood '^^ either as " same laws," or, as " any laws withovi exception.'

questions

10.
Intrinsic and
equivoca!^

tiona

In some cases of ambiguous Middle, the Term in question may be Considered as having in itself, from its own equivocal nature, two significations; (which apparently constitutes the '' Fallacia equivocationis'' of Logical writers;) others again have a Middle-term which is ambiguous from the context, i.e. from what is understood This division will be found useful, though in conjunction with it.
impossible to draw the line accurately in it. dliptical character of ordinary discourse causes many Terms to become practically ambiguous, which yet are not themselves employed in different senses, but with diff'erent ajiplications, which
it is

The

Thus, " The Faith" would be used by a Christian writer to denote the Christian Faith, and by a Mussulman, the Mahometan yet the word Faith, has not in these cases, of it two diflferent significations. So UtuktoI, " elect," or sometimes applied to such as are "chosen," to certsdn pnrlvUeges
are understood.
;

18

See Historic Doubts relative to Na-

^^

poleon.

Christ."

See " Essays on the Kingdom of Note A to Essay 1.

510.]

OF FALLACIES.

121

and advantages; (as the Israelites were, tliongh " tliey were overthrown in the wilderness" for their disobedience; and as all Christians are frequently called in the New Testament) sometimes again to those who are ** chosen," as fit to receive a final reward^ having made a right use of those advantages as when our Lord says, " many are called, but few chosen." What Logicians have mentioned under the title of ** Fallacia Amphibolla. amphiboliae" is referable to this last class; though in real practice An amphibolous sentence is one that it is not very likely to occur. is capable of two meanings, not from the double sense of any of the words, but from its admitting of a double construction: as in the instance Aldrich gives, which is untranslatable; " quod tangitur a Socrate, illud sentit;" where *' illud " may be taken either as the nominative or accusative. So also the celebrated response of the " Aio te, ^acida, Romanes vincere posse:" " Pyrrhus the oracle Eomans shall, I say, subdue:" which closely resembles (as Shak-. speare remarks) the witch-prophecy, "The Duke yet lives that Henry siiall depose." This effect is produced by what the French call "construction louche," a squinting construction; i.e. where some word or words may be referred either to the former or latter of which an instance occurs in the rubric clause of the sentence ** prefixed to the service for the 30th January. If this day shall happen to be Sunday [this form of prayer shall be used] and the fast kept the next day following:" the clause in brackets may belong either to the former or the latter part of the sentence. In the Nicene Creed, the words, " by whom all things were made," are grammatically referable either to the Father or the Son. And in
; ;
;

Commandment, the clause ** of them that hate me," is a by "children," or by "generation:" the latter being indicated by the ordinary mode of punctuation and of reading; which totally changes the real sense. ^ The following
the 2d
genitive governed either

clause of a sentence from a newspaper, is a curious specimen of Amphibolia: "For protecting and upholding such electors as refused, contrary to their desires and consciences, to vote for Messrs.

and B, regardless of threats, and unmindful of intimidation."

There are various ways in which words come to have two Accidental meanings: Zt''^' 1st. By accident; [i.e. when there is no perceptible connexion betAveen the two meanings) as ^' light'' signifies both the contrary to "heavy" and the contrary to "dark." Thus, such Propernames as John or Thomas, kc. which happen to belong to several difi'erent persons, are ambiguous, because they have a difi'erent signification in each case where they are applied. Words which fall under this first head are what are the most strictly called equivocal,
_

20

See Rhetoric, Appendix.

122
First

OF FALLACIES.
it is

[Book IIL
necessary

and

2dly. There are several terms in the use of which

to notice the distinction
this phrase) is a certain

second
intention.

between

first

and second

intention.^^

The

"first-intention" of a Term, (according to the usual acceptation of

vague and general signification of it, as opposed to one more precise and limited, which it hears in some particular art, science, or system, and which is called its *' secondintention." Thus, among farmers, in some parts, the word "beast" and "bird," is applied particularly and especially to the ox kind in the language of many sportsmen, is in like manner appropriated to the partridge the common and general acceptation (which every one is well acquainted with) of each of those two words, is the Firstintention of each the other, its Second-intention. For some remarks on the Second-intention of the word " Species," when applied to organized beings, {viz. as denoting those plants or animals, which it is conceived may have descended from a common stock), see the subjoined Dissertation, Book IV. Chap. V. 1. It is evident that a Term may have several Second-intentions, according to the several systems into which it is introduced, and of which it is one of the technical Terms: thus "line" signifies, in the Art-military, a certain form of drawing up ships or troops to the fisherman, a in Geography, a certain division of the earth string to catch fish, &c. &c.; all which are so many distinct Second-intentions, in each of which there is a certain signification " of extension in length" which constitutes the First-intention, and w^hich corresponds pretty nearly with the employment of the Term in Mathematics. In a few instances the Second-intention, or philosophical employment of a Term, is more extensive than the First-intention, or ;" popular use: thus " affection" is limited in popular use to " love
:
:

Kesen^biance and Analogy.

"charity," to "almsgiving;" "flower," to those flowers which have conspicuous petals and fruit, to such as are eatable. It will sometimes happen, that a term shall be employed always and never, strictly in some one or other of its second intentions in the first, though that first intention is a part of its signification in each case. It is evident, that the utmost care is requisite to avoid confounding together, either the first and second intentions, or the difi*erent second intentions with each other. 3dly. When two or more things are connected by resemblance or Thus a " blade analogy, they will frequently have the same name.
;
;

of grass," and the contrivance in building called a

21 I am aware that there exists another opinion as to the meaning of the pimise *' second intention ;" and that Aldrich is understood by some persons to mean (as indeed his expression may very well be understood to miply) that eAxri/ predicable must necessarily be employed in the Second-intention. I do not undertake to combat the doctrine alluded to, because

*'

dove-taU/'

I must confess that, aftei- the most patient attention devoted to the explanations given of it, I have never been able to comprehend what it is that is meant by It is one, however, which, whether it. sound or unsound, appears not to be connected with any Losjical processes, and therefore may be safely passed by on the present occasion.

OF FALLACIES.
123

10.]

are so called from tlieir resemblance to the blade^ of a sword, and But two things may he connected hy the tail of a real dove. analogy t though they have in themselves no resemblance : for analogy is the resemhlance of ratios (or relations:) thus, as a. sweet taste gratifies the palate, so does a sweet sound gratify the ear; and hence the same word *' sweet" is applied to hoth, though no flavour can resemhle a sound in itself. So, the leg of a table does not resemhle that of an animal ; nor the foot of a mountain that of an animal ; but the leg answers the same 2:)urpose to the table, as the leg of an animal to that animal ; the foot of a mountain has the same situation relatively to the mountain, as the foot of an animal to the animal. This analogy therefore may be expressed like a mathematical analogy (or proportion) "leg : animal : : supporting-stick : table." The words pertaining to 3Iincl may in general be traced up, as borrowed (which no doubt they all were, originally) by Analogy, from those pertaining to 3fotter: though in many cases the primary
;

sense has become obsolete.

Thus, " edify"^ and the origin of

primary sense of "build up"^* is disused, forgotten; although the substantive *' edifice" remains in common use, in a corresponding sense. When however we speak of "weighing" the reasons on both sides, of "seeing," or "feeling" the force of an argument, "imprinting" any thing on the memory, <fec. we are aware of these words being used analogically. In all these cases (of this 3d head) one of the meanings of the Primary and "Word is called by Logicians proper, i.e. original or primary; the senses."^
in its
it

often

other improper, secondary, or transferred : thus, sweet is originally and properly applied to toMes; secondarily and improperly {i.e. by analogy) to sounds : thus also, dove-tail is applied secondarily (though not by analogy, but by direct resemblance) to the contrivance in building so called. When the secondary meaning of a word is founded on some fanciful analogy, and especially when it is introduced for ornament's sake, we call this a metaphor; as when we speak of " a ship's ploughing the deep;" the turning up of the surface being essential indeed to the plough, but accidental only, to the ship. But if the analogy be a more important and essential one, and especially if we have no other word to express our meaning but this transferred one, we then call it merely an analogous word (though the metaphor is analogous also) e.g. one would hardly call it metaphorical OY figurative language to speak of the "leg of a table," or " mouth of a river."
22

tion of the

Unless, indeed, the primary applicaTerm be to the leaf of grass,

and the secondary to cutting instruments, which is perhaps more probable: but the
question
case.
is

See 1 Peter ii. 5. gee Johnson's Dictionary. gee Bp. Copleston's account of Analogy in the notes to his " Four Discour24
25

23

unimportant in the present

ses."

124

OF FALLACIES.

[Book

III.

There are two kinds of error, each very common wliicli lead to confusion of thought in our use of analogical words i. The error of supposing the things themselves to be similar, from their having similar relations to other things. ii. The still commoner error of supposing the Analogy to extend further than it does ; [or, to be more complete than it really is ;] from not considering in what the Analogy in each case consists. For instance, the " Servants'' that we read of in the Bible, and in other translations of ancient books, are so called by Analogy to servants among us : and that Analogy consists in the offices which a ** servant" performs, in waiting on his master, and doing his bidding. It is in this respect that the one description of "servant" "corresponds" ["answers"] to the other. And hence some persons have been led to apply all tlmt is said in Scripture respecting ]\Iasters and Servants, to these times, and this Country : forgetting that the Analogy is not complete, and extends no further than the For the ancient " servants" (except when point above-mentioned. expressly spoken of as /m^ec^-servants) were Slaves; a part of the Master's possessions. Connexion 4thly. Several things may be called by the same name (though they have no connexion of resemblance or analogy) from being conplace, &c. nected hy vicinity of time or place; under which head will come the connexion of cause and efect, or of part and whole, &c. ; and the transference of words in this way from the primary to a secondary meaning, is what Grammarians call Metonymy. Thus, a door signifies both an opening in the wall (more strictly called the doorway) and a board which closes it ; which are things neither similar nor analogous. When I say, "the rose smells sweet;" and "I smell the rose ;" the word " smell" has two meanings: in the latter sentence, I am speaking of a certain sensation in my own mind in the former, of a certain quality in the flower, which produces that sensation, but which of course cannot in the least resemble it and here the word smell is applied with equal propriety to both. On this ambiguity have been founded the striking paradoxes of those who have maintained that there is no heat in fire, no cold in ice, &c. The sensations of heat, cold, &lc. can of course only belong to a Sentient Being. Thus again the word "certainty," denotes either, primarily, the state of our own mind when we are free from doubt, or secondarily, the character of the event about which we feel certain. [See Appendix, No. I.] Thus, we speak of Homer, for "the works of Homer;" and this is a secondary or transferred meaning: and so it is when we say, " a good shot," for a good marksman: but the word "s^oi" has two other meanings, which are both equally proper ; viz. the thing put into a gun in order to be discharged from it, and the act of discharging it. Thus " learning'' signifies either the act of acquiring knowledge, or the knowledge itself; e.g. " he neglects his learning ;" " Johnson
; ;

510.]

OF FALLACIES.
*'

125
is

was a man of learning." Possess'lon'^ manner; and a multitude of others.

ambiguous in the same remarkable and most important instance is the ambiguity of such words as '* samey^^ ''one,'' he. (See the Articles on those words in Appendix, and also Book IV. Chap. V. 1 and 2.) Much confusion often arises from ambiguity of this kind, when unperceived nor is there any point in which the copiousness and consequent precision of the Greek language is more to be admired than in its distinct terms for expressing an act, and the result of that act; e.g. -Trpx^ig, "the doing of any thing;" -Trpotyfioc, the " thing done;" so, loats and oupov Ajjt//;? and Ay^^^a, &c. It will very often happen, that two of the meanings of a word will have no connexion with one another, but will each have some connexion with the third. Thus, ** martyr" originally signified a witness; thence it was applied to those who suffered in bearing testimony to Christianity and thence again it is often applied to *' sufferers" in general: the first and third significations are not

the least connected.

{postimi,

Thus "joosi"

signifies

originally a pillar,
;

then,

from j^ono) then, a distance marked out by posts the carriages, messengers, &,c. that travelled over

and
this

distance.

Thus

'*

Clerk," originally one in Holy Orders, came to

be used as it is at present, from the " Clergy" having been, during the dark Ages, almost the only persons who could read. It would puzzle any one, proceeding on mere conjecture, to make out how the word " premises" should have come to signify " a
building."

Ambiguities of this kind belong practically to the

first

head:
Elliptical
*^^s"*JJ-

there being no perceived connexion between the different senses. Another source of practical ambiguity (as has been just observed) ** is, that, in respect of any subject concerning wliich the generality of men are accustomed to speak much and familiarly in their conversation relative to that, they usually introduce elliptical expressions very clearly understood in the outset, but whose elliptical character comes, in time, to be so far lost sight of, that confusion of language, and thence, of thought, is sometimes the result. Thus, the expression of a person's possessing a fortune of 10,000 is an elliptical phrase meaning, at full length, that all his property if sold would exchange for that sum of money. And in ninety-nine instances out of a hundred, no error or confusion of thought arises from this language but there is no doubt that it mainly contributed to introduce and foster the notion that Wealth consists especially of gold and silver (these being used to measure and express its amount) and that the sure way to enrich a country is to promote the importation, and prevent the export of the precious metals with all the other absurdities of what is commonly called * the mercantile System.' So also we speak commonly of * the example of such a And usually, one's pimishment serving to deter others from crime.'
; : ; ;

^upppiww

iiiiiiiiiium.jL

126

OF FALLACIES.

[Book IIL

no misapprelienslon results from this, wliich is, in truth, an elliptical expression. But sometimes sophistical reasoners take advantage of it, and men who are not clear-headed are led into confusion of thought. Strictly speaking, what deters a man from crime in such
cases as those alluded to, is, the apprehension of himself suffering punishment. That apprehension may be excited by the example of another's being punished; or it may be excited without that example, if punishment be denounced, and there is good reason to expect that the threat will not be an empty one. And on the other hand, the example of others' suifering punishment does not deter anyone, if \i fail to excite this apprehension for himself; if for instance he consider himself as an exempt person, as is the case with a despot in barbarian countries, or with a madman who expects to be acquitted on the plea of insanity. "Again, when a man complains of being out of worlc is * looking out for employment,' and hopes for subsistence by labour, this is elliptical language, well enough understood in general.
*

and that he who is want of food and other necessaries, which he hopes to procure in exchange for his labour, and has no hope of obtaining without it. But there is no doubt that this elliptical language has contributed to lead those who were
that
lives on, is food;
is

We

know

what man

said to be looking out for work,

in

Pefinition

noedei

not attentive to the character of the expression, to regard every thing as beneficial to the labouring classes yfhich. furnishes employ9nent, i.e. gives trouble ; even though no consequent increase should take place in the Country, of the food and other commodities snow-drift which obstructs a road, destined for their support." ^^ and a vein of valuable ore, may conceivably each furnish employment for an equal number of labourers. The remedy for ambiguity is a Definition of the Term which is suspected of being used in two senses ; viz. a Nominal, not necessarily a Real Definition as was remarked in Book II. Chap. V. It is important to observe that the very circumstance which in any case " makes a definition the more necessary, is apt to lead to the omission of it : for when any terms are employed that are not familiarly introduced into ordinary discourse, such as ' parallelogram,' or 'sphere,' or tangent,' * pencil of rays,' or 'refraction,* 'oxygen,' or 'alkali,' the learner is ready to inquire, and the writer to anticipate the inquiry, what is meant by this or that term ? And though in such cases it is undoubtedly a correct procedure to answer this inquiry by a definition, yet of the two cases, a definition is even more necessary in the other, where it is not so likely to be where the word, not being new to the student, but called for ; familiar to his ear, from its employment in every-day discourse, is For in liable to the ambiguity which is almost always the result.

38 Pol.

Econ. Lect. IX.

10.]

OF FALLACIES.

127

respect of words tliat sound something new and strange, tliougli it is, as I have said, much better to define them in the outset, yet

even Avithout this, the student would gradually collect their meaningpretty correctly, as he proceeded in his study of any treatise ; from having nothing to mislead him, nothing from which to form his

notions at

except the manner in which the terms were employed And the very desire he had in the work itself that is before him. felt of a definition would lead him in this way to form one, and generally a sufficiently correct one, for himself. ** It is otherwise with terms to which we are familiarly accusOf these, the student does not usually crave definitions, tomed. from supposing, for that reason, that he understands them well enough though perhaps (without suspecting it) he has in reality been accustomed to hear them employed in various senses, and to If you speak to attach but a vague and inaccurate notion to them. an uninstructed hearer, of any thing that is spherical, or circular, or cylindrical, he will probably beg for an explanation of your meaning ; but if 3''ou tell him of any thing that is round, it will not strike him that any explanation is needed though he has been accustomed to employ the word, indiscriminately, in all the senses denoted by the other three." ^^ But here it may be proper to remark,* that for the avoiding of DeflniHons, Fallacy, or of Verbal-controversy, it is only requisite that the term be exacted, should be employed uniformly in the same sense, as far as the existThus, two persons might, in discussing ing question is concerned. the question whether Augustus was a great man, have some such difi*erence in their acceptation of the epithet "great," as would be non-essential to that question e.g. one of them might understand by it nothing more than eminent intellectual and moral qualities; while the other might conceive it to imply the performance of splendid actions: this abstract difference of meaning would not produce any disagreement in the existing question, because both those circumstances are united in the case of Augustus but if one (and not the other) of the parties understood the epithet " great" to imply pure patriotism, generosity of character, &lc., then there would be a disagreement as to the application of the Term, even between those who might think alike of Augustus's character, as wanting in those qualities.^ Definition, the specific for ambiguity, is to be employed, and demanded, with a view to this principle it is sufficient on each occasion to define a Term as far as regards the question in
all,
: :

hand.
If, for example, we were remonstrating with any one for quitting the church of which he was a member, wantonly, and not from strong and deliberate conscientious conviction, but from motives of taste or fancy, and he were to reply by asking, how do you define a
a?

Pol. Econ. Lect.

28 See Book IX. 28 See Book IV. Ch. IV. 1.

II.

Ch. V.

6.

"

128

OF FALLACIES.

[Book IIL

Churcli ? tlie demand would be quite irrelevant, unless lie meant to deny that tlie Community he quits is a Church. But if we were to insist on designating any one religious-community on earth to which we might belong, as the universal or Catholic Church, in demanding from all Christians submission to its ordinances and decisions,

and denouncing all who should not belong to it, as being out of the pale of Christ's Church, then indeed we might fairly be called on to
give a definition, and one which should be consistent with facts.^

11; Of those cases where the ambiguity arises fivm the context, there are several species some of which Logicians have enumerated, but
;

have neglected to refer them, in the first place, to one common class {viz. the one under which they are here placed;) and have even arranged some under the head of Fallacies ** in dictione," and others under that of ** extra dictionem.""
Pttiiacy of

We may

consider, as the first of these species, the Fallacy of

Composition

" Division" and that of "Composition," taken together; since in each of these the Middle-term is used in one Premiss collectively, in the other, distrihutively : if the former of these is the major Premiss, and the latter, the minor, this is called the "Fallacy of Division ;" the Term which is first taken collectively being afterwards divided and vice versa. The ordinary examples are such as ** All the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles: these B C is an angle of a triangle therefore A B C is equal to two " Five is one number three and two are five thereright angles." fore three and two are one number;" or, "three and two are two numbers, five is three and two, therefore five is two numbers:" it is manifest that the Middle-term, three and two (in this last example) is ambiguous, signifying, in the major Premiss, " taken distinctly in the minor, "taken together:" and so of the rest. To this head may be referred the common Fallacy of over-rating, where each premiss of an argument is otAj probable, the probability of the conclusion which, in that case, is less than that of the less probable of the premises.^^ For, suppose the probabiHty of one of these to be ^q, and of the other /g (each more likely than not) the probability of the conclusion will be only -/g^g or a little more than
;

See Appendix, Article " Truth." See below, 14. Some persons profess contempt for all such calculations, on the ground that we cannot be quite sure
so
81

persons whose trade it is, in which calculations of this nature are made, in the pui-chase of contingent reversions, depending, sometimes, on ajrreat varietj' of risks,

of the exact degree of probability of each premiss. And this is true; but this unavoidable uncertainty is no reason why we should not guard against an additional source of uncertainty which can be avoided. It is some advantage to have no wore doubt as to the degree of probability of the Conclusion, than we have respecting that of the premises. And in tact there are Offices, kept by

which can only be conjecturally estimated; and in Insurances, not only against ordinary risks (the calculations of which are to be drawn from Statistical- tables) but also against every variety and degree oi eo'traordinari/ risk; the arac^ amount of which, no one can confidently pronounce upon. But the calculations are based on the best estimate that can be formed.

; ; :

5 11.]

OF FALLACIES.
is

129

than an even chance.* This Fallacy may be most a form in which any Fallacy of ambiguous middle may easily be exhibited. B.G. *' If it is more likely than not, that these premises are true {i.e. that they are both true) it is more likely than not, that the conclusion is true but it is more likely than not that the premises are true [i.e. that each of them is so) therefore it is more likely than not that the "that conclusion is true." Here, a term in the antecedent, viz. the premises are more likely than not to be true" is taken jointly in the Major, and dividedly in the Minor. To the same class we may refer the Fallacy by which men have sometimes been led to admit, or pretend to admit, the doctrine of Necessity; e.g. "he who necessarily goes or stays {i.e. in reality, who necessarily goes, or who necessarily stays ') is not a free agent
f
;

which

less

easily stated

as a conditional

you must necessarily go or stay {i.e. you must necessarily take the alternative '), therefore you are not a free agent." Such also is the Fallacy which probably operates on most adventurers in lotteries e.g. "the gaining of a high prize is no uncommon occurrence; and what is no uncommon occurrence may reasonably be expected:
*

therefore the gaining of a high prize may reasonably be expected;" the Conclusion, when applied to the individual (as in practice it is),

must be understood

in

the sense of " reasonably expected by

certain individual;'' therefore for the Major-Premiss to be true, the

middle-Term must be miderstood to mean, "no micommon occurrence to some one particular person;" whereas for the Minor (which has been placed first) to be true, you must understand it of "no uncommon occurrence to some one or other;'' and thus you will have the Fallacy of Composition. There is no Fallacy more common, or more likely to deceive, than the one now before us. The form in which it is most usually employed, is to establish some truth, separately, concerning each dngle member of a certain class, and thence to infer the same of the whole collectively. Thus, some infidels have laboured to prove concerning some one of our Lord's miracles, that it might have been the result of an accidental conjuncture of natural circumstances next, they endeavour to prove the same concerning another; and so on and thence infer that all of them occurring as a series might have been so. They might argue in like manner, that because it is not very improbable one may throw sixes in any one out of a hundred throws, therefore it is no more improbable that one may throw sixes & hundred times running. It will often happen that when two objects are incompotihle, though Thaumaeither of them, separately, may be attained, the incompatibility is fauScy. disguised by a rapid and frequent transition from the one to the other alternately. E.G. You may prove that 100 would accomplish this object and then, that it would accomplish that: and then, you recur to the former ; and back agam : till at length a notion is
; ^ ;

See Postscript.

130

OF FALLACIES.

[Book

III.

generated of the possibility of accomplishing both hy this 100. *' Two distinct objects may, by being dexterously presented, again and again in quick succession, to the mind of a cursory reader, be so associated together in his tlwughts, as to be conceived capable, when in fact they are not, of being actually combined in practice. The fallacious belief thus induced bears a striking resemblance to the optical illusion effected by that ingenious and philosophical toy in which two objects painted on opposite called the Thaumatrope for instance a man, and a horse, a bird, and a sides of a card, cage, are, by a quick rotatory motion, made to impress the eye in combination, so as to form one picture, of the man on the horse's As soon as the card is allowed to back, the bird in the cage, &c. remain at rest, the figures, of ^ourse, appear as they really are, mental illusion closely analogous separate and on opposite sides. *^ *^^^' ^^ produced, when by a rapid and repeated transition from J^^^ subject to another alternately, the mind is deluded into an idea J^ 'bf the actual combination of things that are really incompatible.^) If kvF ly^^The chief part of the defence which various writers have advanced" *^ in favour of the system of Penal-Colonies, consists, in truth, of a

v^
J

'

The prosperity of the Colony, and sort of intellectual Thaumatrope. the rqoression of crime, are, by a sort of rapid whirl, presented to very moderate degree of the mind as combined in one picture. calm and fixed attention soon shows that the two objects are painted on opposite sides of the card."^^ Ambiguity The Fallacy of Division may often be considered as turning on the ambiguity of the word *' all;" which may easily be dispelled by ^AiL"*""^ substituting for it the word "each" or "every," where that is its signification; e.g. "all these trees make a thick shade," is ambiguous ; meaning, either, " every one of them," or, " all together." This is a Fallacy with which men are extremely apt to deceive themselves: for when a multitude of particulars are presented to the mind, many are too weak or too indolent to take a comprebut confine their attention to each single hensive view of them and then decide, infer, and act, accordingly ; e.g, point, by turns the imprudent spendthrift, finding that he is able to afford this, or that, or the other expense, forgets that aU of them together will ruin him. To the same head may be reduced that fallacious reasoning by which men vindicate themselves to their own conscience and to others, for the neglect of those undefined duties, which, though indispensable, and therefore not left to our choice whether we will practise them or not, are left to our discretion as to the mode, and the particular occasions, of practising them e.g. " I am not bound to contribute to this charity in particular ; nor to that ; nor to the
.

^ Remarks on Transportation, pp. 25>

26.

 12.]

OF FALLACIES.

131

other:" the loradicdl conckision which they draw, is, that all may be dispensed with. As men are apt to forget that any two circumstances (not natm'ally connected) are more rarely to be met with combined than separate, though they be not at all incompatible; so also they are apt to imagine, from finding that they are rarely combined, that there is an incompatibility e.g. if the chances are ten to one against a man's possessing strong reasoning powers, and ten to one against exquisite taste, the chances against the combination of the two (supposing them neither connected nor opposed) will be a hundred to one. Many, therefore, from finding them so rarely united, will infer that they are "in some measure incompatible which Fallacy may easily " qualities be exposed in the form of Undistributed middle unfriendly to each other are rarely combined excellence in the reasoning powers, and in taste, are rarely combined ; therefore they are qualities unfriendly to each other.
charity
; ; : ;

12.

other kind of ambiguity arising from the context, and which is the last case of Ambiguous middle that I shall notice, is the **fallacia accidentis: " together with its converse, "fallacia a dido secundum quid ad didum simpliciter; " in each of which the Middle-

The

Faiiacfa

Term is
in itself,

used, in one Premiss to signify something considered simply, and as to its essence ; and in the other Premiss, so as to
:

,^
'^

imply that its Accidents are taken into account with it as in the well-known example, " what is bought in the^ market is eaten; raw meat is bought in the market; therefore raw meat is eaten." Here the Middle has understood in conjunction with it, in the MajorPremiss, " <X5 to its substance merely: " in the Minor, '' as to its condition

y-*-^

and

circumstances.''

may be referred the frequently%unded on the occasional, partial, and temporary variations in the acceptation of some Term, arising from circumstances of person, time, and place, which will occasion something to be understood in conjunction with it beyond its strict literal signification.) JS.G. The word "loyalty," which properly denotes attachment to lawful government, whether of a king,
To
this head, perhaps, as well as to any,

Fallacies which are

president, senate, <kc., according to the respective institutions of

each nation,

has

often been used to signify exclusively, attachment

and that, even when carried beyond the boundaries 0^ law. So, "reformer" has sometimes been limited to the protestant reformers of religion; sometimes, to the advocates of some particular parliamentary reform, &c. And whenever any phrase of
to regal authority
;

kind has become a kind of watch-word or gathering-cry of a employment of it would commonly imply certain sentiments not literally expressed by the words. To assume therefore " that one is friendly or unfriendly to " Loyalty " or to " Reform
this

party, the

; ;

132

OF FALLACIES.

[Book IIL

in one sense, because lie has declared himself friendly or nnfriendlj

it in another sense, when implying and connected with such and such other sentiments, is a Fallacy, such as may fairly be referred to the present head.

to

13.
On the non-logical (or material) Fallacies the question; " Fetitio Principii.
Begging the
ques ion.
:

and

first,

of

**

begging

The indistinct and unphilosophical account which has been given ^^ Logical writers of the Fallacy of " non causa,'' and that of
'' petitio pnncipii,'' makes it very difficult to ascertain wherein they conceived them to differ, and Avhat they understood to be the distinctive character of each. I shall not therefore undertake to conform exactly to their language, but merely to express myself distinctly, without departing more than is necessary for that purpose, from established usage. Let the name then of "petitio principii" {begging tJie question) be confined to those cases in which one of the Premises either is manifestly the same in sense with the Conclusion, or is actually proved from it, or is such as the persons you are addressing ^^ are not likely to know, or to admit, except as an inference from the Conclusion : as, e.g. if any one should infer the authenticity of a certain history, from its recording such and such facts, the reality of which rests on the evidence of that history. All other cases in which a Premiss (whether the expressed or the suppressed one) has no sufficient claim to be admitted, I shall designate as the *' Fallacy of undue assumption of a Premiss." Let it however be observed, that in such cases (apparently) as this, we must not too hastily pronounce the argument fallacious for it may be perfectly fair at the commencement of an argument to assume a Premiss that is not more evident than the Conclusion, or is even ever so paradoxical, provided you proceed to prove fairly that Premiss ; and in like manner it is both usual and fair to begin by deducing your Conclusion from a Premiss exactly equivalent to it which is merely throwing the proposition in question into the form in which it will be most conveniently proved. Arguinf^ in a Circle, however, must necessarily be unfair though it frequently is practised undesignedly; e.g. some Mechanicians attempt to prove, (what they ought to have laid down as a probable but doubtful hypothesis,) that every particle of matter gravitates equally; "why?" because those bodies which contain more particles ever gravitate more strongly, i.e. are heavier: "but (it may be urged) those which are heaviest are not always more bulky;'" **no, but still they contain more particles, though more closely
;

Argufng In

Circle.

83

For of two

propositions, the one

may be

the

more evident

to

some, and the

other, to otliers.

13.]

OF FALLACIES.

133

condensed;" ** liow do you know that?" ""because tliey are heavier;" "how does that prove it?" "hecause all particles of matter gravitating equally, that mass which is specifically the heavier must needs have the more of them in the same space." Of course the narrower the Circle, the less likely it is to escape the detection, either of the reasoner himself, (for men often deceive When there is a long themselves in this way) or of his hearers. circuit of many intervening propositions hefore you come hack to the original Conclusion, it will often not he perceived that the arguments really do proceed in a "Circle :" just as when any one is advancing in a straight line (as we are accustomed to call it) along a plain on this Earth's surface, it escapes our notice that we are really moving along the circumference of a Circle, (since the earth is a glohe) and that if we could go on without interruption in the same line, we should at length arrive at the very spot we set out from. But this we readily perceive, when Ave are walking round a small hill. For instance, if any one argues that you ought to submit to the guidance of himself, or his leader, or his party, &c., because these maintain what is right and then argues that what is so maintained is right, because it is maintained by persons whom you ought to submit to and that these are, himself and his party or again, if any one maintains that so and so must be a thing morally wrong, because it is prohibited in the moral portion of the Mosaic-law, and then, that the prohibition of it does form a part of the moral (not the ceremonial, or the civil) portion of that Law, because it is a thing either of these would be too narrow a Circle to morally ivrong, escape detection, unless several intermediate steps were interposed. And if the form of expression of each proposition be varied every this will time it recurs, the sense of it remaining the same,
; ; ;

greatly aid the deception. Of course, the way to expose the Fallacy, is to reverse this procedure: to narrow the Circle, by cutting off the intermediate steps;

and

time,

same proposition, when it comes round the second same words. Obliquity and disguise being of course most important to the ObHqn'ty ot
to exhibit the

in the

success of the petitio prlneipii as well as of other Fallacies, the Sophist will in general either have recourse to the " Circle," or else not venture to state distinctly his assumption of the point in question, but will rather assert some other proposition which implies

^^p'"**'*"^*''*'

^L^
\J^.*--

it;^ thus keeping out of sight (as a dexterous thief does stolen goods) the point in question, at the very moment when he is taking It for granted. Hence the frequent union of this Fallacy with * ignoratio elenchi:" [vide 15.] The English language is perhaps
8* Gibbon affords the most remarkable instances of this kind of style. That

^ ^J^ \h^ V

(j^

His way of writing reminds position. one of those pei-sons who never dare look

which he

speak of, is hardly ever made the Subject of his Proreally

to

means

you

full in

the face,

: ;

134

OF FALLACIES.
suitable for the Fallacy of petitio p^incipii,

[Book

III.

from its being the more formed from two distinct languages, and thus abounding in synonymous expressions, which have no resemblance in sound, and no connexion in etymology; so that a Sophist may bring forward a proposition expressed in words of Saxon origin, and give as a reason for it, the very same proposition stated in words of Norman origin e.g. "to allow every man an unbounded freedom of speech must always be, on the whole, advantageous to the State for it is highly conducive to the interests of the Community, that each individual should enjoy a liberty perfectly unlimited, of expressing his sentiments."
;

u.
Undue

The next head is, the falsity, or, at least, undue assumption, of ^ Pj-gj^iigg ^h^t is not equivalent to, or dependent on, the Conclusion which, as has been before said, seems to correspond nearly with the meaning of Logicians, when they speak of " non causa pro This name indeed would seem to imply a much narrower causa.^^ class: there being one species of arguments which are from cause to effect; in which, of course, two things are necessary; 1st, the 2d, its establishment these are the two sufficiency of the cause if therefore the former be unduly assumed, we are Premises arguing from that which is not a sufficient cause as if it were so e.g. as if one should contend from such a man's having been unjust or cruel, that he will certainly be visited with some heavy temporal judgment, and come to an untimely end. In this instance the Sophist, from having assumed, in the Premiss, the (granted) existence of a pretended cause, infers, in the Conclusion, the existence of the pretended effect, which we have supposed to be the Question. Or vice versa, the pretended eifect may be employed to establish the cause e.g. infemng sinfulness from temporal calamity. But when both the pretended cause and effect are granted, i.e. granted to eodst, then the Sophist will infer something from their pretended conneodon; i.e. he will assume as a Premiss, that *' of these two admitted facts, the one is the cause of the other:" as Whitfield attributed his being overtaken by a hail-storm to his having not preached at the last town or as the opponents of the Reformation assumed that it was the cause of the troubles which took place at that period, and thence inferred that it was an evil, giprnputfor Many are the cases in which a Sign (see Bhet. Part I.) from ^*^ which one might fairly infer a certain phenomenon, is mistaken for the Cause of it (as if one should suppose the falling of the mercury to be a cause of rain of which it certainly is an indication) great deal whereas the fact will often be the very reverse. U.G. of money in a country is a pretty sure proof of its wealth ; and thence has been often regarded as the cause of it whereas in truth The same, with a numerous and increasing populait is an effect.
assump
I

n.

114.]

OF FALLACIES.

135

Again, The labour bestowed on any commodity has often been represented as the cause of its vahie though every one would call a fine pearl an article of value, even though he should meet with it accidentally in eating an oyster. Pearls are indeed generally obtained by laborious diving but they do not fetch a high price from that cause; but on the contrary men dive for them because they fetch a high price. ^ So also exposure to want and hardship in youth, has been regarded as a cause of the hardy constitution of those men and brutes which have been brought up in barren countries of uncongenial climate. Yet the most experienced cattle-breeders know that animals are, cceterls paribus, the more hardy for having been well fed and sheltered in youth but early
tlon.
;
:

hardships, by destroying all the tender, ensure the hardiness of the survivors ; which is the cause, not the effect, of their having lived through such a training. So, loading a gun-barrel to the muzzle,

and

firing

it,

does not give

it

strength; though

it

proves,

if it

escape, that

it

wa^

strong.

is more common than to hear a person Appeal to from his own experience, that such and such a Ixpedeuca. patient was cured by this or that medicine whereas all that he absolutely knows, is that he took the medicine, and that he recovered. Similar is the procedure of many who are no theorists forsooth, but have found by experience that the diffusion of education disqualifies the lower classes for humble toil. They have perhaps experienced really a deterioration in this last respect and having a dislike to education, they shut their eyes to the increase of pauperism i.e. of the habit of depending on parish-pay, rather than on independent exertions which, to any unprejudiced eye would seem the most natural mode of explaining the relaxation of those exertions. But such men require us, on the ground that they are practical men, to adopt the results of their experience i.e. to acquiesce in their crude guesses as to cause and effect, (like that of the rustic who

In like manner, nothing

state confidently, as

Tenterden-steeple the cause of Goodwin Sands,) precisely because they are no^. accustomed to reason. I believe we may* refer to the same head the apprehensions so Hurtful often entertained, that a change, however small, and however in attr^biued itself harmless, is necessarily a dangerous thing, as tending to ones^^""^*^^* 2^roduce extensive and hurtful innovations. Many instances may be found of small alterations being followed by great and mischievous ones ^^ but I doubt whether all history can furnish an instance of the greater innovation having been, properly speaking, caused by the lesser. Of course the first change will always precede the second and many mischievous innovations have taken place but these may all I think be referred to a mistaken effort to obtain some good, or get
;

made

rid of

some

evil

not to the love of innovation for

its

own

sake.

The

35 Pol.

Econ. Lect. IX.

p. 253.

^ " Post hoc

ergo, propter hoc."

136

OF FALLACIES.

[Book

III.

mass of mankind are, in tlie serious concerns of life, wedded to what established and customary and when they make rash changes, this may often he explained hy the too long postponement of the
is
;

which allows (as in the case of the Reformation) reach an intolerable height, before any remedy is thought of. And even then, the remedy is often so violently resisted by many, as to drive others into dangerous extremes. And when this occurs, we are triumphantly told that experience shows what mischievous excesses are caused by once beginning to innovate. *' I told you that if once you began to repair your house, you would have to pull it all down." " Yes but you told me wrong for if I had begun sooner, the replacing of a few tiles might have sufficed. The mischief was, not in taking down the first stone, but in letting it stand too long." Cause and Such an argument as any of these might strictly be called non reason ;'^ but it is not probable that the Logical writers confounded causa pro causa together. intended any such limitation (which indeed would be wholly unnecessary and impertinent,) but rather that they were confounding together cause and reason; the sequence of Conclusion from Premises being perpetually mistaken for that of effect from physical cause.^'^ It may be better, therefore, to drop the name which tends to perpetuate this confusion, and simply to state (when such is the case) that the premiss is ** unduly assumed;" i.e. without being either self-evident, or satisfactorily proved. The contrivances by which men may deceive themselves or others, in assuming Premises unduly, so that that undue assumption shrill not be perceived, (for it is in this the Fallacy consists) are of course infinite. Sometimes (as was before observed) the doubtful Premiss is suppressed, as if it were too evident to need being proved, or even stated, and as if the whole question turned on the establishment of the other premiss. Thus Home Tooke proves, by an immense induction, that all particles were originally nouns or verbs; and thence concludes, that in reality they are so still, and that the ordinary division of the parts of speech is absurd ; keeping out of sight, as self-evident, the other premiss, which is absolutely false ; viz. that the meaning and force of a word, now, and for ever, must be
requisite changes;
evils to
;
;

'

that which
Indirect

it,

or

its root,

originally bore.

tusumption.

Sometimes men are shamed into admitting an unfounded assertion, by being confidently told, that it is so evident, that it would argue great weakness to doubt it. In general, however, the more skilful Sophist will avoid a direct assertion of what he means unduly to assume because that might direct the reader's attention to the consideration of the question whether it be true or not , since that which is indisputable does not so often need to be asserted. It
;

succeeds better, therefore, to allude to the proposition, as something curious and remarkable; just as the Royal Society were

W See Appendix,

No.

I. article

Reason.

511.]

OF FALLACIES.

137

imposed on hj being asked to account for the fact tliat a vessel of no addition to its weight by a dead fish put into it; while they were seeking for the cause, they forgot to ascertain the Thus fact; and thus admitted without suspicion a mere fiction. an eminent Scotch writer,^ instead of asseHing that the " advocates of Logic have been worsted and driven from the field in every controversy," (an assertion which, if made, would have been the more readily ascertained to be perfectly groundless,) merely observes, that " it is a circumstance not a little remarkable.^*
water received

Again, any one who is decrying all appeal to evidence in behalf of Christianity, (see Appendix III. Note) will hardly venture to assert flainly that such was the practice of the Apostles, and that they called on men to believe what they preached, without any reason
for believing.

truth.

He
of
*'

will

Thai would present too glaring a contrast to the succeed better by merely dwelling on the earnest

demand

faith"

made by

the Apostles

trusting that the inadver-

tent reader will forget that the hasis on which this

demand was
;

made

to rest, was, the evidence of miracles

and prophecies

and

will thus

be led to infer that we are to imitate the Apostles by a

is

procedure Avhich

in fact the opposite of theirs.

One

of the

many

contrivances employed for this purpose,

is

what

Fallacy of

may be called the "Fallacy ai references;'' which is particularly common in popular theological works. It is of course a circumto be supported

stance which adds great weight to any assertion, that it shall seem by many passages of Scripture, or of the Fathers and other ancient writers, whose works are not in many people's

hands.

a writer can find few or none of these, that and decidedly favour his opinion, he may at least find many which may be conceived capable of being so understood, or which, in some way or other, remotely relate to the subject but if these texts were inserted at length, it would be at once perceived
distinctly
;

Now when

how

little

they bear on the question

the usual artifice therefore

is,

to give merely re/^rgwces. to

them

trusting that nineteen out of

will never take the trouble of turning to the passages, but, taking for granted that they afford, each, some J'degree of confirmation to what is maintained, will be overa wed by seeing every^ assertion supported, as they suppose, by five or sTx " Scnjptm*e-Fextv asmaiiy from tlic Fathers, &c. '"*

twenty readers

Great force is often added to the employment In a declamatory work, of the fallacy now before us, by bitterly reproaching or deriding an opponent, as denying some sacred truth, or some evident axiom assuming, that is, that he denies the true premiss, and keeping out of sight the one on which the question really turns. E.G. A declaimer who is maintaining some doctrine as being taught in Scripture, may impute to his opponents a contempt for the
;

SB

Dugald Stewart.

138

OF FALLACIES.
;

[Book IIL

authority of Scripture, and reproach them for impiety when the question really is, whether the doctrine he scriptural or not. CombinaFrequently the Fallacy of irrelevant-conclusion [ignoratio elencM] i.e. the Premiss is assumed on the Fallacy with Is Called In to the aid of this the followgj.Qund of another proposition, somewhat like it, having heen proved.
;

Thus, in arguing by example, <fcc. the parallelism of two cases is assumed from their being in some respects alike, though perhaps they differ in the very point which is essential to the argument. JiJ.G. From the circumstance that some men of humble station, who have been well educated, are apt to think themselves above low drudgery, it is argued, that universal education of. the lower orders would beget general idleness this argument rests, of course, on the assumption of parallelism in the two cases, viz. the past and the future whereas there is a circumstance that is absolutely essential, in which they differ for when education is universal, it must ceasel to be a distinction; which is probably the very circumstance that renders men too proud for their ^vork. Again, parallels have been drawn by Hume, (in his Essay on Miracles) and by Christian writers, between the miracles recorded in the New Testament, and those in the Legends of pretended Saints which last were received just as counterfeit coin is, from its
often
:

resemblance to genuine. This very same Fallacy is often resorted to on the opposite side an attempt is made to invalidate some argument from Example, by pointing out a diference between the two cases though they agree in every thing that is essential to the question. It should be added that we may often be deceived, not only by ot^^Tob^w" admitting a premiss which is absolutely unsupported, but also, by lities. attributing to one which really is probable, a greater degree ot probability than rightly belongs to it. And this effect will often be produced by our omitting to calculate the probability in each successive step of a long chain of argument, and being, in each, (see 11,) deceived by the fallacy of Division. Each premiss successively introduced, may have, as was above explained, an excess of chances in its favour, and yet the ultimate conclusion may have a great preponderance against it; e.g. "All Y is (probably) X: all Z is (probably) Y: therefore Z is (probably) X:" now suppose the truth of the major premiss to be more probable than not ; in other words, that the chances for it are more than ^ ; say f ; and for the truth of the minor, let the chances be greater still say | then by multiplying together the numerators, and also the denominators of these two fractions, fX|, we obtain, /y, as indicating the degree of which is less than -} i.e. the conprobability of the conclusion F.G. ^* The reports this clusion is less likely to be true than not. author heard are (probably) true this (something which he records) is a report which (probably) he heard; therefore it is true;" supas 4 out of 7, pose, first, The majority of the reports he heard,
: ; : ; ; ;

i J5.]

OF FALLACIES.

139

(or

m
it

12 of 21,) to be true and, next, That he generally, as twice three times, (or 8 in 12,) repeats faithfully what he heard; follows that of 21 of his reports, only 8 are true.
;

Of course, the results are proportionahly striking when there is a long series of arguments of this description. And yet weak and thoughtless reasoners are often influenced by hearing a great deal in supurged, a great number of probabilities brought forward, port of some conclusion i.e. a long chain, of which each successive link is w^eaker than the foregoing instead of (what they mistake it for) a cumulation of arguments, each, separately, proving the

certainty or probability, of the same conclusion.^^ Lastly, it may be here remarked, conformably with

been formerly
of

said, that it wall often

be

left to

what has your choice whether

to refer this or that fallacious

;

argument to the present head, or that Ambiguous-Middle *' if the middle term is here used in this sense, there is an ambiguity; if in tJiat sense, the proposition is

false."

15.
The
last

kind of Fallacy to be noticed

called ignoratio elenchi.

is

that of Irrelevant-Con-

Jf;^eieynt
'"' Conciusioiw

elusion,

commonly

Various kinds of propositions are, according to the occasion, substituted for the one of which proof is required. Sometimes the Particular for the Universal ; sometimes a proposition with different

Terms and various are the contrivances employed to effect and to conceal this substitution, and to make the Conclusion which the
:

*>

The converse
18.

fallacy is treated of

buted to him by some one likely to be

pretty well-informed: let the probability of the Conclusion, as deduced from one of these arguments by itself, be supposed

below in

there really are several distinct and independent arguments, not incompatible, and not connected, each separately provmg the probability ot the same conclusion, we compute, from our estimate of the degree of probability of each, the joint [cumulafivel force of them, by the same sort ot calculation as the above, only reversed: viz. as, in the ca^e oi two probable premises the conclusion is not estabhslied except on the supposition ot their being both true, so, in the case of two (and the like holds good with any

When

| ^nd, '
.

in the other case

,
,

f
v.

then the opi.i

.,

^^^'^^ probabihties will be, respectively,

-n

and t; which multiplied together give |2 ^^^ probability against the Con^.jusion i.e. the chance that the work
-f

^lay noi be his, notwithstanding those i-easons for believing that it is: and consequently the probability in favour of
^,

that Conclusion will be

\^

-n

i.

23 ^5; or nearly *.
,

number)

and independent indications of the truth of some proposition, unless both of them fail, the proposition must be true: we therefore multiply
distinct

Observe however that, in some cases, a perfectly distinct argument arises from
the combination of certain circumstances, which have, each separately, no force at all, or very little, towards estabhshing a conclusion which yet may be inferred,

together the fractions indicating the probability of /ai7z-e of each, the chances o^atV/sMt; and the result being the total chances against the establishment of the conclusion by these arguments, this fraction being deducted from unity, the remainder gives the probability for it. certain book is conjectured to be E.G. by such and such an author, partly, 1st.

from

resemblance in style to his known works, partly (2dly) from its being attriits

perhaps with a moral certainty, from that combination, when those circumstances are such that the chances are very great against their accidental concurrence. jB.O.When two or more pei-sons, undeserving of credit, coincide (where collusion would be impossible) in a full and circumstantial detail of some transaction. (See Rhet. Part. I. Ch. H. 4.)

See Postscript.

HO
Sophist
lias

OF FALLACIES.
to

[Book

III.

drawn, answer, practically, tlie same purpose as the one have estabhshed. I say, " practically the same purpose," because it will very often happen that some emotion will be excited some sentiment impressed on the mind (by a dexterous employment of this Fallacy) such as shall bring men into the disposition requisite for your purpose, though they may not have assented to, or even stated distinctly in their own minds, the proThus if a Sophist jposition which it was your business to establish.^ has to defend one who has been guilty of some serious offence, which he wishes to extenuate, though he is unable distinctly to prove that it is not such, yet if he can succeed mmaJcing the audience laugh at some casual matter, he has gained practically tha same

he ought

point.

So also if any one has pointed out the extenuating circumstances some particular case of offence, so as to show that it differs widely from the generality of the same class, the Sophist, if he
in

find himself unable to disprove these circumstances,

may

do away

the force of them, by simply referring the action to that very class, which no one can deny that it belongs to, and the very name of w^hich will excite a feeling of disgust sufficient to counteract the and that many extenuation e.g. let it be a case of peculation mitigating circumstances have been brought forward which cannot be denied, the sophistical opponent will repl}^ *' Well, but after
; ;

this

man is a rogue, and there is an end of it;" now in reality was (by hypothesis) never the question and the mere assertion of what was never denied, ougld not, in fairness, to be regarded as
all,

the

Combination of this

Fallacy with the foregoing.

decisive; but practically, the odiousness of the word, arising in great measure from the association of those very circumstances which belong to most of the class, but which we have supposed to be absent in this particular instance, excites precisely that feeling of disgust, which in effect destroys the force of the defence. In like manner we may refer to this head, all cases of improper appeals to the passions, and every thing else which is mentioned by Aristotle as extraneous to the matter in hand {l^a rov 'Trpu.yfiurog.) In all these cases, as has been before observed, if the fallacy we are now treating of be employed for the apparent establishment, not of the ultimate Conclusion, but (as it very commonly happens) of a Premiss, {i.e. if the Premiss required be assumed on the ground that some proposition resembling it has been proved) then there will be a combination of this Fallacy with the last mentioned. For instance, instead of proving that ** this Prisoner has committed an atrocious fraud," you prove that ** the fraud he is accused of is atrocious:" instead of proving (as in the well-known tale of Cyrus and the two coats) that " the taller boy had a right to force the other boy to exchange coats with him," you prove that **the

See Rhetoric, Part II.

5 lo.l

OF FALLACIES.

141

exchange m'OuW have been advantageous to both:" Instead of proving mat ' a man has not a right to educate his children or to dispose of lAs* property, in the way he thinks best,'' you show that the way in which he educates his children, or disposes of his property is not *' the poor ought to be really the best: instead of proving that reheved in this Avay rather than in that," you prove that " the poor ought to be relieved:'' instead of proving that " an irrational-agent whether a brute or a madman can never be deterred from any act by apprehension of punishment," (as for instance, a dog, from sheepbiting, by fear of being beaten) you prove that '* the beating of one dog does not operate as an example to other dogs," &,g. and then you proceed to assume as premises, conclusions different from what have really been established. A good instance of the employment and exposure of this Fallacy occurs in Thucydides, in the speeches of Cleon and Diodotus conthe former (over and above his appeal to cerning the Mitylenseans the angry passions of his audience) urges the justice of putting the which, as the latter remarked, was nothing to revolters to death the purpose, since the Athenians were not sitting m judgment, but And to in deliberation; of which the proper end is expedie'ticy. prove that they had a right to put them to death, did not prove this to be an advisoLle step. It is evident, that ignoi^aiio elenchi may be employed as well for This fallacy the apparent refutation of your opponent's proposition, as for the ?efutatior. apparent establishment of your own for it is substantially the same thing, to prove what was not denied, or to disprove what was not The latter practice is not less common and it is more asserted. offensive, because it frequently amounts to a personal affront, in attributing to a person opinions, &c. which he perhaps holds in Thus, when in a discussion one party vindicates, on abhorrence. the ground of general expediency, a particular instance of resistance to Government in a case of intolerable oppression, the opponent may gravely maintain, that "we ought not to do evil that good may come:" a proposition which of course had never been denied; the point in dispute being " whether resistance in this particular case were doing evil or not." Or again, by way of disproving the assertion of the " 7igM of private-judgment in religion," one may hear a grave argument to prove that "it is impossible every one can be right in his judgment." In these examples, it is to be remarked, (as well as in some given just above,) that the Fallacy of petitlo principli is combined with that of ignoratio elenchi ; which is a very common and often successful practice viz. the Sophist proves, or disproves, not the proposition which is really in question, but one which is so dependent on it as to proceed on the supposition that it by this means his is already decided, and can admit of no doubt ** assumption of the point in question" is so indirect and oblique, that it may easily escape notice ; and he thus estabhshes, practi-

142

OF FALLACIES.
moment he
E.G.
is
it

[Book

III,

tuiii

ad

houunem,

witlidrawivg y'.ur will prove, and dwell on the high criminality of a certain act, and the propriety of severely punishing it; assuming (instead of proving) the commission. There are certain kinds of argument recounted and named hy Logical writers, which we should by no means universally call Fallacies but which luhen unfairly used, and so far as they are such as fallacious, may very well be referred to the present head the " argumentumad hominem,'' ["or personal argument,"] " argilmentum ad verecundiam/' " argumentum ad populum," &c. all of ;'^ them regarded as contradistinguished from '' argumentum ad rem or, according to others (meaning probably the very same thing) These have all been described in the lax and *' ad judicium.'' popular language before alluded to, but not scientifically: the " argumentum ad hominem,'' they say, *' is addressed to the peculiar circumstances, character, avowed opinions, or past conduct of the individual, and therefore has a reference to him only, and does not bear directly and absolutely on the real question, as the argumentum ad rem' does:" in like manner, the ''argumentum ad verecundiam" is described as an appeal to our reverence for some respected authority, some venerable institution, &c. and the ''argumentum ad popidum," as an appeal to the prejudices, passions, <fec. of the Along with these is usually enumermultitude and so of the rest. ated "argumentum ad ignoraniiam," which is here omitted, as being evidently nothing more than the employment of some kind of Fallacy, in the widest sense of that word, towards such as are likely
attention from
to another question.

cally, his Conclusion, at tlie very

An advocate

'

to be deceived
Technical
analysis or

by

it.

personal

argument,

speak rather more technically) that in the the conclusion which actually is established, is not the absolute and general one in question, but relative and particular; viz, not that " such and such is the fact," but that *' this man is bound to admit it, in conformity to his principles of Reasoning, or in consistency with his own conduct, situation," Such a conclusion it is often both allowable and necessary <fec.*^
It

appears then

(to

"argumentum ad hominem"

*1

The "argumentum ad hominem"

will often have the etiect of shifting the burden of proof, not unjustly, to the

adversary. (See Rhet. Part. I. Chap. IIL common instance is the defence, 2.) certainly the readiest and most concise, frequently urged by the Sportsman, when accused of barbarity in sacrificing unoffending hares or trout to his amusement:

subsist in health and vigour without flesh-diet; and the earth would support a much greater human population were such a practice universal.

replies, as he may safely do, to most of his assailants, " why do you feed on the flesh of the harmless sheep and ox?" and that this answer presses hard, is manifested by its being usually opposed by a palpable falsehood; viz. that the animals winch are killed for food are sacrificed to our necessities; though not only men caw, but a large proportion (probably a great majority) ot the human race actually do,

he

When shamed out of this argument they sometimes urge that the brute creation would overrun the earth, if we did not kill them for food; an argument, which, if it were valid at all, would not justify their feeding on Jish; though, if fairly followed up, it ^row^rf justify Swift's proposal for keeping down the excessive
l)opulation of Ireland. The true reason, i-iz. that they eat flesh for the gratification' of the palate, and have a inste for tlie pleasures of the table, though not for tbo sports of the field, is one jvhich they do not like to assign.

116.1

OP FALLACIES.

143

order to silence those who will not yield to fair general argument; or to convince those whose weakness and prejudices would not allow them to assign to it its due weight. It is thus that our Lord on many occasions silences the cavils of the Jews; as in the vindication of healing on the Sabbath, which is paralleled by the authorized practice of drawing out a beast that has fallen into a pit. All this, as we have said, is perfectly fair, provided it be done plainly, and avowedly; but if you attempt to substitute this partial and relative Conclusion for a more general one if you triumph as having established your proposition absolutely and universally, from having established it, in reality, only as far aa it relates to your opponent, then you are guilty of a Fallacy of the kind which we are now treating of: your Conclusion is not in reality that which was, by your own account, proposed to be proved. The fallaciousness depends upon the deceit, or attempt to deceive. The same observations will apply to " argumentum ad verecundiam,^* and the rest. It is very common to employ an ambiguous Term for the purpose Ambiguous of introducing the Fallacy of irrelevant conclusion: i.e. when y mi employed in cannot prove your proposition in the sense in which it was main- this Fallacy, tained, to prove it in some other sense; e.g. those who contend against the efficacy oi faith, usually employ that word in their arguments in the sense of mere helief, unaccompanied with any moral or practical result, but considered as a mere intellectual process ; and when they have thus proved their conclusion, they oppose it to one in which the word is used in a widely different sense.*^
to establish,

16.

The Fallacy of ** irrelevant-conclusion" [ignoratio elenchi] nowhere more common than in protracted controversy, when one

is sh-fting

of

^'""

the parties, after having attempted in vain to maintain his position, shifts his ground as covertly as possible to another, instead of honestly giving up the point. An instance occurs in an attack made
the occasion or object in is not such as calls for, or as is likely to excite in those particular readers

*2"When

question

or hearei-s, the emotions required, it is a common Rhetorical artifice to turn their attention to some object which icill call forth these feelings; and when they are too much excited to be capable of judging
calmly, it will not be difficult to turn their rassions, once roused, in the direction required, and to make them view the case before them in a very different light. When the metal is heated it may easily be moulded into the desired form, Thus vehement indignation against some crime, may be directed against a person who has not been proved guilty of it; and vague declamations against corruption. oppression, &c. or against the mischiefs of anarchy; with high-tiown panegyrics

liberty, rights of man, &c. or on socialorder, justice, the constitution, law, religion, &c. will gradually lead the hearers to take for granted, without proof, that the measure proposed will lead to these evils, or to these advantages; and it will in consequence become the object of groundless abhorrence or admiration, For the very utterance of such words as have a multitude of what may be called stimulating ideas associated with them, will operate like a charm on the minds, especially of the ignorant and unthinking, and raise such a tumult of feeling, as will effectually blind their judgment; so that a string of vague abuse or panegyric will often have the effect of a train of sound

on

Argument."iS/tetortc, PartII.Chap.il.
6.

;; ;'

144

OF FALLACIES.

[Book

III.

on the system pursued at one of our Universities. The ohjectors, finding themselves unable to maintain their charge of the preseQit neglect {viz. in the year 1810) of Mathematics in that place, (to which neglect they attributed the "late general decline'' in those

and contended that that University never famous for Mathematicians:" which not only does not establish, but absolutely overthrows, their own original assertion; for if it never succeeded in those pursuits, it could not have caused
studies) shifted their ground,

"was

their late decline.

Fallacy of

combating the two Premises

Rlternately.

viz.

oral controversy especially that of combating both your opponent's Premises alternately, and shifting the attack from the one to the other, without waiting to '* And besides^ have either of them decided upon before you quit it.
'

A practice of this nature is common in

is

an expression one

may

often hear from a disputant

who

is

pro-

ceeding to a fresh argument, when he cannot establish, and yet wiU not abandon, his first. It has been remarked above, that one class of the propositions that may be, in this Fallacy, substituted for the one required, is the particular for the universal : similar to this, is the substitution of a conditional with a universal antecedent, for one with a particular antecedent which will usually be the harder to prove e.g. you are called on, suppose, to prove that "if any {i.e. some) private interests are hurt by a proposed measure, it is inexpedient;" and you pretend to have done so by showing that "if all private Nearly akin to interests are hurt by it, it must be inexpedient." this is the very common case of proving something to be possible when it ought to have been proved highly probable ; or pnvbable, when it ought to have been proved necessary ; or, which comes to the very same, proving it to be not necessary, when it should have been proved not probable; or improbable, when it should have been proved impossible. Aristotle {in Rhet. Book II.) complains of this last branch of the Fallacy, as giving an undue advantage to the respondent many a guilty person owes his acquittal to this the jury considering that the evidence brought does not demonstrate the complete impossibility of his being innocent ; though perhaps the chances are innumerable against it.
;
:

17.
Fallacy of Objections.

that which may be called the Fallacy of objections : i.e. showing that there are objections against some plan, theory, or system, and thence inferring that it should be rejected when that which ougU to have been proved is, that there are more^ or stronger objections, against the receiving than the rejecting of it. This is the main, and almost universal Fallacy of anti-christians and is that of which a young Christian should be first and principally

Similar to this case

is

warned.**

They

find

numerous "objections" against various parts

See Note at the end of Appendix, No. III.

5 17.]

OF FALLACIES.

lio

of Scripture ; to some of which no satisfactory answer can be given and the incautious hearer is apt, while his attention is fixed on these, to forget that there are infinitely more, and stronger objections against the supposition that the Christian Religion is of human origin and that where we cannot answer all objections, we are bound in reason and in candour to adopt the hypothesis which labours under the least. That the case is as I have stated, I am authorized to assume, from this circumstance ; that no complete and consistent account has ever been given of the manner in which the Christian Beligion, sujjposing it a human contrivance, could have And yet this may obviously be arisen and prevailed as it did. demanded with the utmost fairness, of thQse who deny its divine origin. The Religion exists : that is the phenomenon ; those who will not allow it to have come from God, are bound to solve the phenomenon on some other hypothesis less open to objections. They are not indeed called on to prove that it actually did arise in this or that way ; but to suggest (consistently with acknowledged facts) some probable way in which it may have arisen, reconcileable with all the circumstances of the case. That infidels have never done this, though they have had 1 800 years to try, amounts to a confession that no such hypothesis can be devised, which will not be open to greater objections than lie against Christianity.'** The Fallacy of Objections is also the stronghold of bigoted anti- Reforms are innovators, who oppose all reforms and alterations indiscriminately ; ob/eaions. for there never was, or will be, any plan executed or proposed, against which strong and even unanswerable objections may not be urged so that unless the opposite objections be set in the balance on the other side, we can never advance a step. B.G. The defenders of the Transportation-system a system which, as an eminent writer has observed, was *' begun in defiance of all Reason, and persevered " in, in defiance of all Experience are accustomed to ask *' what kind of Secondary-punishment would you substitute?" and if any one is suggested, they adduce the objections, and difficulties, real and apparent, to which it is exposed if another is proposed, they proceed in the same manner ; and so on, without end. For of all the other plans of Secondary-punishment that have ever been tried, or imagined, the best must be open to S077ie objections, though the very vjorst is much less objectionable than Transportation.*^ *' There are objections," said Dr. Johnson, "against a plenum, and objec" tions against a vacuum; but one of them must be true." The very same Fallacy indeed is employed (as has been said) on the other side, by those who are for overthrowing whatever is established as soon as they can prove an objection agamst it witli; ;

In an " Essay on the Omissions of our Sacred Writers," I have pointed out some circumstances which no one has ever attempted to account for on any supposition of their being other than, not
4*

only

trtie

witnesses, but supematurally

inspired. ^5 See Letters to Eiarl portation.

Grey on Trani^

Wb


146

OF FALLACIES.

[Book

Tir,

out considering whether more and weightier objections may not lie against their own schemes ; but their opponents have this decided advantage over them, that they can urge with great plausibiHty, ** we do not call upon you to reject at once whatever is objected to, but merely to suspend your judgment, and not come to a decision as long as there are reasons on both sides:" now since there always will be reasons on both sides, this non-decision is practically the very same thing as a decision in favour of the existing state of things. *'Not to resolve, is to resolve."*^ The delay of trial becomes
ecjuivalent to

an acquittal}^

18.
Fallacy of proving a part of the question.

Another form of ignoroiio

some part of that which
all
is

elenchi,

which

is

also rather the

more

serviceable on the side of the respondent,

required,

is,

to prove or disprove
tlmt,

and dwell on

suppressing

the rest.

Art of
framing a
lieply.

Thus, if a University is charged with cultivating only the mere elements of Mathematics, and in reply a list of the books studied there is produced, should even any one of those books be not elementary, the charge is in fairness refuted but the Sophist may then earnestly contend that some of those books are elementary and thus keep out of sight the real question, viz. whether they are all so.*^ So, also, one may maintain (with perfect truth) that mere intellectual ability are insufficient for the the reasoning powers alone attainment of truth in religious questions (see Appendix III. Note) and may thence proceed to assume (as if it were the same proposition) that all employment of reasoning all intellectual cultivation are perfectly useless on such questions, and are to be discarded as foreign from the subject. This is the great art of the answerer of a book suppose the main positions in any work to be irrefragable, it will be strange if some ilkistration of them, or some subordinate part, in short, will not admit of a plausible objection the opponent then joins issue on one of these incidental questions, and comes forward with "a Reply" to such and such a work. And such a *' Reply" is still easier and more plausible, when it happens as it often will that a real and satisfactory refutation can be found of some one, or more, of several arguments, each, singly, proving completely the same conclusion (as many a theorem of Euclid admits of several different demonstrations ;) or an answer to one or more of several objections, each, separately, though it is evident on decisive against a certain scheme or theory reflection, that if the rest, or any one of them, remain unrefuted and
;

**
*T

Bacon.

How happy it is for mankind that in

of
tneir decision
is

manyof the most momentous concerns

life

Elexity of doubt and the danger of delay, I but also from the pain of regret: since vve acquiesce much more cheerfully in that

generally formed for

them by external circumstances; which thus saves them not only from the per-

which is unavoidable, ^ " Reply to calumnies of Edinburgh Review agamst Oxford," 1810.

 19.]

OF FALLACIES.

147

unanswerable, the conclusion is established, ar^d stands as firm as if the answerer had urged nothing. He who thus replies to the arguments urged, is in the condition of a commander defending all the practicable breaches in a fortiThis kind of partial " reply" is properlyfication, except one. available only in a case where each of the arguments does not go to establish the certainty, but only the probability, of the conclusion. Then indeed, the conclusion resting not wholly on the force of any one of the arguments, but on the combination of them, is propor-

The fallacy refutation of any of them. speaking of consists in the confounding of the precedingcase either with this latter, or with the case formerly noticed [14] of a chain of arguments, each proving, not, the same conclusion, but a premiss of the succeeding. Hence the danger of ever advancing more than can be well Danger of maintained, since the refutation of that will often quash the whole, too much. The Quakers would perhaps before now have succeeded in doing away our superfluous and irreverent oaths, if they had not, besides many valid and strong arguments, adduced so many that are weak and easily refuted. Thus also, a guilty person may often escape by having too much laid to his charge so he may also, by having too much evidence against him, i.e. some that is not in itself satisfactory. Accordingly, a prisoner may sometimes obtain acquittal by showing that one of the witnesses against him is an infamous informer and spy though perhaps if that part of the evidence had been omitted, the rest would have been sufficient for conviction. Cases of this nature might very well be referred also to the Fallacy formerly mentioned, of inferring the Falsity of the Conclusion from the Falsity of a Premiss which indeed is very closely allied to the present Fallacy: the real question is, " whether or not this Conclusion ought, to be admitted;'' the Sophist confines himself to the question, '* whether or not it is established by this particular argument;'' leaving it to be inferred by the audience, if he has carried his point as to the latter question, that the former is thereby decided which is then, and then only, a correct inference, when there is good reason for believing that other and better arguments would liavo been adduced, if there had been any. (See above, at the end of 6.)
tionably
I

weakened by the

am now

19.
be perceived that nothing is less conducive to the success of the Fallacy in question, than to state clearly, in the outset, either the proposition you are about to prove, or that which you ought to prove. It answers best to begin with the Premises, and to introduce a pretty long chain of argument before you arrive
It will readily
suppressed

The careless hearer takes for granted, at the beginning, that this chain will lead to the Conclusion required and by the time you are come to the end, he is ready to take for granted
at the Conclusion.
;


148

OF FALLACIES.
;

[Book

III.

was to be were distinctly stated. The practice therefore and it Is better in general to avoid it, and to is at best suspicious give and require a distinct statement of the Conclusion intended. The Fallacy now before us is, perhaps, the most common form of that confusion of thought to which those are liable who have been irregularly and unskilfully educated who have collected perhaps a considerable amount of knowledge, without arrangement, and without cultivation of logical habits who have learned (as I have heard it expressed) a good many answers without the questions. Most of the erroneous views in Morals, and in other subjects, which prevail among such persons, may be exhibited in the form of " Fallacies of Irrelevant-conclusion."^^ B.G. The well-known wrong decision -'especting the two boys and their coats, for which Cyrus was punished by his preceptor, was a mistake of the real question which was, not, " which codii fitted each boy the best," but " who had the
proved," than
if it
;
;

that the Conclusion which you draw is the one required This the question having gradually hecome indistinct. greatly aided by the common practice of suppressing the and leaving it to be supplied by the hearer who is of likely to perceive whether it be really that *' which
;

his idea of

Fallacy is Conclusion course less

them." And similar cases to this occur every day. An exact parallel is to be found In the questions relative to the imposition of restrictions or other penalties on those of a different creed from our own. They are usually argued as if the point to be decided were " which religion is the better," or, " whether the differences between them are Important instead of being, whether one man has a right to compel others to profess his religion," or, *' whether the professors of the true Faith have a right to monopolize secular power and civil privileges." Or again (to put the same principles into another form) the questions "whether it be allowable for a Christian to fight in defending himself from oppression and outrage,"*-* and "whether a Christian magistrate may employ physical coercion and Inflict secular punishment on evil-doers," these, are perpetually confounded with the questions "whether Christians are allowed to fight as such; i.e. to fight for their Religion, against those who corrupt or reject the Faith;" and,
right to ^is^o^Q of
; ' '
'

'

* *' The Fallacy consists in confounding tosrether the unbroken Apostolical succession of a christian Ministry, general/y, and the same succession in an unbroken line, of this or that individual Minister, if if Ifeach man's christian hope is made to rest on his receiving the chnstian Ordinances at the hands of a Minister to whom the sacramental virtue" [of ordination] " that gives efficacy to those ordinances, has been transmitted in unbroken succession from hand to hand, every thing must depend on ^Aa^par^zcular Minister : and /s claim is by no means established n:om our merely establishing
if.
:)^ i(.
:)(.

the uninterrupted existence of suck a dass of men as christian Miiiisters. You teach me, a man might say, that my salvation depends on the possession by you iho. particular Pastor under whom I am placed of a certain qualification; and when I ask for the proof that you possess it, you prove to me that it is possessed generally^ by a certain class of persons of whom you are one, and probably by a large majority of them!" Om the Kingdowi o/C/im^ Essay II. 30. ^^ See Essay 1st, on the Kingdom of
Christ,

 20.]

OF FALLACIES.
and
inflict

149

*'wlietlier a Christian magistrate

Christianity,

may employ coercion on hehcdf of punishment on Heretics as evil-doers. ^^ may

often hear,

Again, such propositions as the following, one

sophistically or negligently, confounded together:

**The Apostles held religious assemblies on the first day of the week," with " They transferred the Sabbath from the seventh day to the first :"^^ "A Jew, Maliometan, or Roman Catholic, is not the most eligible person to hold Office in a Protestant-christian country," with " Such persons ought not to he legally eligible:" "The Apostles establislied such and such a form of government in the Churches they founded," with " They designed this form to he binding on all Christians as an ordinance for ever," ka.^^

20.
Before we dismiss the subject of Fallacies, it may not be improper Jests, mention the just and ingenious remark, that Jests are mockFallacies i.e. Fallacies so palpable as not to be likely to deceive any one, but yet bearing just that resemblance of Argument which is calculated to amuse by the contrast in the same manner that a parody does, by the contrast of its levity w^ith the serious production which There is indeed something laughable even in Fallacies it imitates. which are intended for serious conviction, Avhen they are thoroughly exposed.^ There are several different kinds of joke and raillery, which will The be found to correspond with the different kinds of Fallacy. Pun (to take the simplest and most obvious case) is evidently, in most instances, a mock-argument founded on a palpable equivocation of the Middle-Term and others in like manner will be found to correspond to the respective Fallacies, and to be imitations of serious argument. It is probable indeed that all jests, sports, or games, {Tretihtoii) properly so called, will be found, on examination, to be imitative of
to
; ;

serious transactions

as of

War,

or

Commerce.^

But

to

enter

would be unsuitable to the present occasion. I shall subjoin some general remarks on the legitimate province of Reasoning, and on its connexion with Inductive philosophy, and with Rhetoric on which points much misapprehension has prevailed, tending to throw obscurity over the design and use of the Science under consideration. A treatise on what are called the *' laws of evidence " the diff'erent hinds, strictly speaking, of arguments and the occasions for which they are respectively suited, &;c., which is what some would expect in a Logical Work, wiU be found in the 1st part of the " Elements of Rhetoric."
fully into this subject
;

^1 See Essays on the Dangers, &c. Notes E. and F. 52 See Thoughts on the Sabbath. 53 See Kingdom of Christ, Essay II.

orio,
55

See Wallis's Logic, and also RhetPart I. Ch. III. 7, p. 131. gee some excellent remarks on " Imitation," in Dr. A. Smith's posthu-

0.

mo us

Essays,

<

BOOK

IV.

DISSERTATION ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING^

Logic being concerned witli the theory of Reasoning, it is evidently necessary, in order to take a correct view of this Science, that all misapprehensions should be removed relative to the occasions on which the Reasoning-process is employed, the pm'poses it has in view, and the limits within which it is confined. Simple and obvious as such questions may appear to those who have not thought much on the subject, they will appear on further consideration to be involved in much perplexity and obscurity, from the vague and inaccurate language of many popular writers. To the confused and incorrect notions that prevail respecting the Reasoning-process may be traced most of the common mistakes respecting the Science of Logic, and much of the unsound and unphilosophical argumentation which is so often to be met with in

the Avorks of ingenious writers.

These errors have been incidentally adverted to in the foregoing but it may be desirable, before we dismiss the subject, to oifer on these points some further remarks, which could not have been there introduced without too great an interruption to the development of the system. Little or nothing indeed remains to be said that is not implied in the principles which have been already laid down but the results and applications of those principles are liable in many instances to be overlooked, if not distinctly pointed out. These supplementary observations will neither require, nor admit of, so systematic an arrangement as has hitherto been aimed since they will be such as are suggested principally by the at objections and mistakes of those who have misunderstood, partially
part of this work
; ;

or entirely, the nature of the Logical system. Let it be observed, however, that as I am not writing a review or

commentary on any logical works, but an introduction to the science, I shall not deem it necessary to point out in all cases the agreement or disagreement between other writers and myself, in respect of the views maintained, or the terms employed, by each.


Chap.
I. 1.]

ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.

15^

Chap.

I.

Of Induction.

1.
has been said by some writers of the superiority of the Mistai^eof Inductive to the Syllogistic method of seeking truth as if the two induction to and of the advantage of substituting Syllogism, stood opposed to each other the Organon of Bacon for that of Aristotle, he. which indicates a There is, however, the total misconception of the nature of both. more excuse for the confusion of thought which prevails on this subject, because eminent Logical writers have treated, or at least have appeared to treat, of Induction as a kind of Argument which if it were, it certainly might be distinct from the Syllogism contrasted with the Syllogism: or rather, the whole Syllogistic theory would fall to the ground, since one of the very first principles it establishes, is that all Reasoning, on whatever subject, is one and the same process, which may be clearly exhibited in the form of It is hardly to be supposed, therefore, that this was Syllogisms. the deliberate meaning of those writers though it must be admitted that they have countenanced the error in question, by their inaccu; ;

Much

rate expressions.

This inaccuracy seems chiefly to have arisen from a vagueness in the use of the word Induction which is sometimes employed to designate the process of i7ivestigation and of collecting facts ; someThe former times, the deducing of an inference /rom those facts. of these processes {viz. that of observation and experiment) is undoubtedly distinct from that which takes place in the Syllogism but then it is not a process of argumentation; the latter again is an argumentative process but then it is, like all other arguments, And hence Induction capable of being Syllogistically expressed. has come to be regarded as a distinct kind of argument from the This Fallacy cannot be more concisely or clearly Syllogism. stated, than in the technical form with which we may now presume our readers to be familiar.
; ;

Tj^vo senses

induction,

" Induction
**

is distinct from Syllogism Induction is a process of Reasoning;" therefore There is a process of Reasoning distinct from Syllogism." is

Here " Induction," which

senses in the two Premises. Induction, so far forth as
stated Syllogistically with a view to obtain
:

the Middle-Tenn,

is

used in different

it is an argument, may, of course, be but so far forth as it is a process of inquiry tliQ Premises of that argument, it is, of course, out of the province of Logic: and the latter is the original and strict sense of the word. Induction means properly, not the inferring of the conclusion, but the bringing in, one by one, of instances,


152

ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.

[Book IV.

Proper sense Induction

bearing on the point in question, till a sufficient number lias been collected. The ambiguity, therefore, above alluded to, and which has led to much confusion, would be best avoided by saying that we do not, strictly speaking, reason hy Induction, but reason /rom Induction i.e. from our observations on one, or on several Individuals, {ix, Tciv Kocff iKuarou) we draw a Conclusion respecting the Class (to Kudo'hov) they come under: or, in like manner, from several Species, to the Genus which comprehends them in logical language, what we have predicated of certain singnlar-teims, we proceed to predicate of a common-term which comprehends them or proceed in the same manner from Species to Genus. U.G. * The Earth moves round the Sun in an elliptical orbit; so does Mercury and Venus and Mars, &c. therefore a Planet (the common-term comprehending these singulars) moves round," <fc;c.
:

** Philip was reckless of human life; so was Alexander; and J. Csesar and Augustus, <kc. : therefore this is the general character of a Conqueror.'" Now it appears as if the most obvious and simplest way of fiUing up such enthymemes as these, expressed as they are, would be, in the third figure ; having of course a particular Conclusion:
;

Inductive

Argument
expressed in

Sjyllogism,

*' Earth, Mercury, Venus, &c. move, &c. Mi. These are planets therefore Some planets move, &c."
;

!n the first
figure.

Perfectluduction.

But when we argue from Induction we generally mean to infer more than a particular conclusion and accordingly most logical writers present to us the argument in the form of a syllogism in Barbara; inserting, of course, a different minor premiss from the foregoing, And if I am allowed to assume, viz. : the simple converse of it. not merely that "Mercury, Venus, and whatever others I may have named, are Planets," but also, that "All Planets are these" that these are the wlwle of the individuals comprehended under the Term Planet I am, no doubt, authorized to draw a universal conclusion. But such an assumption would, in a very great majority of cases where Induction is employed, amount to a palpable falsehood, if understood literally. For it is but seldom that we find an instance of what Logicians call a " perfect-induction ;" viz. where there is a complete enumeration of all the individuals, respecting which we
;

assert collectively
is in

what we had before asserted separately; as "John and so is Thomas and so is William and all the sons of such-a-one are John, Thomas, and William therefore all Such cases, I say, seldom occur; and his sons are in England." still more rarely can such an Induction (which Bacon characterizes shice it docs not lead the mind from what as *'res puerilis''^)

England

It

may very well happen too, that (as

no connexion, except accidentally, with

the Class
itself,

example above) a certain circinnstance may, in fact, belong to eacli individual of a certain clabs, and yet way have
in the

as such;

i.e.

with the de-

scription ot it, and that which constitutes it a Class. (See Appen. II. Ex. 118.)


Chap.
is
I. 1.]

153

ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.

is

better-known to what

less-known

serve

any important purtlie assumpwould be, as

pose.

But

in

such Inductions as are commonly employed,

tion of such a minor-premiss as in the above example,

I have said, strictly speaking, a false assumption. And accordingly those logicians w^ho state an argument from Induction in the above form, mean, I apprehend, that it is to be understood with a certain latitude; i.e. that, in such propositions as "all planets are Mercury, Venus, <fcc.," or '* all Conquerors are Philip, Alexander, and Csesar," they mean (by a kind of logical fiction) to denote that *' all Conquerors are adequately represented by Philip, Alexander, &c." that these individual persons or cases are a sufficient sampUi in respect of the matter in question, of the Class they belong to. I think it clearer, therefore, to state simply and precisely what it The Major is that we do mean to assert. And in doing this, we shall find that suppressed, the expressed premiss of the enthymeme, viz. : that which contains the statement respecting the individuals is the Minor; and that it is the Major that is suppressed, as being in all cases substantially the same: viz. that what belongs to the individual or individuals we have examined, belongs (certainly, or probably, as the case may be) to the whole class under which they come. E.G. From finding on examination of several sheep, that they each ruminate, we conclude that the same is the case with the whole Species of sheep and from finding on examination of the sheep, ox, deer, and other animals deficient in upper cutting-teeth, that they each ruminate, we conclude (with more or less certainty) that quadrupeds thus deficient are ruminants : the hearer readily supplying, in sense, the suppressed major premiss viz. that *' what belongs to the individual sheep we have examined, is likely to belong to the whole species ;" he. Whether that which is properly called Induction {viz. the inquiry respecting the several individuals or species) be sufficiently ample, i.e. takes in a sufficient number of individual, or of specific cases, whether the character of those cases has been correctly ascertained and how far the individuals we have examined are likely to resemble, in this or that circumstance, the rest of the class, &c. &c., are points that require indeed great judgment and caution but this judgment and caution are not to be aided by Logic because they are, in reality, employed in deciding whether or not it is fair and allowable to lay down your Premises; i.e. whether you are authorized or not, to assert, that "what is true of the individuals you have examined, is true of the whole class:" and that this or that is true of those individuals. Now, the rules of Logic have nothing to do with the truth or falsity of the Premises ; except, of course, when they are the conclusions of former arguments but merely teach us to decide, not, whether the Premises are fairly laid down, but whether the Conclusion follows fairly from the Premises or

not.

154
Necessity of

ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.

[Book IV.

Ma"^!"^
Premiss.

It has however been urged that what are described as the Majorpremises in drawing inferences from Inductions, are resolvable ultimatelj into an assertion of the " Uniformity of the laws of Nature," and that this is, itself, obtained by or some equivalent proposition Induction; whence it is concluded that there must be at least one Induction and that, the one on which all others depend incapable of being exhibited in a Syllogistic form.
;

But it is evident, and is universally admitted, that in every case where an inference is drawn from Induction (unless that name is to be given to a mere random guess without any grounds at all) we must form a judgment that the instance or instances adduced are
that it is '^ allowable'' to *' sufficient to authorize the Conclusion;" take these instances as a sample warranting an inference respecting Now the expression of this judgment in words, is the whole Class. To acknowledge this, therefore, the very Major-premiss alluded to. is to acknowledge that all reasoning from Induction vMTwut exception does admit of being exhibited in a syllogistic form and consequently that to speak of one Induction that does not admit of it, is a contra;

diction.

Whether the belief in the constancy of Nature's laws, a belief of which no one can divest himself be intuitive and a part of the constitution of the human mind, as some eminent metaphysicians hold, or acquired, and in what way acquired, is a question foreign to

For that, it is sufficient to have pointed out our present purpose. that the necessity of assuming a universal Major-premiss, expressed or understood, in order to draw any legitimate inference from Induction, is virtually acknowledged even by those who endeavour to dispute it.

2.
Assumption
^^""^^^^

\n

inductioa

Whether then the Premiss may fairly be assumed, or not, is a point which cannot be decided without a competent knowledge of {\^q nature of the subject. E.G. In most branches of Natural-philosophy, in which the circumstances that in any case affect the result,
are usually far
single instance is

clearly ascertained than in human affairs, a usually accounted a sufficient Induction; e.g. having once ascertained that an individual magnet will attract iron, we are authorized to conclude that this property is universal. In Meteorology, however, and some other branches of Natural-philo-

more

sophy, in which less advancement has been made, a much more And in respect of the affairs copious Induction would be required. of human life, an inference from a single instance would hardly ever be deemed allowable. But it is worth remarking, that in all cases alike, of reasoning from Induction, the greater or less degree of confidence we feel is always proportioned to the belief of our having more or less completely ascertained all the drcwnstances that bear

upon the question.

: ;

Chap.

I. 2.]

ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.

155

All men practically acknowledge this to liolcl good in all cases alike, physical or moral, by invariably attributing any failure in their anticipations in any case, to some ignorance or miscalculation (See respecting some circumstances connected with the case.
will usually be more of these circumstances difficult to be accurately ascertained, than in others and the degree of certainty belonging to the Major-premiss, will But universally, the degree of evidence for any vary accordingly. proposition we set out with as a Premiss (whether the expressed or the suppressed one) is not to be learned from mere Logic, nor indeed but is the province of whatever from any one distinct Science None but Science furnishes the subject-matter of your argument. a Politician can judge rightly of the degree of evidence of a proposia Naturalist, in Natural History, tc. tion in Politics E.G. From examination of many horned animals, as sheep, cows, fec., a Naturalist finds that they have cloven feet; now his skill as a Naturalist is to be shown in judging whether these animals are likely to resemble in the form of their feet all other horned animals and it is the exercise of this judgment, together with the examination of individuals, that constitutes what is usually meant by the
; ;

Append. 1. Art. "Impossible.") In some subjects, however, there

investigo-

that by which we gain, what are properly, not connected with Logic; being not what But when this major is strictly called Beasoning, but Investigation. Premiss is granted him, and is combined with the minor, viz. that the animals he has examined have cloven feet, then he draws the Condus:ion logically ; viz. that "the feet of all horned animals are Again, if from several times meeting with ill-luck on a cloven."^

Inductive process; which

is

new

truths;

and which

is

Friday, any one concluded that Friday, universally, is an unlucky day, one would object to his Induction; and yet it would not be, as an argument, illogical; since the Conclusion follows fairly, if you grant his implied Premiss ; viz. that the events which happened on those particular Fridays are such as must happen, or are especially likely to happen, on all Fridays: but we should object to his laying dovm this Premiss and therefore should justly say that his Induc;

though his argument is correct. And here it may be remarked, that the ordinary rule for fair argument, viz. that m an Enthymeme the suppressed Premiss should be always the one of whose truth legist doubt can exist, is not observed in Induction for the Premiss which is usually the more doubtful of the two, is, in this case, the major; it being in many cases not quite certain that the individuals, respecting w^hich some point has been ascertained, are to be fairly regarded as a sample of the whole class and yet the major-Premiss is seldom expressed; for the reason just
tion
is

faulty,

Thenr^re
premiss
suppressed
induction,

2 I have selected an Instance in which Induction is the oiilv ground we have to rest on ; no reason, that I know of, having

ever been assigned that could have led na to conjecture this curious fact d priori,


156
given, that

ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.

it is

[Book IY.
tlie

easily understood

as being {mutatis mutandis)

same

in every Induction.

has been said of Induction will equally apply to Example from it only in having a singular, instead of a general, conclusion; and that, from a single case. E.G. In one of the instances above, if the conclusion had been drawn, not respecting conquerors in general, but respecting this or that conqueror, that he was not likely to be careful of human life, each of the cases adduced to prove this would have been called an Example. (See JElements of Rhetoric, Part I. Ch. II. 6.) Some have maintained that in employing an Example we proceed at once from one individual case to another, without the intervention of any universal premiss. But whether we are fairly authorized or not to draw an inference from any example, must depend on what is called the parallelism of the two cases; i.e., their being likely to agree in respect of the point in question and the assertion, in words, of this parallelism, is a universal proposition. He who has in his mind this proposition, has virtually asserted such a majorpremiss as I have been speaking of: and he who has it not, if he should be right in the inference itself that he draws, is, confessedly,

What

which

differs

right only
it

by chance.
said in this,

From what has been

will

and

in the preceding section,

are the objections which have of late years been urged, with an air of triumpli, against the
I trust,

be seen,

how untenable

above explanations of the process of reasoning from Induction and Example. Those objections, though having, at the first glance, an air of philosophical ingenuity, are found, on a closer examination, utterly unmeaning and self- destructive since they imply a complete admission, though in different words, of the very principle
;

objected

to.

Chap.

II.

On

the Discovery

of Truth.

1of Reasoning that New Truths are a question which seems to be decided in the negative by what has been already said; though many eminent writers seem to have taken for granted the affirmative. It is, perhaps, in a great measure, a dispute concerning the use of words ; but it is not, for that reason, either uninteresting or unimportant; since an inaccurrate use of language may often, in matters of Science, And, in lead to confusion of thought, and to erroneous conclusions. the present instance, much of the undeserved contempt which has been bestowed on the Logical system may be traced to this source.

Whether

it

is

by a process

brought to

light,

is

Chap.

II. 1.]

ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.

laid

157

down, that " Reasoning is important in the discovery of Truth," and that " Logic is of no service in the discovery of Truth," (each of which propositions is true in a certain sense of the terms employed, hut not in the same sense,) he is naturally led to conclude that there are processes of Reasoning to which the Syllogistic theory does not apply; and, of course, to

For when any one has

misconceive altogether the nature of the Science. In maintaining the negative side of the above question, three Different things are to he premised: Jirst, that it is not contended that dis- ^o^rds^^*^ coveries of any kind of truth beyond what actually falls under the " ^j^.?^^^^!' senses, can be made (or at least are usually made) without Reasoning ; as appiied'to ^^^^^^ only, that Reasoning is not the whole of the process, nor the whole of that which is important therein ; secondly, that reasoning shall be taken in the sense, not of every exercise of the Reason, but of Argumentation, in which Ave have all along used it, and in which it has been defined by all the Logical writers, viz,: "from certain granted propositions to infer another proposition as the consequence of them:" thirdly, that by a "New Truth," be understood, somenot imphed thing neither expressly nor virtually asserted before, [involved] in any thing already known. To prove then, this point demonstratively, becomes, on these data, perfectly easy ; for since all Reasoning (in the sense above defined) may be resolved into Syllogisms; and since even the objectors to Logic make it a subject of complaint, that in a Syllogism the Premises do virtually assert the Conclusion, it follows at once that no New Truth (as above defined) can be elicited by any process of Reasoning. It is on this ground, indeed, that the justly-celebrated author of the Philosophy of Rhetoric, and many others, have objected to the Syllogism altogether, as necessarily involving a petitio principii ; an objection which, of course, he would not have been disposed to bring forward, had he perceived that, whether well or ill-founded, Had he been aware that a it lies against all arguments wJiotever. Syllogism is no distinct kind of argument otherwise than in form, but is, in fact, any argument whatever,* stated regularly and at full length, he would have obtained a more correct view of the object of all Reasoning ; which is merely to expand and unfold the assertions wrapt up, as it were, and implied in those with which we set out, and to bring a person to perceive and acknowledge the full force of that which he has admitted to contemplate it in various points of view ; to admit in one shape what he has already admitted in another, and to give up and disallow whatever is inconsistent with it. Nor is it always a very easy task to bring before the mind the the various applications, several bearings, of even any one pro-

Which Dugald Stewart admits, though he

adopts Campbell's objection.

; :

158
Develop.

ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.

[Book IV.

compreliends an indefinite sometimes and often of Classes and these, often, in some respects, widely differing from eacli other and no one can be, on each occasion of his employing sucli a Term, attending to and fixing his mind on each of the Individuals, or even of the Species, so comprehended. It is to be remembered, too, that both Division and Generalization are in a great degree arbitrary i.e. that we may both divide the same genus on several different principles, and may refer the same individuals or species to several difierent classes, according to the nature of the discourse and drift of the argument; each of which classes will furnish a distinct Middle-Term for an argument, according to the question. E.G. If we wished to prove that " a horse feels," (to adopt an ill-chosen example from the above writer,) we might refer it to the genus ** animal;" to prove that " it has only a single stomach," to the genus of "non-ruminants;" to prove that it is "likely to degenerate in a very cold climate," we should class it with " original Now, each of these, and productions of a hot climate," &c. &lc. numberless others to which the same thing might be referred, are implied by the very term, "horse;" yet it cannot be expected that they can all be at once present to the mind whenever that term is uttered. Much less, when, instead of such a Term as that, we are employing Terms of a very abstract and, perhaps, complex signification,* as "government, justice," &c. is Y," there may be When then we say " Every Y is Z, and an indefinite, and perhaps a great number of other terms of which ** Z" might be affirmed; but we fix our minds on one, viz. " Y;" of which again an indefinite number of other predicates besides " Z'* might be affirmed and then again out of an indefinite number of things of which " Y" might be affirmed, we fix on " X ;" thus bringing before the mind, where it is needful to express both premises, what must in every case be assumed, whether stated in words, And usually this or understood in order to draw the Conclusion. process has to be repeated for the proof of one or both of the premises ; and perhaps again, for the premises by which they are proved &c. But one cause which has led the above-mentioned writers into their error, is, their selecting examples (such as, it must be owned, are abundant in Logical treatises) in which the Conclusion is merely a portion of what one of the Premises by itself has already implied in the very signification of the term that is taken as its Subject, so Fvii as, plainly as to be present to the mind of every one who utters it of sekSng^ triflintr in the abovo example, the very term " horse" implies [" connotes"] fcxampes. animal" to every one who utters those words and understands And hence it is that some writers not destitute of their meaning.^
posltlon.

meaning of a term.

^ verj great

number

common Term

of individuals,

4
*

On

this point there are

some valuable remarks

in the Philosophy

of Rhetorio

itself.

Book IV. Chap. VII. See Book II. Chap. V.


CiiAP. II.
1.]

ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.

159

have been led to imagine that in Reasoning we draAV a Conclusion from a single Premiss. But suppose, instead of such an example as Campbell, &c. fix on, Tve take that of the inference drawn by some Naturalist respecting a fossil-animal, which he concludes to be a " ruminant" from its having horns on the skull. The labourers perhaps Avho dug up the remains, may be ignorant that *' all horned animals are ruminant;" and a naturalist again who is not on the spot, and has heard but an imperfect account of the skeleton, may be ignorant that " this animal was horned." Now neither of these parties could arrive at the conclusion that "it Avas a ruminant." But when the two premises are combined, they do, jointly imply and virtually assert the conclusion ; though, separately, neither of them does so. And hence a Syllogism has been represented (even by those who Syiiofrism acknowledge that all sound Reasoning may be exhibited in that as^a saart. form) as a contrivance for ensnaring men in a trap from which they cannot afterwards escape. But a man can escape admitting the truth of a conclusion: he may perceive its falsity; and may thus be taught the falsity of one of the Premises. But in a case where neither of these alternatives is necessary where, after admitting the whole of what is assumed to be certain or probable, you are left
intelligence

and have no more knowledge had before, this, every one would perceive to be no real, but only an ajyparent argument. But, as I have said, the flat truisms commonly given as examples by logical writers, have led those who have not carefully analysed
free to admit or
is

deny what
its

inferred,

of

its

certainty or of

probability than you

the reasoning-process generally, into the notion that a Syllogism ia necessarily of that trifling character. He who has asserted that the two items of a certain account are 3 and 2, has virtually asserted that the sum-total is 5: and of this few would need even to be reminded: but it is equally certain that he who has stated the items when they amount to some hundreds, has virtually asserted that the sum-total is so and so and yet the readiest accountant requires, in this case, some time to bring these items together before his mind.
;

Subject concerning which something is to be proved, is referred, as has been above remarked, to this or to that Class, according to what it is that is to be proved.

The

Categories^ or Predicaments, which Aristotle and other Logi-

Catcirones.

cal writers have treated of, being certain general-heads or summa genera, to one or more of which every Term may be referred, serve
6

The

Cateprories
ciio-!*,

enumerated by Aristrpia-n.

totle,

are

{ri(rov,^^c7ov,

Toy,

trin, xua-Bxi, ixi'", ronlv, ^uTxitvi

which

are usually rendered, as adequately as, perhaps, they can be in our language, Substance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Place, Time, Situation, Possession, Action, Suflering. The Catalogue (which

is but a very crude one) ha? been by some writers enlarged, as it is evident may easilv be done by subdividing some of the heads and by others cur-

certainly

it is no less evident that all may ultimately be referred to the two heads (if Substance, and Attribute, or (in the language of some Logicians) Accident,

tailed, as

160

ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.

[Book IY.

'

Two binds
o
iscovery,

the purpose of marking out certain tracks, as it were, which are to he pursued in searching for middle Terms, in each argument it heing essential that we should generalize on a right respectively or, in other words, principle, with a view to the question hefore us that w^e should ahstract that portion of any object presented to the There are mind, which is important to the argument in hand. expressions in common use which have a reference to this caution such as, " this is a question, not as to the nature of the object, but the magnitude of it :" " this is a question of time, or o^ place,'' &c. i.e. " the subject must be referred to this or to that Category." With respect to the meaning of the Terms in question, ''Discovery," and "New Truth;" it matters not whether we confine ourselves to the narrowest sense, or admit the widest, provided we There certainly are two kinds of " New Truth" do but distinguish. ^^^ ^^ ,, Discovery," if we take those words in the widest sense in which they are ever used. First, such Truths as were, before they were discovered, absolutely unknown, being not implied by any thing we previously knew, though we might perhaps suspect them as Such are all matters of fact strictly so called, when first probable. made known to one who had not any such previous knowledge, as would enable him to ascertain them a priori; i.e. by Reasoning; as if we inform a man that we have a colony in New-South- Wales ; or or that platina is that the earth is at such a distance from the sun
; ; ;

heavier than gold.

Information, is

The communication

of this kind of knowledge

Instruction.

most usually, and most strictly, called information. We gain it from observation, and from testimony. No mere internal workings of our own minds (except when the mind itself is the very object to be observed), or mere discussions in words, will make a fact known though there is great room for sagacity in judging what to us testimony to admit, and in the forming of conjectures that may lead to profitable observation, and to experiments with a view to it. The Other class of Discoveries is of a very diff'erent nature. That which may be elicited by Reasoning, and consequently is implied in that which we already know, we assent to on that ground, and not from observation or testimony. To take a Geometrical truth upon trust, or to attempt to ascertain it by observation, would betray a In the longest demontotal ignorance of the nature of the, Science. stration, the Mathematical teacher seems only to lead us to make use of our own stores, and point out to us how much we had already
;

admitted and, in the case of many Ethical propositions, we assent a^ first hearing, though perhaps we had never heard or thought of So also do we readily assent to the testimony the proposition before. of a respectable man who tells us that our troops have gained a victory but how diff'erent is the nature of the assent in the two In the latter we are disposed to thank the man for his cases. iiformation, as being such as no wisdom or learning would have enabled us to ascertain; in the former, we usually exclaim ^^very
; ;

Chap.

II. 1.]

ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.

161

a valuable and just remark; tliat never s^j'wcyt me trueV^ before!" implying at once our practical ignorance of it, and also our consciousness that we possess, in what we already know, the means to ascertain the truth of it ; that we have a right, in short, to bear our testimony to its truth. To all practical purposes, indeed, a Truth of this description may be as completely unknown to a man as the other ; but as soon as it is set before him, and the argument by which it is connected with his previous notions is made clear to him, he recognizes it as something conformable to, and contained in, his former belief. It is not improbable that Plato's doctrine of Reminiscence arose from a hasty extension of what he had observed in this class, to all acquisition of knowledge whatever. His Theory of ideas served to confound together matters of fact respecting the nature of things, (which may be perfectly new to us) with propositions relating to our oiun notions, and modes of thought (or to speak, perhaps, more correctly, our own arbitrary Signs) which propositions must be contained and implied in those very complex notions themselves ; and whose truth is a conformity, not to the nature of things, but to our own h^'pothesis. Such are all propositions in pure Mathematics, and many in Ethics, viz. those wliicli involve no assertion as to real matters of fact. It has been rightly remarked,^ that Mathematical propositions are not properh^ true or false, in the same sense as any proposition respecting real fact is so called. And hence, the truth (such as it is) of such propositions is necessary and eternal ; since it amounts only to a conformity with tlie hypothesis we set out with. The proposition, that "the belief in a future state, combined with a complete devotion to the present life, is not consistent with the character of prudence," would be not at all the less true if a future state were a chimera, and prudence a quality which was nowhere met with nor would the truth of the Mathematician's conclusion be shaken, that " circles are to each other as the squares of their diameters," should it be found that there never had been a circle, or a square, conformable to the definition, in reruni natuTce. And accordingly an able man may, by patient Reasoning, attain any amount of mathematical truths because these are all implied in the Definitions. But no degree of labour and ability, would give him the knowledge, by ^^ Reasoning'' alone, of what has taken place in some foreign country nor would enable him to know, if he had never seen, or heard of, the experiments, what would become of a spoonful of salt, or a spoonful of chalk, if put into water, or what would be the appearance of a ray of light when passed through a prism.
**tliat is
; ; ; ;

Plato's

^"'^'

Hence the
demonsirate

futility

(in

of the attempt of Clarke, and others, to \l^l\^^^ the mathematical sense) the exist existence of a Deity. sSie*.

Dugald Stewart's Philosophy, Vol.

II,

162

ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.

[Book IV.

This can only be (apparent!}^) done by covertly assuming in the Premises the very point to be proved. No raatter of fact csiu be mathematically demonstrated though it may be proved in such a manner as to leave no doubt on the mind. U.G. I have no more doubt that I met such and such a man, in this or that place, yesterday, than that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles but the kind of certainty I have of these two truths is widely different to say, that I did not meet the man, would be false indeed, but it would not be any thing inconceivable, self-contradictory, and absurd; but it would be so, to deny the equality of the angles of a
; ;

triangle to
Information
instruction, dutinct.

to distinguish these two kinds of In relation to the former, as I have said, the Discovery of Truth. word " i?formation^* is most strictly applied; the communication of the latter is more properly called " instruction.^^ I speak of the usual practice for it would be going too far to pretend that writers are uniform and consistent in the use of these, or of any other term. We say that the Historian gives us infoi^mcdion respecting the Traveller, respecting foreign countries past times on the other hand, the Mathematician gives instruction in the principles of his Science the Moralist instructs us in our duties, he. However, let the words be used as they may, the things are evidently different, and ought to be distinguished. It is a question comparatively unimportant, whether the term *' Discovery " shall or shall not be extended to the eliciting of those Truths, which, being implied in our previous knowledge, may be established by mere strict ReasonIt is of the
;

two right angles. utmost importance

ing.

Similar verbal questions, indeed, might be raised respecting many other cases e.g. one has forgetten [i.e. cannot recollect) the name of some person or place perhaps we even try to think of it, but in vain at last some one reminds us, and we instantly recognize it as the one we wanted to recollect it may be asked, was this in our mind, or not ? The answer is, that in one sense it was, and in another sense, it was not. Or, again, suppose there is a vein of metal on a man's estate, which he does not know of; is it part of his possessions or not ? and when he finds it out and works it, does he then acquire a new possession or not ? Certainly not, in the same sense as if he has a fresh estate bequeathed to him, which he had formerly no right to but to all practical purposes it is a new possession. This case, indeed, may serve as an illustration of the one we have been considering and in all these cases, if the real distinction be understood, the verbal question will not be of much consequence. To use one more illustration. Reasoning has been aptly compared on each of which, as on a ib the piling together blocks of stone pedestal, a man can raise himself a small, and but a small height
: ; : : ; ; ;

above the plain

but which, when skilfully built up, will form a


OX THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.
163

Chap.
fliglit

II. 2.]

Now (to of steps, wliicli will raise liim to a great elevation. pursue this analogy) when the materials are all ready to the builder's hand, the blocks ready dug and brought, his work resembles one of the two kinds of Discovery just mentioned, viz. that to which we have assigned the name of instruction: but if his materials are to be if he himself is forced to entirely, or in part, provided by himself, this corresponds to the other dig fre'^sh blocks from the quarry,

kind of Discovery.^

2.

I have hitherto spoken of the employment of Argument in the establishment of those hypothetical Truths (as they may be called) It is not, however, which relate only to our own abstract notions. meant to be insinuated that there is no room for Reasoning in the estabhshment of a matter of fact but the other class of Truths have first been treated of, because, in discussing subjects of that
:

^^^^^^^^^.jgg^

kind, the process of Reasoning

always the principal, and often we are but certain and clear as whereas, when assertions respecting to the meaning of the terms recti existence are introduced, we have the additional and more important business of ascertaining and keeping in mind the degree since, otherwise, our Conclusions could of evidence for those facts not be relied on, however accurate our Reasoning.* But, undoubtedly, we may by Reasoning arrive at knowledge concerning matters of fact, ?/ we hfiXQ facts to set out with as data; only that it will very often happen that, " from certain facts," as Campbell remarks, "we draw only probable Conclusions;" because the other Premiss introduced (which he overlooked) is only probable. And the maxim of Mechanics holds good in argimients that " nothing is stronger than its weakest part." He observed that in such an instance, for example, as the one lately given, we infer from the ceiiainty that such and such tyrannies have been short-lived, the probability that others will be so and he did not consider that there is an understood Premiss which is essential to the argument; [viz. that **all tyrannies will resemble those we have already observed") which being only of a probable character, must attach the same degree
is

the only thing to be attended to,

;

if

8 "The fundamental differences between these two great branches of human knowledge, as w ell as their consequences, cannot perhaps be more strikingly iilus-

trated than in the following familiar exposition by a celebrated writer. 'A clever man,' says Sir J. Herschel, 'shut up alone and allowed all unlimited time, might reason out for himself all the truths of mathematics, by proceeding from those simple notions of space and number of which he cannot divest himself without ceasing to think J but he would never tell by any effort ot reasoning what would become of a lump of sugar, if iumiersed in water, or what impression would be

produced on his eye by mixine: the colours yellow and blue,' results which can be learnt only from experience, " Thus then the extremes of human knowledge may be considered as founded on the one hand ])urely upon reason, and on the other purely upon sense. Now, a very large portiort of our knowledge, and what in fact may be considered as, the most important jjart of it, lies between these two extremes, and results from a union or mixture of them, that is to say,
consists of the application of rational principles to the phenomena presented by

the objects of nature."

Prout^s Bridge-

water Treatise, p.

2.

164

ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.

[Book IV.

2)lied,

And the douhtfulness is multiof uncertainty to the Conclusion. For since it is only on the if both Premises are uncertain.

supposition of both Premises being true, that we can calculate on the truth of the Conclusion, we must state in fractional numbers the chances of each Premiss being true, and then multiply these together, to judge of the degree of evidence of the Conclusion.^ An individual fact is not unfrequently elicited by skilfully combining, and reasoning from, those already known of which many curious cases occur in the detection of criminals by officers of justice, and by Barristers, who acquire by practice such dexterity in that particular department, as to draw sometimes the right conclusion from data, which might be in the possession of others, without being General applied to the same use. But in all cases of the inferring of a general law from Induction, that conclusion (as has been formerly ^tra Wished ^y^^asoning remarked) is ultimatdy established by Reasoning. E.G. Bakewell, Induction, the Celebrated cattle-breeder, observed, in a great number of individual beasts, a tendency to fatten readily ; and in a great number of others, the absence of this constitution: in every individual of the former description, he observed a certain peculiar make, though they Those of the latter description differed widely in size, colour, &c. differed no less in various points, but agreed in being of a different make from the others these facts were his data from which, combining them* with the general principle, that Nature is steady and uniform in her proceedings, he logically drew the conclusion that beasts of the specified make have universally a peculiar tendency But then his principal merit consisted in making the to fattening. observations, and in so combining them as to ohstract'iYom. each of a multitude of cases, differing widely in many respects, the circumand also in conjecturing skilfully stances in which they all agreed how far those circumstances were likely to be found in the whole class. The making of such observations, and still more the combination, abstraction, and judgment employed,^*^ are what men commonly mean (as was above observed) when they speak of Induction; and these operations are certainly distinct from Reasoning.^^ The same observations will apply to numberless other cases as, for instance, to the Discovery of the law of '^ vis inertice," and the other principles of Natural-philosophy. It may be remarked here, that even the most extensive observations of facts will often be worse than useless to those who are Their knowdeficient in the power of discriminating and selecting. ledge, whether much or little, is like food to a body whose digestive system is so much impaired as to be incapable of separating the To attempt to remedy the defect of minds thus nutritious portions. to confer constituted " by imparting to them additional knowledge, the advantage of wider experience on those who have not the power
; : ; ; ;

See Book III.

14.

w
"
See Book

See

Polit.

I. 1.

Econ. Lect. IX. pp. 229-239. Note.


Chap.
II. 3.]

ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.

1G5

is to attempt enlarging the prospect of of profiting by experience, a short-sighted man by bringing him to the top of a hill."^' But to what class, it may be asked, should be referred the Discoveries we have been speaking of ? All would agree in calling them, when first ascertained, " New Truths," in the strictest sense of the word, which would seem to imply their belonging to the class which may be called by w^ay of distinction, ** Physical Discoveries:'' and yet their being ultimately established by Reasoning, would seem,

viz.

according to the foregoing rule, to refer them to the other class, W'hat may be called " iyC>(7/caZ Discoveries;" since whatever is estabhshed by Reasoning must have been contained and virtually asserted in the Premises. In answer to this, I would say, that they certainly do belong to the latter class, relcdively to a person who is in 2^ossession of tfie data: but to him Avho is not, they are New Truths of the other class. For it is to be remembered, that the words ** Discovery" and "New Truths" are necessarily relative. There may be a proposition which is to one person completel}'" A-?io?/;?z; to another {viz. one to whom it has never occurred, though he is in possession of all the data from which it may be proved) it will be (when he comes to perceive it, by a process of instruction) what we have called a Logical Discovery: to a third {viz. one who is ignorant of these data) it will be absolutely iinkrtown, and will have been, when made known to him, a perfectly and properly New Truth, a piece of information, a Physical Discovery, as we have called it.^^ To the Philosopher, therefore, who arrives at the Discovery by reasoning from his observations, and from established principles combined with them, the Discovery is of the former class to the multitude, probably of tlie latter; as tliey will have been most likely not possessed of all his data.

Logical ^^''^^"*

3.

said, that in pure Mathematics, ciiaracter of and in such Ethical propositions as we were lately speaking of, we truths, do not allow the possibility of any but a Logical Discovery i.e. no proposition of that class can be true, which was not implied in the Definitions and Axioms we set out with, which are the first principles. For since the propositions do not profess to state any fact, the only truth they can possess, consists in conformity to the original principles. To one, therefore, wdio knows these principles, such propositions are Truths already implied since they may be

It follows

from what has been

Polit.

1' It

may

to define

what

Econ. Lect. IX. p. 236. be worth while in this place is properly to be called

fully convinced of
true,

any thing that

in

he

is

mistaken
lastly, if

is not supposing himself

to

know it;

two persons are each

Knoioledge: it implies three things; 1st, firm belief, 2dly, oi what is true, 3dly, on sufficient (jrounds. If any one, e.Q. is in do^ibt respecting one of Eu(riid's demonstrations, he cannot be said to kno^v the proposition proved by it; if, again, he is

fully confident, one that the moon is inhabited, and the other that it is not, (though one of these opinions must be true) neither of them could properly be said to knoiv the truth, since he cannot have sufficient j^rot/ of it.

; ;

166
cursive faculty

ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.

;

[Book IV.

developed to him by Reasoning, if he is not defective in the disand again, to one who does not understand those principles [i.e. is not master of the Definitions) such propositions On the other hand, propositions relating are, so far unmeaning. to matters of fact, may he, indeed, implied in what he already knew (as he who knows the climate of the Alps, the Andes, &c. <kc. has virtually admitted the general fact, that '* the tops of mountains are comparatively cold ") hut as these possess an absolute and physical Truth, they may also be absolutely *' new," their Truth not being implied in the mere terms of the jjropositions. The truth or falsity of any proposition concerning a triangle, is implied by the meaning of that and of the other Geometrical terms whereas, though one may understand (in the ordinary sense of that word) the full meaning of the terms ** planet," and " inhabited," and of all the other terms in the language, he cannot thence derive any certainty that the planets are, or are not, inhabited. As I have elsewhere observed, *' Every branch of study, which can at all claim the character of a science (in the widest acceptation,) requires two things: 1. correct ascertainment of the data from which we are to reason and, 2. Correctness in the process of deducing conclusions from them. But these two processes, though both are in every case indispensable, are, in different cases, extremely different in their relative difficulty and amount in the space, if I may so speak, which they occupy in each branch of study. In pure Mathematics, for instance, we set out from arbitrary Definitions, and Postulates, readily comprehended, which are the principles from which, by the help of Axioms hardly needing even to be stated, our reasonings proceed. No facts whatever require to be ascertained no process of induction to be carried on the reasoning-process is nearly every thing. In Geology, (to take an instance of an opposite kind) the most extensive information is requisite and though sound reasoning is called for in making use of the knowledge acquired, it is well known what erroneous systems have been devised, by powerful reasoners, who have satisfied themselves too soon with observations not sufficiently accurate and
;

extensive.

Various branches of Natural-philosophy occupy, in this respect, intermediate places. The two processes which I have endeavoured to describe, under the titles of Physical investigation' and Logical investigation,' will, in different cases, differ very much in their relative importance and difficulty. The science of Optics, for instance, furnishes an example of one approaching very near to pure mathematics since, though the foundation of it consists in facts ascertained by experiment, these are fewer and more easily ascertained than those pertaining to other branches of Natural-philosophy. very small number of principles, comprehensible even without being verified by the senses, being assumed,
*'

various

'

Chap.

II.

4.]

ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.

167

the deductions from them are so extensive, that, as is well known, a blind mathematician, who had no remembrance of seeing, gave an In the applicoJiony approved course of lectures on the subject. however, of this science to the explanation of many of the curious natural phenomena that occur, a most extensive and exact

knowledge of facts is called for. " In the case of Political-Economy, that the facts on which the science is founded are few, and simple, and within the range of every one's observation, would, I think, never have been doubted, but for the error of confoundinor toarether the theoretical and the practical branches of it the science of what is properly called Political-Economy, and the practical emijloyment of it. The theory supphes principles, which we may afterwards apply practically to an indefinite number of various cases and in order to make this application correctly, of course an accurate knowledge of the circumstances of each case is indispensable. But it should be remembered that the same may be said even with respect to Geometry. As soon as we come to the practical branch of it, and apply it in actual measurements, a minute attention to facts is requisite for an accurate result. And in each practical question in Political-Economy that may arise, we must be prepared to ascertain, and allow for, various disturbing causes, which may more or less modify the results obtained from our general principles just as, in Mechanics, when we come to practice, we must take into account the thickness, and Aveight, and the degrees of flexibility, of ropes and levers. " The facts then which it may be necessary to ascertain for the practical decision of any single case that may arise, are, of course,
;

in

Political-Economy
of

(as

in

respect

of
in

the

application

of the

principles

any
;

science),

indefinite

number, and sometimes

difiicult to collect

the facts on which the general principles of the science are founded, come within the range of every one's experi-

ence.""

4asked, then, whether such great Discoveries, as have Ambipufty were accomplished, or can be Reasoning, accomplished, by Reasoning the inquirer should be reminded, that the question is ambiguous. It may be answered in the aflSrmative, if by " Reasoning" is meant to be included the assumption of Premises. To the right performance of that work, is requisite, not only, in many cases, the ascertainment of facts, and of the degree of evidence for doubtful propositions, (in which, observation and experiment will often be indispensable,) but also a skilful selection and combination of known facts and principles; such as implies,
it is

When

been made

in Natural-philosophy,
'?

14 Polit.

Econ. Lect. IX.

p. 225.

168

ox THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.

[Book IV.

amongst otTier things, the exercise of that powerful abstraction which seizes the common circumstances the point of agreement in a number of, otherwise, dissimilar individuals and it is in this that the greatest genius is shown. But if " Reasoning" be understood in the limited sense in which it is usually defined, then we must answer in the negative; and reply that such Discoveries are made by means of Reasoning combined with other operations. In the process I have been speaking of, there is much Reasoning throughout; and thence the whole has been carelessly called a

process of Reasoning." It is not, indeed, any just ground of complaint that the word Reasoning is iised in two senses; but that the two senses are perpetually c&nfwinded together: and hence it is that some Logical writers fancied that Reasoning [viz. that which Logic treats of) was the method of discovering Truth; and that so many other writers have accordingly complained of Logic for not accomplishing that end; urging that "Syllogism" [i.e. Reasoning; though they overlooked the coincidence) never established any thing that is, strictly speaking, unknoiun to him who has granted the Premises and proposing the introduction of a certain '* rational Logic" to

**

accomplish this purpose; i.e. to direct the mind in the process of Supposing that some such system could be devised that it could even be brought into a scientific form, (which he must be more sanguine than scientific who expects,) that it were of the greatest conceivable utility, and tliat it should be allowed to bear the name of ** Logic" (since it would not be worth while to contend about a name) still it would not, as these writers seem to suppose, have the same object proposed with the Aristotelian Logic; or be in any respect a rival to that system. plough may be a much more ingenious and valuable instrument than ajlail; but it never can be substituted for it. New truths Those Discoveries of general laws of Nature, <fec. of which we hl?different have been speaking, being of that character which we have described ^^ *^^ name of " Logical Discoveries," to him who is in possession different j>ersons. of all the Premises from which they are deduced; but being, to the multitude^ who are unacquainted with many of those Premises) strictly " New Truths," hence it is, that men in general give to the general facts, and to them, most peculiarly, the name of Discoveries; for to themselves they are such, in the strictest sense the Premises from which they were inferred being not only originally unknown to them, but frequently remaining unknown to the voy E.G. The general conclusion concerning cattle, which Bakelast. well made known, is what most Agriculturists (and many others also) are acquainted with but the JPremises he set out with, viz.
investigation.

the facts respecting this, that, and the other, individual ox, (the ascertainment of which facts was his first Discovery,) these are what few know, or care to know, with any exact particularity.


Chap.
II. 4.]

ON THE PROVINCE OF REASON'ING.

added,
tliat

169

And

it

may be

these discoveries of particular facts, obseryation

wliicli are tlie

immediate result of observation, are, in themselves, experiment uninteresting and insignificant, till they are comhined so as to lead Those who on each occasion watched to a grand general result.

the motions, and registered the times of occupation, of Jupiter's thought, perhaps, tliemselves, what important satellites, little results they Avere preparing the way for.^^ So that there is an additional cause which has confined the term Discovery to these grand general conclusions and, as was just observed, they are, to the generality of men, perfectly New Truths in the strictest sense of the word; not being implied in any previous knowledge they Very often it will happen, indeed, that the conclusion possessed. thus drawn will amount only to a probable conjecture; which conjecture will dictate to the inquirer such an experiment, or course of experiments, as will fully establish the fact. Thus Sir H. Davy, from finding that the flame of hydrogen gas was not communicated through a long slender tube, conjectured that a shorter but still this led him to try slenderer tube would answer the same purpose the experiments, in which, by continually shortening the tube, and at the same time lessening its bore, he arrived at last at the wiregauze of his safety-lamp. It is to be observed also, that whatever credit is conveyed by the word " Discovery," to him who is regarded as the author of it, is well deserved by those who skilfully select and combine known Truths {especially such as have been long and generally known) so as to elicit important, and hitherto unthought-of, conclusions. Theirs is the master-mind: xo-^iTtKroutic'^^ (p^ovmi;: whereas men of very inferior powers may sometimes, by immediate observation, discover perfectly new facts, empirically and thus be of service in furnishing materials to the others to whom they stand in the same relation (to recur to a former illustration) as the brickmaker or stonequarrier to the architect. It is peculiarly creditable to Adam Smith, and to ]\Ialthus, that the data from which they drew such important Conclusions had been in every one's hands for centuries.
; ;
; ;

must always be

Mathematical Discoveries, they (as we have before said) of the description to which we have given the name of " Logical Discoveries; " since to him who properly comprehends the meaning of the Mathematical terms (and to no other are the Truths themselves, properly speaking, intelligible) those results are implied in his previous knowledge, since they are logically deducible therefrom. It is not, however, meant to be implied, that Mathematical Discoveries are effected by pure Reasoning, and by that singly. For though there is not here, as in Physics, any exercise of judgment as to the degree of evidence of the Premises, nor any experiments and observations, yet there is the same call for skill in the
for
15
its

As

Hence, Bacon m-^ci as

to

pursue Truth, without always requiring to perceive

practical application.

170

ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING,

[Book IV.

selection and combination of tlie Premises in such a manner as shall be best calculated to lead to a new, that is, unperceived and

unthought-of C onclusion In following, indeed, and talcing in a demonstration, nothing is called for but pure Reasoning but the assumption of Premises is not a part of Reasoning, in the strict and technical sense of that term. Accordingly, there are many who can follow a Mathematical demonstration, or any other train of argument, who would not succeed well in framing one of their own.^*
;

Jperations

connected with Reasoning.

5. For both kinds of Discovery then, the Logical, as well as the Physical, certain operations are requisite, beyond those which can fairly be comprehended under the strict sense of the word " ReaIn the Logical, is required a skilful selection and combinasoning." tion of known Truths: in the Physical, we must employ, in addition (generally speaking) to that process, observation and experiment.
It will generally happen, that in the study of nature, and, univer-

matters of fact, both kinds of investigation be united: i.e. some of the facts or principles you reason from as Premises, must be ascertained by observation; or, as in the case of the safety-lamp, the ultimate Conclusion will need confirmation so that both Physical and Logical Discovery from experience will take place in the course of the same process. We need not, therefore, wonder, that the two are so perpetually confounded. In Mathematics, on the other hand, and in great part of the discussions relating to Ethics and Jurisprudence, there being no room for any Physical Discovery whatever, we have only to make a skilful use of the propositions in cm* possession, to arrive at every attainable
sally, in all that relates to

will

result.

The

investigation, however, of the latter class of subjects differs

MatTiematical

and

other Keasoning.

from that of the former. For, setting aside the circumstance of our having, in these, no question as to facts, no room for observation, there is also a considerable difference in what may be called, in both instances, the process of Logical investigation; the Premises on which we proceed being of so different a nature in the two cases. To take the example of Mathematics, the Definitions, which are the principles of our Reasoning, are very few, and the Axioms still fewer ; and both are, for the most part, laid down, and placed before the student in the outset; the introduction of a new Definition or Axiom, being of comparatively rare occurrence, at wide intervals, and with a formal statement besides which, there is no room for On the other hand, in all Reasonings doubt concerning either. which regard matters of fact, we introduce almost at every step,
in other points also

JO Hence, the Student niust not confine himself to this passive kind of employ-

ment,

if

he will truly become a Mathe-

matician.

Chap.
fresh

ir. 5.]

ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONINa.

(to a

171

very great number) which had nofc been elicited in the course of our Reasoning, but are taken for granted; viz. facts, and Laws of Nature, which are here the principles of our Reasoning, and maxims, or " elements of belief," which answer to the axioms in Mathematics. If, at the opening of a Treatise, for example, on Chemistry, on Agriculture, on PoliticalEconomy, &c. the author should make, as in Mathematics, a formal statement of all the propositions he intended to assume as granted, throughout the whole work, both he and his readers would be astonished at the number; and, of these, many would be only probable, and there would be much room for dcubt as to the degree
of probability, and for judgment in ascertaining that degree. Moreover, Mathematical axioms are always employed precisely in the same simple form; e.g. the axiom that " the things equal to the same are equal to one another," is cited, whenever there is need, whereas the maxims employed in the other in those very words class of subjects, admit of, and require, continual modifications in the application of them. E.G. " The stability of the laws of Nature,'* which is our constant assumption in inquiries relating to Naturalphilosophy, appears in many different shapes, and in some of them does not possess the same complete certainty as in others e.g. when, from having always observed a certain sheep ruminating, we infer, that this individual sheep will continue to ruminate, we assume that " the property which has hitherto belonged to this sheep will remain unchanged;" when we infer the same property of all sheep, we assume that **the property which belongs to this individual belongs to the whole species;" if, on comparing sheep with some other kinds of horned animals, and finding that all agree in ruminating, we infer that " all horned animals ruminate," we assume that " the whole of a genus or class are likely to agree in any point wherein many species of that genus agree :" or in other words, " that if one of two properties, kc. has often been found accompanied by another, and never without it, the former will be universally accompanied by the latter:" now all these are merely diiferent forms of the maxim, that "nature is uniform in her operations," which, it is evident, varies in expression in almost every different case where it is applied, and the application of which admits of every degree of evidence,
; ;

and fresh propositions

^'^

from perfect moral certainty, to mere conjecture. ^^ The same may be said of an infinite number of principles and maxims appropriated to, and employed in, each particular branch of study. Hence, all such reasonings are, in comparison of Mathematics, very complex; requiring so much more than that does, beyond the process of merely deducing the conclusion logically from so that it is no wonder that the longest Mathematical the premises
:

17 Fix. havin<? horns on the skull. What are called tlie horns of the Rhinoceros ai'e quite different in origin, and in struc-

ture, as well as in situation, are properly called horns,

is

from what

gge Append. Art. " impossible.'*

172

OiN

THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.

[Book IV.

Mathematics useful as an intro-

ductory
praxis of
ilecisoning.

demonstration sliould be so miicli more easily constructed and understood, than a much shorter train of just reasoning concerning real facts. The former has been aptly compared to a long and steep, but even and regular, flight of steps, which tries the breath, and the strength, and the perseverance only while the latter resembles a short, but rugged and uneven, ascent up a precipice, which requires a quick eye, agile limbs, and a firm step and in which we have to tread now on this side, now on that ever considering, as we proceed, whether this or that projection, will afford room for our foot, or whether some loose stone may not slide from under us. There are probably as many steps of pure reasoning in one of the longer of Euclid's demonstrations, as in the whole of an argumentative treatise on some other subject, occupying perhaps a considerable volume. It may be observed here that Mathematical Reasoning, as it calls for no exercise of judgment respecting probabilities, is the best kind of introductory exercise and, from the same cause, is apt, when too exclusively pursued, to make men incorrect moral;

reasoners.

As for those Ethical and Legal Reasonings which were lately mentioned as in some respects resembling those of Mathematics, [viz. such as keep clear of all assertions respecting facts) they have
men are not so completely agreed respecting the maxims and principles of Ethics and Law, but the meaning also of each Term cannot be absolutely, and for ever, fixed by an arbitrary definition on the contrary, a great part of our labour consists in distinguishing accurately the various senses in which men employ each Term, ascertaining which is the most proper, and taking care to avoid confounding them together.-^^ Fallacious It may be worth while to add in this place that as a candid disparagedisposition, a hearty desire to judge fairly, and to attain truth, ment of reasoning. are evidently necessary with a view to give fair play to the reasoningpowers, in subjects where we are liable to a bias from interest or feelings, so, a fallacious perversion of this maxim finds a place in the minds of some persons who accordingly speak disparagingly of all exercise of the reasoning-faculty in moral and religious subjects declaiming on the insufficiency of mere intellectual power for the on the necessity of appealing attainment of truth in such matters, to the heart rather than to the head, &lc.^ and then leading their readers or themselves to the Conclusion that the less we reason on such subjects the safer we are. Proper office But the proper office of candour is to pre^Mre the mind not for the candour. ot rejection of all evidence, but for the right reception of evidence not, to be a substitute for reasons, but to enable us fairly to weigh Such persons as I am alluding to are in the reasons on both sides. fact saying that since just weights alone, without a just balance,
this difl*erence; that not only
;

1*

See Appendix on Ambiguous Terms.

''<'

See Appendix III.

Chap.

III. 1.1

ON THE PROTINCE OF REASONING.

173

we have only to take care of the scales, the weights take care of themselves. This kind of tone is of course most especially to he found in such writers as consider it expedient to inculcate on the mass of mankind what there is reason to suspect they do not themselves fully helieve, and which they apprehend is the more likely to he rejected
will avail nothing, therefore

and

let

the more

it is

investigated.'^

Chap. III. --Of Inference and Proof.

1Since it appears, from what has heen said, that universally a man must possess something else hesides the Reasoning-faculty, in order
apply that faculty properly to his own purpose, whatever that purpose may be; it may he inquired whether some theory could not he made out, respecting those ''other operailons'^ and " intellectual processes, distinct from Reasoning, which it is necessary for us sometimes to employ in the investigation of truth ;"-^ and whether rules could not he laid down for conducting them. Something has, indeed, been done in this way by more than one DifiFerent *^**'''"* writer and more might probably be accomplished by one who should of ^ fully comprehend and carefully bear in mind the principles of Logic, Reasoning, properly so called but it would hardly be possible to build up any thing like a regular Science respecting these matters, such as Logic It may be useful, is wdth respect to the theory of Reasoning. however, to observe, that these ''other operations'' of which we have been speaking, and which are preparatory to the exercise of Reasoning, are of two hinds, according to the nature of the end proposed for Reasoning comprehends Inferring and Proving; which are not two different things, but the same thing regarded in two different points of view: like the road from London to York, and the road from York to London. He who infers,^ proves and he who proves, infers; but the word "infer" fixes the mind j^rs^ on the Premiss and then on the Conclusion; the word "prove," on the contrary, leads the mind from the Conclusion to the Premiss. Hence, the substantives derived from these words respectively, are often used to express that which, on each occasion, is Ixist in the mind Inference being often used to signify the Conclusion, {i.e. Proposition inferred,) and Proof, the Premiss. We say, also, " Howdo joupi^ove that ?" and " What do you infer from that? " which sentences would not be so properly expressed if we were to transpose
TO
; ;
;

21

See Powell's " Tradition Unveiled."

23 i

mean, of course, when the word

is

82

Stewart.

understood to imoly correct Inference.

174

ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.

[Book IV.

One might, therefore, define Proving, "the assigning those verts. of a reason [or argument] for the support of a given proposition:" and Inferring, "the deduction of a Conckision from given Premises." In the one case our Conclusion is given (i.e. set before us as the Question) and we have to seek for arguments; in the other, our Premises are given, and we have to seek for a Conchision: i.e. to put together our own propositions, and try what will follow from them or, to speak more Logically, in the one case, we seek to refer the Subject of which we would predicate something, to a class'^ to which that Predicate will (affirmativel}^ or negatively) ap2:ily; in the other, we seek to find comprehended, in the Subject of vMch loe have predicated something, some other term to which that Predicate had not been before applied.^ Each of these is a definition of Beasoning.
;

Investigator

and
Advocate.

To

i'tifer,

then, is the business of the Philosojyher; to prove, of

Questions concerning
Predicate,

and
concerning Copula.

the former, from the great mass of known and admitted truths, wishes to elicit any valuable additional truth whatever, that has been hitherto unperceived and perhaps, without knowing, with certainty, what will be the terms of his Conclusion. Thus the Mathematician, e.g. seeks to ascertain what is the ratio of circles to each other, or what is the line whose square will be equal The Advocate, on the other hand, has a Proto a given circle. position put before him, which he is to maintain as well as he can. His business, therefore, is to find middle-terms (which is the inventio of Cicero); the Philosopher's to combine and select known facts or principles, suitably, for gaining from them Conclusions which, though implied in the Premises, were before unperceived in other words, for making *' Logical Discoveries." It may be added that all questions may be considered as falling under two classes; viz. " What shall be predicated of a certain Subject ;" and, " Wliich Copida, affirmative or negative, shall We inquire, in short, connect a certain Subject and Predicate." ?" or, 2d, " Is A, B, or is it not ?" The either 1st, " What is former class of questions belongs to the Philosopher the latter to the Advocate. [See Pfiet. Appendix G. p. 387.) The distinction between these two classes of questions is perhaps best illustrated by reference to some case in which our decision of

the Advocate;

each of the questions involved in some assertion, is controverted, by different parties. PJ.G. Paul says, that the apostles preached *' Christ crucified ; to the Jews a stumbling-block, and to the Greeks, foolishness:" that Jesus, who had suffered an ignominious death, was the Messiah, the Saviour of the World, was a doctrine

M Observe, that " Class" is used, here and elsewhere, for either an actual, or what may be called a potential, Class: see Book I. 3. 25 *' Proving" may be comoared to the

act of putting aimy any article into the proper receptacle of goods ot that description; "inferring," to that of brinyiny out the article when needed.

'

Chap.

III.

3.]

ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.

175

opposed both by Jews and Gentiles: though on different grounds, according to their respective prejudices: the Jews who "required a Sign," {i.e. the coming of the Messiah in the clouds to establish a splendid temporal kingdom) were "offended" "scandalized" at the doctrine of a siifering Messiah; the Greeks who " sought

after philosophical their

Wisdom"
;

{i.e.

the

mode

of themselves exalting

any divine aid) ridiculed the idea of a Heavenly Saviour altogether which the Jews admitted. In logical language, the Gentiles could not comprehend the Predicate; the
nature, without

own

Jews, denied the Copula. It may be added, that in modern phraseology, the operations of corresponding prejudices are denoted, respectively, by the words "paradox" (a "stumbling-block") and "nonsense;" ("foolishness;") which are often used, the one, by him who has been accustomed to hold an opposite opinion to what is asserted, the other, by him who has formed no opinion on the subject. The writer who proves an unwelcome truth, is censured as paradoxical; he who brings to hght i!iih&-Unknovm or unthought-of, as nonsensical.

^'^"f^f^a^'-j

nonsense.

3.
Such are the respective preparatory processes in these two Different branches of study, the philosophical, and the rhetorical. They are mind widely different they arise from, and generate, very different habits with tSe of mind and require a very different kind of training and precept, processes. It is evident that the business of the Advocate and that of the
; ;

Judge, are, in this point, opposed the one being, to find arguments for the support of his client's cause the other, to ascertain And hence it is, that those who have excelled the most the truth. in the former department, sometimes manifest a deficiency in the latter, though the subject-matter, in which they are conversant,
;
;

remains the same. The Pleader, or Controversialist, or, in short, the R-hetorician in general, who is, in his own province, the most

be but ill-fitted for philosophical-investigation, even no observation wanted when the facts are all ready ascertained for him. And again, the ablest Philosopher may make an indifferent disputant especially, since the arguments which have led him to the conclusion, and have, with him, the most weight, may not, perhaps, be the most powerful in controversy. The commoner fault, however, by far, is to forget the Philosopher or Theologian, and to assume the Advocate, improperly. It is therefore of great use to dwell on the distinction between these two branches. As for the bare process of Reasoning, tJmt is the same in both cases but the preparatory processes which are requisite, in order to emj^loy Reasoning profitably, these, we see, branch off" into two distinct channels. In each of these, undoubtedly, useful rules may be laid down but they should not be confounded Bacon has chosen the department of Philosophy ; giving together.
skilful,

may

where there

is

176
PhilosoIhical nquiry.

ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.

[Book IV.

rules in his Organon, not only for the conduct of experiments to ascertain new facts, but also for the selection and combination of

known

facts
;

Irtferences

and and it

principles,
is

some writers mean proposed " Logic."

Rhetorical luquirj.

with a view of obtaining valuable probable that a system of such rules is what (if they have any distinct meaning) by their

In the other department, precepts have been given by Aristotle

writers, as a part of their plan.^^ How far these precepts are to be considered as belonging to the present whether " Method" is to be regarded as a paH of Logic, system, ^whether the Matter of Logic {i.e. genera maxims, axioms, or common-places) is to be included in the system, whether Bacon's is properly to be reckoned a kind of Logic ; all these are merely verbal questions, relating to the extension, not of the Science, but

and other Rhetorical

of the name.

clusion from Premises,

The bare process of Reasoning, i.e. deducing a Conmust ever remain a distinct operation from
;

however useful the rules may be that have been given, or may be given, for conducting this latter process, and others connected with it and however properly such rules may be subjoined to the precepts of that system to which the name of Such rules as I now allude Logic is applied in the narrowest sense. but they must always be, as I have to may be of eminent service before observed, comparatively vague and general, and incapable of being built up into a regular demonstrative theory like that of the Syllogism to which theory they bear much the same relation as the principles and rules of Poetical and Rhetorical criticism to those or those of Practical Mechanics, to strict Geometry. of Grammar I find no fault with the extension of a Term but I would suggest a caution against confounding together, by means of a common name, things essentially different and above all, I would deprecate the
the assumption of Premises
; ; ;
; ;
;

sophistry of striving to depreciate what

is

called

*'

the school-Logic,"
it

by perpetually
in

contrasting

it

with systems with which

is

has nothing

common but

the name, and whose object

essentially difi'ereut.

4remarkable that writers, whose expressions tend to confound wjdBacon's. together, by means of a common name, two branches of study which have nothing else in common (as if they were two different plans for attaining one and the same object,) have themselves complained of one of the effects of this confusion, viz. the introduction, early in the career of Academical Education, of a course of Logic; under which name, they observe, ** men now^^ universally comprehend the works
Aristotle's

It is

26 I have attempted the same in Part I. although, Elements of Rhetoric (through some inadvertency) I have found myself mentioned along with some other writers, as having declared that the thing is impossible. If I ever

had made such an

assertion, I

should

of

probably have been the first person that ever undertook to accomplish an acknow ledped impossibility. ^7 i.e. In the Scotch universities.


Chap. IV.
1.]

ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.

177

of Locke, Bacon, &c." which, (as is justly remarked) are unfit foe Now this would not have happened, if men had always beginners. kept in mind the meaning or meanings of each name they used. And it may he added, that, however justly the word Logic may be thus extended, we have no ground for applying to the Aristotelian Logic the remarks above quoted respecting the Baconian; which the ambiguity of the word, if not carefully kept in view, might lead us to do. Grant that Bacon's w^ork is a part of Logic it no more follows, from the unfitness of that for learners, that the Elements of the Theory of Reasoning should be withheld from them, than it follows that the elements of Euclid, and common Arithmetic, are unfit for boys, because Newton s Principia, which also bears the Of two branches of title of Mathematical, is above their grasp. study which bear the same name, or even of two parts of the same branch, the one may be suitable to the commencement, the other to the close of the Academical career.

At whatever period of that career it may be proper to introduce the study of such as are usually called Metaphysical writers, it may be safely asserted, that those who have had the most experience in the business of giving instruction in Logic properly so called, as well as in other branches of knowledge, prefer and generally pursue the plan of letting their pupils enter on that study, next in order after the Elements of Mathematics.

Chap. IV.

0/

Verbal

and Real

Questions.

1ingenious author of the Philosophy of Rhetoric, and other writers, having maintained, or rather assumed, that Logic is applicable to Verbal controversy alone, there may be an advantage (though it has been my aim throughout to show the application of
to all Reasoning) in pointing out the diff'erence between Verbal and Real Questions, and the probable origin of Campbell's mistake. For to trace any error to its source, will often throw more light on the subject in hand than can be obtained if we rest satisfied with merely detecting and refuting it. Every Question that can arise, is in fact a Question whether a
it

The

certain Predicate

is

or

is

not applicable to a certain Subject, or,

;

whnt Predicate is applicable '^ and whatever other account may be given by any writer, of the nature of any matter of doubt or debate, will be found ultimately to resolve itself into this. But sometimes

See Chap. III.

5 2.

178
Difference
tlie

ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.

[Book IV.

verbafand a
'^^^^
.

Questlon turns on the meaning and extent of the terms employed If it be made to appear, Sometimes, on the things signified by them. therefore, that the opposite sides of a certain Question may be held by persons not differing in their opinion of the matter in hand, then, that question may be pronounced Verbal; as depending on the different senses in which they respectively employ the terms. If, on the contrary, it appears that they employ the Terms in the same sense, but still differ as to the application of one of them to the other, then it may be pronounced that the Question is real that they differ as to the opinions they hold of the things in Question. If, for instance, (to recur to an example formerly given. Book III. 10.) two persons contend whether Augustus deserved to be called a "great man," then, if it appeared that the one included, under the term "great," disinterested ^aim^zsm, and on that ground excluded Augustus from the class, as wanting in that quality and that the other also gave him no credit for that quality, but understood no more by the term " great," than high intellectual qualities,
;

energy of character, and

brilliant actions, it

parties did not differ in opinion except as to the use of a

would follow that the Term, and

that the Question was Verbal. If, again, it appeared that the one did give Augustus credit for such patriotism as the other denied him, both of them including that idea in the term great, then, the Question would be Real. Either

kind of Question, it is plain, is to be argued according to Logical principles; but i\\Q middle-terms employed would he different; and for this reason, among others, it is important to distinguish Verbal from Real controversy. In the former case, e.g. it might be urged (with truth) that the common use of the expression "great and good" proves that the idea of good is not implied in the ordinary sense of the word great an argument which could have, of course,
;

no place

in deciding the other Question.^

2.
Verbal

It is
trifling

by no means

SSkenfor
Real.

and frivolous. meaning of a word, either according to ordinary use, or according to the meaning of any particular writer or class of men. But when Verbal Questions are mistaken for Real, much confusion what is usually designated of thought and unprofitable wrangling,
correctly the
result. Nor is it always so easy and simple a task, as might at first sight appear, to distinguish them from each other. For, several objects to which one common name is applied, will often have many points of difference and yet that name may perhaps be applied to them all [univocally] in the same sense, and may be fairly regarded as the Genus they come

to be supposed that all Verbal Questions are It is often of the highest importance to settle

Logomachy, as

Logomachy

will

be generally the

See Book III. the

latter part of 10.

Chap. IV.

2.]

ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.

all

179

under,

if it

appear that they

agree in what

is

designated by that

between them are in points not essential to the character of that genus. A cow and a horse differ in many respects, but agree in all that is implied by the term "quadruped," which is therefore applicable to both in the same sense. ^ So also the houses of the ancients differed in many respects from ours, and their ships still more yet no one would contend that the terms " house " and " ship," as applied to both, are ambiguous, or that oiKQs might not fairly be rendered house, and uavg ship; because the essential characteristic of a house is, not its being of this or that form or materials, but its being a dwelling for men and these therefore would be called two different kiiuls of houses consequently the term "house" Avould be applied to each, without any equivocation, [univocally] in the same sense: and so in the

name, and that the

differences

may bear the same name, and may also have a resemblance in many points, nay, and may from that resemblance have come to bear the same name, and yet if the circumstance which is essential to each be wanting in the other, the term may be pronounced ambiguous. E.G. The word " Plantain " is the name of a common herb in Europe, and of au Indian fruit-tree both are vegetables; yet the term is ambiguous, because it does not denote them so far forth as they agree. Again, the word "Priest" is applied to the Ministers of the Jewish and of the Pagan religions, and also to those of the Christian and doubtless the term has been so transferred in consequence Nor of their being both ministers (in some sort) of religion. ^^ would every difference that might be found between the Priests of different religions constitute the term ambiguous, provided such differences were non-essential to the idea suggested by the word Priest; as e.g. the Jewish Priest served the true God, and the Pagan, false Gods this is a most important difference, but does not constitute the term ambiguous, because neither of these circumstances is implied and suggested by tlie term 'Itoivg-, which accordhigly was applied both to Jewish and Pagan Priests. But the term 'liotvg does seem to have implied the office of offering atoning for the sins of the people, and acting as sacrifice, mediator between Man and the object of his worship. And accordingly that term is' never applied to any one under the Christian
:
;

other instances. On the other hand, two or more things

30 Yet the charge of equivocation is sometimes unjustly brought against a writer in consequence of a gratuitous assumption of our own. An Eastern writer, e.^. may be speaking of " beasts of burden;" and the reader may chance to have the idea occur to his mind of Hoi-ses and Mules he thence takes for granted that these were meant; and if it afterwards come out that it was Camels, he perhaps complains of the writer for mis;

leadina:

him by not expressly mentioning the Species; saying, "I could not know that he meant Camels." Hedid?zo^mean Camels, in particular; he meant, as he said, "beasts of burden:" and Camels are such, as well as Horees and Mules, He is not accountable for your suppositions.
3i See Discourse on "the Christian Priesthood," appended to the Bampton Lectures.

180

ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.

[Book IV.

system, except to the ONE great Mediator. The Christian ministers not having that office which was imphed as essential in the term 'Is^sv;, [sacerdos] were never called bj that name, but by that of 'TTQsa/ivrs^os.^^ It may be concluded, therefore, that the term Priest is ambiguous, as corresponding to the terms 'U^svg and -Tr^saiivrsQos respectively, notwithstanding that there are points in which these two agree. These therefore should be reckoned, not two different kinds of Priests, but Priests in two different senses; since (to adopt the phraseology of Aristotle) the definition of them, so far forth as they are Priests, would be different. " real " question again is liable to be mistaken for a ** verbal," Real when different persons who are in fact using a term in the same misuken for verbal sometimes, sense, are supposed to be using it in different senses from its being erroneously taken for granted that what commonly belongs to the thing spoken of must be implied in the common accepas e.g. if any one should contation of the name of that thing clude, from the ordinary kinds of wood being lighter than water, that the ordinary sense of the term " wood " implies floating in
^

water: sometimes again, from its being rashly inferred from two persons having a difference of opinion respecting some thing, that they each denote that opinion in their use respectively, of the term which expresses that thing as e.g. if two persons differing in opinion as to the question of episcopacy, should be considered as differing in their use of the word " Episcopalian," and implying by it, the one a rigid and the other a wrong foim of Church-government whereas the word itself does not express or imply [connote] either the one or the other, but simply " an adherent to an episcopal form of government. " They both mean the same thing; their difference of opinion being, whether that thing be right or wrong. Different And most especially is ambiguity likely to be erroneously attriofaterm^do buted to some term, when different persons who employ it in reahty ^^ *^^^ Same sense, are accustomed to apply it differently, according ambiguity to circumstances, and thus to associate it habitually in their minds with different things. U.G. " Patriotism " is apj^lied by each in reference to his own country; but the word itself has the same signification with each; just as the word "Father;" though it is So also likely to recall to the mind of each a different individual. the term *' true-believer," which is applied by Mahometans to a believer in the Koran, would be considered by Christians as more applicable to a believer in the Gospel but it would not be correct to say that " the one party means by this term, so and so, and the other, something different: " for they do not attach different senses '* believe " they differ only in to the word " true," or to the word their persuasions of what is true, and ought to be believed. I have noticed some instances of the above kinds of mistake in
: ; ;

82

From which our word

which
(it

Priest

is

deis

rived, but

is

remarkable)

never translated " Priest " in our version of the Scriptures, but "Elder."

Chap. IV.

2.]

ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.

;

181

the Appendix to the third Series of Essays

and

also in the Intro-

in

duction to " Political Economy," from which I will here cite a passage. " In speaking of exchanges, I did not mean to limit myself to those in which the whole transaction takes voluntary exchanges place with the full consent of hoth parties to all the terms of it. Most exchanges, indeed, are of this character but the case of taxation, the revenue levied from the subject in return for the protection afforded by the sovereign, constitutes a remarkable exception the payment being compulsory, and not adjusted by agreement with the payer. Still, whether in any case it he fairly and reasonAnd ably adjusted, or the contrary, it is not the less an exchange. it is worth remarking, that it is just so far forth as it is an exchange, so far forth as protection, whether adequate or not, is afforded
;

exchange for this payment, that the payment itself comes under the cognizance of this science. There is nothing else that distinguishes taxation from avowed robbery.
the generality of exchanges are voluntary, this cirnot essential to an exchange: since otherwise the very expression * voluntary exchange, would be tautological and
**

Though

cumstance

is

'

improper. But it is a common logical error to suppose that what usually belongs to the thing, is implied by the usual sense of the word. Although most noblemen possess large estates, the word * nobleman' does not imply the possession of a large estate. Although most birds can fly, the ordinary use of the term bird' does not imply this ; since the penguin and the ostrich are always admitted to be birds. And though, in a great majority of cases, wealth is acquired by labour, the ordinary use of the word ' wealth' does not include this circumstance, since every one would call a pearl an article of wealth, even though a man should chance to meet with it in eating an oyster."
*

much importance to keep in mind the above order to avoid, on the one hand, stigmatizing, as Verbal controversies, what in reality are not such, merely because the Question turns (as every question must) on the applicability of a certain Predicate to a certain Subject or, on the other hand, falling into the opposite error of mistaking words for things, and judging of men's agreement or disagreement in opinion in every case, merely
It is evidently of
distinctions, in
;

from their agreement or disagreement in the terms employed.

182

ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.

Chap.

[Book

IV.

Y .Of Eealism.
1-

Nothing has a greater tendency

noticed,

to lead to the mistake just

Technical
sense of Species

when
applied to

and thus to produce undetected Verbal Questions and fruitless Logomachy, than the prevalence of the notion of the Realists,^ that Genus and Species are some real Things, existing independently of our conceptions and expressions and that, as in the case of Singular-terms, there is some real individual corresponding to each, so, in Common-terms also, there is some Thing corresponding to each which is the object of our thoughts when we employ any such term.^ There is one circumstance which ought to be noticed, as having probably contributed not a little to foster this error I mean, the peculiar technical sense of the word ** Species" when applied to
; ;
:

organized

organized Beings.
It has been laid down in the course of this work, that when several individuals are observed to resemble each other in some point, a common name may be assigned to them indicating [implying, or ** applying to all or any of them so far connoting "^^] that point,

eing&

attribute, and distinguishing them from all others; as, e.g. the several individual buildings, which, however different in other respects, agree in being constructed for men's dwelling, are called by the common name of '* House:" and

forth as respects that

common

was added, that as we select at pleasure the circumstance that we choose to abstract, we may thus refer the same Individual to any one of several different Species, and again, the same Species, to one Genus or to another, according as it suits our purpose whence it
it
;

seems plainly
minds.

to follow that

Genus and Species are no

real things

existing independent of our thoughts, but are creatures of our

own

it seems at first good but that the Species to which each individual belongs, could not be in any degree arbitrarily fixed

Yet

in the case of Species of organized Beings,

if this

sight as

rule did not hold

S3 It is well known what a furious controversy long existed in all the universities of Europe between the sects of the Realists and the Nominalists ; the heat ot which was allayed by the Reformation, which withdrew men's attention to a. more important question. 34 doctrine commonly, buj; falsely attributed to Aristotle, who expressly He calls individuals contradicts it.

fter^YjTYiTiiv

XXI ctXyfiU
yot,o

Itrnv,

'crt

tSi ti

eryi/u,ef

hii' otn/^ov
itrriv.

xeti i oipiOjU-M to i'/iXevutvef

f^iv

'E^i hi ruv hivripuv oiffiSJv, <1>AINETAI ofjcoiut TtK erx*}/^ecTi r^i ^pecrviyepiocs roSt ri
erctv
ii^y;,

e-rjju.ecivii)/,

cttdpaivoi,

r,

'Cuov'

MHN
TI

OT
is

TE AAH0E2- iXXa
X.
r. X.

(rr,fz,xini.

See Appendix, Art. " Same."

/axXXov HOION Aristotle, Caleg. 3.

There

*'

Genus and Species " secondary,"

denoting thing."
itiiv,

primary

substances"
(t^6
t/)

(^Tparxt olateci)

"

as not really -existing

Tl-i(r Si

o'j(ri(x,

loxu rohi

a-r./xat'

however a continual danger of sliding into Realism inadvertenUy, unless one is continually on the watch against it: of which Aristotle as well as many other writers not deliberately holding the doctrine, furnish instances.

'Esri i^iv ovv

tuv

tr^tiiTiuy

tlaiSv

u,viJi^

See 13ook

II.

Chap. V.

1.

Chap. V.

1.]

ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.

real, unalterable,

183

and independent of Caesar or Socrates, for instance, it may be said, our thoughts. must belong different as they may be to the Species Man, and can belong to no other and the like, with any individual Brute, or Plant e.g. a horned and a hornless sheep every naturalist would regard as belonging to the same Species. On the other hand, if any one utters such a proposition as " this '* Argus was a apple-tree is a codlin ;" " this dog is a spaniel ;" mastiff," to what head of Predicables would such a Predicate be Surely our logical principles would lead us to answer, referred ? that it is the ^loecies; since it could hardly be called an Accident, and is manifestly no other Predicable. And yet every Naturalist would at once pronounce that Mastiff is no distinct Species, but This, however, does not satisfy only a variety of the Species Dog. our inquiry as to the head of Predicables to which it is to be referred. It should seem at first sight as if one needed, in the case of organized Beings, an additional head of predicables to be called "Variety" or **Race." The solution of the difficulty is to be found in the consideration of the peculiar technical sense [or *' second intention"] of the word "Species" when applied to organized Beings: in which case it is specie^ always applied (when we are speaking strictly, as naturalists) to guished by such individuals as are supposed to be descended from a common ^J^*^*^^^** viz. which resemble one variety, stock, or which might have so descended

by

us,

but must be sometliing

another

(to

use
do.

M.

same stock

Cuvier's expression) as much as those of the Now this being a point on which all (not merely

and since it is a fact, (whether an ascer- Questions of tained fact or not) that certain individuals are, or are not, thus qu^esUons o/ connected, it follows, that every question whether a certain individual rrangeAnimal or Plant belongs to a certain Species or not, is a question not of mere arrangement, but of fact. But in the case of questions
Naturalists) are agreed,
If, e.g. two Naturalists differed, respecting Genus, it is otherwise. in the one placing (as Linnasus) all the Species of Bee under one Genus, which the other subdivided (as later writers have done) into several genera, it would be evident that there was no question of fact debated between them, and that it was only to be considered

it

which was the more convenient arrangement. If, on the other hand, were disputed whether the African and the Asiatic Elephant are distinct Species, or merely Varieties, it would be equally manifest that the question is one of fact since both would allow that if they are descended (or might have descended) from the same stock, they are of the same Species and if otherwise, of two this is the fact, which they endeavour to ascertain, by such indications as are to be
;

found.

For it is 'to be further observed, that this fact being one which can seldom be directly known, the consequence is, that the marks by which any Species of Animal or Plant is known, are not the very

]84

ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.

[Book IV.

Mark by
which a Species is

Now, in the case of Differentia wliicli constitutes that Species. tiiiorganized Beings, these two coincide ; the marks by which a
distinguished from other minerals, heing the very Diamond. And the same is the case in the Genera even of organized Beings: the Linnsean Genus "fehs," e.g. (when considered as a Species, i.e. as falhng
e.g. is

Diamond,

known not
always the
DiU'erentia.

Differentia that constitutes the Species

under some more comprehensive Class) is distinguished from others under the same Order, by those very marks which constitute its Differentia. But in the *' Infimse Species" (according to the view of a Naturalist) of plants and animals, this, as has been said, is not the case since here the Differentia which constitutes each Species includes in it a circumstance which cannot often be directly ascertained [viz. the being sprung from the same stock), but which we conjecture, from certain circumstances of resemblance so that the marks by which a Species is known, are not in truth the whole of the Differentia itself, but indications of the existence of that Differentia viz. indications of descent from a common stock. There are a few, and but a few, other Species to which the same observations will in a great degree apply: I mean in which the Differentia which constitutes the Species, and the marh by which the Species is known, are not the same e.g. " Murder:" the Differentia
; ;

of which

is

that

it

be committed "with malice aforethought;" this

;

cannot be directly ascertained and therefore we distinguish murder from any other homicide by circumstances of preparation, &c., which are not in reality the Differentia, but indications of the Differentia i.e. grounds for concluding that the malice did exist. Hence it is that Species, in the case of organized Beings, and also in a few other cases, have the appearance of being some real things, And hence, naturally independent of our thoughts and language. enough, the same notions have been often extended to the Genera also, and to Species of other things: so that men have a notion that each individual of every description truly belongs to some one Species and no other and each Species, in like manner, to some one Genus whether we happen to be right or not in the ones to which we refer them. Few, if any indeed, in the present day avow and maintain this doctrine: but those who are not especially on their guard, are
;

perpetually sliding into

A-rbipuity of the words
*' dame,'* **Oiie."&c.

it

unawares.

Nothing so much conduces to the error of Realism as the transferred and secondary use of the words **same,"^^ "one and the same," "identical," &c. when it is not clearly perceived and carefully borne in mind, that they are employed in a secondary sense, and that, more frequently even than in the primary. Suppose e.g. a thousand persons are thinking of the Sun: it is evident it is one and the same individual object on whith all these
so

See Appendix, No.

I.

Art.

" Same."

Chap. V.

1.]

ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.

185

minds are employed. So far all is clear. But suppose all these persons are thinking of a Triangle ; not any individual triangle, but and considering, perhaps, the equality of ita Triangle in general angles to two right angles it would seem as if, in this case also, their minds were all employed on " one and the same" object: and this object of their thoughts, it may be said, cannot be the mere word Triangle, but that which is meant by it nor again, can it be every thing that the word will apply to for they are not thinking of triangles, but of one thing. Those who do not maintain that this *' one thing" has an existence independent of the human mind, are in general content to tell us, by way of explanation, that the object an explanaof their thoughts is the abstract " idea" of a triangle
;

which satisfies, or at least silences many though it may be doubted whether they very clearly understand what sort of a thing an " idea" is; which may thus exist in a thousand different minds at once, and yet be *' one and the same.*' The fact is, that " unity" and " sameness" are in such cases employed, not in the primary sense, but, to denote perfect similarity. When we say that ten thousand different persons have all '* one and the same" Idea in their minds, or, are all of " one and the same" Opinion, we mean no more than that they are all thinking exactly
tion
;

alike.

When we say that they are all in the ** same" posture, we that they are iiM placed alike: and so also they are said all to have the " same" disease, when they are all diseased alike. One instance of the confusion of thought and endless logomachy Logomachy
mean
which may spring from inattention to this ambiguity of the words from this *' same," (fcc. is afforded by the controversy arising out of a sermon aJ^biguity. of Dr. King (Archbishop of Dublin), published about a century ago. He remarked (without expressing himself perhaps with so much guarded precision as the vehemence of his opponents rendered needful) that " the attributes of the Deity [mz. Wisdom, Justice,
kc.) are not to be regarded as the same with those human qualities which bear the same names, but are called so by resemblance and analogy only." For this he was decried hy Bishop Berkeley and a host of other objectors, down to the present time, as an Atheist, or
little better.

precisely the

*' If the divine attributes," they urged, "are not same in kind (though superior in degree) with the human qualities which bear the same name, w^e cannot imitate the Deity as the Scriptures require we cannot know on what prin;

ciples

we

shall

be judged:

we
to

all;" with a great deal

more

to the

cannot be sure that same purpose;

idle,

God
all

exists at

of which

would have been perceived

recollected to ascertain the

be perfectly

meaning of the

principal

had the authors but word employed.

have the

For, 1st, when any two persons (or other objects) are said to ** same'' quality, accident, &c. what we predicate of them
a name sometimes who adopt this explanation (if it can be called an explanation); to which class Locke is referred.

37 Conceptualists is

applied to those

'

186
Sameness
res" nfbiance aiid analogy,

ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.

[Book IV.

evidently a certain resemblance, and nothing else. One man e.g. does not feel another s sickness ; but they are said to have the a same" disease, (not in the sense in which two men may he killed by the same cannon-ball, but) if they are precisely similar in respect of their ailments : and so also they are said to have the same comis

plexion, if the

qualities as are entirely relative,

hue and texture of their skins be alike. 2dly, Such which consist in the relation borne

by the subject

to certain other things, in these, it is manifest, the only resemblance that can exist, is, resemblance of relations, i.e.

Courage, e.g. consists in the relation in which one stands^ towards dangers Temperance or Intemperance, towards bodily pleasures, &c. When it is said, therefore, of two courageous men, that they have both the same quality, the only meaning this expression can have, is, that they are, so far, completely analogous in their characters having similar ratios to certain similar objects. In short, as in all qualities, sameness can mean only strict resemblance, so, in those which are of a relative nature, resemblance can mean only analogy. Thus it appears, that Avhat Dr. King has been flo vehemently censured for asserting respecting the Deity, is literally true even with respect to men themselves viz. that it is only by Analogy that two persons can be said to possess the same virtue, or other such quality. 3dly, But what he means, is, plainly, that this analogy is far less exact and complete in the case of a comparison between the Deity and his creatures than between one man and another ; which surely no one would venture to deny. But the doctrine against which the attacks have been directed, is self-evident, the moment we consider the meaning of the term employed.^^ In the Introduction and Notes to the last edition of Archbishop King's Discourse, I have considered the matters in debate more fully; but this slight notice of them has been introduced in this place, as closely connected with the present subject.
;

ANALOGY.

2.
Origin

The
**

Origin of this secondary sense of the words,

(fee.

ambiguity ot^'same,"

identical,"

(an attention to which would clear

" same," away an

**

one,"

incalcu-

mass of confused Reasoning and Logomachy,) is easily to be traced to the use of Language and of other signs, for the purposes of reasoning and of mutual communication. If any one utters the " one single" word "triangle," and gives "one single" definition of it, each of the persons who hears him forms a certain notion in his own mind, not differing in any respect from that of each of the rest. They are said therefore to have all "one and the same" notion, because, resulting from, and corresponding with, (that which is, in the primary sense) "one and the same" expression; and there is
lable
38 Ey
lysis

^ See

tS

ixttv irus rpii, Arist. J)r. Copleston's excellent

principles, in the Notes to his

" Four

Ana-

Discourses."

and Defence of Archbishop King's

Chap. V.

2.]

ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.

187

said to be " one single" idea of every triangle (considered merely as a triangle) because one single name or definition is equally applicable In like manner, all the coins struck by tiie same single to each. die, are said to have *'one and the same" impression, merely because the (numerically) "one" description which suits one of

The these coins will equally suit any other that is exactly like it. expression accordingly which has only of late begun to prevail, *' such and such things are of the same description,'' is perhaps the
most philosophical that can be employed.
It is not intended to
*'

recommend the
this

disuse of the words

**

identical,"

(kc.

in

transferred

sense; which,

if

it

same," were

desirable,

w^ould be utterly impracticable;

but merely, a steady

attention to the ambiguity thus introduced,

" It is the errors thence arising. Those who know the value of it best are not therefore the least liberal. We may lend readily and largely and though this be done quietly and without ostentation, there is no harm in keeping an exact account in our private memorandum-book of the sums, the persons, and the occasions on which they were lent. It may be, we shall want them again for our own use or they may be employed by the borrower for a wrong purpose or they may have been so long in his possession that he begins to look upon them as his own. In either of which cases it is allowable, and even right, to
; ; ;

and watchfulness against with words as with inoney.

call

perplexities which have involved the questions respecting personal-identity, among others, may be traced principally I mean that many waiters have to the neglect of this caution. sought an explanation of the primary sense of identity [viz. personal)

them in."*^ The difficulties and

by looking

Any grown man, e.g. is, in the primary to the secondary. sense the same person he was when a child this sameness is, I conceive, a simple notion, which it is vain to attempt explaining by any other more simple ; but when philosophers seek to gain a clearer notion of it by looking to the cases in which sameness is predicated in another sense, viz. similarity, such as exists between several individuals denoted by a common name, (as when we say that there are growing on Lebanon some of the same trees with which the Temple was built meaning, cedars of that species) this is surely as idle as if we were to attempt explaining the primary sense, e.g. of "rage" as it exists in the human mind, by directing our attention to the " rage" of the sea. Whatever personal identity does consist in, it is plain that it has no necessary connexion w^ith similarity since every one would be ready to say, " When I a child I thought as a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child but when I became a man, I put away childish things." But a full consideration of this question would be unsuitable to tlie subject of the present work. 40 " Logic Vindicated." Oxford, 1809.
:

WAS

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

No.

I.

ON CERTAIN TERMS WHICH ARE PECULIARLY LIABLE TO BE USED AMBIGUOUSLY.

LIST OF WORDS EXPLAINED IN THE FOLLOWING APPENDIX,
Identical.

Sec One,


; ;

192

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.

[Afp.I.

respects, of service to tlie learner, to explain the ambiguity of a

few

of those most frequently occurring in the most important discussions, and whose double meaning has been the most frequently overlooked

and this, not by enterino; into an examination of oil the senses in which each term is ever employed, but of those only which are the most liable to be confounded together. It is worth observing, that the words whose ambiguity is the most frequently overlooked, and is productive of the greatest amount of confusion of thought and fallacy, are among the commonest, and are those of whose meaning the generality consider It is indeed from those very there is the least room to doubt. ^ circumstances that the danger arises words in very common use are both the most liable, from the looseness of ordinary discourse, to slide from one sense into another, and also the least likely to Familiar acquairdance is perhave that ambiguity suspected. petually mistaken for accurate knowledge.^ It may be necessary here to remark, that inaccuracy not unfrequently occurs in the employment of the very phrase, " such an author uses such a word in this, or that sense," or ''means so and We should not use these expressions (as some so, by this word." have inadvertently done) in reference, necessarily, to the notion which may exist, in the author's mind, of the object in question his belief or opinion respecting the thing he is speaking of; for the notions conveyed to others by the word, may often (even according
; ;

own expectation) fall short of this. He may be convinced, e.g. that " the moon has no atmospl^re," or that " the Spartans were brave;" but he cannot suppose that the terms imply [connote] any such thing.^ xSior *' moon " or "Spartan" again, should we regard the sense in which they understand him, as
to the writer's
it is theirs) of the word employed mistake his meaning: but we must consider what sense it is likely he ex]Dected and intended to convey, to those to whom he addressed himself. And a judicious writer will always expect each word to be understood, as nearly as the context will allow, in the sense, or in one of the senses, which use has established; except so far as he may have given some different But there are many who, from various causes, freexplanation. And it may be quently fail of conveying the sense they design. added, that there are, it is to be feared, some persons in these days who design to convey different senses by the same expression, to different men to the ordinary reader, and to the initiated reserving to themselves a back-door for evasion when charged with any false teaching, by pleading that they have been misunderstood ** in consequence of the reader's not being aware of the peculiar sense in which they use words!"

necessarily his sense, (though

since they

may

See Book Tir. 10. See Pol. Econ. Lect. IX.

also 13ook

See Note to last Essay, 3d Series; an4 IV. Ch. IV. i'Z.

Apr.

I.]

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.

193

readers ; tliat one It is but fair perliaps to add this warning to \^'lio takes pains to ascertain and explain the sense of the words

my

employed in any discussion, whatever care he may use to show that what he is inquiring after, is, the received sense, is yet almost sure to he charged, by the inaccurate, and the sophistical, with attempting to introduce some new sense of the words in question, in order
to

serve a purpose.

has been defined in Argument (Compendium, Book II. Ch. III. 1:) in that sense it includes (as is there remarked) the Conclusion as well and thus it is, that we say a Syllogism consists of iis the Premises viz. the Conclusion which is proved, as well as 'hree propositions Argumentum is also used by many those by which it is proved.
i.

ARGUMENT,
:

in the strict logical sense,

;

the foregoing treatise

logical writers to

denote the middle term.

Argument is very often used for the Premises alone, in contradistinction to the Conclusion; e.g. "the Conclusion which this Argument is intended to establish is so and
But
in ordinary discourse.

30."

sometimes employed to denote what is, strictly speaking, when a certain Conclusion is 3stabUshed by Premises, which are themselves, in the same dissertation, proved by other propositions, and perhaps those again, by others the whole of this dissertation is often called an Argument to prove the ultimate conclusion designed to be established though in fact it is a train of Arguments. It is in this sense, e.g. that we 5peak of " Warburton's Argument to prove the divine legation of
It is also
a,

course or series of such arguments

^Ioses,"

<fec.

Sometimes
:

also the

word

is

used to denote what

trains of

may

be properly

Argument, opposed to each other as when we say that A and B had a long Argument on such and such a subject; and that A had the best of the Argument. Doubtless the use of the word in this sense has contributed to foster the notion entertained by many, that Logic is the "art of wrangling," that it makes men contentious, kc: they have heard that it is employed about Arguments; and hastily conclude that it is confined to cases where there is oi^positlon and contest. It may be worth mentioning in this place, that the various forms if stating an Argument are sometimes spoken of as difereiit kinds )f Argument: as when we speak of a Categorical or Hypothetical ?lrgument, or of one in the first or some other figure; though ivery logician knows that the same individual Argument may be
called a Disputation;
i.e. tico

tated in various figures, <fec. This, no doubt, has contributed to the error of those who speak of he Syllogism as a pecuhar kind of Argument; and of "Syllogistic leasoning," as a distinct mode of Reasoning, instead of being only certain ybrm of expressing any argument.
.

194
Argument

AMBIGUOUS

TEKMIS.

lApi'.

For an account

of the different hinds

*'

called, the reader is referred to the

of argument, properly Elements of Rhetoric."

s(

Authority.

ii. AUTHORITY. This word is sometimes employed In iti primary sense, when we refer to any one's example, testimony, o] judgment: as when, e.g. we speak of correcting a reading in som( giving a statement o book, on the Authority of an ancient MS. some fact, on the Authority of such and such historians, &c. In this sense the word ans^^ers pretty nearly to the Latir

Auctoritas." It is a claim to deference. Sometimes again it is employed as equivalent to "Potestas,' Power: as when we speak of the Authority of a Magistrate, &c This is a claim to obedience. It is in the former sense that it is usee in our 20th Article ; which speaks of the Church having power tc decree rites and ceremonies, and *' authority" in controversies o:
Faith.

**

be found in which writers have unconsciously from one sense of the word to another, so as to blend confusedly in their minds the two ideas. In no case perhaps has this more frequently happened than when we are speaking of the Authority of the Church in which the ambiguity of the latter word (see the Article Church) comes in aid of that of the former. The Authority) (in the primary sense) of the CathoHc, i.e. Universal Church, at an3 particular period, is often appealed to, in support of this or thai doctrine or practice: and it is, justly, supposed that the opinion o: the great mass of the Christian World affords ^presumption (thougl: only a presumption) in favour of the correctness of any interpretatior of Scripture, or the expediency, at the time, of any ceremony, regulation, &c. But it is to be observed that the *' authority," in this sense, oi any Church or other Commmunit}^, is not that of the Body, as such, The presumption raised is tc but of the individuals composing it. be measured by the numbers, knowledge, judgment, and honesty ol those individuals, considered as individual persons, and not in theii
slid
:

Many instances may

corporate capacity. On the other hand, each particular Church has Authority in the other sense, viz. Power, over its own members, (as long as thej choose to remain members) to enforce any thing not contrary tc God's word.* But the Catholic or Universal Church, not being one religious Community on earth, can have no *' authority" in the sense of Power; since it is notorious there never was a time when the power of the Pope, of a Council, or of any other human Governors, over all Christians, was in fact admitted, whatever arguments may be urged to prove its claim to be admitted. Authority again in the sense of Auctoritas (claim to deference]
* See Essay on the Dangers to Christian Faith, &c. Note A.


App.
I.]

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.
every degree of weiglit,

195

from absolute infallibility, (sueli Authority. may have as, in religious matters, Cliristians attribute to the Scriptures) down On the other hand, " authority" in the to the faintest presumption.
sense of " legitimate jpoiver' does not admit of degrees. One person indeed possess a greater extent of power than another but in each particular instance, he either has a rightful claim to obedience Hinds's History of See Hawkins on Tradition. or he has none. Hinds on Inspb^ the Early Progress of Christianity, Vol. II. p. 99.

may

ration.

Errors of Bomanism, Chap. IV.

Essay on
II.

the

Omission of

Creeds, (tc. in the

New

Testament.

And Essay

on

the

Kingdom

of Christ.

QA-^.See " May,"

Must."
**

Can.

CAPABLE.
SARY."

See "Possible,"

Impossible," and

**

Neces-

capable

Grammarians use this word to signify a certain "variation in the writing and utterance of a Noun, denoting the relation in which it stands to some other part of the sentence ;" sometimes to denote that relation itself: whether indicated by tke termination, or by a preposition, or by its and there is hardly any writer on the subject who does collocation not occasionally employ the term in each sense, without explaining the ambiguity. Much confusion and frivolous debate has hence resulted. Whoever would see a specimen of this, may find it in the Port Royal Greek Grammar in which the Authors insist on giving the Greek language an Ablative case, with the same termination, however, as the Dative: (though, by the way, they had better have fixed on the Genitive; which oftener answers to the Latin Ablative) urging, and with great truth, that if a distinct termination be necessary to constitute a case, many Latin Nouns will be without an Ablative, some without a Genitive or without a Dative, and all Neuters without an Accusative. And they add, that since it is possible, in every instance, to render into Greek the Latin Ablative, consequently there must be an Ablative in Greek.^ If they had known and recollected that in the language of Lapland, there are, as we are told, thirteen Cases, they would have hesitated to use an argument which would prove that there must therefore be thirteen Cases in Greek and Latin also ! All this confusion might have been avoided, if it had but been observed that the word "Case" is used in two senses. See Book III. 10. 4.
iii.

CASE.
is its

Sometimes
strict sense)

Case,

(which

CAUSE./See

" Reason," and " Why."

Caaa*

5 It is in the same way that some of the Latin- Grammarians have made one of the

Moods into three Subjunctive, Potential, and Optative.

;

106
Certain.

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.

[Apf.

I.

iv.

that of

CERTAIN". This is a word whose ambiguity, together with many others of kindred signification (as "may," "can,"
infinite
;

"must," "possible," &c.) has occasioned

discussions on

perplexity in

such as the freedom of human actions, the divine foreknowledge, &c. In its primary sense, it is applied (according to its etymology from denoting any one's full and cerno) to the state of a person's mind complete conviction; and, generally, though not always, implying
;

some of the most important subjects

that there is sufiicient ground for such conviction. It was thence easily transferred metonymically to the truths or events, respecting which this conviction is rationally entertained. And " Uncertain" (as well as the substantives and adverbs derived from these adjectives) follows the

same

rule.

Thus we
is

say,

"it

is

certain that a
will

battle has been fought:" "it

certain that the

moon

be

full

on such a day:" "it is uncertain whether such a one is alive or dead:" "it is uncertain whether it will rain to-morroAv:" meaning, in these and in all other cases, that we are certain or uncertain respectively not indicating any difierence in the character of the events themselves, except in reference to our knowledge respecting them for the same thing may be, at the same time, both certain and uncertain, to different individuals e.g. the life or death at a particular time, of any one, is certain to his friends on the spot
; ; ;

uncertain or contingent, to those at a distance. From not attending to this circumstance, the words "uncertain" and " contingent " (which is employed nearly in the same sense as uncertain in its secondary meaning) have been considered by many writers^ as denoting some quality in the things themselves; and " Contingent" is have thus become involved in endless confusion. indeed applied to events only, not to persons: but it denotes no only, as has been said, the relaquality in the events themselves tion in which they stand to a person who has no complete knowledge It is from overlooking this principle, obvious as respecting them. it is when once distinctly stated, that Chance or Fortune has come
;

to be regarded as a real agent, and to have been, by the ancients, personified as a Goddess, and represented by statues.
Church.
V.

CHURCH

is

sometimes employed to signify the Church,

comprehending in it all Christhe Universal or Catholic Church, tians ; who are " Members one of another," and who compose the
Among others, Archbishop King, in his Discourse on Predestination, has ialien into tliis error ; as is explained in the Notes and the Appendix to my edition of that work. this It may be requisite to mention place, that I have been represented as coinciding with him as to tlie point in question, in a note to Mr. Davision's work on Propliecy; through a misjtake,

i.e,

which the author candidly acknowledged, and promised to rectify. His mistake
arose trom his having (as he himself informed me) spoken from conjecture only, without having read my publication. Unfortunately the error was allowed to remain uncorrected tor several years after it had been pointed out: in tact, till the Avhole of the edition containing the misstatement had been sold oS,

Apf.

I.]

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.
;

197

Body, of wlilch Christ is the Head which, collectively taken, has cimrfth no visible supreme Head or earthly governor, either individual, or council; and which is one, only in reference to its One invisible Governor and Paraclete, the Spirit of Christ, dwelling in It, to the one common faith and character, which ought to be found In all Christians, and the common principles on which all Christian See Hinds's History of the Rise of societies should be constituted. Christianity, and Bernard's Church and Synagogue, an abridged translation from Vitringa. Sometimes again it is employed to signify a Church i.e. any one having governors Society, constituted on these general principles on earth, and existing as a Community possessing a certain power over its own members in which sense we read of the '* Seven Churches in Asia," of Paul's having "the care of all the Churches," To apply to some one of these communities, from its being &c. confessedly a Church, all that is said, in Scripture or elsewhere, of the Church-universal [or Catholic] is a fallacy, which, though very glaring, has misled many. (See the Art. Truth; and also Essay 11. on the " Kingdom of Christ.'')

Moreover, the word "Church" (like several others denoting Communities) sometimes denotes the Body itself, as such, and someThis distinction, times the individual members of it, as individuals. which is an important one, has been noticed above, under the Art. Authority. The " Church" is also sometimes used to denote the Clergy, as distinguished from the Laity; as, when we speak of any one's being educated for the Church, meaning, "for the Ministry." Some would perhaps add, that it is in this sense we speak of the endowments of the Church since the immediate emolument of these is received by clergymen. But if it be considered that they receive it in the capacity of 2^uhlic instructors and spiritual Pastors, these endowments may fairly be regarded as belonging, in a certain sense, to the whole Body, for whose benefit they are, in this way, calculated
;

in the

same manner as we

consider, e.g. the

endowment

of a pro-

fessorship in a university, as a benefaction, not to the professors alone, but to the university at large.
vi.

ELECTION.

This

is

one of the terms which

is

often to all

Election,

practical purposes ambiguous, when not employed, strictly speaking, in two different senses, but with different applications, according to

that which 10.

"On

is understood in conjunction with it. See also Essays on some of tJie DiMculties, Election."

See
&;c.

Book
Essay

III.
III.

vii. EXPECT. This word is liable to an ambiguity, which may sometimes lead, in conjunction with other causes, to a practical bad effect. It is sometimes used in the sense of " anticipate" " calcu-

Expect.

198
Expect,

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.
(Ix-jr/^^-y)

LApp.

I.

late on," Sac.

in short

for

**

require or

demand

as reasonable,"

"consider &s probable;'^ sometimes "consider as right,"

Thus, I may fairly *' expect" (a|/S) that one who has received kindness from me, should protect me in distress yet I may have *' reason to expect {iT^'Tri^nv) that he will not. England expects every man to do his duty;" but it would be chimerical to expect, Hence, when men i.e. anticipate, a universal performance of duty. of great revenues, whether civil or ecclesiastical, live in the splendour and sensuality of Sardanapalus, they are apt to plead that this is expected of them; which may be perhaps sometimes true, in the not true, as sense that such conduct is anticipated as probable implying that it is required or approved. Thus also, because it would be romantic to expect {i.e. calculate upon) in public men a primary attention to the public good, or in men in general an adherence to the rule of doing as you would be done by, m^mj are apt to flatter themselves that they cannot reasonably be expected What may {i.e. fairly called upon) to act on such principles. reasonably be expected (in one sense of the word) must be, precisely the practice of the majority since it is the majority of instances that constitutes |9ro6(x6^7^^?/. what may reasonably be expected (in the other sense) is something much beyond the practice of the generality; as long at least as it shall be true that " narrow is the way that leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it."
; ;

Experience.

viii.

EXPERIENCE.^

This word,

in its

strict

sense, applies

what has occurred within a person's own knowledge. Experience, in this sense, of course, relates to the past alone. Thus it is that a man knows by Experience what sufferings he has undergone in some disease or, what height the tide reached at a certain time and place. More frequently the word is used to denote that Judgment which is derived from Experience in the primary sense, by reasoning from
to
;

Thus, a man may assert, on that, in combination with other data. the ground of experience, that he was cured of a disorder by such a medicine that that medicine is, generally, beneficial in that disorder; that the tide may always be expected, under such cirStrictly speaking, none of cumstances, to rise to such a height. these can be known hy Experience, but are conclusions derived from Experience. It is in this sense only that Experience can be applied to the future, or, which comes to the same thing, to any general fact as e.g. when it is said that we know by Experience that water exposed to a certain temperature will freeze. ** Men are so formed as (often unconsciously) to reason, whether well or ill, on the phenomena they observe, and to mix up their

See Elements of Rhetoric, Book

I.

App.

I.]

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.
tlieir

199

statements of those phenomena, so as in fact Experieno^ scantily and crudely) without knowing it. If you will he at the pains carefully to analyze the simplest descriptions you hear of any transaction or state of things, you will find, that the process which almost invariably takes place is, in logical language, this that each individual has in his mind certain majorpremises or principles, relative to the subject in question; that
inferences witli
to theorize (however
;

observation of what actually presents itself to the senses, supplies minor-'premises ; and that the statement given (and which is reported as a thing experienced) consists in fact of the condu&lons drawn from the combinations of those premises. " Hence it is that several different men, who have all had equal,
in the

or even the very same, experience, i.e. have been witnesses or agents same transactions, will often be found to resemble so many
different

looking at the same book: one perhaps, though he marks on white paper, has never learned his letters another can read, but is a stranger to the language in which the book is written another has an acquaintance with the language, but understands it imperfectly another is familiar with the language, but is a stranger to the subject of the book, and wants power, or previous instruction to enable him fully to take in the author's drift; while another again perfectly comprehends the whole. "The object that strikes the eye is to all of those persons the same ; the difference of the impressions produced on the mind ot each is referable to the differences in their minds. *' And this explains the fact, that we find so much discrepancy in the results of what are called Experience and Common-sense, as In former times men knew by contra-distinguished from theory. experience, that the earth stands still, and the sun rises and sets. Common-sense taught them that there could be no antipodes, since men could not stand with their heads downwards, like flies on the ceiling. Experience taught the King of Bantam that water could not become solid. And (to come to the consideration of himian affairs) the experience and common-sense of one of the most observant and intelligent of historians, Tacitus, convinced him, that for a mixed government to be so framed, as to combine the elements of Royalty, Aristocracy, and Democracy, must be next to impossible, and that if such a one could be framed, it must inevitably be very speedily dissolved."* There are again two different applications of the word {see Book III. 10), which, when not carefully distinguished, lead in practice to the same confusion as the employment of it in two senses "jiz. we sometimes understand our own personal Experience ; sometimes, general Experience. Hume has availed himself of this (practical) ambiguity, in his Essay on Miracles; in which he observes, that wo
distinctly sees black
; ; ; ;

men

Pol.

Econ. Lect. III.

^00'
Experience,

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.
falsity of

[App.

Testimony, but that the occurrence of a Miracle is contrary to our Experience, and is conseNow quently what no testimony ought to be allowed to" estabhsh. had he explained wliose Experience he meant, the argument would have come to nothing: if he means, the Experience of mankind universally, i.e. that a Miracle has never come, under the Experience of any one, this is palpably begging the question if he means the Experience of each individual who has never himself w^itnessed a Miracle, this would establish a rule [viz. that we are to believe nothing of which we have not ourselves experienced the like) which Not only w^as the King of it would argue insanity to act upon. Bantam justified (as Hume himself admits) in listening to no evidence for the existence of Ice, but no one would he authorized on this His Experience informs him, piinciple to expect his own death. Every disease under which he directly, only that others have died. kim,self may have laboured, his Experience must have told him has not terminated fatally if he is to judge strictly of the future by the past, according to this rule, what should hinder him from expecting the like of all future diseases ? Some have never been struck with this consequence of Hume's and some have even failed to perceive it when pointed principles out but if the reader thinks it worth his while to consult the author, he will see that his principles, according to his own account of them, are such as I have stated. Perhaps however he meant, if indeed he had any distinct meanings something intermediate between universal and individual experience viz. the Experience of the generality, as to what is common and of ordinary occurrence in which sense the maxim will only amount to this, that false Testimony is a thing of common occurAn obvious truth, indeed; but rence, and that Miracles are not. too general to authorize, of itself, a conclusion in any particular case. In any other individual question, as to the admissibility of evidence, it would be reckoned absurd to consider merely the average chances for the truth of Testimony in the abstract, without inquiring ivhat the

have Experience of the frequent

Testimony is, in the particidar instance before us. As if, e.g. any one had maintained that no testimony could establish Columbus's accomit of the discovery of America, because it is more common for travellers to lie, than for new Continents to be discovered.* Such a procedure involves a manifest ignoratio elenchi the two propositions brought forward as opposed, being by no means incompatible: Experience tells us that "a destructive hurricane is not a common occurrence:" certain persons tell us that "a destructive hurricane occurred in the West Indies, at such a time;" there is (as Dr. Campbell has pointed out) no opposition between these two
;

assertions,

See

*'

Historic Doul^ts relative to Napbleon Buonaparte.*'

App.

I.]

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.

201

It is to be observed by the way, tbat there is yet an additional Experienoc ambiguity in the eiUire jihrase "contrary to experience;" in one sense, a miracle, or any other event, may be called contrary to the as the experience of any one who has never witnessed the like in another freezing of water was to that of the King of Bantam and stricter sense, that only is contrary to a man's experience, which he knows by experience not to be true as if one should be told of an infallible remedy for some disorder, he having seen it administered without eifect. No testimony can establish what is, in this latter We need not wonder that ordinary sense, contrary to experience. minds should be bewildered by a sophistical employment of such a
;
; ;

mass of ambiguities. Such reasonings as these are accounted ingenious and profound, on account of the subject on which they are employed if applied to the ordinary affairs of life, they would be deemed unworthy of
;

serious notice.

Hume's Essay That might have been sufficiently accomplished, in the way of a "reductio ad absurdum," by mere reference to the case of the King of Bantam adduced by the author himself. But this celebrated Essay, though it has often perhaps contributed to the amusement of an anti-christian sophist at
The reader
is

not to suppose that the refutation of

on Miracles was

my

object in this Article.

the expense of those unable to expose its fallacy, never probably made one convert. The author himself seems plainly to have meant it as a specimen of his ingenuity in arguing on a given hypothesis for he disputes against miracles as contrary to the Course of Nature whereas, according to him, there is no such thing as a Course of to Nature his scepticism extends to the whole external world every thing, except the ideas or impressions on the mind of the individual so that a miracle which is believed, has, in that circumstance alone, on his principles, as much reality as any thing can have. But my object has been to point out, by the use of this example, the fallacies and blunders which may result from inattention to the ambiguity of the word Experience: and this cannot be done by a mere indirect argument ; which refutes indeed, but does not explain,
;
;

an

error.

FALSEHOOD
ix.

and

FALSITY./See

" Truth."

Falsehood.
Falsity.

**

GOD. The Greek and God" having been applied by

Latin words which we translate the Heathen to the highest objects

God.

of their ivorship, were, naturally, employed by Jews and Christians But the Heathen were to denote the object of their oion worship. far from regarding any of these supposed Beings as eternal, or as

They regarded them as the Maker and Governor of the Universe. the same kind of Beings with the Fairies, Demons, Nixes, Bogles, Genii, &lc., which in various parts of the world are still feared, and

202
GotU

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.

[App.

I.

some places propitiated by offerings and other marks of reverence and which in fact are the very Gods (though no longer called by that title) which our Pagan forefathers worshipped and a superstitious dread of which survived the introduction of the belief in a supreme But Christians and also Mahometans (whose creed Is a Creator. corrupted offset of Christianity) imply [connote] by the term *' God" the supreme Author and Governor of the Universe as is plain from this that any one who should deny the existence of any such Being, w^ould be universally considered as an Atheist; i.e. as maintaining that there h no " God." And he would be not the less reckoned an Atheist, even though he should believe (which is conceivable) that there do exist Beings superior in power to Man, such as
in
;
; :
;

Fairies, &c.

description.

The Heathen therefore, They did not

for

the most part,

come under

this

believe in

any God

in our sense

of

the

word.

And

accordingly the Apostle Paul expressly designates them

as Atheists, ["without God"] oikoi. The more any one studies the ancient Classical writers, the more in error he will be respecting their notions, if he is not attentive to the difference between the meanings they attached to certain terms and those which we, now, attach to corresponding terms. The present Is one instance: and another is, " immortahty of the soul."

See Essay
Gospel.

I.

1st Series.

X.

GOSPEL.

This

is

Instanced as one of the words which

is

practically ambiguous, from its different applications, even

though

it sometimes is) In different senses. Conformably to its etymological meaning of " Good-tidings," it is used to signify (and that especially and exclusively) the welcome intelligence of Salvation to man, as preached by our Lord and his followers. But it was afterwards transitively applied to each of the

not employed (as

four histories of our Lord's life, published by those who are called the Evangelists. And the term Is often used to express collectively the Gospel-c^ocirmes; i.e. the Instructions given men how to avail

themselves of the offer of salvation: and preaching the Gospel, Is accordingly often used to include not only the proclaiming of the good tidings, but the teaching of what is to be believed and done, in consequence.^^ This ambiguity is one source of some important theological errors many supposing that Gospel truth is to be found
:

exclusively, or chiefly in the Gosiods; to the neglect of the other

is said to have preached the " Gospel," and the same is said of the Apostles, the conclusion is often hence drawn, that the discourses of our Lord and the Apostolic Epistles must exactly coincide ; and that in case of any apparent difference, the

Sacred Writings. Again, since Jesus

See Discourse

I.

appended

to

"Essays on the Dangers," &c.

p. 2C4.

App.

I.]

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.
;

203

former must be tlie standard, and the latter must be taken to bear Gospel no other sense than what is implied by the other a notion which leads inevitably and immediately to the neglect of the Apostolic Epistles, when every thing they contain must be limited and modified Whereas into a complete coincidence with our Lord's Discourses. it is very conceivable, that though both might be in a certain sense *' good tidings," yet, one may contain a much more full development Which is confirmed by the of the Christian scheme than the other. consideration, that the principal events on which the Religion is founded (the atoning sacrifice and resurrection of Christ) had not taken place, nor could be clearly declared by our Lord, when He preached, saying, "the Kingdom of Heaven is cU, hand:'' not that it was actually established; as it was, when his Apostles Avere sent forth to preach to all nations. See Essays on the Difficulties^ <fcc.

Essay IL

HENCE.^ee

''

Reason" and
'*

**

Why."
*'

Hence
identical.

IDENTICAL.A^ee

OxXe" and

Same."

According to the definition we may impossixi. IMPOSSIBILITY. '^^ ^' choose to give of this word, it may be said either that there are three Species of it, or that it may be used in three different senses. 1st. What may be called mathematical impossibility, is that which involves an absurdity and self-contradiction e.g. that two straight lines should enclose a space, is not only impossible but inconceivable, as it would be at variance with the definition of a straight line. And it should be observed, that inability to accomplish any thing which is, in this sense, impossible, implies no limitation of power, and is compatible, even with omnipotence, in the fullest sense of the word. If it be proposed, e.g. to construct a triangle having one of its sides equal to the other two, or to find two numbers having the same ratio to each other as the side of a square and its diameter, it is not from a defect of power that Ave are precluded from solving such a problem as these since in fact the problem is in itself unmeaning and absurd it is, in reality, nothing, that is required to be done. It is important to observe respecting an Impossibility of this kind, that it is always susceptible of demonstrative proof. Not that every such Impossibility has actually been proved such or that we can be certain it ever Avill be but that it must be i7i itself capable of proof: the materials of such proof the data on which it may be founded, being (whether discovered or not) within the range of our knowledge. This follows from the very character (as above des^-ribed)^^ of such truths as the mathematical: matliematical2i,

11

Book IV. Ch.

II. 1.

'

204
impossi"' ^

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.

[AiP.

I.

being of course included under that term. For, every such trutli must be implied however tedious and difficult may be in tlie Definitions we set out with, and the task of eliciting it consequently in the Terms, which are the exact representatives of JE.G. That any two sides of a Triangle are those Definitions. greater than the third in other words, that it is impossMe to construct a triangle, one of whose sides shall be equal to the other two is a matter of easy and early demonstration. The incommensurability of the Side and the Diameter of a square, in other words, the impossibility of finding two numbers having to one another the ratio of the Side to the Diameter, is a truth which was probably believed some time before a demonstration of it was found: but it is no less implied in the definitions of " Straight line,"
impossibilities

" Square," <kc. In the case of the Circle again, the ratio of the Diameter to the Circumference has been long sought by mathematicians and no one has yet demonstrated, or perhaps ever will, either, what their ratio is, or, on the other hand, that they are incommensurable but one or the other must be within the sphere of mathematical demonstration. When therefore any one says that perhaps so and so may he an Impossibility in the mathematical sense, though we may never be able to prove it such,^^ he is to keep in mind that at least such proof is within the scojoe of inquiry, and that no increase of knoiu"^^ can bo ledge, in the sense of " Information respecting facts, needed to furnish materials for the demonstration. Every such though we may not perceive it, in Impossibility must be implied the terms employed in short, it must be properly a contradiction
;
:

'

'

in terms.
2dly.

'

What may be

called a Physical Impossibility

at variance with the existing

Laws

of Nature,

quently no Being, subject to those Laws, (as but we can easily conceive a Being capable of bringing about Avhat in the ordinary course of Nature is impossible. E.G. To multiply five loaves into food for a multitude, or to walk on the surface of the waves, are things physically impossible, but imply no contradiction on the contrary, we cannot but suppose that the Being, if there be such an one, who created the Universe, is able to alter at wall the properties of any of the substances it contains.^* And an occurrence of this character, we call miraculous. Not but that one person may perform without supernatural power what as, e.g. a man may lift a great is, to another, physically impossible weight, which it would be physically impossible for a child to raise because it is contrary to the Laws of Nature that a muscle of this
;
;

is something and which consewe are) can surmount;

12
13

See Bishop Copleston on PredestinaSee Book IV. Chap. II. 1. See an able disquisition on Miracles,

tion.
1*

snbioined to the Life of Apolloniiis Tyanaeus, in the Eiicydopcediu MetropoUtana,

Afp.

I.]

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.

205
impossi^*^
^

degree of strength should overcome a resistance which one of that But if any one perform what is beyond his own degree is equal to. natural powers, or the natural powers of Man universally, he has performed a miracle. Much sophistry has been founded on the neglect of the distinction between these two senses. It has even been contended, that no evidence ought to induce a man of sense to admit that a miracle has taken place, on the ground that it is a thing impossible in other words, that it is a miracle ; for if it were not a thing imposso that sible to man, there would be no miracle in the case such an argument is palpably begging the question; but it has often probably been admitted from an indistinct notion being suggested of Impossibility in the first sense in which sense {viz. that of self-contradiction) it is admitted that no evidence would justify
;
:

belief.

3dly.
call

probability which leaves no

violation of the

Moral Impossibility signifies only that high degree of imroom for doubt. In this sense we often a thing impossible, which implies no contradiction, or any

Laws of Nature, but which yet we are rationally convinced will never occur, merely from the multitude of chances against it as, e.g. that unloaded dice should turn up the same faces one hundred times successively.^^ And in this sense, we cannot accurately draw the line, so as to determine at what point the improbability amounts to an Impossibility; and hence we often have occasion to speak of this or that as almost impossible, though not quite, <fcc. The other impossibilities do not admit of degrees of approach. That a certain throw should recur two or three times the improbability successively, we should not call very improbable but we cannot say exactly is increased at each successive step
; ; :

it becomes impossible though no one would scruple to call one hundred such recurrences impossible. In the same sense we often call things impossible which are completely within the power of knov/n agents to bring about, but which we are convinced they never will bring about. Thus, e.g. that all the civilized people in the world should with one accord forsake their habitations and wander about the world as savages, every one would call an impossibility though it is plain they have the power to do so, and that it depends on their choice which they will do and moreover that there even have been instances of some few persons doing so. In like manner, if Ave were told of a man's having disgracefully fled from his post, whom we knew to be possessed of the most undaunted courage, we should without scruple (and with good reason, supposing the idea formed of his character meaning, that to be a just one) pronounce this an Impossibility there is sufficient ground for being fully convinced that the thing
; ; ;
;

when

15 And yet why should they not ? since the chances are the very same against

any given 100 throws. Ch. II. 5 4.

See Rhet. Part

206
Impossi*''^^'^'

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.
liberty to fly if
;

[App.

I.

not from any idea of lils not having poicer ; he would for our certainty is built on the very circumstance of his being free to act as he will, together with his being of such a disposition as never to have the will to act disgracefully. If, again, a man were bound hand and foot, it would be, in could never talie place

and

the other sense, impossible for him to fly ; viz. out of his ]30wer. "Capable" has a corresponding ambiguity. E.G. We speak of this or that man being "capable" or "incapable" of a cowardly act, in a different sense from that in which we speak of him as ** capable " or " incapable " of writing a fine poem. The performance of any thing that is morally impossible to a mere man, is to be reckoned a miracle, as much as if the impossibility were physical. E.G. It is morally impossible for poor Jewish fishermen to have framed such a scheme of ethical and religious doctrine as the Gospel exhibits. It is morally impossible for a man to foretell distant and improbable future events with the exactitude of many of the prophecies in Scripture. Much of the confusion of thought which has pervaded, and has interminably protracted, the discussions respecting the long agitated question of human freedom, has arisen from inattention to the ambiguity which has been here noticed. If the Deity, it is said, *' foresees exactly what I shall do on any occasion, it must be impossible iov me to act otherwise;" and thence it is inferred that man's actions cannot be free. The middle-term employed in such an argument as this is "impossible," or "impossibility" employed lie to whom it is, in one sense, impossible, {viz. in two senses. physically) to act otherwise than he does, {i.e. who has it not in his power) is not a free agent correct foreknowledge implies impossibility (in another sense, viz. moral impossibility ; the absence of all room for doubt:) and the perplexity is aggravated by resorting, for the purpose of explanation, to such words as "may," "can," ''possible," "must," &c., all of which are aftected by a corresponding ambiguity. ^^ It should be observed, that many things which are not usually termed "mathematically" necessary or impossible, will at once appear such, when stated, not abstractedly, but with all their actual circumstances: e.g. that "Brutus stabbed Ca3sar," is a fact, the denial of which, though a falsehood, would not be regarded as selfcontradictory (like the denial of the equality of two right angles) because, abstractedly, we can conceive 13rutus acting otherwise : but if we insert the circumstances (which of course really existed) of his having complete power, liberty, and also a predominant will to do 60, then, the denial of the action amounts to a "mathematical"
;

W See Tucker's " Light of Nature," in the Chapters on Providence, on Freewill, and some others. 1 l)ave endeavoured to condense and to simphty some of the
most valuable parts of
uis reasonings in

tlie

Notes and Appendix to an edition of Archbishop King's Disco\irse on Predestination, pubhshed at the end of tho

App.

I.]

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.
;

207
irnpnssi
*^^''*

impossibility, or self-contradiction

for to act voluntarily against the

dictates of a predominant will, implies an eifect without a cause.

Of Future

events, that Being,

and no other, can have the same

knowledge as of the past, who is acquainted with all the causes, remote or immediate, internal and external, on which each depends. But every one is accustomed to anticipate future events, in human affairs, as well as in the material world, in j^^^ojyortioii to his knowledge of the several circumstances connected with each; however different m amount that knowledge may be, in reference to different And in both cases alike, we always attribute the occurrences. failure of any anticipation to our ignorance or mistake respecting some of the circumstances. When, e.g. we fully expect, from our supposed knowledge of some person's character, and of the circumstances he is placed in, that he will do something which, eventually, he does not do, we at once and without hesitation conclude that we were mistaJ:en either as to his character, or as to his situation, or as to our acquaintance with human nature, generally and we are accustomed to adduce any such failure as a proof of such mistake; saying, " it is plain you icere mistaken in your estimate of that man's character; for he has done so and so:" and this, as unhesitatingly as we should attribute the non- occurrence of an eclipse we had predicted, not, to any change in the Laws of Nature, but to some error
;

in our calculations.

xii.

INDIFFERENCE,
is

in its application in respect of the Will

indifforence-

and of the Judgment,

readers

subject to an ambiguity which

;

some of mj

may perhaps think hardly worth noticing the distinction between uiMassed candour and impartiality, on the one side, and carelessness, on the other, being so very obvious. But these two things nevertheless have been, from their bearing the same name, confounded together; or at least represented as inseparably connected. I have known a person maintain, with some plausibility,
the inexpediency, with a view to the attainment of truth, of educating people, or appointing teachers to instruct them, in any particular systems or theories, of astronomy, medicine, religion, politics, <fec.,

on the ground, that a man must loisli to believe, and to find good reasons for believing, the system in which he has been trained, and which he has been engaged in teaching; and this wish must prejudice his understanding in favour of it, and consequently render him an incompetent judge of truth. ^^ Now let any one consider whether such a doctrine as this could have been even plausibly stated, but for the ambiguity of the word Indifference, and others connected with it. For it would follow, from such a prmciple, that no physician is to be trusted, who has been instructed in a certain mode of treating any disorder, becau.so
17

See Essay

T.

Second

Series.

208
Iuut!/cren.'e.

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.

[App.
:

I.

he miist wish to think the theory correct which he has learned nay, no physician should he trusted who is not utterly indifferent Avhether his patient recovers or dies since else, he must wish to find reasons for hoping favourahly from the mode of treatment pursued. No plan for the henefit of the puhlic, proposed hy a philaiithropistf should he listened to since such a man cannot but wish it may he
; ;

successful

<fcc.
;

it is

doubt the judgment is often biassed by the inclinations but and it should be our endeavour, to guard against this bias. If a scheme be proposed to any one for embarking his capital some speculation which promises great wealth, he will doubtless wish to find that the expectations held out are well founded but every one would call him very imprudent, if (as some do) he should suffer this wish to bias his judgment, and should believe, on insufBut we should ficient grounds, the fair promises held out to him. not think such imprudence an inevitable consequence of his desire His wishes, we should say, were both to increase his property. natural and wise but since they could not render the event more probable, it was most unwise to allow them to influence his decision. In like manner, a good man will indeed wish to find the evidence of the Christian religion satisfactory but a wise man does not for that but weighs the reason take for granted that it is satisfactory evidence the more carefully on account of the importance of the
possible,

No

question.

how fully aware of the operation of this and how utterly blind to it, the same persons will be, in oppoSuch writers, e.g. as I have just alluded to, disparage site cases. the judgment of those who have been accustomed to study and to teach the Christian religion, and who derive hope and satisfaction from it, on the ground that they must wish to find it true. And let and that the it be admitted that their authority shall go for nothing But then, question shall be tried entirely by the reasons adduced. on the same principle, how strong must be the testimony of the multitudes who admit the truth of Christianity, though it is to them who have not adopted any a source of uneasiness or of dismay antinomian system to quiet their conscience while leading an unchristian life but, when they hear of "righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come, tremble," and try to dismiss such thoughts till "a more convenient season." The case of these, who have every reason to wish Christianity untrue, is passed by, by the very same persons who are insisting on the influence of the opposite bias. According to the homely but expressive proverb, they are '* deaf on one ear." And it may be added, that it is utterly a mistake to suppose that the bias is always in favour of the conclusion wished for it is often The proverbial expression of ** too good in the contrary direction. news to be true," bears witness to the existence of this feeling.
It is curious to observe
bias,
;
;

Arp.

I.J

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.
is

209
indifference,

There where

in

their

some minds a tendency to unreasonable doubt in cases wishes are strong a morbid distrust of evidence which
;

they* are especially anxious to find conclusive; e.g. groundless fears

for the health or safety of
distress anxious parents.

an ardently-beloved

child, will frequently

Different temperaments (sometimes varying with the state of health of each individual) lead towards these opposite miscalculations, the over-estimate or under-estimate of the reasons for a conclusion we earnestly wish to find true. Our aim should be to guard against both extremes, and to decide according to the evidence; preserving the Indifi'erence of the Judgment, even where the Will neither can, nor should be indifferent.

xiii. is, etymologically, that which is "laid" down; and is Law. used, in the most appropriate sense, to signify some general injunction, command, or regulation, addressed to certain Persons, who are

LAW

called
*'

upon

to

conform to

it.

It is in this sense that

we speak

of

the

Law

of Moses," " the

Law

of the

Land,"

k.Q.

It is also

used in a transferred sense, to denote the statement of

some general fad, the several individual instances of which exhibit a

conformity to that statement, analogous to the conduct of persons in It is in this sense that we speak respect to a Law which they obey. of " the Laws of Nature," when we say that " a seed in vegetating directs the radicle downwards and the plumule upwards, in compliance with a Law of Nature:" we only mean that such is universally tliefact; and so, in other cases. It is evident therefore that, in this sense, the conformity of individual cases to the general rule is that which constitutes a Law of

Nature. If water should henceforth never become solid, at any temperature, then the freezing of water Avould no longer be a Law wlipreas in the other sense, a Law is not the more or the of Nature less a Law from the conformity or non-conformity of individuals to it if an Act of our Legislature were to be disobeyed and utterly disregarded by every one, it would not on that account be the less a Law. This distinction may ajipear so obvious wdien plainly stated, as hardly to need mention yet writers of great note and ability have confounded these two senses together 1 need only mention Hooker (in the opening of his great work) and Montesquieu the latter of whom declaims on the much stricter observance in the Universe of the Laws of Nature, than in mankind, of the divine and human Laws laid down for their conduct: not considering that, in the former case, it is the observance that constitutes the Law.
: : : :

xiv.

MAY,

are each used in two senses,

together.

and CAN, (as well as CANNOT) which are very often confounded They relate sometimes to Power, or Liberty, sometimes to and likewise

MUST,

May.

Contingency.

210
Ma.v
*'

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.

[App.

I.

When we say of one who has obtained a certain sum of money, now he may jDurchase the field he was wishing for," we mean that

in his 2-ower; it is plain that he may, in the same sense, hoard the money, or spend it on something else ; though perhaps we are convinced, from our knowledge of his character and situation, that he will not. When again we say, " it may rain to-morrow,"
it is

lip

or
at

'*

the vessel

all relate to

though we we are not sure of the reverse. When, again, we say, *' this man,

may have arrived in port," the expression does not power, hut merely to contingency: i.e. we mean, that are not sure such an event will happen or has happened,
of so grateful a disposition,

must have eagerly embraced such an opportunity of requiting his benefactor," or " one who approves of the slave trade 7nust be very
hard-hearted," we only mean to imply the absence of all doubt on these points. The very notions of gratitude and of hard-heartedness exclude the idea of compulsion, and of yielding to irresistible power. But when we say that " all men must die," or that " a man must go to prison who is dragged by force," we mean ''whether they will or not" that there is no poiuer to resist. So also, if we say that a Being of perfect goodness " cannot'' act wrong, we do not mean that it is out of his j^ower; since that would imply no goodness of character ; but that there is sufficient reason for feeling sure that He unll not. It is in a very different sense that we say of a man fettered in a prison, that he " cannot'' escape meaning, that though he has the will, he wants the ability. These words are commonly introduced, in questions connected with Fatalism and the Freedom of human actions, to explain the meaning of " necessary," " impossible," &c. and having themselves a corresponding ambiguity, they only tend to increase the

perplexity.

And
Must
Necessary.

Chaos umpire sits. by deciding worse embroils the

fray.**

MUST./^ee" May."
This word is used as the contrary to xv. NECESSARY. impossible" in all its senses, and is of course liable to a correThus it is " mathematically Necessary" that sponding ambiguity. two sides of a triangle should be greater than the third there is a "physical Necessity" for the fall of a stone; and a "moral Necessity" that Beings of such and such a character should act, when left perfectly free, in such and such a manner; i.e. we are sure they will act so ; though of course it is in their power to act otherwise ; else there would be no moral agency.^^ This ambiguity is employed sophistically to justify immoral conduct; since no one is
'
;

See the Article "Impossibility;" Note.


app.i.]

211
Necessary,

ambiguous terms,

respondhle for any thing done under "necessity," i.e. "physical necessity;" ^s when a man is dragged anywhere hy external force, or falls down from heing too weak to stand and then the same excuse is fallaciously extended to " moral necessity" also. There are likewise numberless different apjMcations of the word " necessity" (as well as of those derived from it) in which there is a practical ambiguity, from the difference of the things understood in conjunction ^\\i\i\l: e.g. ioo^ is " necessary ;" ws;. to life great wealth is "necessary" to the gratification of a man of luxurious habits ; the violation of moral duty is in many cases " necessary" for the attainment of certain worldly objects the renunciation of such objects, and subjugation of the desires, is " necessary" to the attainment of the Gospel-promises, (kc. And thus it is that " necessity" has come to be " the tyrant's plea;" for as no one is at all responsible for what is a matter of physical necessity, what he has no power to avoid, so, a degree of allowance is made for a man's doing what he has power to avoid, when it appears to be the less of two evils as e.g. when a man who is famishing takes the first food he meets with, as " necessary" to support life, or throws over goods in a storm, when it is " necessary" in order to save the ship. But if the plea of necessity be admitted without inquiring ^br what the act in question is necessary, any thing whatever may be thus vindicated ; since no one commits any crime which is not, in his view, " necessary" to the attainment of some supposed advantage or gratification. The confusion of thought is further increased by the employment on improper occasions of the phrase " absolutely necessary ;" which, strictly speaking, denotes a case in which there is no possible alternative. It is necessary /or a man's safety, that he should remain in a house which he cannot quit without incurring danger; it is absolutely [or simply) necessary that he should remain there, if he is closely imprisoned in it. I have* treated more fully on this fruitful source of sophistry in the Appendix (No. I.) to King's "Discourse on Predestination." In the course of it, I suggested (in the first edition) an etymology of the word, which I have reason to think is not correct but it should be observed, that this makes no difference in the reasoning, which is not in any degree founded on that etymology nor have I, tis some have represented, attempted to introduce any new or inusual sense of the word, but have all along appealed to common the only right standard, use, and merely pointed out the senses in which each word lias actually been employed. See the introduction
;

to this

Appendix.

This word, in its strict and primary sense, denotes oii xvi. OLD. the length of time that any object has existed and many are not aware that they are accustomed to use it in any other. It is.
;


212
Old.

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.

[Afp.

I.

however, very frequently employed instead of '* Ancient," to denote distance of time. The same transition seems to have taken place, in Latin. Horace says of Lucilius, who was one of the most ancient Koman authors, but who did not live to he old:

-"quo fit ut omnis Votiva pateat veluti descripta tabella Vita Senis,"
is a remarkable instance of the influence of an ambiguous word over the thoughts even of those who are not ignorant of the ambiguity, but are not carefully on the watch against its effects; the impressions and ideas associated by habit with the word when used in one sense, being always apt to obtrude themselves unawares when it is employed in another sense, and thus to affect our reasonings. E.G. *'Old times," '*the Old world," &lc. are expressions in frequent use, and which, oftener than not, produce imperceptibly the associated impression of the superior wisdom resulting from experience, which, as a general rule, we attribute to Old men. Yet no one is really ignorant that the world is older now than ever it was; and that the instruction to be derived from observations on the past (which is the advantage that Old persons possess) must be greater, supposing other things equal, to every successive generation and Bacon's remark to this purpose appears, as soon as distinctly stated, a mere truism yet few, perhaps, that he made, are more important. There is always a tendency to appeal with the same kind of deference, to the authority of " Old times," as of aged men. It should be kept in mind, however, that ancient customs, institutions, &c., when they still exist, may be literally called Old; and have this advantage attending them, that their effects may be estimated from long experience whereas we cannot be sure, respecting any recently-established Law or System, whether it may not produce in time some effects which were not originally contemplated.^^

The present

<in9.

xvii. ONE is sometimes employed to denote strict and proper numerical Unity ; sometimes, close Resemblance ; correspondence with one single description. See " Same."

Nee

di versa

Facies non omnibus UNA, tamen; qualem decet esse soroium." Oy. Mei.
'

h.

ii.

It Is in the secondary or improper, not the primary and proper sense of this word, that men are exhorted to '*be of one mind;" i.e. "The mutual affections, <fec. pursuits, to agree in their faith, Church" [viz. the Universal or Catholic Church] **is undoubtedly It was one, and so is the Human Race one; but not as a Society.

10

from the London Review,

See, however, the Article reprinted in the first

letter to

Earl Grey on Secondary Punish-

ments.


AlP.
I.I

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.
;

213

from the first composed of distinct Societies which were called one, One. because formed on common principles. It is One Society only when considered as to its future existence. The circumstance of its having one common Head, Christ, one Spirit, one Father, are points of unity, which no more make the Church One Society on earth, than the circumstance of all men having the same Creator, and being derived from the same Adam, renders the Human Race one
Family. "20
It is also in this sense that two guineas, e.g. struck from a wedge of uniform fineness, are said to be " of one and the same form and weight," and also *' of one and the same substance." In this

secondary or improper sense also, a child is said to be *' of one and the same (bodily) substance witli its mother;" or, simply "of the substance of its mother:" for these two pieces of money, and two human Beings, are numerically distinct.
It is evidently most important to keep steadily in view, and to explain on proper occasions, these diff"erent uses of the word ; lest

men

should insensibly slide into error on the most important of all by applying, in the secondary sense, expressions which ought to be understood hi the primary and proper. [See "Person. ") Unity is, as might have been expected, liable to corresponding ambiguities. E.G. Sometimes what the Apostles say concerning " Unity of Spirit" of Faith &c. is transferred to Unity of Churchsubjects,

Government.
xviii.

PAY.

transfers to another
is

used to
is

strict sense, a person is said to " pay," who what was once his own in another sense " pay" denote the mere act of handing over what perhaps never
:

In the

^"^

was

In this latter sense a gentleman's steward or housepay the tradesmen their bills ; in the other sense, it is the master who pays them. It is in the secondary or improper sense that an executor is said to pay legacies, a landowner or farmer to pay tithes, &c., since the money these hand over to another never was theirs. See " Evidence," (in vol. of Tracts,) p. 339.

one's own.

keeper

said to

xix. PERSON, ^^ in its ordinary use at present, invariably implies a numerically distinct substance. Each man is one Person, and can be but one. It has also a peculiar theological sense, in which

Person,

we speak of the "three Persons " of the blessed Trinity. It was probably thus employed by our Divines as a literal, or perhaps etymological, rendering of the Latin word "Persona." I am inclined to think, however, from the language of Wallis (the Mathematician and Logician) in the following extract, as well as from that of some other of our older writers, that the English word Person
20
21

Encyclop. Metrop., p. 774.

Most of the following observations

will

apply to the word " Personality."


214
Person.

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.

[App.

was formerly not so strictly confined as now, to the sense It bears in commo'u conversation among us. *' That which makes these expressions " {viz. respecting the Trinity) ** seem harsh to some of these men, is because they have used themselves to fansie that notion only of the word Person, according to which three men are accounted to be three persons, and these three persons to be three men. But he may consider that there is another notion of the word Person, and In common use too, wherein the same man may be said to sustain divers persons, and those persons to be the same man: that is, the same man as sustaining divers capacities. As was said but now of Tully, Tres Fersonas Unus sustineo; meam, adversarii, judicis. And then it will seem no more harsh to say, The Three Persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are one God, than to say, God the Creatour, God tlie Redeemer, and God the Sanctifier, are one God it is much the same thing whether of the two forms we use." Letters on the Trinity, p. 63. " The Avord Person [persona) is originally a Latin word, and does not properly signify a Man ; (so that another person must needs imply another man) for then the word Homo would have served, and they needed not have taken in the word Persona ; but rather, one so circumstantiated. And the same Man, if considered in other
circumstances (considerably different) is reputed another person. And that this is the true notion of the word Person, appears by those noted phrases, personam induere, personam deiDonere, per^ sonam agere, and many the like, in approved Latin authours. Thus the same man may at once sustain the Person, of a King and a Father, if he be invested both with regal and pa/er?iaZ authority. Kow because the King and the Father are for the most part not only different persons but different men also, (and the like in other cases) hence it comes to pass that another person is sometimes supposed to imply another man; but not always, nor is that the proper sense of the word. It is Englished in our dictionaries by the stale, quality or condition whereby one man differs from another and so, as the condition alters, the Person alters, though the man be the same. " The hinge of the controversy, is, that notion concerning the three soraewlmts, which the Fathers (who first used it) did intend to design by the name Person ; so that we are not from the word Person to determine what was that Notion; but from that Notion which they would express, to determine in what sense the word Person is here used," &lc. &c. Letter V. in answer to tlie Arian^s

Vindication.'^
22

Dr. WalHs's theolosical works, con-

siclering his general celebrity, are wonseems to have dert'ully little known. b>ien, in his day, one of the ablest Defen-

He

dtjra of

the Church's doctrine, against the

and Socinians of that period. Of course he incurred the censure, not only of them, but of all who, though not professedly Arian, gave such an exposition of their doctrine as amounts virtually to
Ariatis

App.

I.]

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.

215
Person,

precisely the notion which these Latin Fathers intended and how far it approached the classical signification of the word *' Persona," it may not he easy to determine. But we must presume that they did not intend to employ it in what is, now, the ordinary sense of the word Person; hoth because " Persona" never, I believe, bore that sense in pure Latinity, and also because it is evident that, in that sense, " three divine Persons" would have been exactly equivalent to "three Gods;" a meaning which the
to convey,

What was

orthodox always disavowed. It is probable that they had nearly the same view with which the Greek theologians adopted the word Hypostasis which seems calculated to express ** that which stands under {i.e. is the Subject They meant, it may be presumed, to guard of) Attributes." against the suspicion of teaching, on the one hand, that there are three Gods, or three Parts of the one God or, on the other hand, that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are no more than three names,'-^ all, of the same signification; and the}'' employed accordingly a term which might serve to denote, that, (though divine Attributes belong to all and each of these, yet) there are Attributes of each, respec; ;

tively,

which are not so

as
Avhen,
for

strictly applicable to either of the others, as

such
**

instance,

the

Son
*'

is

called

especially

the

Redeemer," and the Holy

Spirit, the

&c. but

The
is

notion thus conveyed is perhaps for that very reason, (considering what
is,)

Comforter or Paraclete,"^ indeed very faint., and imperfect

Man

is,

and

One may convey to the less likely to lead to error. a blind man a notion of seeing, correct as far as it goes, and instructive to him, though very imperfect: if he form a more fvdl and distinct notion of it, his ideas will inevitably be incorrect. See
what God

Second Series. ^^ It is perhaps to be regretted that our Divines, in rendering the Latin "Persona," used the word Person, whose ordinary sense, in the present day at least, differs in a most important point from the theological sense, and yet is not so remote from it as to preclude all mistake and perplexity. If " Hypostasis," or any other completely foreign term had been used instead, no idea at all would
5,
.

Essay VII.

Tri theism. I beg to be understood however as not demanding an imphcit deference for his, or for any other human authority, however eminent. are taught to " call no man Master, on earth." But the reference to Dr. Wallis may serve both to show the use of the word in his days, and to correct the notion, should any have entertained it, that the views of the subject here taken are, in our Church, any thing novel.

For some very important remarks on

that si<,niification, see Hinds's History, and also a Sermon on the Name Emmaiiuel in the vol. I lately published, 2i English readers are not usually aware that the title of " Paraclete" is ever distinctly applied to Christ in Scripture, as it is in IJohn ii. 1, because it is there translated "advocate" instead of "comforter." 25 Jt is worth observing, as a striking instance of the little reliance to be placed on etymology as a guide to the meanmg of a word, that " Hypostasis," "Substantia," and " Understanding," so widely ditferent in their sense, correspond iu their

We

^ It

is

possible that

some may have

this expression in the very sense r.ttachedby others to the word "Person;" Ifcd, in a great degree, by the peculiar significatiou of "Name" iu Scripture,

used

etymology.

216
Person.

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.
;

[App.

I.

have been conveyed except that of the explanation given and thus the danger at least of being misled by a word, would have been
.

avoided. ^^

Our Reformers however did not introduce the word into their Catechism; though it has been (I must think, injudiciously) employed in some popular expositions of the Catechism, without any explanation, or even allusion to its being used in a peculiar sense. As it is, the danger of being not merely not understood, but msunderstood, should be guarded against most sedulously, by all who wish not only to keep clear of error, but to inculcate important truth by seldom or never employing this ambiguous word without some explanation or caution. For if we employ, without any such care, terms which we must be sensible are likely to mislead, at least the unlearned and the unthinking, we cannot stand acquitted on the plea of not having directly inculcated error. I am persuaded that much heresy, and some infidelity, may be traced in part to the neglect of this caution. It is not wonderful that some should be led to renounce a doctrine, which, through the ambiguity in question, may be represented to them as involving a
;

self-contradiction, or as leading to Tritheism

insensibly slide into this very error

that others should

or that

many more

(which I

know

to

be no

uncommon

case)

should,

for fear

of that error,

deliberately, and on principle, keep the doctrine of the Trinity out of their thoughts, as a point of speculative belief, to which they have assented once for all, but which they find it dangerous to dwell on
it is in fact the very Faith into which, ^^ by our Lord's appointment, we are baptized. Nor should those who do understand, or at least have once understood, the ambiguity in question, rest satisfied that they are thenceforward safe from all danger in that quarter. It should be remembered that the thoughts are habitually influenced, through the force of association, by the recurrence of the ordinary sense of any word to the mind of those who are not especially on their guard against it. See " Fallacies," 5. The correctness of a formal and deliberate Confession of Faith, is not always, of itself, a sufficient safeguard against error in the hahitual imjjressions on the mind. The Romanists flatter themselves that they are safe from Idolatry, because they distinctly acknowledge the truth, that "God only is to be served;'' viz. with "Latria;" though they allow Adoration, ("hyperdulia" and "dulia") to the Virgin and other Saints, and to Relics to which it has to Images, been justly replied, that supposing this distinction correct in itself, it would be, in practice, nugatory since the mass of the people

though

1 wish it to be observed, that it is the ambUjuity of the word Person which renders it objectionable; not, its being
2<5

nowhere employed in Scripture in the technical sense of theologians; for this

circumstance is rather an advantage. 5*65 Essay VI. (Second Series) 4, Note. 27 j,v to ej,, " /w/o the Name;" not in the Name." Matt, xxviii. 19.

Afp.

I.]

AMBIGUOUS

TERJVIS.

217

must soon (as experience proves) lose sight of it entirely in their rersoa. hahitual devotions. Nor again is the habitual acknowledgment of One God, of itself a " since, from the additional ambiguities of *' One sufficient safeguard and "Unity," (noticed in a preceding Article) we may gradually such as unity of fall into the notion of a merely figurative Unity
;

Unity of purpose, substance merely, (see a preceding Article) concert of action, kc, such as 4s often denoted by the phrase " one mind." See "Same," in this Appendix, and "Dissertation," Book IV. Ch.^V. When, however, I speak of the necessity of explanations, the reader is requested to keep in mind, that I mean, not explanations On the one of the nature of the Deity, but of our own use of words. hand we must not content ourselves with merely saying that the whole subject is mysterious and must not be too nicely pried into while we neglect to notice the distinction between divine revelations, and human explanations of them; between inquiries into the mysteries of the divine nature, and into the mysteries arising from tlie ambiguities of language, and of a language, too, adopted by uninspired men. For, whatever Scripture declares, the Christian but is bound to receive implicitly, however unable to understand it to claim an uninquiring assent to expressions of man's framing, (however judiciously framed) without even an attempt to ascertain their meaning, is to fall into one of the worst errors of the Komanists. On the other hand, to require explanations of what God is in Himself, is to attempt what is beyond the reach of the human faculties, and foreign from the apparent design of Scripture-revelation which seems to be, chiefly, if not wholly, to declare to us, (at least to insist on among the essential articles of faith,) with a view to our practical benefit, and to the influenchig of our feelings and conduct, not so much the intrinsic nature of the Deity, as, what He is and does, relatively to us. Scripture teaches us (and our ChurchCatechism directs our attention to these points) to "believe in God, who, as the Father, hath made us and all the world, as the Son, halh redeemed us and all mankind, as the Holy Ghost, sanctifieth us, and all the elect people of God.^ And this distinction is, as I have said, pointed out in the very form of Baptism. Nothing, indeed, can be more decidedly established by Scripture, nothingmore indistinctly explained (except as far as relates to us) than the doctrine of the Trinity;^ nor are we perhaps capable, with oui* present faculties, of comprehending it more fully. In these matters, our inquiry, should at least our first inquiry,

23

Hawkin's Manual,

p. 12.

Word
Luke

of
i.

God is
35,

to

be rightly understood:
xiv. 9;

29

Compare

together, for instance, such

and John

John

xiv.

passages as the following* for it is by cowjoanX^ Scripture with Scripture, no't by dwelling on insulated texts, that the

16,18,26, Matt, xxviii. 19, 20; John xvi. 7, Colos. ii. 9; Phil. i. 19, 1 Cor. vi. 19; Matt. x. 20, and John xiv. 23.


SIS
PerMn.

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.
Tdg,

[App.

I.

any one refuses to adopt as an he be understood as For we are sure that there must necessarily maintaining its falsity. be many truths relative to the Deity, which we have no means of ascertaining nor does it follow that even every truth which can be ascertained, must be a part of the essential faith of a Christian. And as it is wise to reserve for mature age, such instructions as are unsuitable to a puerile understanding, so, it seems the part of a like wisdom, to abstain, during this our state of childhood, from curious speculations on subjects in which even the ablest of human minds can but " see by means of a glass, darkly," On these, the
always
is

what

revealed: nor,

if

article of faith, this or that exposition, should

Learned can have no advantage over others though we are apt to surforget that any mysterious point inscrutable to Man, as Man, must be such to the passing the utmost reach of human intellect, learned and to the ignorant, to the wise and to the simple, alike that in utter darkness, the strongest sight, and the weakest, are on
;

** Sir, in these matters," (said one of the most eminent of a level. our Reformers, respecting another mysterious point,) " I am so fearful, that I dare speak no further, yea almost none otherwise, than as the Scripture doth as it were lead me by the hand. And surely it is much better thus to consult Scripture, and take it for a guide, than to resort to it merely for confirmations, containec^ in detached texts, of the several parts of some System of Theology, which the student fixes on as reputed orthodox, and which is in fact made the guide which he permits to '* lead him by the hand;" while passages culled out from various parts of the Sacred Writings in subserviency to such system, are formed into what may be called an anagram of Scripture and then, by reference to this system as a standard, each doctrine or discourse is readily pronounced Orthodox, or Socinian, or Arian, or Sabellian, or Nestorian, &c. and all this, on the ground that the theological scheme which the student has adopted, is supported by Scripture. The materials indeed are the stones of the Temple but the building constructed with them is
:
;

If instead of this, too common, procedure, students w^ould fairly search the Scriptures with a view not merely not merely to defend their opinions, but to form them, keeping human expositions to their for arguments, but for truth, own proper purposes [See Essay VI. First Series,] and not allowing if, in short, they were as these to become, practically, a standard, honestly desirous to be on the side of Scripture, as they naturally are to have Scripture on their side, how much sounder, as well as more charitable, would their conclusions often be With presumptuous speculations, such as I have alluded to, many theologians, even of those who lived near, and indeed during, the Apostolical times, seem to have been alike chargeable, widely as they differed in respect of the particular explanations adopted by

a fabric of human contrivance.

each:


Arr.
I.]

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.
" Unus utrique
Error; sed
variis illudit partibus."

219
Person.

And

it is

sight of

the circumstance,

important to remember,

wliat

"\ve

are very liable to lose

that, not only there arose grievous errors

during the time of the Apostles, and consequently such -were likely when these insinred guides were removed, there was no longer the same infallible authority to decide what was error. In the absence of such a guide, some errors might be received as orthodox, and some sound doctrines be condemned as heterodox. The Gnostics^ introduced a theory of JEons, or successive emanations from the divine *' Pleroma" or Fulness; one of whom was
to exist in the times immediately following, but also that

Christ, and became incarnate in the man Jesus.^^ The Sabellians are reported to have described Christ as bearing the same relation to the Father, as the illuminating {(^ariariKoy) quality does to the Sun; while the Holy Ghost corresponded to the warming quality or again, the Three as corresponding to the Body, Soul, {doc'h'Trou)
:

and Spirit, of a man or again, to Substance, Thought or Reason, and Will or Action. The Arians again represented the Son and the Holy Spirit, as created Beings, but with a certain imparted divinity. The Nestorians and Eutychians gave opposite, but equally fanciful and equally presumptuous explanations of the Incarnation,
;

kc. (kc.

Nor were those who were accounted orthodox, altogether exempt "Who," says from the same fault of presumptuous speculation. Chrysostom, "was he to whom God said, Let us make man? who the Son of God?" And Epiphanius, on the same but he Each passage, says, " This is the language of God to his W^ord."
of these writers,
that title) as addressing

previously to

be observed, in representing God (under Himself to the Son as to a distinct Being the birth of Jesus on earth, approaches very closely to
it

may

the Arian view. speaks of God

Justin Martyr, in a similar tone, expressly " One, not in nuraber, but in judgment or designs. "^^ I will not say that such passages as these may not be but it is a so interpreted as to exclude every form of tritheism dangerous thing, to use (and that, not in the heat of declamation, but in a professed exposition) language of such a nature that it is a mere chance whether it may not lead into the most unscrlptural If the early writers had not been habitually very incautious errors. in this point, that could hardly have taken place which is recorded respecting the council held at Rimini, (a.d. 360) in which a Confesas
;

And

30 Of these, and several other ancient heretics, we have no accounts but those of their opponents; which however we may presume to contain more or less of approximation to what was usually maintained. 31 Tliese heretics appear to have split

intomany different sects, teaching various modifications of the same absurdities.

See Buiion's Bam2)fon Lectures. 32 Ourcs y.ycecpi.ui os &ih, tm-ce 'fm roZ rk ^a-vra. -re y.act^nt <S)iov, u^iOyift
X=}-,
*

aXA'

a'j ynui/jc-/-,;

no.

220
Person.

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.
was agreed upon,
wliieli

[Afp.

I.

sion of Faitli the Arlans soon after boasted cf as sanctioning their doctrine, and "the Church," we are tokl,

" was astonished

to find itself unexpectedly

become Arian."^

The fact is, that numberless writers, both of those who were, and who were not, accounted heretics, being displeased, and justly, with one another's explanations of the mode of existence of the Deity,
instead of taking warning aright from the errors of their neighbours, sought, each, the remedy, in some other explanation instead, concerning matters unrevealed and inexplicable by man. They found

nothing to satisfy a metaphysical curiosity in the brief and indistinct^ decisive, declarations of Scripture, that " God was in Christ, reconciling the Woild unto Himself;" that "in Him dwelleth all the Fulness of the Godhead, bodily ;" that "it is God that Avorketli in us both to will and to do of his good pleasure;" that if we "keep Christ's saying, He dwelleth in us, and we, in Him;" that " if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his ;" and that " the Lord is the Spirit," hc.^ They wanted something more full, and more philosophical, than all this and their theology accordingly was "spoiled, through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the World, and not after Christ." Hostile as they were to each other, the grand mistake in principle was common to many in all parties. And in later ages the Schoolmen kept up the same Spirit, and even transmitted it to Protestants. "Theology teaches," (says a passage in a Protestant work) "that there is in God, one Essence, two Processions, three Persons, four Relations, five Notions, and the CIrcumincession, which the Greeks call Perichoresls." What follows is still more to my purpose but I cannot bring " Who is this that darkeneth myself to transcribe any further. " counsel by words without knowledge? But the substance of great part of what I have been saying, has been expressed in better language than mine, in a late work, which displays no ordinary ability, Mr. Douglas's Errors regai^ding Mdigion. " The radical mistake in all these systems, whether heretical or orthodox, which have embroiled mankind in so many scandalous disputes, and absurd and pernicious opinions, proceeds from the disposition so natural in man of being wise above what is written. They are not satisfied with believing a plain declaration of the Saviour, I and the Father are one. They undertake with the utmost presumption and folly to explain in what manner the Father and the Son are one but man might as well attempt to take tij) the ocean in the hollow of his hand, as endeavour, by his

though

'

^'
^

33
S4

See Essay VI. (Second Series,)

^ ^ ^

2,

ote h.

Not, as

O i\

in our version, *'/Aa^ Spirit;" Kvfisf 'I'O !Tif:t*.'x i<rr/. In this place,

and also in John i. 21, our translators were apparently lookwig to some version in which an attempt is made to express in Latin the.force of the Greek Articiu.

Arp.

I.]

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.

221
Person,

narrow understanding, to commprehend the manner of the Divine

P. 50. *' Heresies, however, are not confined to the heterodox. While the Arians and Semi-Arians were corrupting the truth hy every subtilty of argument and ingenious perversion of terms, the orthodox all the while were dogmatizing about the Divine nature with a profusion of words which either had no meaning, or were gross mistakes, or inapplicable metaphors when applied to the infinite and spiritual existence of God. And not content with using such arguments against the heretics as generally produced a new heresy without refuting the former one, as soon as they obtained the power, they expelled them from the Roman empire, and sent them with all the zeal which persecution confers, and which the orthodox, from their prosperity, had lost, to spread every variety of error amongst the nations of the barbarians. *' Orthodoxy was become a very nice afiuir, from the rigour of its terms, and the perplexity of its creed, and very unlike the highway slip in a single for the simple, which the Gospel presents. The use or expression was enough to make a m.an a heretic. omission of a single word occasioned a new rent in Christianity. Every heresy produced a new creed, and every creed a new heresy. Never does human folly and learned ignorance appear in . . , . , a more disgusting point of view than in these disputes of Christians amongst themselves; nor does an}'^ study appear so well calculated to foster infidelity *as the history of Christian sects, unless the reader be guided by light from above, and carefully distinguish the doctrines of the Bible from the miserable disputes of pretended
existence."

....

Christians."

P. 53.
it
;

more fully (or perhaps indeed has been here treated of) is hardly suitable to a logical work and yet the importance of attending to the ambiguity I have now been considering, cannot be duly appreciated, without ofi'ering some remarks on the subject-matter with which that ambiguity is connected and such remarks again, if scantily and I must take imperfectly developed, are open to cavil or mistake. the liberty therefore of referring the reader to such works, (in addition to those already mentioned) both my own, and those of others, as contain something of a fuller statement of the same views. It may be added, that the views I have taken derive confirmation, now that they have been so long before the public, from the total absence (to the best of my knowledge) of all attempts at refutation ; especially when considered in conjunction with the strong objection to them which is felt by some. E.G. I have seen, in an argumentative work, a warning given to the reader against this very Article (by name) as containing very erroneous doctrine which one of which, however, no refutation at all is subjoined cannot but suppose any writer would have done, who had ever
discuss this important subject as fully as
;

To


222
Person.

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.
heard
[Afp.

iJ

tliouglit of, or

(First Series,) Essay II. 4, and Essays IV. and V.; Second Series, Essay VI. 2, p. 199; VII. ArchibisJiop 3; and IX. 1, Third Series, Essay II. 1. King's /Sermon on Predestination, d'c, and Encychp. Metropol. History, Chap. XXVII. p. 589, and Chap. XXXIV. p. 740.

doctrines censured.

See Essays,

of,

any, even plausible, arguments against the

Tosiibie.

This word, like the others of kindred meansometimes to contingency, sometimes to power or liberty; and these two senses are frequently confounded. In the first sense we say, e.g. *' it is possible this patient may recover," not meaning, that it depends on his choice; but that we are not sure whether the In the other sense it is " possible" to the event will not be such.
XX.
ing, relates

POSSIBLE.

best
his

man

to violate every rule of morality to act so if

;

power

he chose

in the case

though we
'*

since if it were out of there would be no moral goodness are quite sure that such never will be his
;

it,

choice.
Preach.

See

Impossible."

xxi.

PREACH. The

word

**

preach" has " so much

slid

from

sense ai proclaiming as a herald, as to obscure the sense of every passage in which the preaching of the gospel, [Kr,^vTTitv literally, 'proclaiming the good tidings,' occurs. TO ivxyyi'hiou,) The sacred writers constantly preserve the disthiction between * preaching' and 'teaching;' 'announcing,' 'giving information and giving instruction to believers. And our transof an event lators have also, almost always, adhered to this distinction ; though
its original

'

preach,' having in great measure acquired, in their time, secondary sense, there is one passage in which they inadvertently When the disciples were assembled at Troas, to so employ it. break bread, Paul preached unto them, and as Paul was long preaching, the young man Eutychus fell down from a window, and was taken up dead :' the word lixXsyo.usvog should have been rendered 'dis-

the word

'

its

coursing. '
also
it is

To disciples, he did not, in the strict sense, 2^^^ecich. So not our business, in the strict sense, to ' preach the gospel,' except to any who, from their tender years, or from neglected education, have never had the glad tidings announced to them of God's giving his Son for our salvation. Our ordinary occupation is not to preach {kyiqCttsiu) but {lioxaKsiy) to teach men how to understand Discourse the Scriptures, and to apply them to their lives."
appended
264, 2G5.
to
'*

Essays on the Dangers

to

Christian Faith.''

Pp.

Priest.

xxii. PRIEST.~^ee " Dissertation," Book IV. Ch. IV. 2. Etymologically, tjie word answers to Presbyter, i.e. Elder, in the Christian Church, or Jewish Synagogue ;^ and is often appHed to
^' See Vitrin.^a on the Synagogue. The abridged translation, by Mr. Bernard, of

this valuable work, is an important addition to our theological literature.

App.

l.J

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.

223

But it Priest the second order of Clirlstian Ministers at tlie present day. is remarkable that it never occurs in this sense, in our translation of the Scriptures: the word Tr^sa^vTsoog being always rendered by Elder ; and its derivative, Priest, always given as the translation of This latter is an office assigned to none under the Gospel'Iggey?. scheme, except the ONE great High Priest, of whom the Jewish Priests were types, and who offered a sacrifice (that being the most distinguishing office of a Priest in the sense of 'U^tvg) which is the only one under the Gospel. It is incalculable how much confusion has arisen from confounding together the two senses of the word Priest, and thence, the two offices themselves. I have enlarged accordingly on this subject In a Sermon, delivered before the University of Oxford, and subjoined to the last edition of tlie Bampton Lectures. See also Essays, Third Series, Essay II.

REASON. This word is liable to many ambiguities, of Season, Somepropose to notice only a few of the most important. times it is used to signify all the intellectual powers collectively in which sense it can hardly be said to be altogether denied to brutes since several of what we reckon intellectual processes in the human mind, are evidently such as some brutes are capable of. Reason is, however, frequently employed to denote those intellectual powers exclusively in which Man differs from brutes ; though what these are no one has been able precisely to define. The employment at will of the faculty of Abstraction seems to be the principal that being, at least, principally concerned in the use The Moral Faculty, or power of distinguishing right of Language. from wrong, (which appears also to be closely connected with Abstraction, without which it could not exist) Is one of which brutes are destitute but then Dr. Paley and some other ethical writers deny it to Man also. The description given by that author of our discernment of good and bad conduct, {viz. as wholly dependent on expectation of reward and punishment,) would In a great degree apply to many of the brute-creation especially the more Intelligent It Is In this sense, howof domestic animals, as dogs and horses. ever, that some writers speak of " Reason' as enabling us to judge not, as Dr. Campbell in his Philosophy of of virtue and vice Rhetoric has understood them, ic the sense of the power of arguxxlii.

which

mentation.

Reason, however.
**

Is

often used for the Faculty of carrying on the

viz.

Reasoning, or Piatiocination. ambiguity, (which has been repeatedly noticed In the course of the foregoing treatise,) that some liave treated of Logic as the art of rightly employing the mental
third operation" of the
it

And

is

mind; from inattention to

this

faculties In general.

Reason

Is

also

employed

to signify the

Premiss or Premises of an


224:
Keasor.

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.
especially
tlie

[App.
it is

I.

Argument;

Minor-Premiss
is

and

from Reason

in

this sense tliat the

word " Reasoning"

derived.

It is also very frequently used to signify a Cause ; as when we say, in popular language, that the " Reason of an eclipse of the sun

This that the moon is interposed between it and the earth." On the other hand, " Because" should be strictly called the cause. {i.e. "by-Cause") is used to introduce either the Physical Cause or the Logical proof: and "Therefore," "Hence," "Since," "Follow," " Consequence," and many other kindred words, have a corresponding ambiguity: e.g. "the ground is wet, because it has rained;" or "it has rained, and hence the ground is wet;" this is the assignment of the cause: again, "it has rained, because the ground is wet;" "the ground is wet, and therefore it has rained:" this is assigning the logical proof; the wetness of the ground is the cause, not of the rain having fallen, but of our knowing that it has fallen. And this probably it is that has led to the ambiguous use
is,

words relating to these two points. an ambiguity which has produced incalculable confusion of thought, and from which it is the harder to escape, on account of its extending to those very forms of expression which are introduced
in all languages of almost all the
It is

in order to clear

it

up.

adds to the confusion is, that the Cause is often employed as a Proof of the Effect :^^ as when we infer, from a great fall of which is at once the physical rain, that there is, or will be, a flood
;

What

Effect,

and the

logical Conclusion.
infer that the rain

The case

is

just reversed,

when

from a flood we

has fallen. The more attention any one bestows on this ambiguity, the more /See Book I. 2. extensive and important its results will appear.
iSee

also Rhetoric,

Book

I.

Regeneration.

xxiv. This word is employed by some Divines to signify the actual new life and character which ought to distinguish the Christian by others, a release from a state of condemnation: a reconciliation to God adoption as his children, &c.,^' which is a necessary preliminary to the entrance on such a state (but which, unhappily, is not invariably followed by it:) and these are, of course, as different things as a grain of seed sown, and " the

REGENERATION.

full

corn in the ear." controversy has taken place as to the time at which, and the circumstances under which, " Regeneration " takes place ; the greater part of which may be traced to this ambiguity.

Much

'lamo.

XXV.
8
27

SAME
Book

(as well as

"One," "Identical," and

.

other words

See Fallacies.
III.

" Non causa pro

14

causa."

" Baptism, wherein I teas made a member of Christ, a child of God, jind an inheritor of the Kingdom of Heu-

death unto sin, and a ven." new birth unto righteousness, &c." .... We being regenerate, and made thy children by adoption and grace," &o.

..." A


app.l]
derived from them)
its
;

ambiguous terms.

225

Is used frequently in a sense very different from Same, (as applicable to a single object ;) viz. it is primary one When several objects are employed to denote great similarity.

undistinguishably alike, One single description will apply equally to any of them and thence they are said to be all of one and the same nature, appearance, (kc: as e.g. when we say, "this house is built of th.e same stone with such another," we only mean that the stones not that the one building was are undistinguishable in their qualities pulled down, and the other constructed with the materials. Whereas Sameness, in the primary sense, docs not even necessarily imply Similarity; for if we say of any man that he is greatly altered since such a time, we understand, and indeed imply by the very
;
;

expression,
qualities
;

that
it

else

he is 0)ie 2?erson, though different in several would not be he. It is worth observing also that

'* Same," in the secondary sense, admits, according to popular usage, of degrees: we speak of two things being nearly the same, but not entirely; personal identity does not admit of degrees. Nothing, perhaps, has contributed more to the error of Realism When several persons are said than inattention to this ambiguity. many men, thought or idea, to have One aiul the same opinion overlooking the true simple statement of the case, which is, that they are all thinking alike, look for something more abstruse and mystical, and imagine there must be some One Thing, in the

primary sense, though not an individual, which is present at once and thence readily sprung in the mind of each of these persons Plato's theory of Ideas each of which was, according to him, one real, eternal object, existing entire and complete in each of the Hence, first in individual objects that are known by one name. poetical mythology, and ultimately, perhaps, in popular belief, Fortune, Liberty, Prudence, (Minerva,) a Boundary, (Terminus,) and even the Mildew of Corn, (Rubigo,) (fee, became personified, deified, and represented by Statues somewhat according to tbe process Avhich is described by Swift, in his humorous manner, in speaking of Zeal, (in the Tale of a Tub,) "how from a notion it became a word, and from thence, in a hot summer, ripened into a tangible Substance." We find Seneca thinking it necessary gravely to combat the position of some of his Stoical predecessors, "that the Cardinal Virtues are Animals;" while the Hindoos of the present day, from observing the similar symptoms which are known by the name of Small-pox, and the communication of the like from one patient to another, do not merely call it (as we do) one disease, but beheve (if we may credit the accounts given) that the Small-pox All is a Goddess, who becomes incarnate in each infected patient. these absurdities are in fact but the extreme and ultimate point of of Reahsm. See Dissertation, Book IV. Chap. V.
: ;

xxvi.

SIN, in

its

ordinary

acceptation,

means some

actual

Sin.

226
Sin.

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.

[Apr.

I.

transgression, in thought, word, or deed, of the moral law, or of It has also, what may be called, a a positive divine precept. theological sense, in which it is used for that sinfulness or frailty,

liability, or proneness, to transgression, which all men from our first parents, and which is commonly denominated "original" Sin;"^ in which sense we find such expressions as "in The word seems also to be Sin hath my Mother conceived me." still further transferred, to signify the state of condemnation itself in which the children of Adam are "by nature born," in consequence (or, according to some divines, in of this sinful tendency in them consequence of the very guilt of Adam's offence being actually It must be in the imputed to each individual of his posterity.^^) sense of a " state of condemnation," that our Church, in her office

that

inherit

for Infant Baptism, speaks of "remission of Sins," with reference to a child, which is no moral agent: "following the innocency of

of actual Sin) being mentioned within a few sentences. plain that actual Sin cannot, in the former place, be meant, so, neither can it be, in this place, msnis proneness to Sin:

children,"

{i.e.

And

as

it is

since the baptismal office would not pray for, and hold out a promise of "release'' and "remission'" of that (ppov/if^a aotpx,6g which, according to the Article, "remains even in the regenerate." Though all Theologians probably are aware of these distinctions, yet much confusion of thought has resulted from their not being

always attended
Sincerity,

to.

xxvii. SINCERITY and SINCERE, have a tAvofold meaning of Sincerity is often used to denote mere great moral importance. that a man actually believes what he "reality of conviction;" Sometimes again it is used to denote " unbiprofesses to believe. assed conviction;" or at least an earnest endeavour to shake off all prejudices, and all undue influence of wishes and passions on the

judgment, and to decide impartially. It is in this latter sense that " sincerity"

is

justly regarded as so

commendable a

pardonable in endeavoured to not acted thus, bat has allowed himself to be biassed by self-interest
:

many and great errors are reckoned proportion as a man has earnestly and sincerely while he who has ascertain what is right and true
quality, that

88 Of the dgree of this depravity of our nature, various accounts are given ; some representing it as amounting to a total loss of the moral faculty, or even, to a preference of evil for its own sake ; others making it to consist in a certain undue preponderance of the lower propensities over tlie nobler sentiments, &c. But these seem to be not differonces as to the seiise of the word, (with which alone we are here concerned) but as to the state of the

which some are apt to express themselves, as if this frailty were introduced as a consequence of Adam's transgression; as if, supposing him not
carelessness with
frail,

391
I

he tcould have so transgressed, must aain remind the reader that,

only into the senses in hns, actually been used into the truth or falsity of each On the present doctrine in question. question, see Essays on the DifficuUUs in

am inquirmg

which each word

not

fact. It

St.
is

PauVs

Writings, Essay VI.

worth while

to notice

how ever the

App.

I.]

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.
tlie

227
[i.e.

or passion, deserves no credit for

conviction, even if
it

"

sincerity"

reality) of

liis sinceriti'

should happen to be in itself a right one. It is a common mistake to suppose that the only influence of interest, party spirit, or other improper motives is to induce men to make professions contrary to their real conviction. But ** a gift," as the Scriptures express it, *' blinds the eyes." Not only the outward profession hut the real convictions of the judgment are liable to be biassed by such motives. In fact " sincerity" in this sense will usually be the last stage of depravity: as Aristotle has remarked in respect of the character of the 'AfcoT^ctaro;, the man who from long indulgence in vice has so corrupted his principles as to feel no disapprobation of it. It is notorious that liars often bring themselves by continual repetition to ** credit their own lie."** And universally any one who persists in what is wrong, and in seeking excuses to justify it, will usually in time succeed in deceiving himself into the belief that it is right,*^ and thus warping

his conscience.

Yet the
it

credit

due to the one kind of conscientious Sincerity

is

often (partly through this ambiguity) bestowed on the other.

But

makes all the difference whether you pursue a certain course because you judge it right, or judge it to be right because you pursue whether you follow your conscience vji one follows a guide, or it as one follows the Jwrses in a carriage, while he himself guides theim

according to his wiU.

" The doctrine, as mischievous as it Is, I Tendencj xxviii. TENDENCY. conceive unfounded, that since there is a tendency in population to increase faster than the means of subsistence, hence, the pressure of population against subsistence may be expected to become greater and greater in each successive generation, (unless new and extraordinary remedies are resorted to,) and thus to produce a progressive
diminution of

human

welfare

this doctrine,

in defiance of the fact that all civilized countries

which some maintain, have a greater

proportionate amount of wealth, (in other words, a smaller population, in proportion to the means of subsistence) now, than formerly, ^may be traced chiefly to an undetected ambiguity in the word * tendency, ' which forms a part of the middle term of the argument.

By a

'tendency' towards a certain result

is

sometimes meant,

the

existence of a cause which, if operating unimpeded, would produce

In this sense it maybe said, with truth, that the earth, or any other body moving round a centre, has a tendency to fly oflT at a tangent ; i.e. the centrifugal force operates in that direction, though it is controlled by the centripetal ; or, again, that man has a
that result.'
greater

tendency to

fall

attraction of gravitation

prostrate than to stand erect; i.e. the and the position of the centre of gravity,

Shakespere The Tempest.

See Epistle

to

Rom.

ch.

i.

228
Tendency,

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.
:

[Apf.

I.

are siicli that the least breath of air would overset him, hut for the vokmtary exertion of muscular force ami, again, that population has a tendency to increase beyond subsistence i.e. there are in man
;

propensities, which, if unrestrained, lead to that result.

*' But sometimes, again, a tendency towards a certain result' is understood to mean the existence of such a state of things that
*
*

Now it is in these tioo that result may he exiJeded to take place. senses that the word is used, in the two premises of the argument But in this latter sense, the earth has a greater in question.
'

tendency to remain in its orbit than to fly oiF from it ; man has a and (as may greater tendency to stand erect than to fall prostrate be proved by comparing a more barbarous with a more civilized period in the history of any Country) in the progress of society, subsistence has a tendency to increase at a greater rate than population or at least with a continually diminishing infenoiiiy. In this Country, for instance, much as our population has increased
;

within the last five centuries, it yet bears a far less ratio to subsistence (though still a much greater than could be wished) than it did But many of the writers I have alluded five hundred years ago."^ to seem to have confounded " an excess of increase'' with " an
increase oiih.Q excess.'^
Therefore.

THEREFORE.fe
xxix.
tions,

" REASON," and

'*

Why."

Jiuth.

TRUTH,
made

in the strict logical

;

sense, applies to proposi-

in the conformity of the the actual state of the case agreeably to vera est, quas quod Aldrich's definition of a " true" proposition

and

to nothing else to

and consists

declaration

res est dicit.

It would be an advantage if the word Trueness or Verity could be introduced and employed in this sense, since the word Truth is " What I so often used to denote the " true" Proposition itself. tell you is the Truth; the Truth of what I say shall be proved;" the term is here used in these two senses; mz., in the " concrete," and in the " abstract" sense. *^ In like manner Falsehood is often opposed to truth in both these senses; being commonly used to But as we have the word signify the quality of a false proposition. Fcdsity, which properly denotes this, I have thought it best, in a scientific treatise, always to employ it for that purpose. In its etymological sense. Truth signifies that which the speaker "trows," or believes to be the fact. The etymology of the word AAH0ES seems to be similar; denoting non-concealment. In this sense it is opposed to a Lie; and may be called Moral, as the other

may

witness, therefore, may comjily with his Logical, Truth. oath to speak the Truth, though it so happen that he is mistaken in

Pol.

Econ. Lect. IX. pp. 248-250.

JeeBookII. Ch. V.

1.

App.

I.]

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.
liis

229
is

some particular of
the thing
is

evidence, provided he
it.

fullj convinced that Truth

as he states

'

Truth is not unfrequently apphed, in loose and inaccurate language, to argumerds ; where the proper expression would be "correctness," "conclusiveness," or "validity." Truth, again, is often used in the sense of Reality, TO ON. People speak of the Truth or Falsity oi facts; properly speaking, " they are either real ov fictitious: it is the statement that is " true or "false." The "true" cause of any thing, is a common expression; meaning "that which may with Truth be assigned as the cause." The senses of Falsehood correspond. "Truth" in this sense, of "reality," is also opposed to shadows types pictures, &c. Thus, " the Law was given by Moses, but grace and 'truth' came by Jesus Christ:" for the Law had only a

**

shadow of good things to come." The present is an ambiguity of which advantage has been often

taken through a deficiency either in candour or in clearness of thought in advocating the claims of the Romish Church ; the ambiguity of the word Church (which see) lending its aid to the " Even the Protestants," they say, "dare not deny ours fallacy. " to be a 'true Church;' now there can be but 'one true Church:' (which they support by those passages of Scripture which relate to the collective Body of Christians in all those several Societies which also are called in Scripture, Churches ;) " ours therefore must be the
true

Cliurch; if you forsake us, you forsake the truth and the Church, and consequently shut yourself out from the promises of the Gospel." Those who are of a logical and accurate turn of mind will easily perceive that the sense in which the Romish Church is admitted by her opponents to be a true Church, is that of reality; it is a real, not a jjretencled Church; it may be truly said to be a Church. The sense in which the concession is sometimes made use of, is that of a Church teaching true doctrines; which was never conceded to the Church of Rome by Protestants ; who hold, that a Church may err without ceasing to be a Church.

" The Church

is one,^^

then, not, as consisting of

One

Society,

but because the various societies or Churches were then modelled, and ought still to be so, on the same principles and because they enjoy common privileges, one Lord, one Spirit, one baptism. Accordingly, the Holy Ghost, through his agents the Apostles, has not left any detailed account of the formation of any Christian society but He has very distinctly marked the great principles on which all Avere to be founded, whatever distinctions may exist amongst them. In short, the foundation of the Church by the Apostles was not analogous to the work of Romulus or Solon it was not, properly, the foundation of Christian societies which occupied them, but the
;

'A

See " One."

230
Truth.

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.

[App.

I.

establishment of the principles on which Christians In all ages might societies for themselves. ** The above accomit is sufficiently established even by the mere negative circumstance of the absence of all mention in the Sacred Writings of any one Society on earth, having a Government and officers of its own, and recognized as the Catholic or Universal Church especially when it is considered that the frequent mention of the particular Churches at Jerusalem, Antioch, Rome, Corinth, and of ' the care of all the of the Seven Churches in Asia, &c. Churches' which Paul had founded, would have rendered unavoidable the notice of the One Church (had there been any such) which bore rule over all the rest, either as its subjects, or as provincial departments of it."^

form

Unffy.

UNITY.^ee'' One."

vhence.

WHENCE./^ce
XXX.
senses:

"

Why," and " Reason."

this

Wljy?

WHY? As
viz.

an Interrogative,
(or

"

By what proof?"

Reason.)

"For what purpose?" This last is cause." E.G. *' Why Is this prisoner guilty of the crime ? " *' Why " Why did you go to London?" does a stone fall to the earth?" Much confusion has arisen from not distinguishing these different
inquiries.
/See

word Is employed In three " From what Cause?" commonly called the "final

Reason.

N.B. As the words which follow are all of them connected together in their significations, and as the explanations of their ambiguities have been furnished by the kindness of the Professor of Political Economy, it seemed advisable to place them by themselves, and in the order in which they appeared to him most naturally to arrange themselves.
Terms
of

I'olitical

Economy.

foundation of Political Economy being a few general proposideduced from observation or from consciousness, and generally admitted as soon as stated, it might have been expected that there would be as little difference of opinion among Political-Economists that, being agreed in their premises, as among Mathematicians they could not differ in their conclusions, but through some error in And if they had reasoning, so palpable as to be readily detected. possessed a vocabulary of general terms as precisely defined as the But as the mathematical, this would probably have been the case.

The

tions

4*

" Essays on the Dangers," &c. Note A, pp.

169, 17,

APP.

I.]

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.

231

common discourse, and seldom Terms of by the Avriters who employ them, hardly one of Economy. them has any settled and invariable meaning, and their ambiguities
terms of this Science are drawn from
carefully defined

are perpetually overlooked.

'viz.

The

principal terms are only seven:

Value, Wealth, Labour, Capital, Rent, Wages, Profits.

1.

VALUE.
is

Economy

As value is the only relation with which Political Value conversant, we might expect all Economists to be agreed

as to its meaning; There is no subject as to which they are less agreed. The popular, and far the most convenient, use of the word, is to signify the capacity of being given and received in exchange. So defined, it expresses a relation. The value of any one thing must consist in the several quantities of all other things which can be obtained in exchange for it, and never can remain fixed for au
instant.

Most writers admit the propriety of

it.

this definition at the

outset, but they scarcely ever adhere to

Smith defines Value to mean either the utility of a paror the power of purchasing other goods which the possession of that object conveys. The first he calls " Value in use," the second '* Value in exchange." But he soon afterwards says, that equal quantities of labour at all times and places are of equal Value to the labourer, whatever may be the quantity of goods he receives in return for them and that labour never varies in its own Value. It is clear that he affixed, or thought he had affixed, some other meaning to the word as the first of these propositions is contradictory, and the second false, whichever of his two definitions we adopt. Mr. Ricardo appears to set out by admitting Adam Smith's definition of Value in exchange. But in the greater part of his " Principles of Political Economy," he uses the word as synonymous with Cost : and by this one ambiguity has rendered his great work
ticular object,
;
;

Adam

a long enigma. Mr. Malthus*^ defines Value to be the power of purchasing. In the very next page he distinguishes absolute from relative value, a distinction contradictory to his definition of the term, as expressive of a relation.

Mr. M'Culloch*^ distinguishes between real and exchangeable,

or relative value.
relative,

And

in his nomenclature, the exchangeable, or

ing; its duction or appropriation. All these differences apj)ear to arise from a confusion of cause and eff"ect. Having decided that commodities are Valuable in proportion to the labour they have respectively cost, it was natural to call that labour their Value.

Value of a commodity, consists in its capacity of purchasreal Value in the quantity of labour required for its pro-

^
*

" Measure of Value," p. 1. " Priiicipieb of Poiiticul Economy," Pai't III. E

sect. 1,

232
Wealth.

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.

[Apf.

I.

Lord Lauderdale has defined Wealth to he *' all 2. WEALTH. Mr. Malthus/^ "those material objects which that man desires." Adam Smith confines the are necessary, useful, or agreeable." term to that portion of the results of land and labour which is The French Economists, to the capable of being accumulated. Mr. M'Culloch*^ and M. Storch,^ to those net product of land. material products which have exchangeable value according to Colonel Torrens^^ it consists of articles which possess utility, and are produced by some portion of volmitary efi"ort." M. Say^^ divides wealth into natural and social, and applies the latter term to whatever is susceptible of exchange. It will be observed that the principal diff"erence between these definitions consists in the admission or rejection of the qualifications " exchangeable," and,
;

material." ^^ It were well if the ambiguities of this word had done no more than puzzle philosophers. One of them gave birth to the mercantile system. In common language, to grow rich is to get money; to diminish in fortune is to lose money : a rich man is said to have a great deal of money ; a poor man, very little and the terms Wealth and Money are in short employed as synonymous. In consequence of these popular notions (to use the words of Adam Smith) all the different nations of Europe have studied every means of accumulating gold and silver in their respective countries. This they have attempted by prohibiting the exportation of money, and by giving bounties on the exportation, and imposing restrictions on the importation, of other commodities, in the hope of producing what has been called a "favourable balance of trade;" that is, a trade in which, the imports being always of less value than the exports, the difference is paid in money. conduct as wise as that of a tradesman who should part with his goods only for money ; and instead of employing their price in paying his workmen's wages, or replacing his stock, should keep it for ever in his till. The attempt to force such a trade has been as vain, as the trade, if it could have been obtained, would have been mischievous. But the results have been fraud, punishment, and poverty at home, and discord and war without. It has made nations consider the Wealth of their customers a source of loss instead of profit; and an advantageous
'
:

^ " Principles of
p- 28.
49

Political

Economy,"

any actual
seller,

transfer

from hand

to

hand

of

to the Encyclopjedia Britannica," "Vol. VI. p. 217.

" Supplement

a material object. For instance, when the cojiyright of a book is sold to a bookthe article transferred is not the mere paper covered with writing, but the exclusive privilege of printing and publishing.
It is plain, however, on a moment's thought, that the transaction is as

Tome

Politique," Paris edit. 51 " Production of Wealth," p. 1. 52 " Traite d'Economie Pol." Liv. II.
I. p. 91.

50

" Cours

d'Economie

Chap.
53
'

II.

cases, where an exchange really takes place, the fact is liable (till the attention is called to it) to be overlooked, in consequence of our not seeing

In

many

an excliange, as that which takes place between the bookseller and his customers who buy copies of the work." Introd. to Pol. Econ.hQct. I.
real

Afp.

I.l

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.

233

market a curse instead of a blessing. By inducing them to refuse Wealth, to profit by the peculiar advantages in climate, soil, or industry, possessed by their neighbours, it has forced them in a great measure to give up their own. It has for centuries done more, and perhaps for centuries to come will do more, to retard the improvement of Europe than all other causes put together.
3.

LABOUR.
and the

The word Labour

;

ing,

result of that act.

It is

we

talk of the

wages of labour

both the act of labour- Labour, used in the first sense when in the second when we talk of
signifies

accumulated labour. When used to express the act of labouring, it may appear to have a precise sense, but it is still subject to some ambiguity. Say's definition^* is " action suivie, dirigee vers un but ;" Storch's,^"' " Taction des facultes humaines dirigee vers un but

These definitions include a walk taken for the purposes of and even the exertions of an agreeable converser. The great defect of Adam Smith, and of our own economists in general, is the want of definitions. There is, perhaps, no definition 01 Labour by any British Economist. If Adam Smith had framed one, he would probably have struck out his celebrated distinction between "productive" and "unproductive" labourers; for it is difiicult to conceive any definition of Labour which will admit the epithet " unproductive" to be applied to any of its subdivisions, excepting that of misdirected labour. On the other hand, if Mr. M'Culloch or Mr. Mill had defined Labour they Avould scarcely have applied that term to the growth of a tree, or the improvement of
utile."

health,

wine in a

cellar.

4. CAPITAL. This word, as might have been expected, from CapUaL the complexity of the notions which it implies, has been used in

very difterent senses. It is, as usual, undefined by Adam Smith. The general meaning which he attached to it will however appear from his enumeration of
its species.

the

first

with.

He divides it^^ into Fixed and Circulating: including in what the capitalist retains, in the second what he parts Fixed Capital he subdivides into 1. Machinery; 2. Shops

and other buildings used for trade or manufacture 3. Improvements of Land 4. Knowledge and Skill. Circulating Capital he subdivides into 1. Money; 2. Provisions In the hands of the pro;

vision-venders

4. Finished 3. Unfinished materials of manufacture hands of the merchant or manufacturer such as furniture in a cabinet-maker's shop, or trinkets in that of a jeweller. The following is a hst of the definitions adopted by some of the most eminent subsequent economists Ricardo^^ " that part of the wealth of a country which is
; ;

work

in the

" Traite," &c. Tome II. p. 506. Cours," &c. Liv. I. Chap. IV. Book II. Chap. 1
'

p. 89,

" Principles of Political Economy,'* 3d edit.

234*
Capital

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.

[Afp.

I.

employed in production; consisting of food, clothing, tools, raw materials, machinery, &c,, necessary to give effect to labour." '* that portion of the material possessions of Malthus^*^ a country

destined to be employed with a view to profit." "accumulation de valours soustraites a la consomption Say^^ Chap. III. ** Machinery, necessaries of the workimproductive." man, materials." Storch^ " un fonds de richesses destine a la production ma"which
is

terielle."

M'Culloch^^ " that portion of the produce of industry which can be made directly available to support human existence or facilitate production."
Mill*'^ " something produced, for the purpose of being employed as the mean towards a further production." '* those things on which labour has been Torrens^^ bestowed, and which are destined, not for the immediate supply of our wants, but to aid us in obtaining other articles of utility." It is obvious that few of these definitions exactly coincide. Adam Smith's (as implied in his use of the term; for he gives no formal definition) excludes the necessaries of the labourer, when in his own possession all the rest (and perhaps with better reason) admit them. On the other hand, Adam Smith admits (and in that he seems to be right) those things which are incapable of productive consumption, provided they have not yet reached their consumers. All the other definitions, except perhaps that of Mr. Malthus, which is ambiguous, are subject to the inconsistency of affirming that a diamond, and the gold in which it is to be set, are Capital while the jeweller keeps them separate, but cease to be so when he has formed them into a ring almost all of them, also, pointedly exclude knowledge and skill. The most objectionable, perhaps, is that of Mr. M'CuUoch, which, while it excludes all the finished contents of a jeweller's shop, would include a racing stud. Adam Smith, however, is far from being consistent in his use of the word thus, in the beginning of his second book he states, that all Capitals are destined for the maintenance of productive labour only. It is difficult to see what labour is maintained by what is to be unproductively consumed.

5.
Avr*es,
i'roiit

RENT.
first

6.

WAGES.

7.

PROFIT.

divided revenue Into Rent, Wages, and Profit has been generally followed. The following definitions will best show the degree of precision wdth which these three terms have been employed.

Adam
i^Js

Smith

an(j

division

" Principles," &c. p. 293. " Traite," <Scc. Tome 11, p.

'

ei

454.
I.

62 3

60

Cours," &c. Liv.

II.

Chap.

" Principles," &c. p. 02. " Elements," &c. p. 1!), ;3d edit. " Production of Wealtli," p. ii.

App.

I.]

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.
Adam
Smith.

235

Wliat Is paid for 1. Rent. the land. Book I. Chap. YI.

tlie

license to gather the produce of Rent,^

The price of labour. Book I. Chap. V. The revenue derived from stock by the person who 3. Profit. manages or employ's it. Book I. Chap. VI.
2.

Wages.

Protiu'

Say.
1.

{Traite cVEconomie Politique.)

4eme

Edit.

Rent.
II. p.

Le
169.

profit resultant

du

service productif de la terre.

Tome
2.

Wages.
II. p.

Le

prix de I'achat d'un service productif industriei.

portion de la valeur produite, retiree par le capip. 71,

^Tome
3.
taliste.

503.

Profit.

Tome

La
I.

subdivided into interet, profit industriei,

and

profit capital.

Storch.
1.

{Cours d'Economie Politique.)

Paris, 1823.
terre.

Rent.
I.

Le prix qu'on paye pour I'usage d'un fonds de

p.

Tome
2.
3.

354.

Le prix du travail. p. 283. The returns to capital are considered by Storch, under The first the heads, rente de capital, and profit d'lentrepreneur.
Profit.

Wages.

he divides into

loyer, the hire of fixed capital,

and

interet, that of

considers as composed of, 1st, remuneration for the use of capital 2d, assurance against risk 3d, remuneration for trouble. Liv. III. Chap. II. VIII. XIII.
circulating capital.

The second he

SiSMOXDi.

[Nouveau Princq^es,

(fee.)

1. Rent. La part de la rocolte annuelle du sol qui revlent au proprietaire apres qu'il a acquitte les frais qui I'ont fait naitre and he analyzes rent into, 1st, la compensation du travail de la

terre:

proprietaire

de monopole: 3d, la mieux valeur que le par la comparaison d'une terre de nature superieure a uiie terre inferieure: 4th, le revenu des capitaux qu'il a fixes luimeme sur la terre, et ne pent plus en retirer. Tome I. p. 280.
2d,
le

prix

obtient

2.
3.

Wages.
Profit.

acheve surpasse les avances qui I'ont fait faire. L'avantage qui resulte des travaux passes. Subdivided into interet and profit mercantile. ^p. 94, 359.

Le prix du travail. p. 91. La valeur dont I'ouvrage

Malthus.
1
.

{Principles, kc.)

Rent. That portion of the value of the whole produce of land which remains to the owner after payment of all the out-goings


235
Kent,

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.
tlie

[Apr.

T.

PrS'

of cultivation, including average profits on "^^^^ excess of price above wages and profits.
2.

capital employed.
for his personal

Wages.

The remuneration
240.

of the

134. labourer
p.

exertions.

The difference between the value of the advances 3. Profit. necessary to produce a commodity, and the value of the commodity when produced. p. 293.

p.

Mill.

{Elements, kc.)

3d.

Ed.

1. Rent. The difi^erence between the return made to the most productive, and that which is made to the least productive portion of capital employed on the land. p. 33. 2. Wages. The price of the labourer's share of the commodity

produced.
3.

The share of the joint produce of labour and stock which is received by the owner of stock after replacing the capital consumed. The portion of the whole annual produce which remains after deducting rent and wages. Remuneration for hoarded labour.
Profit.

p. 41.

Chap.

II. III.

ToRREXS.
1.

{Com
soil.

Trade.)

3d Ed.
is

Rent.

That part of the produce which

p.

given to the landreceives in

proprietor for the use of the

2.

Wages.

The

articles of

130. wealth which the labourer

exchange

for his labour.

3. Profit. of value which the finished work possesses above the value of the material, implements, and subsistence expended. The surplus remaining after the cost of production has been replaced. Production of Wealth, p. 53.

The excess

p. 83.

M'CuLLOCH.
1.

{Principles, &c.)

Rent.

by the farmer
powers of the
2.

That portion of the produce of the earth which is paid to the landlord for the use of the natural and inherent
soil.

Wages.
Profit.

The compensation paid

Essay on Rate of Wages,

p.

265.
to labourers in return for
p. 1.

their services.
3.

The excess

of the

commodities produced by the

capital.

expenditure of a given quantity of capital, over that quantity of Principles, p. 366.

RiCARDO.

{Principles, &c.)

3d Ed.

That portion of the produce of the earth which is 1. Rent. paid to the landlord for the use of the original and indestructible powers of the soil. p. 53.


App.
2.
I.]

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.

237

Wages.

3. Profit.

The labourer's proportion of tlie produce. Chap. Y. The capitalist's proportioB of the produce. Chap. VI.

Rfnt
proti*?

The first observation to be made on these definitions, is, that the Rent of land, which is only a species of an extensive genus, is used as
a genus, and that its cognate species are either omitted, or included under genera to which they do not properly belong. Wages and Profits are of human creation: they imply a sacrifice of ease or immediate enjo^^ment, and bear a ratio to that sacrifice which is
indicated by the common expressions of **the rate of wages," and the "rate of profits:" a ratio which has a strong tendency to uniformity. But there is another and a very large source of revenue which is not the creation of man, but of nature ; which owes its origin, not to the will of its possessor, but to accident which implies no sacrifice, has no tendency to uniformity, and to which the term
;

is seldom applied. This revenue arises from the exclusive right to some instrument of production, enabling the employment of a given amount of labour The principal of or capital to be more than usually productive. these instruments is land but all extraordinary powers of body or mind, all processes in manufacture which are protected by secrecy all peculiar advantages from situation or connexion, or by law, in short, every instrument of production which is not imiversally accessible, afi"ords a revenue distinct in its origin from Wages or In the Profits, and of which the Rent of land is only a species. classification of revenues, either Rent ought to have been omitted as a genus, and considered only as an anomalous interruption of the general uniformity of wages and profits, or all the accidental sources of revenue ought to have been included in one genus, of which the Rent of land would have formed the principal species. Another remark is, that almost all these definitions of Profit The continental include the wages of tlie labour of tlie Capitalist. Economists have in general been aware of this, and have pointed it

" rate"

The British out in their analyses of the component parts of Profit. Economists have seldom entered into this analysis, and the want of it has been a great cause of obscurity.
the other hand, much of what properly belongs to Profit and Almost all Economists generally included under Wages. consider the members of the liberal professions under the class of labourers. The whole subsistence of such persons, observes Mr. M'CuUoch,*^ is derived from Wages; and they are as evidently But it should labourers as if they handled the spade or the plough. be considered, that those who are engaged in any occupation requiring

On

Rent

is

more

skill

capital,

more

than that of a common husbandman, must have expended their educaor less, on the acquisition of their skill
;

0*

" Principles," &c.

p. 228.

238
Rfnt,
jTofil*'

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.
must have
cost sometliing in every case,

[App.

I.

tlon

craft apprentice, to that of the legal or medical student

from that of the handiand a Profit

; ;

on

this outlay is of course

;

capital

as in other disbursements of and the higher profit, in proportion to the risk viz. the
for,

looked

a man's success in his business. Part, therefore, and generally far the greater part, of Avhat has been reckoned the wages of his labour ought more properly to be reckoned profits on the capital expended in fitting him for that particular kind of labour. And again, all the excess of gains acquired by one possessing extraordinary talents, opportunities, or patronage (since these correspond to the possession of land, of a patent-right, or other monopoly, of a secret, &,c.) may be more properly regarded as Rent than as Wages. Another most fruitful source of ambiguity arises from the use of the word Wages, sometimes as expressing a quantity, sometimes as expressing a proportion. In ordinary language, Wages means the amount of some commocUtif, generally of silver, given to the labourer in return for a given exertion and they rise or fall, as that amount is increased or
uncertaint}'- of

diminished. In the language of Mr. Ricardo, they usually mean the labourer's 2yroportion of what is produced, supposing that produce to be divided between him and the Capitalist. In this sense they generally rise as the whole produce is diminished ; though if the word be used in the other sense, they generally fall. If Mr. Ricardo had constantly i\sed the word "Wages," to express a, proportion, the only inconvenience would have been the necessity of always translating this expression into common language. But he is not consistent. When he says,*^ that "whatever raises the Wages of labour lowers the Profits of stock," he considers Wages as a proportion. When he says,^^ that "high Wages encourage population;" he considers wages as an amount. Even Mr. M'Culloch, who has clearly explained the ambiguity, has not escaped it. He has even suffered it to afi"ect his reasonings. In his valuable essay, " On the Rate of Wages, "^^ he admits that "when Wages are high, the Capitalist has to pay a larger share of the produce of industry to his labourers." An admission utterly inconsistent with his general use of the word, as expressing the amount of what the labourer receives, which, as he has himself observed,^ may increase while his proportion diminishes.

few only have been noticed of the ambiguities which attach to the seven terms that have been selected ; and these terms have been fixed on, not as the most ambiguous, but as the most important, in the political nomenclature. "Supply and Demand," "Productive
-5

" Principles," &c.,

p. 312.

67

<W Ibid. p. 83.

P. 3Ud.

p. 161.

App.

I.]

AMBIGUOUS TERMS.

239
Rent,
prSiat?

in political economy,

and Unproductive," "Overtrading," and very many others, botli and in other subjects, which are often used without any more explanation, or any more suspicion of their requiring it, than the words "triangle " Or "twenty," are perhaps But it even more liable to ambiguities than those above treated of. is sufficient for the purpose of this Appendix to have noticed, by way of specimens, a few of the most remarkable terms in several different branches of knowledge, in order to show both the frequency of an ambiguous uss of language, and the importance of clearing up such
ambiguity.

:;

APPENDIX.

No.

II.

MISCELLANEOUS EXAMPLES FOR THE EXERCISE OF LEARNEHS.

N.B. In such of
tlie following Examples as are not in a syllogistic form, it is intended that the student should practise the reduction of them into that form; those of them, that is, in which the reasoning is in itself sound viz. where it is impossible to admit Of such as are apparent the Premises and deny the Conclusion. Syllogisms, the validity must be tried by logical rules, which it may be advisable to apply in the following order: 1st. Observe whether the argument be Categorical or Hypothetical recollecting that an hypothetical Premiss does not necessarily imply an hypothetical Syllogism, unless the reasoning turns on the hypothesis. If this appear to be the case, the rules for 2dly. If the argmnent hypothetical Syllogisms must be applied. 3dly. If only three, observe be categorical, count the terms. whether the Middle be distributed. 4thly. Observe whether the Premises are both negative ; {i.e. really, and not in appearance only,) and if one is, whether the Conclusion be negative also ; or 5thly. Observe what affirmative, if both Premises affirmative. terms are Distributed in the conclusion, and whether the same 6thly. If the Syllogism is not a are distributed in the Premises. Categorical in the first Figure, reduce it to that form.
:

1. No one is free who is enslaved by his appetites: a sensualist enslaved by his appetites : therefore a sensuaUst is not free. 2. None but Whites are civilized: the ancient Germans were Whites : therefore they were civilized. 3. None but Whites are civilized : the Hindoos are not Whites in

therefore they are not civilized.

4.

None but

civilized people are

Whites: the Gauls were Whites:

therefore they were civilized.

5.

No

one

is

rich

who has not enough: no miser has enough:

were enforced, they would be

therefore no miser
6.

is rich.

If penal laws against Papists

App.

II.]

EXAMPLES.
: :

241

aggrieved but penal laws against them are not enforced therefore the Papists are not aggrieved. 7. If all testimony to miracles is to he admitted, the popish legends are to be believed: but the popish legends are not to be believed therefore no testimony to miracles is to be admitted. 8. If men are not likely to be influenced in the performance of a known duty by taking an oath to perform it, the oaths commonly administered are superfluous : if they are likely to be so influenced, every one should be made to take an oath to behave rightly throughout his life; but one or the other of these must be the case: tlierefore either the oaths commonly administered are superfluous, or every man should be made to take an oath to behave rightly
:

throughout his
9.

life.

must be admitted to be agreeable to truth and the Church of England is conformable to the Scriptures A, B, is a divine of the Church of England; and this opinion is in accordance with his sentiments therefore it must be presumed to be true.
Scriptures
; :

The

10.

Enoch (according
but without faith

to the testimony of Scripture,) pleased

God

it is

impossible to please

Him

(for

he that

Cometh to God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him): therefore, <fcc. 11. "If Abraham were justified by works, then had he whereof
to glory [before God:] but not [any one can have whereof to glory] before God:" therefore Abraham was not justified by works.

them

of God hearetli my words: ye therefore hear ye are not of God." 13. Few treatises of science convey important truths, without any intermixture of error, in a perspicuous and interesting form: and therefore, though a treatise would deserve much attention which should possess such excellence, it is plain that few treatises of science do deserve much attention. 14. We are bound to set apart one day in seven for religious duties, if the fourth commandment is obligatory on us but we are bound to set apart one day in seven for religious duties and hence it appears that the fourth commandment is obligatory on us. 15. Abstinence from the eating of blood had reference to the divine institution of sacrifices one of the precepts delivered to Noah was abstinence from the eating of blood therefore one of the pre12.

"

He

that

is

not, because

cepts delivered to Noah contained the divine institution of sacrifices. 16. If expiatory sacrifices were divinely appointed before the Mosaic law, they must have been expiatory, not of ceremonial sin

(which could not then exist), but of moral sin: if so, the Levitical sacrifices must have had no less efficacy; and in that case, the atonements under the Mosaic law would have "made the comers thereunto perfect as pertaining to the conscience;" but this was not
the case
:

therefore, &C.

[Davison on Prophecy.]

242

EXAMPLES.
Tlie adoration of images
is

[App.II.

forbidden to Cliristians, if we 17. suppose the Mosaic law designed not for the Israehtes alone, hut for all men: it was designed, however, for the Israelites alone, and not for all men: therefore the adoration of images is not forbidden to
Christians.
18.
profit

desire to gain
all

by another's

loss is a violation of the tenth

commandment:
commandment.

gaming, therefore, since it imphes a desire to at the expense of another, involves a breach of the tenth

19. All the fish that the net enclosed were an indiscriminate mixture of various kinds those that were set aside and saved as
:

valuable, were fish that the net enclosed

set aside,

therefore those that were and saved as valuable, were an indiscriminate mixture of
:

various kinds. 20. All the elect are finally saved : such persons as are arbitrarily separated from tlae rest of mankind by the divine decree are the elect : therefore such persons as are arbitrarily separated from the
rest of

mankind by the

divine decree, are finally saved.

[The oppo-

nents of this Conclusion generally deny the Minor Premiss and admit the Major; the reverse would be the more sound and the more effectual objection.]

justified,

one who lives with another on terms of confidence is on any pretence, in killing him Brutus lived on terms of confidence with Csesar: therefore he was not justified, on the pretence he pleaded, in killing him. 22. He that destroys a man who usurps despotic power in a free country deserves well of his countrymen Brutus destroyed Csesar, who usurped despotic power in Rome therefore he deserved well of
21.
: : :

No

the Romans. 23. If virtue is voluntary, vice is voluntary: virtue is voluntary: [Aristh. Eth. B. Ill,] therefore so is vice. 24. wise lawgiver must either recognise the rewards and punishments of a future state, or must be able to appeal to an extraordinary Providence, dispensing them regularly in this life;

Moses did not do the former: therefore he must have done the
latter.

[Warburton.]

is of less frequent occurrence than the falsity of testimony can be fairly established by testimony any extraordinary and unusual fact is a thing of less frequent occurrence than the falsity of testimony (that being very common) : therefore no extraordinary and unusual fact can be fairly established by testimony.

25. Nothing which

26. Testimony is a kind of evidence which is very likely : the evidence on which- most men believe that there are mids in Egypt is testimony: therefore the evidence on which men believe that there are pyramids in Egypt is very likely
false
false.

to

be

pyrato

most be

27. The religion of the ancient Greeks and Romans was a tissue of extravagant fables and groundless superstitions, credited by the

: ;

App.

II.]

EXAMPLES.

243

vulgar and the weak, and maintained by the more enlightened, from selfish or political views: the same was clearly the case with the religion of the Egyptians the same may be said of the Brahminical worship of India, and the religion of Fo, professed by the Chinese the same, of the romantic mythological system of the Peruvians, of the stern and bloody rites of the Mexicans, and those of the Britons and of the Saxons: hence we may conclude that all systems of religion, however varied in circumstances, agree in being superstitions kept up among the vulgar, from interested or political views in the more enlightened classes. [See Dissertation, Chap. I. 2.] 28. No man can possess power to perform impossibilities; a miracle is an impossibility : therefore no man can possess power to perform a miracle. [See Appendix, Art. " Impossible."] 29. A, B, and C, D, are each of them equal to E, F : therefore they are equal to each other. 30. Protection from punishment is plainly due to the innocent therefore, as you maintain that this person ought not to be punished, it appears that you are convinced of his innocence. 31. All the most bitter persecutions have been religious persecutions among the most bitter persecutions were those which occurred in France during the revolution : tiierefore they must have been
: :

religious persecutions.

32. He who cannot possibly act otherwise than he does, has neither merit nor demerit in his action a liberal and benevolent man cannot possibly act otherwise than he does in relieving the
:

poor

therefore such a

man

has neither merit nor demerit in his

action.

[See Appendix, Art. " Impossible."]

33. What happens every day is not improbable: some things against which the chances are many thousands to one, happen every day: therefore some things against which the chances are many thousands to one, are not improbable. 34. The early and general assignment of the Epistle to the Hebrews to Paul as its author, must have been either from its professing to be his, and containing his name, or from its really being his ; since, therefore, the former of these is not the fact, the Ep'istle

must be Paul's. 35. " With some of them God was not well pleased;
were overthrown
36.
in the wilderness."

for they

sensualist wishes to enjoy perpetual gratifications without is impossible to enjoy perpetual gratifications without satiety: therefore it is impossible for a sensualist to obtain his
satiety:
it

wish.
37. If Paley's system Is to be received, one who has no knowledge of a future state has no means of distinguishing virtue and vice: now one who has no means of distinguishing virtue and vice can

commit no

sin:

therefore, if Paley's system is to be received, one

who has no knowledge

of a future state can

commit no

sin.

244

EXAMPLES.
:

Upp.

II.

38. The principles of justice are variable the appointments of therefore the principles of justice are no nature are invariable appointment of nature. [Arist. Eth. B. V.] 39. Every one desires happiness : virtue is happiness : therefore every one desires virtue. [Arist. Eth. B. III.] story is not to be believed, the reporters of which give 40. contradictory accounts of it the story of the life and exploits of
:

Buonaparte
[See B. I.
3.]

is

of this description

therefore

it is

not to be believed.

first day of the week as a commemoration of Christ's resurrection, was first introduced, it must have been a novelty when it was a novelty, it must have attracted notice when it attracted notice, it would lead

41.

When

the observance of the

religious festival in

to inquiry respecting the truth of the resurrection

this inquiry,
it

when

it

led to

must have exposed the story as an imposture, supposing it not attested by living witnesses therefore, when the observance of the first day of the week, &c., was first introduced, it must have exposed as an imposture the story of the resurrection, supposing it not attested by living witnesses. 42. All the miracles of Jesus would fill more books than the world could contain: the things related by the Evangelists are the miracles of Jesus: therefore the things related by the Evangelists would fill more books than the world could contain. 43. If the prophecies of the Old Testament had been written without knowledge of the events of the time of Christ, they could not correspond with tliem exactly and if they had been forged by Christians, they would not be preserved and acknowledged by the Jews they are preserved and acknowledged by the Jews, and they
:

correspond exactly with the events of the time of Christ : therefore they were neither written without knowledge of those events, nor were forged by Christians. 44. Of two evils the less is to be preferred occasional turbulence, therefore, being a less evil than rigid despotism, is to be preferred to it. 45. According to theologians, a man must possess faith in order to be acceptable to the Deity : now he who believes all the fables of the Hindoo mythology must possess faith: therefore such an one must, according to theologians, be acceptable to the Deity. 46. If Abraham were justified, it must have been either by faith or by works : now he was not justified by faith, (according to James,) nor by works, (according to Paul): therefore Abraham was not
:

justified.

47. No evil should be allowed that good may come of it: all punishment is an evil therefore no punishment should be allowed that good may come of it. 48. Repentance is a good thing : wicked men abound in repentance [Arist. Eth. B. IX.] : therefore wicked men abound in what
:

is

good.

App.

II.]

EXAMPLES.
person Infected
it

245

49.

witli tlie
:

three in five of the infected die]

this
:

man

plague will (probably) die [suppose is (probably) infected wi^li the

die.
?

plague

[suppose
is

an even chance]

therefore he will (probably)

Query. "What

the

amount

of this probabiUty

Again, suppose the probabiHty of

the major to be (instead of |) ^, and of the minor, (instead of 1,) to be |, Query. What will be the probabihty of the Conclusion ?

50. It must be admitted, indeed, that a man who has been accustomed to enjoy liberty cannot be happy in the condition of a slave: many of the negroes, however, may be happy in the condition of slaves, because they have never been accustomed to enjoy
liberty.

51. Wliatever is dictated by Nature is allowable: devotedness to the pursuit of pleasure in youth, and to that of gain in old age, are therefore they are allowable. dictated by Nature [Arist. Rhet. B. II.] o2. He is the greatest lover of any one who seeks that person's
:

greatest good a virtuous man seeks the greatest good for himself: therefore a virtuous man is the greatest lover of himself. [Arist. Eth.
:

B. IX.]

has a confirmed habit of any kind of action, exercises a good man has a confirmed habit of Virtue therefore he who exercises self-denial in the practice of Virtue is not a good man. [Arist. Eth. B. II.] 54. That man is independent of the caprices of Fortune who places his chief happiness in moral and intellectual excellence: a true philosopher is independent of the caprices of Fortune therefore a true philosopher is one who places his chief happiness in moral
53.

He who

no

self-denial in the practice of that action:

:

and

intellectual excellence.

system of government which extends to those actions that 55. are performed secretly, must be one which refers either to a regular divine providence in this life, or to the rewards and

punishments of another world every perfect system of government must extend to those actions which are performed secretly: no system of government therefore can be perfect, which does not
:

refer either to a regular divine providence in this

life,

or to the

rewards and punishments of another world.

Legation.]

[Warburton's Divine

5Q. For those who are bent on cultivating their minds by diligent study, the incitement of academical honours is unnecessary and it
;

is inefiectual,

for the idle,

and such as are

indifi'erent to

mental

improvement:
57.

therefore the incitement of academical honours is either unnecessary or ineff"ectual.

make

properly called an actor, does not endeavour to he expresses and the feelings he exhibits, are really his own: a barrister does this: therefore he is not properly to be called an actor. 5d>. He who bears arms at the command of the mao^Istrate does
is

He who

his hearers believe that the sentiments

246

EXAMPLES.

[App.ir.

wliat is lawful for a Christian: the Swiss in the French service, and the British in the American service, bore arms at the command the magistrate therefore they did what was lawful for a Christian. 59. If Lord Bacon is right, it is improper to stock a new colony "with the refuse of Jails hut this we must allow not to be improper, if our method of colonizing New South Wales be a wise one ; if this be wise, therefore, Lord Bacon is not right. 60. Logic is indeed worthy of being cultivated, if Aristotle is to "be regarded as infallible: but he is not: Logic therefore is not worthy of being cultivated. 61. All studies are useful which tend to advance a man in life, or to increase national and private wealth but the course of studies pursued at Oxford has no such tendency therefore it is not useful. 62. If the exhibition of criminals, publicly executed, tends to heighten in others the dread of undergoing the same fate, it may be expected that those soldiers who have seen the most service, should have the most dread of death in battle but the reverse of this is the case therefore the former is not to be believed. 63. If the everlasting favour of God is not bestowed at random, and on no principle at all, it must be bestowed either with respect to men's persons, or with respect to their conduct: but " God is no respecter of persons:" therefore his favour must be bestowed with respect to men's conduct. [Sumner's Apostolical Preaching.] 64. If transportation is not felt as a severe punishment, it is in itself ill-suited to the prevention of crime: if it is so felt, much of its severity is wasted, from its taking place at too great a distance to affect the feelings, or even come to the knowledge, of most of those whom it is designed to deter ; but one or other of these must be the case : therefore transportation is not calculated to answer the purpose of preventing crime. 65. War is productive of evil: therefore peace is Hkely to be productive of good. 66. Some objects of great beauty answer no other perceptible purpose but to gratify the sight : many flowers have great beauty ; and many of them accordingly answer no other purpose but to gratify the sight. man who deliberately devotes himself to a life of sensuality 67. is deserving of strong reprobation: but those do not deliberately devote themselves to a life of sensuality who are hurried into excess by the impulse of the passions such therefore as are hurried into excess by the impulse of the passions are not deserving of strong
: : : : ; :

reprobation.

[Arist. Eth.

B. VII.]

task to restrain all inordinate desires: to conform to the precepts of Scripture implies a restraint of aU inordinate desires : therefore it is a difficult task to conform to the precepts of Scripture. 69. Any one who is candid will refrain from condemning a book
68. It
is

difficult

App.

II.]

EXAMPLES.
:

247

without reading it some Reviewers do not refrain from this : theresome Reviewers are not candid. 70. If any objection that can be urged would justify a change of established laws, no laws could reasonably be maintained but some laws can reasonably be maintained: therefore no objection that can be urged will justify a change of established laws. 71. If any complete theory could be framed, to explain the establishment of Christianity by human causes, such a theory would have been proposed before now but none such ever has been proposed therefore no such theory can be framed. 72. He who is content with what he has, is truly rich a covetous man is not content with what he has : no covetous man therefore is
fore
:

truly rich.

true prophecy coincides precisely with all the circumstances 73. of such an event as could not be conjectured by natural reason this is the case with the* prophecies of the Messiah contained in the Old
:

Testament: therefore these are true prophecies. 74. The connexion of soul and body cannot be comprehended or explained but it must be believed therefore something must be believed which cannot be comprehended or explained. 75. Lias lies above Red Sandstone Red Sandstone lies above Coal: therefore Lias lies above Coal. 76. Cloven feet being found universally in horned animals, we may conclude that this fossil animal, since it appears to have had
; :

cloven feet, was horned. 77. All that glitters not gold.
78.

is

not gold: tinsel glitters: therefore

it is

A negro is a man

therefore he

who murders a negro murders

of life:

a man.
79.
Vitellius Vitellius

Meat and drink are necessaries were spent on Meat and Drink

the revenues of therefore the revenues of

were spent on the necessaries of life. is heavier than Platina: feathers are heavier than nothing: therefore feathers are heavier than Platina. 81. The child of Themistocles governed his mother: she governed her husband he governed Athens Athens, Greece and Greece, the world therefore the child of Themistocles governed the world. 82. He who calls you a man speaks truly he who calls you a fool, caUs you a man: therefore he who calls you a fool speaks
80. Nothing
;

truly.

countries alone produce wines: Spain is a warm therefore Spain produces wines. 84. It is an intensely cold climate that is sufficient to freeze Quicksilver the climate of Siberia is sufficient to freeze Quicksilver there-

83.

Warm
:

country
:

fore the climate of Siberia

is
is

intensely cold.

85. Mistleto of the oak

plant;

and every vegetable excrescence which

a vegetable excrescence which is not a is not a plant, is

248

EXAMPLES.

[App. II.

possessed of magical virtues : therefore Mistleto of the oak is possessed of magical virtues. SQ. If the hour-hand of a clock he any distance (suppose a foot) before the mmute-hand, this last, though moving twelve times faster, can never overtake the other for while the minute-hand is moving over those twelve inches, the hour-hand will have moved over one inch so that they will then he an inch apart and while the minute-hand is moving over that one inch, the hour-hand will have moved over -^^ inch, so that it will still be a-head and again, while the minute-hand is passing over that space of tV inch which now divides them, the hour-hand will pass over ^l^ inch so that it will still he a-head, though the distance between the two is diminished (kc. (kc. (fee, and thus it is plain we may go on for ever: therefore the minute-hand can never overtake the hour-hand. [This
; : ; ; ; ;

is one of the sophistical puzzles noticed by Aldrich (the moving bodies being Achillea and a Tortoise;) but he is not happy in his attempt at a solution. He proposes to remove the difficulty by demonstrating that, in a certain given time, Achilles would overtake the Tortoise: as if any one had ever doubted that. The very problem proposed is to surmount the difficulty of a seeming demonstration of a thing palpably impossible; to show that it is palpably impossible, is no solution of the problem. I have heard the present example adduced as a proof that the pretensions of Logic are futile, since (it was said) the most perfect logical demonstration may lead from true premises to an absurd conclusion. The revei-se is the truth; the example before

us furnishes a confirmation of the utility of an acquaintance with the syllogistic form: in which form the pretended demonstration in question cannot possibly be exhibited. An attempt to do so will evince the utter want of connexion between the premises and the
conclusion.]

87. Theft is a crime : theft was encouraged by the laws of Sparta therefore the laws of Sparta encouraged crime.

Every hen comes from an egg: every egg comes from a hen: egg comes from an egg. therefore the son of Jupiter 89. Jupiter was the son of Saturn was the grandson of Saturn. 90. All cold is to be expelled by heat this person's disorder is a cold therefore it is to be expelled by heat. 91. Wine is a stimulant: therefore in a case where stimulants
88.

therefore every

are hurtful, wine is hurtful. 92. Opium is a poison : but physicians advise some of their patients to take opium: therefore physicians advise some of their patients to take poison. 93. What we eat grew in the fields loaves of bread are what we eat: therefore loaves of bread grew in the fields. (as Is shown by 94. Animal-food may be entirely dispensed with the practice of the Brahmins and of some monks ;) and vegetablefood may be entirely dispensed with (as is plain from the example of the Esquimaux and others;) but all food consists of animal-food and vegetable-food therefore all food may be dispensed with. 95. No trifling business will enrich those engaged in it a mining speculation is no trifling business: therefore a mining speculation will enrich those engaged in it. 96. He who is most hungry eats most: lie who eats least is most
: :
:

app.ii.]

examples.

249

therefore he who eats least eats most. [See Aldrich's Compendium: Fallacise: where this is rightly solved.] 97. Whatever body is in motion must move either in the place

hungry

where

it is,

or in a place
is

therefore there

where it is not neither of these is possible no such thing as motion. [In this instance, as well as
:

in the one lately noticed, Aldrich mistakes the character of the difficulty; which is, not to prove the truth of that which is self-evident, but to explain an apparent demonstration militating against that which nevertheless no one ever doubted. He says in this case, solvitur ambulando ;" but (pace tanti viri) this is no solution at all, but is the very thing which constitutes the difficulty in question; for it is precisely because we know the possibility of motion, that a seeming proof of its impossibility produces perplexity. &e Introduction.] 5
^''

grow most in the increase of the moon hair a vegetable: therefore hair grows most in the increase of the moon. 99. Most of the studies pursued at Oxford conduce to the improvement of the mind all the works of the most celebrated ancients are among the studies pursued at Oxford therefore some of the works of the most celebrated ancients conduce to the improvement of the mind. 100. Some poisons are vegetable: no poisons are useful drugs: therefore some useful drugs are not vegetable. 101. A theory will speedily be exploded, if false, which appeals to the evidence of observation and experiment Craniology appeals to this evidence therefore, if Craniology be a false theory, it will speedily be exploded. [Let the probability of one of these premises be ip and of the other 1 Query. What is the probability of the conclusion, and which are
98. All vegetables
:

is

the terms

?]

102. Wilkes was a favourite with the populace; he who is a favourite with the populace must understand how to manage them he who understands how to manage them, must be Avell acquainted with their character: he who is well acquainted with their character, must hold them in contempt therefore Wilkes must have held the populace in contempt. 103. To discover whether man has any moral sense, he should be viewed in that state in which all his faculties are most fully developed; the civilized state is that in which all man's faculties are most fully developed therefore, to discover whether man has any moral sense, he should be viewed in a civilized state. 104. Revenge, Robbery, Adultery, Infanticide, &c., have been
: :

countenanced by public opinion in several countries all the crimes we know of are Revenge, Robbery, Adultery, Infanticide, &c. therefore, all the crimes we know of have been countenanced by
:

public opinion in several countries.

[Paley's Moral Philosophy.]

105. No soldiers should be brought into the field who are not well qualified to perform their part. None but veterans are well qualified to perform their part. None but veterans should be brought into the field. 106. monopoly of the sugar-refining business is beneficial to

sugar-refiners

and of the corn-trade

to corn-growers

and of the

250

EXAMPLES.
&lc.

[App.
tlius eacli class

II.

silk -manufacture to silk- weavers,

&c.; and

men are benefited by some restrictions. Now men make up the whole community therefore
:

of these classes of a system of restricall

tions is beneficial to the

community.

[See

Chap.

III. ii.]

107. There are two kinds of things which we ought not to fret about what we can help, and what we cannot. [To be stated as a
:

Dilemma.]

108. He who believes himself to be always in the right in his opinion, lays claims to infallibility: you always believe yourself to

be

in the right in

your opinion

therefore

you lay claim

to infalli-

bility.

part of mankind can ever have received divine instruction who are said to have had a revelation made to them of religion, did not know, in the times of Solomon, that the circumference of a Circle differs from the treble of the Diameter. 110. The Epistle attributed to Barnabas is not to be reckoned among the writings of the Apostolic Fathers because, if genuine, it

109.

No

in any of the arts of life: because the Israelites,

a part of Scripture, and, if spurious, it is the work of some forger of a later age. 111. If the original civilization of Mankind was not the work of a divine Instructor, some instance may be found of a nation of Bavages having civihzed themselves. [Pol. Econ. Lect. V.] 112. The Law of Moses prohibited theft, murder, &lc. But that Law is abolished: therefore theft, murder, <fec., are not prohibited. 113. Agriculture might have been invented by man, without a superhuman instructor and so might the working of metals and so might medicine; and so might navigation, &c.; and in short there is no art of civilized life that can be pointed out, which might not have been invented by the natural faculties of man. Therefore the arts of civilized life might have been invented by man without
is
;

any superhuman instructor.^ 114. All those must disapprove of

inflicting

woman who
inflicting

consider her as innocent:

it

punishment on her,

is

to

punishment on this and as you disapprove of be presumed you think her

innocent.

115. If a State has a right to enforce laws, (and without this it could not subsist) it must have a right to prescribe what the religion [See Book III. 9.] of the People shall be. 116. Everyman is bound in duty to aim at promoting the good of Mankind: a Civil Magistrate (or generally, and in all respects Legislator) is a man therefore a Civil Magistrate is bound in duty to aim at promoting the good generally and in all respects of Mankind. And hence it appears that, since true religion is one of the greatest of goods, the Civil Magistrate is bound to enforce, by

See

Polit.

Econ. Lect. V.

p. 123.

App.

II.]

EXAMPLES.
tlie

251

means of

power committed

Religion, and to suppress heresy.

[See Essay I.

to him, the profession of a true on the " Kingdom of Christ."]

;

117. The month of May has no *'i^" in its name nor has June, July, or August : all the hottest months are May, June, July, and August: therefore all the hottest months are without an "i2" in their names. [See Book IV. Ch. I. 1.] 118. This man may possibly be right in his peculiar religious

Creed; and the same may be said of that man: and of a third, and a fourth, <fc;c. therefore it is possible they may be all right. 119. When the Disciples were first called Christians, they must have received the title either from Believers, or from Jewish unbelievers, or from Pagans: but one of these suppositions is and another is negatived by the New Testament impossible records therefore the remaining supposition is established.
:

APPENDIX.

No. III.

PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS.

Some have expressed mucli contempt for tlie mode in wliicli Logic is usually taught, and in whicli students are examined in it, as comprising no more than a mere enumeration of technical rules, and perhaps an application of them to the simplest examples, exhibited in a form already syllogistic, or nearly so. That such a description, if intended to be universal, is not correct, I am perfectly certain; though, hitherto, the indiscriminate requisition of Logic from all candidates for a degree, has confined both lectures and examinations, in a greater degree than is desirable, to this elementary character.^ But the student who wishes to acquire, and to show that he has acquired, not only the elementary rules, but a facility of applying them in practice, should proceed from the study of such examples as the foregoing, to exercise himself in analysing logically, according to the rules here given, and somewhat in the

**

manner of the subjoined specimen, some

various portions of Aristotle's works,

the opening

of Euclid's demonstrations,

of Warburton's

Divine Legation," (which exhibits the arguments in a form very nearly syllogistic) several parts of Chillingworth's Defence of Protestantism, the concluding part of Paley's Horse Paulinae, Leslie's Method with the Deists, various portions of A. Smith's AVealth of Nations, and other argumentative works on the most dissimilar subjects. The latter part of L Chap. V. of the Dissertation on the Province of Reasoning, will furnish a convenient subject of a short analysis. student who should prepare himself, in this manner, in one or more such books, and present himself for this kind of examination in them, would furnish a good test for ascertaining his proficiency in practical Logic.

the rules of Logic apply to arguments only after they have full length in the bare elementary form, it may be useful to subjoin some remarks on the mode of analysing and reducing to that form, any train of argument that may be presented

As

been exhibited at

See

Pi'eface.

App. III.}
to us:

PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS.

253

since this must in general be the first step taken in an attempt to apply logical rules. First then, of whatever length the reasoning may he, "whether treatise, chapter, or paragraph, begin with the concluding assertion not necessarily the last sentence expressed, but the last point and this, whether it be formally enunciated, or left to established be understood. Then, tracing the reasoning backwards, observe on. what ground that assertion is made. The assertion will be your The the ground on which it rests, your Premises. Conclusion whole Syllogism thus obtained may be tried by the rules of Logic. If no incorrectness appear in this syllogism, proceed to take the premises separately, and pursue with each the same plan as with premiss must have been used as the conclusion you first stated. such, either because it required no proof, or because it had been proved. If it have not been proved, consider whether it be so If it have been proved, self-evident as to have needed no proof. you must regard it as a conclusion derived from other assertions which are premises to it: so that the process with which you set out will be repeated viz. to observe on what grounds the assertion rests, to state these as premises, and to apply the proper rules to the syllogism thus obtained. Having satisfied yourself of the cor-

rectness of this, proceed, as before, to state

its

premises,

if

needful,

as conclusions derived from other assertions.

will

And
;

thus the analysis

till you arrive which of course should be assertions requiring no proof or, if the chain be any where faulty, the analysis will proceed till you come to some proposition, either assumed as self-evident, though requiring proof, or incorrectly deduced from other assertions.^

go on

(if

the whole chain of argument be correct)

at the premises with which the whole

commences

2 Thesedirections are, in substance, and in words, extracted from the Preface to Hinds's abridged Introduction to Logic. s Many students probably will find it a

nearly,

very clear and convenient mode of exhibiting the logical analysis of a course of argument, to draw it out in the form of a Tree, or Logical Division; thus:

254

PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS.

[Apr-. III.

It win often happen that the same assertion will have been proved by many different arguments and then, the inquiry into the truth
;

In mathematical or of the premises will branch out accordingly. other demonstrative reasoning, this will of course never take place, and if, as is often since absolute certainty admits of no increase the case, the same truth admits of several different demonstrations, we select the simplest and clearest, and discard the rest. But in probable reasoning there is often a Cumulation of arguments, each proving the same conclusion ; i.e. each proving it to be probable.
:

In such cases, therefore, you will have first to try each argument separately; and should each of them establish the conclusion as in some degree probable, you will then have to calculate the aggregate
probability.

In this calculation Logic only so far assists as it enables us to place the several items of probability in the most convenient form. As the degree of probability of each proposition that is originally assumed, is a point to be determined by the reasoner's own sagacity and experience as to the matter in hand, so, the degree of probability of each conclusion, (given, that of each of its premises,)* and also the collective probability resulting from several different argu-

ments all tending to the same conclusion, is an arithmetical question. But the assistance afforded by logical rules in clearly stating the
several items so as to prepare the way for the other operations, will not be thought lightly of by any who have observed the confusion of thought and the fallacy, which have often been introduced through the want of such a statement.

Example of Analysis applied

to the first

part of Foley's Evidences,

The ultimate Conclusion, that "The God" is made to rest (as far as *' the

Christian Religion

came from

direct historical evidence" is

concerned) on these two premises; That Religion attested by Miracles is from God;" and that *' The Christian Religion is so attested." Of these two premises, it should be remarked, the Minor seems to have been admitted, while the Major was denied, by the unbelievers of old whereas at present the case is reversed.''
:

"A

See Fallacies, 14, near the end. * It is clear from the fragments remaining of the ancient arguments against Christianity, and the allusions to them in Christian writers, and also from the Jewish accounts of the life of Jesus which are still extant, (under the title of Toldoth
*
Jeschu) that the original opponents of Christianity admitted that miracles were

wrought, but denied that they proved the

divine origin of the religion, and attri-

buted them to Magic. This concession, in persons living so much nearer to the

times assigned to the miracles, should bo noticed as an important evidence; for, credulous as men vvere in those days respecting magic, they would hardly have resorted to this explanation, unless some, at least plausible, evidence for the miracles had been adduced. And they could not but be sensible that to prove (had that been possible) the pretended miracles to be imposttires, would have been the most decisive course ; since i'Aa^ would at once have disproved the religion.


App.
III.]

; :

PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS.

255

Paley's argument therefore goes to establlsli tlie Minor premiss, about which alone, in these days, there is likely to be any question. He states with this view, two propositions viz. Prop. I. " That there is satisfactory evidence, that many, professing to be original witnesses of the Christian miracles, passed their lives in labours, dangers, and sufferings, voluntarily undergone in attestation of the accounts which they delivered, and solely in consequence of their belief of those accounts and that they also submitted, from the same motives, to new rules of conduct." Prop. II. " That there is not satisfactory evidence, that persons pretending to be original witnesses of any other similar miracles, have acted in the same manner, in attestation of the accounts which they delivered, and solely in consequence of their belief of the truth of those accounts." Of these two propositions, the latter, it will easily be perceived, is the Major premiss, stated as the converse by Negation (Book II. Chap. II. 4) of a universal affirmative the former proposition is the Minor. As a Syllogism in Barhara, therefore, the whole will stand thus

** All miracles attested by such and such evidence, are worthy of credit:" (by conversion, " none which are not worthy of credit are BO attested.") ** The Christian miracles are attested by such and such evidence:" Therefore *' they are worthy of credit."

The Minor premiss

tinct ones,

is first

each of which
1.

is

separately established.

proved by being taken as several disSee Book II.

Chap. IV.
I.

It is

proved that the

first

propagators of Christianity suffered

by showing,
from the nature of the case, that they were likely [because they were preachers of a religion unexpected and unwelcome: 1. to the Jews; and 2. to the Gentiles.^ ] 2d. From piv/ane testimony.
1st.
2'>Tiori,
:

to suffer

3d.

From the

testimony of Christian Writings.

[And here comes

argument
;

in the proof of one of the premises of this last

viz.

the proof of the credibility, as to this point at least, of the Christian Writings.]

These arguments are cumulative; i.e. each separately goes to establish the probability of the one common conclusion, that ** the
first

propagators of Christianity suffered."

similar arguments it is shown that their suflferings were such as they voluntarily exposed themselves to.
6

By

As Paul

expresses

it,

"to the Jews, a stumUing-Uocle ; and

_,

to the

Greeks,

foolishness.''*

256
II.

PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS.

It is

[App. III.

they suffered for was a miraculous story." by 1st. The nature of the case They could have had nothing but miracles on which to rest the claims of the new religion.
;

proved that "

What

2d.

By

allusions to miracles, particularly to the

in

both in Christian and

ResuiTcction, profane Writers, as the evidence on

which the

religion rested.

course of argument goes to show that the miracles in attestation of which they suffered were such as they professed to

The same

have witnessed. These arguments again are cumulative.

** The miracles thus attested are what we call the Christian miracles:" in other words, that the story was, in the main, that which we have now in the Christian Scriptures by 1st. The nature of the case; viz. that it is improbable the original story should have completely died away, and a substantially new one have occupied its place 2d. by The incidental allusions of ancient writers, both Christian and profane, to accounts agreeing with those of our Scriptures, as the ones then received 3d. by The credibihty of our Historical Scriptures: This is established by several distinct arguments, each separately tending to show that these books were, from the earliest ages of Christianity, well known and carefully preserved among Christians: viz. i. They were quoted by ancient Christian writers. ii. with peculiar respect. iii. Collected into a distinct volurae, and iv, distinguished by appropriate names and titles of respect. V. Publicly read and expounded, and vi. had commentaries, &c. written on them vii. Were received by Christians of different sects ; he. &c.' The latter part of the first main proposition, branches off into two; viz. 1st., that the early Christians submitted to new rules of conduct; 2d, that they did so, in consequence of their belief in miracles wrought before them. Each of these is established in various parts of the above courso of argument, and by similar premises ; viz. the nature of the case, and the testimony of the Christhe accounts of heathen writers, tian Scriptures, &c.

III. It is proved that

The Major
credit,"
'

premiss, that ** Miracles thus attested are worthy of (which must be combined with the former, in order to
persons, See " Hinds pp. 3046.

For some important remarks respect-

on Inspiration,"

ing the different ways in whicli this part of the argument is presented to different

App.

III.]

PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS.

257

tlie conclusion, that " the Christian miracles are worthy of credit,") is next to be established. Previously to his entering on the second main proposition, (whic^ I have stated to be the Converse by negation of this Major premiss,) he draws his conclusion (Ch. X. Part I.) from the Minor premiss, combination with the Major, resting that Major on 1st. The a- priori improbability that a false story should have

establish

**

If

been thus attested viz. it be so, the religion must be true.

:

be deceivers.

By

These men could not only not bearing testimony, they might have

Would men in avoided all these suiferings, and have lived quietly. such circumstances pretend to have seen wliat they never savr; assert facts which they had no knowledge of; go about lying, to teach virtue ; and, though not only convinced of Christ's being an impostor, but having seen the success of his imposture in his crucifixion, yet persist in carrying it on ; and so persist, as to bring upon themselves, for nothing, and with a full knowledge of the conse" quence, enmity, and hatred, danger and death? 2d. That no /aZse story of Miracles is likely to be so attested, is again proved, from the premiss that " no false story of miracles ever Jias been so attested;" and this premiss again is
proved in the form of a proposition which includes it viz. that " No other miraculous story whatever is so attested." This assertion again, bifurcates; viz. it is proved respecting the several stories that are likely to be, or that have been adduced,
;

as parallel to the Christian, that either

1 .

are not so attested; or are not properly miraculous; i.e. that admitting the veracity of the narrator, it does not follow that any miracle took place as in cases that may be explained hj false percqj;

They They

lions,-accidents,

<i:c.

In this way the learner may proceed to analyze the rest of the work, and to fill up the details of those parts of the argument which I have but slightly touched upon.^ It will be observed that, to avoid unnecessary prolixity, I have in most of the above syllogisms suppressed one premiss, which the learner will be able easily to supply for himself. B.G. In the early part of this analysis it will easily be seen, that the first of the series of cumulative arguments to prove that the propagators of Christianity did sufier, would at full length stand thus
8 This is the tdtimate conclusion deduced from the premiss, that " it is attested by real Miracles; which, in the present day, comes to the same thing: since those for whom he is writing, are ready at once

admit the truth of the religion, if convinced of the reality of the miracles. The ancient Jews were not." See Note at the end of this Appendix,
to

25S
**

PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS.

to the

[App. III.

Whoever propagated a religion unwelcome the Gentiles, was likely to suffer The Apostles did this
;

Jews and

to

Therefore they were likely to suffer," &c.,

It is also to

<fec.

be observed, that the same proposition used in difmay require to be differently expressed by a substitution of some equivalent, in order to render the argument, in This of course is always allowable, proeach, formally correct. vided great care is taken that the exact meaning be preserved e.g. if the proposition be, " The persons who attested the Christian
ferent syllogisms
:

miracles underwent sufferings in attestation of them," I am authorized to state the same assertion in a different form, thus, "The Christian miracles are attested by men who suffered in attestation
of their reality," &c.

Great care, however, should be used to avoid being misled by the when the two are not (though perhaps they sound so) really equivalent, so that the one warrants the assumption of the other. See Book III. 3. Lastly, the learner is referred to the Supplement to Chap. III. 1, p. 97, where I have treated of the statement of a proposition as several distinct ones, each implying all the rest, but differing in the Of this procedure the division of the Predicate from the Subject. above analysis affords an instance.
substitution of one proposition for another,

Note referred

to at

page 257.

the Student considers that the foregoing is only one out of many branches of evidence, all tending to the same point, and yet that there have been intelligent men who have held out against them all, he may be apt to suspect either that there must be some flaw in

When

these arguments, which he is unable to detect, or else that there must be much stronger arguments on the other side than he has ever met with. To enter into a discussion of the various causes leading to but I will notice one infidelity would be unsuitable to this occasion as being more especially connected with the subject of this work, '^ In no other instance and as being very generally overlooked. perhaps," (says Dr. Hawkins, in his valuable Essay on Tradition)
;

*' besides that of Religion, do men commit the very illogical mistake^ of first canvass'lng all the objections against any particular system wJwse pretensions to truth they would examine, before they consider But why, it may be the direct arguments in its favour.'' (P. 82.) An answer, asked, do they make such a mistake in this case ? which I think would apply to a large proportion of such persons, is this because a man having been brought up in a Christian country,
:

App.

III.]

PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS.

259

has lived perhaps among such as have been accustomed from their infancy to take for granted the truth of their religion, and even to regard an uninqidring assent as a mark of commendable /(ZV/i; and hence he has probably never even thought of proposing to himself

Why should I receive Christianity as a divine revelathe question, Christianity being nothing neio to him, and the presumjytion tion? being in favour of it, while the burden of proof lies on its opponents, he is not stimulated to seek reasons for believing it, till he finds it
when an opponent and the other, with the idea of a divine revelation? these objections strike by their novelty by their being opposed to what is generally received. He is thus excited to inquiry which he sets about naturally enough, but very unwisely by seeking for answers to all these objections and fancies that unless they can all be satisfactorily solved, he ought not to receive the religion. *' As if," (says the Author already cited) ** there could not be truth, and truth supported by irrefragable arguments, and yet at the same time obnoxious to objections, numerous, plausible, and by no means easy of solution. There are objections (said Dr. Johnson) against a pfemwz, and objections against avacuum; but one of them must be true." He adds, that ** sensible men, really desirous of discovering the truth, will perceive that reason directs them to examine first the argument in favour of that side of the question, where the first presumption of truth appears.
controverted.

urges

How do you

And when

it

is controverted,

reconcile this,

and

that,

the presumption is manifestly in favour of that religious creed already adopted by the country Their very earliest inquiry therefore must be into the direct arguments for the authority of that book on which their country rests its religion." But reasonable as such a procedure is, there is, as I have said, a strong temptation, and one which should be carefully guarded against, to adopt the opposite course ; to attend first to the objections which are brought against what is established, and which, for that very reason, rouse the mind from a state of apathy. When Christianity was first preached, the state of things was reversed. The presumption was against it, as being a novelty. ** Seeing that all these things cannot be spoken against, ye ought to be quiet,' was a sentiment which favoured an indolent acquiescence in the old pagan worship. The stimulus of novelty was all on the side of those who came to overthrow this, by a new religion. The first inquiry of any one who at all attended to the subject, must have ** What are been, not, but, *' On the objections to Christianity?" what grounds do these men call on me to receive them as divine messengers?" And the same appears to be the case with the Polynesians among whom our Missionaries are labouring: they begin by inquiring, ** Why should we receive this religion?" and those of them accordingly who have embraced it, appear to be Christians on much more rational and deliberate conviction than
^

And

260

PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS.

us,
civilization, are

[App. IIL

many among
and

even of those who, in general maturity of intellect advanced considerably beyond those Islanders. I am not depreciating the inestimable advantages of a religious education but, pointing out the peculiar temptations which accom;

pany

it.

The Jews and Pagans had,

difficulties to

in their early prejudices,

;

surmount, than ours but they were ditHculties of a different hind. See Essays on the Dangers, &c., Disc. I. 3; and also Ehei. Part. I. Chap. III. 1.
greater

Apf.

III.

PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS.

261

^ ^
.be
93

if

o
c

fa
"^^

^ >

oj-~

ei^

fS

S S-^

g s O S
fl

2la-g|o;;g^--2
--

"

<U

t^

<=>

^^
fl ro

3
^>
rt

?<

M
M o
i 0)

_ a Ph

rt^

2 -3 ^
cJ
,J=3

I ?c'2'< 11IIS
11
5co25rtM'*j;wr
S3 aj "^

P^4-.

-^
OJ

.2 to-W-a

? S M W

S
QQ

?3

= E -.2

(DC?

loo
"

C
>

.-^
fl c3

eS

o
o-xs

'::;3

<2


262

PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS.

[App. III.

might have done with much truth,) hut as a complete substitute for them, a man's feeling of the suitahleness of the religion for his wants; a suitahleness which douhtless many of the Mahometans perceive in their own religion, and of the Hindoos in theirs. The coincidence hetween writers of such different schools is very striking, and affords matter for much reflection. They all agree in representing the *' Faith " that is required of a Christian as wholly
^'^

independent of evidence, and as necessarily, or most properly, hased on feelings such as attach Pagans to their superstitions. And they all apparently calculate on the reader's heing totally ignorant of the New Testament, of which almost every chapter convicts Jesus and his followers of that ** timidity " in appealing to the evidence of For, the miracles and prophecies which is censured and derided. passages ahove cited from Scripture, even if multiplied many fold, as might easily he done, would give hut a very inadequate view of the case inasmuch as the general tenor of all the narrative, and all the teaching, of the New Testament, presupposes evidence as the original ground on which helief had heen all along demanded the unhelief which it ** denounces as sin" heing, not as those other on the contrary^ writers represent, the requiring of evidence, but
;
:
'

the

rejection of evidence.

The
is like

fallacy of representing all appeal to reason as useless in cases

*' argumentative faculty " is not alone sufficient which denying the utility of light, because it will not enable a man to see, whose eyes are not in a state to perform their functions, has been already noticed. Book IV. Ch. II. 5. It may be a useful exercise for the learner to analyze some others

where the

of this collection of fallacies, referring to Book I. 2, to Ch. II. 3, and to Appendix I. Art. " Experience."
10 I have treated of this point in the *' on Christian Evidences," liessons under the head of "Internal Evidence."

Book

II.

See also Professor Powell's valuable work

" Tradition Unveiled.'*

263

POSTSCRIPT.

HAVE

lately

discovered

the

existence

of

misappreliension

which I had not anticipated, nor accordingly provided against, but into which some persons appear to have very strangely fallen, who are far from wanting in intelligence generally, or in

learning.

When

I speak

probabilities in

been by some
w^ords

of expressing in the form of a fraction, the favour of the truth of some proposition, it has persons assumed tacitly though not in express

that

the

opposite

fraction,

the

remaining

chances,

must express the

if

probability of the propositions being false. Thus, certain witnesses depose to having seen A. B. in London at a

certain time ; and it is calculated that the result of their testimony goes to establish a probability equal to ^, that he was there at that time, it is assumed, without the smallest grounds, that this

amounts

to a probability (equal to
;

f)

of his having not been in

is

London,

but elsewhere
that effect.

whereas in truth there

|-

no

tittle

of evidence to

The

only expresses the compatibility of his absence

from London with the existence of the testimony of those witnesses. And even if it should come out tliat they were not only of doubtful credit, but wholly unworthy of belief, and that their evidence ought to be completely disregarded, still A. B. may have been in London at the time, and it may be possible to find complete proof of it. A refuted argument as I have elsewhere remarked tliough it ought to go for nothing, is often, by the hasty and unthinking, mistaken for a dis^rooi of the conclusion. And this, though when stated

distinctly, it appears a truism, is, in practice, perpetually overlooked.

Suppose a person to argue from certain deposits of organic remains, and from some traditions he has met with, in favour of the Noachian Deluge, and on examination it should appear that the probability thus established amounts to only ^ 1 or less, how absurd

would be to regard this as a proof that it is as likely as not, or more likely than not, that no such Deluge ever occurred But an elaborate and long calculation, quite correct, except only in being based on a perfectly groundless supposition, which however is not
it
!

264

POSTSCEIPT.

expressly' stated but tacitly assumed, will often mislead the author as well as his readers.

In some cases it is true, we do reasonably infer something from the bringing forward of weak arguments, and no others, and the
producing exclusively of w^orthless testimony. But the inference is drawn not from the arguments and the witnesses themselves, but from the absence of others, when there is good reason to suppose that better evidence would have been produced, had any existed. If, e. g., a number of learned and ingenious scholars set themselves to find objections to

some version

of

Scripture,

and

after

time and labour, bring forward merely the feeblest cavils, this affords a strong presumption that the version is a good one. But this inference is drawn, not from the objections themselves, but from the probability that such men would have found valid objections had it been open to any. So also when a man of so much acuteness and research as Hume, set himself to find in all history, parallels to the Scripture-miracles, and produced (as Paley has pointed out) such only as are quite different in all the essential points, it is justly inferred that no parallels do exist ; but this is inferred not from the instances Hume does adduce, but from our knowledge of his ability and learning, and anti- Christian zeal; which render it morally certain that if there had been any cases that were really to his purpose, he would have found them. But all such considerations are quite foreign (as an attentive reader will have perceived) from the question I was treating of; which was, the degree of probability conferred on a proposition by such and such given arguments ; without assuming that other arguments besides, do or do not exist, tending to the same result.

much

INDEX
PRINCIPAL TECHNICAL TERMS.
Absolute terms, b.
ii. ch. v. I. Abstraction. The act of "drawing off" in thought, and attending to separ-

Attributive term, b.

Bacon

some portion of an object presented to the mind, b. ii. ch. v. 2. Abstract terms, b. ii. ch. v. 1. Accident. In its widest technical sense, (equivalent to Attribute,) any thing that is attributed to another, and can only be conceived as belonging to some substance (in which sense it is opposed to " Substance ;") in its narrower and more properly logical sense, a Predicable which may be present or absent, the essence of the Species remaining the same, b. ii. ch. v. 4. Accidental Definition. definition which assigns the Properties of a Species, or the Accidents of an Individual; it is otherwise called a Description, b. ii. ch. v. 6. denotes the quality of a Affirmative Proposition which asserts the agreement of the Predicate with the subject,
ately,

supposed to have designed his Organon as a rival system to that here treated of, Introd. 3,

erroneously

ii.

ch. r. 1.

and b. iv. ch. iii. 3. Categories, b. iv. ch. ii.

Categorematic.

may

so called which by itself be employed as a Term,

is

A word
_

1.

b. ii. ch. i. 3. one which is Categorical Proposition affirms or denies a Predicate of a Subject, absolutely, and without any hypothesis, b. ii. ch. ii. 4.

Circle

Class

fallacy of, b.

iii.

strictly speaking,

13. a Class consists

several things coming under a description, b. i. 3. Contraposition, see Negation. Common term is one which is applicable in the same sense to more than one

of

common

ii.

b.

ii.

ch.

Amphibolia

a kind of ambiguity of sentence, b. iil 10. Analogous. terra is so called whose single signification applies with unequal propriety to more than one object, b.

1.

i. 6; b. ii. ch. i. 3, and b. ii. ch. iv. 6. Compatible terms, b. ii. ch. v. I. Composition Fallacy of, b. iii. II. That Proposition which is Conclusion. inferred from the Premises of an Argument, b. ii. 2, and b. ii. ch. iii.

individual object, b.

1.
Concrete term, b. ii. ch. v. 1. one which is Conditional Proposition asserts the dependence of one cateProposition on another. gorical conditional Syllogism is one in which

Antecedent.

and b. iii. 10. That part of a Conditional Proposition on which the other
ii.

ch. V.

1,

depends, b. ii. ch. iv. 6. Apprehension (simple.)The operation of the mind by which we mentally perceive or form a notion of some object,
b.
ii.

the reasoning" depends on such a Proposition, b.

ii.

ch. iv. 6.

Connotative term, b. ii. ch. v. 1. ^That part of a conditional Consequent.

ch.

Argument. An expression in which, from something laid down as granted, something else is deduced, b. ii. ch. iii.

i.

1.

Proposition which depends on the (Consequens,) b. ii. ch. i\r. other. 6, Note.
Consequence.

The

connexion between

iir^i^a/^ division,
5
;

faulty,
ii.

b.
v.

ii.

ch. v.
b.
ii.

definition, b.

ch.

6.

Assertion an affirmation or denial,

ch. u.
I.

the Antecedent and Consequent of a conditional Proposition. (Consequentia,) b. ii. ch. iv. 6, Note. ConstructivedondXiiondX syllogism, b. ii,
ch. iv. 3.

256

INDEX.

^The Matter of a ProposiContingent. tion is so called when the terms of it in part agree, and in part disagree, b. ii. eh. ii. 2. Contradictory Propositions are those

comprehend
and
b.
ii.

all its significates,

it is

every
i.

thing to which
ch.

applicable, b.

5,

Division, logical

which, having the same terms, both in Quantity and Quality,

ch.
iii.

differ
b.
ii.

5.

Contrary Propositions
sals, affirmative

are two univerand negative, with the

ch.
ii.

is the distinct enumeration of several things signified by a common name; and it is so called metaphorically, from its being analogous to the (real and properly-called) division of a whole into its parts, b. ii.

iii.

2.

ch. V. 5.

understood, b. ii. ch. iv. 7. Equivocal Term is defined to be equivocal whose different significations apply equally to several objects. Strictly speaking, there is hardly a An expression explanatory Definition. word in any language which may not of that which is defined, i.e. separated, be regarded, as in this sense, equivoas by a boundary, from every thing cal but the title is usually applied else, b. ii. ch. v. 6 ; b. iii. 10. only in any case where a word is Description An accidental Definition, employed equivocally; e.g. where the b. ii. ch. V. 6. Middle-term is used in different senses Destructive conditional Syllogism, b. ii. in the two Premises; or where a ch. iv. 3. Proposition is liable to be understood Deaf-mutes incapable of a train of in various senses, according to the reasoning, till they shall have learned various meanings of one of its terms, some kind oi general signs. Introd. 5. b. iii. 10. Dictum " de omni et nullo ;" Aristotle's: Essential Definition is one which an abstract statement of an Argument, assigns, not the Properties or Accigenerally, b. 1, 4. Applicable to a dents of the thing defined, but what are Sorites, b. ii. ch. iv. 7. regarded as its essential parts, whether Difference {Differentia) The formal or physical or logical, b. ii. ch. v. 6. distinguishing part of the essence of a Evidence of Christianity, App. No. III. Species, b. ii. ch. v. 4. Example use of, implies a universal Dilemma. complex kind of conditional premiss, b. iv. ch. i. 2, is not what, syllogism, having more than one strictly speaking, deters, b. iii, 10. Antecedent in the Major Premiss, and Exception, proof of a rule, b. ii. ch. v. 6. a disjunctive Minor, b. ii. ch. iv. 5. Exclusive Figure, the second Figure, so Discovery of Truth two kinds of, b. iv. called, b. ii. ch. iii. 4. ch. ii. 1. Extreme The Subject and Predicate of Discourse. The third operation of the a Proposition are called its Extremes mind. Reasoning, b. ii. ch. i. 1. or Terms, being, as it were, the two Disjunctive Proposition one which boundaries, having the copula (in is consists of two or more categoricals, regular order) placed between them. feo stated as to imply that some one of In speaking of a syllogism, the word them must be true. syllogism is is often understood to imply the excalled disjunctive, the reasoning of tremes of the Conclusion, b. ii. ch. i. 2. which turns on such a proposition, Fallacy. Any argument, or apparent b. ii. ch. iv. 4. argument, which professes to be deciDistributed \s applied to a Term that is sive of the matter at issue, while in

3. Contrary terms, b. ii. ch. v. 1. Converse, b. ii. ch. ii. 4. Conversion of a Proposition is the transposition of the terms, so that the Subject is made the Predicate, and vice versa, b. ii. ch. ii. 4. Copula. That part of a Proposition which affirms or denies the Predicate of the Subject : viz. is, or is not, expressed or implied, b. ii. ch. i. 2. Cross-divisions, b. ii. ch. v. 5 and 6. Definite terms, b. ii. ch. v. 1.
ii.

same terms,

b.

Fallacy of, b. iii. 11. Drift of a proposition, b. ii. ch. iv. I. Elliptical expressions apt to lead to ambiguity, b. iii. 10. Enstatic'Fig^nre, the third Figure, so
Division.

called, b.

Enihymeme An argument having one Premiss expressed, and the other

ii.

ch.

iii.

4.

employed in

its

full extent,

so as to

reality

it is

not, b.

ii.

ch. v. 4.


INDEX.
False m
its strict sense, denotes the quality of a Proposition wliich states something not as it is, b. ii. ch. ii. 1. Figure of a Syllogism denotes the situation of its Middle-term in reference to the Extremes of the Conclusion

267
except into
b. iv. ch.
ii.

subdivided,
b.
ii.

individuals,
1.

ch. v. 4.

Information.

Ignoratia-elencJii

fallacy

of,

b.

iii.

15

19.
Inseparable

The Major and Minor Terms,

ch.
iii.

b.

ii.

4.

Accident is that which cannot be separated from the individual it belongs to, though it may from the
Species, b.

JForm fallacies
Generalization.

The act of comprehendcommon name

several ob-

in, b.

iii.

and

7.

ing under a

some point which we abstract from each of them, and which

jects agx-eeing in

ii. 1. fallacy of. b. iii. 9. Interrogation Irrelevant-conclusion fallacy of, b. ilL

Instruction.

ii.

ch. v. 4.

b. iv. ch.

15-19.

that
b.
ii.

common name
ch. V. 2.

serves to indicate,
is

Genws. APredicable which

considered

as the material part of the Species of which it is affirmed, b. ii. ch. v. 3. Sume. Essay on Miracles, b. i. 3, Note; and Appendix I. Art. Experience. Coincidence with some Christian

writers,

Appendix

III.

is one which Hi/pothetical Proposition asserts not absolutely, but under an

hypothesis, indicated by a conjunction. An hypothetical Syllogism is one of

Judgment. The second operation of the mind, wherein we pronounce mentally on the agreement and disagreement of two of the notions obtained by simple Apprehension, b. ii. ch. i. 1. Knowledge. h. iv. ch. ii. 2. Note. Language an indispensable instrument for reasoning, Introd. 5. Logic, conversant about, b. ii. ch. i, 2. Limitation See "Per Accidens." Locke notions of Syllogism, Introd. 3. Logical definition is that which assigns the Genus and Difference of the Spe-

which the reasoning depends on such

a proposition,
Idea,

cies defined, b.

" abstract,"

b.

ii.

ch. iv. 2.

(supposed) Introd.

and b. iv. ch. v. 1 and 2. is that in which the Illative Conversion truth of the Converse follows from the

5,

truth of the Exposita, or Proposition given, b. ii. ch. ii. 4. The Matter of a Proposition Impossible. is so called when the extremes altogether disagree, b. ii. ch. ii. 1,

Logomachy. b. iv. ch. iv. 12. Major term of a Syllogism is the Predicate of the Conclusion. The Major Premiss is the one which contains the Major term. In Hypothetical Syllogisms, the Hypothetical Premiss is called the Major, b. it ch. iii. 2, and

ii.

ch. v. 6.

b.

ii.

ch. iv. 2,

Matter of a proposition the nature of the connexion of its extreme, b. ii.

ch.
13.
ii.

Indefinite

Ambiguity of, Appendix II. Proposition is one which has

for its Subject a

3. Fallacies in, b.
b. b.
iii.

iii.

and

Common-term without Metaphor.

or

any sign to indicate distribution non-distribution, b. ii. ch. ii. 2.

Metonymy.

iii.

10. 10.

Indefinite Terms, b. ii. ch. v. 1. Indirect reduction of Syllogisms in the last three Figures, b. ii. ch. iii. 6. Individual. object which is, in the

Middle term of a categorical Syllogismis that with which the two extremes
of the conclusion are separately compared, b. ii. ch. iii. 2, and b. ii. ch. iii.

An

strict

and primary

sense,

one,

4. and Minor term of a categorical Syllogismis

consequently cannot be logically divided; whence the name, b. ii. ch. v. 5. Induction. A kind of argument which

the Subject of the conclusion.

The

Minor Premiss is that which contains the Minor term. In Hypothetical

Syllogisms, the Categorical Premiss is called the IMinor, b. ii. ch. iii. 2, and
b.
ii.

infers, respecting a whole class, what has been ascertained respecting one or

more
ch.
Infer.
i.

individuals of that class, b.

1.

iv.

ch. iv. 2.

To

Modal
draw
a
conclusion

from

1.

granted premises, b. iv. ch. See Prove. Infima Species is that which

iii.

categorical proposition one is asserts that the Predicate exists in the Subject in a certain mode or manner, b. ii. ch. ii. 1, and b. ii. ch.

which

is

not

iv.

1.


2GS
Mood of

INDEX.

a catcc^orical Syllogism is the Postulate a form in wliich a Definition may be stated, b. ii. ch. v. 6. designation of its three propositions, in the order in which they stand, Predicaments, b. iv. ch.ii. 1. according to their quantity and quality, Predicate of a Proposition is that Term which is affirmed or denied of tha b. ii. cli. iii. 4. other, b. ii. ch. i. 2. Necessary matter of a proposition is the essential or invariable agreement Predicable. Term which can be affir* 3. matively predicated of several others, of its terms, b. ii. ch. ii. Neces-

b. ii. ch. v. 2. ambiguity of, Appendix, No. I. Negation conversion by (otherwise call- Premiss A proposition employed establish a certain conclusion, b. ed conversion by contraposition,) b. ii.

sary,

to
ii,

ch.

ii.

4.

one Privative terms, b. ii. ch. v. 1. which 'asserts the disagreement of its Probable arguments, b. iii. 11 and 14. extremes, b. ii. ch. ii= 1. P?-o/?e?--na?Hes ambiguity of, b. iii. 10. Negative terms, b. ii. ch. v. 1. Property. A Predicable which denotes New Truths of two kinds, b. iv. ch. ii. something essentially conjoined to the
iV^^a^ii-e categorical proposition
is

ch.

iii.

1.

Nominal Definition is one which ex- Proposition. A sentence which asserts, plains only the meaning of the term i.e. affirms or denies, b. ii. ch. ii. 1. defined, and nothing more of the Prove. To adduce Premises Avhich nature of the thing signified by that establish the truth of a certain conclu-

essence of the Species,

b.

ii.

ch. v. 3.

than is implied by the Term sion, b. iv. ch. iii. 1. itself to every one who understands Proximum Genus of any Species is the the meaning of it, b. ii. ch. v. 6, and nearest [least remote] to which it b. iv. ch. ii. 3. can be referred, b. ii. ch. v. 4. Nominalism. b. iv. ch. v. Introd. 5, Pure categorical proposition is one and b. ii. ch. v. 4. which asserts simply that the Predicate Objections fallacy of, b. iii. 17. is, or is not, contained in the Subject,

Term

mind three laid down by logical writers, b. ii. ch. 1. 1. Opposed. Two propositions are said to be opposed to each other, when, having the same Subject and Predicate,
Operations of the

they

differ either in

quantity or quality,

b. ii. ch. ii. 3. Opposition of terms, b. ii. ch. v. 1. Ostensive reduction of Syllogisms in the last three figures, b. ii ch. iii. 5.

or both,

Paronymous loords, b, iii. 8. Part logically. Species are called Parts of the Genus they come under, and

b. ii. ch. ii. 1, and b. ii. ch. iv. 1. Quality of a Proposition is its affirming This is the Quality of or denying. the expression, which is, in Logic, the The Quality essential circumstance. of the matter is, its being true or false; which is, in Logic, accidental, being essential only in respect of the subjectmatter treated of, b. ii. ch. ii. 1. Quantity of a Proposition is the extent in which its subject is taken; viz. to stand for the whole, or for a part only

Species really, the Genus is a Part of the Species, and the Species, of the Individual, b.
ii.

individuals,

parts

of

the

Question.

ch. ii. 1. to be established as a Conclusion, stated in an interro-

of

its Significates, b.

That which
ii.

ii.

is

gative form, b.

ch.

ii.

4.

ch. V. 5.

Particular Proposition is one in which the Predicate is afiirmed or denied of some part only of the subject, b. ii. ch. ii. 1. Realisnu Introd. 3. b. iv. ch. v. Per Accidens. Conversion of a proposi- Reasoning General Signs necessary for, tion is so called when the Quantity is Introd. 5. changed, b. ii. ch. ii. 4. Reduction of syllogisms in the last three Physical definition is that which asFigures, to the first, so as to fall under signs the parts into which the thing the Dictum, b. ii. ch. iii. 5 and 6, defined can be actually divided, b. ii. of hypothetical syllogisms to cate-

Real definition

one which explains the nature of the thinir defined beyond what is necessarily understood by the Term, b. ii. ch. v. 6.
is

ch. V. 6. Positive terms, b.

gorical, b.
ii.

ch. v.

1.

References

fallacy

ii.

ch. iv. 6.
of, b. iii.

14,

INDEX.
Refutation

269

of an argnment,

liable to

be

ftiUaciously used, b. iii. ^ 6 and 7. Relative terms, b. ii. cb. v. 1. Secondary use of tbe word, b. iSame.

Quality. Of these, the Universal is the Subalternant, and the Particular

the Subalternate,
iv.

b.

ii.

ch.

ii.

3,

and

b.

ii.

ch. v. 4.

is that which is not considered as a Species of any higher 1. Genus, b. ii. ch. v. 4. Signs general, indispensable for reasonSyllogism. ing, Introd. 5. An argument expressed in strict logical form; viz. so that its Singular term is one which stands for Singular proposiconclusiveness is manifest from the one individual. structure of the expression alone, tion is one which has for its subject without any regard to the meaning of Singular term, or a common either a the Terms, b. ii. ch. iii. J term limited to one Individual by a singular sign, e.g. "This," b. ii. ch. i. Syncategorematic words are such as cannot singly express a Term, but only 3 ; b. ii. ch. ii. 2, and b. ii. ch. v. a part of a Term, b. ii. ch. i. 3. 1. A a abridged form of stating a Term. The Subject or Predicate of a Sorites. Proposition, b. ii. ch. i. 2. series of Syllogisms, of which the Conclusion of each is a Premiss of the Tendency ambiguity of. Appendix, No. I. Thaumatrope, b. iii. 11. succeeding, b. ii. ch. iv. 7. predicable which is consid- True Proposition is one which states Species. what really is, b. ii. ch. ii. 1. ered as expressing the whole essence of the individuals of which it is Truth new two kinds of, b. iv. ch. ii. '~~ peculiar affirmed, b. ii. ch. v. 3, 2, and Appendix, No. I. sense of, in Natural History, b. iv. Tucker his Light of Nature, Append. I. Art. xi. ch. V. 1. Stewart, Professor Dugald, his mistake Universal Proposition is one whose Predicate is affirmed or denied of the respecting Aristotle's ^^ Dictum" b. i. whole of the Subject, b. ii. ch. ii. 1. instance of fallacy from, b. iii. 4 Univocal. Common term is called 14. Univocal in respect of those things to Subaltern Species and Genus is that which it is applicable in the same which is both a Species of some higher signification, b. ii. ch. v. 1. Genus, and a Genus in respect of the Species into which it is divided. Sub- Wallis, Professor, his remark on jests, b. iii. 20. altern opposition, is between a Universal and a Particular of tbe same Waii^ his notion of Logic, lutrod. 3.

ch. V. 1, and Append. No. L of a term, b. iii. 10. Separable accident is one wbich may be separated from the individual, b. iii. Introd. Signijicate ^The several things signified by a common Term are its significates
/Seconc? intention

Subcontrary opposition is between two Particulars, the Affirmative and the Negative, b. ii. ch. ii. 3. Subject of a pi'oposition is that term of which the other is affirmed or denied,

b.

ii.

ch

ii.

2.

Summum Genus

(Significata), b.

ii.

ch.

ii.

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