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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA DENNY JONES, Petitioner,

v. KENNETH DETZNER, in his official capacity as Florida Secretary of State, Respondent. _____________________________________/ RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE Respondent, Florida Secretary of State Kenneth W. Detzner (Secretary), pursuant to Rule 1.630, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby responds to the Courts Order to Respond to Petition dated December 4, 2012. The election has passed and the Court cannot grant Petitioner the relief he seeks. Regardless, the Secretary fulfilled his ministerial duty to certify the Justices for placement on the ballot. The Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto should be dismissed as moot or, alternatively, denied as without merit. I. INTRODUCTION A. The Petition Petitioner originally filed1 his Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto in the Florida Supreme Court on November 5, 2012. Petitioner challenges the Secretarys determination on April 20, 2012 that Justices Lewis, Pariente and Quince qualified for placement on the November 6 general election ballot. Petitioner does not challenge the Justices eligibility to hold office. Pet. at 7. Petitioner seeks issuance of writ directing the Secretary to demonstrate his authority to[:] identify the Justices as qualified; refuse to disqualify the Justices upon disclosure of
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CASE NO.: 2012 CA 3694

The Secretary was served with process on December 12, 2012.

verified facts; and to assist the Justices in facially meeting the statutory deadline to submit their candidate qualifying documents. Pet. at 14. Petitioner also seeks a writ to preclude the tabulation of votes and certification of the elections. Pet. at 46. Respondent is the Secretary of State who is the head of the Department of State, 20.10, Fla. Stat, and the chief election officer of the state, 97.012, Fla. Stat.2 B. The Qualifying Period and General Election In order for a candidate for judicial officeto be qualified, the Division of Elections must receive several items by the end of the qualifying period, which was noon, April 20, 2012. 105.031(5)(a), Fla. Stat. Forms for these items have been adopted by Rule. Id. at (1); Rule 1S-2.0001, F.A.C. (incorporating the qualifying forms). 3 The required items and corresponding forms are: the candidates oath and loyalty oath on Form DS-DE 26; form for the appointment of campaign treasurer and designation of campaign depository on Form DS-DE 9; and full and public disclosure of financial interests on CE Form 6. 4 105.031(5)(a), Fla. Stat. Judicial candidates must also file a statement of candidate for judicial office on DSDE 83 within 10 days of filing the form for the appointment of campaign treasurer and designation of campaign depository. 105.031(5)(a)4., Fla. Stat.

Contrary to Petitioners assertion, the Secretary is not a member of the Governors cabinet, Pet. at 8. Art. IV, 4(a), Fla. Const. (There shall be a cabinet composed of an attorney general, a chief financial officer, and a commissioner of agriculture). 3 Largely in footnote, Petitioner argues at length that the Divisions rule and incorporated forms, as well as the Florida Commission on Ethics rule and CE Form 6, are invalid. Pet. n. 8-9, 12-13, 15-16, 18, 21, 24-26, pp. 36-38. An administrative rule has the force of law however, and can only be declared invalid by rule challenge under Chapter 120. See Sw. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Save the Manatee Club, 773 So. 2d 594, 598 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Dept of Revenue v. Novoa, 745 So. 2d 378, 380 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). The judicial qualifying statute explicitly states that Filing shall be on forms provided for that purpose by the Division of Elections. 105.031(1), Fla. Stat. The financial disclosure must be on a form prescribed by the Florida Commission on Ethics. 112.347, Fla. Stat. 4 CE Form 6 is a form adopted by the Florida Commission on Ethics. Rule 34-8.002(1), F.A.C. 2

On January 12, 2012, the Division received each of the Justices form for the appointment of campaign treasurer and designation of campaign depository, and statement of candidate for judicial office on Forms DS-DE 9 and 83. Exhibits A at 1-2 (qualifying papers of Justice Lewis), B, at 1-2 (qualifying papers of Justice Pariente), and C, at 1-2 (qualifying papers of Justice Quince); Pet. at 18-19. Before noon on April 20, 2012, the Division received each Justices remaining qualifying forms, the candidates oath and loyalty oath on Form DS-DE 26, and full and public disclosure of financial interests on CE Form 6. Exhibits A, at 6-10, B, at 6-61, and C, at 6-10; Pet. at 10. The Justices were each determined to be qualified on April 20, 2012, and the Secretary certified their names for appearance on the general election ballot on September 6, 2012. Exhibit D, at 3. The general election was held on November 6, 2012. Votes were tabulated, canvassed, and reported by local elections officials. 102.071, 102.111, and 102.141, Fla. Stat. Each of the Justices was retained in office by more than the required majority of the qualified electors voting within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, i.e. Florida. Art. V, 10, Fla. Const. Justice Lewis received 67.51% of the votes cast, Justice Pariente received 67.99% of the votes cast, and Justice Quince received 67.72% of the votes cast. 5 The Canvassing Commission, not the Secretary, certified both the returns of the election for these offices and the results on November 20, 2012. 102.111, Fla. Stat.; Exhibits E, at 1, and F, at 1. II. THE PETITION SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS MOOT An issue is moot when the controversy has been so fully resolved that a judicial determination can have no actual effect. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass'n
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Election data is available on the Division of Elections website. The number of votes received by and percentage of votes cast for each Justice is available at: http://enight.elections.myflorida.com/Judicial/SupremeCourtJustice/ (last accessed on December 17, 2012). 3

v. Florida Div. of Admin. Hearings, 948 So. 2d 705, 710 (Fla. 2007) citing Godwin v. State, 593 So. 2d 211, 212 (Fla. 1992). This occurs, inter alia, where by a change of circumstances prior to the appellate decision, an intervening event makes it impossible for the court to grant a party any effectual relief. Montgomery v. Dept of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 468 So. 2d 1014, 1016 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). It is the function of a judicial tribunal to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions on moot questions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue. Id. at 1016-17. The general election, which included the merit retention races Petitioner seeks to affect, was held on November 6, 2012, one day after Petitioner filed suit. As a result, the controversy in the instant case whether or not the Secretary properly certified Justices Lewis, Pariente and Quince as duly-qualified became moot. See Tyler v. Peacock, 124 So. 463, 464 (Fla. 1929) (dismissing post-election appeal concerning name sought to be placed on ballot as moot); Matter of Finno, 546 So. 2d 805, 807 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Chafetz v. Greene, 203 So. 2d 18, 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967); Gill v. City of North Miami Beach, 156 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963). Moreover, the remaining relief Petitioner seeks as to the tabulation of votes and certification of the results, although not within the Secretarys authority, is moot as well. [I]t is too late to attack the validity of an election after the people have voted. Polly v. Navarro, 457 So.2d 1140, 1143-44 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). Petitioners own actions prevented timely resolution of this matter. Petitioner did not move to expedite this action or even timely file. Indeed, the Petition was untimely before it even became moot. The Secretary, through the Division of Elections, determined that each Justice duly-qualified on April 20, 2012. Petitioner however waited 199 days to file this action on the day before the election.

Indeed, a substantial number of cases in Florida hold that remedies are available to challenge whether a candidate has properly qualified to appear on a ballot, and to seek removal of that candidate's name from the ballot, BEFORE the election is held. Levey v. Dijols, 990 So. 2d 688, 694 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (collecting cases). Another action, to which Petitioner was not a party, also challenged the Secretarys determination that the Justices duly-qualified. See Long v. Detzner, No. 2012 CA 1980 (2nd Jud. Cir.). 6 That action however, was filed on June 27, 2012, 68 days after the Secretarys determination was made. Moreover, actions challenging the Secretarys determination around June 8 as to other candidates qualification to be on the August 14 primary election ballot were brought less than a week after that determination. Moon v. Detzner, No. 2012 CA 1811 (2nd Jud. Cir.) (filed on June 12); Hayden v. Detzner, No. 2012 CA 1818 (2nd Jud. Cir.) (filed on June 13); Weeks v. Detzner, No. 2012 CA 1858 (docketed on June 13). All of these actions were timely resolved by the Court. 7 Even if Petitioner were to succeed on the merits which he should not and even if Petitioner timely filed this action which he did not the intervening event of the general election makes it impossible for the Court to grant Petitioner the relief he seeks. See Montgomery, 468 So. 2d at 1016. The action should be dismissed as moot. See id. III. A. ALTERNATIVELY, THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED A Writ of Quo Warranto is Improper

Quo warranto means by what authority and a writ of quo warranto has historically been used to determine whether a state officer or agency has improperly exercised a power or right derived from the State. Fla. House of Reps. v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 607 (Fla. 2008). A
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Petitioner is represented in this action by the same attorneys who represented the plaintiffs in Long v. Detzner. 7 Weeks v. Detzner is currently on appeal. See Weeks v. Detzner, No. 1D12-4243. The Secretary has moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. 5

petition for writ of quo warranto may be brought by a citizen, but this, like all other rules of law has its limitations. State ex rel. Pooser v. Wester, 170 So. 736, 738 (Fla. 1936). A petitioner must act seasonably and appropriately. Id. at 738-39 (rejecting petition where, inter alia, petitioner filed less than one month prior to the general election); see also Almas Italian & Seafood Restaurant v. Jones, 627 So. 2d 605, 606 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (denying petition for writ of mandamus where [a]lthough the issues presented by the motion for recusal have been known to petitioners for some time, they waited until immediately before the scheduled final hearing to seek relief). Moreover, extraordinary relief of a writ will not be granted where the relief sought will result in confusion and disorder and will produce an injury to the public which outweighs the individual right of the complainant to have the relief he seeks. Id. at 738-39. In Pooser, the relators sought to void two primary elections on the basis that more than half the voterswere not qualified and therefore voted illegally. Id. at 738. The relators waited more than four months to seek relief however, and at the time the information was filed, the general electionwas less than a month in the future. Id. at 739. Moreover, the Supreme Court saw nothing that could result but confusion and disorder if the election were voided, even if most votes were illegal. Id. Indeed, the state has a well-recognized interest in avoiding chaotic elections. Boudreau v. Winchester, 642 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994; Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989)(A State indisputably has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election process). Confidence in the integrity of our electoral processes is essential to the functioning of our participatory democracy. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 at 4 (2006) (allowing the impending election to proceed without suspending challenged voter identification rules because of the voter

confusion and uncertainty that would result). The Supreme Court therefore granted the motion to discharge the show cause order issued in Pooser, dismissing the action. Here, Petitioner waited almost seven months and filed the day before the election to challenge the Justices appearance on the ballot. Petitioner does not challenge the election that has now passed. 8 Each of the Justices has been retained by over 67 percent of the vote. Nothing but chaos could result from voiding the Justices retention, which is essentially what Petitioner asks of this Court. The Court should deny the Petition for the same reasons the Supreme Court rejected the petition in Pooser. B. The Petition Fails on the Merits

Recognizing the unique nature of the election process, Florida courts have traditionally shown deference to the judgment of election officials. Cobb v. Thurman, 957 So. 2d 638, 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). The Florida Legislature has vested the Secretary with the general supervision and administration of the election laws, and specifically found the Division of Elections to be capable and competent to render opinions regarding interpretations of the Election Codes provisions. 15.13, 106.23(2), Fla. Stat. An agencys interpretation of the statute that it is charged with enforcing is entitled to great deference. GTC, Inc. v. Edgar, 967 So. 2d 781, 785 (Fla. 2007). The Supreme Court will not depart from the Divisions contemporaneous construction of the statute it is charged with enforcing unless the construction is clearly unauthorized or erroneous. Id. (internal citations omitted). Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that, This is how government operates. The decisions of public administrators made within the ambit of their
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Nor could Petitioner challenge the election. The grounds and timing for an election contest are strictly limited to those specified in section 102.168, Florida Statutes. See Norman v. Ambler, 46 So. 3d 178, 181 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Levey v. Dijols, 990 So. 2d 688, 693 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). Petitioners challenge would be late and failure to qualify would provide no basis. 7

responsibilities are presumptively correct and will be upheld, if factually accurate and absent some compelling circumstances, clear error or overriding legal basis. State ex rel. Siegendorf v. Stone, 266 So. 2d 345, 346 (Fla. 1972) (upholding Secretarys determination that candidate dulyqualified because candidate substantially complied with the requirements). Petitioner challenges the Secretarys authority to notify the Justices, during the qualifying period, that qualifying documents were missing, determine that the Justices duly-qualified, and certify their names for placement on the ballot. Quite simply, the Secretary is authorized to do all of these things pursuant to section 105.031, Fla. Stat. and his determination should be given great deference and upheld. 1. The Secretary may notify candidates of missing qualifying papers Petitioner argues that the Secretary, through the Division of Elections, had no authority to notify the Justices that some of the required items had not yet been received. Pet. at 41-44; id. at 12-13. Petitioner argues that the Secretary is not permitted to contact candidates during the qualifying period regarding deficiencies unless some qualifying papers had been received during the qualifying period or 14 days prior. Pet. at 41, 43-44. Section 105.031(5)(b) does not prohibit the Secretary from contacting candidates regarding deficient qualifying papers however, but rather may impose a duty upon the Secretary to contact them if some items are missing, if the other papers were received during the qualifying period or 14 days prior, or earlier. 105.031(5)(b), Fla. Stat.; see Sancho v. Joanos, 715 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (interpreting the same language in the general candidate qualifying statute, section 99.061(7)(b), to impose a duty to contact that may arise under either situation); Browning v. Young, 993 So. 2d 64, 67-68 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (explaining that in Joanos the court held that such a duty exists with respect to qualifying papers that are submitted for filing).

Section 105.031(5)(b) states that the filing officer shall make a reasonable effort to notify the candidate of missing or incomplete items if the filing officer receives qualifying papers that do not include all items prior to the last day of qualifying. 105.031(5)(b), Fla. Stat. The Division of Elections received each of the Justices Forms DS-DE 9 and 83 prior to the last day of qualifying on January 12, 2012. Exhibits A, at 1-2 B, at 1-2 and C, at 1-2; Pet. at 18-19. Form DS-DE 26 and CE Form 6 had not yet been received by the Division just prior to the end of the qualifying period however, and the Division therefore made a reasonable effort to notify the candidates. See Pet. Appx. at 320, ll. 8-15; id. at 321, ll. 15-22 (transcript of FDLE interview of Elisabeth H. Goodner). Section 105.031(5)(b) did not prohibit the Division from doing so. To the contrary, it may have required such notification. The Secretary, through the Division of Elections was authorized and not prohibited by section 105.031(5)(b) to make the reasonable effort to notify the Justices of the missing Form DS-DE 26 and CE Form 6. The petition for writ of prohibition should be denied. 2. The Justices timely filed all required qualifying papers Petitioner argues that two of the forms submitted by the Justices were early and therefore untimely, requiring the Secretary to determine the Justices failed to qualify. Pet. at 11 & n.4; 1828. Specifically, Petitioner argues that since each of the three Justices failed to submit the required completed form for the appointment of campaign treasurer and designation of campaign depository for candidate and statement of candidate for judicial office during the qualifying period or 14 days prior when qualifying papers may be accepted for filing during the qualifying period, the Secretary was mandated to determinethat they had not qualified Pet. at 24-25. This ignores the plain text of section 105.031 however, which states that such items must be received by the Division of Elections by the end of the qualifying period, which

they undisputedly were on January 12, 2012. 105.031(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added); Pet. at 18-19. Indeed, in letters dated January 17, 2012, the Division not only acknowledged receipt of each Justices Form DS-DE 9, but also confirmed that each Justices form was placed on file in our office. Exhibits A, at 3, B, at 3, C at 3. It is of no moment for the purposes of qualifying that the Justices Form DS-DE 9 and Form DS-DE 83 were filed before the qualifying period began. See Pet. at 25-26. Indeed, section 105.031 requires that Form DS-DE 9 be received by the filing officer as required by s. 106.021, 105.031(5), Fla. Stat., which states that the form be filed with the officer before whom such candidate is required to qualify prior to qualifying, 106.021(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Form DS-DE 83 must be filed within 10 days thereafter. 105.031(5)(a)4., Fla. Stat. Moreover, Form DS-DE 9 must be filed before any campaign contribution is accepted and before any expenditure is made. 106.021(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (No person shall accept any contribution or make any expenditureunless such person has appointed a campaign treasurer and designated a primary campaign depository). The Justices each correctly filed their Form DS-DE 9 on January 12 prior to accepting the contributions and making the expenditures reported in the January 12, 2012 March 31, 2012 filing period. Exhibit G. 9 Section 105.031 is unambiguous. In order for each Justice to qualify, the forms provided for that purpose, must have been received by the filing officer, the Division of Elections, by the end of the qualifying period. 105.031(1), (5)(a), Fla. Stat. Each Justices Form DS-DE 9 must have been received by the Division of Elections before the end of the qualifying period and Form DS-DE 83, within 10 days after that. Id. Section 105.031 simply
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Each Justice reported contributions received beginning on January 21 and expenditures made beginning on January 31. See Searchable Campaign Finance Database (Contribution Records and Expenditure Records) available at: http://election.dos.state.fl.us/campaign-finance/camfinance-index.shtml. 10

does not state that the forms be filed during the qualifying period or 14 days prior as Petitioner insists. To hold otherwise would require the addition of words, which the Court cannot do. Hayes v. State, 750 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1999). Moreover, section 105.031s requirement that Form DS-DE 9 be filed by the end of the qualifying period and section 106.021s requirement that it be filed prior to qualifying are in harmony. Indeed, section 105.031 incorporates section

106.021s mandate that the form be filed prior to financing the campaign, possibly before the qualifying period begins. 105.031(5)(a)4., Fla. Stat. Each of the Justices timely filed both Form DS-DE 9 and Form DS-DE 83 on the same day, by the end of the qualifying period as required by section 105.031, Florida Statutes. The Secretary was authorized under section 105.031 to determine and certify the Justices as dulyqualified and a writ of prohibition should be denied on this basis. 3. The Secretary cannot look beyond the face of the qualifying papers The Secretarys charge under the constitution and statute does not extend to the substance or correctness or enforcement of a sworn compliance with the law with matters in pais, as it were. State ex rel. Shevin v. Stone, 279 So. 2d 17, 22 (Fla. 1973); Op. Div. of Elections 78-30 (Aug. 3, 1978) (stating that [s]uch an official merely examines the face of the qualifying papers presented and, if in proper order, accepts them). Indeed, the Secretary of State is without authority to pass judgment on questions dehors the filing instruments concerning the qualifications of candidates. State ex rel. Cherry v. Stone, 265 So. 2d 56, 58 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972); Davis ex rel. Taylor v. Crawford, 116 So. 41 (Fla. 1928); State ex rel. Hall v. Hildebrand, 168 So. 531 (Fla. 1936); State ex rel. Siegendorf v. Stone, 266 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 1972) (judicial candidate); Schurr v. Sanchez-Gronlier, 937 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (same).

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Petitioner argues however, that the Secretary should have looked beyond Justice Parientes facially complete Form CE 6 to discover all W-2s were not attached, even though the source and amount of income reported on the W-2s was attached. Pet. 28-31; Exhibit B at 57 (indicating the amount and sources of income). Additionally, Petitioner argues that the Secretary should have judged the accuracy or veracity of financial information sworn by Justices Lewis and Pariente on their Forms CE 6. Pet. at 31-41. Petitioner further argues that the determination should have been based on amended forms received after the Secretary determined that the Justices had duly-qualified. Id. at 32-33 (listing changes from the original forms, which almost all concern increasing or decreasing reported amounts, not changing sources); id. at 34 (stating that the amended and supplemental forms strongly indicate[] that the original[]s were deficient). Moreover, Petitioner later argues that the amended forms are not qualifying papers that the Secretary may even consider. Pet. at 36 (stating that the Secretary may not rely on CE Form 6X as an additional requirement for qualifying). The Secretary had no authority to perform Petitioners suggested investigations. Once the candidate states his compliance, under oath, the Secretarys ministerial determination of Eligibility for the office is at an end. Shevin v. Stone, 279 So. 2d at 22. The Secretary is not authorized to determine the correctness of the candidates statement of compliance in determining the candidates qualification. Id.; see also Cherry, 265 So. 2d at 58 (denying writ of mandamus seeking to compel Secretary to determine whether Wright has complied with the Resign-to-Run Law because we cannot issue a writ commanding him to do that which he is powerless to do). Justices Lewis and Pariente each filed a Form CE 6, which is not a Division

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of Elections form and implicates requirements not enforced by the Division of Elections10, which appeared facially complete; neither form was missing any entries. Even if Justices Lewis and Pariente only substantially complied11 with the qualifying statute, the Secretarys determination would be correct. See Siegendorf, 266 So. 2d 345. Indeed, the judgment of officials duly charged with carrying out the election process should be presumed correct if reasonable and not in derogation of the law. Krivanek v. The Take Back Tampa Political Comm., 625 So. 2d 840, 844-45 (Fla. 1993). The Secretary was authorized under section 105.031 and, alternatively, Siegendorf as well, to determine and certify the Justices as duly-qualified and the petition for writ of quo warranto should be denied on this basis. 4. The Secretary does not tabulate votes or certify the returns of elections Petitioner also seeks a writ to preclude the tabulation of the votes and certification of the elections of the Justices. Pet. at 46; id. at 2, 5, 7-8, 13-14. The Secretary is not a member of the Florida Elections Canvassing Commission, the entity responsible for certifying the returns of elections. 102.111(1), Fla. Stat. Nor does the Secretary tabulate votes for any race. See

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Nevertheless, the Commission on Ethics contemplates incomplete or incorrect information being filed and therefore permits later amendment of the form. 112.3145(9), Fla. Stat. 11 Petitioner misstates the Secretarys arguments in previous qualifying cases, as well as the law regarding substantial compliance. Pet. at n.19 (citing filings in Weeks v. Detzner, No. 2012 CA 1858 and Moon v. Detzner, No. 2012 CA 1811). As the court in those cases recognized, in Siegendorf, the [Florida Supreme] Court applied substantial compliance to justify the Secretarys determination to qualify the candidate, not to override it. Weeks, at 8 (Fla. 2d Jud. Cir. Aug. 8, 2012) (Order Granting Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment); Moon, at 8 ((Fla. 2d Jud. Cir. Jul. 30, 2012) (Order Granting Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment). Copies of the Orders are attached as Exhibits H and I. Candidates must strictly comply with qualifying requirements or risk being determined to have failed to qualify. The Secretarys determination that a candidate qualified where the candidate substantially complied however, will nevertheless be upheld. 13

102.071, Fla. Stat. The Secretary exercised no such authority. The petition for writ of quo warranto should be denied on this basis. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto should be dismissed as moot or, alternatively, denied as without merit. _____/s/ Ashley E. Davis_______________ ASHLEY E. DAVIS Assistant General Counsel Florida Bar No.: 48032 Ashley.Davis@DOS.MyFlorida.com Betty.Money@DOS.MyFlorida.com Stacey.Small@DOS.MyFlorida.com Florida Department of State R.A. Gray Building 500 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 (850) 245-6536 (850) 245-6127 facsimile Counsel for Florida Secretary of State Kenneth W. Detzner

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was sent by email this 26th day of December, 2012 to: Eric S. Haug eric@erichaug.com Shannon L. Goessling pro hac vice admission pending Shannon@southeasternlegal.org amy@southeasternlegal.org jayers@southeasternlegal.org Counsel for Petitioner John A. DeVault, III jad@bedellfirm.com ghw@bedellfirm.com Henry M. Coxe, III hmc@bedellfirm.com gad@bedellfirm.com Michael E. Lockamy mel@bedellfirm.com jbam@bedellfirm.com Counsel for Intervenors

_______/s/ Ashley E. Davis__________ Attorney

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