POLITICAL LAW REVIEW III. LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS C. PERSONNEL MOVEMENTS AND DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS 1.

PRUDENCIO QUIMBO GERVACIO et al. 466 SCRA 277 (2005) v. ACTING OMBUDSMAN MARGARITO

warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. Political Law That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact explicitly provided by Section 24 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws. As stated in Sec. 24, preventive suspension is not a punishment or penalty for misconduct in office but is considered to be a preventive measure. Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under preventive suspension is not considered part of the actual penalty of suspension. So Section 25 of the same Rule XIV provides that the period within which a public officer or employee charged is placed under preventive suspension shall not be considered part of the actual penalty of suspension imposed upon the employee found guilty. Clearly, service of the preventive suspension cannot be credited as service of penalty. 2. VILMA E. ROMAGOS vs. METRO CEBU WATER DISTRICT, EDITHA D. LUZANO and DULCE M. ABANILLA G.R. No. 156100 September 12, 2007 FACTS: 1. Metro Cebu Water District (MCWD) employed Vilma E. Romagos (Romagos) as Clerk-Processor B. 2. On August 9, 1999, MCWD barred Romagos from entering the work premises unless she undergoes psychiatric treatment and is certified by her doctor to be mentally fit to work. Thereafter, MCWD informed Romagos that she was being dropped from the rolls for mental incapacity. 3. Romagos questioned the procedure and factual basis of her dismissal. ISSUE: Whether there was proper procedure and substantial basis for MCWD to declare Romagos mentally unfit to work and drop her from the rolls. HELD: No. 1. Before an officer or employee may be dropped from the rolls for mental incapacity, the following elements and process must obtain: first, that it has been observed that the subject officer or employee has been behaving abnormally for an extended period; second, that it has been established through substantial evidence that such abnormal behavior manifests a continuing mental disorder and incapacity to work; third, that a written notice is issued by the subjects immediate supervisor, describing the formers continuing mental disorder and incapacity to work and citing the reports of his co-workers or immediate supervisor, as confirmed by the head of office; and finally, that another notice is issued by the appointing authority

DOCTRINE: Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative investigation, not a penalty or punishment. FACTS: Petitioner Prudencio C. Quimbo, Provincial Engineer of Samar, was administratively charged for harassment and oppression by Elmo V. Padaon (Padaon), a general foreman. During the pendency of the case, he was placed under preventive suspension without pay. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman found Quimbo guilty of oppression and recommended that he be suspended from office for a period of eight (8) months without pay. This was approved by the Ombudsman. The Court of Appeals (CA) found Quimbo guilty of simple misconduct only and penalized him with suspension from office for a period of two (2) months without pay. Quimbo filed a Motion for Modification/Reconsideration calling attention to the fact that he had been on preventive suspension from March 18, 1998 to June 1, 1998 and praying that the order under reconsideration be modified to take into account the period of his PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION of 2 MONTHS and 17 DAYS WITHOUT PAY as part of the final penalty imposed. The Ombudsman clarified that preventive suspension is not a penalty but a preliminary step in an investigation; and that if after such investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated upon is found guilty warranting the imposition of penalty, then he shall accordingly be penalized. Such was affirmed by the CA. ISSUE: Whether or not the preventive suspension pending the investigation is a penalty. HELD: Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension as preventive measure and suspension as penalty. The distinction, by considering the purpose aspect of the suspensions, is readily cognizable as they have different ends sought to be achieved. Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. If after such investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts

or head of office, informing the subject of his separation from the service due to mental incapacity. 2. Thus, a declaration of mental disorder does not automatically translate to a judgment of mental incapacity to perform work. A window remains open for the affected officer or employee to counter opinion on his mental condition and to show that his ability to work remains unimpaired. Only then may the appointing authority or head of office decide on whether said officer or employee is no longer mentally capable of performing his work and should be discharged. These requirements are designed to obviate misuse of nondisciplinary modes of separation for petty vengeance or vicious harassment. 3. The procedure adopted by MCWD in dropping Romagos from the rolls substantially complied with the two-notice requirement of MC 40-98. MCWD issued to Romagos a letter, requiring her to undergo psychiatric evaluation. Although the letter was addressed to Romagos spouse (Mr. Romagos), she was sufficiently notified for she even replied to said letter. 4. However, the factual bases relied upon by MCWD in declaring Romagos mentally unfit to work appear inadequate as they failed to comply with the elements and process provided for in the MC 40-98. MCWD sufficiently established that Romagos suffers from a mental disorder. There is overwhelming evidence of this condition. The question, however, is whether MCWD sufficiently proved that Romagos mental condition has rendered her incapacitated to work as to justify her being dropped from the rolls. It did not. All that the 1989 and 1991 medical certifications established is that, during said periods, Romagos was diagnosed to be suffering from Major Depression. These certifications hardly prove that Romagos behavior manifests a continuing mental disorder and incapacity to work. 5. Another evidence of Romagos continuing capacity to work despite her mental condition is her performance ratings for 1996 and 1998. In both evaluations, Romagos work performance was rated "very satisfactory". Her ratee, Editha Luzano, even remarked about an improvement in her performance. 6. In sum, the CA gravely erred in affirming the dismissal of Romagos. While there is no question that at the time she was dropped from the rolls, she was suffering from a protracted mental disorder, the same did not render her incapable of performing her work. There was therefore an incomplete cause or justification to drop her from the rolls. Her separation from the service being invalid, she is entitled to reinstatement to her former position with payment of backwages. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. 3. YENKO v. GUNGON G.R. No. 165450 August 13, 2009 FACTS:

1. Raul Nestor C. Gungon, who holds professional career service eligibility, was extended a permanent appointment as Local Assessment Operations Officer III in the Assessors Office of the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila. 2. San Juan Municipal Administrator Francisco F. Yenko issued a Memorandum temporarily reassigning Gungon to the Public Order and Safety Office (POSO) of the said municipality in the exigency of the service. 3. Gungon, in compliance with the reassignment Memorandum, reported to the POSO. The officer-in-charge (OIC) of the POSO, Arnulfo Aguilar, issued a Memorandum requiring Gungon to report as Duty Agent, whose responsibility was "to conduct inspections within the municipal compound, apprehend any suspicious characters roaming within the vicinity of the municipal hall and compound," and setting his tour of duty at 12:01 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. from Monday to Friday. 4. Gungon protested his reassignment for being violative of the Administrative Code of 1987, which prohibits reassignment that results in reduction in rank, status or salary of an employee. He requested the recall of the Memorandum and his reinstatement to his position as Local Assessment Operations Officer III. He reported back to his office at the Municipal Assessors Office and continued to do so even if he was not given work there. 5. Gungon received from Yenko a Memorandum, which called his attention to his failure to report for duty at the POSO since the date of his reassignment. Gungon was informed that his action was a violation of Civil Service Rules which might constitute a ground for dismissal from the service. 6. In a Memorandum, Mayor Jinggoy Estrada informed Gungon that he was "considered dropped from the rolls because of [his] absence without official leave. 7. Gungon appealed the Memoranda. He alleged that the Municipal Administrator committed abuse of authority amounting to oppression in reassigning him from the Assessors Office, where he was working as Local Assessment Operations Officer III, to the POSO, where he would be required to work as a security guard, even if the Municipal Administrator knew that he never had the knowledge, background or training as a security guard. He also alleged that the Municipal Administrator violated the Civil Service Law when he effected the reassignment, because he knew that such personnel action was meant to demote, humiliate and subject him to ridicule, risk, harassment and undue injury rather than enhance the so-called "exigency of service." 8. The CSC dismissed Gungons appeal. His motion for reconsideration was denied. 10. Gungon filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which rendered a Decision in favor of Gungon.

ISSUE: Whether Gungons reassignment can be considered reduction in rank and status. HELD: YES. 1. SC agrees with the decision of the Court of Appeals that the reassignment of Gungon from the Municipal Assessors Office, where his primary function was that of land appraiser, to the POSO, where he was required to work as a security guard/duty agent, was void ab initio because it clearly involved a reduction in rank and status. The CSC affirmed the reduction in rank; petitioners Municipal Administrator Yenko and Mayor Estrada did not dispute it. Such reassignment is expressly prohibited by Executive Order No. 292. 2. Reassignments involving a reduction in rank, status or salary violate an employees security of tenure, which is assured by the Constitution, the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Security of tenure covers not only employees removed without cause, but also cases of unconsented transfers and reassignments, which are tantamount to illegal/constructive removal. 3. Since Gungons reassignment order was void ab initio, his alleged failure to report for duty at the POSO, where he was reassigned, had no legal basis. Gungon could not have incurred absences in the POSO, because his reassignment was void. Thus, the cause of his separation from the service, which was unauthorized absences from the post where he was reassigned, was not a valid cause for dismissing him from the service. 4. Republic of the Philippines v. Pacheco G.R No. 178021 January 25, 2012 Doctrine: While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the employee's prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or a scheme to lure him away from his permanent position, or when it is designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation. Facts: Respondent Minerva Pacheco, through a Revenue Travel Assignment Order (RTAO) issued by the BIR, was reassigned as Assistant Chief of Legal Division from Quezon City to San Fernando, Pampanga. The BIR cited exigencies of the revenue service as basis for such issuance. Pacheco claims that she was constructively dismissed as her reassignment will result in the reduction of her salary and let her suffer physical burden from waking up early and coming home late at night. The CSC dismissed her complaint on the ground that she was not constructively dismissed as she maintained her position as Revenue Atty. IV and was designated as Assistant Chief. The CA reversed the CSCs decision and ordered her immediate reinstatement with full backwages and benefits.

Issue: Whether respondent was constructively dismissed, and, therefore, entitled to backwages. Held: Yes. The contention of the CSC, through the OSG, that the deliberate refusal of Pacheco to report to work either in her original station in QC or her new place of assignment in Pampanga negates her claim of constructive dismissal is untenable. It was legally impossible for Pacheco to report to her original place of assignment in Quezon City because the said RTAO also reassigned another personnel as Assistant Chief from Pampanga to QC, the very same position that Pacheco held. It is also erroneous on the part of the CSC to argue that the subject RTAO was immediately executory, unless otherwise ordered by the CSC, and, thus, it was incumbent upon Pacheco to report to her new place of assignment. The Court held that it is an order to detail that is immediately executory and not reassignment. However, Pacheco is not entitled to full backwages and benefits. It is a settled jurisprudence that an illegally dismissed civil service employee is entitled to back salaries but limited only to a maximum period of five (5) years, and not full back salaries from his illegal dismissal up to his reinstatement 5. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. HENRY A. SOJOR FACTS: Respondent Henry A Sojor was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as president of Central Visayas Polytechnic College (CVPC) in Dumaguete city on August 1, 1991. He was subsequently reappointed by the Board of Trustees when the law mandated that a BOT be formed to act as the governing body in state colleges. On June 25, 2004, CVPC converted into the Negros Oriental State University (NORSU), the Board of Regents (BOR) succeeded the BOT as its governing body. Meanwhile the respondent was charged with 3 administrative cases filed by CVPC faculty members before the CSC Regional Office (CSC-RO) No. VII in Cebu City namely: (1) Dishonesty, Misconduct, and Falsification of Official Document; (2) Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; and (3) Nepotism. Respondent argued that CSC has no jurisdiction over him as presidential appointee. He further argued that only the BOT has the power to remove university officials citing provisions of R.A. No. 8292. CSC issued a resolution dismissing respondents appeal and authorizing the regional office to proceed with the investigation and preventively suspending the respondent. When the CSC denied the respondents motion for reconsideration with finality, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari and prohibition. He alleged that the CSC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed resolutions; that CSC encroached upon the academic freedom of CVPC; and that the power to remove, suspend, and discipline the president

of CVPC was exclusively lodged in the BOT of CVPC. The CA resolved in favor of respondent. It annulled the questioned CSC resolutions and permanently enjoined the CSC from proceeding with the administrative investigation. Hence this petition was filed by CSC. ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC has jurisdiction in the discipline and removal of state university officials. RULING: The Constitution grants to the CSC administration over the entire civil service. As defined, the civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, including every government-owned or controlled corporation. It is further classified into career and non-career service positions. The CSC has also been granted by the Constitution and the Administrative Code jurisdiction over all civil service positions in the government service, whether career or non-career. As provided in Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service Sec. 5; Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil Service Commission shall have the final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees. Argument of the respondent that BOR has the sole authority to discipline and remove his office cannot prosper. The power of the BOR to discipline officials and employees is not exclusive. CSC has concurrent jurisdiction over a president of a state university. Academic freedom cannot be invoked by Sojor as this is not applicable to the present case. It cannot be justified that he is within the bounds of academic freedom since administrative complaints filed against him involve violations of civil service rules. Petition was granted by the Supreme Court and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. 6. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. MARIAN D. TORRES and MARICAR D. TORRES G.R. No. 168309 January 29, 2008 FACTS: (1) Maricar was appointed as Legislative Staff Assistant in the Office of then Councilor of Malabon, Edilberto Torres. Marian was appointed as Messenger in the same office. (2) At the time of Maricars appointment to and employment in her position (1995-1997), she was a full-time regular college student at UST. At the time of Marians appointment and employment as messenger in her fathers office

(1996-2000), she was a full-time regular dentistry-proper student at the College of Dentistry of Centro Escolar University. (3) During the employment of respondents in government service, they submitted DTRs indicating that they religiously reported for work from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. during work days. (4) By reason thereof, respondents collected their full salaries during the entire time of their employment in their respective positions. (5) These all occurred with the full knowledge and consent of their father. ISSUE: Whether Maricar and Marian may be held administratively liable. HELD: YES. 1. OMB was correct in holding respondents administratively guilty of dishonesty and falsification of official document. Dishonesty is defined as the "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness, lack of integrity." Falsification of an official document, as an administrative offense, is knowingly making false statements in official or public documents. Both are grave offenses under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which carry with it the penalty of dismissal on the first offense. 2. Falsification of DTRs amounts to dishonesty. The evident purpose of requiring government employees to keep a time record is to show their attendance in office to work and to be paid accordingly. Closely adhering to the policy of no work-no pay, a DTR is primarily, if not solely, intended to prevent damage or loss to the government as would result in instances where it pays an employee for no work done. 3. Respondents claim of good faith, which implies a sincere intent not to do any falsehood or to seek any undue advantage, cannot be believed. In this case, respondents knew fully well that the entries they made in their respective DTRs were false considering that it was physically impossible for them to have reported for full work days when during those times they were actually attending their regular classes, which undoubtedly would take up most of the daytime hours of the weekdays. With this knowledge, respondents did not bother to correct the DTR entries to honestly reflect their attendance at their workplace and the actual work they performed. Worse, they repeatedly did this for a long period of time, consequently allowing them to collect their full salaries for the entire duration of their public employment as staff members of their father. 4. Respondents protestations that petitioner failed to prove their actual attendance in their regular classes and thus, suggest that they may not have been attending their classes, is preposterous and incredible, simply because this is not in accord with the natural course of things. The voluminous documentary evidence subpoenaed by petitioner from UST and Centro Escolar University showing the schedule of classes of respondents during the questioned period, along with the certificates of matriculation painstakingly

perused by GIO Generoso, strongly militates against this claim. It would be the height of absurdity on the part of respondents to voluntarily enroll in their respective courses, pay school fees, and not attend classes but instead report for work. Even if this was remotely possible, such a situation would be irreconcilable with the respondents having graduated from their respective courses. 5. Without doubt, the scrutiny of the numerous school documents, the DTRs submitted, and the payrolls from the office of the then Municipal Accountant of Malabon overwhelmingly revealed that the classes in which respondents enrolled for several school years were in stark conflict with the time entries in the DTRs, and several payroll sheets showed that respondents collected their full salaries corresponding to the DTR entries. 6. Thus, the CA gravely erred when it exonerated respondents from administrative guilt based on the findings of fact of petitioner which it even affirmed. 7. PRUDENCIO M. REYES, JR. vs. SIMPLICIO C. BELISARIO and EMMANUEL S. MALICDEM G.R. No. 154652 August 14, 2009 FACTS: 1. Deputy Administrators Simplicio Belisario, Jr. and Emmanuel B. Malicdem (respondents), along with Daniel Landingin and Rodolfo S. De Jesus, all officers of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint against LWUA Administrator Prudencio M. Reyes, Jr. (petitioner) for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. 2. 13 days after the filing of the graft charge, the petitioner issued Office Order No. 69 reassigning respondents together with De Jesus from the offices they then held to the Office of the Administrator. Supposedly, the reassigned officers were to act as a core group of a LWUA Task Force and their specific assignments were to be given by petitioner; Officers-in-Charge (OICs) were designated for the offices they vacated. 3. The following day, the OIC for Administration issued a directive to the Magilas Security Agency to bar the respondents from using the rooms and facilities they occupied prior to their reassignments. 4. The petitioner further directed the respondents to "vacate [their] offices and remove [their] personal belongings and transfer the same to the former PROFUND Office which has been designated as the Office of the Special Task Force." 5. Atty. Arnaldo M. Espinas, LWUA corporate legal counsel, sought the opinion of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) regarding the regularity of the reassignments of respondents and of De Jesus.

6. The petitioner, via Office Order No. 99, directed the respondents to "desist in performing and exercising the functions and activities pertaining to [their] previous positions" and relieved them of their designations or assignments as 6th Member and interim Directors of the Water Districts under their responsibility. To implement this latest Office Order, and in the respondents absence, entry was effected into their respective rooms with the help of police officers; their room locks were replaced with new ones; and their cabinet drawers were sealed with tapes. 7. The CSC responded through a legal opinion (CSC legal opinion) issued by Assistant Commissioner Adelina B. Sarmiento. It categorically ruled that the reassignments were not in order, were tainted with bad faith, and constituted constructive dismissal. 8. The respondents filed before the Office of the Ombudsman an administrative complaint for Oppression and Harassment against the petitioner and the OICs. The petitioner duly filed a counter-affidavit raising as defense his authority to terminate the respondents employment and forum shopping. The petitioner denied as well that force and intimidation were used in taking over the respondents' offices. 9. The Office of the Ombudsman resolved the administrative case. The Ombudsman desisted from ruling on the validity of the respondents reassignments, acknowledging the primary jurisdiction of the CSC over the issue. ISSUE: Whether the OMB committed grave abuse of discretion. HELD: YES. 1. SC fully supports the finding of the CA that grave abuse of discretion attended the Ombudsmans decision. 2. The Ombudsman should have judged the petitioners actions mainly on the basis of whether they constituted acts of harassment and oppression. In making this determination, the Ombudsman could not have escaped considering the validity of the reassignments made a determination that is primarily and authoritatively for the CSC to make. The charge of harassment and oppression would have no basis if the reassignments were in fact valid as they were alleged to be the main acts of harassment and oppression that drove the commission of the petitioners other similarly-motivated acts. In this sense, the validity of the reassignments must necessarily have to be determined first as a prior question before the full consideration of the existence of harassment or oppression could take place. Stated otherwise, any finding of harassment and oppression, or their absence, rendered without any definitive ruling on the validity of the reassignments would necessarily be premature. The finding would also suffer from the lack of factual and legal bases.

3. SC notes that the Office of the Ombudsman duly noted in its decision that the CSC has primary jurisdiction over the issue of the reassignments validity, declaring that it "can hardly arrogate unto itself the task of resolving the said issue." This is a correct reading of the law as the CSC is the central personnel agency of the government whose powers extend to all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. Constitutionally, the CSC has the power and authority to administer and enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit system; promulgate policies, standards, and guidelines for the civil service; subject to certain exceptions, approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service; hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it; and perform such other functions that properly belong to a central personnel agency. Pursuant to these powers, the CSC has the authority to determine the validity of the appointments and movements of civil service personnel. 4. Along the way, however, the Ombudsmans decision diverged from its basic legal premise when it refused to apply the rule it had acknowledged that the CSC is the "administrative body of special competence" to decide on the validity of the reassignments; it refused to accord due respect to the CSC opinion and, later, to the CSC Resolution No. 001729 on the flimsy ground that these were not yet final and conclusive. On the strength of this "nonfinality" argument, the Ombudsman proceeded to declare the reassignments presumptively regular and, finding insufficient evidence of force and intimidation in the implementation of the reassignments by the petitioner and the OICs, sustained the invalid reassignments and their complementary acts. The effect, of course, was the exoneration of the petitioner and his codefendants of the administrative charge of oppression and harassment. To the respondents and to the CA as well, the exoneration was attended by grave abuse of discretion.