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Peasants and Debt in Eighteenth-Century Champagne Author(s): Thomas Brennan Reviewed work(s): Source: The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Autumn, 2006), pp. 175-200 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4139545 . Accessed: 05/01/2013 23:00
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Journal Interdisciplinary of History, xxxvlI:2 (Autumn, 2oo6), 175-200.

Thomas Brennan

Peasants Debt in and Eighteenth-Century" Champagne The classicmonographsof ruralhistorywritten

during the past fifty yearshave numbereddebt among the many tribulations afflicting the early-modern peasantry, particularly in France. Offering little more than anecdotalevidence, the authors were sure, nevertheless,that peasantssufferedfrom massive amounts of debt. Anyone who consulted inventoriesafter death quicklyfound balancesheetsthatpresentedmore debitsthan credits and, indeed, more debts than assets.These debts periodically forcedthe peasants sell theirlandto rapacious to from the creditors Debt was an easy explanationfor the obvious expropriation city. of so many peasants,particularly those near towns. Long-term debt, to which peasantswere driven when they could no longer keep up with the burdenof short-termdebt, was also an important mechanismby which towns parasitically siphonedoff the producof the countryside.Debt in the old regime was thus exploittivity ive or, at best, unproductive.The classof rentiers-that is, those who lived on the income from their annuities-symbolized the lack of an entrepreneurial, capitalistmentality among the bourof the old regime. The debtorssymbolizedthe Malthusian geoisie cleft stick.1 A number of historianswho have recently begun to look more closely at the creditor/debtorrelationshipnow argue for a different interpretationof its economic and social role. Their views, which are basedon unprecedentedstatistical precisionand economic sophistication, more thanjust the classicqueschallenge
ThomasBrennan Professor History,United StatesNavalAcademy. is the authorof is of He to The in France Burgundy Champagne: WineTrade EarlyModern (Baltimore,1997);Public and Culture Eighteenth-Century (Princeton, in Paris 1988). Drinking Popular The author would like to thankDon Sutherland Liana of and Vardifor theircritiques earlierdrafts.
C 2006 by The Massachusetts Instituteof Technologyand the Journalof Interdisciplinary History,Inc.

that "it is au 1968),214, admits I PierreGoubert,Centmille (Paris, provinciaux XVIIesiecle difficult know it [debt]with precision .. it doesnot haveitsown archives." to . MarcVenard, et au de Bourgeoispaysans XVIIesiecle 1957),42-46; Pierrede Saint (Paris, Jacob,LesPaysans la du in "Immobilisme catastrophe," et Bourgogne nord(Paris,1960), 159-i6I; JeanJacquart, Wallon(eds.),Histoire la France de rurale GeorgesDuby andArmand (Paris,1975),III, 239LXXIX (1964),478Historical 248. GeorgeTaylor,"Typesof Capitalism," Review, English 497-

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tion of peasantimmiseration. new school of thought among hisA and toriansof Francesees economic transformation growth represented in the spreadof commercialexchange,particularly through involvement in the market, in which debt was an integralpart. Work on the detailsof the creditmarketin Parisand the province is ongoing: the slow evolution of interestrates,the crucialagency of notaries,the profile of lendersand borrowers,and the connection to the land market.The huge amounts of credit discovered throughout the country give the lie to the old belief that France sufferedfrom a lack of it, even in the countryside,and indicate that capitalwas available be investedin socialand economic asto sets. Thus has the credit marketgained new importance. Some scholars rejectthe idea that those who lent money ultiland, at leastin the eighteenthcenmatelyintendedto expropriate out thatcreditorsrarelyforeclosedand often paid tury.They point little attentionto the land that secureda loan. Creditorsundoubtover debtors,in that they could edly obtaineda marketadvantage demand access to debtors'labor and produce, but they may also have felt a moral obligationto assistthem. Accordingto the new view, loans became primarilya means to achieve a steadyrate of returnon wealth-a rationaleconomic and social investment.2 This new researchalso concludes that the borrowers came from an elite who used the fundsfor productivepurposes.It identifies those in Parisas overwhelminglyfrom the upper reachesof society and well to do. Additionally,it emphasizesthe role that "life cycle" playedin the demandfor loans-"older lendersgranting loans to younger borrowers, who built houses, established businesses,or purchasedgovernment offices." By specifying the constructiveuses to which these loans could be put, this model asserts the prevalenceof investment debt over consumer debt.3
2 G&rardBeaur, Le marchd foncier (Paris, 1984); Laurence Fontaine, "Espaces, usages et dynamiques," Annales, XLIX (I994), 1385-1386; idem, "Antonio and Shylock: Credit and Trust in France, c. I68o-c. 1780," Economic HistoryReview,LIV (2001), 54; Philip Hoffman, Growthin a Traditional 145o-1815 (Princeton, 1996), 71-80; Society:The FrenchCountryside, au Guillaume Daudin, Commerce prosperitd: France XVIIIe sidcle(Paris, 2005); Liana Vardi, et la The Land and the Loom (Durham, 1993); Hoffman, Gilles Postel-Vinay, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, "Economie et politique: les marches du credit a Paris, 175O-I840," Annales,XLIX His(1994), 65-98; idem, "Redistribution and Long-Term Private Debt," Journalof Economic Markets:The Political Economyof Creditin Paris, 166otory,LV(1995), 256-284; idem, Priceless et 187o (Chicago, 2000); Postel-Vinay, La terre l'argent(Paris, 1998). See the recent collection rural(Toulouse, 1998), for work being done Maurice Berthe (ed.), Endettement paysanet credit in a variety of European countries. 3 Hoffman et al., "Redistribution and Long-Term Private Debt," 260.

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177

Recent studies equally reject the traditional argument that debt in the countryside was a sign of misery and that loans were fundamentally exploitive, often arguing instead that the rich loaned most of the money to the only slightly less rich, who invested it in real estate and productive assets. Even poor peasants, on this view, borrowed to invest. Since, in fact, it is rarely clear how borrowers used their loans, much of this argument stands on the identity and wealth of the borrowers, though little direct evidence of their wealth is available.4 The new model also makes its points by focusing on longterm rather than short-term debt, arguing that it constituted the large majority of the existing loaned capital. Short-term borrowing, which tended to be small sums to fund consumption, continues to be associated with a genuine risk of poverty. In contrast, long-term debt consisted principally of perpetual and life annuities (rentes) that lenders with extra funds bought from individuals needing money. The debtors then paid 4 to 5 percent per year on the capital, either "in perpetuity" or until the death of the creditor. Because rentes were usually secured with some collateral, they functioned somewhat like mortgages, though lenders could not ask for repayment of "perpetual" annuities. This market was organized almost solely by notaries and functioned as the principal means of making credit available for the creation of landed enterprises. Unlike short-term debt, long-term debt allowed investment in property and offices. Yet documentary evidence for the reasons why people actually borrowed money in the form of rentes is scarce. Only rarely do notarial archives conjoin constitutions of rente with other documents or suggest a causal link to the acquisition of land, or to inheritance and marriage. Hence, it is probably safer to say that rente "permitted investment" than that it always resulted in investment. There were undoubtedly many reasons for long-term loans, several of which are obvious. Inheritances and dowries often required complicated arrangements to make landed assets more liquid without selling them. The purchase of long-term assets-land, offices, or leaseswas, and is, a classic reason for raising funds over long periods of time, but so was, and is, the need to defend these assets against the necessity of liquidating them in hard times.5
4 For a longer, though still largely speculative, discussion, see idem, Priceless Markets,154157. Postel-Vinay, La terreet l'argent,47-49; Vardi, Land and the Loom, 172-176. 5 Rosenthal, "Rural Credit Markets and Aggregate Shocks: The Experience of Nuits St.

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Long-term debt might thus have been an entrepreneurial strategy or simply the consequence of transitions in the life cycle of families, but it also might have been a sign of distress. Although there is some logic in drawing a distinction between small, shortterm loans intended for immediate consumption and larger, longterm loans earmarked for investment, the two were not mutually exclusive; one could become the other. The older historiography argued that cumulative short-term debt was often turned into long-term mortgages, at least partly to allow creditors to foreclose.6 If the precise causes of debt are unknown, the next-best way to determine debtors' motivations for borrowing is to ascertain their economic situation and whether they enjoyed relative wealth or poverty. In general, debt borne by someone with substantialassets was not a sign of distress and may well have been part of a long-term investment strategy. Debtors with few assets may also have been borrowing to invest, but if these debts were large, they would have been in distress nonetheless. In other words, whether the poor borrowed to acquire a small piece of land or to save it from foreclosure, they were probably no more comfortable than the landless villagers who had no mortgage. In the end, the new investment model of debt offers a plausible alternative to the old, exploitive model, but it fails to provide sufficient information about debtors to make its case.7
La et L Journal Economic of Georges,1756-1776," History, (1994),288-306. Postel-Vinay, terre which that debt"constituted 87%of the loanedcapital, 42-44, estimates "notarized l'argent, also includedobligations, 46-47, shows that they Markets, though Hoffmanet.al., Priceless rentesuntil the late madeup only 5%of loansin Parisas late as 1742and did not overtake Relations in and The of of I770s.CraigMuldrew,TheEconomy Obligation: Culture Credit Social Modern (New York, 1998),82, definespovertyas "astateof continuedindebtEngland Early had and that of edness" argues a "majority the households [thathe studied] more [short-term] more debtsthancreditsand . debtsthancredits,andthat a largepercentage . . had actually au de moveablegoods combined"(117-119). Beaur,Histoire agraire la France XVIIIesiecle 2ooo), 124-131. (Paris, Steve Cox), TheAncien 6 See Goubert(trans. (New York, 1973),1, 131-132,as an Regime exampleof the olderhistoriography. of of 7 Fora recentdiscussion the cultural of Economy Obligameanings debt,see Muldrew, of tion,148-172; Fontaine,"Antonioand Shylock,"39-57. The classicdiscussion the economic impactof debt beganwith a debatebetween David Spring,"The EnglishLanded XI Estate the Age of CoalandIron:I83o-8o,"Journal Economic in History, (1951),3-24, and of F. M. L. Thompson,"TheEnd of a GreatEstate," Economic VIII (1955),36Review, History in Indebtedness landedgentry.See alsoDavidCannadine, "Aristocratic 52, aboutthe English XXX (1977),624the NineteenthCentury: CaseRe-opened,"Economic The Review, History

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PEASANTS AND DEBT

1 179

This articleexaminessome of the new claims about debt in the old regime, employingunusuallydetailedevidence to paintan accuratepicture of borrowers'economic circumstances, particularly their assets.It is part of a largerproject that uses long- and short-term debt to study the regional economy of eighteenthcentury Champagne.This articlefocuses on long-term debt with the aid of particularly rich tax records.Whereas most studies of debt examine borrowersover a span of time through notarialrecords,this studytakesa snapshotof ruralChampagnein the 1770s, based on a selection of forty-fourvillageswithin 40 kilometersof Reims, to see who borrowed and who did not. The notarialrecordsgive no directevidence about cumulativedebt, althoughthe to calculations studiesdevoted to these recordsmake sophisticated estimateit. The tax recordsin Champagne,however, identifythat very information,thereby allowing a detailed analysisof debtors within their communities. Since, unlike most tax rolls, those of Champagnealso list the immovablepropertyof each household, this study can directly relate debts to assetsin a manner that has eluded previous studies of debt.8 The region aroundReims, in all its varioffersdetailedevidence about the impactof debt on the rural ety, world via its tax records. Like rural communities throughout France,the villagestherepaid the hearthtax-the taille--buttheir to tax recordsareunusual.Champagne one of two generalities was known as the taille conduct an experimentin tax administration on which was an attemptto base tax assessments a full retarifre, cord of every taxpayer'srevenues-productive land, house, and profession.It calculatedthe amount of these assetsand estimated between arable the net revenue thatthey generated,distinguishing land, vines, meadow, etc., and even between "good" and "bad" land. Severalof the relativelyfew rollsthatsurvivefrom the 1740s, when the tailletarifeefirstappeared, explicitlydefinedrevenuesas 5 percentof the value of both landandhouses. This techniquewas
TAXES IN CHAMPAGNE
650; L. Perry Curtis,Jr., "IncumberedWealth: Landed Indebtednessin Post-Famine Ireland," American Historical Review,LXXXV (1980), 332-367; David and Eileen Spring, "Debt and the English Aristocracy," CanadianJournal of History, XXXI (1996), 377-394. The consensus seems to be that debt must be understood in terms of a debtor's ability to pay the debt service. 8 Hoffman et. al., "Redistribution and Long-Term Private Debt," 280-282. The earliest tailles tarifeesfor most villages were in the early 1770s, though a few exist for the early 1740s.

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no longer explicit in later rolls, though it may still have shaped revenue estimations.The rolls also distinguishedbetween property that was rented, owned, and worked and propertythat was owned and rented. Finally,the rollsaddedthe revenuefrom interest that creditorsearnedon rentes and subtracted interestthat the debtors paid on rentes. Although the records rarely specify whether a rente was perpetualor lifetime, the work of PostelVinay and others suggeststhat perpetualannuitieswere far more common. The few recordsthat actuallyso specifyreferto lifetime rentes, suggestingthat the rest were perpetual.9 to Although what inspired the administration push for the taille tarifeeduringthese yearsis not clear,nearlyevery village in the region produced one or two full cadastral surveysbetween 1768 and 1772, thus takinga snapshotof an interestingmoment in the eighteenth century: Following several decades of modest a growth and prosperity, suddenincreasein the price of grainushered in a turbulenteconomic period before the Revolution. Since the assetsand debtsrecordedin the tax rollsprobablyreflectedthe previous calm more than the immediate crisis,they offer a fairly benign image of the ruraleconomy. Most of these data seem to have been relativelyaccurate.The documentsarelitteredwith the marginaliaof assessorscorrecting and updating the amounts of This kind of informationappropertybelonging to each taxpayer. obviouslytried pearsto have been largelypublic, and the assessors to stay current.Their valuationof immovablegoods was less exact, since the later rolls made no effort to distinguishbetween the productivityof good and bad acres, although the valuations reflecteddifferentproductivityfrom one villageto the next. All of
en 9 The whole history is discussed in Robert Lentz, La tailletarifre Champagne (Paris, 1928), de and, more succinctly, in Mireille Touzeray, L'invention l'impotsur le revenu,la tailletarifte, 1715-1789 (Paris, 1994), who gives an example of officials trying to calculate the net revenue of their parish (87). There is no easy way to check on the accuracy of the estimates for land revenues around Reims, but many of the cahiers produced by these villages before the Revolution offered calculations of profits from arableland and vines that come close to the official estimates. See George Laurent, Reims et la regionremoise la veille de la Revolution(Reims, ai 1930), IV, for the cahiers. For estimates of income from vines around Paris, see Marcel du en Lachiver, Vin, vigne et vignerons region parisienne XVIIe au XIXe sidcle(Pontoise, 1982), rurale en 338-339. In a painstakingstudy of returnsin Alsace, Jean-Michel Boehler, Une socidte milieurhenan:la paysannerie la plaine d'Alsace(1648-1789)(Strasbourg,1994), 901-915, sugde gests that a return of 7 to 8% on arableland was common, as opposed to 15 to 20% for vines. Unfortunately, no tailles tarifees rolls survive in this region for the period between 1743 and 1768.

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PEASANTS

AND DEBT

I8I

the taxpayers had a clear incentive to reduce their declared income by reporting the rentes that they owed. According to the taille records, the total long-term debt of the 5,300 households that comprised the forty-four villages chosen from the region was nearly I million livres, paying 48,000 livres a year in annuities. This figure represented an increase of nearly 30 percent over debt levels in the region thirty years earlier-slower growth than in much of France, though faster than elsewhere in Champagne. With an average household debt of some 182 livres-nearly a year's worth of unskilled wages-the region around Reims was not much different from other poor rural regions. Real household debt was much higher, because it included a host of small, informal, short-term debts that do not figure in the tax records, but for the purposes of this study, debt will refer only to the long-term debt. Against the long-term debts should be set the long-term credits, 32 livres a year, leaving an average of 50olivres of debt per household. Fewer than io percent of debtors had any credits, but we will focus on net debt as a consequence. An average of 15o livres works out to a yearly payment of 7.5 livres per household in annuities, which represented more than 9 percent of the annual income estimated by the taxes-an impressive total, given that much of it had been borrowed from the inhabitants of Reims alone. But the totals do not reveal the large disparities of its distribution. Fewer than one-third of these villagers owed the debt, and debtors owed from 20 to 10,ooo livres. The average debt was almost 580 livres (the median was 426), the annual payment for which consumed one-quarter of estimated income, even though debtors were wealthier than non-debtors and had about 60 percent more income.1?
Io Although the tax records give no information about the interest rate or principal of the des rente, the notarized debt contracts collected in the controle actesshow that rentes constituted in the early 1770s were paying 5%annuities, and Postel-Vinay, La terre l'argent, et 89-98, indicates that so were most of them in the third quarterof the century. He arguesfor a gradual decline in interest rates through the century but notes that when the official rate was reduced to 4%, from 1766 to 1770, the number of new loans declined precipitously, suggesting that lenders did not want the rates to drop so low. Rosenthal, "Credit Markets and Economic in Change in Southeastern France 1630-1788," Explorations Economic History,XXX (1993), 134, finds that the interest rates charged to lower-class borrowers remained higher than on loans made to others. For simplicity, this article assumesthat all rentes were paying 5%of the principal. Tax roles from 1742 or 1743 are availablefor the villages of Beine, Boult s/Suippes, Bourgogne, Chaumuzy, Hermonville, Juniville, Prosne, Sacy, Troispuits, and Verzy. See

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1 THOMAS BRENNAN

The totalsalso missimportantdifferences the geographyof in debt. The details about debt in this region show great disparity among the villages. The hinterlandof Reims held the principal economic activitiesthat maintainedthe vibranteconomy of the city. Famousnow for its wines, it was also, in the eighteenthcentury,among the most importanttextile regionsof France.FurtherThe tax rolls more, it had to help feed a city of 25,000 inhabitants. in this study reproducethe ruraleconomy of this hinterland,to a distance of 40 kilometers from Reims. They display importantpatternsof indebtedness, both the villageand the individual at levels.11 The landholdingpatternsdetailedin the tax rolls reveal the socialgroupsin the villages.Most villageshad an elite class,readily identifiableby its monopoly of arableland, to which it usually addedincome from tithes or seigneurialdues. Through a combination of ownershipand rental,these wealthy villagerscontrolled vast farmsof 30 hectaresor more-roughly what the tax assessors identified as a "plowteam"-on which they employed many laborers.Distinctfrom this elite minoritywas a largergroupof indewhose ability to make a living from their pendent smallholders lands was more precarious.Those with more than io hectares were considerably more secure in their independencethan those with more than 5 hectares.Those with less than 5 hectareswere and clearlydependentpeasants cottagers,obliged to work for others to supplementtheir meagercrops.Many of them did not even have arableland,just a few smallparcelsof vines or a garden.The value of land varied considerably type and location; the reveby nue estimatesin the tax rolls provide a simple technique to assess landin it. Given an averageincome of 6 livresper hectareof arable the forty-fourvillages, we can distinguishthose who earnedless than 30, 6o, i8o livres,etc., from the land that they controlled.At the bottom was a large group who owned no land and often no for habitation; many of them escapedthe full assessment wagesbecause of infirmity or age.12
Chaof et La 132-136,for growthin otherareas France, including Postel-Vinay, terre l'argent, and 41-42 for a generalaverageof 400 livresper inhabitant. However, the teau-Thierry, figurewould be halfof thatone in poor regionslike Champagne. a de Les Histoire industries des lainidres Colbert la fran(aises. industries S1 TihomirMarkovitch, Revolution (Geneve,1976). considered 12 Touzeray, of io6, L'invention, notes thatthe intendant Champagne roughly

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AND DEBT

183

The villages in this sample reflect a basic division between hills to the west and south of Reims and plains to the north and east. The hills grew vines, and the plains grew grain, though not all of the villages could concentrate on one of these crops. The few villages in the region with an economy based exclusively on arable land, with no weavers or vineyardists of any consequence, tended to be far from the city. Most of the villages in the plains supplemented their arable income with revenue from cottage textiles. In several of the villages close to Reims that produced a rough cloth called serge, weavers occupied the majority of households. Textile villages farther away tended to make a lighter, finer cloth called weavers there comprised a large minority (see Table I).13 etamine; The wealthiest communities, mostly to the south and west of Reims, were purely viticultural. Because the income from a hectare of vines was worth roughly five times the income from arable land in these villages, a much higher percentage of households there could manage some degree of independence. At least half of the male inhabitants in these communities were vinedressers (vignerons);none were cloth workers; and few were plowmen or day were unlaborers. The outsiders owning property there (forains) usually prevalent, accounting for more than 20 percent of the tax rolls. The bourgeoisie of Reims clearly had made an effort to acquire some of the valuable vineyards around them, much as the elites of Bordeaux and Dijon had done for more than a century. In a few cases, they had acquired half of a village's vines, in holdings that were well above the average size.'4
30 hectares to be a plowteam. See, for example, Jean-JacquesClere, Lespaysansde la Hauteet Marneet la Revolutionfrangaise (Paris, 1988), 62-72; Jean-Michel Chevet, La terre lespaysans en Franceet en Grande-Bretagne (Paris, 1998), I, 71-80. Such a calculation depended on the varying productivity in different villages, which is further complicated by the different kinds of land listed within these villages. These values could vary considerably among the different villages, which estimated their arableproductivity at anything from 2 to 12 livres per hectare and their vines at 17 to Ioo livres per hectare. A farmer might have aspired to independence with Io hectares of arableland; a vigneron might do as well with less than a hectare of vines. 13 Archives Departementales de la Marne (hereinafter AD Marne) C 2202, 2211, 2212, 2216, 2217, 2239, 2263, 2290, 2302, 2303, 2309, 2315, 2320, 2323, 2324, Chilons en Champagne. Arable villages and years: Auberive (1775), Draze (1775), Mourmelon le petit (1770), Prosne (1770), Prunay (1770), Saulce-Champenoise (1770), St-Pierre a Arne, and Serrincourt (1770). Textile villages and years: Beine (1770), Bethiniville (1772), Boult s/Suippes (1771), Bourgogne (1772), Dommery (1769), Juniville (1769), Roizy (1770), St-Clement (1770), and St-Masmes (1770). 14 AD Marne, C 2221, 2223, 2233, 2257, 2313, 2341, 2342, 2347, 2349, E depot 670. Villages and years: Cernay (1768), Cormontreuil (1768), Cormoyeux (1770), Chamery (1768),

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A final category in the sample were the fifteen villages with mixed-agricultural economies, where vines were part of a policulture that included fruit trees, pasturing, forest products, and arable land. Most of them lay in a band of hilly and wooded countryside west and south of Reims, farther away from the city than the viticultural villages. These were the poorest communities, with the smallest proportion of those capable of even a precarious independence, few of whom could make a living as vinedressers. Most of these villages were small, with a surprisinglylarge proportion of forains, and some of them seem to have been auxiliaries to other, larger, villages in their neighborhoods.15 The forty-four villages in this sample exemplified the credit economy in hugely diverse ways; the average per capita debt among them ranged from 8 to 709 livres. Part of the difference was due to large disparities in the percentage of debtors among these villages, from 2 to 63 percent, but average per capita debt among debtors in each village also
GEOGRAPHICAL

DIFFERENCES IN DEBT

ranged from 200 livres to 1130 livres. The differences in debt be-

tween villages reinforce an important argument of the new school-that proximity to urban sources of credit was crucial to understanding debt patterns. Yet loans from Reims made up little more than half of the region's debts, and the geographical pattern of debt suggests that other factors, like the different economic activities among these villages, also had a significant impact on indebtedness. The correlation between distance from Reims and average debt for these villages is evident (R= -0.5168), as is the correlation between distance and percentage of a village that was indebted (R= -o.6I154)-a measure more resistant to the impact of heavily indebted outliers. In addition, in agreement with the new
Champfleury (1768), Hautvillers (1767), Hermonville (1770), Sacy (1773), Trigny (1770),
Troispuits (1770), Verzy (1770), Villedommange (I770). Paul Butel, "Les grands proprietaires

et production des vins de Medoc au XVIIIe siecle," Revue historiquede Bordeauxet du au de XI departement la Gironde, (1963), 129-141; Gaston Roupnel, La villeet la campagne XVIIe du sihcle: etudesur les populations pays dijonnais(Paris, 1955), 268-270.
15 AD Marne, C 2216, 2217, 2227, 2237, 2289, 2292, 2298, 2309, 2315, 2321, 2324, 2341.

Villages and years:Bouleuze (1772), Bouilly (1770), Bouvancourt(177I), Bourgognelochefontaine (1771), Chaumuzy (1772), Courville (1772), Montigny s/Vesle (1771), Nanteuille (1770), Poilly (1774), Ronay (1773), St-Euphraise (1770), Sapicourt (1770), Sarcy

Treslon (1770), (1773), (1770). Savigny

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Table 1 The Social Makeup of Economic Subregions

TOTAL HOUSEHOLDS N % N ARABLE % N TEXTILE %

VITIC N

Plowmen Independent Precarious Dependent Landless

265
I,027

5
19

57
153

934
2,006

18 38
20

143 444
167

1,059
5,29I

6 16 15 46 17

964

71 178 142 519 458 1,368

5 Io IO 38 33

85 602 516 529 176 ,9o8

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model's emphasis on the familiarity of creditors with lenders, villages in which many citizens of Reims owned land, asforains, also correlate significantly with average debt (R= 0.5844) and with percentage of indebtedness (R= 0.3902). Moreover, since forains from Reims were more likely to own land in villages that featured wine production (R= 0.8045) than in those close to the city (R= 0.4503), the amount of wine that each village produced is strongly correlated with debt (R= 0.6415) and with percentage of indebtedness (R= 0.5122). Finally, average debt is most closely correlated with a village's average or median taxed income (R= 0.668 I; R= 0.6228). Debt regressed against distance, forains, wine, and median income shows a robust R' of 0.5391, as does percentage of indebtedness regressed against the same factors (R2 = 0.5173). But the considerable colinearity between all of these factors makes these correlations particularly difficult to interpret.16 A village's distance from Reims was also linked, at least generally, to its economic role in the region. Because of both accidents of geography and access to markets, a belt of rich vineyards producing expensive wine surrounded the city. The six villages from this sample that lay within Io km of the city were viticultural, averaging 49 percent indebtedness. The two-dozen villages in the next Io km belt, which were more evenly distributed among viticulture, textile, and mixed economies, averaged 33 percent indebtedness. However, whereas the textile villages in this band averaged 20 percent indebtedness, the viticultural villages averaged an indebtedness of 49 percent and the mixed economies an indebtedness of 31 percent. The villages between 20 and 30 km away were geared principally to arable land and textiles-averaging 25 and 26 percent indebtedness, respectively; the viticultural and mixed-economy villages within that area averaged 42 percent. Nearly all of the more distant villages had low levels of indebtedness. The upshot is that a village's economy influenced its indebtedness in a way that depended only partly on its proximity to the city (see Table 2). The different economies in this region had vastly different ex16 The volume of wine production for each village, as an estimate made in 1773 of "the number of muids in an average year," can be found in AD Marne, C 430. The P-values for
average debt: distance= o.1730, wine= 0.o883. 0.0546, median income=
0.0532,

forains=

0.7944, wine=

0.1308.

The P-values for percentage in debt: distance= o.ooo5, median income= 0.o874, forains=

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Table

Indebtedness in Economic Subregions

T VILLAGES (44) ARABLE(8) TEXTILE(9)

VILLAGES (UNWEIGHTED)

Avg. debt (in livres) Percent households in debt Avg. debt of debtors (livres)

171 31.7 497.2

68.3 18.6 386.7

117 21.3 563.9

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I THOMAS BRENNAN

periencesof long-term debt. The per-capitadebtsof those in viticulturalvillageswere 338 livres,approaching levels in wealththe of France.The per-capitaaveragein mixed economies ier parts was lessthanhalfof thatin the viticultural villages.Textile villagers 117livres, and those in arablecommunities owed only averaged 68 livres. The disparitywas due only partlyto the prevalenceof debtors, however. Although the average debt was roughly 375 livresin villageswith mixed and arableeconomies, it was 50 percent greaterin textile villagesand more than 75 percentgreaterin viticulturalvillages. The recordof rentesin severaldecades'worth of notarialarchives, registeredin the contr6lesdes actes,paintsmuch the same picturefor the more than 350 villagesin the 30 km radiusaround Reims. A sampleof more than I,ooo loans, worth nearly 500,000 livres, shows relativelylittle correlationbetween debt and either distance from Reims (R= -0.3342) or wine production (R= 0.2680). Thus, the thirty-eight villages within io km of Reims owed only 21 percent of the number and 23 percent of the amountof debt in the region. To some extent, these low percentages testifyto the robustinvolvement of ruralcreditors,who provided nearlytwo-thirdsof the numberandroughlyone-halfof the amountof the loansin this sample.Yet the vastmajorityof the region's debt (82 percent of both numberand amount)went to the 155 villagesthatlay within 20 km of the city. In this scenario,the role of wine was much more important(R= 0.5378) and distance from Reims much less (R= -0.1382). Thus, the 59 villages within this radiusthat produced no wine received 13 percent of the loans, andthe 51 villagesin which wine productionwas below the region's averagereceived 27 percent. The 29 percent of the villageswith the most vines received 60 percent of the loans.'7 Patternsof long-term debt in these villagesreinforceone of the chief argumentsof the new economic historyof the Old Regime. Although other factorsinfluencedthe amountof borrowing in different villages-such as proximity to Reims and average wealth-the type of economy clearly played an importantrole. Viticulturewas among the most commercialsectorsof the area's
17 This information derives from the controle des actes of Cormicy, 17721773;
Pontfaverger, 1770-1771; Reims, 1741, 1751-1752, 1769-1771; Verzy, 1747-1750, 17671771; Ville, 1758-1773. See AD Marne, C 4296, 4594, 4623, 4629, 4644, 4645, 5062, 5063, 5065, 5093, 5094.

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PEASANTS AND DEBT

189

agriculture, depending on the market to sell the wine that it produced and to buy the grain that it did not produce. Wine growers, even those operating at a modest level, were more likely to rely on the market than all but the largest grain producers; they were more likely to commercialize their produce personally than were most textile weavers. With markets came debt-for investments, for inventory, and for income smoothing-but who within each village sought such credit and why are still unknown. The new model of debt argues that wealthy individuals did most of the borrowing and that loans correlated with landed assets and wealth on an individual basis. However, because the relationship between income and debt on the village level gives only a rough indication of individual patterns of debt, questions remain: What was the relationship between individuals' debts and their circumstances? Do connections between wealth, age, sex, or occupation explain the existence of debt, and do any discernible patterns suggest the role of debt in individual lives? The details of each household may provide answers.18
INDIVIDUAL

DEBT Despite the apparent correlation between a

village's average income and its average debt, the income of individual households, as measured by the tax assessors,does a mediocre job of predicting debt (R= 0.3044). Nor does the income figure provided by the tax records appear to be the best one to use for distinguishing between households in any case. The official system assessed income on the basis of estimated revenue from various properties, to which it added estimated revenue from taxpayers' wages and professional or commercial activities. It also assessed household income from any rental property, including housing, even though it was simply a living expense. These calculations tended to overestimate the income of the poorest households and underestimate the income of the wealthiest ones in these villages, thereby minimizing actual disparities in wealth. Thus, the coefficient of variation for all income was 1.214, whereas the coefficient of variation for all assetswas 1.382, and for landed property, which probably revealed the disparities in rural society better than the other measures, was 1.632. Yet land did not
18 Beaur, "Investissementfoncier, epargne et cycle de vie dans le pays chartrainau XVIIIe siecle," Histoireet mesure,VI (1991), 275-288; Brennan, Burgundyto Champagne:The Wine Tradein Early ModernFrance(Baltimore, 1996); Vardi, Land and the Loom, 191.

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THOMAS BRENNAN

predict debt much better than income did (R= 0.3402); only when housing assetsare added does it predict even moderately
well (R= 0.4146).19 The role of wealth becomes clearer when examined with regard to the social groups within these villages. The impact of debt on them depended on two issues-what percentage of each group was in debt, and how much the debtors owed. Since a small percentage of the few debtors who were also creditors were net creditors, the questions are, Who were the net debtors, and how much net debt did they owe? The richest villagers were not, as a group, substantiallymore indebted than the next group. Although the average elite debtor owed considerably more (1230 livres) than the average debtor in other economic groups, 61 percent of the elite group owed nothing at all, making the average debt per elite villager only 538 livres. This group also owned 40 percent of the credits. The villagers at the next level, whose 10 to 30 hectares translated into economic independence but not necessarily economic power, owed nearly as much collectively as the elites did, but only because half of their households were in debt. On an individual basis, they owed less than the elites did. Even more modest landholders, those with 5 to Io hectares, were more likely to be in debt than the elites (44 percent), though their individual debts were much smaller. Only the smallest landholders and those without any land were less likely to owe rentes (27 percent), and the debts that they incurred were much smaller, too. In general terms, wealth in land assets meant both greater likelihood of debt and
larger per capita debt (see Table 3).20

The relationship between debt and land, however, was not straightforward. The amount of debt that the different classes of landholder carried as a function of their landed wealth varied considerably. The 1230 livres that the average elite debtor owed reduced to 30 livres per each acre owned, based on an average holding of 38 hectares or its equivalent. A comparison of the annuity paid on this debt, at 5 percent, to the estimated revenue of this land, shows that the debt service (the ratio of debt payments to in19 Ulrich Pfister, "Le petit credit ruralen Suisse aux XVIe-XVIIIe siecles," Annales,LXIX (1994), 1345, finds a correlation of 0.6 in the Swiss village of Ebikon. David Weir, "Family Income, Mortality, and Fertility on the Eve of the Demographic Transition: A Case Study of History,LV (1995), 2-I2, discusses the components of Rosny-Sous-Bois," Journalof Economic the taille tarifee in one village. 20 Of 1,66o households in debt, 121 also had rentes owed them; 35 of these households were net creditors.

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191

Table 3 Social Makeup of Debtors

ALL HOUSEHOLDS AVG. DEBT, LIVRES AVG. CREDIT, LIVRES NET DEBTORS AVG. NET DEBT, LIVRES

% DEBTORS

Plowmen 265 5 Independent I,027 19

Precarious Dependent

538 390
235
90

204 55
16 Io 12 32

39 49
44
27

1,230

764
518 326

Landless
Total

934 I8 2,oo6 38 1,o05920 5,291

17
150

6
31

272
566

come from land) amountedto only 28 percent. A comparisonof land value, which earlierrolls estimatedat twenty times annual revenue, to total debt, also shows a debt burden of 28 percent. In bore a burden contrast,the debtorsamong the poorestlandholders four times greateron each of theirfew hectares.They paid 18 percent more in debt service than they made from their lands and owed 18 percentmore thantheirlandswere worth. Hence, even a fairlygood correlationbetween debt and propertyamong those who chose to borrow meantlargedisparities the impactof debt. in So far as landed assetsand collateralare concerned, elites were were practilightlyburdenedby debt and the smallestlandholders crushed (see Table 4). cally In fact, it is hardto see how the poorestvillagerswere able to come up with the collateral their debts. The value of landvarfor ied considerably within villages;the estimatedincomes in Table 4 are clearlya rough averagefor the whole village,probablyoverestimatingthe value of the poorestland, owned by the poorestlandholders.Nevertheless,the availableevidence suggeststhat the averagevalue of the land owned by the dependentpeasantry-their most obvious collateral-was inferior to the averageamount of their debts. How did they manage to borrow so much? One answer appearsto lie in their housing assets.Scholars have studiedruralhousing much less than rurallandholding,for a varietyof reasons.Descriptionsof the houses and evidence about their value are scarce.Yet the taille tarifie was scrupulousabout identifyinghousingassetsalongwith the land.For the homes of all it taxpayers, noted the fact of ownershipor rental,and even docu-

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Table 4

Debt Burdens
AVG. NET AVG. LAND INCOME, LIVRES AVG. LAND, HECTARES

NET

NET DEBTORS, ALL VILLAGES

DEBT, LIVRES

SER LI

Plowmen Independent

103 504
412

6 31 25 33 4

Precarious
Dependent Landless Total

541 65 1,625

1,230 764 518 326 272 566

223 92 40 14 O 59

37.7 14.5 6.5

2.4

O 9.5

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PEASANTS AND DEBT

193

mented when taxpayers received free housing. As they did for all of the assets listed in the tax records, assessorsestimated the value of houses or their rental value, though evidence suggests that the revenue from housing, like that from land, was meant to be 5 percent of a house's estimated worth. Roughly one-third of all households owned no housing assets and paid rent for their lodging-?three-quarters of the landless among them. A much smaller minority in the other categories was in the same position.21 Based on these estimations, housing made up one-third of the region's immovable wealth, a considerable proportion, and the average debt of borrowers is remarkably close to the estimated value of their housing. Since debt was, on average, nearly as much as a house was worth and rarely greater, Table 4 suggests that housing was the primary form of collateral, answering the question of how households managed to incur debt. But it does not shed much light on why. A majority of those who owned housing (55 percent), even of those who owned both housing and land (53 percent), were not in debt. Why did some borrow and others not? Since housing provided collateral but no income to service the debt, the answer probably lies in landholding patterns. Furthermore, housing fails to explain important differences in borrowing practices across the region. The percentage of homeowners in debt varied enormously, from less than one-quarter in arable villages and less than one-third in textile villages to one-half in mixed economies and two-thirds in viticultural villages. Nor, for the same reason, can we explain home owning by debt. Although the desire for home ownership might have pushed vine growers to borrow more than others, the percentage of home owning in viticultural villages was not particularly high, even though debt was. Instead, arable villages, which had the smallest percentage of indebted households, also had the highest level of home owning. Here collateral was readily available, yet few chose to use it. Some of the differences between economic groups are attributable to the life cycle. Households tended to start out with only a little land and to acquire more with time; households with fewer acres tended to be younger than those with more. The
LIFE CYCLE et dans la Francetraditionnelle J. P. Bardet, Maisonsrurales urbaines (Paris, 1971); Jacquart, L'habitat ruralen Ile de France XVIIe sidcle(Marseille, 1977). This evidence is found only in au the tax rolls of 1743, in which houses are given an estimated value, as well as revenue.
21

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THOMAS BRENNAN

fact that women headed one-fifth of these households,however, complicatesthe issue. Women are usuallyexcluded from discussions of taille recordssince most of them were old and widowed and thus notoriously anomalous.In fact, female heads of household were, on average,much older than their male counterparts (53.5 versus 44.2), even though slightly more than one-third of them were unmarried"filles"whose average age was only 38. Women also had considerably income and less property.But less debt had less of an impact on women as a whole than on men, largely because a smaller proportion of women were debtors. Women debtors,however, owed nearlyas much as male debtors livres)than did men (.48 livres).Thus was women's experienceof debt distinctfrom men's. Since it followed a differentlife cycle, it should be excluded from discussionsof debt based on age. Severalstudies use the life-cycle model to explain debt as a soundinvestmentstrategy ratherthanas a sign of poverty.According to the model, young people went into debt to marryand to establisha household, farm, or business.They incurredas much as two-thirdsof their debt before the age of forty. With age, householders switched from borrowing to lending, again as a rational use of assets.To some extent, the villages aroundReims support this model. Treatingthe age profile of these villagesnot as a static snapshotbut as a dynamic trajectoryallows debt to be followed throughthe life cycle. The percentageof debtorsincreasedsharply from one-third of men in their thirtiesto nearlyone-half of those in their fiftiesbefore declining againto one-third of men in their seventies.The averageamount of debt increasedsimilarly, though less dramatically--thatowed by men younger than forty being lower than that owed by men in their fifties but not so different from that owed by men in their seventies.The male populationin its thirtiesassumedmore than half (58 percent) of the total debt level that men ever reached (in their fifties). In the process,they acquiredfarmore propertythan those not in debt, almostdouble the propertyby theirforties.Old age broughta significant increase in lending,both among debtorsandnon-debtors(see Table 5).22
22 Postel-Vinay, et Terre l'argent, de 54-60;Jean-Marc Moriceau,Lesfermiers l'Ilede France and foncier,281-283;Hoffman, 1994),592-594;Beaur,"Investissement (Paris, Postel-Vinay, LII Rosenthal,"PrivateCredit Marketsin Paris,169o0-840," History, Journal Economic of that Income,"10, argues (1992), 293-306. Weir,"Family similarly his "one-timeobservation on householdincome is a good proxyfor lifetimeincome."

(513 livres versus 576 livres) and bore a heavier debt service (.56

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Table 5

Life Cycle of Male Debt

MEN AVG. AVG. CREDIT, LIVRES % AGE AVG. NET DEBT, LIVRES NET DEBTORS AVG. LAND, LIVRES DEBT

BY AGE

o%

DEBT, LIVRES

SERVIC LIVRES

<30 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+ T

583 1,254 857 576

492

14 30
21 14 12

56 188 223 323

221 172
189

9 13 24 38 48
146
31

259
155

6 4

11 33 38 46 38 31
23

506 547 557 673 56o 495 757 576

4,176

198

31

33

41 50 65 73 65 45 77 6o

.62 .55 .43 .46 -43 .55 .49 .48

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THOMAS BRENNAN

Most debtors shed little of their debt even in old age, and even though average debt declined with age, so did average land holdings. Thus, the burden of debt on land diminished relatively little (II percent) between debtors' thirties and fifties, and it changed little between middle and old age, though the percentage of debtors declined. If the justification for debt was to get ahead, most debtors never succeeded. Furthermore, the extra assets that debt was supposed to bring became less evident over time; debtors tended not to be the wealthy people in their villages. Debtors in their thirties owned 72 percent more land than non-debtors. By their fifties, however, their advantage had dropped to 55 percent, and by their seventies, they had actually fallen behind nondebtors. Subtracting debt service from land income reveals that most debtors were earning less than non-debtors their own age. After a point, debt became not so much a strategy to gain assets as a way for consumers to keep pace. Debtors' lack of success demonstrates that analysis based solely on age and wealth does not sufficiently answer the question of why people went into debt. This article offers considerable support for the new model of debt, but with important limitations. The majority of the region's borrowed money (56 percent), though not of the individual loans (37 percent), went to those who were relatively solvent-independent or even wealthy farmers. Yet borrowing was less a strategy of those at the top of ruralsociety, the coqsdu village, than of those who were less secure in their wealth. Independent peasants alone comprised one-third of all debtors and owed 42 percent of the region's debts. Their Io to 30 hectares gave them the "prestige, position, and power of the employer," but, since their debts were worth roughly 40 percent of their landed assets, most of them owned only 8 or 9 hectares that were free and clear. Without going into debt, these villagers probably would not have been assured of economic independence, not to mention the social mobility, and the trappings of success, that went along with it.23 A similar argument may apply, though more hesitantly, to the quarter of debtors whose independence was even more precarious, depending upon location and year. Slightly fewer than half of
IMPACT OF DEBT
23

Goubert, The Ancien Regime, I, I I4

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PEASANTS AND DEBT

197

those owning 5 to Io hectaresalso owed rentes, but their debts were, on average,largeenough to engulf two-thirdsof what their landswere estimatedto produce as profit. This ratio of debt payments to income from land, the debt service, is an important measureof a debtor'ssolvency. A study of landed estatesin nineteenth-centuryIrelandsuggeststhatwhen debt servicerose above 6o percent (two-thirds of the land mortgaged), owners were arrears, "headingfor irrecoverable insolvency, and other embarrassments." the case of the Reims area,what this group of vilIn lagersowned clear of debt was little more than 2 hectares.Their borrowingsmight have moved them into a social categorythatoffered subsistenceand even profits in good times, but their debt service would have eaten much of the benefit away; the bulk of
their assets were fragile.24

The one-third of debtorsin these villageswho comprisedthe smallest,most dependent landholdersappearto evade the new model entirely.Even if they employed debt as a rationalstrategy for acquiringa few parcelsof land to avoid complete penury, on average,their land was totally mortgaged,and their debt service swallowed all of their landed income, and then some. To these who marginallandownerscan be addedthe few landlesspeasants, do not conform to the new model either. Together they owed only one-fifth of the total debt, but theirnumbersmeantthattheir collective experience of debt was a major factor in the region. Hence, althoughsome of the debtorsin these villagessupportthe new paradigm,almost as many supportthe old one. The poorest peasantswere unlikely to have borrowed money for the purpose of investment; they look much like the classic case of poverty compounded by mortgage. The patternof debt service for the region as a whole makes roughly the same point. It defines three basic levels of debtor: those safelypaying less than two-thirds;those paying more than two-thirds, with a high risk of ruin; and those alreadyin deep trouble,payingmore than theirlandedincome was worth. A little more than half of the region's indebted households were either safeor relativelyso; their debtslook like rationalinvestments.The other half were in dire straits,however, nearlyone-third of them
facing ruinous debt. The life cycle does not help to explain these
24 Curtis, "Incumbered Wealth," 348.

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THOMAS BRENNAN

differences, since the average age of each of these groups was practically identical-the safe half averaging forty-eight years and the ruinous half averaging forty-nine years. Instead, the economic differences within the region shed some light on their debt (see Table 6). The worst case-debt devouring the landed income of 39 to 40 percent of households-occurred in the mixed and textile villages, which also saw the greatest poverty, defined by the proportion of households with less than 5 hectares. The percentage of debtors in this category was noticeably less in arable villages and just slightly more than half as large in viticultural villages, which also saw the least poverty. Similarly, the safest borrowing-debt service below two-thirds-was most common in the richest villages with arable economies (64 percent) and viticultural economies (57 percent). What is equally striking, however, is that villages with vines, especially the purely viticultural ones, had more borrowers (and a higher percentage of them) in the high-risk category-between 66 percent and Ioo percent of landed incomethan did villages without them. The reason might have something to do with the land hunger that is often associated with vineyards; investment in a small amount of such land could often provide employment and even subsistence. Furthermore, whereas those in the safest category of debt averaged Ioo livres of land income, and

those in miseryaveragedonly 17 livres,those in the high-riskcategory averaged45 livres of land income, which put them squarely in the classof landownerswith precariousindependence.Unfortunately,these debtorsalso owed an averageof 81 percentof their landed income as debt service, leaving them only a pittance for
survival.25

As the amounts and rates of indebtednessclearly demonstrate, with proximity vines meant debt, though debt was also associated to Reims and with its citizens' ownershipof vineyardsas forains. But what debt meant in the viticultural villagesdependedon several variables,not least of which was its role in the investment
strategies of young adults. A small majority of the debtors in these villages bore sustainable debts. They appear to have been enter25
1428.

Beaur, "Foncier et credit dans les socit&&s preindustrielles,"Annales,XLIX (1994), 1421-

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Table 6 Impact of Debt Service by Economic Subregion

DEBT SERVICE TOTAL DEBT PAYMENT DIVIDED BY LAND INCOME N % N ARABLE % N TEXTILE %

< 33 % 33-66 %
> Ioo %
66-Ioo %

420 456
282

26 28
17

57 43
18

36 28
II

69 61
30

26 23
II

2 2

18

467 1,625

29

42

26

Io6

40

160

266

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THOMAS BRENNAN

prising peasants who took a chance on acquiring land, helping to make the favored vineyards around Reims into a more democratic and economically homogenous society than the other communities in the region. But vines did not rescue the mixed economies from poverty. They seem to have lured a large number of poor peasants into extremely risky bets on land from which they could not expect to make a living. One-third of the sample's debtors belonged to the two most burdened groups in the two economies with vineyards. Debt for those whose small vineyards were mortgaged to the hilt could only be associated with grinding poverty. This heavy debt would also shape the development of the local wine trade. The citizens of Reims had been busily buying up vineyards in the villages around them; whether they had been using credit and foreclosure on debt to acquire them is unclear. More importantly, they had been gaining control of the local wine trade and using credit to gain leverage over the wine growers who owed them. Falling into arrearson annuities made debtors vulnerable to threats of court action, which they could prevent only by selling their wine to their creditors at a low price. The inhabitants of Reims were acquiring even more wine than land, and developing an international market for it. With names like Mopinot, Clicquot, Sutaine, and Maillefer prominent among the creditors of Reims, the link between the wine trade and the credit market is unmistakable. The need for loans drove the poorest of the landowners to rely on the people who could most profit from their distress.Debt, which was increasingly a tool of rational investment for a growing number of people in towns and the countryside, was still, for many of the rural poor, the agency of their own exploitation.26
26 Brennan, Burgundyto Champagne,I29-130, 265-271.

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