Samme Sheikh Prof.

Lauren Farmer International Relations January 19, 2013 The Challenges Facing Modern Mali: Consequences of Imprecise Democratization, Implicit Neoliberalism, and Inflamed Islamism In a little more than a year, the oddly shaped and oft-forgotten North African country of Mali seems to have climbed high up on the list of international priorities and concerns for many of the worlds powers. Malis ethnic rebellion-cum-coup dtat in early 2012 and the ensuing flare-up of factionalism now ravaging the countrys north has been a process that seemed to slowly creep up onto the international stage, to the point where it has now become a dominating issue in world affairs. It was only last week that France saw fit to send its own troops to aid Malis beleaguered soldiers, and in that short period of time, an Algerian hostage crisis involving foreign nationals in one of the countrys oil refineries seems to have helped coalesce argumentsfrom within Mali, France, and the international community against foreign intervention into a general sentiment of acceptance.1,2 As direct international involvement in Mali becomes a material reality, such actions become symbolic of the Malian crisis significance relative to other internationally relevant situations unfolding elsewhere in the world. Placing the crisis in Syria on this plane of relative comparison perhaps cant be avoided, but problems such as the tensions between the M23 and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the
1 2

"Mali Conflict: France Aiming for 'total Reconquest'" BBC News. BBC, 20 Jan. 2013. Web. 22 Jan. 2013. "France: Hostage Crisis Justifies Mali Action." Al Jazeera English, 17 Jan. 2013. Web. 22 Jan. 2013.

heightening of ethnic violence in Kenya in the lead-up to elections are just a few issues which exhibit a similar capacity for regional or at least internal instability within Africa.3 However Malis current predicament carries roots that, when traced backwards through time, reveal a complex trajectory through historical circumstance that today grant Mali its distinctive quality among world crises. In this essay, I will argue that the political and social upheaval in Mali cannot be assessed by the classic metrics of failed statehood, as Malis current condition is not reducible to its ethnic discord, religious fundamentalism or any other internal condition. Nor can future solutions be expected from an external bolstering of the status quo, as the recent intervention and general state of international dialogue would suggest. Instead, I will argue that a fruitful and sustainable end to the conflict in Mali can only take place with an acknowledgement and reversal of longstanding governmental negligence in regard to the enduring inequalities entrenched within Malis cultural milieu. Such domestic reforms, which would be aimed at both the social and legal frameworks that perpetuate and strengthen Malis ethnic divisions, could do little without a concurrent acknowledgement on the part of foreign powers whose self-interested activities in North Africa played an undeniable role in constructing the pressures now facing a vulnerable Mali. Officially, Malis current problems began when the channels of power in Malis much touted democratic government altered to take on a decidedly

Moshiri, Nazanine. "Reporter's Notebook: The Rise of M23." Al Jazeera English, 30 Dec. 2012. Web. 22 Jan. 2013.

undemocratic character. On March 22nd, 2012, military soldiers, in the absence of the Malian president, stormed the presidential palace in the countrys capital of Bamako and initiated a take-over of power. This coup served as an expression of the militarys increasing dissatisfaction with the acting administrations inability lead and equip Malian soldiers in the effort to fend off a coalition comprising of a cohort of Malis Tuareg ethnic minority and Islamic militia groups. The two had been working in tandem since the beginning of 2012 to wrest northern Mali from government control. The Malian military has since relinquished control of the government in the face of greater territory losses and rebel gains, and has ceded power to the speaker of Malis national assembly. However, throughout these different phases of governmental upheaval, there has been no positive change in the elected governments ability to engage with or counteract the gains of the rebel groupswho by the time of the coups reversal had claimed all of northern Mali under their confused and fragmented control. This confusion has been a facet of the rebellion since its beginnings in January, when the heavy artillery of Libyan rebel made their way into Azawadthe lands of north Mali that have long been home to separatist sentiments. Those separatist sentiments managed to cohere a mainly secular and nationalistic movement for a perceived reclamation of ethnic territory, with a hyper-religious movement that incorporates an element of ethnic self-rule, but is more concerned with the imposition of religious rule. In the Malian crisis of 2012, these discordant elements exploited each other for their shared aims, but after pushing the Malian government from the north, the two groups formerly

aligned groups came into conflict, which resulted in the dominance of Islamist groups. This is a basic account of Malis recent troubles and in the interest of easily digestible narrative, addresses only the manifest content of the problems facing the country. As insufficient as this glimpse of Mali may be, it seems to be the dominant narrative in not only media accounts of the crisis, but also serves as the basic framework for the decisions of the international community. The conception of Mali as a disintegrating bastion of North African democracy and or lawless Afghanistan of Africa should ideally be dismissed as reckless simplifications of a complex situation, but the international consensus on action in Mali appear to be deriving their decisions from this representation of the conflict.4 In the preceding account, there was little in the way of explaining how the Malian military could rationally hold their government responsible for their own failures in combatting rebels in the north. There was also little background on the rebels themselves and their reasons for rebellion. Despite the part in the account implying that the rebels perhaps were not a monolithic entity and that their brief unity ignored an internal conflict between an ethnic nationalism and an opportunistic brand of religious expansion the narratives emphasis on the governmental breakdown makes it easy to gloss over these subtle distinctions. Bringing these distinctions into sharp relief requires a momentary abandonment of the present and a shifting of attention towards the tangled and divergent histories of all the groups implicated in Malis current crisis.

Doyle, Mark. "Mali: Dangers of Dealing with 'Afghanistan of West Africa'" BBC News. BBC, 13 June 2012. Web. 22 Jan. 2013.

This means assessing the history of the modern Malian state, along with that of the Islamist groups, andperhaps most importantlythat of the Tuareg people, whose rebellion initiated the chain of events that brought Mali to its current state. Malis exit from French colonial rule in 1960 came in the form of an orderly petitioning of Frances national assembly by the colonys democratic movement. The most prominent of these movements was known as the African Democratic Rally (RDA) and it incorporated the separatist sentiments of all French West Africa. Only after independence was won in this region did Mali become a separate entity from this landmass, carving out its own leadership and government structures from the remnants of the RDA and the vestiges of former French rule. Mobido Keita, as the first president of the newly independent Malian state, served as the architect of this process. Building off of the centralism that characterized the French approach to colonial governance, Keitas leftist leanings led the country towards an interventionism that aligned with post-independence sentiments of national solidarity and cohesion.5 Like elsewhere in Africa, socializing policies in the administrative, political, and economic realms offered a self-actualizing image of national unity in the wake of colonial rule. Keitas tenure as president of Mali saw these policies of centralization pushed with the goals of both attaining food sufficiency on a national level and funding national investments with centralized agricultural products.6

"Mali, a Nation Still in Search of a State - Africa Governance Institute." Mali, a Nation Still in Search of a State - Africa Governance Institute. African Governance Institute, 2010. Web. 22 Jan. 2013. 6 Koenig, Dolores, and Timan Diarra. "The Environmental Effects of Policy Change in the West African Savanna: Resettlement, Structural Adjustment and Conservation in Western Mali." Journal of Political Ecology 5 (1998): 30-31. JSTOR. Web. 22 Dec. 2012.

However, President Keitas socialism came with an authoritarian bent, as his government maintained a one-party system that was perhaps seen as maintaining equilibrium in Malis pluralistic society, but ultimately weakened the government and damaged the condition of civic life in Mali. Well-intentioned or not, the relatively benign character of Keitas one-party government was exploited in 1968 by a military coup that positioned itself against the governments socialist constraints. In reality, the militarys true motivation was self-preservation, as Keita had committed to reject foreign aid directed toward boosting its military and even went to so far as to slash domestic military spending.7 With Keita deposed and replaced by a lieutenant named Moussa Traor, Malis affairs were now conducted under a pronouncedly authoritarian military. Upon assuming power Traor suspended the constitution, brought Mali under the control of a military-police state, and brought an end to all political activity in the country. Although Traors coup exploited a cultural moment within Mali characterized by dissatisfaction with the general stagnancy of Keitas socialist policies, Traor accomplished relatively little in the way of directing Mali away from its established centralist doctrine. At the time of Keitas fall from power, state ownership of the nations economy was its height, with over 90% of the countrys economic firms and business projects belonging to the state. The pressure for increased efficiency and profit margins were insulated by state ownership and foreign aid from competitive interventionists in the east and west were often

Wolpin, Miles D. "Legitimising State Capitalism: Malian Militarism in Third-World Perspective." The Journal of Modern African Studies 18.02 (1980): 286-87.JSTOR. Web. 20 Dec. 2012.

needed to pay for the losses of state owned companies. 8 In contrast the economic condition of Mali under Keita, Traors initial inclination toward free market economic reform faced opposition from a bureaucratic elite who were at the controlling end Malis state apparatus. This was class that benefitted from Keitas institutional constraints on private enterprise by appropriating surplus for personal use, often in expenditures and investments in foreign markets. The practices of this class in Malian society subverted the socialist implementation of Malis productive forces under Keita, and pressured Traor to maintain the status quo. These pressures coupled with general lack of interest in the country on the part of foreign investors due to poorly managed Malian enterprises in financially unappealing industries.9 Only in Malis recently discovered mineral reserves was there a substantial interest in private investments from abroad. Thus Traor denationalized Malis government to a very limited extent, with the bulk of the process represented in the opening up of the countrys mineral wealth to foreign investment. Traors remained president of Mali for 25 years, and in that time, the devastating Sahelian drought and bloody civil insurgencies exacerbated the already worsening economic condition in Mali. Caught between the destructive forces of a bloated but politically important public sector, and inefficient privatization of the economy, Malis national debt began to rapidly increase. Structural inefficiencies were not solely to blame for this period of economic distress. As Mali grew increasingly reliant on foreign funds in the 70s and 80s, the siphoning of national funds for personal use by Malis bureaucratic elite became so widespread that not
8 9

Ibid. p. 284 Ibid. p. 284-285

only did the practice now pose an ideological and moral contradiction to the government, but also contributed significantly to Malis economic malaise. It was then no surprise that these conditions severely weakened the legitimacy of Traors authority in the eyes of individual Malians suffering from problems ranging from hunger and joblessness, to free-speech suppression and arbitrary imprisonment. By 1991, the range of issues facing Malis citizens came to a saturation point within the society and provoked a cyclical exchange of increasing public demonstrations and government reprisals that finally resulted in Traors ouster. The calls for an end to the one-party system found throughout Africa during this time were realized in Mali during this transition, with the formation of an opposition party that produced the countrys next president. The election of president Alpha Oumar Konare, a lieutenant in Malis military, were accompanied by sweeping governmental reforms, the greatest of which being a the re-instating of constitutional governance based on a newly drafted constitution.10 While Malis first president pursued a continuation of the centralist policies already institutionalized by Malis former colonizers, and the Traor presidency sought liberalization only insofar as it did not alter the basic parameters of Malis corrupt state bourgeoisthe Konare administration represented a substantive break with established modes of governance and finance in the country. President Konare, along with many in Mali who had hardened to the contradictions and inefficiencies of the countrys bloated civil service and centralized governance,

10

Wolpin, Miles D. "Legitimising State Capitalism: Malian Militarism in Third-World Perspective." The Journal of Modern African Studies 18.02 (1980): 282 .JSTOR. Web. 20 Dec. 2012.

envisioned a future Mali that would gain prosperity from a less centralized government and a deeper integration with the world market. This process of decentralization came about as response to a variety of pressures. One pressure was that of conformity, as Malis rising calls for multi-party government and widespread reforms ascended with the tide of democratization and economic liberalization occurring elsewhere in Africa. African regimes with similar roots in averted socialisms followed different paths to this moment, but the shared characteristic was a decaying in the norms of legitimate authority. From roots long since established in the socialist and populist founding of these states, public conceptions of democracy grew from an accountability of a bureaucratic leadership through the procedure of an established legal framework and gave way to ideas of self-governance and self-determination.11 Decentralization In Mali was to be instrumental in this flattening of the traditionally vertical structures of government power in order to bring Malis citizenry closer to direct representation. There were however, other pressures which led to Malis decentralization process that had less to do with comprehensive political change. In order to become a viable reality, the reconstruction and even the new addition of political institutionsboth in the central government and in local areas of governance in Malis disparate regionrequired the confidence of the international community for continued and increased aid. Specifically, the International Monetary Fund had then maintained a strong association between decentralization and good governance. Thus, the process of ceding the inefficient control Malis government exerted over

11

Ibid p. 284

the levels of the public sector was politically attractive on both the domestic and international levels. One specifically important group to whom these policies of shrinking the potency of central government appeared especially attractive were the Tuareg people of Northern Mali.12 The Tuareg comprised an intensely cohesive group with a shared a pre-colonial history and culture that was found not only in Mali, but permeated through the modern borders of North African states.13 During the days of French colonialism, the Tuaregs relationship to centralized power was extremely unstable, as their societies did not integrate with the sedentary urban Africans in the south of Mali. Thus there existed a definite tendency towards separatism, even during the time of French rule, as the roving pastoralist culture of the Tuaregs many tribes rejected efforts towards their incorporation into a solid structure of authority. This continued into Malian independence, as African self-rule brought into sharp contrast the animosities underlying the cultural relationship between the Tuareg and their black African neighbors. Historic practices of Tuareg owning black slaves and their lack of sedentary culture solidified the view, both in the largely black African populace and government, that the Tuareg were both socially and economically and posed an obstacle to national development.14 Over the years this has led to numerous Tuareg rebellions, and due to the resiliency of Tuareg groups

12

Ceely, Jennifer. "AfricaBib | Search Results." AfricaBib | Search Results. N.p., Sept. 2001. Web. 24 Jan. 2013. 13 Keita, Kalifa. Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali. [Carlisle Barracks, Pa.]: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1998. Print.
14

Keita, Kalifa. Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali. [Carlisle Barracks, Pa.]: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1998: 8-9. Print.

afforded them by their disparate organization and despite their cohesive culture, often came at great cost to the Malian government. An especially destructive insurrection against against Malis government under President Traors regime coincided with Malis deepening economic woes and helped contribute to the creation of Malis multi-party government under Konar. For the government of President Konar, the benefits of decentralization were found not only in the increased productivity of the economic sector, or the greater enfranchisement for both the countrys rural and urban population, but it appeared as a nonconfrontational method for peacefully incorporating Tuareg population under the purview of governmental control. The precipitous decline in the stability of Malis government and society began in 2012 as the newest iteration of Tuareg discontent with the Malian governments attempts at reform. However, in the space in the relationship between a Malian establishment and Tuareg dissenters, there exists a less evident complex of international actors. These can be divided into two categories: the long-held policies of western powers, specifically in the United States, and the formation of Islamist elements through international neglect, external fomentation, and foreign funding. The role of the United States in Malis current crisis is an interesting one and is analogous to its history of noncommittal intervention in Africa. There was once a sense of novel fascination in the United States, regarding the mystical swirlings of ideology that characterizes much of the internal crises in the states we know as troublesome, or those that are definitively termed failing. These states tend to exist together on a universal plane of shared iniquities, ranging from instances of

blatant power grabs, dishearteningly entrenched ethnic tensions, resource mismanagement, and a host of other clear evils that can be found academically itemized in the writings of any international watchdog or humanitarian group. The 1990s were a time when these failed states appeared as aberrations amidst an era anointed by a moment of liberal ascendency. The fall of the Soviet Union that preceded the decade along with the widespread democratic movements-turned governments in the post-colonial world, together seemed to signal a long-awaited a triumph of liberal ideals in the modern world. Thus the realist securing of national interests that dominated the foreign policy of the United States and other western powers, gave way to policy and interventions which incorporated a kind magnanimous national character, central to the ideal positivism of liberal doctrine. The United States especially exhibited a marked divergence in its foreign policy during this time, turning away from the instigating of self-serving coups in Latin America and the protection of oil interests in the Middle East toward ostensibly more humanitarian endeavors. The 90s saw the United States stand with its strategic allies against aggressors in its military support for Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The notion of a direct linking between national interest and military intervention was greatly countered in this era with the involvement of the US in Somalia, Haiti, and Yugoslavia. It seemed that the ardor for a stable world order resulting from the aftermath of World War II and enshrined in the supranational bodies created at its wake, wereafter 50 years of complete reticence or even negligence to these idealsfinally were seeing meaningful expression in the international conduct of world powers, especially in the United States.

Whether or not practiced liberal doctrine in this era adhered to the more lofty of its guiding principles and other doubts regarding this space between theory and practice were existent in the 90s, but were dragged into a critical form of spotlight in the new millennium. Nineties liberalisms encounter with the American public had a constitutive impact on domestic culture, bringing about significant policy changes with economic and social ramifications that palpably reverberated through American society. The inherent humanist tendencies in the core of liberal doctrine, during this time of ideological and practical dominance, extended itself through all spheres of life. Liberal blocs in American government succeeded in presenting policies that were widely accepted as the sensible course for governance, both domestically and internationally. Democrat and Republican administrations in the 90s alike worked from a shared liberal logic, especially in the realm of foreign affairs. Both President Bill Clinton and George Bush Sr. led international interventions that shared a liberal impetus and rationale. The motives for both involvement in the Gulf War and Bosnia-Serbia crisis were explained in the language of universal gain as opposed to direct national interest along with the general weight of humanist morality. Though the aforementioned international conflicts are exemplary of liberalisms hold on international policy decisions and general governance during the 1990s, it was undoubtedly attaining ideological dominance in spite of widening holes in its internal logic. The intervention in Somalia, initiated by Bush Sr. and then vigorously pursued by Clinton, was perhaps the most inarguably liberal military intervention of the time. The humanitarian element of the mission, first titled

Operation Restore Hope was at the core of the whole endeavor, and with the absence of serious material implications for the international status quo, it served as the first pure test of humanitarian intervention and its place within liberalism. However, the missions outcome dealt a critical blow to liberalisms ideological dominance in the political and social sphere. Though the mission, in conjunction with the UN helped assuage the immediate concerns in the region, which were civilian famine and aid distribution, it failed to follow through on aims for reconciliation amongst the nations warlords and the restoration of a functioning government. The same absence of direct national interest in the United States involvement in Somalia also worked to rapidly bring down to popularity of the mission among citizens when the American death toll reached unexpectedly high numbers. Bill Clintons presidency, the preamble to the kind millennial liberalism that operates in our world today, began from ideologically damaged position. Despite an apparent commitment on Clintons part to stay the course in Somalia, the snags and the complexities of the mission that were encountered on the ground were incommensurable with the established logic of liberalism in Americas political and private spheres. Moving into the new millennium, the strongly held liberal ideals which seemed so inseparable from the market reforms that together underlined much of the United States foreign policy agenda, were becoming less and less important. Instead of promoting foreign policy that ultimately assures stability in developing countries as allies, there has instead been a return to the indiscriminating securing of national interests at the expense of stability in many of the worlds regions where

US foreign policy has focused its attention. The crisis of modern Mali occurred in relation to US foreign policy enacted in North Africa since this realist turn early in the decade. The significance of North Africa to United States foreign policy comes from two inter-related categories of US strategy concerns: energy security and military security. Americas relationships with Mauritania, Libya, Chad, and Algeria, correspond to the US interest in maintaining and cultivating a supportive relationship to these regimes that are key players in the world oil trade. The emphasis on military security comes from the redirection of Americas military focus and resources in the wake of 9/11, but also even later, after the initial US military successes in Afghanistan.15 Though Mali seems tangential in this larger discussion of US policy in North Africa, it is in Malis very character as a minor player squeezed between major international interests that it was able to reach its current level of instability.

15

Zoubir, Yahia H. "The United States and Maghreb-Sahel Security." International Affairs85.5 (2009): 977-95. Print.