Case Analysis: Lancanshire County Council and another v B (a child) [2000] 2A.C 147 (HL) 1.

The issue for decision is whether the threshold of conditions for the making of care order as was stated by s31. Of the Children Act were met due to the fact that the courts could not identify if it was the parents (A.F and A.M) or the care giver (B.M)1 who caused the harm to the child. 2. The House of Lords gave a unanimous decision to the case mentioned above. The bulk, if not all of the judgement came from Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead and Lord Clyde, with Lord Nolan, Lord Hoffman and Lord Slynn of Hadley merely reading the judgement put forward by Lord Nicholls and agreeing to the reasons given. Lord Nicholls started by looking into the statute and section in question, Section (31) of the Children Act 1989, and trying to interpret the threshold conditions as best as he could using the spirit of the parliament, purposively if literal interpretation would cause absurdity. He went through previous similar cases to see if the present case fulfilled the threshold conditions. He then began to go through the summary of the events and in doing so, he also critically examined the decisions by the previous Judges in the case and decided if he agreed with them or disagreed. He went to an in-depth examination of the arguments of both counsels and again agreed and disagreed where he saw fit. He analysed the appellants argument, saying at one point that their argument went too far in one direction and being too rigid. He dismissed the arguments of the appellants and the respondents saying that the results their arguments led to could not be right

A.F As father, A.M- As mother and B.M Bs mother is how they were identified during the trial and how they shall be identified for the rest of my analysis

He decided to interpret the act purposively stating that he could not believe that Parliament intended the attributable condition in section 31(2)b should operate in this way, which is that the child should be unprotected from the risk of further harm if the courts could not identify which of the parties inflicted the harm, the child, A should remain outside the threshold as propounded by the appellants counsel . He set out a permissible and preferable interpretation of s 31(2)(b)(i) by looking for a balance between the two extremes and finally dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the threshold conditions were met. Lord Clyde: started by agreeing to dismiss the appeal and then stating the reasons why. The issue of the case in his own terms, was then brought forward and explaining the for the subsection in question. He decided to explain what harm is and what its not with the help of the act. He decided that he had not been persuaded by the arguments for the appellants in the way the section ought to be contrused. He said that the language of the subsection did not necessarily ask for the identification of who caused the harm. He interpreted the subsection to not, point out the author of the harm but to find out if there is harm instead. He said that he had not found any guidance from all the previous cases and texts that had been used by both the previous courts. He decided that restricting the subsection on its scope to a particular group of people called the primary carers, as was favoured by the appellants, would lead to too many difficulties in its application and that the jurisdictional provision in the making of a care order should be given some latitude in order to cover the welfare of the child. He talked about a family is important and that the granting of care order should be made only when it is better for the child than making none at all. 3.

At the end of the trial the House of Lords unanimously dismissed the appeal. The appeal which was brought by the appellants, the parents of the child A was to reverse the decision of the court of Appeal which gave the state care of the child A. I find the decision by the decision of the House of Lords on this case sound and convincing. The physical and mental health of any child is really important and if the parents cannot be trusted to provide for normal growth of the child directly and indirectly, they should be relieved of their duties. Although it could not be proven if it was A.F. A.M or B.M who caused the injuries to the child A, the parents of A were infact very careless with their child. The fact that A was taken to the hospital for the same nonaccidental shaking two times before the 2nd of November, where the state got into an investigation of the matter should have alerted As parents, if they were infact innocent, that B.M, the child-minder in this case was incompetent. Even with all the assumptions stated above, this decision is still a very difficult one for the fact that there are two extremes as to what might have happened to A. She could have been injured by the child-minder B.M and as such her parents pay for a crime that they did not commit and the family is shattered or, the second scenario whereby the injuries where infact inflicted by the parents and living her there without, even supervision by the state would lead to more injuries to the child. This is where both counsels agree that interpreting the Children Act 1989 literally would lead to absurdity and I agree with their statements. Finally, I find it hard to disagree with the House of Lords, for although family is very important, and should be given the chance to remain together, life is more important than family and every child has the right to life. If the only way a child will continue living a normal life is away from the parents due to continuous lack of care on their side, by all means the state should be given the care of the child. Afterall, it is better to be more safe than sorry as regards to the life of any human being.