Professional Documents
Culture Documents
When laws become effective Tanada v. Tuvera Facts: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern (Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution) as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, Lorenzo M. Tanada, Abraham F. Sarmiento and Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (Mabini) seek a writ of mandamus to compel Juan C. Tuvera (in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President), Joaquin Venus (in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President), Melquiades P. de la Cruz (in his capacity as Director, Malacaang Records Office), and Florendo S. Pablo (in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing), to publish, and or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. Issue: Whether publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates Held: NO. Generally, publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. This is correct insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Article 2 of the New Civil Code, however, does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of the such provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. Further, publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. The publication of laws has taken so vital significance when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden on the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. The publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. Presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. However, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is an operative fact, which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Garcillano v. House of Representatives Facts: The Hello Garci tapes came out.They allegedly contained the Presidents instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress. On June 8, 2005, House Minority Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero delivered a privilege speech, setting in motion a congressional investigation jointly conducted by respondent House Committees. NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the House Committees seven alleged original tape recordings of the supposed three-hour taped conversation. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee members on the admissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played in the chambers of the House. On August 3, 2005, the hearings were suspended indefinitely. Nevertheless, they decided to prepare committee reports based on the said recordings and the testimonies of the resource persons. Garcillano then filed a petition for prohibition and injunction, with prayer for a TRO (the first of the two petitions in this case), asking that the respondent House Committees be restrained from using these tape recordings. He also asked that they be stricken off the record of and that the House desist from further using the recordings. The House discussion and debates on the Garci case then stopped. Two years after, Sen. Lacson delivered a privilege speech reviving the issue. The speech was referred to the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security.The following day, in plenary session, a lengthy debate ensued when Senator Richard Gordon aired his concern on the possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 42001(An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire-Tapping) if the body were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter. On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam DefensorSantiago delivered a privilege speech, articulating her considered view that the Constitution absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or communication of the contents of the Hello Garci tapes. However, she recommended a legislative
An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communications and for Other Purposes.
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION vs. GMA NETWORK G.R. No. 164026 FACTS On August 19, 1995, the petitioner, GMA NETWORK, INC., (GMA), a domestic corporation, filed an application for collective approval of various amendments to its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws with the respondent Securities and Exchange Commission, (SEC). The amendments applied for include, among others, the change in the corporate name of petitioner from "Republic Broadcasting System, Inc." to "GMA Network, Inc." as well as the extension of the corporate term for another fifty (50) years from and after June 16, 2000. Upon such filing, the petitioner had been assessed by the SECs Corporate and Legal Department a separate filing fee for the application for extension of corporate term equivalent to 1/10 of 1% of its authorized capital stock plus 20% thereof or an amount of P1,212,200.00. On September 26, 1995, the petitioner informed the SEC of its intention to contest the legality and propriety of the said assessment. However, the petitioner requested the SEC to approve the other amendments being requested by the petitioner without being deemed to have withdrawn its application for extension of corporate term. The following month, the petitioner formally protested the assessment amounting to P1,212,200.00 for its application for extension of corporate term. The following year,
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Exceptions to irretroactivity of laws LIAM LAW VS. OLYMPIC SAWMILL FACTS: Liam Law loaned 10k to Olympic Sawmill Corporation and Ellino Lee Chi. The loan became due but the debtors failed to pay and asked for an extension of 3 months instead. Law agreed but added an additional obligation of 6k to the principal amount. The debtors failed to pay again. Because of this, Law instituted a collection case against the debtors. The trial court ruled in favor of Law.
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Nationality Principle Conflicts Rules Llorente vs. CA Nationality Principle: Conflicts Rules FACTS: Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in Camarines Sur. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo left for the US Navy while Paula stayed in their conjugal home in Camarines Sur. Lorenzo was admitted to US citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization was issued in his favor. When Lorenzo was allowed to visit his wife in the Philippines, he discovered his wife was pregnant and was living in and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and the two drew a written agreement which essentially shows that Paula admitted her adulterous acts and that the couple agreed to separate. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce which was granted. Lorenzo returned to the Philippines and married Alicia Llorente. Alicia had no knowledge of the first
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9. Chato v. Fortune Tobacco RA 7654 was passed in June 10, 1993. Prior to its enactment, cigarette brands Champion, Hope and More were considered local brands subjected to a lower ad valorem tax rate. 2 days before RA 7654 took effect, Chato issued RMC 37-93 which reclassified the same cigarette brands resulting to the imposition of a higher ad valorem rate. In effect, the RMC subjected the cigarette brands to the RA even before it took effect. In a separate case (CIR v. CA), RMC 37-93 was held to be not valid for having fallen short of the requirements for a valid admin issuance. Fortune (the cigarette manufacturer) filed a complaint for damages against Chato in her private capacity. It contended that Chato violated Art. 32 of the CC by depriving it of its property without due process of the law and in violation of equal protection. To this, Chato argued that she issued the RMC in the performance of her official functions and within the scope of her authority so she cant be liable. She filed motion to dismiss. Via petition for certiorari, the denial of the motion to dismiss reached the SC. In its June 19, 2007 decision it ordered the trial court to proceed with the case. Chato moved for the reconsideration of that decision. Issue: w/n Chato can be held liable in her personal capacity for having issued the RMC NO Ruling: To determine whether a public officer is liable for improper or nonperformance of duty, it must be first determined what kind of duty is involved. There are 2 kinds of duties exercised by public officers. One is the duty owing to the public collectively and duty owing to particular individuals. The former pertains to officers who act for the public at large and are ordinarily paid out of the treasury. Ex. Governors duty to the public is to see to it that laws are properly executed, that competent officials are appointed by him, etc. Legislators owe a duty to the public to
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12. Baksh vs. Court of Appeals (219 SCRA 115) Facts: Baksh, an Iranian citizen, courted respondent Gonzales. She accepted his love on the condition that they will get married, so he promised her that he will marry her. Gonzales parents made preparations by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors. Without getting married, Baksh and Gonzales lived together. Gonzales cherry got popped. Thereafter, Baksh began maltreating Gonzales and eventually told her that he no longer wanted to marry her and that he was already married to another woman. Gonzales filed a complaint for damages. Issue: W/N Article 21 of the New Civil Code is applicable such that damages may be awarded? Held: Yes! Article 21 applies! SC said that Article 21 is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold moral
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15. Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, Feb. 17 1997 Facts: Tabuena, Gen. Manager of the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), was instructed by Pres. Marcos to pay directly to the presidents office and in cash what the MIAA owes the Phil. National Construction Corp. (PNCC) in the amount of P55 million. The order was done both through phone and through a Presidential Memorandum, received through Gimenez, Marcos private secretary. With the help of the Asst. Gen. Manager, Dabao, and Acting Manager of the Financial Services Department, Peralta (they were the ones authorized to make withdrawals), Tabuena was able to release the amount of P55 million by means of 3 withdrawals. The money was delivered to the presidents office through Gimenez. Cases were filed against Tabuena and Peralta in the Sandiganbayan, charging them of malversation (Dabao was still at large). SB convicted them, saying
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COJUANGCO vs. PALMA FACTS: The complainant Eduardo Cojuangco is a client of ACCRA, w h o a s s i g n e d t h e c a s e t o A t t y . P a l m a , t h e respondent. The f o r m e r h i r e d t h e l a t t e r a s h i s p e r s o n a l c o u n s e l f o r h i s business. Atty. Palma becomes very close to the family of Cojuangco, and he dines and goes with them abroad. He even tutored, complainants 22year old daughter Maria Luisa Cojuangco (Lisa). On June 22, 1982, respondent married Lisa in Hongkong without the knowledge of the complainant and despite the facts that the former is already m a r r i e d a n d w i t h t h r e e ( 3 ) c h i l d r e n . C o m p l a i n a n t s e n d s h i s t w o s o n s t o persuade Lisa to go home with them, which she did. In the celebration of respondents marriage with Lisa he misrepresented himself as a bachelor. On August 24, 1982, complainant filed with the Court of First Instance, a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage and which was granted. Subsequently complainant filed a disbarment complaint on the ground of grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed in him. Respondent in his answer filed a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action. As he contends that complaint fails to allege acts constituting deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct or violation of his lawyers oath. ISSUE: W O N r e s p o n d e n t s a c t s c o n s t i t u t e d e c e i t , m a l p r a c t i c e , gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer that would warrant his disbarment. YES!
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Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities - July 30, 2008 Facts: Reyes is the Vice-President of Wincorp, a corporation that arranges and brokers loans of its clients, one of whom is Pearlbank Securities. Sometime before this case, investors or lenders made demands on Pearlbank to pay several loans that were brokered by Wincorp. The investors alleged that they werent able to collect on their outstanding credits with Wincorp because Pearlbank didnt pay. Apparently, Pearlbank alleges that it did not have any outstanding loans that WINCORP brokered. Thus Pearlbank investigated on these alleged debts. Pearlbank demanded from Wincorp a full and accurate accounting of the identities and investments of the lenders and the alleged debts of Pearlbank with supporting records and documents. Wincorp did not respond to this demand. Pearlbank instituted a case with the SEC, now pending with the RTC (bec. of that law which transferred jurisdiction with the RTCs, for full and accurate accounting of investments and alleged loan obligations of Pearlbank. Pearlbank, through its treasurer, also filed complaints with the DOJ against officers of Wincorp, one of them was Reyes, for falsification of commercial and private documents.
PIMENTEL V PIMENTEL
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4 Section 4, Republic Act 9048. 5 Art. 407. Acts, events, and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register. Art. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register: (1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)acknowledgements; (10) naturalization; (11) loss or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
2 No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority 3 Clerical Error Law
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22. Republic v. Cagandahan Topic of SEX under Legal Capacity/ Doctrine: Change of Gender not a mere typographical or clerical error, hence subject to judicial order. Facts: In her petition, she alleged that she was born as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. Petitioner further alleges that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff. (She has both male and female organs!) Court granted petition, to which the OSG countered, saying among others, that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondent's claimed medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male, and that the local civil registrar should be impleaded as an indispensable party . Issue: whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff," under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court. Held: Petition denied. Cagandahan wins. Ratio: Article 412 of the Civil Code provides: No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by R.A. 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. In short, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Further, the medical testimony proves that Cagandahan has this unique condition which makes her feel and appear like a man. In other words, the Court respects her congenital condition and her mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with her unordinary state and thus help make her life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case. As for her change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be
LILIA contested validity of the pre-trial order and asked the court for an opportunity to present evidence that: (1) 1st marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and Maxion and (2) Maxion, at the time of their marriage, was already married to someone else. Hon. Sempio-Dy ruled against the presentation f evidence because the existence of force exerted on LILIA and Maxion had already been agreed upon. LILIA assailed Sempio-Dys Orders (compelling to submit the case for resolution based on agreed facts and denying motion to present evidence in her favor) through a Petition for Certiorari alleging GADALEJ.
Issue: Sempio-Dy guilty of GADALEJ? Held: No. Petition dismissed. There is no need for LILIA to prove that her 1st marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties, because even assuming this to be so, marriage WILL NOT BE VOID but merely voidable, and therefore VALID until annulled. Since there was no annulment yet, it is clear that when she married Karl Wiegel, she was still validly married to Maxion. Thus, her marriage to Karl is VOID. There is likewise no need to introduce evidence about the existing prior marriage of Maxion at the time he and LILIA were married, because even if their marriage was void, a judicial declaration of such fact is necessary. Without the judicial declaration, LILIA (for all legal intents and purposes) was still regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with Karl Wiegel. Thus, marriage to Karl would still be regarded as VOID under the law.
24. TY v. CA
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Joselano Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose Emmanuel Eala A.C. No. 7136 August 1, 2007 Facts: On March 4, 2002 a complaint of disbarment was filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala for grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyers oath. In the Complaint, Guevarra first met the respondent in January 2000 when his then fiance Irene Moje introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne Tantoco with whom he had three children.
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27 Aranes v Occiano Facts: Merceditas Aranes charged Judge Occiano with gross ignorance of the law in a letter complaint because said judge solemnized her marriage (Feb. 17, 2000) with Dominador Orobia outside of his territorial jurisdiction and without the requisite marriage license. She and Orobia relying on the marriage lived together as husband and wife for many years but on his death she was deprived of inheriting from him because their marriage was a nullity. She was likewise deprived of receiving Orobias pension from the navy. In his comment, the Judge said that on Feb. 15, 2000, a Juan Arroyo asked him to solemnize the marriage between the parties on the assurance that all the necessary
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28. NAVARRO v. DOMAGTOY Facts: Complainant Municipal Mayor Navarro filed an administrative case against Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Domagtoy for gross misconduct, inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. First, he solemnized a wedding despite knowing that the groom is merely separated from his first wife. Second, he performed another marriage ceremony outside his courts jurisdiction. His jurisdiction was Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte, but he solemnized the wedding at his residence in Dapa. Judge Domagtoy seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the wedding of a married man because he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the MTC Judge confirming the fact that the husband has not seen his first wife for almost 7 years. Regarding the second charge, he did not violate Art. 7, par. 1 of the FC (marriage may be solemnized by any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction) and that Art.8 applies: The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the churchand not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote placesor where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement Issues:
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REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, Petitioner, vs. ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, Respondent. Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife. Respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court. In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter has failed on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child. Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental advice from his parents before he got married. He also averred that they never lived together as husband and wife and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child. Trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when, on the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide support to the child when the latter is not, and could not have been, his own child. ISSUES: First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for support and second. Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked. However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
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BORJA-MANZANO V. SANCHEZ Herminia Borja-Mariano was married to the late David Manzano on May 21, 1966. They had four children. However, on March 22, 1993, David contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before Infanta, Pangasinan MTC Judge Roque Sanchez. During that time, Payao was also married to Domingo Relos. Payao and David issued an affidavit stating that they were both married however due to
incessant quarrels, they both left their families and they no longer communicated with them. They have lived together as husband and wife for 7 years. Judge agreed to solemnize the marriage. Herminia filed charges of gross ignorance of the law against Sanchez. ISSUE: Whether or not David Manzanos marriage with Payao is valid?
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Anonuevo vs Intestate Estate of Rodolfo Jalandoni Facts: Rodolfo Jaladoni died intestate. Bernadino Jalandoni (Rodolfos brother) filed a petitioner for issuance of letters of administration. Petitioners and their siblings filed a manifestation that they were the children of Sylvia who in turn was the child of Isabel Blee with one John Desantis. Note however that Isabel Blee was allegedly legally married to Rodolfo Jalandoni at the time of the latters death (hence, petitioners are supposedly Rodolfos grandchildren). Petitioners presented 2 marriage certificates between Isabel and Rodolfo and Sylvias birth certificate. Petitioners assert that these pieces of evidence are enough to establish that Isabel was the spouse of Rodolfo and as such, they are the lawful representatives. However, Bernardino begged to differ. Notably, the birth
REPUBLIC VS. DAYOT FACTS: Jose and Felisa Dayot were married. Later on, Jose filed a complaint for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham. There was no marriage ceremony; his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud; the affidavit of marital cohabitation was false. However, the petition was dismissed. The CA likewise affirmed. But then it changed its mind and ruled in favor of Jose.
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Garcia vs Recio Recio, a Filipino, married Samson, an Australian, here in the Philippines. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. A few years later, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. After a few years, Recio became an Australian citizen. He married a Garcia in Cabanatuan. However, they separated without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. Garcia filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of bigamy. She contends that Recios marriage with Samson was still subsisting when they got married.
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38. Amor-Catalan v. CA Felicitas Amor-Catalan married Orlando Catalan on June 1950 in Pangasinan. They migrated to the US and became naturalized American citizens. They divorced in 1988.
6 Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
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Remo v. Secretary of Foreign Affairs Facts: Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine passport was expiring. Her passport stated her name as Maria Virginia Remo Rallonza (her given name, middle name, and husbands last name). Remo, whose marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport. This was denied by the DFA on the ground that the use of ones maiden name is allowed in passport applications only if the married name has not been used
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41. Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas (GR No. 186571, August 11, 2010) Facts: Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship. He married respondent Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig. Shortly after the wedding, Corpuz went back to Canada for business. When he returned to the Philippines he found out that Sto. Tomas was having an affair (mga babae talagatsk, tsk, tsk). Corpuz went to Canada and got a divorce. He wanted to marry another Filipina so he registered the divorce decree with the Pasig City Civil Registry Office. Nevertheless, he was informed by a NSO official that his marriage with Sto. Tomas still subsists and that for the divorce decree to be enforceable, it must first be judicially recognized by Philippine courts. So Corpuz filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage. The RTC ruled that he was not the proper party to institute the action because he was an alien; that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy provided in the 2nd paragraph of Article 26 of the New Civil Code. Issue: Can the alien spouse avail of the remedy in par. 2 of Article 26?
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2.
43. Ablaza v Republic Can a person bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil Code? Facts: The petitioner alleged that the marriage between his brother Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated is void because there was no a marriage license at the time the marriage was celebrated (the license was given a week later). The marriage was in 1949. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest. He also claims that he can impugn the validity of the marriage because it was void, even if after the death of his brother. Issue: Does he have standing? Held: Yes. Issue: Whether or not The RULE is applicable to the case? The SC AM states that only the husband or the wife can bring an action for the nullity of the marriage. However, in Carlos v Sandoval, the Court said that this wont apply to: 1. those actions commenced before March 15, 2003 (when the rules came out) 2. those filed for marriages celebrated before March 15, 2003 The marriage between Cresence and Leonila was under the Civil Code. It was way back in 1949. The AM has no application to them. Held: NO. The Court ruled in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli that the coverage of the RULE extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the FC which took effect on Aug. 3, 1988. The Bolos marriage took place on Feb. 1980. The RULE, which was promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Sec. 1 of the same reads: 44. Bolos v. Bolos, Oct. 20, 2010 Facts: Danilo and Cynthia Bolos were married on Feb. 14, 1980. On July 2003, Cynthia filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Art. 36 of the FC (psychological incapacity). RTC granted the petition. Danilo filed a Notice of Appeal. The RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilos failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Sec. 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (The RULE) (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC). Danilo then filed for certiorari (Rule 65) in the CA seeking to annul the orders of the RTC. CA granted the petition and reversed the RTCs decision. CA stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in this case as the Bolos marriage was solemnized before the Family Code took effect. Cynthia then filed a petition (Rule 45) in the SC.
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DINO V. DINO Difference of Void and Voidable: Necessity of Court Declaration 46. Weigel vs. Sempio-Diy Lilia Olivia Wiegel got married to Karl Heinz Wiegel on July 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church in Makati. Karl, upon learning that Lilia had a subsisting marriage, filed for a declaration of nullity of their marriage. Lilia contracted her first marriage with Eduardo Maxion on June 25, 1972. She claims that the first marriage is not valid because they were forced to enter the union and Maxion was married to someone else at that time. ISSUE: WON Lilias first marriage is void? HELD: No. Its voidable. Petition dismissed. RATIO: There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code). There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.
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psychological incapacity. She presented signs of immaturity Reynaldo: preferred to spend dependent on his parents for familys finances.
alleges that a year after their marriage, Reynaldo and irresponsibility as both husband and father as time with, and spend money on, his friends; was aid, and; was always dishonest with her about the
CIVREV DIGESTS MIDTERMS (DEAN DEL CASTILLO) 7. Interpretation by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
8. Church in the Philippines, while not decisive, should be given great respect by the courts. Trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State. No decision shall be handed down without the Solicitor Generals issuance of a certificate, stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition. Such certificate will be quoted in the decision. The certificate must be submitted within 15 days from the date the case is submitted for resolution.
Reynaldo had been terminated from employment in February 1986 and Rorida had been the sole breadwinner since. In March 1987, she resigned from her job and went to stay with her parents. Shortly thereafter, Reynaldo left her and their son, Andre, and had since abandoned their family. The trial court declared the marriage void and the Court of Appeals affirmed. ISSUE: W/N Reynaldo is psychologically incapacitated NO. The marriage subsists. RATIO: It has not been established that the defect spoken of is an incapacity. It is more of a difficulty, if not an outright refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations. Roridels evidence simply showed that she and Reynaldo could not get along. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities are not tantamount to psychological incapacity. Rather than merely failing to meet marital obligations, it is necessary to show that said person is incapable of doing so because of a psychological illness. Psychological incapacity is the mental incapacity to the most serious of psychological disorders demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity is characterized by: gravity, judicial antecedence, and incurability. (Art. 36 Guidelines laid down by the Court) 1. Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage is on the plaintiff. Doubt is resolved in favor of the continuation of the marriage. 2. The root of psychological incapacity must be: a.) clinically identified; b.) alleged in the complaint; c.) proven by experts; and d.) clearly explained in the decision. The evidence should satisfy the court that either, or both, of the parties is mentally ill to the extent that s/he could not have known the obligation s/he was assuming; or knowing the obligations, could not validly assume them. 3. Incapacity must exist at the time the marriage was celebrated. Perception of a manifestation is unnecessary at the time of the celebration, but the illness must be proven to exist at such moment. 4. Incapacity must be shown to be incurable or permanent. 5. Illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. 6. The essential obligations are those covered by Art. 68 to 71 of the Family Code, between spouses, and Art. 220, 221 and 225 as regards parents and their children.
Noel Baccay v. Maribel Baccay Topic under Psychological Incapacity/ Doctrine: Unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage per se, must clearly establish true incapability to perform basic marital covenants. Facts: Noel and Maribel were college sweethearts. Then, sometime in November 1998, Maribel informed Noel that she was pregnant with his child. They immediately wed days after before RTC QC. After the marriage ceremony, both agreed to live with Noel's family in their house. During all the time she lived with Noel's family, Maribel remained aloof and did not go out of her way to endear herself to them. She would just come and go from the house as she pleased, She never contributed to the family's coffer leaving Noel to shoulder all expenses for their support, she refused to have any sexual contact with Noel. Surprisingly, despite Maribel's claim of being pregnant, Noel never observed any symptoms of pregnancy in her! Trouble ensued and so Noel filed for declaration of nullity of the marriage, to which the Court granted, stating that Maribel failed to perform the essential marital obligations of marriage, and such failure was due to a personality disorder called Narcissistic Personality Disorder characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability as determined by a clinical psychologist. CA reversed, hence this petition. Issue: Marriage null and void under Article 36? Psychological incapacity? (in short, will the personality disorder and no sexy-time merit the nullity of marriage?) Held: Petition denied! Totality of evidence by Noel fails to prove P.I. Ratio: First, Santos v. Court of Appeals that the phrase "psychological incapacity" is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Second, Republic v. CA laid down the guidelines to determine P.I. a) Burden of Proof on petitioner/ Resolved in favor of validity and continuity of marriage b) Must be alleged in complaint that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. c) Medically proven to be permanently incurable in terms of marital obligations (INCURABILITY)
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Enrique Agraviador v. Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador G.R. No. 170729, December 8, 2010 Facts: PETITIONER (Enrique) met RESPONDENT (Erlinda) in 1971 at a beerhouse where RESPONDENT worked. PETITIONER, at that time, was a 24-year old security guard of the Bureau of Customs, while RESPONDENT was a 17-year old waitress. PETITIONER and RESPONDENT eventually became sweethearts. They soon entered into a common-law relationship. In 1973, PETITIONER and RESPONDENT married in a ceremony officiated by Reverend Reyes at a church in Tondo. PETITIONERs family was apprehensive because of the nature of RESPONDENTs work and because she comes from a broken family. Out of their union, they begot four children: Erisque, Emmanuel, Evelyn, and Eymarey. In 2001, PETITIONER filed with RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. PETITIONER alleged that RESPONDENT was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as she was carefree and irresponsible, and refused to do household chores like cleaning and cooking; stayed away from their house for long periods of time; had an affair with a lesbian; didnt take care of their sick child; consulted a witch doctor in order to bring him bad fate; and refused to use the family name Agraviador in her activities. PETITIONER further claimed RESPONDENT refused to have sex with him since 1993 because she became very close to a male tenant in their house (Enrique also discovered their love notes to each other, and caught them inside his room several times). RESPONDENT moved to dismiss petition on the ground that the root cause of her psychological incapacity was not medically identified. RTC denied motion. In her answer, RESPONDENT denied engaging in extramarital affairs and maintained that PETITIONER refused to have sex with her. PETITIONER
Issue: Whether there is basis to nullify the petitioners marriage to the respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations? Held: No. Petition denied. 1. TOTALITY OF EVIDENCE presented failed to establish RESPONDENTs psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity under Art. 36 is not vitiation of consent; it does not affect the consent to the marriage. Summary of Jurisprudential Guidelines:
2.
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v.
vi. vii.
viii.
e. Ting v. Velez-Ting & Suazo v. Suazo: clarified that Ngo Te did not
abandon Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements. Ngo Te merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on PI. 3. Summary of Evidence a. Petitioners testimony: Petitioners theory that the respondents psychological incapacity is premised on her refusal or unwillingness to perform certain marital obligations, and a number of unpleasant personality traits such as immaturity, irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness. These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of psychological
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OCHOSA v. ALANO G.R. NO. 167459, JANUARY 26, 2011 Soldier love story FACTS: It appears that Jose met Bona in August 1973 when he was a young lieutenant in the AFP while the latter was a seventeen-year-old first year college dropout. They had a whirlwind romance that culminated into sexual intimacy and eventual marriage on 27 October 1973 before the Honorable Judge Cesar S. Principe in Basilan. The couple did not acquire any property. Neither did they incur any debts. Their union produced no offspring. In 1976, however, they found an abandoned and neglected one-year-old baby girl whom they later registered as their daughter, naming her Ramona Celeste AlanoOchosa. During their marriage, Jose was often assigned to various parts of the Philippine archipelago as an officer in the AFP. Bona did not cohabit with him in his posts, preferring to stay in her hometown of Basilan. Neither did Bona visit him in his areas of assignment, except in one (1) occasion when Bona stayed with him for four (4) days. Sometime in 1985, Jose was appointed as the Battalion Commander of the Security Escort Group. He and Bona, along with Ramona, were given living quarters at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City where they resided with their military aides.
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56 De Castro v De Castro Declaration of Nullity FACTS: Reilen and Annabelle De Castro applied for a marriage license which however expired so instead they executed an affidavit stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for five years and got married in a civil rite with a judge. They in fact became sweethearts during 1991 and only started engaging in sex in October 1994. They executed the affidavit on March 1995. Annabelle gave birth to Reinna and is now asking for support from Reilen as his wife and for their child. He says that their marriage was void ab initio because they executed a fake affidavit; that he was just asked to sign the marriage contract because she wanted to be saved from embarrassment because she was pregnant and he didnt obtain the necessary parental advice. He avers that they never lived as husband and wife and he never acknowledged the child. Trial Court: No valid marriage because no marriage license but as father of child need to give support.
Cojuango v. Palma FACTS: Eduardo Cojuangco filed with the court the instant complaint for disbarment
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Antone v. Beronilla Facts: Antone executed a complaint for bigamy against Beronilla, alleging that her marriage with respondent had not yet been legally dissolved when the latter contracted a second marriage with Maguillo. Beronilla moved to quash the information because his marriage with Antone was declared null and void by the RTC. Absent a first marriage, he cannot be charged with bigamy. The court quashed the information. MR denied. CA dismissed the case as well. Issue: Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it sustained the motion to quash on the basis of a fact contrary to those alleged in the information Held: Yes A motion to quash an information is a mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the information. The court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted, or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage The issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the information does not constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by way of exception to the established rule that facts contrary to the allegations in the information are matters of defense which may be raised only during the presentation of evidence. The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in quashing the information. It considered an evidence introduced to prove a fact not alleged thereat disregarding
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ANCHETA vs. ANCHETA 424 SCRA 725 FACTS Petitioner Marietta Ancheta and respondent Rodolfo Ancheta were married on March 5, 1959 and had eight children. After 33 years of marriage the petitioner left the respondent and their children. Their conjugal properties were later separated through a court-sanctioned compromise agreement where the petitioner got among others a answer the said petition. Just over a month after it was filed, the trial court granted the petition and declared the marriage of the parties void ab initio. Five years later, petitioner challenged the trial courts order declaring as void ab initio her marriage with respondent Rodolfo, citing extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction over her person, among others. She alleged that the respondent lied on her real address in his petition so she never received summons on the case, hence depriving her of her right to be heard. The Court of Appeals dismissed her petition so she now comes to the Supreme Court for review on certiorari.
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YU VS. YU FACTS: Eric Jonathan Yu filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA, alleging that his estranged wife, Caroline Tanchay-Yu, unlawfully withheld from him the custody of their minor child, Bianca Yu. The petition included a prayer for the award to him of the custody of Bianca. Eric also filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and the dissolution of absolute community of property before the Pasig RTC. The petition also included a prayer for the award to him of the custody of Bianca, subject to the final resolution by the CA of his petition for habeas corpus. Because of this, the CA dismissed the petition for habeas corpus, having been rendered moot and academic. ISSUE: WON the Pasig RTC acquired jurisdiction over the custody issue??? RULING: YES. Art. 49. During the pendency of the action [for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage] and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. x x x It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)17 Art. 50. x x x x
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Antionio Macadangdang vs. CA, Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang Effect of death of one of the parties Antonio and Filomena got married in 1946 after living together for 2 years. Their business grew from a humble buy-and-sell business and sari-sari store operation into merchandising, trucking, transportation, rice and corn mill businesses, abaca stripping, real estate, and others. They have 6 children. While their financial stabilized, their marriage became shaky up to 1965 when they split up and the wife, Filomena, left for Cebu. When she returned to Davao in 1971, she learned of the illicit affairs of her estranged husband and she decided to file a complaint for legal separation. The judgment was rendered ordering the legal separation of the spouses. Since there is no complete list of the community property which has to be divided, pending the dissolution of the conjugal property, Antonio was ordered to pay P10k as support for the wife and the children. Filomena filed a motion for the appointment of an administrator and urging favorable action to impede unlawful sequestration of some conjugal assets and clandestine transfers by Antonio. Several motions objecting to this were filed by Antonio but were denied by the court. Antonio then appealed to CA, which dismissed the case. Hence, the case was brought to SC. Pending appeal, Antonio died. Counsel for Antonio informed the court and filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the case is already moot and academic as a consequence of the death of petitioner. Filomena agreed. ISSUE: WON the death of the petitioner rendered the case moot and academic? HELD: No. Legal problems do not cease simply because one of the parties dies and in view of the significant issues raised, this Court resolved to meet said issues frontally.
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67. Sabalones v. CA Petitioner Samson Sabalones was a member of our diplomatic service assigned to different countries during his successive tours of duties. He left to his wife, herein respondent Remedios, the administration of some of their conjugal properties for 15 years. When Samson retired as an ambassador, he came back to the Philippines but not to his wife and kids. 4 years later, he sought judicial authorization to sell a lot and building in Greenhills. It belonged to the conjugal partnership, but he claimed that he was 68 y.o, then, very sick and living alone without any income. He needed his share of the proceeds to defray his hospitalization costs. Remedios filed a counterclaim for legal separation. She alleged that the property in Greenhills was being occupied by her and her 6 kids and that they merely depended on support from the rentals earned by another conjugal property in Forbes Park. She also alleged that Samson was living with another woman, Thelma, and their 3 kids. She wanted a decree of legal separation and to order the liquidation of their properties, and that her husbands share be forfeited because of his adultery. It was found out in trial that Samson contracted a bigamous marriage with Thelma. Court granted legal separation and forfeiture of Samsons shares in the conjugal properties.
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Held: No! The order of the lower court violated Section 26 of CA186 (GSIS Charter) which prohibits the attachment, garnishment or freezing of any benefit granted by the Act. The order was in effect, a freeze order. The directive to deliver of the retirement benefits to Norma makes the default judgment doubly illegal because retirement benefits have been adjudged as gratuities or reward for lengthy and faithful service of the recipient and should be treated as separate property of the retiree-spouse. Thus, if the monetary benefits are
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73. Ching v. CA, Feb. 23, 2004 Facts: The Phil. Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a loan of P9M from the Allied Banking Corp. (ABC). By virtue of the loan, PBMCI executed a promissory note through Alfredo Ching (Alfredo), its EVP. As added security, Alfredo, together with 2 others, executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC binding them to jointly and severally guarantee the payment of all PBMCIs obligations owing to ABC to the extent of P38M. After a year, PBMCI contracted another loan with ABC for P13M. Thereafter, PBMCI defaulted in the payment of its loans. ABC filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment against PBMCI to collect the amounts due to it, impleading as co-defendants Alfredo and the 2 others in their capacity as sureties of PBMCI. The court granted ABCs application for a writ of preliminary attachment. In this regard, the deputy sheriff of the trial court levied on attachment the 100,000 common shares of Citycorp stocks in the name of Alfredo. Encarnacion Ching (Encarnacion), assisted by Alfredo, her husband, filed a motion to set aside the levy on attachment. She alleged that the 100,000 shares of stocks levied by the deputy sheriff were acquired by her and Alfredo during their marriage out of conjugal funds. Furthermore, the indebtedness covered by the continuing guaranty contract executed by Alfredo for the account of PBMCI did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Likewise, she alleged that being the wife of Alfredo, she was third-party claimant entitled to file a motion for the release of the properties. ABC filed a comment alleging mainly that Encarnacion has no personality to file any motion, not a being a party to the case. RTC granted the motion, lifting the writ of preliminary attachment on the shares of stocks. CA reversed such order, citing the same reasons given by ABC.
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Munoz v. Ramirez, G.R. 156125, August 23, 2010. Facts: This case involves a dispute of ownership over a parcel of land between Munoz and the spouses Erlinda Ramirez and Eliseo Carlos. 1989: Eliseo Carlos obtained a P136,500 housing loan and constructed a 2 story residential house over the subject parcel of land. This was secured by a real estate mortgage over the land. 1993: The land was purportedly sold to Munoz via deed of absolute sale for the total consideration of P602,000. Munoz claims that under the said sale, the spouses were given a chance to repurchase the lot within 1 year but they failed to do so. The spouses allege that the deed of sale is void for being falsified because what they entered into was a mortgage contract and not a deed of sale. They claim
Spouses Estonina v. Court of Appeals 266 SCRA 627 January 27, 1997 Facts: A lot was owned by Santiago Garcia, who has 9 children and a wife named Consuelo Garcia. Santiago already died when this controversy arose. Petitioners, the spouses Estonina, filed a case against Consuelo Garcia and was able to obtain an attachment over the land. While the case was pending, the 9 children sold their 1/10 share in the lot to Spouses Atayan, who are the respondents here. Estonina were able to obtain a favorable judgment against Consuelo Garcia. The land was sold at public auction and a TCT was issued in the name of Estonina. Atayan however filed a complaint for annulment of the sheriff sale and the TCT claiming that they own 9/10 of the land.
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CRUZ V LEIS FACTS Adriano Leis and Gertrudes Isidro were married on 19 April 1923. On 27 April 1955, Gertrudes acquired from the DANR a parcel of land in Marikina. The Deed of Sale described Gertrudes as a widow. Thereafter, TCT No. 43100 was issued in the name of "Gertrudes Isidro," who was also referred to therein as a widow. On 2 December 1973, Adriano died. On 5 February 1985, Gertrudes obtained a loan from petitioners, the spouses Cruz, in the amount of P15,000.00 at 5% interest, payable on or before 5 February 1986. The loan was secured by a mortgage over the property. On March 11 1986, due to her inability to pay her outstanding obligation when the debt became due and demandable, Gertrudes executed two contracts in favor of the petitioners. The first is denominated as "Kasunduan," a pacto de retro sale, granting Gertrudes one year within which to repurchase the property. The second is a "Kasunduan ng Tuwirang Bilihan," a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the same property. For failure of Gertrudes to repurchase the property, ownership thereof was consolidated in favor of the petitioners.
Anno v. Anno G.R. No. 163743 (480 SCRA 419) Facts: Petitioner Dolores Pintiano-Anno (Dolores) and respondent Albert Anno (Albert) were married in 1963. Dolores claims that during their marriage, they acquired a 4-hectare agricultural land in La Trinidad, Benguet. In 1974, the land was
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Uy v. CA Topic under Joint Administration; Sole/Transfer of Administration Doctrine: Incapacitated spouse warrants Judicial Guardianship under Rules of Court, not under the Family Code.
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Fuentes v. Roca Facts: Sabina Tarroza owned a titled 358-square meter lot in Canelar, ZamboangaCity. In 1982, she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale. But Tarciano did not for the meantime have the registered title transferred to his name. In 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel and Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses). They later signed an agreement to sell prepared by one Atty. Plagata dated April 29, 1988, which agreement expressly stated that it was to take effect in six months. The agreement required the Fuentes spouses to pay Tarciano a down payment of P60,000.00 for the transfer of the lots title to him. And, within six months, Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the consent of his estranged wife, Rosario Gabriel Roca (Rosario), to the sale. Upon Tarcianos compliance with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses were to take possession of the lot and pay him an additional P140,000.00 orP160,000.00, depending on whether or not he succeeded in demolishing the house standing on it. If Tarciano was unable to comply with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses would become owners of the lot without any further formality and payment. As soon as Tarciano met the other conditions, Atty. Plagata notarized Rosarios affidavit in Zamboanga City. On January 11, 1989 Tarciano executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of the Fuentes spouses. They then paid him the additional P140,000.00 mentioned in their agreement. A new title was issued in the name of the spouses who immediately constructed a building on the lot. On January 28, 1990 Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife Rosario who died nine months afterwards. Eight years later, the children of Tarciano and Rosario filed an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses with the RTC- Zamboanga City. The Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses was void since Tarcianos wife, Rosario, did not give her consent to it. Her signature on the affidavit of consent had been forged. They thus prayed that the property be reconveyed to them upon reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano. RTC dimissed the action. CA reversed. Hence, this petition.
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Homeowners Bank v. Miguela Dailo Facts: Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage, they purchased a house and lot situated at Barangay San Francisco, San Pablo City. The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife, Miguel. On December 1, 1993, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing her to obtain a loan from Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailo's house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan in the amount of P300,000.00 from Homeowners. The house and lot served as the security for the Real Estate Mortgage. Miguela had no knowledge of the SPA and of the REM. The loan was not paid and the house and extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings followed. At the sale, Homeowners ended up being the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued to Homeowners. A year passed and the property wasnt redeemed so Homeowners consolidated the ownership thereof by executing on June 6, 1996 an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale. Marcelino died on December 20, 1995. In one of her visits to the subject property, Miguela learned that Homeowners had already employed a certain Roldan Brion to clean its premises and that her Ford sedan was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire in the compound Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property, which was conjugal in nature, Miguela filed a case with the RTC for declaration of nullity of the mortgage and its subsequent sale, and for reconveyance. The RTC nullified the mortgage and the sale. It also instructed Homeowners to pay Miguela 40,000 for her Ford Sedan. The CA affirmed. Issues: 1. WON the mortgage constituted by Marcelino on the subject property as coowner is valid as to his undivided share. 2. WON the conjugal partnership is liable for the payment of the loan, because it redounded to the benefit of the family. Held: 1. NO! Co-ownership doesnt even apply here. Without the other spouses consent any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void. 2. NO! This assertion wasnt proven. Ratio: 1. In Guiang v. Court of Appeals it was held that the sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and wife. In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to
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SAN LUIS VS. SAN LUIS FACTS: Felicisimo contracted 3 marriages. Felicisimo married Virginia Sulit but she died [6 children]. Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin but divorced later on [one son]. Felicisimo married Felicidad San Luis but this time, Felicisimo died [no children]. Thereafter, Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate before the RTC. However, one of the children of Felicisimo in the first marriage, Rodolfo San Luis, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Felicidad has no legal personality since she was just a mistress of Felicisimo, the latter being legally married to Merry Lee. The RTC ruled in favor of Rodolfo. However, CA reversed. ISSUE: WON Felicidad has the legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration??? RULING: YES. Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative. The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus: In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799: "The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a
Cario vs Cario
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