ENBANC

ROSALINDAA.PENERA, Petitioner,

G.R.No.181613 Present: PUNO,C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARESSANTIAGO, CARPIO, CORONA, CARPIOMORALES, CHICONAZARIO, VELASCO,JR., NACHURA, LEONARDODECASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DELCASTILLO,and ABAD,JJ.

versus

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Promulgated: andEDGART.ANDANAR, September11,2009 Respondents. xx DECISION CHICONAZARIO,J.: ThisPetitionforCertiorariwithPrayerfortheIssuanceofaWritof PreliminaryInjunctionand/orTemporaryRestrainingOrder 1[1] underRule
1[1]

Rollo,pp.328.

65,inrelationtoRule64oftheRulesofCourt,seeksthenullificationofthe Resolution2[2] dated 30 January 2008 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc. Said Resolution denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the earlier Resolution3[3] dated 24 July 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division in SPA No. 07224, ordering the disqualification of herein petitioner Rosalinda A. Penera (Penera) as a candidate for the position of mayor of the Municipality of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte (Sta. Monica) in the 2007 Synchronized National and LocalElections. Theantecedentsofthecase,bothfactualandprocedural,aresetforth hereunder: Penera and private respondent Edgar T. Andanar (Andanar) were mayoraltycandidatesinSta.Monicaduringthe14May2007elections. On 2 April 2007, Andanar filedbeforethe Officeof theRegional Election Director (ORED), Caraga Region (Region XIII), a Petition for Disqualification4[4]againstPenera,aswellasthecandidatesforViceMayor and Sangguniang Bayan who belonged to her political party,5[5] for unlawfullyengaginginelectioncampaigningandpartisanpoliticalactivity prior to the commencement of the campaign period. The petition was docketedasSPANo.07224. Andanarclaimedthaton29March2007adaybeforethestartofthe authorizedcampaignperiodon30March2007Peneraandherpartymates went around the different barangays in Sta. Monica, announcing their candidaciesandrequestingthepeopletovoteforthemonthedayofthe elections.AttachedtothePetitionweretheAffidavitsofindividuals6[6]who witnessedthesaidincident.
2 [2]

4[4] 5

6[6]

PennedbyCommissionerNicodemoT.FerrerwithActingChairmanResurreccionZ. Borra and Commissioners Romeo A. Brawner, Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., and Moslemen T. Macarambon,Sr.,concurring,andCommissionerReneV.Sarmiento,dissenting;rollo,pp.4152. [3] PennedbyCommissionerNicodemoT.FerrerwithCommissionerFlorentinoA.Tuason, Jr.,concurring,andCommissionerReneV.Sarmiento,dissenting;id.at2940. Id.at5354. [5] Arcelito Petallo, Renato Virtudazo, Glorina Aparente, Silverio Tajos, Jose Platil, MedardoSunico,EdelitoLerioandSensualitoFebra. LoretaBillona,HermiloBotonaandVictorinoFlorendo;rollo,pp.5557.

Penera alone filed an Answer7[7] to the Petition on 19 April 2007, averringthatthechargeofprematurecampaigningwasnottrue.Although Peneraadmittedthatamotorcadedidtakeplace,sheexplainedthatitwas simplyinaccordancewiththeusualpracticeinnearbycitiesandprovinces, where the filing of certificates of candidacy (COCs) was preceded by a motorcade,whichdispersedsoonafterthecompletionofsuchfiling.Infact, Peneraclaimed,inthemotorcadeheldbyherpoliticalparty,nopersonmade any speech, not even any of the candidates. Instead, there was only marchingmusicinthebackgroundandagrandstandingforthepurposeof raisingthehandsofthecandidatesinthemotorcade.Finally,Peneracited Barrosov.Ampig8[8]inherdefense,whereintheCourtsupposedlyruledthat amotorcadeheldbycandidatesduringthefilingoftheirCOCswasnota formofpoliticalcampaigning. Also on 19 April 2007, Andanar and Penera appeared with their counselsbeforetheOREDRegionXIII,wheretheyagreedtosubmittheir positionpapersandotherevidenceinsupportoftheirallegations.9[9] AfterthepartiesfiledtheirrespectivePositionPapers,therecordsof the case were transmitted to the COMELEC main office in Manila for adjudication. It was subsequently raffled to the COMELEC Second Division. While SPANo.07224waspendingbeforetheCOMELECSecond Division, the 14 May 2007 electionstookplaceand,asaresult thereof, PenerawasproclaimedthedulyelectedMayorofSta.Monica.Penerasoon assumedofficeon2July2002. On 24 July 2007, the COMELEC Second Division issued its Resolution in SPA No. 07224, penned by Commissioner Nicodemo T. Ferrer(Ferrer),whichdisqualifiedPenerafromcontinuingasamayoralty candidate in Sta. Monica, for engaging in premature campaigning, in violationofSections80and68oftheOmnibusElectionCode. TheCOMELECSecondDivisionfoundthat:
7[7] 8 9[9]

Id.at5859. [8] 385Phil.237(2000). Rollo,p.127.

Ontheafternoonof29March2007,the1st[sic]daytofilethe certificatesofcandidacyforlocalelectivepositionsandadaybeforethe startofthecampaignperiodfortheMay14,2007elections[someofthe membersofthepoliticalpartyPartidoPadajonSurigao],headedbytheir mayoraltycandidateDattyPenera,filedtheirrespectiveCertificatesof CandidacybeforetheMunicipalElectionOfficerofSta.Monica,Surigao delNorte. Accompaniedbyabevyofsupporters,[Peneraandherpartymates] cametothemunicipalCOMELECofficeonboardaconvoyoftwo(2) trucksandanundeterminednumberofmotorcycles,ladenwithballoons ad[sic]posters/bannerscontainingnamesandpicturesandthemunicipal positionsforwhichtheywereseekingelection.Installedwith[sic]oneof thetruckswasapublicspeakersoundsubsystemwhichbroadcast[sic]the intentthe[sic]runinthecomingelections.Thetruckhadthepostersof Penera attached to it proclaiming his [sic] candidacy for mayor. The streamerof[MarLongos,acandidateforthepositionofBoardMember,] wasproudlyseenatthevehiclesside.Thegroupproceededtomotorcade untilthebarangaysofBailan,Libertadandasafar[sic]asMabinialmost nine(9)kilometersfromSta.Monica.[Peneraandherpartymates]were seen aboard the vehicles and throwing candies to the residents and onlookers. Various affidavits and pictures were submitted elucidating the abovementioned facts. The above facts were also admitted in the Answer,thePosition Paperandduringthehearings conducted forthis case,theonlydefensepropoundedby[Penera]isthatsuchactsallegedly do not constitute campaigning and is therefore not proscribed by the pertinentelectionlaws. xxxx What wehowever finddisturbing is [Peneras] reference tothe AmpigCaseasthejustificationfortheactscommittedby[her].Thereis reallynoreferencetotheactsorsimilaractscommittedby[Penera]as havingbeenconsideredasnotconstitutingpoliticalcampaignorpartisan politicalactivity.Theissueinthatcaseiswhetherornotthedefectofthe lackofacertificationagainstnonforum[sic]shoppingshouldresulttothe immediate dismissal of the election cases filed in that case. There is nothinginsaidcasejustifyingamotorcadeduringthefilingofcertificates ofcandidacy.[Peneras]reliancethereonisthereforemisplacedandofno potencyatall.

xxxx However, the photos submitted by [Andanar] only identified [Penera]anddidnothaveanynotationidentifyingorindicatinganyofthe other[candidatesfromPenerasparty].Itcannotbeconclusivelyproven thattheother[candidatesfromPenerasparty]wereindeedwithPenera duringtheMotorcade. Moreimportantly,theAnswerandthePosition Papercontainadmissionsreferringonlyto[Penera].Thereisthereforeno justificationforawholesale[sic]disqualificationofallthe[candidates fromPenerasparty],aseventhepetitionfailedtomentionparticularlythe participationoftheotherindividual[partymembers].10[10]

TheaforequotedfindingsoffactledtheCOMELECSecondDivision todecree:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Commission resolves to disqualify[Penera]butabsolvestheother[candidatesfromPenerasparty] fromviolationofsection80and68oftheOmnibusElections[sic]Code. 11 [11]

CommissionerFlorentinoA.Tuason,Jr.(Tuason)wroteaSeparate Opinion12[12] on the 24 July 2007 Resolution. Although Commissioner Tuasonconcurredwiththeponente,hestressedthat,indeed,Penerashould bemadeaccountableforheractionsafterthefilingofherCOCon29March 2007. Priorthereto,there wasnocandidateyetwhosecandidacywould havebeenenhancedbytheprematurecampaigning. It was the third member of the COMELEC Second Division, CommissionerReneV.Sarmiento(Sarmiento)whoputforthaDissenting Opinion13[13] on the 24 July 2007 Resolution. Commissioner Sarmiento believed that the pieces of evidence submitted by Andanar did not sufficiently establish probable cause that Penera engaged in premature campaigning,inviolationofSections80and68oftheOmnibusElection Code.Thetwophotocopiedpictures,purportingtobethoseofPenera,did notclearlyrevealwhatwasactuallyhappeninginthetruckorwhowerethe
10[10] 11[11]

12[12] 13[13]

Id.at3033. Id.at33. Id.at3436. Id.at3740.

passengersthereof.Likewise,theAffidavitsseemedtohavebeenprepared andexecutedbyoneandthesamepersonbecausetheyhadsimilarsentence constructionandform,andtheyweresworntobeforethesameattesting officer. Penera filed before the COMELEC en banc a Motion for Reconsideration14[14] of the 24 July 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC SecondDivision,maintainingthatshedidnotmakeanyadmissiononthe factualmattersstatedintheappealedresolution.Peneraalsocontendedthat the pictures and Affidavits submitted by Andanar should not have been givenanycredence. Thepicturesweremerephotocopiesoftheoriginals and lacked the proper authentication,whiletheAffidavitsweretaken ex parte,whichwouldalmostalwaysmakethemincompleteandinaccurate. Subsequently,PenerafiledaSupplementalMotionforReconsideration,15[15] explaining that supporters spontaneously accompanied Penera and her fellowcandidatesinfilingtheirCOCs,andthemotorcadethattookplace afterthefilingwasactuallypartofthedispersalofsaidsupportersandtheir transportationbacktotheirrespectivebarangays. In the Resolution dated30January2008,theCOMELEC enbanc deniedPenerasMotionforReconsideration,disposingthus:
WHEREFORE, this Commission RESOLVES to DENY the instantMotionforReconsiderationfiledby[Penera]forUTTERLACK OFMERIT.16[16]

TheCOMELEC enbanc ruledthatPeneracouldnolongeradvance theargumentssetforthinherMotionforReconsiderationandSupplemental Motion for Reconsideration, given that she failed to first express and elucidateonthesameinherAnswerandPositionPaper. Peneradidnot specificallydenythematerialavermentsthatthemotorcadewentasfaras BarangayMabini,announcingtheircandidacyandrequestingthepeopleto voteforthemonElectionDay,despitethefactthatthesamewereclearly propounded by Andanar in his Petition for Disqualification and Position Paper.Therefore,thesematerialavermentsshouldbeconsideredadmitted.
14[14] 15[15]

16[16]

Id.at97108. Id.at112126. Id.at48.

AlthoughtheCOMELECenbancagreedthatnoundueimportanceshould begiventoswornstatementsoraffidavitssubmittedasevidence,thisdidnot meanthatsuchaffidavitsshouldnotbegivenanyevidentiaryweightatall. SincePeneraneitherrefutedthematerialavermentsinAndanarsPetition andtheAffidavitsattachedtheretonorsubmittedcountervailingevidence, then said Affidavits, even if taken ex parte, deserve some degree of importance. TheCOMELEC enbanc likewiseconcededthatthepictures submittedbyAndanarasevidencewouldhavebeenunreliable,butonlyif theywerepresentedbytheirlonesome. However,saidpictures,together with Peneras admissions and the Affidavits of Andanars witnesses, constituted sufficient evidence to establish Peneras violation of the rule againstprematurecampaigning. Lastly,theCOMELEC enbanc accused PeneraofdeliberatelytryingtomisleadtheCommissionbycitingBarroso, giventhatthesaidcasewasnotevenremotelyapplicabletothecaseatbar. Consistent with his previous stand, Commissioner Sarmiento again dissented17[17] fromthe30January2008ResolutionoftheCOMELEC en banc. He still believed that Andanar was not able to adduce substantial evidence that would support the claim of violation of election laws. Particularly, Commissioner Sarmiento accepted Peneras explanation that themotorcadeconductedafterthefilingbyPeneraandtheothercandidates oftheirCOCswasmerelypartofthedispersalofthespontaneousgathering oftheirsupporters. Theincidentwasonlyinaccordwithnormalhuman socialexperience. Stillundeterred,PenerafiledtheinstantPetitionbeforeus,praying that the Resolutions dated 24 July 2007 and 30 January 2008 of the COMELECSecondDivisionandenbanc,respectively,bedeclarednulland voidforhavingbeenissuedwithgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolack orexcessofjurisdiction. In a Resolution18[18] dated 4 March 2008, we issued a Temporary RestrainingOrder(TRO),enjoiningtheCOMELECfromimplementingthe assailedResolutions,ontheconditionthatPenerapostabondintheamount ofP5,000.00.WealsodirectedCOMELECandAndanartocommentonthe instantPetition.
17[17] 18[18]

Id.at4952. Id.at138.

After the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),andAndanarfiledtheirrespectiveComments19[19]onthePetitionat bar,werequiredPenera,inaResolution20[20] dated17June2008,tofilea Reply.However,asnoReplywasfiledinduetime,wedismissedPeneras PetitioninaResolution21[21]dated14October2008,inaccordancewithRule 56,Section5(e)oftheRulesofCourt.22[22]PenerasubsequentlyfiledanEx Parte Motion to Admit Reply,23[23] which we treated as a Motion for ReconsiderationoftheResolutiondated14October2008.On11November 2008,weissuedanotherResolutionreinstatingPenerasPetition.24[24] Penerapresentsthefollowingissuesforourconsideration:
I. Whetherornot[Penera]hasengagedinanelectioncampaignorpartisan politicalactivityoutsidethecampaignperiod. II. Whetherthecontentsofthecomplaintaredeemedadmittedforfailureof [Penera]tospecificallydenythesame. III. Whether or not [Andanar] has presented competent and substantial evidencetojustifyaconclusionthat[Penera]violatedSection80and68 oftheOmnibusElectionCode. IV. Whether or not [the COMELEC] committed grave abuse of discretion amountingtolackoforinexcessofjurisdictioninfindingthattheactof
19[19] 20[20]

21[21]
22

23[23] 24[24]

Id.at161165,190208. Id.at210. Id.at215. [22] Sec.5.Groundsfordismissalofappeal.Theappealmaybedismissedmotuproprioor onmotionoftherespondentonthefollowinggrounds: xxxx (e)Failuretocomplywithanycircular,directiveororderoftheSupremeCourt withoutjustifiablecause; Rollo,pp.217225. Id.at227228.

[Penera]inconductingamotorcadebeforethefilingofhercertificateof candidacyconstitutesprematurecampaigning. V. Whether or not [the COMELEC] committed grave abuse of discretion amountingtolackoforinexcessofjurisdictionwhenitresolves[sic]to disqualify[Penera]despitethefailureof[Andanar]topresentcompetent, admissibleandsubstantialevidencetoprove[the]violationofSection68 and80oftheOmnibusElectionCode.

Penera claims that the COMELEC exercised its discretion despotically,arbitrarilyandwhimsicallyindisqualifyingherasamayoralty candidate in Sta. Monica on the ground that she engaged in premature campaigning.SheassertsthattheevidenceadducedbyAndanarwasgrossly insufficienttowarranttherulingoftheCOMELEC. Penera insists that the COMELEC Second Division erred in its findingsoffact,basicallyadoptingAndanarsallegationswhich,contraryto the belief of the COMELEC Second Division, Penera never admitted. Peneramaintainsthatthemotorcadewasspontaneousandunplanned,and thesupportersmerelyjoinedPeneraandtheothercandidatesfromherparty along the way to, as well as within the premises of, the office of the COMELECMunicipalElectionOfficer. Andanarsaverments thatafter PeneraandtheothercandidatesfromherpartyfiledtheirCOCs,theyhelda motorcadeinthedifferentbarangaysofSta.Monica,waivedtheirhandsto the public and threw candies to the onlookers were not supported by competentsubstantialevidence.EchoingCommissionerSarmientosdissent from the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, Penera argues that too much weightandcredenceweregiventothepicturesandAffidavitssubmittedby Andanar. The declaration by the COMELEC that it was Penera in the pictures is tenuous and erroneous, as the COMELEC has no personal knowledgeofPenerasidentity,andthesaidpicturesdonotclearlyreveal thefacesoftheindividualsandthecontentsoftheposterstherein. Inthe samevein,theAffidavitsofAndanarsknownsupporters,executedalmosta month after Andanar filed his Petition for Disqualification before the OREDRegionXIII,wereobviouslypreparedandexecutedbyoneandthe same person, because they have a similar sentence construction, and

computerfontandform,andwereevensworntobeforethesameattesting officeronthesamedate. WefindnomeritintheinstantPetition. Thequestionsoffact CrystalclearfromtheaboveargumentsisthatPeneraisraisingonly questionsoffactinherPetitionpresentlybeforeus. Wedonotfindany reasontopassuponthesame,asthisCourtisnotatrieroffacts.Itisnotthe functionoftheCourttoreview,examineandevaluateorweightheprobative valueoftheevidencepresented.Aquestionoffactwouldariseinsuchan event. Thesolefunctionofawritofcertiorariistoaddressissuesofwantof jurisdictionorgraveabuseofdiscretion,anditdoesnotincludeareviewof the tribunals evaluation of theevidence.25[25] Because ofitsfactfinding facilitiesanditsknowledgederivedfromactualexperience,theCOMELEC isinapeculiarlyadvantageouspositiontoevaluate,appreciateanddecideon factualquestionsbeforeit.FactualfindingsoftheCOMELEC,basedonits ownassessments anddulysupportedbyevidence,areconclusiveonthis Court,moresointheabsenceofagraveabuseofdiscretion,arbitrariness, fraud,orerroroflawinthequestionedresolutions. Unlessanyofthese causesareclearlysubstantiated,theCourtwillnotinterferewiththefindings offactoftheCOMELEC.26[26] Graveabuseofdiscretionissuchcapriciousandwhimsicalexerciseof judgmentequivalenttolackofjurisdiction.Mereabuseofdiscretionisnot enough.Itmustbegrave,aswhenitisexercisedarbitrarilyordespotically byreasonofpassionorpersonalhostility.Theabusemustbesopatentand sogrossastoamounttoanevasionofapositivedutyortoavirtualrefusal toperformthedutyenjoinedortoactatallincontemplationoflaw.27[27]
25 [25]

26[26] 27

BantayRepublicActorBARA7941v.CommissiononElections,G.R.No.177271,4 May2007,523SCRA11,citedin Cadangenv.CommissiononElections, G.R.No.177179,5 June2009. Alvarezv.CommissiononElections,405Phil.950,959(2001). [27] Cantoriav.CommissiononElections,G.R.No.162035,26November2004,444SCRA 538,543,citedinBasmalav.CommissiononElections,G.R.No.176724,6October2008,567 SCRA664,668.

Wefindnograveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessof jurisdictiononthepartoftheCOMELECSecondDivisionindisqualifying PeneraasamayoraltycandidateinSta.MonicaintheResolutiondated24 July 2007; and also on the part of the COMELEC en banc in denying PenerasMotion for ReconsiderationontheResolutiondated30January 2008. SaidResolutionsaresufficientlysupportedbysubstantialevidence, meaning,suchevidenceasareasonablemindmightacceptasadequateto supportaconclusion.28[28] TheprohibitedactofprematurecampaigningisdefinedunderSection 80oftheOmnibusElectionCode,towit:
SECTION 80. Election campaignor partisan political activity outside campaign period. It shall be unlawful for any person, whetherornotavoterorcandidate,orforanyparty,orassociationof persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except during the campaign period: Provided, That political parties may hold political conventions or meetings to nominate their official candidates withinthirty daysbeforethecommencement ofthe campaignperiodandfortyfivedaysforPresidentialandVicePresidential election.(Emphasisours.)

Ifthecommissionoftheprohibitedactofprematurecampaigningis duly proven, the consequence of the violation is clearly spelled out in Section68ofthesaidCode,whichreads:
SECTION. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an actionorprotestinwhichheisapartyisdeclaredbyfinaldecisionofa competentcourtguiltyof,orfoundbytheCommissionofhavingxxx(e) violatedanyofSections80,83,85,86and261,paragraphsd,e,k,v,and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign countryshall notbe qualified torunforany elective officeunder this Code,unlesssaidpersonhaswaivedhisstatusaspermanentresidentor immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirementprovidedforintheelectionlaws.(Emphasesours.)

28[28]

Doruelov.CommissiononElections,218Phil.346(1984).

In the case at bar, it hadbeen sufficientlyestablished, not just by Andanarsevidence,butalsothoseofPeneraherself,thatPeneraandher partymates, after filing their COCs on 29 March 2007, participated in a motorcadewhichpassed throughthedifferent barangays ofSta.Monica, waivedtheirhandstothepublic,andthrewcandiestotheonlookers. Indeed,PeneraexpresslyadmittedinherPositionPaperthat:
Respondentsactuallyhadamotorcadeofonlytwo(2)jeppneys [sic]andten(10)motorcyclesafterfilingtheirCertificateofCandidacy at3:00P.M.,March29,2007withoutanyspeechesmadeandonlyone streamer of a board member Candidate and multicolored balloons attachedtothejeppneys[sic]andmotorcycles.29[29](Emphasisours.)

Additionally,theJointAffidavitofMarcialDolar,AllanLlatona,and Renante Platil, attached to Peneras Position Paper, gave an even more straightforwardaccountoftheevents,thus:
1. ThatonMarch29,2007at3:00P.M.atSta.Monica,SurigaodelNorte, Mayoralty Candidates Rosalinda CA. Penera [sic] and her parties of four (4) kagawadsfiledtheircertificateofcandidacyattheCOMELECOffice; 2. Thattheir[sic]wasamotorcadeconsistingoftwojeppneys[sic]and10 motorcyclesafteractualregistrationwiththeCOMELECwithjeepsdecorated withballoonsandastreamerofMargaritoLongos,BoardMemberCandidate; 3. That themotorcadeproceededtothree(3)barangaysoutofthe11 barangayswhilesupporterswerethrowingsweetcandiestothecrowd; 4. Thattherewasmerrimentandmarchingmusicwithoutmentionofany nameofthecandidatesmoreparticularlyleadcandidateRosalindaCA.Penera [sic]; 5. Thatwewereinthemotorcadeonthatafternoononlyridinginoneofthe jeepneys.30[30](Emphasesours.)

29[29] 30[30]

Rollo,p.76. Id.at77.

In view of the foregoing admissions by Penera and her witnesses, Peneracannotnowbeallowedtoadoptaconflictingposition. Moreimportantly,theconductofamotorcadeisaformofelection campaignorpartisanpoliticalactivity,fallingsquarelywithintheambitof Section 79(b)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code, on [h]olding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaignorpropagandafororagainstacandidate[.] Amotorcadeisa procession or parade of automobiles or other motor vehicles.31[31] The conduct thereof during election periods by the candidates and their supportersisafactthatneednotbebelaboredduetoitswidespreadand pervasivepractice.Theobviouspurposeoftheconductofmotorcadesisto introducethecandidatesandthepositions,towhichtheyseektobeelected, tothevotingpublic;ortomakethemmorevisiblesoastofacilitatethe recognitionandrecollectionoftheirnamesinthemindsofthevoterscome election time. Unmistakably, motorcades are undertaken for no other purposethantopromotetheelectionofaparticularcandidateorcandidates. IntheinstantPetition,Peneraneverdeniedthatshetookpartinthe conductofthemotorcadeaftershefiledherCOConthedaybeforethestart of the campaign period. She merely claimed that the same was not undertaken for campaign purposes. Peneraprofferedtheexcusethatthe motorcade was already part of the dispersal of the supporters who spontaneouslyaccompaniedPeneraandherpartymatesinfilingtheirCOCs. Thesaidsupporterswerealreadybeingtransportedbacktotheirrespective barangaysaftertheCOCfiling.Penerastressedthatnospeechwasmadeby anyperson,andtherewasonlybackgroundmarchingmusicandagrand standing for the purpose of raising the hands of the candidates in the motorcade. Wearenotconvinced. Aswepreviouslynoted,Peneraandherwitnessesadmittedthatthe vehicles,consistingoftwojeepneysandtenmotorcycles,werefestooned withmulticoloredballoons;themotorcadewentaroundthreebarangaysin
31 [31]

Motorcade.Dictionary.com. Dictionary.comUnabridged(v1.1).RandomHouse,Inc. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/motorcade(accessed:July16,2009).

Sta.Monica;andPeneraandherpartymateswavedtheirhandsandthrew sweetcandiestothecrowd. Withvehicles,balloons,andevencandieson hand,Peneracanhardlypersuadeusthatthemotorcadewasspontaneous andunplanned. ForviolatingSection80oftheOmnibusElectionCode,proscribing electioncampaignorpartisanpoliticalactivityoutsidethecampaignperiod, Penera must be disqualified from holding the office of Mayor of Sta. Monica. Thequestionsoflaw Thedissentingopinion,however,raisesthelegalissuethatSection15 ofRepublicActNo.8436,asamendedbyRepublicActNo.9369,provides anewdefinitionofthetermcandidate,asaresultofwhich,premature campaigningmaynolongerbecommitted. UnderSection79(a)oftheOmnibusElectionCode,a candidate is anypersonaspiringfororseekinganelectivepublicoffice,whohasfileda certificateofcandidacybyhimselforthroughanaccreditedpoliticalparty, aggroupment,orcoalitionofparties. RepublicActNo.8436,32[32]enactedon22December1997,authorized the COMELEC to use an automated election system for the process of voting,counting of votes, andcanvassing/consolidatingtheresultsofthe nationalandlocalelections. ThestatutealsomandatedtheCOMELECto acquire automated counting machines, computer equipment, devices and materials; and to adopt new electoral forms and printing materials. In particular, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 provided for the specificationsofthe officialballotstobeusedintheautomatedelection systemandtheguidelinesfortheprintingthereof,therelevantportionsof whichstate:
SECTION11. Officialballot.TheCommissionshallprescribe thesizeandformoftheofficialballotwhichshallcontainthetitlesofthe
32 [32]

AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO USE AN AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11, 1998 NATIONAL OR LOCAL ELECTIONSANDINSUBSEQUENTNATIONALANDLOCALELECTORALEXERCISES, PROVIDINGFUNDSTHEREFORANDFOROTHERPURPOSES.

positions to be filled and/or the propositions to be voted upon in an initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Under each position, the names of candidates shall be arranged alphabetically by surname and uniformly printedusingthesametypesize.Afixedspacewherethechairmanofthe BoardofElectioninspectorsshallaffixhis/hersignaturetoauthenticate theofficialballotshallbeprovided. Bothsidesoftheballotsmaybeusedwhennecessary. Forthispurpose,thedeadlineforthefilingofcertificate of candidacy/petitionforregistration/manifestationtoparticipateinthe electionshallnotbelaterthanonehundredtwenty(120)daysbefore theelections:Provided,That,anyelectiveofficial,whethernationalor local,runningforanyofficeotherthantheonewhichhe/sheisholdingin a permanent capacity, except for president and vicepresident, shall be deemedresignedonlyuponthestartofthecampaignperiodcorresponding to the position for which he/she is running: Provided, further, That, unlawfulactsoromissionsapplicabletoacandidateshalltakeeffect upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That,forpurposesoftheMay11,1998elections,thedeadlineforfilingof thecertificateofcandidacyforthepositionsofPresident,VicePresident, SenatorsandcandidatesunderthePartyListSystemaswellaspetitions forregistrationand/ormanifestationtoparticipateinthePartyListSystem shallbeonFebruary9,1998whilethedeadlineforthefilingofcertificate ofcandidacyforotherpositionsshallbeonMarch27,1998.(Emphases ours.)

On10February2007,RepublicActNo.936933[33]tookeffect.Section 13ofRepublicActNo.9369amendedSection11ofRepublicActNo.8436 andrenumberedthesameasthenewSection15ofRepublicActNo.8436. ThepertinentportionsofSection15ofRepublicActNo.8436,asamended byRepublicActNo.9369,nowread:

33

[33]

RepublicActNo.9369isentitledANACTAMENDINGREPUBLICACTNO.8436, ENTITLEDANACTAUTHORIZINGTHECOMMISSIONONELECTIONSTOUSEAN AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11, 1998 NATIONAL OR LOCAL ELECTIONSANDINSUBSEQUENTNATIONALANDLOCALELECTORALEXERCISES, TO ENCOURAGE TRANSPARENCY, CREDIBILITY, FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY OF ELECTIONS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMPANSA BLG. 881, AS AMEMDED, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7166 AND OTHER RELATED ELECTIONS LAWS, PROVIDINGFUNDSTHEREFORANDFOROTHERPURPOSES."Itwaspublishedinthe newspapersMalaya(26January2007)andBusinessMirror(2627January2007). Itthustook effectfifteen(15)daysafteritspublicationoron10February2007.

SECTION.15. Official Ballot. The Commission shall prescribe the formatoftheelectronicdisplayand/orthesizeandformoftheofficial ballot,whichshallcontainthetitlesofthepositiontobefilledand/orthe proposition tobevoteduponinaninitiative, referendumorplebiscite. Wherepracticable,electronicdisplaysmustbeconstructedtopresentthe namesofallcandidatesforthesamepositioninthesamepageorscreen, otherwise,theelectronicdisplaysmustbeconstructedtopresenttheentire ballottothevoter,inaseriesofsequentialpages,andtoensurethatthe voterseesalloftheballotoptionsonallpagesbeforecompletinghisor hervoteandtoallowthevotertoreviewandchangeallballotchoices priortocompletingandcastinghisorherballot.Undereachpositiontobe filled, the names of candidates shall be arranged alphabetically by surnameanduniformlyindicatedusingthesametypesize.Themaidenor married name shall be listed in the official ballot, as preferred by the femalecandidate.Undereachpropositiontobevoteupon,thechoices shouldbeuniformlyindicatedusingthesamefontandsize. Afixedspacewherethechairmanoftheboardofelectioninspectorshall affixher/hersignaturetoauthenticatetheofficialballotshallbeprovided. Forthispurpose,theCommissionshallsetthedeadlineforthefilingof certificateofcandidacy/petitionofregistration/manifestationtoparticipate intheelection.Anypersonwhofileshiscertificateofcandidacywithin thisperiodshallonlybeconsideredasacandidateatthestartofthe campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That,unlawfulactsoromissionsapplicabletoacandidate shall effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided,finally,Thatanypersonholdingapublicappointiveofficeor position,includingactivemembersofthearmedforces,andofficers,and employees in governmentowned orcontrolled corporations, shall be considered ipsofactor resignedfromhis/herofficeandmustvacatethe same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certification of candidacy.(Emphasesours.)

In view of the third paragraphofSection15ofRepublic ActNo. 8436, as amended, the Dissenting Opinionarguesthat Section80of the OmnibusElectionCodecannotbeappliedtothepresentcasesince,asthe CourtheldinLanotv.CommissiononElections,34[34]theelectioncampaign orpartisanactivity,whichconstitutetheprohibitedprematurecampaigning, should be designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular
34[34]

G.R.No.164858,16November2006,507SCRA114.

candidateorcandidates.Underpresentelectionlaws,whileapersonmay have filed his/her COC within the prescribed period for doing so, said personshallnotbeconsideredacandidateuntilthestartofthecampaign period. Thus,priortothestartofthecampaignperiod,therecanbeno election campaign or partisan political activity designed to promote the electionordefeatofaparticularcandidatetopublicofficebecausethereis nocandidatetospeakof. AccordingtotheDissentingOpinion,evenifPenerasactsbeforethe start of the campaign period constitute election campaigning or partisan politicalactivities,thesearenotpunishableunderSection80oftheOmnibus ElectionCodegiventhatshewasnotyetacandidateatthattime. Onthe otherhand,Penerasacts,ifcommittedwithinthecampaignperiod,when shewasalreadyacandidate,arelikewisenotcoveredbySection80asthis provisionpunishesonlyactsoutsidethecampaignperiod. TheDissentingOpinionultimatelyconcludesthatbecauseofSection 15ofRepublicActNo.8436,asamended,theprohibitedactofpremature campaigning in Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, is practically impossibletocommitatanytime. We disagree. Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code remains relevant andapplicabledespiteSection15ofRepublicActNo.8436,as amended. AclosereadingoftheentireRepublicActNo.9369,whichamended RepublicActNo.8436,wouldreadilyrevealthatthatitdidnotcontainan expressrepealofSection80oftheOmnibusElectionCode. An express repealisonewhereinastatutedeclares,usuallyinitsrepealingclause,that aparticularandspecificlaw,identifiedbyitsnumberortitle,isrepealed.35 [35] Absent this specific requirement, an express repeal may not be presumed. AlthoughthetitleofRepublicActNo.9369particularlymentioned theamendmentofBatasPambansaBlg.881,ortheOmnibusElectionCode, towit:
35[35]

Mecanov.CommissiononAudit,G.R.No.103982,11December1992,216SCRA500,504.

AnActAmendingRepublicActNo.8436,Entitled"AnActAuthorizing theCommissiononElectionstoUseanAutomatedElectionSystemxxx, AmendingforthePurposeBatasPambansaBlg.881,AsAmendedxx x.(Emphasisours.),

saidtitleexplicitlymentions,nottherepeal,butthe amendment ofBatas PambansaBlg.881. Suchfactisindeedverymaterial. Repeal ofalaw means its complete abrogationbytheenactment of asubsequent statute, whereasthe amendment ofastatutemeansanalterationinthelawalready existing,leavingsomepartoftheoriginalstillstanding.36[36] Section80of theOmnibusElectionCodeisnotevenoneofthespecificprovisionsofthe saidcodethatwereexpresslyamendedbyRepublicActNo.9369. Additionally,Section46,37[37]therepealingclauseofRepublicActNo. 9369,statesthat:
Sec. 46. Repealing Clause. All laws, presidential decrees, executiveorders,rulesandregulationsorpartsthereofinconsistentwith theprovisionsofthisActareherebyrepealedormodifiedaccordingly.

Section46ofRepublicActNo.9369isageneralrepealingclause.It isaclausewhichpredicatestheintendedrepealundertheconditionthata substantialconflictmustbefoundinexistingandprioracts.Thefailureto addaspecificrepealingclauseindicatesthattheintentwasnottorepealany existinglaw,unlessanirreconcilableinconsistencyandrepugnancyexistin the terms of the new and oldlaws. This latter situation falls under the categoryofanimpliedrepeal.38[38] Wellsettledistheruleinstatutoryconstructionthatimpliedrepeals aredisfavored. Inordertoeffectarepealbyimplication,thelaterstatute mustbesoirreconcilablyinconsistentandrepugnantwiththeexistinglaw thattheycannotbemadetoreconcileandstandtogether.Theclearestcase possiblemustbemadebeforetheinferenceofimpliedrepealmaybedrawn, for inconsistency is never presumed. There must be a showing of repugnanceclearandconvincingincharacter. Thelanguageusedinthe
36[36] 37[37] 38

BlacksLawDictionary(6thEd[1990]),p.1299. ErroneouslycitedasSection47intheRevisedDissentingOpinion. [38] Intia, Jr. v. Commission on Audit, 366 Phil. 273, 290 (1999), citing Mecano v. CommissiononAudit,supranote35.

laterstatutemustbesuchastorenderitirreconcilablewithwhathadbeen formerlyenacted.Aninconsistencythatfallsshortofthatstandarddoesnot suffice.39[39] Courts of justice, when confronted with apparently conflicting statutes,shouldendeavortoreconcilethesameinsteadofdeclaringoutright theinvalidityofoneasagainsttheother.Suchalacrityshouldbeavoided. The wise policy is for the judge to harmonize them if this is possible, bearinginmindthattheyareequallythehandiworkofthesamelegislature, andsogiveeffecttobothwhileatthesametimealsoaccordingduerespect toacoordinatedepartmentofthegovernment.40[40] Toourmind,thereisnoabsoluteandirreconcilableincompatibility betweenSection15ofRepublicActNo.8436,asamended,andSection80 of the Omnibus Election Code, which defines the prohibited act of prematurecampaigning.Itispossibletoharmonizeandreconcilethesetwo provisionsand,thus,giveeffecttoboth. Thefollowingpointsareexplanatory: First, Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, on premature campaigning,explicitlyprovidesthat[i]tshallbeunlawfulforanyperson, whetherornotavoterorcandidate, orforanyparty,orassociationof persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity, except during the campaign period. Very simply, premature campaigningmaybecommittedevenbyapersonwhoisnotacandidate. Forthisreason,theplaindeclarationinLanotthat[w]hatSection80 oftheOmnibusElectionCodeprohibitsisanelectioncampaignorpartisan politicalactivitybyacandidateoutsideofthecampaignperiod,41[41]is clearlyerroneous. Second,Section79(b)oftheOmnibusElectionCodedefineselection campaignorpartisanpoliticalactivityinthefollowingmanner:
39[39] 40

41[41]

Agujetasv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.106560,23August1996,261SCRA17,3435. [40] Tyv.Trampe,G.R.No.117577,1December 1995,250SCRA500,514515,citing Gordonv.Veridiano,11December1992,216SCRA500,505506. G.R.No.164858,16November2006,507SCRA114,146.

SECTION79.Definitions.AsusedinthisCode: xxxx (b)Theterm"electioncampaign"or"partisanpoliticalactivity" referstoanactdesignedtopromotetheelectionordefeatofaparticular candidateorcandidatestoapublicofficewhichshallinclude: (1)Formingorganizations,associations,clubs,committeesorother groupsofpersonsforthepurposeofsolicitingvotesand/orundertaking anycampaignfororagainstacandidate; (2)Holdingpoliticalcaucuses,conferences,meetings,rallies, parades,orothersimilarassemblies,forthepurposeofsolicitingvotes and/orundertakinganycampaignorpropagandafororagainsta candidate; (3)Makingspeeches,announcementsorcommentaries,orholding interviewsfororagainsttheelectionofanycandidateforpublicoffice; (4)Publishingordistributingcampaignliteratureormaterials designedtosupportoropposetheelectionofanycandidate;or (5)Directlyorindirectlysolicitingvotes,pledgesorsupportforor againstacandidate.

True, that pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, even after the filing of the COC but before the start of the campaign period, a person is not yet officially considered a candidate. Nevertheless,aperson,uponthefilingofhis/herCOC,alreadyexplicitly declareshis/herintention torunasacandidateinthecomingelections. The commission by such a person of any of the acts enumerated under Section79(b)oftheOmnibusElectionCode(i.e.,holdingralliesorparades, makingspeeches, etc.)can,thus,belogicallyandreasonablyconstruedas forthepurposeofpromotinghis/herintendedcandidacy. When the campaign period starts and said person proceeds with his/her candidacy, his/her intent turningintoactuality,wecanalready consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC and prior to the campaignperiod,asthepromotionofhis/herelectionasacandidate,hence,

constitutingprematurecampaigning,forwhichhe/shemaybedisqualified. Also, conversely, if said person, for any reason, withdraws his/her COC beforethecampaignperiod,thenthereisnopointtoviewhis/heractsprior tosaidperiodasactsforthepromotionofhis/herelectionasacandidate.In the latter case, there can be no premature campaigning as there is no candidate,whosedisqualificationmaybesought,tobeginwith.42[42] Third,inconnectionwiththeprecedingdiscussion,thelineinSection 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, which provides that any unlawfulactoromissionapplicabletoacandidateshall takeeffect only upon the start of the campaign period, does not mean that the acts constitutingprematurecampaigningcanonlybecommitted,forwhichthe offendermaybedisqualified,duringthecampaignperiod.Contrarytothe pronouncementinthedissent,nowhereinthesaidprovisowasitstatedthat campaigningbeforethestartofthecampaignperiodislawful,suchthatthe offendermayfreelycarryoutthesamewithimpunity. Aspreviouslyestablished,aperson,afterfilinghis/herCOCbutprior tohis/her becomingacandidate(thus,priortothestartofthecampaign period),canalready commit theactsdescribedunderSection79(b)ofthe OmnibusElectionCodeaselectioncampaignorpartisanpoliticalactivity. However, only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the beginningofthecampaignperiod,cansaidactsbegiveneffectaspremature campaigningunderSection80oftheOmnibusElectionCode.Onlyafter said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start of the campaign period, can his/her disqualification be sought for acts constituting prematurecampaigning.Obviously,itisonlyatthestartofthecampaign period,whenthepersonofficiallybecomesacandidate,thattheundue andiniquitousadvantagesofhis/herprioracts,constitutingpremature campaigning, shall accrue to his/her benefit. Compared to the other candidateswhoareonlyabouttobegintheirelectioncampaign,acandidate
42

[42]

Thissamereasoningholdstrueforaperson(whoisneitheracandidatenoravoter)who commitsanyoftheactsdescribedunderSection79(b)oftheOmnibusElectionCodeforthe promotionoftheelectionofanotherpersonwhohasalreadyfiledacertificateofcandidacy;the formershallbeprosecutedfortheelectionoffenseofprematurecampaigningonlyintheevent thatthelatteractuallycontinueswithhis/hercandidacyafterthestartofthecampaignperiod.

whohadpreviouslyengagedinprematurecampaigningalreadyenjoysan unfairheadstartinpromotinghis/hercandidacy. Ascanbegleanedfromtheforegoingdisquisition,harmonyinthe provisionsofSections80and79oftheOmnibusElectionCode,aswellas Section15ofRepublicActNo.8436,asamended,isnotonlyverypossible, butinfactdesirable,necessaryandconsistentwiththelegislativeintentand policyofthelaw. Thelaudableandexemplaryintentionbehindtheprohibitionagainst prematurecampaigning,asdeclaredinChavezv.CommissiononElections,43 [43] istoleveltheplayingfieldforcandidatesofpublicoffice,toequalizethe situationbetweenthepopularorrichcandidates,ononehand,andlesser knownorpoorercandidates,ontheother,bypreventingtheformerfrom enjoying undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their resources and popularity. The intention for prohibiting premature campaigning, as explained in Chavez, could not have been significantly alteredoraffectedbyRepublicActNo.8436,asamendedbyRepublicAct No.9369,theavowedpurposeofwhichistocarryontheautomationofthe electionsystem. Whethertheelectionwouldbeheldunderthemanual or the automated system, the need for prohibiting premature campaigningtolevel theplayingfieldbetweenthepopularorrich candidates,ononehand,andthelesserknownorpoorercandidates,on theother,byallowingthemtocampaignonlywithinthesamelimited periodremains. We cannotstress stronglyenoughthatprematurecampaigningisa perniciousactthatiscontinuouslythreateningtounderminetheconductof fairandcredibleelectionsinourcountry,nomatterhowgreatorsmallthe actsconstitutingthesameare.Thechoiceastowhoamongthecandidates willthevotingpublicbestowtheprivilegeofholdingpublicofficeshould not be swayed by the shrewd conduct, verging on bad faith, of some individualswhoareabletospendresourcestopromotetheircandidaciesin advanceoftheperiodslatedforcampaignactivities.

43[43]

480Phil.915(2004).

Verily, the consequences provided for in Section 6844[44] of the Omnibus Election Code for the commission of the prohibited act of prematurecampaigningaresevere:thecandidatewhoisdeclaredguiltyof committingtheoffenseshallbedisqualifiedfromcontinuingasacandidate, or,ifhe/shehasbeenelected,fromholdingoffice.Nottomentionthatsaid candidate also faces criminal prosecution for an election offense under Section262ofthesameCode. The Dissenting Opinion, therefore, should not be too quick to pronouncetheineffectivenessorrepealofSection80oftheOmnibus ElectionCodejustbecauseofachangeinthemeaningofcandidateby Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, primarily, for administrativepurposes.Aninterpretationshouldbeavoidedunderwhich astatuteorprovisionbeingconstruedisdefeated,orasotherwiseexpressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant,meaningless, inoperative,ornugatory.45[45] Indeed,notonly will the prohibited act of premature campaigning be officially decriminalized, the value and significance of having a campaign period before the conduct of elections would also be utterly negated. Any unscrupulousindividualwiththedeepestofcampaignwarchestscouldthen affordtospendhis/herresourcestopromotehis/hercandidacywellaheadof everyoneelse. Suchistheveryevilthatthelawseekstoprevent. Our lawmakerscouldnothaveintendedtocausesuchanabsurdsituation. The Dissenting Opinion attempts to brush aside our preceding argumentsbycontendingthatthereisnoroomforstatutoryconstructionin thepresentcasesinceSection15ofRepublicActNo.8436,46[46]asamended bySection13ofRepublicActNo.9369,47[47]iscrystalclearinitsmeaning.
44 [44]

45[45]

46

47

Sec.68.Disqualifications.Anycandidatewho,inanactionorprotestinwhichheisa partyisdeclaredbyfinaldecisionofacompetentcourtguiltyof,orfoundbytheCommissionof havingxxx(e)violatedanyofSections80,83,85,86and261,paragraphsd,e,k,v,andcc, subparagraph6,shallbedisqualifiedfromcontinuingasacandidate,orifhehasbeenelected, fromholdingtheoffice.xxx(Emphasisours.) Parasv.CommissiononElections,332Phil.56,64(1996). [46] ANACTAUTHORIZINGTHECOMMISSIONONELECTIONSTOUSEAN AUTOMATEDELECTIONSYSTEMINTHEMAY11,1998NATIONALORLOCAL ELECTIONSANDINSUBSEQUENTNATIONALANDLOCALELECTORALEXERCISES, PROVIDINGFUNDSTHEREFORANDFOROTHERPURPOSES. [47] AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8436, ENTITLED "AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO USE AN AUTOMATED

Wedisagree. Therewouldonlybenoneedforstatutoryconstructionif thereisaprovisioninRepublicActNo.8436orRepublicActNo.9369that explicitlystatesthatthereshallbenomoreprematurecampaigning. But absent the same, our position herein, as well as that of the Dissenting Opinion, necessarily rest on our respective construction of the legal provisionsinvolvedinthiscase. Notably,whilefaultingusforresortingtostatutoryconstructionto resolvetheinstantcase,theDissentingOpinionitselfcitesaruleofstatutory construction,particularly,thatpenallawsshouldbeliberallyconstruedin favoroftheoffender. TheDissentingOpinionassertsthatbecauseofthe thirdparagraphinSection15ofRepublicActNo.8436,asamended,the electionoffensedescribedinSection80oftheOmnibusElectionCodeis practicallyimpossibletocommitatanytimeandthatthisflawinthelaw, which defines a criminal act, must be construed in favor of Penera, the offenderintheinstantcase. The application of the above rule is uncalled for. It was acknowledgedin Lanot thatadisqualificationcasehastwoaspects: one, electoral;48[48] the other, criminal.49[49] Theinstant caseconcernsonlythe electoralaspectofthedisqualificationcase. Anydiscussionhereinonthe matterofPenerascriminalliabilityforprematurecampaigningwouldbe nothingmorethan obiterdictum. Moreimportantly,asheretoforealready
ELECTIONSYSTEMINTHEMAY11,1998NATIONALORLOCALELECTIONSANDIN SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL EXERCISES, TO ENCOURAGE TRANSPARENCY, CREDIBILITY, FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY OF ELECTIONS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881, AS AMENDED, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7166 AND OTHER RELATED ELECTIONS LAWS, PROVIDING FUNDSTHEREFORANDFOROTHERPURPOSES. [48] Theelectoralaspectofadisqualificationcasedetermineswhethertheoffendershouldbe disqualifiedfrombeingacandidateorfromholdingoffice.Proceedingsaresummaryincharacter andrequireonlyclearpreponderanceofevidence.Anerringcandidatemaybedisqualifiedeven withoutpriordeterminationofprobablecauseinapreliminaryinvestigation.Theelectoralaspect mayproceedindependentlyofthecriminal aspect,andviceversa. (Lanotv.Commissionon Elections,supranote34.) [49] The criminal aspect of a disqualification case determines whether there is probable causetochargeacandidateforanelectionoffense.TheprosecutoristheCOMELEC,throughits LawDepartment,whichdetermineswhetherprobablecauseexists.Ifthereisprobablecause,the COMELEC,throughitsLawDepartment,filesthecriminalinformationbeforethepropercourt. Proceedings before the proper court demand a fullblown hearing and require proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict. A criminal conviction shall result in the disqualification of the offender,whichmayevenincludedisqualificationfromholdingafuturepublicoffice.(Lanotv. CommissiononElections,supranote34.)

48

49

elaboratedupon,Section15ofRepublicActNo.8436,asamended,didnot expressly or even impliedly repeal Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code,andthesetwoprovisions,basedonlegislativeintentandpolicy,can beharmoniouslyinterpretedandgiveneffect.Thus,thereisnoflawcreated inthelaw,arisingfromSection15ofRepublicActNo.8436,asamended, whichneededtobeconstruedinPenerasfavor. TheDissentingOpinionfurtherexpressesthefearthatpursuanttoour theory,allthepoliticianswithinfomercialspriortothefilingoftheir COCs would be subject to disqualification, and this would involve practicallyalltheprospectivepresidentialcandidateswhoarenowleadingin thesurveys. Thisfearisutterlyunfounded. Itisthefilingbythepersonof his/herCOCthroughwhichhe/sheexplicitlydeclareshis/herintention torunasacandidateinthecomingelections.Itissuchdeclarationwhich wouldcolorthesubsequentactsofsaidpersontobeelectioncampaigningor partisanpoliticalactivitiesasdescribedunderSection79(b)oftheOmnibus ElectionCode.Itbearstopointoutthat,atthispoint,nopoliticianhas yet submitted his/her COC. Also, the plain solution to this rather misplaced apprehension isforthepoliticiansthemselvestoadheretothe letterandintentofthelawandkeepwithintheboundsoffairplayinthe pursuitoftheircandidacies.ThiswouldmeanthatafterfilingtheirCOCs, theprudentandpropercourseforthemtotakeistowaitforthedesignated startofthecampaignperiodbeforetheycommencetheirelectioncampaign orpartisan politicalactivities. Indeed,suchistheonlywayforthemto avoiddisqualificationonthegroundofprematurecampaigning.Itisnotfor ustocarveoutexceptionstothelaw,muchmoretodecreeawaytherepeal thereof,inordertoaccommodateanyclassofindividuals,wherenosuch exceptionorrepealiswarranted. Lastly, as we have observed at the beginning, Peneras Petition is essentially grounded on questions of fact. Peneras defense against her disqualification, before the COMELEC and this Court, rests on the argumentsthatsheandherpartymatesdidnotactuallyholdamotorcade; that their supporters spontaneously accompanied Penera and the other candidates from her political party when they filed their certificates of

candidacy; that the alleged motorcade was actually the dispersal of the supporters of Penera and the other candidates from her party as said supportersweredroppedoffattheirrespectivebarangays;andthatAndanar wasnotabletopresentcompetent,admissible,andsubstantialevidenceto provethatPeneracommittedprematurecampaigning.Peneraherselfnever raised the argument that she can no longer be disqualified for prematurecampaigningunderSection80,inrelationtoSection68,of theOmnibusElectionCode,sincethesaidprovisionshavealreadybeen, in the words of the Dissenting Opinion, rendered inapplicable, repealed,anddoneawaywithbySection15ofRepublicActNo. 8436, as amended. This legal argument was wholly raised by the DissentingOpinion. Asarule,apartywhodeliberatelyadoptsacertaintheoryuponwhich thecaseistriedanddecidedbythelowercourtwillnotbepermittedto changetheoryonappeal.Pointsoflaw,theories,issues,andargumentsnot broughttotheattentionofthelowercourtneednotbe,andordinarilywill notbe,consideredbyareviewingcourt,asthesecannotberaisedforthe firsttimeatsuchlatestage. Basicconsiderationsofdueprocessunderlie thisrule.50[50]Ifwedonotallowandconsiderthechangeintheoryofacase byapartyonappeal,shouldwenotalsorefrainfrommotuproprioadopting atheorywhichnoneofthepartiesevenraisedbeforeus? Nonetheless,thequestionsoffactraisedbyPeneraandquestionsof lawraisedbytheDissentingOpinionmustallberesolvedagainstPenera. PenerashouldbedisqualifiedfromholdingofficeasMayorofSta.Monica forhavingcommittedprematurecampaigningwhen,rightaftershefiledher COC,butstilladaybeforethestartofthecampaignperiod,shetookpartin amotorcade,whichconsistedoftwojeepneysandtenmotorcyclesladen with multicolored balloons that went around several barangays of Sta. Monica,andgaveawaycandiestothecrowd. Succession

50

[50]

Spouses Pasco v. PisonArceo Agricultural and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 165501,28March2006,485SCRA514,523.

Despite the disqualification of Penera, we cannot grant Andanars prayertobeallowedtoassumethepositionofMayorofSta.Monica.The wellestablished principleisthattheineligibilityofacandidatereceiving majority votes does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest numberofvotestobedeclaredelected.51[51] In this case, the rules on succession under the Local Government Codeshallapply,towit:
SECTION 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, ViceGovernor, Mayor, and ViceMayor. If a permanent vacancyoccursintheofficeofthe xxx mayor, the xxx vicemayor concernedshallbecomethexxxmayor. xxxx ForpurposesofthisChapter,apermanentvacancyariseswhenan electivelocalofficialfillsahighervacantoffice,refusestoassumeoffice, fails to qualify or is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.(Emphasesours.)

ConsideringPenerasdisqualificationfromholdingofficeasMayorof Sta.Monica,theproclaimedViceMayorshallthensucceedasMayor. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for CertiorariisherebyDISMISSED.TheResolutionsdated24July2007and 30 January 2008 of the COMELEC Second Division and en banc, respectively,inSPANo.07224arehereby AFFIRMED. Inviewofthe disqualificationofpetitionerRosalindaA.Penerafromrunningfortheoffice ofMayorofSta.Monica,SurigaodelNorte,andtheresultingpermanent vacancytherein,itisherebyDECLAREDthattheproclaimedViceMayor istherightfulsuccessortosaidoffice. TheTemporaryRestrainingOrder issuedon4March2008ishereby ORDERED lifted. Costsagainstthe petitioner.

51[51]

Labo,Jr.v.CommissiononElections,211Phil.297,312(1992).

SOORDERED.