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Backtest Analysis
September 2004 by Bennett Stewart, Senior Partner Ling Yang, CFA, Vice President Monica Nica, Vice President
Contents
The Problem with Backtesting ................................................................................... 1
Models Fitted to Data.............................................................................................................1 Testing for Only Currently Listed Companies........................................................................1 The PRVit Backtesting Process.............................................................................................2
Notice
COPYRIGHT 2004 STERN STEWART & CO. NO PART MAY BE TRANSMITTED, QUOTED OR COPIED WITHOUT EXPRESS WRITTEN CONSENT OF STERN STEWART & CO. FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY. ALL INVESTMENT COMMENTARY AND RATINGS CONTAINED HEREIN ARE FOR ILLUSTRATION ONLY AND ARE NOT INTENDED AS BUY/SELL RECOMMENDATIONS. INVESTMENT ADVICE POWERED BY PRVIT IS AVAILABLE FROM MATRIX INVESTMENT RESEARCH, LLC, THE EXCLUSIVE LICENSEE OF STERN STEWARTS PRVIT AND EVA METHODOLOGIES FOR INVESTMENT ANALYSIS. FOR MORE INFORMATION ON THE INVESTMENT APPLICATIONS OF PRVIT, CONSULT WWW.MATRIXUSALLC.COM, OR CONTACT MATRIX INVESTMENT RESEARCH AT 212-220-5147. FOR MORE INFORMATION ABOUT THE CORPORATE MANAGEMENT APPLICATIONS OF EVA AND PRVIT, CONSULT WWW.EVA.COM, OR CONTACT STERN STEWART AT 212-261-0600.
The Investors Guide to EVA and PRVit : Backtesting Analysis
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was shaped, rather, by the seminal work of two eminent financial economists, the Nobel Laureate Merton Miller and Franco Modigliani1. They were the first to set forth three entirely equivalent and wholly rational models of corporate valuation. They demonstrated, for instance, the complete equivalence between a model of projecting and discounting cash flow and one based on projecting and discounting excess earnings or residual income what we have chosen to call EVA. We developed PRVit to be consistent with M&Ms fundamental model of valuation, with a sense that a firm had a true intrinsic value, and a belief that share prices would gravitate toward that value over time. We also applied judgment shaped by our years of experience as consultants on questions of corporate value. Only after we had developed the model and set its parameters (such as placing a greater weight on growth for Gamble and Growth companies in the P score) did we test it against actual data.
Three papers form the backbone of the modern theory of intrinsic valuation: (1) "The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment," by Merton Miller and Franco Modigliani, American Economic Review, June 1958; (2) "The Cost of Capital and the Theory of Investment: A Reply," by Merton Miller, American Economic Review, September 1959; and (3) "Dividend Policy, Growth and the Valuation of Shares" by Merton Miller and Franco Modigliani, Journal of Business, October 1961. The Investors Guide to EVA and PRVit : Backtesting Analysis
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or other along the way. The trouble is, at the time the historical data is available, it is not clear which people will live a long healthy life and which will not. We had first hand experience with this so-called survivor bias when we first ran our backtests. We had not yet received the delisted company data file from our source, Standard&Poors, but on a lark we decided to press ahead and undertake a preliminary run on the surviving firms. We found that companies with a higher set of risk factors earned higher shareholder returns, when our intuition (and economic theory) told us that investors should discount value for risk. When we included the defunct companies in the test and eliminated the survivor bias, the sign on the risk factor turned negative, just as our original PRVit model held it should be. The risk factor was capturing something significant about firms that never make it to the end of the game, but that wasnt noticeable without including those companies in the test.
The qualifying stocks were divided each month into 20 sectors corresponding to the four-digit level GICS code4. Portfolios were formed by dividing the stocks in each sector into 5 quintile groups according to their PRVit scores, and then aggregating the quintiles across all the sectors. That way, each of the portfolios had the same exposure to all of the industry sectors, and their returns would be attributable solely to their PRVit scores and not to sectors shifting in and out of favor.
2 3 4
1995 data starts with February 1995 due to data constraint from the data source. st It is expected that PRVit will cover financial institutions as of no later than December 1 , 2004. The backtests were repeated using the 54 non-financial 6-digit GICS sectors and were found to be substantially the same.
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250%
Portfolio returns
200%
150%
T op quintile
100%
50%
0%
Feb-97 Feb-99 Feb-01 Jun-98 Jun-00 Jun-96 Feb-03 Feb-95 Feb-00 Feb-02 Feb-96 Feb-98 Oct-95 Oct-97 Oct-99 Jun-03 Jun-95 Jun-97 Jun-99 Jun-01 Jun-02 Oct-96 Oct-98 Oct-00 Oct-01 Oct-02 Oct-03
-50%
The top rated PRVit portfolio produced a cumulative return of 193.4% versus only 37.8% for the lowest rated portfolio. Moreover, the portfolio returns were all in order of their PRVit scores. These results strongly suggest that PRVit has information content in distinguishing the relative value of stocks within industry sectors. PRVit also fared well on a yearly basis against its Russell benchmark, as shown in Exhibit 2. The top portfolio beat its Russell non-financial benchmark by a cumulative total of 70.7% over the nine year period, and fell short in only one calendar year out of nine, in 1999, by 15.9% versus 17.1%, a year when new economy buzz was putting low PRVit rated stocks out of alignment with their fundamental value.
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Russell 3000 29.5% 19.0% 31.7% 23.9% 20.9% -7.5% -10.5% -22.8% 27.8%
S&P 500 24.0% 16.0% 24.8% 12.3% 10.6% 8.7% 0.1% -18.7% 34.2%
200.0% 193.4% 150.0% 122.7%
100.0%
112.1%
111.9%
50.0%
193.4% 21.5%
122.7% 13.6%
112.1% 12.5%
111.9% 12.4%
Not surprisingly, the results are even more dramatic when the returns are compounded, as opposed to just summed. The top rated portfolio produced a total compound return of 489.8% versus the Russell non-financial benchmark return of 188.2%.
489.8% 21.8%
188.2% 12.5%
170.0% 11.7%
168.3% 11.6%
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Exhibit 4: Excess Return by Sector (TSR Top Rated TSR Sector Average)
Energy Utilities Food Beverage & Tobacco Food & Staples Retailing Automobiles & Components Materials Capital goods Media Hotels Restaurants & Leisure Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology Softw are & Services Transportation Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment Telecommunication Services Consumer Durables & Apparel Commercial Services & Supplies Retailing Household & Personal Products Health Care Equipment & Services Technology Hardw are & Equipment -20% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% -3% 9% 23% 25% 29% 36% 41% 52% 72% 73% 77% 78% 87% 90% 95% 100% 103% 108% 110% 132% 140%
Hypothetical cumulative returns that could have been achieved by buying the PRVit rated top 20 percentile companies in each sector versus the sector average return over 1995 2003, with portfolio rebalanced monthly
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37.8% 0.4% 1.5% 12.1% -20.7% 6.6% 17.4% 8.9% 12.5% -1.8% 25.2% -19.0% -2.9% -42.2% 39.7%
67.7% 0.7% 1.6% 11.2% -16.9% 5.8% 22.6% 13.6% 15.4% 11.7% 26.6% -14.3% -14.6% -31.1% 37.7%
58.7% 0.6% 2.0% 14.0% -20.7% 6.6% 20.6% 8.5% 14.2% -6.3% 34.6% -13.4% -5.9% -39.4% 45.7%
-5.6% 0.0% 1.7% 17.3% -23.5% 7.6% 19.1% 8.0% 11.8% -9.0% 9.5% -32.2% 7.0% -52.9% 33.1%
61.2% 0.6% 1.9% 13.0% -17.5% 5.9% 21.5% 15.3% 23.3% 19.5% 23.3% -30.3% -23.2% -23.0% 34.7%
For comparison, the left column presents the results already examined, from investing in the top and bottom PRVit rated portfolios cutting across all the sectors, and investing the same amount in each company regardless of size. The right-most column shows the same results but where the investment amount is proportionate to each firms market capitalization. Observe that the long-short spread is lower for the market cap weighted returns than for equal dollar weighed returns because, once again, PRVit doesnt find as much mis-valuation in large caps as it does in small caps. To put that into perspective, note that the market cap weighted portfolio returns are still quite attractive, with a cumulative 9-year long-short spread of 101% (top rated 167.8% - bottom rated 66.8%). The top rated portfolio is also less risky, with a monthly return standard deviation of 4.9% versus 5.9% for the bottom rated portfolio. A market-weighted long-short strategy would also have made money in 69 out of the 110 months studied (an equal weighted
The Investors Guide to EVA and PRVit : Backtesting Analysis
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long-short strategy would have done even better, of course, making money in 80 of 110 months, although with higher transactions costs). The bottom line is that PRVit appears to have significant information content, especially when used to rate stocks within a sector and to construct sector-neutral portfolios or pair trades.
Next Steps
The complete Investors Guide to EVA and PRVit is available for download at www.sternstewart.com/prvit/investorsguide. Arrange a trial PRVit subscription at www.matrixusa.com. Visit www.sternstewart.com for corporate applications of EVA.
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