FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 177761 : April 18, 2012] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS.

REMEDIOS TANCHANCO Y PINEDA, APPELLANT. DECISION DEL CASTILLO, J.: Theft becomes qualified when it is committed with grave abuse of confidence.[1] Factual Antecedents On appeal is the September 27, 2006 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR. CR-H.C. No. 01409 which affirmed with modification the July 4, 2005 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City, Branch 198, finding appellant Remedios Tanchanco y Pineda (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft. The Information[4] against appellant contained the following accusatory allegations: That during the period from October 2000 to May 8, 2001, in the City of Las Pias, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed Accused, being then employed as Legal Secretary and Liaison Officer of ComplainantATTY. REBECCA MANUEL Y AZANZA, with intent [to] gain, with grave abuse of confidence and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal, and carry away cash money amounting to Four Hundred Seventeen Thousand Nine Hundred Twentytwo [Pesos] and ninety centavos (P417,922.90) [from] said Complainant, to the damage and prejudice of the latter x x x. CONTRARY TO LAW.[5] The appellant entered a plea of not guilty during her arraignment. ensued. Version of the Prosecution Private complainant Atty. Rebecca Manuel y Azanza (Rebecca) knew appellant for more than 25 years, the latter being the niece of her long-time neighbor. During this period, Rebecca and her children established a close relationship with appellant to the point that they treated her as a member of their family. In June 1999, Rebecca hired appellant to work in her office as legal secretary and liaison officer. One of appellants tasks as liaison officer was to process the transfer of titles of Rebeccas clients. In the course of appellants employment, Rebecca noticed that the completion of the transfer of titles was taking longer than usual. Upon inquiry, appellant attributed the delay to the cumbersome procedure of transferring titles, as well as to the fact that Thereafter, trial
cralaw

personnel processing the documents could not be bribed. Rebecca took appellants word for it. However, appellant suddenly abandoned her job on April 18, 2001. And when Rebecca reviewed appellants unfinished work, she discovered that the latter betrayed her trust and confidence on several occasions by stealing sums of money entrusted to her as payment for capital gains tax, documentary stamp tax, transfer tax and other expenses intended for the transfer of the titles of properties from their previous owners to Rebeccas clients. According to Rebecca, she gave appellant P39,000.00 as payment for donors tax in connection with a Deed of Donation and Acceptance and Deed of Partition by Donees/Co-Owners, which her client Tomas Manongsong (Tomas) paid for the partitioning of a parcel of land located in Batangas. Upon verification from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), however, it turned out that appellant paid only P31,709.08. This was confirmed by the Bank of Commerce,[6] where appellant made such payment. Appellant also received P20,000.00 from Tomass wife, Mila Manongsong, for the processing of the properties land titles. Appellant liquidated the same in a handwritten statement[7] in which she indicated payment of P10,089.45 for transfer tax under Official Receipt (OR) No. 1215709 and of P7,212.00 for registration with the Registry of Deeds of Bauan, Batangas under OR No. 5970738. An inquiry, however, later revealed that OR No. 1215709 was issued only for the amount of P50.00, representing payment for the issuance of a certified true copy of a tax declaration,[8] while OR No. 5970738 was never issued per Certification[9] from the same Registry of Deeds. Rebecca also found out that the documents relevant to the said transfer of titles are still with the BIR since the amount of P4,936.24 had not yet been paid. Appellant also duped Rebecca relative to the P105,000.00 for the payment of the capital gains and documentary stamp taxes. Said taxes arose from the sale of a house and lot covered by TCT No. (62911) T-33899-A to her client Dionisia Alviedo (Alviedo). Appellant submitted a liquidation statement[10] stating that she paid the sums of P81,816.00 as capital gains tax and P20,460.00 for documentary stamp tax under Equitable Bank OR Nos. 937110 and 937111, respectively. However, said bank certified that said ORs do not belong to the series of ORs issued by it.[11] As a result, Rebecca was constrained to pay these taxes with the corresponding penalties and surcharges. Rebecca further alleged that in connection with the payment of the capital gains and documentary stamp taxes imposed on the property of another client, Carmelita Sundian (Sundian), she gave appellant P120,000.00. Appellant purportedly presented a handwritten liquidation report stating that she paid the amounts of P94,281.00 as capital gains tax and P23,571.00 as documentary stamp tax under Equitable Bank OR Nos. 717228[12] and 717229.[13] Appellant also stated that the balance from the money intended for processing the papers of Sundian was only P2,148.00.[14] However, Rebecca discovered upon verification that the receipts submitted by appellant are bogus as Equitable Bank issued a Certification[15] that said ORs were issued to different persons and for different amounts. Rebecca was again forced to refund the sum to Sundian. With regard to Rebeccas client Rico Sendino, Rebecca claimed that she gave appellant P35,000.00 for the payment of capital gains and transfer taxes in connection with the

deed of sale executed between one Priscilla Cruz and her said client. In the handwritten liquidation statement[16] submitted to her by appellant, the latter claimed to have paid the amount of P35,000.00 under Traders Royal Bank OR No. 1770047.[17] Again, the receipt turned out to be a fake as said bank issued a Certification[18]negating the issuance of said OR. And just as in transactions with her other clients, Rebecca was forced to shell-out money from her own funds to pay the same. Leilani Gonzaga (Gonzaga) was another client of Rebecca who engaged her services to pay the capital gains tax imposed on the sale of a property. After Rebecca told appellant to go to the BIR, the latter indicated in her handwritten liquidation statement that she paid the capital gains tax using two Equitable PCI Managers Checks for which she was issued OR Nos. 1770016 and 1770017, and cash payments of P71,184.00 under OR No. 1770018 and P17, 805.00 under OR No. 1770019.[19] However, no payments were actually made. To complete the processing of the transaction, Rebecca had to pay the sum of P3,273.00 to the Registry of Deeds and P9,050.00 for the transfer tax imposed on the transaction. The same thing happened with the payment of capital gains tax as a result of a Deed of Transfer with Partition Agreement of a Land executed between Rebeccas client Edmer and his siblings, Evelyn and Renato, all surnamed Mandrique.[20] This time, appellant showed Rebecca a donors tax return[21]accomplished in her own handwriting as proof of payment of the sum of P12,390.00. Appellant also liquidated the amount of P6,250.00 as advance payment made to a geodetic engineer for the purpose of subdividing the property.[22] Again, Rebecca was later able to verify that no payments in such amounts were made. According to Rebecca, appellant likewise pocketed the sum of P10,000.00 intended for the processing of 15 titles that the latter claimed to have paid in her liquidation report. Also, Rebecca asserted that appellant did not pay or file the proper application for the issuance of title of the Grand Del Rosario property. Aside from the above, Rebecca was likewise constrained to complete the processing of one of the three other titles recovered from appellant and had to pay the capital gains tax imposed on the purchase of the land in the sum of more than P100,000.00. All in all, the money supposed to be used as payments for capital gains and transfer taxes as well as for the registration of sale of properties of Rebeccas various clients amounted to P427,992.90. Aside from this sum, Rebecca also spent at least P650,000.00 for the reconstitution of all the documents, payment of surcharges for late filing of capital gains tax returns, transportation expenses and other incidental expenses. Version of the Appellant Appellant admitted that she used to be the legal secretary and liaison officer of Rebecca. In particular, as liaison officer, she attended to the transfer of titles of Rebeccas clients such as Gonzaga, Manongsong, Alviedo and others whose names she could no longer remember. She claimed that the processing of the title of the Manongsong property was her last transaction for Rebecca. She was given money to pay the capital gains tax at the BIR. When confronted with the charges filed against her, appellant merely denied the allegations.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court In its Decision[23] of July 4, 2005, the trial court found the existence of a high degree of confidence between Rebecca and appellant. It noted that the relationship between the two as employer-employee was not an ordinary one; appellant was being considered a part of Rebeccas family. Because of this trust and confidence, Rebecca entrusted to appellant cash in considerable sums which were liquidated through appellants own handwritten statements of expenses. However, appellant gravely abused the trust and confidence reposed upon her by Rebecca when she pocketed the money entrusted to her for processing the clients land titles. And as a cover up, she presented to Rebecca either fake or altered receipts which she did not even deny during trial. The trial court thus found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. However, the trial court ruled that the total amount stolen by appellant was P407,711.68 and not P417,907.90 as claimed by Rebecca. It disposed of the case as follows: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the court finds the accused Remedios Tanchanco y Pineda GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Theft as defined and penalized under Article 309, paragraph 1 and Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences said accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the offended party in the sum of Four Hundred Seven Thousand Seven Hundred Eleven Pesos and Sixty Eight Centavos (P407,711.68) representing the total amount taken by the accused, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, with costs. SO ORDERED.[24] Ruling of the Court of Appeals The appellate court affirmed the trial courts ruling but came up with a different figure as to the total amount taken by the appellant. The CA noted that there was no clear justification for the award of P407,711.68 as an examination of the records revealed that appellant failed to pay or padded her expenses only in the total amount of P248,447.45, computed as follows:

On the Manongsong property: P Transfer tax[25] 10,089.45 P Registration of the documents[26] 7,212.00 P Estate tax[27] 2,000.00 P Difference between the donors tax that accused- appellant 8,000.00 claimed she paid and that which she actually paid per certification of the Bank of Commerce[28] P Sub-total 27,301.45

On the Alviedo property: P Capital gains tax[29] 81,816.00 P Documentary stamp tax[30] 20,460.00 P Sub-total 102,276.00 On the Sundian property: P Capital gains tax[31] 94,281.00 P Documentary stamp tax[32] 23,571.00 P Sub-total 117,852.00 On the Sendino property: P Ueda donors tax[33] 6,018.00 P Capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax[34] 35,000.00 P Sub-total 41,018.00 On the Mandrique property: P Difference between donors tax per accused- appellants 10,000.00 liquidation report and the amount she actually paid[35] P Sub-total 10,000.00 P Total[36] (Footnotes supplied.) 248,447.45
Thus, the dispositive portion of its Decision[37] dated September 27, 2006 reads: WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated July 4, 2005 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-appellant, Remedios Tanchanco Pineda is hereby ordered to indemnify the private complainant Rebecca Manuel y Azanza the sum of Two Hundred Forty-Eight Thousand Four Hundred Forty-Seven Pesos and Forty Five Centavos (P248,447.45)representing the total amount she took from the private complainant. SO ORDERED.[38] Issue In this appeal, appellant again raises the lone issue she submitted to the CA, viz:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF QUALIFIED THEFT DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN HER FAVOR.[39] Appellant maintains that there is no direct evidence to prove that she actually received the alleged amounts intended for the processing of various documents. She also denies the claim that she took the money entrusted to her during the period from May 2000 to May 8, 2001 as alleged in the Information. Our Ruling The appeal is not meritorious. Courts below correctly held appellant liable for qualified theft The elements of the crime of Theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code [(RPC)] are: (1) x x x there [was] taking of personal property; (2) x x x [the] property belongs to another; (3) x x x the taking [was] done with intent to gain; (4) x x x the taking [was] without the consent of the owner; and (5) x x x the taking was accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.[40] As to the first and second elements, we quote with approval the CAs discussion on the matter: Accused-appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove by direct evidence the first and basic element of the offense that is, the taking of the sum of Php417,922.90 during the period from May 2000 up to May 8, 2001. She claims that the prosecution failed to adduce any evidence that would prove that the accused actually received the alleged amounts handed to her for the processing of various documents. xxxx Regarding x x x the prosecutions failure to present direct evidence to prove the accused-appellants taking of the questioned amount, it is Our view that the absence of direct evidence proving accused-appellants stealing and carrying away of the alleged Php417,922.90 from private respondent would not matter as long as there is enough circumstantial evidence that would establish such element of taking. After all, Sec. 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that an accused may be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence if more than one circumstance is involved, the facts of which, inferring said circumstances have been proven, and provided that the combination of all such circumstances would suffice to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. There is no doubt, as held by the trial court, that the prosecution was able to establish the following circumstances: 1. Accused-appellant was the legal secretary and liaison officer of private complainant from June 1999 to April 18, 2001. She was the only person working for the private complainant during said period.

2. As legal secretary and liaison officer, accused-appellant was tasked to process land titles of private complainants clients. Her duties included the payment of taxes (documentary stamp taxes, capital gains taxes, transfer tax) for the transfer of title from previous owners to new owners/buyers of the property. 3. Because of the nature of accused appellants work and the trust reposed in her by private complainant, the latter confidently gave her considerable amounts of cash without need of receipts. The accused-appellant even admitted that she often received money from private complainant for payment of capital gains and transfer taxes. 4. There were also instances when accused-appellant was authorized by private complainant to collect money from her clients especially when the accused-appellant ran out of money needed in the processing of titles. 5. The accused-appellant was given a free hand in liquidating her expenses in her own handwriting. 6. Upon verification from banks and government agencies with which the accusedappellant transacted in relation to her tasks, the private complainant discovered that what the accused-appellant submitted were handwritten padded liquidation statements because her reported expenses turned out to be higher than what she actually spent; and worse, the official receipts she submitted to private complainant were fake. x x x. xxxx 7. The accused-appellant did not specifically deny her submitting altered or fake receipts in liquidating her expenses for said taxes. 8. And conceding her guilt, the accused-appellant suddenly disappeared leaving some of her tasks, unfinished. xxxx [These] pieces of circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution constitute an unbroken chain leading to a fair and reasonable conclusion that accused-appellant took sums of money that were entrusted to her by the private complainant. x x x[41] Circumstantial evidence may prove the guilt of appellant and justify a conviction if the following requisites concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[42] In other words, [f]or circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support conviction, all circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.[43] Here, we agree with the CA that the circumstances above enumerated lead to the reasonable conclusion that appellant took amounts of money from Rebecca. With regard to the third element, [i]ntent to gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be

alleged in an information, in which it is charged that there was unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and appropriation by the offender of the things subject of asportation.[44] In this case, it was established that appellant padded her expenses and submitted fake receipts of her supposed payment for the processing of the transfer of land titles, to gain from the money entrusted to her by Rebecca. Her intentional failure to properly and correctly account for the same constitutes appropriation with intent to gain. Anent the fourth element pertaining to Rebeccas lack of consent, same is manifested by the fact that it was only after appellant abandoned her job on April 18, 2001 that Rebecca discovered the missing sums of money. Her subsequent acts of confirming the payment or non-payment of fees and of verifying from different banks the issuance of the purported ORs presented to her by appellant in liquidating the amounts she entrusted to the latter, negates consent on Rebeccas part. With regard to the fifth element, it is clear from the facts that the taking was accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. From these, it is clear that all the elements of theft are obtaining in this case. The next crucial question now is, did appellant commit the crime with grave abuse of confidence as to make her liable for qualified theft? Under Article 310 of the [RPC], theft [becomes] qualified when it is, among others, committed with grave abuse of confidence. x x x[45] The grave abuse of confidence must be the result of the relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the appellant and the offended party that might create a high degree of confidence between them which the appellant abused.[46] Here, it is undisputed that appellant was a close friend of Rebecca and her family. It was due to this personal relationship that appellant was employed by Rebecca as a legal secretary and liaison officer. The latter position necessarily entails trust and confidence not only because of its nature and the functions attached to it, but also because appellant makes representations on behalf of Rebecca as regards third parties. By reason of this, all matters essentially pertaining to the conduct of business of the law office were known by, and entrusted to, appellant. This included the safekeeping of important documents and the handling of money needed for the processing of papers of Rebeccas clients. It is thus safe to assume that Rebecca relied on appellant when it comes to the affairs of her law office as to create a high degree of trust and confidence between them. And as Rebecca trusted appellant completely, and by reason of her being the liaison officer, she handed the monies to appellant without requiring the latter to sign any paper to evidence her receipt thereof. She also allowed appellant to liquidate the expenses incurred through mere handwritten liquidation statements solely prepared by appellant and treated them, as well as the official receipts presented, as true and correct. It thus becomes clear that it is because of the trust and confidence reposed by Rebecca upon appellant that the latter was able to make it appear from her liquidation statements that she spent the sums she received from Rebecca for their intended purposes. To conceal this, she presented to Rebecca fake or altered receipts for the supposed payment, all of which form part of the records as evidence. Unfortunately for appellant, she was not able to refute Rebeccas allegations against her as well as the evidence supporting the same since what she advanced during trial were

mere bare denials. The Court has oft pronounced that x x x denial x x x [is] an inherently weak [defense] which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused committed the crime.[47] The Court therefore concludes that appellant took undue advantage of Rebeccas confidence in her when she appropriated for herself sums of money that the latter entrusted to her for a different purpose. The theft in this case was thus committed with grave abuse of confidence. Hence, appellant was correctly held by the lower courts as liable for qualified theft. With respect to appellants contention that she could not have taken the alleged amount of money until May 8, 2001 since her employment with Rebecca lasted only until April 18, 2001, same fails to impress. The Information alleged that the crime was committed during the period from October 2000 to May, 2001. The word during simply means at some point in the course of[48] or throughout the course of a period of time[49] from October 2000 to May 8, 2001. In the Information, during should therefore be understood to mean at some point from October 2000 to May 8, 2001, and not always until May 8, 2001. Further, the period alleged in the Information, which is from October 2000 to May 8, 2001 is not distant or far removed from the actual period of the commission of the offense, which is from October 2000 to April 17, 2001. As to the total amount unlawfully taken by appellant, we hold that the sum of P407,711.68 which the trial court came up with has no basis. After a thorough review of the records, we find as correct instead the result of the detailed computation made by the CA as to the total amount of money that appellant stole or padded as expenses, which is only P248, 447.75. The Proper Penalty Article 310 of the RPC provides that the crime of qualified theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in Art. 309. Under paragraph 1, Art. 309 of the RPC, the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods is to be imposed if the value of the thing stolen is more than P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00. But if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in said paragraph [prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods], and one year for each additional P10,000.00, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty (20) years. In such cases and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of the RPC, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. Here, the amount stolen by appellant, as correctly found by the CA, is P248,447.75. Since the said amount exceeds P22,000.00, the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods to be imposed in the maximum period, which is eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years of prision mayor.[50] To determine the additional years of imprisonment, P22,000.00 must be deducted from the said amount and the difference should then be divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount less than P10,000.00. Hence, we have twentytwo (22) years that should be added to the basic penalty. However, the imposable penalty for simple theft should not exceed a total of twenty (20) years. Thus, had the appellant committed simple theft, the penalty for this case would be twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal. But as the penalty for qualified theft is two degrees higher, the

proper penalty as correctly imposed by both lower courts is reclusion perpetua.[51]

cralaw

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01409 finding appellant Remedios Tanchanco y Pineda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft is AFFIRMED. Costs against the appellant. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court Manila

EN BANC

CONRADO QUE, Complainant,

A.C. No. 7054 PUNO, C J., CARPIO, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: December 4, 2009

- versus -

ATTY. ANASTACIO REVILLA, JR. Respondent.

x ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
PER CURIAM: In a complaint for disbarment,[1] Conrado Que (complainant) accused Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline (IBP

Committee

on

Bar

Discipline or CBD) of committing the following violations of the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138 of the Rules of Court: (1) The respondents abuse of court remedies and processes by filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), two petitions for annulment of title before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a petition for annulment of judgment before the RTC and lastly, a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC (collectively, subject cases) to assail and overturn the final judgments of the Metropolitan Trial Court[2] (MeTC) and RTC[3]in the unlawful detainer case rendered against the respondents clients. The respondent in this regard, repeatedly raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction by the MeTC and RTC knowing fully-well that these courts have jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case. The respondent also repeatedly attacked the complainants and his siblings titles over the property subject of the unlawful detainer case; (2) The respondents commission of forum-shopping by filing the subject cases in order to impede, obstruct, and frustrate the efficient administration of justice for his own personal gain and to defeat the right of the complainant and his siblings to execute the MeTC and RTC judgments in the unlawful detainer case; (3) The respondents lack of candor and respect towards his adversary and the courts by resorting to falsehood and deception to misguide, obstruct and impede the due administration of justice. The respondent asserted falsehood in the motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment by fabricating an imaginary order issued by the presiding judge in open court which allegedly denied the motion to dismiss filed by the respondents in the said case. The complainant alleged that the respondent did this to cover up his lack of preparation; the respondent also deceived his clients (who were all squatters) in supporting the above falsehood.[4]

(4) The respondents willful and revolting falsehood that unjustly maligned and defamed the good name and reputation of the late Atty. Alfredo Catolico (Atty. Catolico), the previous counsel of the respondents clients. (5) The respondents deliberate, fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in court in the petition for annulment of judgment for 15 litigants, three of whom are already deceased; (6) The respondents willful and fraudulent appearance in the second petition for annulment of title as counsel for the Republic of the Philippineswithout being authorized to do so.

Additionally, the complaint accused the respondent of representing fifty-two (52) litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762 when no such authority was ever given to him. The CBD required the respondent to answer the complaint.

In his Answer,[5] the respondent declared that he is a member of the Kalayaan Development Cooperative (KDC) that handles pro bono cases for the underprivileged, the less fortunate, the homeless and those in the marginalized sector in Metro Manila. He agreed to take over the cases formerly handled by other KDC members. One of these cases was the unlawful detainer case handled by the late Atty. Catolico where the complainant and his siblings were the plaintiffs and the respondents present clients were the defendants.

With respect to paragraph 1 of the disbarment complaint, the respondent professed his sincerity, honesty and good faith in filing the petitions complained

of; he filed these petitions to protect the interests of his clients in their property. The respondent asserted that these petitions were all based on valid grounds thelack of jurisdiction of the MeTC and the RTC over the underlying unlawful detainer case, the extrinsic fraud committed by the late Atty. Catolico, and theextrinsic fraud committed by the complainant and his family against his clients; he discovered that the allegedly detained property did not really belong to the complainant and his family but is a forest land. The respondent also asserted that his resort to a petition for annulment of judgment and a petition for declaratory relief to contest the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC were all parts of his legal strategy to protect the interests of his clients.

On the allegations of falsehood in the motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment (covered by paragraph 3 of the disbarment complaint), the respondent maintained that his allegations were based on his observations and the notes he had taken during the proceedings on what the presiding judge dictated in open court.

The respondent denied that he had made any unauthorized appearance in court (with respect to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the disbarment complaint). He claimed that the 52 litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762 were impleaded by inadvertence; he immediately rectified his error by dropping them from the case. On the petition for annulment of judgment, the respondent claimed that a majority (31 out of 49) of the litigants who signed the certification constituted sufficient compliance with the rules on forum-shopping. The respondent likewise

denied having represented the Republic of the Philippines in the second petition for annulment of title. The respondent pointed out that there was no allegation whatsoever that he was the sole representative of both the complainants (his clients) and the Republic of the Philippines. The respondent pointed out that the petition embodied a request to the Office of the Solicitor General to represent his clients in the case.[6] The respondent submitted that he did not commit any illegal, unlawful, unjust, wrongful or immoral acts towards the complainant and his siblings. He stressed that he acted in good faith in his dealings with them and his conduct was consistent with his sworn duty as a lawyer to uphold justice and the law and to defend the interests of his clients. The respondent additionally claimed that the disbarment case was filed because the complainants counsel, Atty. Cesar P. Uy (Atty. Uy), had an axe to grind against him.

Lastly, the respondent posited in his pleadings[7] before the IBP that the present complaint violated the rule on forum shopping considering that the subject cases were also the ones on which a complaint was filed against him in CBD Case No. 03-1099 filed by Atty. Uy before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline. The respondent also posited that the present complaint was filed to harass, ridicule and defame his good name and reputation and, indirectly, to harass his clients who are marginalized members of the KDC.

The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner

Except for the last charge of unauthorized appearance on behalf of 52 litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762, Investigating Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan[8] (Investigating Commissioner Cunanan) found all the charges against the respondent meritorious. In his Report and Recommendation, he stated:
While an attorney admittedly has the solemn duty to defend and protect the cause and rights of his client with all the fervor and energy within his command, yet, it is equally true that it is the primary duty of the lawyer to defend the dignity, authority and majesty of the law and the courts which enforce it. A lawyer is not at liberty to maintain and defend the cause of his clients thru means, inconsistent with truth and honor. He may not and must not encourage multiplicity of suits or brazenly engage in forum-shopping.[9]

On the first charge on abuse of court processes, Investigating Commissioner Cunanan noted the unnecessary use by the respondent of legal remedies to forestall the execution of the final decisions of the MTC and the RTC in the unlawful detainer case against his clients.[10]

On the second charge, the Investigating Commissioner ruled that the act of the respondent in filing two petitions for annulment of title, a petition for annulment of judgment and later on a petition for declaratory relief were all done to prevent the execution of the final judgment in the unlawful detainer case and constituted prohibited forum-shopping.[11]

On the third and fourth charges, Investigating Commissioner Cunanan found ample evidence showing that the respondent was dishonest in dealing with the court as shown in his petition for annulment of judgment; he resorted to falsities

and attributed acts to Atty. Catolico and to the presiding judge, all of which were untrue. [12]

On the fifth and sixth charges, the Investigating Commissioner disregarded the respondents explanation that he had no intention to represent without authority 15 of the litigants (three of whom were already deceased) in the petition for annulment of judgment (Civil Case No. Q-01-45556). To the Investigating Commissioner, the respondent merely glossed over the representation issue by claiming that the authority given by a majority of the litigants complied with the certification of non-forum shopping requirement. The Investigating Commissioner likewise brushed aside the respondents argument regarding his misrepresentation in the second complaint for annulment of title since he knew very well that only the Solicitor General can institute an action for reversion on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. Despite this knowledge, the respondent solely signed the amended complaint for and on behalf of his clients and of the Republic. The Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, through its Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 on CBD Case No. 03-1100, adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Cunanan and recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.[13] On reconsideration, the Board of Governors reduced the respondents suspension from the practice of law to one (1) year.[14] The Issue

The case poses to us the core issues of whether the respondent can be held liable for the imputed unethical infractions and professional misconduct, and the penalty these transgressions should carry.

The Courts Ruling

Except for the penalty, we agree with the Report and Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Cunanan and the Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline.

We take judicial notice that this disbarment complaint is not the only one so far filed involving the respondent; another complaint invoking similar grounds has previously been filed. In Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo C. Garcia v. Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr.,[15] we suspended the respondent from the practice of law for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse of court procedures and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We initially imposed a suspension of two (2) years, but in an act of leniency subsequently reduced the suspension to six (6) months.[16] Abuse of court procedures and processes

The following undisputed facts fully support the conclusion that the respondent is guilty of serious misconduct for abusing court procedures and

processes to shield his clients from the execution of the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC in the unlawful detainer case against these clients:

First, the respondent filed a petition for certiorari (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53892) with prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order to question the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC for lack of jurisdiction. In dismissing the respondents petition, the CA held:
Even for the sake of argument considering that the petition case be the proper remedy, still it must be rejected for failure of petitioners to satisfactorily demonstrate lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City over the ejectment case.[17]

Second, notwithstanding the CAs dismissal of the petition for certiorari, the respondent again questioned the MeTCs and the RTCs lack of jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case in a petition for annulment of judgment (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-45556) before the RTC with an ancillary prayer for the grant of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The RTC dismissed this petition on the basis of the motion to dismiss filed.[18]

Third, the respondent successively filed two petitions (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-38780 and Civil Case No. Q-02-46885) for annulment of the complainants title to the property involved in the unlawful detainer case. The records show that these petitions were both dismissed for lack of legal personality on the part of the plaintiffs to file the petition.[19]

Fourth, after the dismissals of the petition for annulment of judgment and the petitions for annulment of title, the respondent this time filed a petition for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the complainant and his siblings from exercising their rights over the same property subject of the unlawful detainer case. The respondent based the petition on the alleged nullity of the complainants title because the property is a part of forest land.

Fifth, the persistent applications by the respondent for injunctive relief in the four petitions he had filed in several courts the petition for certiorari, the petition for annulment of judgment, the second petition for annulment of complainants title and the petition for declaratory relief reveal the respondents persistence in preventing and avoiding the execution of the final decisions of the MeTC and RTC against his clients in the unlawful detainer case.

Under the circumstances, the respondents repeated attempts go beyond the legitimate means allowed by professional ethical rules in defending the interests of his client. These are already uncalled for measures to avoid the enforcement of final judgments of the MeTC and RTC. In these attempts, the respondent violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which makes it obligatory for a lawyer to observe the rules of procedure and. . . not [to] misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. By his actions, the respondent used procedural rules to thwart and obstruct the speedy and efficient administration of justice, resulting in prejudice to the winning parties in that case.[20]

Filing of multiple actions and forum shopping

The respondent likewise violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,[21] as well as the rule against forum shopping, both of which are directed against the filing of multiple actions to attain the same objective. Both violations constitute abuse of court processes; they tend to degrade the administration of justice; wreak havoc on orderly judicial procedure;[22] and add to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.[23]

While the filing of a petition for certiorari to question the lower courts jurisdiction may be a procedurally legitimate (but substantively erroneous) move, the respondents subsequent petitions involving the same property and the same parties not only demonstrate his attempts to secure favorable ruling using different fora, but his obvious objective as well of preventing the execution of the MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful detainer case against his clients. This intent is most obvious with respect to the petitions for annulment of judgment and declaratory relief, both geared towards preventing the execution of the unlawful detainer decision, long after this decision had become final. Willful, intentional and deliberate falsehood before the courts

The records also reveal that the respondent committed willful,

intentional and deliberate falsehood in the pleadings he filed with the lower courts. First, in the petition for annulment of judgment filed before the RTC, Branch 101, Quezon City, the respondent cited extrinsic fraud as one of the grounds for the annulment sought. The extrinsic fraud was alleged in the last paragraph of the petition, as follows:
In here, counsel for the petitioners (defendants therein), deliberately neglected to file the proper remedy then available after receipt of the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration thus corruptly sold out the interest of the petitioners (defendants therein) by keeping them away to the Court and in complete ignorance of the suit by a false pretense of compromise and fraudulent acts of alleging representing them when in truth and in fact, have connived with the attorney of the prevailing party at his defeat to the prejudice of the petitioner(defendants therein) [24]

Yet, in paragraph 35 of the same petition, the respondent alleged that no second motion for reconsideration or for new trial, or no other petition with the CA had been filed, as he believed that the decisions rendered both by the MeTC and the RTC are null and void.[25] These conflicting claims, no doubt, involve a fabrication made for the purpose of supporting the petition for annulment. Worse, it involved a direct and unsubstantiated attack on the reputation of a law office colleague, another violation we shall separately discuss below.

Second, the respondent employed another obvious subterfuge when he filed his second petition for annulment of title, which was an unsuccessful attempt to circumvent the rule that only the Solicitor General may commence reversion proceedings of public lands[26] on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. This second petition, filed by a private party and not by the Republic, showed that: (a)

the respondent and his clients requested that they be represented by the Solicitor General in the proceedings; (b) the Republic of the Philippines was simply impleaded in the amended petition without its consent as a plaintiff; and (c) the respondent signed the amended petition where he alone stood as counsel for the plaintiffs. In this underhanded manner, the respondent sought to compel the Republic to litigate and waste its resources on an unauthorized and unwanted suit.

Third, the respondent also committed falsehood in his motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing his petition for annulment of judgment where he misrepresented to the court and his clients what actually transpired in the hearing of June 28, 2002 in this wise:
Likewise, the proceedings on said date of hearing (June 28, 2002) show, that after both counsel have argued on the aforesaid pending incident, the Honorable Presiding Judge, in open court, and in the presence and within the hearing distance of all the plaintiffs and their counsel as well as the counsel of the defendants resolved: TO DENY THE MOTION TO DISMISS FILED AND DIRECTED DEFENDANTS COUNSEL TO FILE AN ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT WITHIN THE REMAINING PERIOD.[27][Underscoring and emphasis theirs]

The records, however, disclose that the scheduled hearing for June 28, 2002 was actually for the respondents application for temporary restraining order and was not a hearing on the adverse partys motion to dismiss. [28] The records also show that RTC-Branch 101 held in abeyance the respondents application for injunctive relief pending the resolution of the motion to dismiss filed by the adverse party.[29] As stated in the order of the Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 101:

Browsing over the records of this case specifically the transcripts of stenographic notes as transcribed by the Stenographer, the same will indicate that the allegations in the Motion for Reconsideration are not true. how can this Court make a ruling on the matter even without stating the factual and legal bases as required/mandated by the Rules. Moreover, there are no indications or iota of irregularity in the preparation by Stenographer of the transcripts, and by the Court interpreter of the Minutes of the open Court session.[Underscoring theirs]

The records further disclose that despite knowledge of the falsity of his allegations, the respondent took advantage of his position and the trust reposed in him by his clients (who are all squatters) to convince them to support, through their affidavits, his false claims on what allegedly transpired in the June 28, 2002 hearing. [30]

For these acts, we find the respondent liable under Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 the Code of Professional Responsibility for violating the lawyers duty to observe candor and fairness in his dealings with the court. This provision states:
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be mislead by an artifice.

Likewise, the respondent violated his duty as an attorney and his oath as a lawyer never to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law.[31] The respondent failed to remember that his duty as an officer of the court makes him an indispensable participant in the administration of justice,[32] and that he is expected to act candidly, fairly and truthfully in his work.[33] His duty as a lawyer obligates him not to conceal the truth from the court,

or to mislead the court in any manner, no matter how demanding his duties to his clients may be.[34] In case of conflict, his duties to his client yield to his duty to deal candidly with the court.[35] In defending his clients interest, the respondent also failed to observe Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which reads:
CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF LAW Rule 19.01 A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his clients x x x

This Canon obligates a lawyer, in defending his client, to employ only such means as are consistent with truth and honor.[36] He should not prosecute patently frivolous and meritless appeals or institute clearly groundless actions.[37] The recital of what the respondent did to prevent the execution of the judgment against his clients shows that he actually committed what the above rule expressly prohibits. Maligning the name of his fellow lawyers

To support the charge of extrinsic fraud in his petition for annulment of judgment, the respondent attacked (as quoted above) the name and reputation of the late Atty. Catolico and accused him of deliberate neglect, corrupt motives and connivance with the counsel for the adverse party. We find it significant that the respondent failed to demonstrate how he came upon his accusation against Atty. Catolico. The respondent, by his own admission,

only participated in the cases previously assigned to Atty. Catolico after the latter died. At the same time, the respondents petition for annulment of judgment also represented that no second motion for reconsideration or appeal was filed to contest the MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful detainer case for the reason that the respondent believed the said decisions were null and void ab initio. Under these circumstances, we believe that the respondent has been less than fair in his professional relationship with Atty. Catolico and is thus liable for violating Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which obligates a lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his professional colleagues. He was unfair because he imputed wrongdoing to Atty. Catolico without showing any factual basis therefor; he effectively maligned Atty. Catolico, who is now dead and unable to defend himself. Unauthorized appearances

We support Investigating Commissioner Cunanans finding that the respondent twice represented parties without proper authorization: first, in the petition for annulment of judgment; and second, in the second petition for annulment of title.[38] In the first instance, the records show that the respondent filed the petition for annulment of judgment on behalf of 49 individuals, 31 of whom gave their consent while the other 15 individuals did not. We cannot agree with the respondents off-hand explanation that he truly believed that a majority of the litigants who signed the certification of non-forum shopping in the petition already

gave him the necessary authority to sign for the others. We find it highly improbable that this kind of lapse could have been committed by a seasoned lawyer like the respondent, who has been engaged in the practice of law for more than 30 years and who received rigid and strict training as he so proudly declares, from the University of the Philippines College of Law and in the two law firms with which he was previously associated.[39] As Investigating Commissioner Cunanan found, the respondents explanation of compliance with the rule on the certification of non-forum shopping glossed over the real charge of appearing in court without the proper authorization of the parties he allegedly represented. In the second instance, which occurred in the second complaint for annulment of title, the respondent knew that only the Solicitor General can legally represent the Republic of the Philippines in actions for reversion of land. Nevertheless, he filed an amended petition where he impleaded the Republic of thePhilippines as plaintiff without its authority and consent, as a surreptitious way of forcing the Republic to litigate. Notably, he signed the amended complaint on behalf of all the plaintiffs his clients and the Republic.

In both instances, the respondent violated Sections 21 and 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court when he undertook the unauthorized appearances. The settled rule is that a lawyer may not represent a litigant without authority from the latter or from the latters representative or, in the absence thereof, without leave of court.[40] The willful unauthorized appearance by a lawyer for a party in a given case constitutes contumacious conduct and also warrants disciplinary measures against the erring lawyer for professional misconduct.[41]

The Respondents Defenses

We find no merit in the respondents defenses.

Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking unconscientious advantage of another. Accordingly, in University of the East v. Jader we said that "[g]ood faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious."[42] Bad faith, on the other hand, is a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest, ill will or for an ulterior purpose.[43] As both concepts are states of mind, they may be deduced from the attendant circumstances and, more particularly, from the acts and statements of the person whose state of mind is the subject of inquiry. In this case, we find that the respondent acted in bad faith in defending the interests of his clients. We draw this conclusion from the misrepresentations and the dubious recourses he made, all obviously geared towards forestalling the execution of the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC. That he took advantage of his legal knowledge and experience and misread the Rules immeasurably strengthen the presence of bad faith. We find neither sincerity nor honest belief on the part of the respondent in pleading the soundness and merit of the cases that he filed in court to prevent the

execution of the MeTC and RTC decisions, considering his own conduct of presenting conflicting theories in his petitions. The succession of cases he filed shows a desperation that negates the sincere and honest belief he claims; these are simply scattershot means to achieve his objective of avoiding the execution of the unlawful detainer judgment against his clients.

On the respondents allegations regarding his discretion to determine legal strategy, it is not amiss to note that this was the same defense he raised in the first disbarment case.[44] As we explained in Plus Builders, the exercise of a lawyers discretion in acting for his client can never be at the expense of truth and justice. In the words of this cited case:
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. He must give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of his clients case with the end in view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes, and counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. He must always remind himself of the oath he took upon admission to the Bar that he will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; and that he will conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients. Needless to state, the lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and the administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds of reason and common sense. A lawyers responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party.[45]

We cannot give credence to the respondents claim that the disbarment case was filed because the counsel of the complainant, Atty. Uy, had an axe to grind

against him. We reject this argument, considering that it was not Atty. Uy who filed the present disbarment case against him; Atty. Uy is only the counsel in this case. In fact, Atty. Uy has filed his own separate disbarment case against the respondent. The sui generis nature of a disbarment case renders the underlying motives of the complainants unimportant and with very little relevance. The purpose of a disbarment proceeding is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as an officer of the court and a participant in the dispensation of justice an issue where the complainants personal motives have little relevance. For this reason, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by the Court motu proprio upon information of an alleged wrongdoing. As we also explained in the case In re: Almacen:
. . .disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not - and does not involve - a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. x x x

It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of-the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.[46]

Hence, we give little or no weight to the alleged personal motivation that drove the complainant Que and his counsel to file the present disbarment case. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed various acts of professional misconduct and thereby failed to live up to the exacting ethical standards imposed on members of the Bar. We cannot agree, however, that only a penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of law should be imposed. Neither should we limit ourselves to the originally recommended penalty of suspension for two (2) years.

Given the respondents multiple violations, his past record as previously discussed, and the nature of these violations which shows the readiness to disregard court rules and to gloss over concerns for the orderly administration of justice, we believe and so hold that the appropriate action of this Court is to disbar the respondent to keep him away from the law profession and from any significant role in the administration of justice which he has disgraced. He is a continuing risk, too, to the public that the legal profession serves. Not even his ardor and overzealousness in defending the interests of his client can save him. Such traits at the expense of everything else, particularly the integrity of the profession and the orderly administration of justice, this Court cannot accept nor tolerate.

Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondents first ethical infraction of the same nature. We penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and

Edgardo Garcia versus Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse of court procedures and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We showed leniency then by reducing his penalty to suspension for six (6) months. We cannot similarly treat the respondent this time; it is clear that he did not learn any lesson from his past experience and since then has exhibited traits of incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis to the respondents professional legal career for the sake of the public, the profession and the interest of justice.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 dated December 17, 2005 and Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated December 11, 2008 of the Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline insofar as respondent Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is found liable forprofessional misconduct for violations of the Lawyers Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However, we modify the penalty the IBP imposed, and hold that the respondent should be DISBARRED from the practice of law.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court Manila

EN BANC

RE: SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM DATED JANUARY 11, 2010 OF ACTING DIRECTOR ALEU A. AMANTE, PIAB-C, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

A.M. No. 10-1-13-SC Present: PUNO, C.J., CARPIO, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: March 2, 2010

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Before us for consideration are the interrelated matters listed below. a. The subpoena duces tecum (dated January 11, 2010 and received by this Court on January 18, 2010), issued by the Office of the Ombudsman on the Chief, Office of the Administrative Services or AUTHORIZED

REPRESENTATIVE, Supreme Court, Manila, for the submission to the Office of the Ombudsman of the latest Personal Data Sheets and last known forwarding address of former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and former Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez. The subpoena duces tecum was issued in relation to a criminal complaint under (b) below, pursuant to Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution and Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6770. The Office of the Administrative Services (OAS) referred the matter to us onJanuary 21, 2010 with a request for clearance to release the specified documents and information.

b. Copy

of

the

criminal

complaint

entitled Oliver

O.

Lozano

and Evangeline Lozano-Endriano v. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., et al., OMB-C-C-090527-J, cited by the Ombudsman as basis for the the subpoena duces tecum it

issued. We secured a copy of this criminal complaint from the Ombudsman to determine the legality and propriety of the subpoena duces tecum sought.

c. Order dated February 4, 2010 (which the Court received on February 9, 2010), signed by Acting Director Maribeth Taytaon-Padios of the Office of the Ombudsman (with the approval of Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas NavarroGutierrez), dismissing the Lozano complaint and referring it to the Supreme Court for appropriate action. The order was premised on the

Memorandum[1] issued on July 31, 2003 by Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo who directed that all complaints against judges and other members of the Judiciary be immediately dismissed and referred to the Supreme Court for appropriate action.

OUR RULING

I. The Subpoena Duces Tecum

In light of the Ombudsmans dismissal order of February 4, 2010, any question relating to the legality and propriety of the subpoena duces tecum the Ombudsman issued has been rendered moot and academic. The subpoena duces tecum merely drew its life and continued viability from the underlying criminal complaint, and the complaints dismissal belated though it may be cannot but have the effect of rendering the need for the subpoena duces tecum academic.

As guide in the issuance of compulsory processes to Members of this Court, past and present, in relation to complaints touching on the exercise of our judicial functions, we deem it appropriate to discuss for the record the extent of the Ombudsmans authority in these types of complaints.

In the appropriate case, the Office of the Ombudsman has full authority to issue subpoenas, including subpoena duces tecum, for compulsory attendance of witnesses and the production of documents and information relating to matters under its investigation.[2] The grant of this authority, however, is not unlimited, as the Ombudsman must necessarily observe and abide by the terms of the Constitution and our laws, the Rules of Court and the applicable jurisprudence on the issuance, service, validity and efficacy of subpoenas. Under the Rules of Court, the issuance of subpoenas, including a subpoena duces tecum, operates under the requirements of reasonableness and relevance.[3] For the production of documents to be reasonable and for the documents themselves to be relevant, the matter under inquiry should, in the first place, be one that the Ombudsman can legitimately entertain, investigate and rule upon. In the present case, the matter that gave rise to the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum was a criminal complaint filed by the complainants Lozano for the alleged violation by retired Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. and retired Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).

A first step in considering whether a criminal complaint (and its attendant compulsory processes) is within the authority of the Ombudsman to entertain (and

to issue), is to consider the nature of the powers of the Supreme Court. This Court, by constitutional design, is supreme in its task of adjudication; judicial power is vested solely in the Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts, not only to settle actual controversies, but also to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction has been committed in any branch or instrumentality of government.[4] As a rule, all decisions and determinations in the exercise of judicial power ultimately go to and stop at the Supreme Court whose judgment is final. This constitutional scheme cannot be thwarted or subverted through a criminal complaint that, under the guise of imputing a misdeed to the Court and its Members, seeks to revive and re-litigate matters that have long been laid to rest by the Court. Effectively, such criminal complaint is a collateral attack on a judgment of this Court that, by constitutional mandate, is final and already beyond question.

A simple jurisprudential research would easily reveal that this Court has had the occasion to rule on the liability of Justices of the Supreme Court for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019the very same provision that the complainants Lozano invoke in this case.

In In re Wenceslao Laureta,[5] the client of Atty. Laureta filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan charging Members of the Supreme Court with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for having knowingly, deliberately and with bad faith rendered an unjust resolution in a land dispute. The Court unequivocally

ruled that insofar as this Court and its Divisions are concerned, a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that such collective decision is unjust should not prosper; the parties cannot relitigate in another forum the final judgment of the Court, as to do so is to subordinate the Court, in the exercise of its judicial functions, to another body.[6] In re Joaquin T. Borromeo[7] reiterates the Laureta ruling, particularly that (1) judgments of the Supreme Court are not reviewable; (2) administrative, civil and criminal complaints against a judge should not be turned into substitutes for appeal; (3) only courts may declare a judgment unjust; and (4) a situation where the Ombudsman is made to determine whether or not a judgment of the Court is unjust is an absurdity. The Court further discussed the requisites for the prosecution of judges, as follows:
That is not to say that it is not possible at all to prosecute judges for this impropriety, of rendering an unjust judgment or interlocutory order; but, taking account of all the foregoing considerations, the indispensable requisites are that there be a final declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and there be also evidence of malice and bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable negligence on the part of the judge in rendering said judgment or order.

Thus, consistent with the nature of the power of this Court under our constitutional scheme, only this Court not the Ombudsman can declare a Supreme Court judgment to be unjust. In Alzua v. Arnalot,[8] the Court ruled that judges of superior and general jurisdiction are not liable to respond in civil action for damages, and provided this rationale for this ruling: Liability to answer to everyone who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the judge would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom and would destroy that independence without which no judiciary can

be either respectable or useful. The same rationale applies to the indiscriminate attribution of criminal liability to judicial officials.

Plainly, under these rulings, a criminal complaint for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, based on the legal correctness of the official acts of Justices of the Supreme Court, cannot prosper and should not be entertained. This is not to say that Members of the Court are absolutely immune from suit during their term, for they are not. The Constitution provides that the appropriate recourse against them is to seek their removal from office if they are guilty of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.[9] Only after removal can they be criminally proceeded against for their transgressions. While in office and thereafter, and for their official acts that do not constitute impeachable offenses, recourses against them and their liabilities therefor are as defined in the above rulings.

Section 22 of Republic Act No. 6770, in fact, specifically grants the Ombudsman the authority to investigate impeachable officers, but only when such investigation is warranted:
Section 22. Investigatory Power. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the power to investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted.

Conversely, if a complaint against an impeachable officer is unwarranted for lack of legal basis and for clear misapplication of law and jurisprudence, the Ombudsman should spare these officers from the harassment of an unjustified investigation. The

present criminal complaint against the retired Justices is one such case where an investigation is not warranted, based as it is on the legal correctness of their official acts, and the Ombudsman should have immediately recognized the criminal complaint for what it is, instead of initially proceeding with its investigation and issuing a subpoena duces tecum. II. The Ombudsmans Dismissal of the Criminal Complant

As the Ombudsmans dismissal of the criminal complaint (Oliver O. Lozano and Evangeline Lozano-Endriano v. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., et al., OMB-C-C-090527-J) clearly implied, no complete dismissal took place as the matter was simply referred to the Supreme Court for appropriate action.

Although it was belatedly made, we cannot fault this Ombudsman action for the reasons we have already discussed above. While both accused are now retired from the service, the complaint against them still qualifies for exclusive consideration by this Court as the acts complained of spring from their judicial actions while they were with the Court. From this perspective, we therefore pass upon the prima facie merits of the complainants Lozanos criminal complaint. a. Grounds for the Dismissal of the Complaint By its express terms, the criminal complaint stemmed from the participation of the accused in the Resolution the First Division of this Court issued in Heirs of Antonio Pael v. Court of Appeals, docketed as G.R. Nos. 133547 and 133843. The

retired Chief Justice and retired Associate Justice allegedly committed the following unlawful acts:
1) Overturning the findings of fact of the CA; 2) Stating in the Resolution that the Chin-Mallari property overlaps the UP property, when the DENR Survey Report stated that the UP title/property overlaps the ChinMallari property; 3) Issuing a Resolution, for which three Justices voted, to set aside a Decision for which five Justices voted.

By these acts, the retired Members of this Court are being held criminally accountable on the theory that they violated the Constitution and the law in their ruling in the cited cases, thereby causing undue injury to the parties to these cases.

After due consideration, we dismiss the criminal complaint against retired Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and retired Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez under Section 3(e) of RA 3019. We fully expound on the reasons for this conclusion in the discussions below. a. Contrary to the complainants position, the Supreme Court has the power to review the lower courts findings of fact.

The Supreme Court is the highest court of the land with the power to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of the lower courts.[10] It has the authority to promulgate rules on practice, pleadings and admission to the bar, and

suspend the operation of these rules in the interest of justice.[11] Jurisprudence holds, too, that the Supreme Court may exercise these powers over the factual findings of the lower courts, among other prerogatives, in the following instances: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd of impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when, in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific

evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.[12] Thus, contrary to the complainants Lozano assertions in their complaint, the Supreme Court, in the proper cases, can and does rule on factual submissions before it, and even reverses the lower courts factual findings when the circumstances call for this action.

b. Constitutional Provisions were misused.

The complainants Lozano appear to us to have brazenly misquoted and misused applicable constitutional provisions to justify their case against the retired Justices. We refer particularly to their use (or strictly, misuse) of Article X,

Section 2(3) of the 1973 Constitution which they claim to be the governing rule that the retired Justices should have followed in acting on Pael. This constitutional provision states:
Cases heard by a division shall be decided with the concurrence of at least five Members, but if such required number is not obtained the case shall be decided en banc; Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc.[13]

For failure of the retired Justices to act according to these terms, the complainants claim that the former subverted the Constitution by reversing, by a vote of a majority of only three members, the decision of the First Division unanimously approved by its full membership of five members.

Had the complainants bothered to carefully consider the facts and developments in Pael and accordingly related these to the applicable

constitutional provision, they would have discovered that Pael was decided in 2003 when the 1987 Constitution, not the 1973 Constitution, was the prevailing Charter. They then would have easily learned of the manner cases are heard and decided by Division before the Supreme Court under the 1987

Constitution. Section 4(3), Article VIII of this Constitution provides:

Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc; Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc. (Emphasis supplied.)

This was the provision that governed in 2003 and still governs to this day. Thus, the complainants argument and basis for their criminal complaint that in ruling on a motion for reconsideration, all five members of the Division should concur is totally wrong. c. The elements of the offense charged are not sufficiently alleged in the complaint

A public official can violate Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019[14] in two ways: (1) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (2) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference; [15] in either case, these acts must be committed with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross and inexcusable negligence.

Partiality is defined as a bias or disposition to see and report matters as wished for, rather than as they are. Bad faith connotes not only bad judgment or negligence, but also a dishonest purpose, a conscious wrongdoing, or a breach of duty amounting to fraud. Gross negligence, on the other hand, is characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences as far as other persons are concerned.[16]

The criminal complaint in this case failed to allege the facts and circumstances showing that the retired Justices acted with partiality, bad faith or

negligence. A judicial officers act in reviewing the findings of fact in a decision and voting for its reversal cannot by itself constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 in the absence of facts, alleged and proven, demonstrating a dishonest purpose, conscious partiality, extrinsic fraud, or any wrongdoing on his or her part. A complainants mere disagreement with the magistrates own conclusions, to be sure, does not justify a criminal charge under Section 3(e) against the latter. In the absence of alleged and proven particular acts of manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, good faith and regularity are generally presumed in the performance of official duties by public officers.[17]

For the criminal complaints fatal omissions and resultant failure to allege a prima facie case, it rightfully deserves immediate dismissal. III. The Complainants Potential Liability for Filing the Ombudsman Complaint

In light of the above conclusions and under the attendant circumstances of the criminal complaints, we cannot avoid considering whether the complainants Lozano acted properly as members of the Bar, as officers of this Court, and as professionals governed by norms of ethical behavior, in filing their complaint.

In their criminal complaint, the complainants gave a slanted view of the powers of this Court to suit their purposes; for these same purposes, they wrongly cited and misapplied the provisions of the Constitution, not just any ordinary

statute. As lawyers, the complainants must be familiar and well acquainted with the fundamental law of the land, and are charged with the duty to apply the constitutional provisions in light of their prevailing jurisprudential interpretation. As law practitioners active in the legal and political circles, the complainants can hardly be characterized as unknowing in their misuse and misapplication of constitutional provisions. They should, at the very least, know that the 1973 Constitution and its provisions have been superseded by the 1987 Constitution, and that they cannot assail invoking the 1973 Constitution the judicial acts of members of the Supreme Court carried out in 2003 when the 1987 Constitution was in effect. Their misuse of the Constitution is made more reprehensible when the overriding thrust of their criminal complaint is considered; they used the 1973 provisions to falsely attribute malice and injustice to the Supreme Court and its Members.

In our view, the complainants errors do not belong to the genre of plain and simple errors that lawyers commit in the practice of their profession. Their plain disregard, misuse and misrepresentation of constitutional provisions constitute serious misconduct that reflects on their fitness for continued membership in the Philippine Bar. At the very least, their transgressions are blatant violations of Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
Rule 10.02. A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, orknowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved. (Emphasis provided.)

To emphasize the importance of requiring lawyers to act candidly and in good faith, an identical provision is found in Cannon 22 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. Moreover, lawyers are sworn to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court before they are even admitted to the

Bar. All these the complainants appear to have seriously violated.

In the interest of due process and fair play, the complainants Lozano should be heard, in relation to their criminal complaint before the Ombudsman against retired Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and retired Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, on why they should not be held accountable and accordingly penalized for violations of their duties as members of the Bar and officers of this Court, and of the ethics of the legal profession.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the criminal complaint entitled Oliver O. Lozano, et al. v. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., et al., OMB-C-C-090527-J for utter lack of merit, and DECLARE as MOOT and ACADEMIC the question of compliance with the subpoena duces tecum dated January 11, 2010 that the Ombudsman issued against this Court.

We hereby ORDER the complainants Atty. Oliver O. Lozano and Atty. Evangeline Lozano-Endriano to EXPLAIN IN WRITING to this Court, within a non-extendible period of 15 days from receipt of this Resolution, why they should not be penalized as members of the Bar and as officers of this Court, for their open disregard of the plain terms of the Constitution and the applicable laws and

jurisprudence, and their misuse and misrepresentation of constitutional provisions in their criminal complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman, entitled Oliver O. Lozano, et al. v. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., et al., OMB-C-C-09-0527-J.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

CATHERINE & HENRY YU, Complainants,

A.C. No. 7747

Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO,* VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, REYES, DE CASTRO, and BRION, JJ. Promulgated:

- versus -

July 14, 2008

ATTY. ANTONIUTTI K. PALAA, Respondent. x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

On November 16, 2006, complainants Henry and Catherine Yu filed a complaint[1] for disbarment against respondent Atty. Antoniutti K. Palaa for alleged acts of defraudation, before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).[2] Complainants attached therewith their Consolidated Complaint-Affidavit[3] which they earlier filed before the City Prosecutors Office of Makati, charging the respondent and his co-accused (in the criminal case), with syndicated estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22).

The facts, as found by the CBD, are as follows:

Sometime in 2004, complainants met a certain Mr. Mark Anthony U. Uy (Mr. Uy) who introduced himself as the Division Manager of Wealth Marketing and General Services Corporation (Wealth Marketing), a corporation engaged in spot currency trading.[4] Mr. Uy persuaded the complainants, together with other investors, to invest a minimum amount of P100,000.00 or its dollar equivalent with said company. They were made to believe that the said company had the socalled stop-loss mechanism that enabled it to stop trading once the maximum allowable loss fixed at 3%-9% of the total contributions, would be reached. If, on the other hand, the company would suffer loss, Wealth Marketing would return to the investors the principal amount including the monthly guaranteed interests. Further, Wealth Marketing promised to issue, as it had in fact issued, postdated checks covering the principal investments.[5]

It turned out, however, that Wealth Marketings promises were false and fraudulent, and that the checks earlier issued were dishonored for the reason account closed. The investors, including the complainants, thus went to Wealth Marketings office. There, they discovered that Wealth Marketing had already ceased its operation and a new corporation was formed named Ur-Link Corporation (Ur-Link) which supposedly assumed the rights and obligations of the former. Complainants proceeded to Ur-Link office where they met the respondent. As Wealth Marketings Chairman of the Board of Directors, respondent assured the complainants that Ur-Link would assume the obligations of the former company.[6] To put a semblance of validity to such representation, respondent signed an Agreement[7] to that effect which, again, turned out to be another ploy to further deceive the investors.[8] This prompted the complainants to send demand letters to Wealth Marketings officers and directors which

remained

unheeded. They

likewise

lodged

criminal

complaint

for

syndicated estafa against the respondent and his co-accused.[9]

Despite the standing warrant for his arrest, respondent went into hiding and has been successful in defying the law, to this date.

In an Order[10] dated November 17, 2006, Director for Bar Discipline Rogelio B. Vinluan required respondent to submit his Answer to the complaint but the latter failed to comply. Hence, the motion to declare him in default filed by the complainants.[11] The case was thereafter referred to Commissioner Jose I. De la Rama, Jr. (the Commissioner) for investigation. In his continued defiance of the lawful orders of the Commission, respondent failed to attend the mandatory conference and to file his position paper. Respondent was thereafter declared in default and the case was heard ex parte.

In his report,[12] the Commissioner concluded that Wealth Marketings executives (which included respondent herein) conspired with one another in defrauding the complainants by engaging in an unlawful network of recruiting innocent investors to invest in foreign currency trading business where, in fact, no such business existed, as Wealth Marketing was not duly licensed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to engage in such undertaking. This was bolstered by the fact that Wealth Marketings financial status could not support the investors demands involving millions of pesos. It also appears, said the Commissioner, that Ur-Link was created only to perpetuate fraud and to avoid obligations. The Commissioner likewise found that respondent had been previously suspended by this Court for committing similar acts of

defraudation.[13] Considering the gravity of the acts committed, as well as his previous administrative case and defiance of lawful orders, the Commissioner recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law, the pertinent portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, after a careful evaluation of the documents presented, including the jurisprudence laid down by the complainants involving the same respondent, and said decision of the Supreme Court forms part of the law of the land, the undersigned commissioner is recommending that respondent Atty. Antoniutti K. Palaa be disbarred and his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys upon the approval of the Board of Governors and the Honorable Supreme Court.[14]

In its Resolution dated August 17, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Commissioners report and recommendation.[15]

This Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors.

Lawyers are instruments in the administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. In so doing, the peoples faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. Lawyers may be disciplined whether in their professional or in their private capacity for any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good demeanor.[16]

In the present case, two corporations were created where the respondent played a vital role, being Wealth Marketings Chairman of the Board and Ur-Links representative. We quote with approval the Commissioners findings, thus:

As correctly pointed out by the City Prosecutors Office of Makati, it appears that the executive officers of Wealth Marketing Corporation conspired with each (sic) other to defraud the investors by engaging in unlawful network of recruiting innocent investors to invest in foreign currency trading business. The truth of the matter is that there was no actual foreign currency trading since said corporation is not duly licensed or authorized by the Securities and Exchange Commission to perform such task.

In the General Information Sheet (Annex I) of Wealth Marketing and General Services Corporation, the authorized capital stock is only P9,680,000.00 and the paid up capital, at the time of [in]corporation is (sic) only P605,000.00. Said corporation, as the records will show, has been dealing with investors with millions of pesos on hand, with the hope that their money would earn interests as promised. However, their company resources and financial status will show that they are not in the position to meet these demands if a situation such as this would arise.

xxxx

Furthermore, in order to evade the investors who were then asking for the return of their investments, said respondent even formed

and made him part of a new company, Ur-Link Corporation, which according to the complainants, when they met the respondent, would assume the obligations of the defunct Wealth Marketing Corporation. It is also evident that respondent is frolicking with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the purpose of employing fraud.[17]

To be sure, respondents conduct falls short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.

The fact that the criminal case against the respondent involving the same set of facts is still pending in court is of no moment. Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of criminal cases. A criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings.[18] Besides, it is not sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before a complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless to apply the rules on admission to, and continuing membership in, the legal profession during the whole period that the criminal case is pending final disposition, when the objectives of the two proceedings are vastly disparate.[19] Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare and for preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to

practice law.[20] The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court.[21]

As to the recommended penalty of disbarment, we find the same to be in order.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. x x x.

Time and again, we have stated that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution for only the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar.[22]

The Court notes that this is not the first time that respondent is facing an administrative case, for he had been previously suspended from the practice of law in Samala v. Palaa[23] and Sps. Amador and Rosita Tejada v. Palaa.[24] In Samala, respondent also played an important role in a corporation known as First Imperial Resources Incorporated (FIRI), being its legal officer. As in this case, respondent committed the same offense by making himself part of the money trading business when, in fact, said business was not among the purposes for which FIRI was created. Respondent was thus meted the penalty of suspension for three (3) years with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.[25] Likewise, in Tejada, he was suspended for six (6) months for his continued refusal to settle his loan obligations.[26]

The fact that respondent went into hiding in order to avoid service upon him of the warrant of arrest issued by the court (where his criminal case is pending) exacerbates his offense.[27]

Finally, we note that respondents case is further highlighted by his lack of regard for the charges brought against him. As in Tejada, instead of meeting the charges head on, respondent did not bother to file an answer and verified position paper, nor did he participate in the proceedings to offer a valid explanation for his conduct.[28] The Court has emphatically stated that when the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him.[29] Verily, respondents failure to comply with the orders of the IBP without justifiable reason manifests his

disrespect of judicial authorities.[30] As a lawyer, he ought to know that the compulsory bar organization was merely deputized by this Court to undertake the investigation of complaints against lawyers. In short, his disobedience to the IBP is in reality a gross and blatant disrespect of the Court.[31] By his repeated cavalier conduct, the respondent exhibited an unpardonable lack of respect for the authority of the Court.[32]

Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light of his prior misconduct herein-before mentioned for which he was penalized with a threeyear suspension with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely; and another six-month suspension thereafter, the contumacious behavior of respondent in the instant case which grossly degrades the legal profession indeed warrants the imposition of a much graver penalty --disbarment.[33] Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office, and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic.[34]

WHEREFORE, respondent Antoniutti K. Palaa is hereby DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 162525 September 23, 2008

ASEAN PACIFIC PLANNERS, APP CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION*AND CESAR GOCO, petitioners, vs. CITY OF URDANETA, CEFERINO J. CAPALAD, WALDO C. DEL CASTILLO, NORBERTO M. DEL PRADO, JESUS A. ORDONO AND AQUILINO MAGUISA,**, respondents. DECISION QUISUMBING, J.: The instant petition seeks to set aside the Resolutions1 dated April 15, 2003 and February 4, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76170. This case stemmed from a Complaint2 for annulment of contracts with prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction and temporary restraining order filed by respondent Waldo C. Del Castillo, in his capacity as taxpayer, against respondents City of Urdaneta and Ceferino J. Capalad doing business under the name JJEFWA Builders, and petitioners Asean Pacific Planners (APP) represented by Ronilo G. Goco and Asean Pacific Planners Construction and Development Corporation (APPCDC) represented by Cesar D. Goco. Del Castillo alleged that then Urdaneta City Mayor Rodolfo E. Parayno entered into five contracts for the preliminary design, construction and management of a four-storey twin cinema commercial center and hotel involving a massive expenditure of public funds amounting to P250 million, funded by a loan from the Philippine National Bank (PNB). For minimal work, the contractor was allegedly paid P95 million. Del Castillo also claimed that all the contracts are void because the object is outside the commerce of men. The object is a piece of land belonging to the public domain and which remains devoted to a public purpose as a public elementary school. Additionally, he claimed that the contracts, from the feasibility study to management and lease of the future building, are also void because they were all awarded solely to the Goco family.

In their Answer,3 APP and APPCDC claimed that the contracts are valid. Urdaneta City Mayor Amadeo R. Perez, Jr., who filed the city's Answer,4 joined in the defense and asserted that the contracts were properly executed by then Mayor Parayno with prior authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Mayor Perez also stated that Del Castillo has no legal capacity to sue and that the complaint states no cause of action. For respondent Ceferino J. Capalad, Atty. Oscar C. Sahagun filed an Answer5 with compulsory counterclaim and motion to dismiss on the ground that Del Castillo has no legal standing to sue. Respondents Norberto M. Del Prado, Jesus A. Ordono and Aquilino Maguisa became parties to the case when they jointly filed, also in their capacity as taxpayers, a Complaint-in-Intervention6 adopting the allegations of Del Castillo. After pre-trial, the Lazaro Law Firm entered its appearance as counsel for Urdaneta City and filed an Omnibus Motion7 with prayer to (1) withdraw Urdaneta City's Answer; (2) drop Urdaneta City as defendant and be joined as plaintiff; (3) admit Urdaneta City's complaint; and (4) conduct a new pre-trial. Urdaneta City allegedly wanted to rectify its position and claimed that inadequate legal representation caused its inability to file the necessary pleadings in representation of its interests. In its Order8 dated September 11, 2002, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, Branch 45, admitted the entry of appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm and granted the withdrawal of appearance of the City Prosecutor. It also granted the prayer to drop the city as defendant and admitted its complaint for consolidation with Del Castillo's complaint, and directed the defendants to answer the city's complaint. In its February 14, 2003 Order,9 the RTC denied reconsideration of the September 11, 2002 Order. It also granted Capalad's motion to expunge all pleadings filed by Atty. Sahagun in his behalf. Capalad was dropped as defendant, and his complaint filed by Atty. Jorito C. Peralta was admitted and consolidated with the complaints of Del Castillo and Urdaneta City. The RTC also directed APP and APPCDC to answer Capalad's complaint. Aggrieved, APP and APPCDC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. In its April 15, 2003 Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the following grounds: (1) defective verification and certification of non-forum shopping, (2) failure of the petitioners to submit certified true copies of the RTC's assailed orders as mere photocopies were submitted, and (3)

lack of written explanation why service of the petition to adverse parties was not personal.10 The Court of Appeals also denied APP and APPCDC's motion for reconsideration in its February 4, 2004 Resolution.11 Hence, this petition, which we treat as one for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the proper remedy to assail the resolutions of the Court of Appeals.12 Petitioners argue that: I. THE APPELLATE COURT PALPABLY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS JUDICIAL PREROGATIVES BY SUMMARILY DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE BASIS OF PROCEDURAL TECHNICALITIES DESPITE SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE [THEREWITH] II. THE TRIAL COURT PALPABLY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS JUDICIAL PREROGATIVES BY CAPRICIOUSLY (a.) Entertaining the taxpayers' suits of private respondents del Castillo, del Prado, Ordono and Maguisa despite their clear lack of legal standing to file the same. (b.) Allowing the entry of appearance of a private law firm to represent the City of Urdaneta despite the clear statutory and jurisprudential prohibitions thereto. (c.) Allowing Ceferino J. Capalad and the City of Urdaneta to switch sides, by permitting the withdrawal of their respective answers and admitting their complaints as well as allowing the appearance of Atty. Jorito C. Peralta to represent Capalad although Atty. Oscar C. Sahagun, his counsel of record, had not withdrawn from the case, in gross violation of well settled rules and case law on the matter.13 We first resolve whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying reconsideration of its April 15, 2003 Resolution despite APP and APPCDC's subsequent compliance. Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals should not have dismissed the petition on mere technicalities since they have attached the proper documents in their motion for reconsideration and substantially complied with the rules.

Respondent Urdaneta City maintains that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition because Cesar Goco had no proof he was authorized to sign the certification of non-forum shopping in behalf of APPCDC. Indeed, Cesar Goco had no proof of his authority to sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping of the petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals.14 Thus, the Court of Appeals is allowed by the rules the discretion to dismiss the petition since only individuals vested with authority by a valid board resolution may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping in behalf of a corporation. Proof of said authority must be attached; otherwise, the petition is subject to dismissal.15 However, it must be pointed out that in several cases,16 this Court had considered as substantial compliance with the procedural requirements the submission in the motion for reconsideration of the authority to sign the verification and certification, as in this case. The Court notes that the attachments in the motion for reconsideration show that on March 5, 2003, the Board of Directors of APPCDC authorized Cesar Goco to institute the petition before the Court of Appeals.17 On March 22, 2003, Ronilo Goco doing business under the name APP, also appointed his father, Cesar Goco, as his attorney-in-fact to file the petition.18 When the petition was filed on March 26, 200319 before the Court of Appeals, Cesar Goco was duly authorized to sign the verification and certification except that the proof of his authority was not submitted together with the petition. Similarly, petitioners submitted in the motion for reconsideration certified true copies of the assailed RTC orders and we may also consider the same as substantial compliance.20 Petitioners also included in the motion for reconsideration their explanation21 that copies of the petition were personally served on the Lazaro Law Firm and mailed to the RTC and Atty. Peralta because of distance. The affidavit of service22supported the explanation. Considering the substantial issues involved, it was thus error for the appellate court to deny reinstatement of the petition. Having discussed the procedural issues, we shall now proceed to address the substantive issues raised by petitioners, rather than remand this case to the Court of Appeals. In our view, the issue, simply put, is: Did the RTC err and commit grave abuse of discretion in (a) entertaining the taxpayers' suits; (b) allowing a private law firm to represent Urdaneta City; (c) allowing respondents Capalad and Urdaneta City to switch from being defendants to becoming complainants; and (d) allowing Capalad's change of attorneys?

On the first point at issue, petitioners argue that a taxpayer may only sue where the act complained of directly involves illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. The allegation of respondents Del Castillo, Del Prado, Ordono and Maguisa that the construction of the project is funded by the PNB loan contradicts the claim regarding illegal disbursement since the funds are not directly derived from taxation. Respondents Del Castillo, Del Prado, Ordono and Maguisa counter that their personality to sue was not raised by petitioners APP and APPCDC in their Answer and that this issue was not even discussed in the RTC's assailed orders. Petitioners' contentions lack merit. The RTC properly allowed the taxpayers' suits. In Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Roxas,23 we held: In the case of taxpayers' suits, the party suing as a taxpayer must prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. Thus, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. xxxx Petitioners' allegations in their Amended Complaint that the loan contracts entered into by the Republic and NPC are serviced or paid through a disbursement of public funds are not disputed by respondents, hence, they are invested with personality to institute the same.24 Here, the allegation of taxpayers Del Castillo, Del Prado, Ordono and Maguisa that P95 million of theP250 million PNB loan had already been paid for minimal work is sufficient allegation of overpayment, of illegal disbursement, that invests them with personality to sue. Petitioners do not dispute the allegation as they merely insist, albeit erroneously, that public funds are not involved. Under Article 195325 of the Civil Code, the city acquired ownership of the money loaned from PNB, making the money public fund. The city will have to pay the loan by revenues raised from local taxation or by its internal revenue allotment. In addition, APP and APPCDC's lack of objection in their Answer on the personality to sue of the four complainants constitutes waiver to raise the objection under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.26

On the second point, petitioners contend that only the City Prosecutor can represent Urdaneta City and that law and jurisprudence prohibit the appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm as the city's counsel. The Lazaro Law Firm, as the city's counsel, counters that the city was inutile defending its cause before the RTC for lack of needed legal advice. The city has no legal officer and both City Prosecutor and Provincial Legal Officer are busy. Practical considerations also dictate that the city and Mayor Perez must have the same counsel since he faces related criminal cases. Citing Mancenido v. Court of Appeals,27 the law firm states that hiring private counsel is proper where rigid adherence to the law on representation would deprive a party of his right to redress a valid grievance.28 We cannot agree with the Lazaro Law Firm. Its appearance as Urdaneta City's counsel is against the law as it provides expressly who should represent it. The City Prosecutor should continue to represent the city. Section 481(a)29 of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 199130 mandates the appointment of a city legal officer. Under Section 481(b)(3)(i)31 of the LGC, the city legal officer is supposed to represent the city in all civil actions, as in this case, and special proceedings wherein the city or any of its officials is a party. In Ramos v. Court of Appeals,32 we cited that under Section 1933 of Republic Act No. 5185,34 city governments may already create the position of city legal officer to whom the function of the city fiscal (now prosecutor) as legal adviser and officer for civil cases of the city shall be transferred.35 In the case of Urdaneta City, however, the position of city legal officer is still vacant, although its charter36 was enacted way back in 1998. Because of such vacancy, the City Prosecutor's appearance as counsel of Urdaneta City is proper. The City Prosecutor remains as the city's legal adviser and officer for civil cases, a function that could not yet be transferred to the city legal officer. Under the circumstances, the RTC should not have allowed the entry of appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm vice the City Prosecutor. Notably, the city's Answer was sworn to before the City Prosecutor by Mayor Perez. The City Prosecutor prepared the city's pre-trial brief and represented the city in the pre-trial conference. No question was raised against the City Prosecutor's actions until the Lazaro Law Firm entered its appearance and claimed that the city lacked adequate legal representation. Moreover, the appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm as counsel for Urdaneta City is against the law. Section 481(b)(3)(i) of the LGC provides when a special legal officer may be employed, that is, in actions or proceedings where

a component city or municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government. But this case is not between Urdaneta City and the Province of Pangasinan. And we have consistently held that a local government unit cannot be represented by private counsel37 as only public officers may act for and in behalf of public entities and public funds should not be spent to hire private lawyers.38 Pro bono representation in collaboration with the municipal attorney and prosecutor has not even been allowed.39 Neither is the law firm's appearance justified under the instances listed in Mancenido when local government officials can be represented by private counsel, such as when a claim for damages could result in personal liability. No such claim against said officials was made in this case. Note that before it joined the complainants, the city was the one sued, not its officials. That the firm represents Mayor Perez in criminal cases, suits in his personal capacity,40 is of no moment. On the third point, petitioners claim that Urdaneta City is estopped to reverse admissions in its Answer that the contracts are valid and, in its pre-trial brief, that the execution of the contracts was in good faith. We disagree. The court may allow amendment of pleadings. Section 5,41 Rule 10 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that if evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues raised by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby. Objections need not even arise in this case since the Pre-trial Order42 dated April 1, 2002 already defined as an issue whether the contracts are valid. Thus, what is needed is presentation of the parties' evidence on the issue. Any evidence of the city for or against the validity of the contracts will be relevant and admissible. Note also that under Section 5, Rule 10, necessary amendments to pleadings may be made to cause them to conform to the evidence. In addition, despite Urdaneta City's judicial admissions, the trial court is still given leeway to consider other evidence to be presented for said admissions may not necessarily prevail over documentary evidence,43 e.g., the contracts assailed. A party's testimony in open court may also override admissions in the Answer.44 As regards the RTC's order admitting Capalad's complaint and dropping him as defendant, we find the same in order. Capalad insists that Atty. Sahagun

has no authority to represent him. Atty. Sahagun claims otherwise. We note, however, that Atty. Sahagun represents petitioners who claim that the contracts are valid. On the other hand, Capalad filed a complaint for annulment of the contracts. Certainly, Atty. Sahagun cannot represent totally conflicting interests. Thus, we should expunge all pleadings filed by Atty. Sahagun in behalf of Capalad. Relatedly, we affirm the order of the RTC in allowing Capalad's change of attorneys, if we can properly call it as such, considering Capalad's claim that Atty. Sahagun was never his attorney. Before we close, notice is taken of the offensive language used by Attys. Oscar C. Sahagun and Antonio B. Escalante in their pleadings before us and the Court of Appeals. They unfairly called the Court of Appeals a "court of technicalities"45 for validly dismissing their defectively prepared petition. They also accused the Court of Appeals of protecting, in their view, "an incompetent judge."46 In explaining the "concededly strong language," Atty. Sahagun further indicted himself. He said that the Court of Appeals' dismissal of the case shows its "impatience and readiness to punish petitioners for a perceived slight on its dignity" and such dismissal "smacks of retaliation and does not augur for the cold neutrality and impartiality demanded of the appellate court."47 Accordingly, we impose upon Attys. Oscar C. Sahagun and Antonio B. Escalante a fine of P2,00048each payable to this Court within ten days from notice and we remind them that they should observe and maintain the respect due to the Court of Appeals and judicial officers;49 abstain from offensive language before the courts;50 and not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record.51 Similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. WHEREFORE, we (1) GRANT the petition; (2) SET ASIDE the Resolutions dated April 15, 2003 and February 4, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76170; (3) DENY the entry of appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm in Civil Case No. U-7388 and EXPUNGE all pleadings it filed as counsel of Urdaneta City; (4) ORDER the City Prosecutor to represent Urdaneta City in Civil Case No. U-7388; (5)AFFIRM the RTC in admitting the complaint of Capalad; and (6) PROHIBIT Atty. Oscar C. Sahagun from representing Capalad and EXPUNGE all pleadings that he filed in behalf of Capalad. Let the records of Civil Case No. U-7388 be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

Finally, we IMPOSE a fine of P2,000 each on Attys. Oscar C. Sahagun and Antonio B. Escalante for their use of offensive language, payable to this Court within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC ADM. CASE No. 7006 October 9, 2007

RE : SUSPENSION OF ATTY. ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, FORMER SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR. DECISION AZCUNA, J.: This administrative case stemmed from the events of the proceedings in Crim. Case No. 5144, entitled People v. Luis Bucalon Plaza, heard before the sala of Presiding Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City, Branch 29. Crim. Case No. 5144 was originally raffled to the sala of Judge Floripinas C. Buyser, RTC of Surigao City, Branch 30. In an Order dated March 14, 2002, Judge Buyser denied the Demurrer to the Evidence of the accused, declaring that the evidence thus presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove the crime of homicide and not the charge of murder. Consequently, the counsel for the defense filed a Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond. Respondent Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, then Senior State Prosecutor and the deputized prosecutor of the case, objected thereto mainly on the ground that the original charge of murder, punishable with reclusion perpetua, was not subject to bail under Sec. 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.1 In an Order dated August 30, 2002,2 Judge Buyser inhibited himself from further trying the case because of the "harsh insinuation" of Senior Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo that he "lacks the cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate," by allegedly suggesting the filing of the motion to fix the amount of bail bond by counsel for the accused. The case was transferred to Branch 29 of the RTC of Surigao City, presided by Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan. In an Order dated November 12, 2002, Judge Tan favorably resolved the Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond, and fixed the amount of the bond at P40,000.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated November 12, 2002, which motion was denied for lack of merit in an Order dated February 10, 2003. In October, 2003, respondent appealed from the Orders dated November 12, 2002 and February 10, 2003, to the Court of Appeals (CA). Instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies, respondent caused the publication of an article regarding the Order granting bail to the accused in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. The article, entitled "Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out," reads: SENIOR state prosecutor has lashed at a judge in Surigao City for allowing a murder suspect to go out on bail. Senior state prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo lambasted Judge Manuel Tan of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 29 based in Surigao City for ruling on a motion that sought a bailbond for Luis Plaza who stands charged with murdering a policeman . . . . Plaza reportedly posted a P40-thousand bail bond. Bagabuyo argued that the crime of murder is a non-bailable offense. But Bagabuyo admitted that a judge could still opt to allow a murder suspect to bail out in cases when the evidence of the prosecution is weak. But in this murder case, Bagabuyo said the judge who previously handled it, Judge F[lori]pinas B[uy]ser, described the evidence to be strong. B[uy]ser inhibited from the case for an unclear reason. xxx Bagabuyo said he would contest Tan's decision before the Court of Appeals and would file criminal and administrative charges of certiorari against the judge. Bagabuyuo said he was not afraid of being cited in contempt by Judge Tan. "This is the only way that the public would know that there are judges there who are displaying judicial arrogance." he said.3 In an Order dated August 21, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, directed respondent and the writer of the article, Mark Francisco of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, to appear in court on September 20, 2003 to explain why they should

not be cited for indirect contempt of court for the publication of the article which degraded the court and its presiding judge with its lies and misrepresentation. The said Order stated that contrary to the statements in the article, Judge Buyser described the evidence for the prosecution as not strong, but sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused only for homicide. Moreover, it was not true that Judge Buyser inhibited himself from the case for an unclear reason. Judge Buyser, in an Order dated August 30, 2002, declared in open court in the presence of respondent that he was inhibiting himself from the case due to the harsh insinuation of respondent that he lacked the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. On the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge, Mark Francisco admitted that the Mindanao Gold Star Daily caused the publication of the article. He disclosed that respondent, in a press conference, stated that the crime of murder is nonbailable. When asked by the trial court why he printed such lies, Mr. Francisco answered that his only source was respondent.4 Mr. Francisco clarified that in the statement alleging that Judge Buyser inhibited himself from the case for an unclear reason, the phrase "for an unclear reason," was added by the newspaper's Executive Editor Herby S. Gomez.5 Respondent admitted that he caused the holding of the press conference, but refused to answer whether he made the statements in the article until after he shall have filed a motion to dismiss. For his refusal to answer, the trial court declared him in contempt of court pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.6 The Court's Order dated September 30, 2003 reads: ORDER Mr. Mark Francisco for publishing this article which is a lie clothed in half truth to give it a semblance of truth is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P10,000. Prosecutor Bagabuyo, for obstinately refusing to explain why he should not be cited for contempt and admitting that the article published in the Mindanao Gold Star Daily on August 18, 2003 and quoted in the Order of this Court dated August 21, 2003 which is contemptuous was caused by him to be published, is hereby adjudged to have committed indirect contempt of Court pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court and he is hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of 30 days in jail. The BJMP is hereby ordered to arrest Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo if he does not put up a bond ofP100,000.00. SO ORDERD.7

Respondent posted the required bond and was released from the custody of the law. He appealed the indirect contempt order to the CA. Despite the citation of indirect contempt, respondent presented himself to the media for interviews in Radio Station DXKS, and again attacked the integrity of Judge Tan and the trial court's disposition in the proceedings of Crim. Case No. 5144. In an Order dated October 20, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, required respondent to explain and to show cause within five days from receipt thereof why he should not be held in contempt for his media interviews that degraded the court and the presiding judge, and why he should not be suspended from the practice of law for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 11.05 of Canon 118 and Rule 13.02 of Canon 13.9 In the Order, the trial court stated that respondent was interviewed by Jun Clergio, and that the interview was repeatedly aired on September 30, 2003 and in his news program between 6:00 and 8:00 a.m. on October 1, 2003. He was also interviewed by Tony Consing on October 1 and 2, 2003, between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m. in his radio program. In those radio interviews, respondent allegedly called Judge Tan a judge who does not know the law, a liar, and a dictator who does not accord due process to the people. The hearing for the second contempt charge was set on December 4, 2003. On November, 20, 2003, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer to Contempt alleging that he was saddled with work of equal importance and needed ample time to answer the same. He also prayed for a bill of particulars in order to properly prepare for his defense. In an Order dated November 20, 2003, the trial court denied the motion. It stated that a bill of particulars is not applicable in contempt proceedings, and that respondent's actions and statements are detailed in the Order of October 20, 2003. On the scheduled hearing of December 4, 2003 respondent neither appeared in court nor informed the court of his absence. The trial court issued an Order dated December 4, 2003 cancelling the hearing "to give Prosecutor Bagabuyo all the chances he asks for," and ordered him to appear on January 12, 2004 to explain in writing or orally why he should not be cited in contempt of court pursuant to the facts stated in the Order dated October 20, 2003. However, respondent did not appear in the scheduled hearing of January 12, 2004.

On January 15, 2004, the trial court received respondent's Answer dated January 8, 2004. Respondent denied the charge that he sought to be interviewed by radio station DXKS. He, however, stated that right after the hearing of September 30, 2003, he was approached by someone who asked him to comment on the Order issued in open court, and that his comment does not fall within the concept of indirect contempt of court. He also admitted that he was interviewed by his friend, Tony Consing, at the latter's instance. He justified his response during the interview as a simple exercise of his constitutional right of freedom of speech and that it was not meant to offend or malign, and was without malice. On February 8, 2004, the trial court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, finding preponderant evidence that Prosecutor Bagabuyo has grossly violated the Canons of the legal profession and [is] guilty of grave professional misconduct, rendering him unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law. Likewise, he is also found guilty of indirect contempt of court, for which he is hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of IMPRISONMENT for ninety (90) days to be served at the Surigao City Jail and to pay the maximum fine of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00). Future acts of contempt will be dealt with more severely. Let copies of the relevant records be immediately forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review and for further determination of grounds for [the] disbarment of Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo.10 The trial court found respondent's denials to be lame as the tape of his interview on October 2, 2003, duly transcribed, showed disrespect of the court and its officers, thus: TONY CONSING: Fiscal, nanglabay ang mga oras, nanglabay ang gamay'ng panahon ang samad sa imong kasingkasing nagpabilin pa ba ni. O ingnon nato duna na bay pagbag-o sa imong huna-huna karon? (Fiscal, after the lapse of time, are you still hurt? Or have you not changed your mind yet?) BAGABUYO : Ang akong huna-huna kon aduna man ugaling pagbag-o ang pagsiguro, ang mga Huwes nga dili mahibalo sa balaod tangtangon pagka abogado, mao kana.

(If my mind has changed at all, it is that I ensure that all judges who are ignorant of the law should be disbarred. That's it.) xxx BAGABUYO : Mao kana ang tinuod, Ton, ug kining akong guibatonan karon nga hunahuna mahitungod nianang mga Huwes nga dili kahibalo sa balaod, magkadugay magkalami. Kada adlao nagatoon ako. Nagabasa ako sa mga bag-ong jurisprudence ug sa atong balaod aron sa pagsiguro gayod nga inigsang-at unya nako sa kaso nga disbarment niining di mahibalo nga Huwes, sigurado gayod ako nga katangtangan siya sa lisensiya . . . . Ang kini nga Huwes nga dili mahibalo sa balaod, pagatangtangon na, dili lamang sa pagka-Huwes kon dili sa pagkaabogado. Tan-awa ra gyod kining iyang gibuhat nga Order, Ton, ang iyang pagkabakakon . . . . (That's true, Ton, and this conviction I have now about judges who are ignorant of the law is made firmer by time. I study everyday. I read new jurisprudence and the law to insure that when I file the disbarment case against this Judge who does not know his law, I am certain that he loses his license. . . . This judge who is ignorant of the law should not only be removed as a judge but should also be disbarred. Just take a look at his Order, Ton, and see what a liar he is . . . .) xxx BAGABUYO : Yes, nag-ingon ang iyang Order. . . . Ngano nga nakaingon ako nga bakakon kini, nag-ingon nga kini konong order given in open court, ang kalooy sa dios, ang iyang order sa Korte wala siya mag-ingon ug kantidad nga P100,000.00 nga bail bond. . . . (Yes, his Order said that . . . . Why did I say that he is a liar? It states that this Order was "given in open court," and in God's mercy, he did not state the amount of P100,000.00 as bail bond. . . .) BAGABUYO : Kay dili man lagi mahibalo sa balaod, ako siyang gui-ingnan, Your Honor, I have the right to appeal. Mibalik dayon, ug miingon siya, BJMP arrest Bagabuyo. (Because he does not know the law, I said, "Your Honor, I have the right to appeal." Then he came back and said, "BJMP, arrest Bagabuyo.")

xxx BAGABUYO : . . . P100,000.00 ang iyang guipapiyansa. Naunsa na? Dinhi makita nimo ang iyang pagka gross ignorance of the law. . . . (He imposed a bail of P100,000.00. How come? This is where you will see his gross ignorance of the law. . . . ) xxx TONY CONSING : So karon, unsay plano nimo karon? (So what is your plan now?) BAGABUYO : Sumala sa akong gui-ingon moundang lang ako kon matangtang na siya sa pagka abogado. . . . (As I have said, I will only stop if he is already disbarred. . . .) xxx BAGABUYO : Nasuko siya niini kay hambugero kuno, pero angayan niyang hibaw-an nga ang trabajo sa Huwes dili ang pagtan-aw kon ang tawo hambugero . . . . Ug ang akong gisulti mao lamang ang balaod nga siya in fact at that time I said he is not conversant of the law, with regards to the case of murder. . . . (He got angry because I was allegedly bragging but he should know that it is not for a judge to determine if a person is a braggart. . . .And what I said was based on the law. In fact, at that time, I said he is not conversant of the law, with regards to the case of murder . . . .) xxx BAGABUYO : Ah, mi sit down sab ako, contempt ra ba kadto . . . . Mao kana, pero unsa may iyang katuyoan ang iyang katuyoan nga ipa-adto ako didto kay didto, iya akong pakauwawan kay iya kong sikopon, iya kong ipa-priso, pero kay di man lagi mahibalo sa balaod, ang iyang gui orderan BJMP, intawon por dios por Santo, Mr. Tan, pagbasa intawon ug balaod, naunsa ka ba Mr. Tan? Unsa may imong hunahuna nga kon ikaw Huwes, ikaw na ang diktador, no way, no sir, ours is a democratic country where

all and everyone is entitled to due process of law you did not accord me due process of law . . . . (I sat down. . . . That's it. But what was his purpose? He made me come in order to humiliate me because he wanted me arrested, he wanted me imprisoned, but because he is ignorant of the law, he ordered the BMJP. For God's sake, Mr. Tan, what's wrong with you, Mr. Tan? Please read the law. What is your thinking? That when you are a judge, you are also a dictator? No way, no sir, ours is a democratic country where all and everyone is entitled to due process of law you did not accord me due process of law. . . .) TONY CONSING: So mopasaka kang disbarment, malaumon kita nga maaksiyonan kini, with all this problem sa Korte Suprema. (So you are filing a disbarment case? We hope that this be given action with all the problems in the Supreme Court.) BAGABUYO : Dili ako mabalaka niana kay usa ka truck ang akong jurisprudence, nga ang mga Huwes nga di mahibalo sa balaod pagatangtangon gayod sa ilang pagka Huwes. . . . Apan unsa man intawon ang balaod ang iyang gibasa niini nadunggan ko nga kini kuno siya madjongero, mao bitaw na, madjong ang iyang guitunan? (I am not worried because I have a truckload of jurisprudence that judges who are ignorant of the law must be removed from the Bench. But what law has he been reading? I heard that he is a mahjong aficionado(mahjongero) and that is why he is studying mahjong.11 The trial court concluded that respondent, as a member of the bar and an officer of the court, is duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the court, and should not promote distrust in the administration of justice. The trial court stated that it is empowered to suspend respondent from the practice of law under Sec. 28, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court12 for any of the causes mentioned in Sec. 2713 of the same Rule. Respondent was given the opportunity to be heard, but he opted to be silent. Thus, it held that the requirement of due process has been duly satisfied. In accordance with the provisions of Sec. 29,14 Rule 138 and Sec. 9,15 Rule 139 of the Rules of Court, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, transmitted to the Office of the Bar Confidant the Statement of Facts of respondent's suspension

from the practice of law, dated July 14, 2005, together with the order of suspension and other relevant documents. In its Report dated January 4, 2006, the Office of the Bar Confidant found that the article in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, which maligned the integrity and independence of the court and its officers, and respondent's criticism of the trial court's Order dated November 12, 2002, which was aired in radio station DXKS, both in connection with Crim. Case No. 5144, constitute grave violation of oath of office by respondent. It stated that the requirement of due process was complied with when respondent was given an opportunity to be heard, but respondent chose to remain silent. The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended the implementation of the trial court's order of suspension dated February 8, 2004, and that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year, with a stern warning that the repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely. The Court approves the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant. It has been reiterated in Gonzaga v. Villanueva, Jr.16 that: A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. Among the grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are deceit; malpractice; gross misconduct in office; grossly immoral conduct; conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to the practice of law; willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; corrupt or willful appearance as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The grounds are not preclusive in nature even as they are broad enough as to cover practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in his professional career or in his private life. A lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent to his entrance to the Bar, but are likewise essential demands for his continued membership therein. Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.17 Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations.18 Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [he] should insist on similar conduct by others." Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states that a lawyer "shall submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities only."

Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly caused the holding of a press conference where he made statements against the Order dated November 12, 2002 allowing the accused in Crim. Case No. 5144 to be released on bail. Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was displaying judicial arrogance in the article entitled, Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out, which appeared in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. Respondent's statements in the article, which were made while Crim. Case No. 5144 was still pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of Canon 13, which states that "a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party." In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing, respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for not resorting to the proper authorities only for redress of his grievances against Judge Tan. Respondent also violated Canon 11 for his disrespect of the court and its officer when he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant of the law, that as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of studying the law, and that he was a liar. Respondent also violated the Lawyer's Oath, as he has sworn to "conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients." As a senior state prosecutor and officer of the court, respondent should have set the example of observing and maintaining the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers. Montecillo v. Gica19 held: It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude. As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions which, without such respect, would be resting on a very shaky foundation. The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against erring judges but the rules clearly provide for the proper venue and procedure for doing so, precisely because respect for the institution must always be maintained. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo is found guilty of violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility, and of violating the Lawyer's Oath, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year effective upon finality of this Decision, with aSTERN WARNING that the repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court Manila

EN BANC

ATTY. JOSABETH V. ALONSOand SHALIMAR P. LAZATIN, Complainants,

A.C. No. 8481

[Formerly B.M. No. 1524]

Present:

CORONA, C.J., CARPIO, CARPIO-MORALES, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, - versus BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD,

VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, and MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated: ATTY. IBARO B. RELAMIDA, JR., Respondent. x --------------------------------------------------x August 3, 2010

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a Complaint[1] dated October 13, 2005 for disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Ibaro B. Relamida, Jr. filed by Attys. Josabeth V. Alonso and Shalimar P. Lazatin, counsel of Servier Philippines, Incorporated for violating the rules on forum shopping and res judicata. The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: In March 2001, Jennifer Ebanen filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against Servier Philippines, Incorporated (Servier) docketed as NLRC-NCR-Case

No. 30-03-01583-01, alleging constructive dismissal with prayer for reinstatement or payment of separation pay, backwages, moral and exemplary damages. On July 5, 2002, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Servier.[2] It held that Ebanen voluntarily resigned from Servier and was, therefore, not illegally dismissed. Ebanen appealed at the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On March 31, 2003, the NLRC-Third Division affirmed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter.[3] Thus, Ebanen moved for reconsideration. However, the NLRC denied the same in a Resolution[4] dated May 5, 2003. Unsatisfied, Ebanen filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 77968. In a Decision[5] dated January 16, 2004, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the findings of the NLRC that Ebanen voluntarily resigned and that there was no constructive dismissal. Ebanen moved anew for reconsideration, but was denied in a Resolution [6] dated April 30, 2004. Unrelenting, Ebanen filed a Petition for Review before the Supreme Court. However, in a Resolution[7] dated August 4, 2004, the Court found no reversible error on the part of the CA, thus, denied said petition. Ebanen filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied with finality in a Resolution [8] dated October 11, 2004.

Ebanen filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolutions dated August 4, 2004 and October 11, 2004, respectively. On January 19, 2005, the Court denied her motion.[9] Persistent, Ebanen filed a Motion to Admit a Third Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated January 19, 2005. On April 20, 2005, the Court denied her motion for being a prohibited pleading and noted without action Ebanens third motion for reconsideration.[10] On July 27, 2005, the Second Division of the Supreme Court noted without action Ebanens Motion for Leave to Admit Supplemental Third Motion for Reconsideration dated June 1, 2005, in view of the entry of judgment on February 17, 2005.[11] On February 17, 2005, the Courts Resolution dated August 4, 2004 has already become final and executory; thus, a corresponding Entry of Judgment[12]has been issued. However, despite said entry of judgment, Ebanen, thru her counsel, Atty. Relamida, filed a second complaint on August 5, 2005 for illegal dismissal based on the same cause of action of constructive dismissal against Servier, now docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-08-07222-05. Thus, on October 13, 2005, Servier, thru counsel, filed a letter-complaint addressed to the then Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., praying that respondents be disciplinary sanctioned for violation of the rules on forum shopping and res judicata.

Subsequently, in a Resolution[13] dated November 15, 2005, the Court required both Ebanen and Atty. Relamida to comment on the letter-complaint against them. On January 16, 2006, respondents filed their Comments.[14] Both respondents admitted the filing of the second complaint against Servier. They claimed that the judgment rendered by the Labor Arbiter was null and void for want of due process, since the motion for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum for the production of vital documents filed by the complainant was ignored by the Labor Arbiter. They opined that the dismissal did not amount to res judicata, since the decision was null and void for lack of due process. As a result, they claimed that there was also no violation of the rule on forum shopping.[15] On February 7, 2006, the Court referred the instant bar matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[16] On January 22, 2007, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the second complaint on the grounds of res judicata and forum shopping. It further reiterated that Ebanen voluntarily resigned from employment and was not constructively dismissed. On March 14, 2008, during the mandatory conference before the IBP, complainants failed to appear. Ebanen manifested that she is not a lawyer. Both parties were required to submit their respective position papers. Atty. Relamida reiterated that Ebanen is not a lawyer and that she is the daughter of Atty. Leonardo Aurelio (Atty. Aurelio), the senior partner of A.M. Sison Jr. and Partners Law Offices where he is employed as associate lawyer.

He narrated that on March 28, 2001, Ebanen filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against Servier. He claimed that in the beginning, Atty. Aurelio was the one who prepared and reviewed all the pleadings and it was Atty. Lapulapu Osoteo who stood as counsel for Ebanen in the said labor case. Atty. Relamida admitted, however, that during the filing of the second complaint he took over as counsel of Ebanen, as requested by Atty. Aurelio.[17] He also admitted that during the pendency of the first complaint, he occasionally examined pleadings and signed as counsel for Ebanen.[18] Atty. Relamida reasoned out that as a courtesy to Atty. Aurelio and Ebanen, he had no choice but to represent the latter. Moreover, he stressed that his client was denied of her right to due process due to the denial of her motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. He then argued that the decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void; thus, there was no res judicata.[19] He maintained that he did not violate the lawyers oath by serving the interest of his client. Servier, on the other hand, argued that the filing of the second complaint is a violation of the rights of Servier, since the issue has already attained finality. It contended that Atty. Relamida violated the rules on forum shopping for the same act of filing a second complaint. As a consequence, they are being made to defend themselves in a case that has been settled before the labor tribunals and courts. Likewise, Servier insisted that the filing of the second complaint was also a blatant violation of the rule on res judicata. Hence, Servier prayed that Atty. Relamida be disciplinary dealt with due to his abuse of the processes of the courts.

On April 19, 2008, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) recommended that respondent Atty. Relamida be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. It imposed no sanction on Ebanen for being a non-lawyer. In its Report, the IBP found that by filing the second complaint, Atty. Relamida was guilty of violating the rules on res judicata and forum shopping. It concluded that Atty. Relamida abused his right of recourse to the courts by filing a complaint for a cause that had been previously rejected by the courts. On June 5, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with modification as to penalty the report of the IBP-CBD. Instead, it recommended that Atty. Relamida be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) month for his violation of the rules on res judicata and forum shopping. On December 7, 2009, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the instant complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative case against Atty. Relamida. We sustain the findings of the IBP-CBD.

All lawyers must bear in mind that their oaths are neither mere words nor an empty formality. When they take their oath as lawyers, they dedicate their lives to the pursuit of justice. They accept the sacred trust to uphold the laws of the land. As the first Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility states, "[a] lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes." Moreover, according to the lawyers oath they took, lawyers should "not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the same."[20]

In the instant case, it is clear that Atty. Relamida is guilty of forum shopping and violation of the rule on res judicata. Atty. Relamida should have refrained from filing the second complaint against Servier. He ought to have known that the previous dismissal was with prejudice, since it had the effect of an adjudication on the merits. He was aware of all the proceedings which the first complaint went through as by his own admission, he participated in the preparation of the pleadings and even signed as counsel of Ebanen occasionally. [21] He knew that the decision in the subject case had already attained finality. Atty. Relamida was well aware that when he filed the second complaint, it involved the same parties and same cause of action, albeit, he justified the same on the ground of nullity of the previous dismissal. His allegation that he was not the original counsel of Ebanen and that his intention was only to protect the rights of his clients whom he believed were not properly addressed in the prior complaint deserves scant consideration. He should know that once a case is decided with finality, the controversy is settled and the matter is laid to rest. The prevailing party is entitled to enjoy the fruits of his victory, while the other party is obliged to respect the courts verdict and to comply with it.[22] The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another, or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable decision. An important factor in determining its existence is the vexation caused to the courts and the partieslitigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs. Forum

shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. Thus, the following requisites should concur:[23]
x x x (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.

A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, but not at the expense of truth and the administration of justice. The filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the courts processes and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court. Needless to state, the lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just and are consistent with truth and honor.[24] The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in violation of the doctrine of res judicata, runs contrary to Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. By his actuations, respondent also violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04 of the Code, as well as a lawyers mandate "to delay no man for money or malice."[25]

The Court has, time and again, warned lawyers not to resort to forum shopping for this practice clogs the court dockets. Their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes such lawyers duty.[26] This we will not tolerate. In cases of similar nature,[27] the penalty imposed by this Court was six (6) months suspension from the practice of law. Thus, consistent with the existing jurisprudence, we find that, in this case, the suspension of six (6) months from practice of law is proper. WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-286, dated June 5, 2008, of the IBP, which found respondent Atty. Ibaro B. Relamida, Jr. guilty of violating the Rules on Res Judicata and Forum Shopping, is AFFIRMED. Atty. Relaminda is hereby SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the practice of law, effective upon the receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the personal record of Atty. Relamida as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator, for circulation to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

This Decision shall be immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-35252 October 21, 1932

THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiff-appellant, vs. UY TENG PIAO, defendant-appellee. Nat. M. Balboa and Dominador J. Endriga for appellant. Antonio Gonzales for appellee.

VICKERS, J.: This is an appeal by the plaintiff a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila absolving the defendant from the complaint, without a special finding as to costs. The appellant makes the following assignments of error: The trial court erred: 1. In finding that one Mr. Pecson gave a promise to appellee Uy Teng Piao to condone the balance of the judgment rendered against the said Uy Teng Piao and in favor of the Philippine National Bank in civil case No. 26328 of the Court o First Instance of Manila. 2. In finding that merely in selling the property described in certificate of title No. 11274 situated at Ronquillo Street, Manila, to Mariano Santos for P8,600 (Exhibit 2), the appellant had undoubtedly given the alleged promise of condonation to appellee Uy Teng Piao. 3. In finding that the consideration of document Exhibit 1 is the condonation of the balance of the judgment rendered in said civil case No. 26328. 4. In finding that said Mr. Pecson, granting that the latter has actually given such promise to condone, could bind the appellant corporation.

5. In holding that the absence of demand for payment upon appellee Uy Teng Piao for the balance of the said judgment from February 11, 1925 up to the year 1930 is "una senal inequivoca una prueba evidente" of the condonation of the balance of the said judgment. 6. In finding that by the sale of the said property to Mariano Santos for the sum of P8,600, the said judgment in civil case No. 26328 has been more than fully paid even discounting the sum of P1,300 which appellant paid as the highest bidder for the said property. 7. In declaring that the offer of appellee Uy Teng Piao as shown by Exhibits D and D-1, reflects only the desire of the said appellee Uy Teng Piao to avoid having a case with the appellant bank. 8. In finally absolving appellee Uy Teng Piao and in not sentencing him to pay the amount claimed in the complaint with costs. On September 9, 1924, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a judgment in favor of the Philippine National Bank and against Uy Teng Piao in civil case No. 26328 for the sum of P17,232.42 with interest at 7 per cent per annum from June 1, 1924, plus 10 per cent of the sum amount for attorney's fees and costs. The court ordered the defendant to deposit said amount with the clerk of the court within three months from the date of the judgment, and in case of his failure to do so that the mortgaged properties described in transfer certificates of title Nos. 7264 and 8274 should be sold at public auction in accordance with the law and the proceeds applied to the payment of the judgment. Uy Teng Piao failed to comply with the order of the court, and the sheriff of the City of Manila sold the two parcels of land at public auction to the Philippine National Bank on October 14, 1924 for P300 and P1,000 respectively. On February 11, 1925, the Philippine National Bank secured from Uy Teng Piao a waiver of his right to redeem the property described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8274, and on the same date the bank sold said property to Mariano Santos for P8,600.
1awphil.net

Evidently the other parcel, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7264, was subsequently resold by the bank for P2,700, because the account of the defendant was credited with the sum of P11,300. In other words, the bank credited the defendant with the full amount realized by it when it resold the two parcels of land.

The bank brought the present action to revive the judgment for the balance of P11,574.33, with interest at 7 per cent per annum from August 1, 1930. In his amended answer the defendant alleged as a special defense that he waived his right to redeem the land described in transfer certificate of title No. 8274 in consideration of an understanding between him and the bank that the bank would not collect from him the balance of the judgment. It was on this ground that the trial court absolved the defendant from the complaint. In our opinion the defendant has failed to prove any valid agreement on the part of the bank not to collect from him the remainder of the judgment. The alleged agreement rests upon the uncorroborated testimony of the defendant, the pertinent part of whose testimony on direct examination was as follows: P. En este documento aparece que usted, por consideracion de valor recibido del Banco Nacional demandante en la presente causa, renuncia a su derecho de recompra de la propiedad vendida por el Sheriff en publica subasta el catorce de octubre de mil novecientos veintecuatro a favor del Banco Nacional; quiere usted explicar al Honorable Juzgado, cual es esta consideracion de valor? R. Si, seor. Esto desde mil novecientos veintitres o mil novecientos veintecuatro, no recuerdo bien, me haba dicho el seor Pecson, porque algunas veces yo no podia pagar esos intereses mensuales. Entonces me dijo Pecson, "como puede usted recibir alquileres y no paga usted intereses?" P. Quien es ese seor Pecson? R. Era encargado de este asunto. P. Que era el del Banco Nacional, usted sabe? R. Era encargado de estas transacciones. Cuando tenia necesidad siempre llamaba yo al seor Pecson. Entonces hable al seor Pecson que somos comerciantes, algunas veces los alquileres no pueden cobrarse por anticipado. Sr. ENDRIGA. No es responsiva la contestacion a la pregunta. Sr. GONZALEZ. Si esta explicando y no ha terminado el testigo su contestacion. JUZGADO. Que la termine. TESTIGO. Me dijo el seor Pecson que es cosa mala para mi "por que usted cobra alquileres y no paga los intereses? Mejor deje usted ya todos sus bienes para cubrir sus deudas.

P. El seor Pecson le dijo a usted "mejor deje usted ya todos sus bienes," a que bienes se referia el ? R. Al terreno de Ronquillo y al terreno de Paco. P. Cual de esos terrenos, el de Ronquillo o el de Paco, el que se refiere aqui en el Exhibit 1? R. Paco, primeramente, los dos ambos. P. Pero este Exhibit 1, a que se refiere; al de Paco o al de Ronquillo? R. Parece que Paco. P. No recuerda usted muy bien? R. No recuerdo. P. Y cuando le dijo a usted el seor Pecson mejor que dejara todos sus bienes, le dijo a usted a favor de quien iba usted a dejar sus bienes? R. Al Banco Nacional. P. Y que le dijo a usted, si le dijo a usted algo el seor Pecson con respecto al saldo deudor que usted todavia era en deber a favor del Banco Nacional? R. No recuerdo mas; pero mas o menos de catorce mil pesos. P. Que le dijo el con respeto al saldo, si el cobraria todavia o se le condonaria? Sr. ENDRIGA. Es alternativa la pregunta. Me opongo. JUZGADO. Cambiese la pregunta. P. Que le dijo a usted con respeto al saldo, una vez otorgado este Exhibit 1? SR. ENDRIGA. La pregunta no tiene ninguna base. Nos openemos. Sr. GONZALES. Si dice el que se havian vendido todos los terrenos. JUZGADO. Puede contestar. Sr. ENDRIGA. Excepcion. R. Me dijo que para que usted no cobre alquileres y no pague intereses deje usted esos terrenos de Ronquillo y terreno de Paco para cubrir ya todas mis deudas. Entonces dije ya, si, como yo tengo buena fe con este Banco. Hasta que al fin yo dije que queria yo comprar.

P. Cuando usted firmo el once de febrero de mil novecientos veintecinco este documento Exhibit 1, recibio usted algun centimo de dinero del Banco? R. Nada, absolutamente. When asked on cross-examination if Pecson was not in Iloilo at the time of the execution of defendant's waiver of his right to redeem, the defendant answered that he did not know; asked when Pecson had spoken to him about the matter, the defendant replied that he did not remember. One of the attorneys for the plaintiff testified that the defendant renounced his right to redeem the parcel of land in Calle Ronquillo, Exhibit 1, because a friend of the defendant was interested in buying it. The bank ought to have presented Pecson as a witness, or his deposition, if he was not residing in Manila at the time of the trial. With respect to the testimony of the bank's attorney, we should like to observe that although the law does not forbid an attorney to be a witness and at the same time an attorney in a cause, the courts prefer that counsel should not testify as a witness unless it is necessary, and that they should withdraw from the active management of the case. (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, p. 148.) Canon 19 of the Code of Legal Ethics reads as follows: When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely formal matters, such as the attestation or custody of an instrument and the like, he should leave the trial of the case to other counsel. Except when essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer should avoid testifying in court in behalf of his client. Defendant's testimony as to the alleged agreement is very uncertain. There is no mention in Exhibit 1 as to such an agreement on the part of the bank. Exhibit 1 relates only to the land in Calle Ronquillo. If Pecson had made any such agreement as the defendant claims, it is reasonable to suppose that he would have required the defendant to waive his right to redeem both parcels of land, and that the defendant, a Chines business man, would have insisted upon some evidence of the agreement in writing. It appears to us that the defendant waived his right to redeem the land in Calle Ronquillo, because a friend of his wished to purchase it and was willing to pay therefor P8,600, and the bank agreed to credit the defendant with the full amount of the sale. Furthermore, if it be conceded that there was such an understanding between Pecson and the defendant as the latter claims, it is not shown that Pecson was authorized to make any such agreement for the bank. Only the

board of directors or the persons empowered by the board of directors could bind the bank by such an agreement. There is no merit in the contention that since the bank accepted the benefit of the waiver it cannot now repudiate the alleged agreement. The fact that the bank after having bought the land for P1,000 resold it at the instance of the defendant for P8,600 and credited the defendant with the full amount of the resale was a sufficient consideration for the execution of defendant's waiver of his right to redeem. For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the defendant is condemned to pay the plaintiff the sum of P11,574.38 with interest thereon at the rate of 7 per cent per annum from August 1, 1930, and the costs of both instances. Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Imperial and Butte, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila --EN BANC RE: LETTER OF PRESIDING JUSTICE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, JR. ON CA-G.R. SP NO. 103692 [Antonio Rosete, et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, et al.] A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA

Present:

PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, REYES,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:

September 9, 2008

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

The Judiciary, which is acclaimed as the firmest pillar of our democratic institutions, is vested by the Constitution with the power to settle disputes between parties and to determine their rights and obligations under the law. For judicial decisions, which form part of the law of the land, to be credible instruments in the peaceful and democratic resolution of conflicts, our courts must be perceived to be and, in fact be, impartial, independent, competent and just. To accomplish this end, it is imperative that members of the Judiciary from its highest magistrates to its humblest employees adhere to the strictest code of ethics and the highest standards of propriety and decorum. Indeed, it is

unfortunate that one of the countrys second highest courts, the Court of Appeals, should be presently embroiled in scandal and controversy. It is this Courts bounden duty to determine the culpability or innocence of the members of the Judiciary involved in the said controversy and to discipline any one whose conduct has failed to conform to the canons of judicial ethics, which uphold integrity, independence, impartiality, competence and propriety in the performance of official functions.

The present administrative matter arose from the Letter dated August 1, 2008 of Court of Appeals Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. (Presiding Justice Vasquez), referring to this Court for appropriate action the much publicized dispute and charges of impropriety among the justices of the Court of Appeals (CA) involved in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 entitled Antonio Rosete, et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, et al.

To assist in its investigation of this sensitive matter, the Court in its Resolution dated August 4, 2008 constituted a three-person panel (the Panel of Investigators) composed of retired Justices of the Court; namely, Mme. Justice Carolina Grio-Aquino as Chairperson, Mme. Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero and Mr. Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. as Members. The Panel of Investigators was tasked to investigate the (a) alleged improprieties of the actions of the Justices of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 (Antonio V. Rosete, et al. v. SEC, et al.); and (b) alleged rejected offer or solicitation of bribe disclosed respectively by Mr. Justice Jose Sabio and Mr. Francis de Borja.

A narration of relevant events and facts, as found by the Investigating Panel, follows: On April 15, 2008, Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes (Justice Reyes), then Chairperson of the Ninth Division of the CA, filed an application for leave from May 15, 2008 to June 5, 2008.[1]

In Office Order No. 149-08-CMV dated May 14, 2008 issued by Presiding Justice Vasquez, Justice Jose C. Mendoza (Justice Mendoza) was designated by the Raffle Committee as Acting Chairman of the Ninth Division during the absence of Justice Reyes. Apart from his duties as regular senior member of the Fifth Division, Justice Mendoza was authorized to act on all cases submitted to the Ninth Division for final resolution and/or appropriate action, except ponencia, fromMay 15, 2008 to June 5, 2008 or until Justice Reyes reports back for duty. The said office order likewise applied to the other Division(s) where Justice Reyes had participated or took part as regular member or in an acting capacity.[2]

On May 29, 2008, Antonio V. Rosete, Manuel M. Lopez, Felipe B. Alfonso, Jesus P. Francisco, Christian S. Monsod, Elpidio L. Ibaez, and Francis Giles B. Puno, as officers, directors and/or representatives of the Manila Electric Company (hereinafter to be collectively referred to as Meralco), filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order (TRO) against the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Commissioner Jesus Enrique G. Martinez, Commissioner Hubert B. Guevarra, and the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). [3] Aside from the application for immediate issuance of

a TRO, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a preliminary injunction that should thereafter be declared permanent, as well as a declaration of nullity of the cease and desist and show cause orders issued by the SEC through Commissioner Martinez. The petition was received by the CA at 10:49 a.m. on May 29, 2008 and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 103692. On the same day, petitioners simultaneously filed at 10:48 a.m. an urgent motion for a special raffle. Presiding Justice Vasquez granted the motion in a handwritten note on the face of the urgent motion,[4] and CA-G.R. No. 103692 was raffled to Justice Vicente Q. Roxas (Justice Roxas).[5] At 3:10 p.m., the Office of Presiding Justice Vasquez received a letter from Atty. Estrella C. Elamparo (Atty. Elamparo), Chief Legal Counsel of the GSIS, requesting the re-raffling of the case in the presence of the parties in the interest of transparency and fairness.[6] At 4:10 p.m. on that day, the GSIS filed an ex-parte motion to defer action on any incident in the petition pending the resolution of their motion for the re-raffle of the case.[7]

Atty. Elamparo, accompanied by Atty. Orlando P. Polinar, also of the GSIS Law Office, personally filed the urgent motion to defer action on the petition pending the resolution of their motion to re-raffle the case. Since the receiving clerk of the Court of Appeals could not assure them that the motion would be transmitted to the Court of Appeals Division, Attys. Elamparo and Polinar allegedly went to the office of Justice Roxas for the sole purpose of personally furnishing him a copy of the motion.[8] They initially talked to a male clerk who referred them to one of the lawyers, who, however, told them that it was not possible for them to personally hand a copy of the motion to Justice Roxas. Thus, Attys. Elamparo and Polinar left a copy of the motion to the staff but no one wanted to sign and acknowledge receipt of the copy.[9]

On May 30, 2008, Justice Reyes filed an application for the extension of his leave until June 6, 2008.[10] In the meantime, Justice Mendoza, who had been designated to replace Justice Reyes during the latters absence, informed Justice Roxas through a letter that he (Justice Mendoza) was inhibiting from the case on the ground that he used to be a lawyer of the Meralco.[11] Hence, in an Emergency Request for Raffle, Justice Roxas informed the Raffle Committee about the inhibition.[12]

Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. (Justice Sabio) was assigned as Acting Chairman of the Ninth Division by raffle, in lieu of Justice Mendoza.[13] At 11:30 a.m., the office of Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal (Justice Dimaranan-Vidal) received a notice of emergency deliberation with the new Acting Chairman of the Special Ninth Division, apparently sent by Justice Roxas, stating that her presence and that of Justice Sabio, Jr. were indispensable on account of the national interest involved in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692.[14]

Meanwhile, Atty. Elamparo received a telephone call from somebody who did not identify herself but (who) said that she had important information regarding the Meralco case. The unidentified caller told Atty. Elamparo that a TRO was already being prepared and that certain Meralco lawyers had in fact been talking to Justice Roxas. The caller warned Atty. Elamparo against Justice Roxas who had administrative cases and was very notorious, but when prodded, the caller would not disclose more details.[15]

At about 1:30 p.m. also on May 30, 2008, Justice Sabio received a telephone call in his chambers from his older brother, Chairman Camilo Sabio (Chairman Sabio) of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).[16] Chairman Sabio informed his brother that he (Justice Sabio) had been named the third member of the division to which the MERALCO-GSIS case had been raffled. Justice Sabio was surprised as he had not yet been officially informed about the matter. Chairman Sabio likewise informed him that a TRO had been prepared. Chairman Sabio then tried to convince Justice Sabio of the rightness of the stand of the GSIS and the SEC, and asked his brother to help the GSIS, which represents the interest of the poor people. Justice Sabio told his brother that he would vote according to *his+ conscience and that the most that he could do was to have the issuance of the TRO and the injunctive relief scheduled for oral arguments, at which the respondents must be able to convince him that the TRO indeed had no legal basis.

In his signed testimony,[17] which he read before the Panel of Investigators, Chairman Sabio narrated the circumstances of this call to his brother on May 30, 2008. It appears to have been prompted by a call from a member of the Board of Trustees of GSIS. To quote from Chairman Sabios testimony:

Last May 30, 2008 I was in Davao City Airport with my wife, Marlene, waiting for our 1:25 P.M. PAL flight to Manila. xxx xxx xxx.

As we were boarding, I received a call from Atty. Jesus I. Santos, a Member of the Board of Trustees of GSIS. We had known each other and had become friends since before Martial Law because as Chief

Counsel of the Federation of Free Farmers (FFF) we were opposing counsel in various cases in Bulacan.

Attorney Santos informed me that the dispute between the GSIS and MERALCO was now in the Court of Appeals; and, that as a matter of fact, my brother, Justice Sabio, was chair of the Division to which the case had been assigned. Being a Trustee, Attorney Santos requested me to help. I readily welcomed the request for help and thanked him. There was no mystery about his having known of the results of the raffle because the lawyers are notified thereof and are present thereat. As a Trustee, Attorney Santos should be concerned and involved. As such it is his duty to seek assistance for the GSIS where he could legitimately find it. He was right in seeking my assistance.

I was aware of the controversy between the GSIS and MERALCO. In essence this was in fact a controversy between the long suffering public and the mighty financially and politically controlling owners of MERALCO. MERALCO is not only a public utility but also a monopoly. Fortunately, GSIS had taken up the cudgels for the long suffering public, who are at the mercy of MERALCO.

xxx

xxx

x x x.

Immediately, I tried to contact Justice Sabio. But due to the noise I could not hear him. So I waited until we would arrive in Manila.

As we were leaving the Airport, I again got in touch with Justice Sabio. After, he confirmed that he was in fact in the Division to which the petition of MERALCO had been raffled. I impressed upon him the

character and essence of the controversy. I asked him to help GSIS if the legal situation permitted. He said he would decide according to his conscience. I said: of course.

xxx

xxx

x x x.

On the same day, May 30, 2008, GSIS filed an urgent ex-parte motion to inhibit Justice Roxas from CA-G.R. No. SP 103692.[18] The Special Cases Section of the Court of Appeals received a copy of the motion at 11:58 a.m.[19]

Claiming that the TRO was issued to pre-empt the hearing scheduled in the afternoon of that day before the SEC, the GSIS Law Office, through Atty. Marcial C. Pimentel, Jr., set forth its reason for the motion for inhibition as follows:

3. Unfortunately, reports have reached respondent GSIS that the Honorable ponente has been in contact with certain lawyers of MERALCO and has in fact already prepared a draft resolution granting the TRO without affording respondents even a summary hearing. The records of this case was (sic), per information, immediately transmitted to the Honorable ponente upon his instructions. The worries of the respondent were exacerbated when it learned that there are supposedly two administrative cases pending against the Honorable ponente, both of which involve allegations of bias and prejudice.

It turned out, however, that at that time, Justice Roxas had not yet been officially notified by the Raffle Committee that the case was raffled to him.[20] Moreover, contrary to the allegation of Atty. Elamparo that the raffle was rigged, Justice Roxas had no hand in the raffle proceeding, which was handled by the Division chaired by Justice Mariano del Castillo with the use of a fool-proof Las Vegas tambiolo, like the lotto machine.[21]

Justice Roxas brought to the office of Justice Sabio, for the latters signature, the TRO which he had prepared, already signed by himself and Justice DimarananVidal. Convinced of the urgency of the TRO, Justice Sabio signed it on condition that the case will be set for oral arguments.

Thus, at 2:08 p.m. on May 30, 2008,[22] the Special Ninth Division composed of Justices Sabio, Roxas, and Dimaranan-Vidal, issued the Resolution granting the TRO prayed for by the petitioners and directing the respondents to file their respective comments (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition within ten days from notice, with the petitioners given five days from receipt of that comment within which to file their reply. The Special Ninth Division also set the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction for 10:00 a.m. on June 23 and 24, 2008. In the same Resolution, parties were directed to file their respective memorandum of authorities in connection with the application for a writ of preliminary injunction together with their comments/reply. After the parties had filed their memorandum of authorities relative to the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, the prayer for the said writ would be considered submitted for resolution forty five (45) days from promulgation of this Resolution. The SEC received a copy of the Resolution at 4:03 p.m. on that day.[23]

For Justice Roxas, the issuance of the TRO was an implied denial of the motion for inhibition filed against him. There was no need to put in writing the action on the motion for inhibition.[24]

At 3:00 p.m., the Special Cases Section of the Court of Appeals received the Urgent Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order and To Hold Its Enforcement in Abeyance filed by the GSIS.[25] Justice Roxas did not act on the Urgent Motion because he did not consider it meritorious.[26]

On May 31, 2008, Justice Sabio received a cellular phone call from Mr. Francis De Borja (Mr. De Borja), a person he had lost contact with for almost a year already.[27] Mr. De Borja greeted him with: Mabuhay ka, Justice. When Justice Sabio, Jr. asked Mr. De Borja why he said that, Mr. De Borja told him that the Makati Business Club was happy with his having signed the TRO, to which Justice Sabio retorted, I voted according to my conscience.

On June 5, 2008, the GSIS Law Office received a letter dated June 2, 2008 of Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. informing GSIS Chief Legal Counsel, Atty. Elamparo, that the Court of Appeals could not grant her request for the re-raffling of CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 in the presence of the parties in the interest of transparency and fairness, as the case had been raffled in accordance with the procedure under the IRCA.[28]

On June 10, 2008, Justice B. L. Reyes reported back to work.[29]

On June 11, 2008, at 3:50 p.m.,[30] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appearing for the SEC, filed a manifestation and motion praying for the admission of the comment (to the petition) attached thereto, as well as the advance and additional copies of the memorandum of authorities.

On June 12, 2008, at 4:53 p.m., the GSIS filed its comment/opposition to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692,[31] as well as its memorandum of authorities.

On June 16, 2008, the Division Clerk of Court, Atty. Teresita Custodio (Atty. Custodio), delivered to Justice Reyes the cartilla of the Meralco case, and informed him that a hearing on the prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction had been scheduled at 10:00 a.m. on June 23 and 24, 2008.[32] However, on the same day, the Division Clerk of Court came back to retrieve the cartilla upon instructions of Justice Sabio. Justice Reyes instructed his staff to return thecartilla and when he asked the Division Clerk of Court why she was retrieving it, she said that Justice Sabio demanded that it be returned back to him. Personally affronted by the domineering and superior stance of Justice Sabio, Justice Reyes read and re-read Secs. 1, 2(d) & 5, Rule VI (Process of Adjudication) until he was satisfied that he should sit as Division Chairman in the Meralco case.[33]

On either June 17 or 18, 2008, Justice Sabio requested the rollo of CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 from Justice Roxas so that he could study the case before the hearing.[34] Justice Roxas asked him whether Justice Reyes would preside over the hearing. Justice Sabio explained the reason why he, not Justice Reyes, should preside. Justice Roxas promised to instruct the Division Clerk of Court to send the rollo over to Justice Sabio. The next day, the Division Clerk of Court told Justice Sabio that the rollo was with Justice Reyes. When the rollo was eventually transmitted to Justice Sabio, the Division Clerk of Court asked him whether therollo should be with Justice Reyes. Justice Sabio explained why the rollo should be with him.

On June 18, 2008, petitioners filed a motion for an extension of five days or until June 23, 2008 within which to file their consolidated memoranda of authorities and reply to the comment of the SEC.[35]

On June 19, 2008, MERALCO filed an ex-parte manifestation together with their reply to the comment of the GSIS.[36] Meanwhile, Justice B. L. Reyes asked Atty. Custodio to report on what transpired between her and Justice Sabio when she returned the cartilla. Teary-eyed, Atty. Custodio begged off from making a report.[37]

Justice Reyes decided to consult the Presiding Justice to avoid an ugly confrontation with the Justices on the highly politicized case involving giants of the Philippine society. He explained to the Presiding Justice his understanding of the relevant IRCA rules and the actual practice in similar situations in the past. The Presiding Justice promised to talk with Justice Sabio and, for the sake

of transparency and future reference, Justice Reyes requested permission to write an inquiry on the matter.[38]

On the same day, Justice Reyes wrote Presiding Justice Vasquez a letter[39] calling the attention of Justice Edgardo P. Cruz (Justice Cruz), Chairperson of the Committee on Rules, to the dilemma as to who between him and Justice Sabio should receive CA-G.R. SP No. 103692. Justice Reyes posed these questions before the Presiding Justice:
Will the case remain with Justice Jose Sabio, Jr. as Acting Chairman of the Special 9th Division and who participated in the initial Resolution of the case?

Will the case revert to the regular 9th Division with the undersigned as Chairman?

For Justice Reyes, the dilemma was engendered by this provision of Section 2 of Rule VI of the IRCA:
(2) When, in an original action or petition for review, any of these actions or proceedings, namely: (1) giving due course; (2) granting writ of preliminary injunction; (3) granting new trial; and (4) granting execution pending appeal have been taken, the case shall remain with the Justice to whom the case is assigned for study and report and the Justices who participated therein, regardless of their transfer to other Divisions in the same station.

The hearing on the application for preliminary injunction having been scheduled for June 23 and 24, 2008, Justice Reyes considered it necessary that the issues be resolved before that date. Moreover, the referral of the controversy to the Presiding Justice would give him sufficient time to seriously study the case before the hearing.[40]

On June 20, 2008, Presiding Justice Vasquez referred the letter of Justice Reyes to Justice Cruz, Chairperson of the Committee on Rules, noting some urgency involved as the hearing of the case is on Monday, June 23, 2008.[41]

On that same day, Justice Cruz wrote Justice Reyes a letter[42] quoting Section 2 (d), Rule VI of the IRCA and stating that the *i+ssuance of a TRO is not among the instances where the Justices who participated in the case shall remain therein. Hence, Justice Cruz opined that *n+otwithstanding the issuance of the TRO (not writ of preliminary injunction), the case reverted to the regular Chairman (Justice Reyes) of the Ninth Division upon his return. Justice Reyes received a copy of the letter of Justice Cruz in the afternoon of that day.[43]

During the hearings of this case, Justice Cruz explained his opinion before the Panel. He opined that the motion to lift the TRO is not a motion for reconsideration because Rule 52 of the Rules of Court states that a motion for reconsideration may be filed with respect to a decision or a final resolution. A TRO is not a final resolution but an interlocutory order. Moreover, since the subject of the hearing on June 23, 2008 was on the application for preliminary injunction, Justice Sabio had no right to participate in the hearing because as an Acting Chairman, his authority was only to act on the motion to lift the TRO. Under the

IRCA, the position of Justice Sabio invoked the exception to the general rule in the IRCA. However, the settled principle is to construe a rule strictly against the exception. The participation of Justice Sabio in the hearing on June 23, 2008 was a passport to participation in the decision-making process, in violation of the IRCA.[44]

Justice Reyes having consulted with him, the Presiding Justice referred the matter to Justice Sabio who in turn, opined that a temporary restraining order is part of the injunctive relief or at least its initial action such that he should be the one to chair the Division. [45] In his office after that consultation with the Presiding Justice, Justice Reyes found that the Division Clerk of Court had given him a copy of the cartilla just in case he would preside over the hearing. In the evening, the Presiding Justice called up Justice Reyes to inform him that Justice Sabio insisted that he would preside over the hearing of the case, and that the opinion of Justice Cruz, who was junior to Justice Sabio was no better than his own opinion.[46]

It turned out that, upon receipt of a copy of the letter of Justice Cruz, Justice Sabio told the Presiding Justice by telephone that he disagreed with the opinion of Justice Cruz because he did not sign in an official capacity as Chairman of the Rules Committee, but in his personal capacity and hence, the opinion of Justice Sabio was as good as his, as in fact I (Justice Sabio, Jr.) am even more senior than he.[47] Justice Sabio told the Presiding Justice that he smelled something fishy about the move to transfer the case to the Ninth Division especially because Justice Reyes did not inform him about it despite the fact that they were seated together on three occasions.

Justice Sabio smelled something fishy because a couple or so weeks ago, he attended a Chairpersons meeting regarding the leakage of the ponencia of Justice Bato, with Justice Reyes as Chairperson and Justice Jose Mendoza as senior member. The meeting was called because prior to the promulgation of the decision of Justice Bato, the losing party already filed a motion for the inhibition of the ponente. According to Justice Sabio information on the decision could not have been leaked by Justice Bato but by a member of the Division.[48]

The Presiding Justice did not do anything anymore to prevent an unpalatable situation at the scheduled June 23, 2008 hearing, notwithstanding the conflicting opinions of Justices Reyes and Sabio. The personal view of the Presiding Justice was at the time with Justice Cruz but Justice Sabio had a different interpretation. Neither did the Presiding Justice suggest that the Rules Committee be convened because the Committee then had only two members. He felt that it would be better if Justices Reyes and Sabio could settle it between themselves. The Presiding Justice was seeing the Justices practically everyday because he did not want these things to blow up. However, neither did it enter the mind of the Presiding Justice that the hearing on June 23 could be reset. Had he known that there was a motion to inhibit Justice Roxas, he would have changed his position that it should be the Sabio group.[49]

Also on June 20, 2008, the GSIS requested permission to conduct a powerpoint presentation during the hearing.[50] Likewise the SEC, through the OSG prayed that it be allowed the use of Microsoft Powerpoint Application at the June 23 and 24, 2008 hearings.[51] Justice Roxas did not act on the motions.

On June 21, 2008, Justice Sabio came to know that it was the Division chaired by Justice Reyes that would handle the case on account of the opinion of Justice Cruz.[52]

In the morning of June 23, 2008, Justice Sabio consulted with Justice Martin Villarama, Jr. (Justice Villarama) who advised him, in no uncertain terms, that his stand was correct and that he should remain in the case.[53] Justice Villarama said that the case should remain with the Special Ninth Division regardless of the transfer of the ponente to the Eighth Division because of the pending motion to lift TRO, which the Special Ninth Division should resolve following the general rule that when a decision or resolution is rendered by a division, a motion for reconsideration thereof should be acted upon by all the Members of that division, whether regular or special, which participated in the rendition of the decision or resolution, except in case of death, retirement or resignation of such Member.[54]

That morning, Justice Roxas also consulted Justice Villarama. The latter told the former that since there was a motion to lift the TRO, Justice Roxas should first rule on the motion. He also advised Justice Roxas to inhibit himself from the case, as there might be a problem (mag-inhibit ka baka magka-problema).Justice Roxas told Justice Villarama that he would follow his suggestion.[55]

Justice Reyes also went to the office of Justice Villarama to tell him of his strong conviction that the issuance of a TRO is not among the instances provided

in Sec. 2 (d), Rule VI when the case shall remain with those Justices who participated in the case regardless of their transfer to other division(s). Justice Villarama told Justice Reyes that per his understanding and interpretation of said provision, x x x the case should remain with the Special Ninth Division.[56]

At 9:50 a.m., the Office of the Division Clerk of Court called Justice Reyes to inform him that the parties and their counsels were already in the hearing room. Justice Reyes informed the caller that he could not preside as Justice Sabio had apparently hardened his position and he wanted to avoid an ugly spectacle. His name plate was displayed in the hearing room but Justice Sabio moved to another hearing room.[57] Allegedly, the removal of the nameplate of Justice Reyes was the talk of the Court of Appeals for weeks.[58]

Villaraza Cruz Marcelo and Angangco entered its appearance as counsel for Meralco.[59] At the hearing, Justice Sabio presided with Justices Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal in attendance. Justice Roxas, the ponente, did not ask a single question.[60] Not one of the Justices in attendance brought up the motion for inhibition filed by the GSIS against Justice Roxas.[61] In open court, the parties in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 agreed to submit, within 15 days, simultaneous memoranda on the injunctive relief prayed for by the petitioners, after which the application for preliminary injunction would be deemed submitted for resolution.[62]

On June 25, 2008, or about two days after the separate conversations of Justice Villaram with Justices Sabio and Reyes, the Presiding Justice also consulted Justice Villarama about the letter-queries of Justices Roxas and Reyes on which

Division should resolve the matter of injunctive relief or issue the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692. [63]

The Presiding Justice issued Office Order No. 196-08-CMV reconstituting the Committee on Rules and designating Justice Cruz as the Chairperson, with Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, Reyes, Hakim Abdulwahid, and Noel G. Tijam, as members.[64] The Committee on Rules was tasked to propose amendments to the IRCA on or before August 15, 2008 for submission and adoption of the Court en banc. (The office order was later amended by Office Order No. 196-08CMV on August 4, 2008 to include as members Justices Mario L. Guaria III, Lucas P. Bersamin, and Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores.[65]) The Rules Committee used to be composed of only three members, namely: Justices Cruz, Abdulwahid, and Roberto Barrios, now deceased, as members, with Justice Cruz as chairperson.[66]

It was also on June 25, 2008 that Presiding Justice Vasquez issued Office Order No. 200-08-CMV stating that, in view of the retirement of Justices Enrique Lanzanas, Lucenito N. Tagle, Agustin S. Dizon, and Rodrigo Cosico, and the appointments of Justices Ruben C. Ayson and Edgardo L. delos Santos, the Divisions would have a new composition effective July 4, 2008.[67] Under that office order, Justice Sabio became the Chairman of the Sixth Division, with Justice Dimaranan-Vidal as a member. Justice Reyes became the Chairman of the Eighth Division, with Justices Roxas and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. (Justice Bruselas) as members.

On June 29, 2008, Justice Reyes went on official leave of absence to use a business class airplane ticket to Sydney, Australia that he had won in an APT Golf

Tournament in January 2008. He was still on official leave when the reorganization of the Court of Appeals took place on July 4, 2008.[68]

On July 1, 2008, Justice Roxas told Justice Sabio that he did not attend the Access to Courts (sic) summit on June 30 and July 1, 2008 at the Court of Appeals Auditorium because he was busy with the Meralco case. Justice Sabio was taken aback because at that time the parties had not yet submitted their memoranda.[69]

That same afternoon, Mr. De Borja again called up Justice Sabio, seeking to meet with him for an important matter. Because Justice Sabio had 6-8 p.m.classes at the Ateneo Law School, they agreed to meet after his classes but not for long because his wife and his daughter, Atty. Silvia Jo Sabio who is an Attorney VI in the Office of the Chief Justice,[70] would be waiting for him.[71] According to Justice Sabio, the conversation at that meeting with Francis de Borja went as follows:

17. By the time my class was finished at 8 pm, Mr. De Borja was already waiting for me at the Lobby Lounge of the 3rd Floor of the Ateneo Law School. His first words to me were:Alam mo Justice kung sino ang kasama ko sa kotse? Si Manolo Lopez. Then he said: Noong tinatawagan kita at sinabi kong Mabuhay ka Justice, si Manolo Lopez ang katabi ko noon. Nasa Amerika siya, kaya ako na lang ang pumunta dito para makiusap sa yo. Alam mo, itong kaso na ito is a matter of life and death for the Lopezes. And alam mo naman what the Marcoses did to them, which is being done now by the Arroyos.

 At that point he mentioned the impasse between Justice Bienvenido Reyes and myself. He said: Alam naming may problema kayo ni Justice Reyes tungkol sa chairmanship. I was surprised how he came to know about it, as this was an internal matter of the Court of Appeals which only happened fairly recently and many associate justices of the CA were not even aware of this. Just the same, I explained my stand and why I could not relinquish the chairmanship to Justice Reyes. He then replied: Alam mo, Justice ang opinion dito ni Nonong Cruz ay i-challenge ang stand mo. Kaya lang, mayroon namang nagsabi na it might become messy. Then he bragged to me: Ako din ang responsible sa pagrecommend at pag-hire ng Villaraza Law Firm. Then he explained that he was there to offer me a win-win situation. He said: Justice, mayroon kaming P10 million. Ready. Just give way to Justice Reyes. Then I said: Bakit ganun. Nakasisiguro sila sa kanya, sa akin hindi? He said: Mas komportable lang sila sa kanya. At that point, I was shocked that he had a very low regard for me. He was treating me like there was a price on my person. I could not describe my feelings. I was stunned. But at the same time, hindi ko rin magawang bastusin siya because I had known him since 1993 and this was the first time that he had ever treated me like this, or shown that he believed I could be bought. So I just told him: Francis, I cannot in conscience agree to that.

 His answer was: Sabi ko nga sa kanila, mahirap ka talaga papayag. Kasi may anak iyang Opus Dei. Numerary pa. At this point, I just wanted to leave, so I told him I could not stay long. I told him my wife and lawyer daughter were waiting. Even then, he was already insistent. His parting words before I left were: Just think about it, Justice.[72]

At that time, Mr. De Borja was carrying a sealed brown paper bag, which he was handling as if something important was inside. However, Justice Sabio did not know if the bag contained P10 million.[73] In his car, Justice Sabio told his wife and his daughter, Silvia Jo, about the offer of Mr. De Borja for Meralco.[74]

In his affidavit submitted to the Panel of Investigators, Mr. De Borja describes himself as a businessman, a deal maker, and project packager. On July 1, 2008, he invited Justice Sabio for dinner to touch base and for chismis about the MERALCO-GSIS case. As the latter would have evening classes at the AteneoLaw School, and his wife and daughter would be waiting in their car after his classes, they just agreed to meet at the lobby-lounge of the School. What Mr. De Borja knew about the MERALCO case allegedly came from news reports but he was interested in the news because he is a confirmed freeenterpriser. Moreover, De Borja thought that there was *n+othing like hearing things directly from the horses mouth.[75]

When Mr. De Borja and Justice Sabio met, Mr. De Borja averred he was indeed carrying a bag, not an expensive looking luggage. After parking his car at

the Rockwell basement, he took the escalator, intending to walk out of the mall. On his way, he passed by the Kenneth Cole shop and, since it was still early, he looked in and saw a T-shirt he liked. He bought the T-shirt, which he brought before the Panel of Investigators in the grey Kenneth Cole Reaction bag. The photographs of the bag and the T-shirt costing P1,650.00 are marked Exhibits ADe Borja and A-1-De Borja and attached to the rollo of A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA, while the photograph of the receipt issued by the Kenneth Cole Boutique, marked as Exhibit A-2-De Borja, shows that the purchase was made on July 1, 2008 at 19:47. He stressed the bag did not contain P10 million.

Before the Panel, Justice Sabio claimed that the bag Mr. De Borja brought during the hearing was not the bag that Mr. De Borja was carrying when Justice Sabio saw him on July 1, 2008. What Mr. De Borja allegedly brought with him to the lobby-lounge of the Ateneo Law School was a brown bag with paper handle about 2/3 (of the Kenneth Cole bag) in size. Justice Sabio was told by the Panel that it could be the subject of rebuttal evidence but he did not present such evidence.

According to Mr. De Borja, Manolo Lopez (Mr. Lopez), the owner of MERALCO whose wife was a member of Marthas Vineyard just like Mr. De Borjas wife, was also an acquaintance of Mr. De Borja at the Ateneo grade school. Mr. Lopez did not ask him (Mr. De Borja) to contact Justice Sabio. At a party where Mr. De Borja met Mr. Lopez, Mr. De Borja informed him that he knew Justice Sabio but Mr. Lopez did not say anything.

Mr. De Borja denied having offered P10 million to Justice Sabio. Instead, he claimed that Justice Sabio informed him that the government has offered him (Justice Sabio) money and a promotion to the Supreme Court to favor GSIS. When Mr. De Borja asked what would it take for Justice Sabio to resist the governments offer, Justice Sabio allegedly replied: Fifty Million.[76] He alleged that it was Justice Sabio who called up after that July 1, 2008 meeting to feel his reaction to the P50 million solicitation. Justice Sabio asked him: O, ano, kumusta, ano ang nangyayari.

Mr. De Borja admitted having given P300,000 to Justice Sabio, some 15 years ago, as a balato because he came to value the friendship of Justice Sabio that developed while the latter was helping the Roa family in a business transaction. Mr. De Borja earned more than P25 million although he received only P3 million as down payment out of the sale of 100 hectares of the Roa property. He gave the balato of 10% of the P3 million to Justice Sabio in cash at the Roa-owned bank in Cagayan de Oro. Since the Roas had a lot of legal problems, Justice Sabio rendered advice and consultation at the time that he was an RTC judge in Cagayan de Oro. After the promotion of Justice Sabio to the Court of Appeals, Mr. De Borja invited him for dinner. They would see each other at get-togethers of the Roas with whom Mr. De Borja is related, even at a gathering in the house of Mr. De Borjas mother.[77]

On July 2, 2008, Justice Sabio that informed Presiding Justice Vasquez that he (Justice Sabio) was offered a bribe (which he rejected) to have him ousted from the Meralco case. The news allegedly shocked the Presiding Justice. Justice Sabio also went to Justice Villarama who was both shocked and amused. Justice Sabio. did not tell them who the offeror was. However, a day or two later,

Justice Sabio found out that Mr. De Borja had called their mutual friend, Mrs. Evelyn Clavano, who was also shocked that Mr. De Borja had the gall to ask her to convince Justice Sabio to accept the bribe.[78]

Although Justice Sabio told the Presiding Justice that the offer of P10 million to a Justice was, in the words of Justice Sabio, bastusan na ito, and he knew that bribing a Justice is a criminal act, the Presiding Justice did nothing because he could not advise a fellow Justice on what to do the Justice would know what he should do. Neither did he think of consulting Justices Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal on the chairmanship impasse.[79]

On July 3, 2008, to stop Mr. De Borja from pestering him with phone calls and text messages, Justice Sabio called up Mr. De Borja who told him: Mabuti naman Justice tumawag ka, kasi malapit na ang deadline ng submission ng memorandum. Pinag-isipan mo bang mabuti ang offer namin? Kasi sayang din kung di mo tatanggapin, Kasi kahit aabot itong kaso sa Supreme Court, matatalo ka din. Sayang lang yung P10 million. Baka sisihin ka pa ng mga anak mo. Shocked by what he heard, Justice Sabio said No. Since Mr. De Borja did not seem to understand why he kept saying No, Justice Sabio explained to him:If I accept that, my conscience will bother me forever. How can I face my wife and two daughters? One a lawyer and the other a Numerary member of Opus Dei? And besides, how can I reconcile my being a member of PHILJAs Ethics and Judicial Conduct Department; being a lecturer of the MCLE; and being a pre-bar reviewer of the Ateneo Law School on Legal and Judicial Ethics? Mr. De Borja retorted: Wala naman kaming pinapagawa sa iyo na illegal, eh. Then he added: You know Justice, after two or three weeks, makakalimutan na ito ng mga tao. Meron naman diyang mga Atenista na tumatanggap. Justice Sabio said: I

dont know about them, but I am different. Mr. De Borja then said: Well, if you will not accept, we will be forced to look for other ways. To this, Justice Sabio said: But they will have to contend with me. In parting, Mr. De Borja said: Justice, no matter what, saludo talaga ako sa iyo.

Mr. De Borja admitted that Justice Sabio called him up, but denied the above conversation with Justice Sabio.

On July 4, 2008, the reorganization of the Court of Appeals became effective and brought Justices Reyes, Roxas and Bruselas to the Eighth Division. Justice Reyes went to see the Presiding Justice about the urgent motion for him to assume the chairmanship of the Division, which shows on its face that the Urgent Motion dated July 10, 2008 was received by the Court of Appeals at 2:08 p.m. on July 10, 2008 and by Atty. Teresita C. Custodio on July 9, 2008. Justice Reyes expressed to the Presiding Justice his apprehension that should he fail to assume the chairmanship, he would face administrative liability for nonfeasance or dereliction of duty. The Presiding Justice suggested that the respondents in the case be required to comment on the Urgent Motion in a resolution to be issued by the former 9th Division of Justice J.L. Sabio, Jr. since to allow the new Division of Justice B.L. Reyes to issue the resolution x x x would render moot and academic the same motion. Justice Reyes agreed and told the Presiding Justice that he would be sending over the records to him so that the Presiding Justice could place a note thereon as to what had been agreed upon. However, the records of the case did not reach the Presiding Justice.[80]

For Justice Roxas, the July 4, 2008 reorganization was mandatory and the Meralco case followed him as its ponente to the Eighth Division. By the reorganization, Justice Sabio was moved from the disbanded Special Ninth Division to the Sixth Division, as the reorganization did not spare any Justice.[81]Moreover, the IRCA does not require that the Justices that issued a TRO be the same Justices that will render the decision.[82] This is because the TRO does not appear in Section 2 (d), Rule VII of the IRCA. Accordingly, only the issuance of a preliminary injunction could be an exception to the July 4, 2008 reorganization of the CA.[83] He believes the IRCA does not require that the Justices who heard the case should also decide it because the CA is a court of record and Justices may rely on the transcript of stenographic notes.[84] And so, once the three Justices have signed the decision, the ponente has the pressing duty to promulgate the decision.[85]

Since July 4, 2008, Justice Bruselas alleged that he acted on all the ponencias of Justices Reyes and Roxas, just as they had acted on hisponencias.[86]

On July 7, 2008, the GSIS filed its memorandum.

On or about July 8, 2008, Atty. Silvia Sabio, to help her father, sought the advice of Atty. Jose Midas Marquez (Atty. Marquez) regarding the bribery attempt. Atty. Marquez advised that Justice Sabio should write the Chief Justice about the incident, detailing not only the bribery attempt but all that has transpired relative to the chairmanship issue. Atty. Silvia Sabio immediately called her father and relayed Atty. Marquezs advice. Later that date, Justice Sabio

handed his daughter, Silvia, a handwritten letter for her to deliver to the Chief Justice.[87] The handwritten letter, in essence, requested permission for Justice Sabio to unburden himself before the Chief Justice on the Meralco case.[88]

At around 2:30 p.m., Justice Reyes went to see Justice Sabio. The conversation between them, as recalled by Justice Sabio, was as follows: As soon as he came in, I said: Why did you stab me behind my back? He said, Why, what did I do? I asked him Why is it that you have to resort to that strategy of seeking the opinion of Ed Cruz, in his personal capacity, when we could have discussed the matter with the PJ? I reminded him that we were seated three times near each other on different occasions only recently and he never mentioned to me about the plan to oust me. He said: Perhaps that was my fault. I should have talked to you. I told him, that all the while I thought we were friends. Why did you have to do these things behind my back and not discuss the matter with me face to face? Then he said it just came about due to the urgent motion; that he was afraid Meralco would take action against him for nonfeasance for not doing his job. It was then that I said: Are you aware that I was offered 10M for me to give way to you? I further asked him the following: In the first place, how was the Meralco emissary able to know that there was an impasse between you and me when that was supposed to be an internal matter?

 If you will now insist on assuming the chairmanship after I told you of the 10Million offer, what will I think of you? Are you a Trojan horse? Can you blame me if I think you are part of this whole scheme or shenanigan? Does not the timing alone stink of corruption? After they failed to convince me of their offer, now they will use you to oust me? Is it because they are certain of your loyalty and they are uncertain with mine? And why did they file this stupid urgent motion to assume? In my nine years in this court, I have never seen such an animal as this. This is a cowardly act, and whoever advised this stupid motion is also stupid. Why do you have to dignify such a foolish motion? They should file a motion for me to inhibit or recuse myself. Why is it that Meralco actively participated in the hearing on the 23rd and never raised any question on the alleged irregularity of my having presided over the hearing? Why do you insist on assuming the case? Are you not aware that several days after the issuance of the TRO, respondents filed a motion for inhibition of Justice Vicente Roxas and a motion to lift the TRO. Who then had the right to resolve such motion? Under the circumstances, anong iisipin ko sa yo? Ano ang tingin ko ngayon sa iyo? His feeble answer was: you. He then said he did not know of those pending motions. (Incidentally, these motions were never resolved.) He also said, wala talaga akong interest dito kundi ayaw ko lang ma charge ng non-feasance for failing to do my duty. I answered him: Malayo yung non-feasance. Hindi ito nonfeasance. I taught the subject for many years and this is not one of them.

 So I told him, I have made my decision on the matter. Bahala ka na. Then I stood up to show him to the door. He was silent after that and before he left, he put his arm around me.

For his part, Justice Reyes kept on repeating: Wala talaga ako dito, wala akong interest kung di yun lang hindi ako ma non-feasance. Justice Sabio thought otherwise.

Meanwhile, Justice Roxas brought to the office of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal the final decision on the MERALCO case bearing his signature, which he gave to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal for concurrence/dissent. According to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal, Justice Roxas explained to her the rationale for his conclusion. Justice Roxas went out for a while and returned with an expensive looking travelling bag from where he pulled out the purported final decision. Before the close of office hours, Justice Roxas returned to the chambers of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal to check if he (Justice Roxas) had signed his decision. When she replied that yes, he had signed it, Justice Roxas said he would pick it up the next day.[89]

Justice Dimaranan-Vidal signed the decision notwithstanding that on July 8, 2008 the Court of Appeals had been reorganized because she believed that the Special Ninth Division was still existing on account of its having issued the TRO.[90] She also concurred with the portion of the decision recommending administrative sanctions against the GSIS lawyers because she believed the OSG or the OGCC should have appeared for the GSIS.[91]

Also late that day, Justice Villarama told Justice Sabio that he had advised Justice Reyes to lay off the case and allow Justice Sabio to continue and to resolve the urgent motion for Justice Reyes to assume the chairmanship. Justice Villarama recalled that Justice Reyes repeatedly said: Wala talaga ako dito Jun, Wala akong personal interest dito.

After a careful and judicious study of the more than 56-page decision of Justice Roxas, Justice Dimaranan-Vidal signed it. True to his word, Justice Roxas personally picked up the decision that day purportedly for the action of the Acting Chairman, Justice Sabio, who was then on leave of absence until July 11, 200.[92] Notwithstanding the fact that the parties had not submitted their respective memoranda, Justice Dimaranan-Vidal signed the convincing ponencia,including three copies of the signature page, because Justice Roxas was insistent of the urgency of the signing of the decision due to the impending lapse of the TRO on July 29, 2008.[93] Justice Sabio thought otherwise.[94]

However, Justice Roxas denied that the decision he gave to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal was the final decision. He denied that he gave it to her for her signature. He said it was only for her to read because she asked to read it. He said it was a mere draft as everything was unofficial there was no rollo or logbook with it, it was not placed in an envelope, and it did not have the special seal of Justice Roxas. It allegedly was thrown in the garbage can.

On July 9, 2008, the OSG filed the memorandum for the SEC.

On July 10, 2008, Meralco filed an urgent motion praying that Justice Reyes assume the chairmanship of the Division,[95] alleging the reasons for the urgent motion as follows:
5. At the scheduled oral arguments on 23 June 2008 in the instant case, the parties were first directed to one of the Hearing Rooms of the Court of Appeals. At the said room, the name plate of Justice Reyes was already placed on the table for the justices. Thus, petitioners were of the impression that the leave of absence of Justice Reyes was over and that he would be presiding over the oral arguments as Chairman of the Ninth Division of the Honorable Court.

6. However, when the parties were directed to transfer to another Room of the Court of Appeals for the oral arguments in the instant case, petitioners saw that the name plates on the table for the justices included that of Justice Sabio, Jr., together with that (sic) of Justices Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal. Thereafter, Justice Sabio presided over the oral arguments as Chairman of the Special Ninth Division of the Honorable Court. Petitioners were, thus, of the impression that the regular Chairman of the Ninth Division, Justice Reyes, was still on temporary leave of absence.

7. Subsequently, it has come to the attention of the petitioners that Justice Reyes has already returned from his temporary leave of absence and has resumed his duties as Chairman of the Ninth Division of the Honorable Court.

8. Under the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, Justice Sabio, Jr. should now refrain from acting as the chairman of the Division

hearing the instant case as he is already disqualified from acting as such upon the return of Justice Reyes.

8.1. With due respect, Justice Reyes cannot shirk from his bounden judicial responsibility of performing his duties and functions as Chairman of the Ninth Division of the Honorable Court. 8.2. Specifically, under Section 3 (d), Rule IV of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, a case can remain with the justices who participated therein only when any of the following actions have been taken: (a) giving due course; (b) granting of a writ of preliminary injunction; (c) granting of a new trial; or (d) granting of execution pending appeal: xxx xxx x x x.

9. None of the foregoing instances apply with respect to Justice Sabio, Jr.s continuing hold on the case. Although Justice Sabio, Jr. was one of the Justices who issued the temporary restraining order in favour of the petitioners in the instant case, this circumstance is not among the grounds as above-quoted, when a justice of the Court of Appeals may remain in the Division.

10. As above-quoted, the rule is categorical that it is not the grant of a temporary restraining order but rather the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction that sanctions a justices remaining with the Division. Thus, the continued participation of Justice Sabio, Jr., in the instant case, considering the clear Rules of the Honorable Court, is not only irregular but may lead one to conclude that he is exhibiting undue interest in the instant case.

On this day, Justice Reyes reported back to work after his trip to Australia.[96]

On July 11, 2008, Justice Sabio was on leave when Justice Roxas called him up for a meeting to discuss the case. Justice Sabio told him that he needed ample time to read the memoranda of the parties. Justice Roxas promised to send to Justice Sabio the memoranda immediately.[97]

At 4:00 p.m., Justice Reyes received from the Eighth Division Clerk of Court a copy of Meralcos Urgent Motion for him to assume the chairmanship of the Ninth Division.

On Monday, July 14, 2008 at the flag ceremony, Justice Sabio requested Justice Roxas to meet with him as he had by then read the memoranda of the parties. Justice Roxas initially agreed to the meeting but he later informed Justice Sabio that he had another matter to attend to; neither was he available in the afternoon. Justice Roxas had become scarce. Justice Sabio learned that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal was also looking for Justice Roxas.[98]

Justice Sabio prepared a resolution on the motion for the reconsideration of the TRO and informed Justices Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal that he wanted to discuss it with them. The resolution he prepared never saw light.[99]

At 10 a.m., Justice Roxas, with his messenger, brought the rollo of CA G.R. SP No. 103692 to Justice Reyes, and told the latter that he and Justice Bruselas would be coming over to deliberate on the case. Ten minutes later, the Eighth Division deliberated on the case.[100] After a cursory examination of therollo, Justice Reyes found that the decision had been signed by Justices Roxas and Bruselas but Justice Reyes asked for more time to study the case.[101]

A transcript of the Final Deliberation on July 14, 2008 is attached to page 1926 of Volume III of the rollo of CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 and marked as Exh. 2Roxas on page 279 of the rollo of A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA. According to Justice Roxas, it was he who prepared the transcript from memory to lend credence to the certification of Justice Reyes at the end of the decision pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution.[102] Justice Reyes denied having seen it or having authorized its transcription. Justice Bruselas did not sign any transcript of the deliberation as he was not aware that a transcript was being taken. There was no stenographer present, as only the three of them, Justices Reyes, Roxas, and Bruselas were present at the deliberation. Neither was there a recording machine. Justice Roxas admittedly prepared the transcript from memory.[103]

The statement attributed to Justice Reyes in the transcript that there were previous deliberations were really meetings, which they had twice, in the office of Justice Reyes, according to Justice Roxas.[104]

On July 15, 2008, when she felt that the timing was right, Atty. Silvia Sabio testified that she handed her fathers letter to the Chief Justice through his private secretary, Ms. Jasmin Mateo.[105] A few days later, however, Presiding

Justice Vasquez told Justice Sabio that the Chief Justice would no longer meet with him, as the Presiding Justice had apprised the Chief Justice about the matter.[106]

According to Justice Reyes, at 2:00 p.m. that day, the Office of the Presiding Justice informed him that Justice Sabio was waiting for him in his office. As soon as Justice Reyes was seated, Justice Sabio berated him and accused him of orchestrating matters. Justice Sabio told him that an emissary of MERALCO had offered him P10 million to drop off the case, hence, he asked that if he was offered that much, how much could have been offered to the principals?[107]

On July 17, 2008, Justice Reyes went back to the office of the Presiding Justice and informed him of the episode in the office of Justice Sabio. He also went to ask Justice Villarama for his opinion as to who was the rightful claimant to the chairmanship of the Division that should decide the Meralco case. Justice Villarama allegedly replied that they were both correct.

On July 18, 2008, at the pre-launching meeting for the CA-CMIS, Justice Villarama had a brief chat with Justice Bruselas. The former told the latter that both Justices Sabio and Reyes are correct in the sense that one (1) *of+ them can properly assume chairmanship either under the exception provided in Sec. 2 (d), Rule VI of the 2002 IRCA depending on the final disposition of the prayer for injunctive relief, or pursuant to the general rule enshrined in Sec. 7 (b), Rule VI.[108]

On July 21, 2008, Justice Roxas personally filed with the Presiding Justice[109] an Interpleader Petition[110] praying that Presiding Justice Vasquez decide which division Chairman (Justice Sabios Former Special 9th Division or Justice B. L. Reyes 8th Division) should sign the Preliminary Injunction or Decision.[111] Justice Roxas averred that *t+he impasse between two Chairmen from two Divisions has to be resolved much earlier than July 30, 2008 because July 30, 2008 is the expiration date of the TRO issued by the Special 9th Division (signed by Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., Justice Vicente Q. Roxas [ponente] and Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal). He opined that the two Chairpersons differed in the interpretation of Sections 1 and 2 (d) in relation to Section 5 of Rule VI on Process of Adjudication of the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (IRCA).[112] His stand was that the IRCA should be strictly applied because *w+hen the provisions are clear, there is no room for interpretation.

Justice Roxas endorsed his Interpleader Petition to Justice Reyes for his signature or dissent to the finalized MERALCO Decision, which had been in Justice Reyes possession since July 14, 2008.[113] He also gave the rollo of the case to Justice Reyes.[114]

Presiding Justice Vasquez allegedly told Justice Roxas that as Presiding Justice, he had no authority to rule on the Interpleader Petition, which is not an administrative concern over which the Presiding Justice must intervene. Nevertheless, to avoid further discussion, the Presiding Justice told Justice Roxas that he would study the matter.[115]

On July 22, 2008, Justice Reyes wrote the Presiding Justice a letter on what was discussed between us last 17 July 2008 at around 3:30 p.m.[116]Apparently the Presiding Justice had suggested to endorse the case and have the Special Ninth Division direct the respondents to file their simultaneous comments on the petitioners Urgent Motion (For Honorable BIENVENIDO L. REYES to Assume Chairmanship of the Division in the Instant Case) dated 10 July 2008.

Justice Reyes expressed doubts that the suggestion was most prudent, as the dispute revolves around the correct interpretation of the IRCA. He believed that since the question was purely internal, the CA should not seek enlightenment from the litigants for it would only be construed against its competence. He shared Justice Cruzs and Roxas interpretation of the IRCA. Hence, he urged the Presiding Justice to decide the matter; otherwise, he would interpret the rules according to his best lights and act accordingly.

On July 23, 2008, Presiding Justice Vasquez asked for the rollo of CA G. R. No. SP No. 103692 so he could properly submit the requested opinion. It was then that he came across the unresolved motion praying for the inhibition of Justice Roxas and the pending urgent motion to lift the TRO or to hold its enforcement in abeyance. The Presiding Justice considered the latter as a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution issuing the TRO.[117]

Meanwhile, at noon of that day, as Justice Reyes had not yet received any reaction from the Presiding Justice, he signed the decision as well as the Certification. It was promulgated on the same day.

The decision was promulgated without waiting for the Presiding Justices opinion on whether it was the Eighth or Special Ninth Division that should decide the case. Justice Roxas alleged that he did not expect the Presiding Justice to answer or resolve the matter anyway.

On July 24, 2008, Presiding Justice Vasquez issued his reply to Justice Reyes letter and Justice Roxas Interpleader-Petition. The Presiding Justice claimed having doubts on whether he possessed the authority to decide the subject conflict simply because under the IRCA, the Presiding Justice has control and supervision only over administrative affairs of the Court. The controversy was certainly not an administrative matter but Section 11 of Rule VIII of the IRCA provides that the Presiding Justice has the authority to act on any matter not covered by the Rules although such action should be reported to the Court en banc.

The Presiding Justice expressed in his letter the view that the (Special Ninth) Division that issued the temporary restraining order should continue resolving the injunctive prayer in the petition because it was the Division that issued the Resolution granting the TRO and setting the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, aside from the fact that the parties did not contest the authority of Justice Sabio as Division Chairman at the time, although Justice Reyes had reported back to work. Moreover, the motion for inhibition and the urgent motion to lift the TRO have a bearing on the application of Section 2 of Rule VI of the IRCA, especially because Section 7 (b) of Rule VI[118] points to the retention of the case by the Special Ninth

Division. Furthermore, the new Division headed by Justice Reyes may not be allowed to resolve the pending incidents because two of its members, Justices Reyes and Bruselas did not participate in the hearing on June 23, 2008. He did not believe that Justice Reyes would be charged with dereliction of duty should he not assume the chairmanship. The Presiding Justice ended his letter with the hope that the matter would be laid to rest and that whoever would be dissatisfied with its outcome may elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.

At 2:00 p.m. that day, Justice Sabio informed the Presiding Justice that a decision had been promulgated in the Meralco case the previous day. The Presiding Justice was surprised because Justices Roxas and Reyes had asked him to resolve the impasse on the Division chairmanship. Upon inquiry, the Presiding Justice found that the decision had indeed been promulgated at 4:10 p.m. on July 23, 2008.[119]

It was also on July 24, 2008 that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal received a call from Justice Sabio, informing her that Meralco had offered him a bribe of P10 million in exchange for his voluntary stepping out from the Meralco case in order to give way to Justice B. L. Reyes, and that the decision in the Meralco case had been promulgated by the Eighth Division.[120] Shocked that Justice Roxas did not inform her as a matter of judicial courtesy of the scrapping of the decision which she signed on July 8, 2008, Justice Dimaranan-Vidal wrote a letter to the Presiding Justice dated July 24, 2008,[121] bringing to his attention the apparent and obvious irregularities in the handing of CA-G.R. SP No. 103692, and complaining about Justice Roxas lack of judicial courtesy in discarding for reasons she would not know, his purported final Decision that he had asked her to sign and which she signed after a judicious study of the records

and rollothereof. Justice Roxas gave the lame excuse that he had to incorporate therein some ten pages which he forgot to include in his Decision.

Justice Dimaranan-Vidal expressed surprise and consternation when she learned on even date that a Decision in the case had been promulgated on July 23, 2008 by the Eighth Division chaired by Justice Reyes, with Justices Roxas and Bruselas as members. She said:

My deepest regret is that the undersigned who already signed the supposed final draft of the Decision in the instant case which bears the signature of the ponente, was not even informed by the latter as a judicial courtesy at least, of the hurried easing out of the undersigned from the case. This inevitably posed even to an unprejudiced mind the following questions: under what basis was the case suddenly transferred to the 8th Division and why is it that neither the undersigned nor the Acting Chairman Justice SABIO, of the Special 9th Division not consulted thereof? and, foremost, what happened to the Decision which the undersigned signed after devoting her precious time and effort in carefully and laboriously examining the voluminous records and rollo of the case?

Sad to say the circumstance obtaining herein constitute a flagrant violation of the provision of Canon 5 particularly Sections 2 and 3 thereof of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC).

On July 25, 2008, Justice Bruselas wrote the Presiding Justice a letter,[122] which was prompted by a disturbing telephone call he received from

Justice Sabio in the morning of July 24, 2008. Justice Sabio informed Justice Bruselas that, after the injunction hearing on June 23, 2008, Meralco offered him P10 Million to either favor them or yield the chair to Justice Reyes. Justice Sabio told Justice Bruselas that he had informed the Presiding Justice of the bribery incident and that he was disgusted over the turn of events because he should have remained chair of the Special 9th Division that issued the TRO on the case. Justice Bruselas informed Justice Sabio that it was the first time that he heard of the matter and that he had participated in the deliberation on the case and concurred with the ponencia of Justice Roxas without such information ever being taken up. Justice Sabio told Justice Bruselas that he would not leave the matter as it is because he would bring it up in the open, to media, etc. Justice Sabio asked Justice Bruselas that if P10M was offered to him, how much would have been offered to the others.

Troubled by the information, Justice Bruselas went to the Presiding Justice where Justice Dimaranan-Vidal, who had received the same call from Justice Sabio, joined them. After that meeting with the Presiding Justice, Justice Bruselas called up Justice Reyes who confirmed that he had heard about the bribe offer but that he did not reveal the same to Justice Bruselas as it escaped his mind. The effort of Justice Bruselas to get in touch with Justice Roxas proved futile.

Allegedly prompted by the manner by which the decision x x x was arrived at, and how the decision was promulgated, and that unless an immediate and thorough investigation thereon be undertaken by the Court of Appeals, both the individual and institutional integrity of the justices and of the Court of

Appeals would undoubtedly be tarnished, Justice Sabio wrote on July 26, 2008 a letter[123] to the Presiding Justice, which precipitated the present investigation.

On July 28, 2008, the Philippine Daily Inquirer carried an account of the letter of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal to the Presiding Justice, without her knowing how her confidential letter to the Presiding Justice leaked out.[124]

Before Justice Bruselas delivered his letter to the Presiding Justice, he received a copy of the letter of Justice Sabio and, through a telephone call, reiterated his full agreement with his desired investigation.

The Presiding Justice called the Court of Appeals to an emergency en banc session at 10:00 a.m. on July 31, 2008 at the Session Hall to elicit the reaction of the Court and on the possible effect on the decision rendered. The session was also called in order that the predicament experienced in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 could be deliberated upon by the Committee on Rules with a view to amending the IRCA on the reorganization of the Court of Appeals. The Executive Justices of Cebu and Cagayan de Oro, Justices Antonio L. Villamor and Romulo V. Borja, respectively, were instructed to attend the en banc session to report to the other Justices in their stations what transpired at the session, and to collect the personal reaction, comment or view of the Justices on the matter.[125]

In its closed door en banc session on July 31, 2008, after a torrid discussion of all the issues, the Court of Appeals decided, as follows:

(1) Refer the propriety of the actions of the Justices concerned to the Supreme Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator;

(2) Leave the matter regarding the validity of the decision rendered in the above-entitled case to the parties for them to take whatever legal steps they may deem appropriate in the usual course of procedure; and

(3) Refer the conflict in the interpretation of our Internal Rules to the Committee on Rules of the Court of Appeals in order to prevent the recurrence of a similar situation.[126]

After the en banc session, Justice Dimaranan-Vidal expressed in a letter for the Presiding Justice[127] her strong reaction to the paper of Justice Roxas falsely imputing to her grandstanding before the media or resorting to mediarecourse instead of just filing an administrative complaint before the Supreme Court, and taking exception to the equally outrageous, revolting and baseless accusation that she is allegedly clinging to the case. She asserted that she never leaked a copy of her letter to the Philippine Daily Inquirer, as her letter was only intended to bring to the attention of the Presiding Justice the impropriety done by Justice Roxas in the MERALCO case that resulted in her having been eased out of the case notwithstanding that she carefully and judiciously examined theponencia with more than 50 pages, after devoting her precious time to such study, and affixing her concurrence thereto. Justice Dimaranan-Vidal reiterated her prayer for an investigation of the matter.

Meanwhile, on that day, Mr. De Borja, executed an affidavit admitting that he was the businessman referred to by Justice Sabio, Jr. in his letter to Presiding Justice Vasquez. Mr. De Borja publicly claimed having learned from the news that Justice Sabio was one of the justices in the case arising from the order of the SEC to nullify the proxies issued in favor of the MERALCO management. He also alleged that Justice Sabio told him about the blandishments coming from the government side, that he was being offered a promotion to the Supreme Court and money to favor the GSIS position. Mr. De Borja asked Justice Sabio, Jr., What would it take for you to resist the governments offer? and that the response of Justice Sabio, Jr. was Fifty Million.

Justice Sabio asked permission from the Presiding Justice to hold a press conference the next day on account of the publicized affidavit of Mr. De Borja. The Presiding Justice told Justice Sabio that this is a matter of self-defense on his part, hence, the Presiding Justice cannot stop him from doing so.

Justice Sabio issued a signed statement as an initial response to the affidavit of Mr. De Borja, vehemently denying that Mr. De Borja asked him what it would take for him to inhibit from the case, and that he never asked for money from him.[128]

On August 1, 2008, Justice Sabio called the press conference to read a signed statement entitled My Reaction to Mr. Francis De Borjas Affidavit datedJuly 31, 2008 on the Meralco-SEC Case.

Expressing anger at the filthy lie of Mr. De Borja, Justice Sabio decided to narrate almost word for word his conversations with Mr. De Borja.

In an affidavit dated August 1, 2008, which Evelyn Clavano[129] executed in Davao City, she stated that -

Francis de Borja requested me if I have the cell phone number of Justice Jose L. Sabio Jr. He related that because he was very close to the Lopezes of Meralco, he wanted to call him regarding his possible inhibition in a certain Meralco case, wherein he was designated as a substitute member of the division vice a justice who was temporarily on leave by reason of sickness. He further said that the Lopezes desire that the same Justice, with whom the Lopezes are more comfortable, to sit in the division.

So, I gave Francis de Borja the cell phone number of Justice Jose. L. Sabio, Jr. through business card.

xxx

xxx

x x x.

On August 4, 2008, the Supreme Court constituted the Panel of Investigators to investigate (1) alleged improprieties of the actions of the Justices of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 (Antonio V. Rosete, et al. v. SEC, et al.) and (2) the alleged rejected offer or solicitation of bribe disclosed respectively by Mr. Justice Jose Sabio and Mr. Francis de Borja.

The Panel of Investigators held hearings from August 8 to 23, 2008. Affidavits were submitted to the Panel to serve as the parties direct testimonies upon which they were cross-examined by the Panel and the other parties.

On September 4, 2008, the Panel of Investigators submitted its Report of even date to the Court en banc.

According to the Report, the investigation has revealed irregularities and improprieties committed by the Court of Appeals Justices in connection with the MERALCO case, CA-G.R. SP No. 103692, which are detrimental to the proper administration of justice and damaging to the institutional integrity, independence and public respect for the Judiciary.[130]

Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas

Justice Roxas inexcusably failed to act on a number of motions of the parties prior to the promulgation of the Decision.

As found by the Panel of Investigators, several motions were not resolved or acted upon by Justice Roxas. These were enumerated in the Report as follows:

(a)

The Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Defer Action on any Incident of the Petition Pending Resolution of Re-Raffle filed by GSIS on May 29, 2008 soon after this case was filed on that date (Rollo, pp. 185-186).

b)

GSIS Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Inhibit Justice Roxas, which was filed on May 30, 2008. As the motion raised a prejudicial question, Justice Roxas should have resolved it before issuing the TRO sought by Meralco, but he never did (Rollo, pp. 220223). GSIS Motion to Lift TRO which was filed on May 30, 2008 (Rollo, pp. 187-210) GSIS Motion filed on June 18, 2008, praying that it be allowed to use Power point at the hearing on June 23, 2008 . On June 20, 2008, the SEC filed a similar motion. Both motions were not acted upon by Justice Roxas (Rollo, pp. 593-621,) Meralcos Motion for Extension of Time to file their Consolidated Memorandum of Authorities and Reply to Repondent SECs Comment filed on June 25, 2008 (Rollo, pp. 981- 987).

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

Meralcos Urgent Motion for Honorable Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes to Assume Chairmanship of the Division in the Instant Case, which was filed on July 10, 2008 (Rollo, pp. 12621274).[131] (emphasis supplied)

We agree with the Panel of Investigators that by ignoring or refusing to act on the motion for his inhibition, Justice Roxas violated Rule V, Section 3, third paragraph of the IRCA, which provides that he should resolve such motion in writing with copies furnished the other members of the Division, the Presiding Justice, the Raffle Committee, and the Division Clerk of Court. The pertinent portion of the said provision states:
Sec. 3. Motion to Inhibit a Division or a Justice. x x x xxx A motion for voluntary inhibition of a Justice shall be acted upon by him alone in writing, copy furnished the other members of the Division, the Presiding Justice, the Raffle Committee and the Division Clerk of Court.

This Court cannot agree with Justice Roxas proposition that the issuance of the TRO constitutes an implied denial of the motion to inhibit since under IRCA the obligation of the Justice to act on such a motion is mandatory.

Furthermore, the Court finds well-taken the Panels finding that Justice Roxas failure to act on the other motions of the parties violated Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct (which applies in a suppletory manner to the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary) providing that:

Rule 3.05. A judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.

Even Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that *j+udges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness. Thus, it has become well-settled in jurisprudence that even just undue delay in the resolving pending motions or incidents within the reglamentary period fixed by law is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency.[132] With more reason, this Court finds suspicious and reprehensible the failure of Justice Roxas to act at all on pending motions and incidents in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692.

This is in fact not the first time that Justice Roxas has been cited administratively for failure to resolve pending incidents in cases assigned to him. In Orocio v. Roxas, A.M. Nos. 07-115-CA-J and CA-08-46-J, this Court imposed a P15,000 fine on Justice Roxas for unwarranted delay in resolving two motions for reconsideration in another case and sternly warned him that future commission any act of impropriety will be dealt with more severely.

Justice Roxas is guilty of gross dishonesty.

Apart from Justice Roxas inexcusable inaction on pending incidents in the Meralco case, the Panel of Investigators found that he had been dishonest and untruthful in relation to the said case. The Court adopts the following findings of the Panel:

2. Justice Roxas was dishonest and untruthful.

(a) Justice Roxas admitted that the Transcript of Final Decision, which is supposed to be a transcript of the deliberation on July 14, 2008 of the Eighth Division on the final decision in the Meralco case was not a true transcript of the minutes of the meeting, but purely a transcript from memory because no notes were taken, no stenographer was present, and no tape recorder was used. It was in fact a drama which he composed from my recollection to comply with Sec. 9, Rule VI of the IRCA which requires that minutes of the meeting, i.e., deliberation, shall be kept. The so-called transcript is a fabrication designed to deceive that there had been compliance when actually there was none -- with the prerequisite of the IRCA that consultation and/or deliberation among the members of the Division must precede the drafting of a decision.

(b) The statement in the transcript that it was a recap from our previous deliberations was another falsehood because there had been no previous deliberations.

(c) The reference in the transcript to a Final Report of Justice Roxas was also false for Justice Roxas admittedly did not submit a report as ponente, as required by Sec. 9, Rule VI of the IRCA, for deliberation by the Eighth Division on July 14, 2008. The Final Report which he submitted was admittedly the decision itself which he and Justice Bruselas, Jr. had already signed. The Final Report was merely the title of the page that served as the cover of the decision. Hence, Justice B.L. Reyes supposed closing statement in the transcript that -We have covered every angle of the Final Report of Justice Roxas extensively is also false. Justice B.L. Reyes testified at the investigation that he had not seen the transcript until the copy in the rollo was

shown to him by Justice Callejo, Sr. during his cross-examination of Justice B. L. Reyes on August 26, 2008.

xxx

xxx

xxx

(e) Justice Roxas testimony that when he brought the Meralco decision to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal on July 8, 2008, it was only a draft for her to read, because she asked if she may read it, not for her to sign it, is completely false. This testimony was labelled by Justice Dimaranan-Vidal as a lie, and she called Justice Roxas a liar, because she did not ask to borrow the decision for her reading pleasure, but Justice Roxas personally brought it to her office for her to sign as a member of the Special Ninth Division. After poring over it the whole night, she signed it, as well as three (3) additional signature pages which were to be attached to three (3) other copies of the decision.[133]

xxx

xxx

xxx

Indeed, the fabrications and falsehoods that Justice Roxas blithely proferred to the Panel in explanation/justification of his questioned handling of the Meralco case demonstrated that he lacks the qualification of integrity and honesty expected of a magistrate and a member of the appellate court. Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, dishonesty is considered a serious offense that may warrant the penalty of dismissal from the service. Under the Rule IV, Section 52 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty is likewise considered a grave offense and warrants the penalty of

dismissal even for the first offense. In the past, the Court has had the occasion to rule that: dishonesty and falsification are considered grave offenses warranting the penalty of dismissal from service upon the commission of the first offense. On numerous occasions, the Court did not hesitate to impose such extreme punishment on employees found guilty of these offenses. Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the government service. Dishonesty has no place in the judiciary.[134] Justice Roxas showed a lack of courtesy and respect for his colleagues in the Court of Appeals.

The Panel of Investigators reported on this matter in this wise:

xxx xxx xxx

(f) Justice Roxas was thoughtlessly disrespectful to a colleague and a lady at that, when he unceremoniously discarded, shredded, and burned the decision that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal had signed, because he allegedly forgot that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal and Justice Sabio, Jr. had already been reorganized out of the Special Ninth Division as of July 4, 2008, hence, out of the Meralco case. Out of courtesy, he should have explained to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal the reason why he was not promulgating the decision which she had signed.

The truth, it seems, is that Justice Roxas, who had consulted Justice Villarama, Jr. on which Division should decide the Meralco case, may have been convinced that it should be the Special Ninth Division. That is why he brought his decision to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal for her signature. However, somehow, somewhere, during the night, while Justice Dimaranan-Vidal was patiently poring over his decision, Justice Roxas was persuaded to bring his decision to the Eighth Division (to which he and Justice B.L. Reyes belong after the July 4, 2008 reorganization of the Court), it may have dawned on him that if the case remained in the Special Ninth Division, Justice Sabio, Jr. might dissent, requiring the Presiding Justice to constitute a special division of five. If he (Justice Roxas) should fail to obtain a majority of the Division on his side, he would lose his ponencia; someone else would become the ponente (perhaps Justice Sabio, Jr.). That may be the reason why he junked Justices Sabio, Jr. and Dimaranan-Vidal (even if the latter concurred with his decision) because he was unsure of Justice Sabio, Jr. He chose to cast his lot with his companions in the Eighth Division -Justices B. L. Reyes and Bruselas, Jr. -- with whom he and Meralco were comfortable.

(g) J. Roxas was disrespectful to Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. whose ruling on his Interpleader Petition he sought on July 21, 2008, but he promulgated the Meralco decision two (2) days later, on July 23, 2008, without waiting for Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr.s ruling which came out on July 24, 2008, only three (3) days after the Interpleader Petition was filed by him, and two (2) days after Justice B.L. Reyes also reiterated in writing his request for Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. to resolve the same chairmanship issue raised in the Interpleader. Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. was embarrassed and humiliated by Justices B.L. Reyes and Roxas lack of courtesy and respect for his position as head of the Court.

xxx

xxx

xxx

There is an old adage which says to gain respect one must learn to give it. If judges and justices are expected to treat litigants, counsels and subordinates with respect and fairness, with more reason, that judges and justices should give their fellow magistrates the courtesy and professional regard due to them as their colleagues in the Judiciary. Thus, in Canon 5, Section 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are expected to carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.

This Court cannot view lightly the discourteous manner that Justice Roxas, in his apparent haste to promulgate his decision in the Meralco case, treated his colleagues in the Court of Appeals. It behooves the Court to remind all magistrates that their high office demands compliance with the most exacting standards of propriety and decorum.

Justice Roxas questionable handling of the Meralco case demonstrates his undue interest therein.

In the Report, the Panel of Investigators observed that Justice Roxas in fact began drafting his decision even prior to the submission of the parties memoranda. As discussed in the Report:

xxx

xxx

xxx

(d) Although the parties were given 15 days after the hearing on June 23, 2008, or up to July 8, 2008, to simultaneously submit their memoranda and memoranda of authorities, and actually submitted: On July 7, 2008 GSISs 39 page- memorandum On July 9, 2008 SECs 62 page-memorandum On July 10, 2008 MERALCOs 555 page- memorandum (by messenger) with memorandum of authorities

Justice Roxas prepared the decision before the parties had filed their memoranda in the case and submitted it to Justice DimarananVidal for her signature on July 8, 2008. His rush to judgment was indicative of undue interest and unseemly haste, according to J.Romero.

He cheated the parties counsel of the time, effort, and energy that they invested in the preparation of their ponderous memoranda which, as it turned out, neither he nor the other members of the Eighth Division bothered to read before signing his decision. He made a mockery of his own order for the parties to submit memoranda, and rendered their compliance a futile exercise. xxx xxx xxx

(underscoring supplied)

We agree with Mme. Justice Romeros observation that the rush to judgment (even before the filing of the parties memoranda) was indicative of Justice Roxas undue interest and unseemly haste, especially when taken together with other circumstances. This inexplicable haste in resolving the case on the merits is likewise apparent in Justice Roxas failure to resolve the several pending incidents and instead jumping ahead to deciding the case on the merits; his rushing of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal into signing his draft Decision on July 8, 2008 when the parties memoranda have not yet all been filed with the CA; his precipitate transfer of the case to the Eighth Division for promulgation of decision, without notice to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal of the Special Ninth Division who had already signed his draft Decision and despite the unresolved Chairmanship dispute between Justice Reyes and Justice Sabio which he (Justice Roxas) even submitted to the Presiding Justice for appropriate action, just a few days before the promulgation.

We reiterate here that as the visible representation of the law and justice, judges are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that would enhance respect and confidence of the people in the judicial system. The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality; but they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. This standard applies not only to the decision itself, but also to the process by which the decision is made.[135] This Court will not hesitate to sanction with the highest penalty magistrates who exhibit manifest undue interest in their assigned cases.[136]

In sum, this Court finds that Justice Roxas multiple violations of the canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct constitute grave misconduct, compounded by dishonesty, undue interest and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, which warrant his DISMISSAL from the service.

Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr.

In the Report, the Panel found that Justice Sabio likewise committed improprieties in relation to the Meralco case.

The circumstances of the telephone call of Chairman Sabio to his brother Justice Sabio showed that Justice Sabio failed to uphold the standard of independence and propriety expected of him as a magistrate of the appellate court.

In his testimony before the Panel, Chairman Sabio admits that he called up Justice Sabio on May 30, 2008 from Davao City, in response to a resquest for help from a member of the Board of Trustees of Meralco. Notwithstanding the fact that Chairman Sabio called to relay to Justice Sabio the rightness of the GSIS cause and asked him to help GSIS and that Justice Sabio allegedly told his brother that he would act in accordance with his conscience, the same still

constituted a violation of Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for lawyers, which provides that:
A lawyer shall x x x refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the Court.

As they were both members of the Bar, it is incomprehensible to this Court how the brothers can justify their improper conversation regarding the Meralco case. As the Panel observed in its Report:

Ironically, both of them found nothing wrong with brother Camilos effort to influence his younger brothers action in the Meralco case, because both believe that our Filipino culture allows brother-tobrother conversation, even if the purpose of one is to influence the other, provided the latter does not agree to do something illegal.[137]

For the Panel, Justice Sabio violated Sections 1, 4, and 5, Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which provide that
Sec. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently x x x free from extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Sec. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others,

nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.

Sec. 5. Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influence by, the executive and legislative branches of government, but must also appear to be free therefrom to a reasonable observer.

In the Investigators mind, although Justice Sabio signed the TRO in favour of Meralco contrary to his brothers advice, Justice Sabios unusual interest in holding on to the Meralco case, seemed to indicate that he may have been actually influenced by his brother to help GSIS. In arriving at this conclusion, the Panel noted the following circumstances: (1) Justice Sabio adamantly refused to yield the chairmanship of the Special Ninth Division although the regular chairman, Justice Reyes had returned to duty on June 10, 2008; and, (2) Justice Sabio officiously prepared and signed a resolution (a chore for the ponente Justice V. Roxas to perform), requiring the GSIS and the SEC to comment on Meralcos Motion for Justice B. Reyes to Assume the Chairmanship of the 9th Division, which he probably intended to delay the decision on the preliminary injunction beyond the life of the TRO to the prejudice of Meralco and the advantage of the GSIS.

Based on the facts on record, the Court is wary of declaring that Justice Sabio had been influenced by his brother by speculating that he would have favored GSIS had he been a part of the division which rendered the decision in the

Meralco case. However, we do find that it was improper for Justice Sabio to hold on to the chairmanship of the Ninth Division the despite the return of Justice Reyes, when Justice Sabios designation as acting chairman was clearly only for the duration of Justice Reyes leave of absence. We likewise note with disfavor his stubborn insistence on his own interpretation of the IRCA and hostile, dismissive attitude towards equally well-reasoned positions of his colleagues on the proper interpretation of their rules. Such conduct on the part of Justice Sabio did nothing to aid in the swift and amicable resolution of his dispute with Justice Reyes but rather fanned the flames of resentment between them. We deem this sort of behavior unbecoming for a magistrate of his stature.

Justice Sabios conversations with Mr. De Borja were improper and indiscreet.

On this matter, the Court accepts the following findings in the Report:

Knowing the nature of De Borjas profession, Justice Sabio, Jr. should have been wary of the former. He should have foreseen that De Borja had the Meralco case on his mind when he called Justice Sabio, Jr. True enough, De Borja mentioned the Meralco case and congratulated Justice Sabio, Jr. for having signed the TRO in favour of Meralco.

But that was not the last time Justice Sabio, Jr. would hear from De Borja. A month later, after Justice Sabio, Jr. had presided at the hearing of Meralcos prayer for preliminary injunction on June 23, 2008, and the case was ripening for decision or resolution, De Borja again

called up Justice Sabio, Jr. and asked to meet him over dinner to chit chat about the Meralco case.

Instead of telling off De Borja that he could not, and would not, talk about the Meralco case, Justice Sabio, Jr. agreed to meet De Borja in the lobby-lounge of the Ateneo Law School after his evening class in Legal Ethics in said school.

Justice Sabio Jr.s action of discussing the Meralco case with De Borja was highly inappropriate and indiscreet. First, in talks with his brother; the second time in conversation with De Borja, Justice Sabio, Jr. broke the shield of confidentiality that covers the disposition of cases in the Court in order to preserve and protect the integrity and independence of the Court itself. He ignored the injunction in Canon 1, Section 8 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary that: Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct (and discretion) in order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence.

It was during that meeting with De Borja in the lobby-lounge of the Ateneo Law School, that De Borja allegedly offered him P10 million, in behalf of Meralco, to step out of the case and allow Justice Bienvenido Reyes to assume the chairmanship of the Special Ninth Division because Meralco was not comfortable with him (Justice Sabio, Jr.). He rejected the bribe offer because he could not in conscience accept it.

Justice Sabio, Jr. was allegedly shocked and insulted that De Borja would think that he (Justice Sabio, Jr.) could be bribed or bought. The

Panel is, however, honestly perplexed why in spite of his outraged respectability, Justice Sabio, Jr. called up De Borja two (2) days later (on July 3, 2008), to tell De Borja to stop pestering him with his calls. The Panel is nonplussed because, normally, a person who has been insulted would never want to see, much less speak again, to the person who had disrespected him. He could have just shut off his cell phone to De Borjas calls. De Borja denied that he reiterated his offer of P10 million to Justice Sabio, Jr. He denied saying that even if the case should go up to the Supreme Court, GSIS would still lose, hence, saying lang yung P10 million; baka sisihin ka pa ng mga anak mo. He testified that his reply to Justice Sabio, Jr.s call was deadma or indifference. Justice Sabio, Jr. blamed that call of his to a lapse in judgment on his part.

Be that as it may, the Investigating Panel finds more credible Justice Sabio, Jr.s story about De Borjas P10 million-bribe-offer on behalf of Meralco, than De Borjas denial that he made such an offer. Why does the Panel believe him, and not De Borja?

First, because Justice Sabio, Jr. verbally reported the rejected bribe offer to CA Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. the next day a fact admitted by Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr.

Second, even though Justice Sabio, Jr. did not mention the bribeofferors name in both his verbal and written reports to Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr., De Borja identified himself to the media as the person alluded to.

Third, De Borjas allegation, that Justice Sabio, Jr. wanted P50 million, not P10 million, is not believable, for, if Justice Sabio, Jr. quoted P50 million as his price, he would not have reported the P10 million

bribe offer to Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. He would have waited for Meralcos reply to his counter-offer.[138] xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, the Court agrees with the Panel that the allegation of solicitation on the part of Justice Sabio is not credible. Nevertheless, the continued communications between Justice Sabio and Mr. De Borja even after the latters rejected bribery attempt is highly inappropriate and shows poor judgment on the part of Justice Sabio who should have acted in preservation of the dignity of his judicial office and the institution to which he belongs.

Premises considered, this Court is of the view that Justice Sabios indiscreet and imprudent conversations regarding the Meralco case with his brother and Mr. De Borja and his actuations in the chairmanship dispute with Justice Reyes constitute simple misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a justice of the Court of Appeals which warrant the penalty of two (2) months suspension without pay.

Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes.

As previously discussed, Justice Reyes appealed to Presiding Justice Vazquez in a letter dated July 22, 2008, reiterating his (Justice Reyes) request that the Presiding Justice render an opinion which Division of the Court of Appeals the Eighth Division with him as chairman, or the Special Ninth Division chaired by Justice Sabio should resolve the Meralco case. This was in conjunction with an

Interpleader filed by Justice Roxas on the same issue with the Presiding Justice. Yet, despite the fact that the Presiding Justice informed Justices Reyes and Roxas that he would study the matter, Justices Reyes and Justice Roxas, together with Justice Bruselas, promulgated the decision in the Meralco case on July 23, 2008. Justice Reyes and Justice Roxas did not withdraw their request for a ruling nor did either of them advise the Presiding Justice beforehand of their intention to proceed with the resolution of the Meralco case. Thus, when the Presiding Justice issued his ruling on the chairmanship dispute on July 24, 2008, he was unaware of the promulgation of the Meralco decision on July 23, 2008, under the aegis of Justice Reyes Eighth Division. As found by the Panel, Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. was completely taken aback when he learned about it on July 24, 2008, the same day that he issued his opinion on the chairmanship issue which by then had become functus oficio. He felt belittled and humiliated by the discourtesy of the two justices to him.

It bears repeating here that under Canon 5, Section 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are mandated to show the appropriate consideration and respect for their colleagues in the Judiciary.

Thus, we adopt the finding of the Panel on this point and find Justice Reyes guilty of simple misconduct, which is mitigated by the fact that he repeatedly asked Presiding Justice Vasquez to act on his request to rule on the conflicting interpretation of the IRCA. However, Justice Reyes should be reprimanded for taking part in the decision of the subject case without awaiting the ruling of the Presiding Justice.

Findings regarding the conduct of Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal

The Court finds well-taken and adopts the findings of the Panel of Investigators, to wit:

Justice Dimaranan-Vidal deviated from the IRCA when she allowed herself to be rushed by Justice Roxas to sign the Meralco decision on July 8, 2008, without reading the parties memoranda and without the deliberation among members of the Division required by the IRCA. She knew that the TRO would not expire until July 30, 2008 some three (3) weeks away from July 8, 2008 yet she allowed herself to believe Justice Roxas misrepresentation that signing the decision was urgent. Her compliance with certain dissembling practices of other justices of the Court, in violation of the IRCA, showed weakness and lack of independence on her part.[139]

The following sections of Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct are instructive in this regard:

SEC. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free of any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.

SEC. 2. In performing judicial duties, judges shall be independent from judicial colleagues in respect of decisions which the judge is obliged to make independently.

Allowing a fellow justice to induce her to deviate from established procedure constitutes conduct unbecoming a justice for which Justice DimarananVidal should be ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of her judicial duties.

Findings regarding the conduct of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez

It is the view of the Panel of Investigators that Presiding Justice Vasquez failed to provide the leadership expected of him as head of the Court of Appeals. The following quote from the Report summarizes the perceived lapses on the part of the Presiding Justice:

Clearly, Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. had been indecisive in dealing with the turmoil arising from the Meralco case. He vacillated andtemporized on resolving the impasse between Justice Sabio, Jr. and Justice B. L. Reyes over the chairmanship of the Division that should hear and decide the Meralco case. He failed to take action on the reported bribe-offer by Meralco to J. Sabio, Jr. He hesitated to assert his leadership of the Court even when the parties repeatedly urged him to lay down the rule for them to follow. Was he hampered by the fact that he has relatives two daughters employed in the GSIS, and a sister who is a consultant thereof? He pleaded lack of authority. Was he not aware then, or did he discover

too late, that under Section 11, Rule VIII of the IRCA, he is in fact authorized to act on any matter involving the Court and its members? That Rule provides:

Sec. 11. x xx the Presiding Justice or any one acting in his place is authorized to act on any matter not covered by these Rules. Such action shall, however, be reported to the Court en banc.

He should have convened the Court en banc as soon as the alleged bribery attempt on Justice Sabio, Jr. was reported to him, for it was an attempt to corrupt a member of the Court, calling for the protection and preservation of the integrity of the judicial processes of the Court, hence, an administrative matter cognizable by the Court en banc. Section 5 (c), Rule I of the IRCA, provides:

Sec. 5. Matters cognizable by the Court en banc.- The Court en banc shall, inter alia: (a) xxx

(b) Adopt uniform administrative measures, procedures, and policies for the protection and preservation of the integrity of the judicial processes, x x x.

Presiding Justice Vasquez admitted his lapses in judgment.[140]

In the light of the foregoing observations of the Panel, this Court is of the view that much of the trouble now being faced by the Court of Appeals could have been averted by timely, judicious and decisive action on the part of the Presiding Justice. Certainly, this unpleasant and trying episode in failure to act in the early part of his tenure as Presiding Justice has indelibly impressed upon him what is required of him as leader of the second highest court in the land. Nevertheless, Presiding Justice Vasquez is hereby severely reprimanded for his failure to act promptly and decisively on the controversy as required of him by the IRCA.

Findings regarding other personalities involved in the Meralco case

Although the Presiding Justice in his letter dated August 1, 2008 only referred to this Court the propriety of the actions of the Justices concerned in the Meralco case, we cannot simply turn a blind eye to the facts brought to light during the investigation that relate to potential liabilities of other personalities in the Meralco case.

With respect to Chairman Sabio, this Court has the power to discipline members of the Bar and his attempt to influence a member of the Judiciary, his brother at that, should be referred to the Bar Confidant for appropriate action.

With respect to Mr. De Borja, the present investigation has given this Court reason to believe that Mr. De Borja may be criminally liable for his attempt to bribe a magistrate of the Court of Appeals. This matter should be referred to the Department of Justice for appropriate action.

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, this per curiam decision was reached after deliberation of the Court en banc. At the outset, the offer of three (3) members of the Court to recuse themselves was denied by the Court. Except for two members of the Court who were allowed to inhibit themselves from the case, the Justices voted as follows: Twelve Justices voted for the dismissal from service of Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas and one (1) voted for his suspension from the service for six (6) months. Ten (10) Justices voted for two (2) month suspension from service without pay of Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, one (1) voted for six-month suspension, one (1) for reprimand only as he should be credited for being a whistle blower and one (1) for his dismissal from the service. Eight (8) Justices voted to reprimand Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes and five (5) for his suspension from the service for one (1) month. As to the rest, the voting was unanimous.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES as follows:

(1) Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas is found guilty of multiple violations of the canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct, grave misconduct, dishonesty, undue interest and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and is DISMISSED from the service, with FORFEITURE of all benefits, except accrued

leave credits if any, with prejudice to his re-employment in any branch or service of the government including government-owned and controlled corporations;

(2) Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. is found guilty of simple misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a justice of the Court of Appeals and is SUSPENDED for two (2) months without pay, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty;

(3) Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. is SEVERELY REPRIMANDED for his failure to act promptly and decisively in order to avert the incidents that damaged the image of the Court of Appeals, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty;

(4) Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes is found guilty of simple misconduct with mitigating circumstance and is REPRIMANDED, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty;

(5) Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal is found guilty of conduct unbecoming a Justice of the Court of Appeals and is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the discharge of her judicial duties.

(6) PCGG Chairman Camilo L. Sabios act to influence the judgment of a member of the Judiciary in a pending case is hereby referred to the Bar Confidant for appropriate action;

(7) Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr.s charge against Mr. Francis R. De Borja for attempted bribery of a member of the Judiciary is hereby referred to the Department of Justice for appropriate action.

This Decision shall take effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC DECISION October 18, 1957 G.R. No. L-8974 APOLONIO CABANSAG, plaintiff, vs. GEMINIANA MARIA FERNANDEZ, ET AL., defendants. APOLONIO CABANSAG, ROBERTO V. MERRERA and RUFINO V. MERRERA, respondentsappellants. Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Assistant Solicitor General Jose G. Bautista and Solicitor Troadio T. Quiazon, Jr., appellee. , J.: This is a contempt proceeding which arose in Civil Case No. 9564 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan wherein Apolonio Cabansag and his lawyers Roberto V. Merrera were found guilty and sentenced the first to pay a fine of P20 and the last two P50 each with the warning that a repetition of the of offense will next time be heavily dealt with. Apolonio Cabansag filed on January 13, 1947 in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a complaint seeking the ejectment of Geminiana Fernandez, et al. from a parcel of land. Defendants filed their answer on January 31, 1947 and a motion to dismiss on February 2, 1947 and a motion of plaintiffs counsel, set the case for hearing on July 30, 1947. The meeting was postponed to August 8, 1947. On that day only one witness testified and the case was postponed to August 25, 1947. Thereafter, three incidents developed, namely: one regarding a claim for damages which was answered by defendants, another concerning the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction which was set for on March 23, 1948, and the third relative to an alleged contempt for violation of an agreement of the parties approved by the court. Pleadings were filed by the parties on these incidents and the court set the case for hearing on October 27, 1948. Hearing was postponed to December 10, 1948. On this date, only part of the evidence was received and the next hearing was scheduled for January 24,1949 when again only a part of the evidence was received and the case was continued to October 4, 1949. On October 4, 1949, the court, presided over by Judge Villamor upon petition of both parties, ordered the stenographers who took down the notes during the

previous hearings to transcribe them within 15 days upon payment of their fees, and the hearing was postponed until the transcript of said notes had been submitted. Notwithstanding the failure of the stenographers to transcribe their notes, the hearing was set for March 17, 1950. Two more postponements followed for March 23, 1950 and March 27, 1950. On August 9, 1950, August 23, 1950, September 26, 1950 and November 29, 1950, hearings were had but the case was only partly tried to be postponed again to January 30, 1951 and February 19, 1951. Partial hearings were held on February 20, 1951, March 12, 1951 and June 6,1951. These hearings were followed by three more postponements and on August 15, 1951, the case was partially heard. After this partial hearing, the trial was continued on March 6, 1952 only to be postponed to May 27, 1952. No hearing took place on said date and the case was set for continuation on December 9, 1952 when the court, Judge Pasicolan presiding, issued an order suggesting to the parties to arrange with the stenographers who took down the notes to transcribe their respective notes and that the case would be set for hearing after the submission of the transcript. From December 9, 1952 to August 12, 1954, no further step was taken either by the court or any of the contending parties in the case. . On December 30, 1953, President Magsaysay assumed office, he issued Executive Order No. I creating the Presidential Complaints and Action Commission (PCAC), which was later superseded by Executive Order 19 promulgated on March 17, 1954. And on August 12, 1954 Apolonio Cabansag, apparently irked and disappointed by the delay in the disposition of his case, wrote the PCAC, a letter copy which he furnished the Secretary of Justice and the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which reads: We, poor people of the Philippines are very grateful for the creation of your Office. Unlike in the old days, poor people are not heard, but now the PCAC is the sword of Damocles ready to smite bureaucratic aristocracy. Poor people can now rely on PCAC to help them. Undaunted, the undersigned begs to request the help of the PCAC in the interest of public service, as President Magsaysay has in mind to create the said PACC, to have his old case stated above be terminated once and for all. The undersigned has long since been deprived of his land thru the careful maneuvers of a tactical lawyer. The said case which had long been pending could not be decided due to the fact that the transcript of the records has not, as yet, been transcribed by the stenographers who took the stenographic notes. The new Judges could not proceed to hear the case before the transcription of the said notes. The stenographers who took the notes are now assigned in another courts. It seems that the undersigned will be deprived indefinitely of his right of possession over the land he owns. He has no

other recourse than to ask the help of the ever willing PCAC to help him solve his predicament at an early date. Now then, Mr. Chief, the undersigned relies on you to do your utmost best to bring justice to its final destination. My confidence reposes in you. Thanks. Most confidently yours, (Sgd.) APOLONIO CABANSAG Plaintiff</TD> </TR> Upon the receipt of the letter, the Secretary of Justice indorsed it to the Clerk of Court of First Instance of Pangasinan instructing him to require the stenographers concerned to transcribe their notes in Civil Case No. 9564. The clerk of court, upon receipt of this instruction on August 27, 1954, referred the matter to Judge Jesus P. Morfe before whom the case was then informing him that the two stenographers concerned, Miss Iluminada Abello and Juan Gaspar, have already been assigned elsewhere. On the same date, Judge Morfe wrote the Secretary of Justice informing him that under provisions of Act No. 2383 and Section 12 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, said stenographers are not obliged to transcribe their notes except in cases of appeal and that since the parties are not poor litigants, they are not entitled to transcription free of charge, aside from the fact that said stenographers were no longer under his jurisdiction. Meanwhile, on September 1, 1954, Atty. Manuel Fernandez, counsel for defendants, filed a motion before Judge Morfe praying that Apolonio Cabansag be declared in contempt of court for an alleged scurrilous remark he made in his letter to the PCAC to the effect that he, Cabansag, has long been deprived of his land thru the careful maneuvers of a tactical lawyer, to which counsel for Cabansag replied with a counter-charge praying that Atty. Fernandez be in turn declared in contempt because of certain contemptuous remarks made by him in his pleading. Acting on these charges and counter- charges, on September 14, 1954, Judge Morfe dismissed both charges but ordered Cabansag to show cause in writing within 10 days why he should not be held liable for contempt for sending the above letter to the PCAC which tended to degrade the court in the eyes of the President and the people. Cabansag filed his answer stating that he did not have the idea to besmirch the dignity or belittle the respect due the court nor was he actuated with malice when he addressed the letter to the PCAC; that there is no single contemptuous word in said letter nor was it intended to give the Chief Executive a wrong impression or opinion of the court; and that if there was any inefficiency in the

disposal of his case, the same was committed by the judges who previously intervened in the case. In connection with this answer, the lawyers of Cabansag, Roberto V. Merrera and Rufino V. Merrera also submitted a written manifestation stating that the sending of the letter to their client to the PCAC was through their knowledge and consent because they believed that there was nothing wrong in doing so. And it appearing that said attorneys had a hand in the writing and remittance of the letter to the PCAC, Judge Morfe on, on September 29, 1954, issued another order requiring also said attorneys to show cause why they should not likewise be held for contempt for having committed acts which tend to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice. Anent the charge for contempt preferred by Judge Morfe against Apolonio Cabansag, several incidents took place touching on the right of the Special Counsel of the Department of Justice to appear as counsel for Cabansag, which were however settled when the court allowed said Special Counsel to appear as amicus curiae in his official capacity. In addition to this Special Counsel, other members of the local bar were likewise allowed to appear for respondents in view of the importance of the issues involved. After due hearing, where the counsel of respondents were allowed to argue and submit memoranda, the decision finding respondents guilty of contempt and sentencing them to pay a fine as stated in the early part of this decision. Respondents in due time appealed to this Court. The issues involved in this appeal appear well stated in the decision of the trial Court. They are: (a) Did the writing in the letter in question to the PCAC tend directly or indirectly to put the lower court into disrepute or belittle, degrade or embarrass it in its administration of justice?; and (b) Did writing of said letter tend to draw the intervention of the PCAC in the instant case which will have the effect of undermining the courts judicial independence? We agree that the trial court that courts have the power to preserve their integrity and maintain their dignity without which their administration of justice is bound to falter or fail (Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778; Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil. 322). This is the preservative power to punish for contempt (Rule 64, Rules of Court; Villavicencio vs. Lukban, supra). This power is inherent in all courts and essential to their right of self-preservation (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil. 271). In order that it may conduct its business unhampered by publications which tends to impair the impartiality of its decisions or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice, the court will not hesitate to exercise it regardless of who is affected. For, as important as is the maintenance of unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizen is the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary (In re Lozano and Quevedo, 54 Phil. 801).The reason for this is that

respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such said institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724). The question that now arises is: Has the lower court legitimately and justifiably exercised this power in the instant case? The lower court tells us that it has because in its opinion the act of respondents to put it belittle or degrade or embarrass it in its administration of justice, and so it punished them for contempt to protect its judicial independence. But appellants believe otherwise, for they contend that in sending the letter in question to the PCAC, they did nothing but to exercise their right to petition the government for redress of their grievance as guaranteed by our constitution (section 1, paragraph 8, Article III). The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances. The First Amendments of the Federal expressly guarantees that right against abridgement by Congress. But mention does not argue exclusion elsewhere. For the right is one that cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and political institutions,- principles which the Fourteenth Amendment embodies in the general terms of its due process clause. (Emerson and Haber, Political and Civil Rights in the United States, p. 419.). We are therefore confronted with a clash of two fundamental rights which lie at the bottom of our democratic institutions-the independence of the judiciary the right to petition the government for redress of grievance. How to balance and reconcile the exercise of these rights is the problem posed in the case before us. . . . A free press is not to be judiciary, nor an independent judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other; both are indispensable to a free society. The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary through which that freedom may, if necessary, be vindicated. And one of the potent means of assuring judges their independence is a free press. (Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Pennekamp vs. Florida, 328 U.S. 354-356) Two theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the clear and present danger rule and the dangerous tendency rule. The first as interpreted in a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before

the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the substantive evil sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the disorderly and unfair administration of justice. This test establishes a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published. Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration of justice. This rule had its origin in Schenck vs. U. S. (249) U. S. 47), promulgated in 1919, and ever since it has afforded a practical guidance in a great variety of cases in which the scope of the constitutional protection of freedom of expression was put in issue.1 In one of said cases, the United States Supreme Court has made the significant suggestion that this rule is an appropriate guide in determining the constitutionality of restriction upon expression where the substantial evil sought to be prevented by the restriction is destruction of life or property or invasion of the right of privacy Thornhill vs. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88). Thus, speaking of the extent and scope of the application of this rule, the Supreme Court of the United States said Clear and present danger of substantive evils as a result of indiscriminate publications regarding judicial proceedings justifies an impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and press only if the evils are extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high. . . . A public utterance or publication is not to be denied the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press merely because it concerns a judicial proceeding still pending in the courts, upon the theory that in such a case it must necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly and fair administration of justice. The possibility of engendering disrespect for the judiciary as a result of the published criticism of a judge is not such a substantive evil as will justify impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and press. (Bridges vs. California, 314 U.S. 252, syllabi) No less important is the ruling on the power of the court to punish for contempt in relation to the freedom of speech and press. We quote; Freedom of speech and press should not be impaired through the exercise of the punish for contempt of court unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question are a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. A judge may hold in contempt one who ventures to publish anything that tends to make him unpopular or to belittle him. . . . The vehemence of the language used in newspaper publications concerning a judges decision is not alone the measure of the power to punish for contempt. The fires which it kindles must constitute an imminent not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice. (Craig vs. Harney, 331 U. S. 367, syllabi)

And in weighing the danger of possible interference with the courts by newspaper criticism against the right of free speech to determine whether such criticism may constitutionally be punished as contempt, it was ruled that freedom of public comment should in borderline instances weigh heavily against a possible tendency to influence pending cases. (Pennekamp vs. Florida, 328 U. S. 331). The question in every case, according to Justice Holmes, is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree (Schenck vs. U.S. supra). The dangerous tendency rule, on the other hand, has been adopted in cases where extreme difficulty is confronted determining where the freedom of expression ends and the right of courts to protect their independence begins. There must be a remedy to borderline cases and the basic principle of this rule lies in that the freedom of speech and of the press, as well as the right to petition for redress of grievance, while guaranteed by the constitution, are not absolute. They are subject to restrictions and limitations, one of them being the protection of the courts against contempt (Gilbert vs. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325.) This rule may be epitomized as follows: If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent. (Gitlow vs. New York, 268 U.S. 652.). It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of speech and of the press which is secured by the Constitution does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language, and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom. . . . Reasonably limited, it was said by story in the passage cited this freedom is an inestimable privilege in a free government; without such limitation, it might become the scourge of the Republic. xxx xxx xxx And, for yet more imperative reasons, a state may punish utterances endangering the foundations of organized government and threatening its overthrow by unlawful means. These imperil its own existence as a constitutional state. . . .

xxx xxx xxx . . . And the immediate danger is none the less real and substantial because the effect of a given utterance cannot be accurately foreseen. The state cannot reasonably be required to measure the danger from every such utterance in the nice balance of a jewelers scale. A single revolutionary spark, may kindle a fire that, smoldering for a time, may burst into a sweeping and destructive conflagration. It cannot be said that the state is acting arbitrarily or unreasonably when, in the exercise of its judgment as to the measures necessary to protect the public peace and safety it seeks to extinguish the spark without waiting until it has enkindled the flame or blazed into the conflagration. It cannot reasonably be required to defer the adoption of measures for its own peace and safety until the revolutionary utterances lead to actual disturbances of the public peace or imminent and immediate danger of its own destruction; but it may, in the exercise of its judgment, suppress the threatened danger in its incipiency. In People vs. Lloyd, supra, p. 35 (136 N. E. 505), it was aptly said: Manifestly, the legislature has authority to forbid the advocacy of a doctrine until there is a present and imminent danger of the success of the plan advocated. If the state were compelled to wait until the apprehended danger became certain, than its right to protect itself would come into being simultaneously with the overthrow of the government, when there would be neither prosecuting officers nor courts for the enforcement of the law. Gitlow va. New York, supra.) The question then to be determined is: Has the letter of Cabansag created a sufficient danger to a fair administration of justice? Did its remittance to the PCAC create a danger sufficiently imminent to come under the two rules mentioned above? Even if we make a careful analysis of the letter sent by appellant Cabansag to the PCAC which has given rise to the present contempt proceedings, we would at once see that it was far from his mind to put the court in ridicule and much less to belittle or degrade it in the eyes of those to whom the letter was addressed for, undoubtedly, he was compelled to act the way he did simply because he saw no other way of obtaining the early termination of his case. This is clearly inferable from its context wherein, in respectful and courteous language, Cabansag gave vent to his feeling when he said that he has long since been deprived of his land thru the careful maneuvers of a tactical lawyer; that the case which had long been pending could not be decided due to the fact that the transcript of the records has not as yet, been transcribed by the stenographer who took the stenographic notes, and that the new Judges could not proceed to hear the case before the transcription of the said notes. Analyzing said utterances, one would see that if they ever criticize, the criticism refers, not to the court, but to opposing counsel whose tactical maneuvers has allegedly caused the undue delay of the case. The

grievance or complaint, if any, is addressed to the stenographers for their apparent indifference in transcribing their notes. The only disturbing effect of the letter which perhaps has been the motivating factor of the lodging of the contempt charge by the trial judge is the fact that the letter was sent to the Office of the President asking for help because of the precarious predicament of Cabansag. While the course of action he had taken may not be a wise one for it would have been proper had he addressed his letter to the Secretary of Justice or to the Supreme Court, such act alone would not be contemptuous. To be so the danger must cause a serious imminent threat to the administration of justice. Nor can we infer that such act has a dangerous tendency to belittle the court or undermine the administration of justice for the writer merely exercised his constitutional right to petition the government for redress of a legitimate grievance. The fact is that even the trial court itself has at the beginning entertained such impression when it found that the criticism was directed not against the court but against the counsel of the opposite party, and that only on second thought did it change its mind when it developed that the act of Cabansag was prompted by the advice of his lawyers. Nor can it be contended that the latter is groundless or one motivated by malice. The circumstances borne by the record which preceded the sending of that letter show that there was an apparent cause for grievance. Thus, the record shows that on January 13, 1947, or more than 8 years ago, appellant Cabansag filed with the lower court a complaint against Geminiana Fernandez, et al. seeking to eject them from a portion of land covered by a torrens title. On October 4, 1949, or two years thereafter, the court, Judge Villamor presiding, issued an order requiring the stenographers who took down the notes to transcribe them within 15 days upon payment of their corresponding fees. On December 9, 1952, or almost 3 years thereafter, the court, Judge Pasicolan presiding, issued a similar order requiring the stenographers to transcribe their notes and decreeing that the case be set for hearing after said notes had been transcribed. No further step was taken from his last date either by the by the court or by the opposing parties. Meanwhile, the stenographers were given assignment elsewhere, and when this matter brought to the attention of the court by its own clerk of court, said court in an indorsement sent to the Secretary of Justice expressed its inability to take action in view of the fact that the stenographers were no longer under its jurisdiction. And in said indorsement nothing was said about its readiness to continue the trial even in the absence of the transcript of the notes. Under such a state of affairs, appellant Cabansag cannot certainly be blamed for entertaining the belief that the only way by which he could obtain redress of his grievance is to address his letter to the PCAC which after all is the office created by

the late President to receive and hear all complaints against officials and employees of the government to facilitate which the assistance and cooperation of all the executive departments were enjoined (Executive Order No. 1, as amended by Executive Order No. 19). And one of the departments that come under the control of the President is the Department of Justice which under the law has administrative supervision over courts of first instance.(Section 83, Revised Administrative Code) The PCAC is part of the Office of the President. It can, therefore, be said that the letter of Cabansag though sent to the PCAC is intended for the Department of Justice where it properly belongs. Consequently, the sending of that letter may be considered as one sent to the Department of Justice and as such cannot constitute undue publication that would place him beyond the mantle of protection of our constitution. . . . under the presidential type of government which we adopted and considering the departmental organization established and continued in force by paragraph, section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. (Villena vs. The Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil. 451, 463.) We would only add one word in connection with the participation in the incident of Cabansags co-appellants, Attys. Roberto V. Merrera and Rufino V. Merrera. While the conduct of Cabansag may be justified considering that, being a layman, he is unaware of the technical rules of law and procedure which may place him under the protective mantle of our constitution, such does not obtain with regard to his coappellants. Being learned in the law and officers of the court, they should have acted with more care and circumspection in advising their client to avoid undue embarrassment to the court or unnecessary interference with the normal course of its proceedings. Their duty as lawyers is always to observe utmost respect to the court and defend it against unjust criticism and clamor. Had they observed a more judicious behavior, they would have avoided the unpleasant incident that had arisen. However, the record is bereft of any proof showing improper motive on their part, much less bad faith in their actuation. But they should be warned, as we now do, that a commission of a similar misstep in the future would render them amenable to a more severe disciplinary action.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed, without pronouncement as to costs. Bengzon, Paras, C.J., Padilla, Reyes, A., Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.