Texas Criminal Jury Selection

Texas Criminal Jury Selection
Mark W. Bennett
Bennett & Bennett
735 Oxford Street
Houston, Texas 77007
(713)224-1747
mb@ivi3.com
http://Blog.BennettAndBennett.com
Table of Contents
I. Introduction .............................................................................................................................................................. 1
II. The Purpose of Voir Dire ..................................................................................................................................... 1
III. Voir Dire Procedure ............................................................................................................................................. 1
A. Formation of jury panel ................................................................................................................................... 1
B. Composition of the venire ............................................................................................................................... 1
C. Qualifying the venire ......................................................................................................................................... 2
D. Presence of defendant ...................................................................................................................................... 3
E. Interim jury service ........................................................................................................................................... 3
F. Open courtroom .................................................................................................................................................. 4
G. Group or individual voir dire ......................................................................................................................... 4
H. Recording jury selection ................................................................................................................................. 4
I. The shuffle ............................................................................................................................................................. 4
J. Time limits ............................................................................................................................................................. 5
K. Alternate jurors .................................................................................................................................................. 5
L. Questioning by counsel .................................................................................................................................... 5
1. Scope of questioning .......................................................................................................................................................... 5
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
Diligent questioning is required ................................................................................................................................................... 5

Proper questions: intelligent, but not TOO intelligent ....................................................................................................... 5
Law applicable to the case .............................................................................................................................................................. 6
Permissible questions ...................................................................................................................................................................... 6
Impermissible questions ................................................................................................................................................................. 6
Fishing expedition ............................................................................................................................................................................... 6
2. Commitment questions ..................................................................................................................................................... 7

a. Proper commitment questions ..................................................................................................................................................... 7
b. Improper commitment questions ............................................................................................................................................... 8
c. States improper commitment questions ................................................................................................................................. 8
3. Denial of proper question ................................................................................................................................................ 9

4. Improper comments by the state .............................................................................................................................. 10
a. Preserving error ................................................................................................................................................................................ 11
M. Questions by the court ................................................................................................................................... 11

N. Excusing jurors sua sponte ........................................................................................................................... 11
a. Exemptions .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 11
O. Challenges for cause ........................................................................................................................................ 11

1. Challenge for cause: bias ............................................................................................................................................... 13
2. Vacillating jurors ............................................................................................................................................................... 13
3. Trick questions .................................................................................................................................................................. 13
4. Rehabilitation ..................................................................................................................................................................... 13
5. Courts sua sponte strikes for cause ......................................................................................................................... 13
6. Denied challenge for cause: .......................................................................................................................................... 14
a. Error preservation ........................................................................................................................................................................... 14
b. Showing harm .................................................................................................................................................................................... 15
P. Peremptory challenges ................................................................................................................................... 15

1. Batson .................................................................................................................................................................................... 15
a. Batson procedure .............................................................................................................................................................................. 15
b. Some race-neutral reasons: ......................................................................................................................................................... 17
IV. Further reading .................................................................................................................................................... 17

V. Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................................................. 17
ii

I.
INTRODUCTION
In Texas criminal cases, voir dire is a matter of
constitutionally protected right and statutory law.
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
protects the right to a jury trial in criminal cases, but
the U.S. Supreme Court has limited all criminal
prosecutions to those involving at least six months
punishment. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300
U.S. 617 (1937); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66
(1970).
Texas courts have interpreted all criminal
prosecutions in article I, Section 10 of the Texas
Constitution and article 1.05 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure much more broadly to guarantee
the right to a jury trial in all criminal prosecutions,
regardless of punishment. Since this constitutional
provision applies to all criminal prosecutions, the
defendant in a misdemeanor case has the same right of
trial by jury as in felony cases. Franklin v. State, 576
S.W.2d 621, 623 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
The right to a jury includes the right to voir dire
in order to intelligently and effectually exercise
peremptory challenges and challenges for cause. Ex
parte McKay, 819 S.W.2d 478, 482 (Tex. Crim. App.
1990). The voir dire process helps protect a
defendants right to trial by a competent and
unimpaired jury. See Tanner v. United States, 483
U.S. 107, 127 (1987) (Petitioners Sixth Amendment
interests in an unimpaired jury, on the other hand, are
protected by several aspects of the trial process. The
suitability of an individual for the responsibility of
jury service, of course, is examined during voir dire.)
Chapter 35 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure governs the jury-selection process.
is composed of names derived from (1) the countys

voter registration list, and (2) a list of citizens who are
qualified to serve and who hold a valid Texas drivers
license or a valid personal identification card issued
by the Department of Public Safety. TEX. GOVT.
CODE 62.001(a). Those names are placed on cards,
mixed in a wheel, and drawn at random for jury
service. Tex. Govt. Code 62.002-62.004. Deviation
from this statutory scheme is not reversible error so
long as the procedure used insures a random selection
of jurors. Rivas v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 480 S.W.2d
610 (Tex. 1972).
The lists of prospective jurors are then delivered
to the clerks of the respective courts for safekeeping.
TEX. GOVT CODE 62.007. At the appropriate time,
the clerk sends a summons to each person on the list
with an order to appear before the court on a certain
date. TEX. GOVT. CODE 62.012-62.013. The
prospective juror may claim an exemption from
service under section 62.106. A judge may not dismiss
a potential juror for economic reasons unless all
parties are present and approve. TEX. GOVT. CODE
62.110(c).
If a party suspects that the officer summoning the
jurors has summoned them in a willful attempt to
ensure a conviction or an acquittal, the party may
challenge the array of the panel. TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. art. 35.07. The challenge must be made in
writing (Motion to Quash the Venire) and, if made by
the defendant, must be supported by an affidavit from
the defendant or a credible person. Id. This challenge
must be made before the jury is qualified and voir dire
begins, or it is waived. Esquivel v. State, 595 S.W.2d
516, 523 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 986 (1980). A timely challenge requires an
evidentiary hearing before the trial judge. TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. art. 35.07.
II. THE PURPOSE OF VOIR DIRE

There are three possible purposes for the
voir dire examination of veniremen. The
first purpose is to elicit information which
would establish a basis for a challenge for
cause.The second purpose is said to
facilitate the intelligent use of peremptory
challenges.And the third purposealbeit
not necessarily a legally legitimate oneis
to indoctrinate the jurors on the partys
theory of the case and to establish rapport
with the prospective jury members.
1.
Sanchez v. State, 165 S.W.3d 707, 71011 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2005).
Electronic or Mechanical Selection

Section 62.011 of the Texas Government Code
allows a county to adopt a plan for the selection of
names of persons for jury service with the aid of
electronic or mechanical equipment instead of
drawing the names from a [literal] jury wheel. TEX.
GOVT. CODE 62.011.
The District Clerk is in charge of the selection
process, which uses the same sources of names as
Section 62.001 (that is, voter registration, drivers
licenses, and personal ID cards). Tex. Govt. Code
62.011(2)-(3).
III. VOIR DIRE PROCEDURE
B.
Composition of the venire

The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
guarantees a defendant the right to trial by an
impartial jury of the State. This right is incorporated
into the Fourteenth Amendments Due Process Clause
and is thus binding on the states. Duncan v. Louisiana,
A.
Formation of jury panel

In most jurisdictions in Texas, prospective jurors
names are selected at random from the countys jury
wheel, which is reconstituted annually. The jury wheel
1

Rogers, 73 F.3d 774, 775 (8th Cir. 1996) (blacks thirty
percent less likely over five-year period to be selected
for jury duty).
Once the defendant has made this prima facie
showing of a violation of the fair-cross-section
requirement, the state must show that the exclusion
advances a significant government interest. See U.S. v.
Rodriguez-Lozada, 558 F.3d 29, 38 (1st Cir. 2009)
(exclusion of jurors not proficient in English served an
overwhelming national interest).
Texass procedure of choosing venires from the
pool of all registered voters and all people with Texas
drivers licenses or identification cards issued by the
Department of Public Safety, TEX. GOVT. CODE
62.001, if not tampered with, will likely not support a
claim of systematic exclusion. See U.S. v. Miller, 116
F.3d 641, 659 (2nd Cir. 1997), Phillips v. State, 654
S.W.2d 846, 848 (Tex. App.Dallas 1983, no pet.)
(absent a showing of purposeful and systematic
exclusion of a cognizable group, appellant did not
show that previous jury selection procedure, which
used only voter-registration lists and not lists of
drivers, systematically and arbitrarily excluded a
cognizable class.).
A defendant may also challenge the composition
of a venire on equal protection grounds. To do so, he
must show, in place of systematic exclusion, that the
selection procedure is susceptible of abuse or is not
racially neutral. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482
(1977). To rebut that prima facie showing the state
must prove an absence of discriminatory intent. See,
e.g., Smith v. Cunningham, 782 F.2d 292, 294 (1st Cir.
1986) (everyone responsible for selection of jurors
denied discriminatory intent).
391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).

An impartial jury is one that is drawn from a fair
cross-section of the community. Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975); see also Smith v. Texas,
311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) (because juries are
instruments of public justice, they must be truly
representative of the community). A jury selection
process that purposefully or systematically excludes
otherwise qualified groups from service is at war
with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a
representative government. Smith, 311 U.S. at 130.
While a jury does not have to represent a fair
cross-section of the community, see Holland v.
Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480-84 (1990), the Sixth
Amendment requires that the jury venire represent a
fair cross-section of the community. See, e.g., Duren
v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364-365 (1979)
(disproportionate exclusion of women violated Sixth
Amendment).
To show a violation of the fair-cross-section
requirement, the defendant must first show the
exclusion of a distinctive group in the community.
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). A
distinctive group is one whose members share
qualities that define them as a group (okay,
tautological), whose members exhibit similar
attitudes, beliefs, or experiences, and whose members
share a community of interest. See U.S. v.
Raszkiewicz, 169 F.3d 459, 463 (7th Cir. 1999).
Next, the defendant trying to show a violation of
the fair-cross-section requirement must show that the
group alleged to be excluded is a distinctive group in
the community; (2) that the groups representation in
the source from which juries are selected is not fair
and reasonable in relation to the number of such
persons in the communitythat is, that the group
was not fairly represented in the venire. Duren v.
Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 357 (1979). To do so, the
defendant must demonstrate the percentage of the
community made up of the group alleged to be
underrepresented. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357,
364 (1979). A gross discrepancy shows unfair
representation, see Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357,
364 (1979) (15% of venire, and 54% of community,
was female). A smaller discrepancy may not
demonstrate discrimination. See U.S. v. McAnderson,
914 F.2d 934, 941 (7th Cir. 1990) (discrepancy of less
than ten percent between blacks in community and
blacks on venire).
Finally, the defendant must show that the
underrepresentation resulted from a systematic
exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.
This may be shown through the processes underlying
the exclusion, see Machetti v. Linahan, 679 F.2d 236
(11th Cir. 1982) (underrepresentation of women
resulted from a procedure that exempted women who
filed notice), or through the statistics, see U.S. v.
C.
Qualifying the venire

Qualifications of jurors are set forth in Section
62.102 of the Texas Government Code. These
qualifications include being age 18 or older,
citizenship in the state and county in which he is to
serve, being of sound mind and good moral character,
not having been convicted of or under indictment for
misdemeanor theft or any felony, and being able to
read and write. TEX. GOVT. CODE 62.102.

(Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (holding that requirement that
juror be citizen of county is waivable because it is
subsumed under article 35.16(a)(1)s qualified voter
in the county requirement). Otherwise section
62.102s disqualifications are not waivable.
If a defendant learns during trial that an
absolutely disqualified juror is empaneled, he must
raise an objection before the verdict is entered in order
to preserve the issue. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.
44.46(1); Nelson v. State, 129 S.W.3d 108, 113 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2004). If the defendant preserves error and
is convicted, he may obtain a reversal on these
grounds without carrying a high burden to show
harm. Nelson v. State, 129 S.W.3d 108, 113 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2004).
If the service of an absolutely disqualified juror is
not discovered until after the verdict is entered, the
defendant must make a showing of significant harm to
prevail on appeal. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.
44.46(2).
Statutory Qualifications
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
At least 18 years of age.

Citizen of the county.
Qualified to vote.
Of sound mind and good moral character.
Able to read and write.
Has not served for six days during the preceding
three months (county court) or during the
preceding six months (district court).
Not convicted of misdemeanor theft or a felony.
Not under indictment or other legal accusation
for misdemeanor theft or a felony.
TEX. GOVT. CODE 62.102

The court has discretion to eliminate the literacy
requirement if the requisite number of literate jurors
cannot be found in the county. TEX. GOVT. CODE
62.103.
A court may suspend the qualification for jury
service that requires a person to have less than six
days of service as a petit juror during the preceding
three months in the county court or during the
preceding six months in the district court if it appears
to the court that the countys sparse population makes
its enforcement seriously inconvenient. TEX. GOVT.
CODE 62.103(b).
A deaf or hard of hearing person is disqualified
to serve as a juror if, in the opinion of the court, his
hearing loss renders him unfit to serve as a juror in
that particular case. TEX. GOVT. CODE 62.1041(a).
A deaf or hard of hearing person serving as a juror
shall be reasonably accommodated in accordance with
the Americans with Disabilities Act. TEX. GOVT.
CODE 62.1041(b).
Under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article
35.16, a prospective juror is absolutely disqualified
from service if he is convicted of a misdemeanor theft
or any felony, if he is indicted or under legal
accusation for misdemeanor theft or any felony, or if
he is insane. These grounds for disqualification may
not be waived. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 35.16(b).
Section 62.102 encompasses all types of trials
and is a minimal threshold of juror qualifications. By
contrast, Article 35.16 stated additional disqualifying
factors to be considered in criminal cases. Cantu v.
State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
Government Code section 62.102 provides
additional disqualifications, and no waiver. TEX.
GOVT. CODE 62.102. But [t]hose qualifications
found in the Government Code that are also contained
in Art. 35.16 and are waivable under Art. 35.16
age, citizenship, qualification to voteare waivable
in a criminal case. Mayo v. State, 4 S.W.3d 9, 12
D.
Presence of defendant
A defendant has a constitutional right, under both
article I, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution and the
Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, to be
present at all phases of trial. Lewis v. United States,
146 U.S. 370, 13 S.Ct. 136, 36 L.Ed. 1011 (1892);
Miller v. State, 692 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. Crim. App.
1985).
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 33.03
requires the defendants presence at trial unless he
voluntarily absents himself. The defendant cannot
waive this requirement before the jury is selected.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 33.03.
The right to be present does not apply to the
taking of excuses and qualifications during the general
jury assembly. Chambers v. State, 903 S.W.2d 21, 31
(Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
There is no reason, however, to think that it does
not apply to questioning of jurors by counsel at the
bench.
Two Steps to Preserve Error
Defendant Absent for Voir Dire
1.
2.
E.
On the record.
Object.
Interim jury service

Interim jury service occurs when a juror serves
on a separate jury during the period between selection
as a juror in the defendants trial and the
commencement of the defendants trial. Linnell v.
[I]f the trial judge intends to select more than
3

one jury from a single venire, the veniremembers
selected to serve as jurors must be excluded from the
venire from which the other jurors will be selected.
Linnell v. State, 935 S.W.2d 426, 430 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1996).
evidence in a Rule 44.2(b) harm analysis of error in

other parts of trial. See Morales v. State, 32 S.W.3d
862, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
For the defense, there is no sound tactical reason
for not having a record made of the voir dire. Brian
Wice, Preservation of Error [see his chapter in this
book].
F.
Open courtroom
The accused has a right under the Sixth
Amendment not only to a trial, but to a public trial.
This right may give way in certain cases to other
rights or interests, such as the defendants right to a
fair trial or the governments interest in inhibiting
disclosure of sensitive information. Waller v.
Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45 (1984), but [t]rial courts
are obligated to take every reasonable measure to
accommodate public attendance at criminal trials.
Presley v. Georgia, 130 S. Ct. 721, 725 (2010)
(reversing for defendants uncles exclusion from
courtroom during voir dire).
When the constitutionally tainted portion of trial
encompasses the entire jury-selection process, it has
been almost universally held that relief involves a new
voir dire and a new jury; perforce, it necessitates a
new trial. Steadman v. State, 360 S.W.3d 499, 510
(Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (reversing and remanding for
new trial where defendants family was excluded from
courtroom during jury selection).
No Texas cases discuss the interplay of the right
to a public trial with article 35.17 of the Texas Code
of Criminal Procedure, which allows the voir dire of
each venireperson apart from the others (see infra,
section immediately following), but the accuseds
right to a public trial is a factor that a trial court may
want to consider before performing individual voir
dire.
I.
The shuffle
Article 35.11 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure requires the jury panel to be randomly
shuffled on either partys demand. The jury shuffle
may be used as a strategic tool and is designed to
ensure the compilation of a random list of jurors.
Ford v. State, 73 S.W.3d 923, 926 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002).
The right to a shuffle is absolute, though the
granting of a request made by either party satisfies this
right. Jones v. State, 833 S.W.2d 146, 149 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1992).
A trial judge has discretion to shuffle the panel
sua sponte, but a sua-sponte shuffling does not
foreclose the right of a party to request a subsequent
shuffle. Wilkerson v. State, 681 S.W.2d 29 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1984). Otherwise only one shuffle is
allowed. Chappell v. State, 850 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1993).
A party has the right to see the panel members
seated in the order in which they were called before
deciding whether to request a shuffle. Batchelor v.
State, 757 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tex. App.Dallas 1988,
pet. refd). The court has discretion to allow or
disallow the parties to review panel members
biographical questionnaires or juror information cards
in determining whether to exercise the right to a
shuffle. Garza v. State, 7 S.W.3d 164 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1999).
The demand for a shuffle must be made before
voir dire begins for it to be timely. Gonzalez v. State,
296 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. App.El Paso 2009, pet.
refd). Generally, voir dire begins when the trial judge
concludes any introductory remarks and recognizes
the prosecutor to begin examination of the jury.
Williams v. State, 719 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986). In a capital case, however, voir dire begins
when the trial judge begins his examination of the
panel as required by Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure article 35.17(2). Davis v. State, 782 S.W.2d
211, 215 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
As a creature of statute, however, the right to a
shuffle does not rise to the level of a constitutional
right. Ford v. State, 73 S.W.3d 923 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002). Thus, any error in connection with the shuffle
is subject to Rule 44.2(b) harm analysisspecifically,
whether the jury shuffle statutes purpose was
thwarted by the error. Id. at 926.
G. Group or individual voir dire

In most non-death-penalty cases, voir dire is
conducted in the presence of the entire panel. TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 35.17(1).
In a death-penalty case, either the state or the
defense may examine each juror apart from the entire
panel. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 35.17(2).
Article 35.17(1) implicitly allows individual voir
direthat is, voir dire of each venireperson apart from
the othersat the courts discretion. Courts in Harris
County (State v. Blomberg, no appellate opinion) and
Galveston County (State v. Durst, no appellate
opinion) have used individual voir dire to ferret out
prejudice in high-profile non-capital cases.
H. Recording jury selection
Defense counsel should always ask that voir dire
be recorded. Not only is any jury-selection error
waived if it does not appear on the record, Villarreal
v. State, 617 S.W.2d 703, 703 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel
Op.] 1981), but the record of voir dire may be helpful
4

J.
Time limits
The trial court may impose reasonable time limits
on voir dire. Cantu v. State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 687
(Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Time limits are reviewed
under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Boyd v. State,
811 S.W.2d 105, 115-16 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
discretion to limit improper questioning. Smith v.

State, 513 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). See
also Abron v. State, 523 S.W.2d 405, 408 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1975) (trial court can restrict repetitious or
vexatious questions, restrict questions asked in
improper form, restrict questions directed at personal
habits of jurors).
Like time limits, refusals to allow lines of
questioning during voir dire are reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard. In re Commitment of
Hill, 334 S.W.3d 226, 229 (Tex. 2011).
That discretion inquiry turns on the propriety of
the question: a court abuses its discretion when its
denial of the right to ask a proper question prevents
determination of whether grounds exist to challenge
for cause or denies intelligent use of peremptory
challenges. Standefer v. State, 59 S.W.3d 177, 185
Seven Steps to Preserve Error

Time Limits
On the record.
Timely and specific objection to time limit.
Request additional time.
Dont try to prolong the voir dire.
Make record of questions you would ask.
Questions must be:
a. Relevant;
b. Not repetitious; and
c. Not vague or open-ended.
Show which jurors that you were unable to
question served on the jury.
Five Reasons the Court May Limit

the Defendants Voir Dire
K. Alternate jurors
The trial court can seat up to four alternate jurors;
these alternates replace jurors who become or are
found to be unable or disqualified to perform their
duties or are found by the court on agreement of the
parties to have good cause for not performing their
duties. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 33.011.
1.
L.
5.
2.
3.
4.
Questioning by counsel
The U.S. Constitution does not provide a right for
the lawyers (as opposed to the court) to conduct voir
direin fact, using a written questionnaire in place of
oral questioning has been held not to abuse the courts
discretion, U.S. v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289, 301-02
(2nd Cir. 2007)but the right to be heard under article
I, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution includes the
right to pose proper questions during voir dire
examination through counsel. Jones v. State, 223
S.W.3d 379, 381 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 35.17
also permits the lawyers to conduct the voir dire.
Question commits a venireman to a specific set

of facts.
Questions are repetitious.
Juror has already stated his views clearly and
unequivocally.
Question is so vague or broad in nature as to
constitute a global fishing expedition.
Question is not in proper form.
Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 345 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1995) (#s 1-3,5); Sells v. State, 121 S.W.3d 748,
756 (Tex. Crim. App.) (#4).
a.
Diligent questioning is required

Error occurs [w]hen a prejudiced or biased juror
is selected without fault or lack of diligence on the
part of defense counsel, such counsel acting in good
faith on the jurors responses and having no
knowledge of their inaccuracy. Brandon v. State, 599
S.W.2d 567, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
Defense counsel must diligently ask questions
calculated to bring out that information which might
be said to indicate a jurors inability to be impartial,
truthful, and the like. [D]iligent counsel will not
rely on written questionnaires to supply any
information that counsel deems material. Gonzales v.
1.
Scope of questioning
The permissible areas of questioning the panel
in order to exercise peremptory challenges are broad
and cannot be unnecessarily limited. Mathis v. State,
576 S.W.2d 835, 836837 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). A
question is proper if it seeks to discover a jurors
views on an issue applicable to the case. Smith v.
The trial court should give a defendant great
latitude in questioning the jury panel during voir dire.
Trevino v. State, 572 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. Crim. App.
[Panel Op.] 1978). The trial court can, however,
control the scope of voir dire by exercising its sound
b. Proper questions: intelligent, but not TOO

intelligent
The more intelligent or effective the question,
the more likely it is that the question will commit the
venire member to decide the case, or to refrain from
5

deciding the case, on a basis not required by law.
Barajas v. State, 93 S.W.3d 36, 39 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002).
State, 414 S.W.2d 668, 670 (Tex. Crim. App.

1967).
e.
Impermissible questions
Some questions held impermissible, or at least
within the courts discretion to disallow:
No abuse of discretion where trial court refused

voir dire questioning on definitions of terms
deliberately, probability, and criminal acts
of violence in a capital case. Milton v. State, 599
S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
Appellant's attempt to question venire members

on their willingness to consider his 'background'
as a particular mitigating factor in sentencing him
for aggravated robbery was not a proper
question. Ledbetter v. State, No. 01-07-00421CR, 2008 WL 2756684, at *2 (Tex. App.
Houston July 17, 2008).
Counsel would like to have gone into that

holding juveniles to higher or lower standards
and prisons for juveniles. In re V.M.S, No. 01
0300072CV, 2004 WL 2475111, at *4 (Tex.
App.Houston Nov. 4, 2004) (counsel didnt
make a clear record of the question she would
have asked).
Could you be fair and impartial in a case where

the victim is an 8-year-old child? is an improper
question. Daniel v. State, No. 01-03-00469-CR,
2004 WL 1485470, at *1 (Tex. App.Houston
[1st Dist.] July 1, 2004, no pet.).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in

refusing to allow appellant to ask questions based
on facts peculiar to the case on trial Coleman v.
1994). It is not error for the trial court to refuse to
allow questions based on facts peculiar to the
case at trial. White v. State, 629 S.W.2d 701,
706 (Tex.Crim.App.1981).
c.
Law applicable to the case

The trial court can refuse to allow questions
about areas of the law that will not be raised in the
trial, but it is error to disallow questions about the law
applicable to the case. See Loredo v. State, 59 S.W.3d
289, 29394 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi-Corpus
Christi 2001) (reversing defendants conviction
because he was prevented from asking relevant
questions on voir dire concerning parole); McGee v.
State, 35 S.W.3d 294, 298 (Tex.App.Texarkana
2001, no pet.) (reversing defendant's conviction
because he was prevented from asking relevant
questions on voir dire concerning permissible use of
prior convictions); Gonzales v. State, 2 S.W.3d 600,
603 (Tex.App.Texarkana 1999, no pet.) (holding
error to be harmful after the trial court prohibited
questioning the panel concerning the theory of
necessity).
d.
Permissible questions
Proper questions seek to discover a jurors
views on an issue applicable to the case, and are not
commitment questions, nor so vague or broad in
nature as to constitute a global fishing expedition.
Sells v. State, 121 S.W.3d 748, 75556 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2003).
Hypothetical fact situations may be employed
during voir dire to explain the application of the law,
but not to determine how a venireperson would
respond to particular circumstances. Cuevas v. State,
742 S.W.2d 331, 336 n. 6 (Tex. Crim. App.1987).
A trial court abuses its discretion if it refuses to
allow the defendant to ask venirepersons about what
they think reasonable doubt means. Lane v. State, 828
S.W.2d 764, 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
Some other permissible questions:
With regard to my question of incarceration,

Mr. Robertson, do you consider yourself a
believer in the theory of deterren[ce],
punishment, or rehabilitation? Powell v. State,
631 S.W.2d 169, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel
Op.] 1982).
Have you read something in the paper that

discusses the pros and cons or just anything
regarding the defense of insanity? Smith v.
State, 703 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
Have you ever known somebody that was

harmed by extra-marital affairs? Shipley v.
1990) (relevant to an intelligent use of
peremptory challenges).
Prior jury service is an appropriate area for the

parties to question the venire. De La Rosa v.
f.
Fishing expedition
A fishing expedition question does not seek
particular information from a particular panel
member; rather, it presents a general topic for
discussion. Smith v. State, 703 S.W.2d 641, 645
(Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (holding that the trial judge
correctly restricted appellant from asking every juror
for his or her thoughts on the insanity defense
because the question, as phrased, was improperly
broad and duplicitous).
In Boyd v. State counsel inquired, What Im
basically asking you is what you as layman think is a
case that is proper for the death penalty to be
imposed? This question was unrelated to the
statutory sentencing scheme, was improperly broad,
and so was an improper fishing expedition. Boyd v.
Another example of a fishing expedition
6

question: [W]hat would be a mitigating
circumstance, in your mind? Dickson v. State, No.
74533, 2001 WL 34736485, at *5 (Tex. Crim. App.
Oct. 13, 2004).
2.
Commitment questions
Commitment questions commit a prospective
juror to resolve or refrain from resolving an issue a
certain way after learning a particular fact. Standefer
v. State, 59 S.W.3d 177, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
Commitment questions often require a yes or
no answer. Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 317, 346
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Often they do not, though,
and often yes-or-no questions are not commitment
questions. For example, Have you known anyone
who has been abused as a child?
When the law requires a certain type of
commitment from jurors, the attorneys may ask the
prospective jurors whether they can follow the law in
that regard. Standefer v. State, 59 S.W.3d 177, 181
a.
Proper commitment questions

For a commitment question to be proper, one of
the possible answers to that question must give rise to
a challenge for cause. [W]here the law does not
require the commitment, a commitment question is
invariably improper. Standefer v. State, 59 S.W.3d
177, 181 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Even if the question
meets this challenge-for-cause requirement, the
question may nevertheless be improper if it includes
facts in addition to those necessary to establish a
challenge for cause. Id. To be proper a commitment
question must contain only those facts necessary to
test whether a prospective juror is challengeable for
cause. Id. (Emphasis in original).
So a proper commitment question is one that
would allow a valid challenge for cause if answered a
particular way, and that contains only those facts
necessary to test whether a prospective juror is
challengeable for cause.
For example, can you consider probation in a
first-degree felony theft case is a proper commitment
question (because, assuming that the accused is
probation eligible, jurors must be able to consider
probation); can you consider probation in a firstdegree felony theft case involving the theft of more
than $400,000 is not a proper commitment question
(because the amount of the theft is a fact beyond those
necessary to test whether prospective jurors are
challengeable for cause).
Some other examples:
Whether venire members would be biased

because the defendant was a black man and the
victim a white woman. Abron v. State, 523
S.W.2d 405, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). In
Barajas v. State the Court of Criminal Appeals
(1)
distinguished that question from the improper

question in Abron of whether the venire
members could be impartial in an indecency case
involving a victim who was eight to ten years
old because the nun question was precisely
tailored to get to the heart of an issue relevant to
the case. Barajas v. State, 93 S.W.3d 36, 40
(Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The concurrence added
that the prohibition of discrimination on the
basis of race that is embodied in the Due Process
Clause is part of 'the law applicable to the case
upon which the defense is entitled to rely,'
Barajas v. State, 93 S.W.3d 36, 42 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2002) (Womack, J., concurring).
Do you believe a police officer, any police
officer, just because he is a police officer would
not perjure himself from the witness stand?
Hernandez v. State, 563 S.W.2d 947, 950 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1978).
Would you presume someone guilty if he or she
refused to make a statement to the police?
Standefer v. State, 59 S.W.3d 177, 183 n.28 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2001).
Full range of punishment

Bias against the range of punishment is a proper
area of inquiry for both challenges for cause and
peremptory challenges. Mathis v. State, 576 S.W.2d
835, 83637 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
Asking a juror if he is able to consider the full
range of punishment is a proper commitment question.
Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 317, 346 (Tex. Crim. App.
2010). Asking a juror if he can consider the minimum
sentence given specific evidentiary facts is not.
Cardenas v. State, 325 S.W.3d 179, 184 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010). A defendant is entitled to jurors who can
consider (not necessarily give) the entire range of
punishment. Cardenas v. State, 325 S.W.3d 179, 184
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010). In other words, a juror must
be able to conceive of both a situation in which the
maximum penalty would be appropriate, and a
situation in which the minimum penalty would be
appropriate, for a particular offense as charged in the
indictment. McCoy v. State, 996 S.W.2d 896, 898
(Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. refd).
A prospective juror must be able to consider the
full range of punishment for the offense generally, not
for some specific manner or means of committing the
offense. Johnson v. State, 982 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1998). A hypothetical question seeking to
commit the jurors to a particular set of facts is an
improper question. Atkins v. State, 951 S.W.2d 787,
789 (Tex. Crim. App.1997).
Once a prospective juror admits an inability to
consider the full range of punishment, including
community supervision, a sufficient foundation has
been laid to support a challenge for cause. Cumbo v.
7

1988).
cause based upon the sufficiency implications of an

item of evidence would be inappropriate. Standefer v.
b.
Improper commitment questions

An improper commitment question either a)
attempts to commit jurors to do (or not do) something
that they are not required to do (or not do), or b)
contains more facts than necessary to test whether a
prospective juror is challengeable for cause.
For example:
Can you be fair and impartial if the victim in

this case is a nun? See Barajas v. State, 93
S.W.3d 36, 40 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)
(overruling Nunfio v. State, 808 S.W.2d 482
(Tex. Crim. App. 1991)) (too many facts).
Whether jurors could be impartial in an

indecency case involving a victim who was eight
to ten years old. Barajas v. State, 93 S.W.3d 36
(Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (too many facts).
Whether a juror considers a particular type of

evidence to be mitigating Standefer v. State, 59
S.W.3d 177, 181 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (jurors
do not have to consider a particular type of
evidence to be mitigating).
If the evidence, in a hypothetical case, showed

that a person was arrested and they had a crack
pipe in their pocket, and they had a residue
amount in it, and it could be measured, and it
could be seen, is there anyone who could not
convict a person, based on that- Atkins v. State,
951 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)
(too many factscould you find someone guilty
if I proved to you, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that he had knowingly possessed a trace amount
of cocaine would have been a proper
commitment question).
Would you presume someone guilty if he or she

refused a breath test on their refusal alone?
Standefer v. State, 59 S.W.3d 177, 183 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2001) (jurors may convict based on
refusal alone).
[W]hich jurors would require an additional fact

such as mercy killing before they could consider
assessing probation? Richardson v. State, 83
S.W.3d 332, 360 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi
2002).
[W]hether the prospective jurors would be able

to consider the minimum range of punishment
where a gun was used in the commission of a
crime. Cuero v. State, No. 01-93-00989-CR,
1994 WL 620897, at *7 (Tex. App.Houston
[1st Dist.] Nov. 10, 1994).
Absent statutory directionCode of Criminal
Procedure Article 38.14, for example, or 38.141, or
38.15, each of which requires a certain amount of
evidence in a certain type of casea challenge for
Three-Part Inquiry:
Commitment Question
1.
2.
3.
Does the question attempt to commit jurors to

doing or not doing something? (If yes, it is a
commitment question.)
Does the law require the jurors to do what the
question would commit them to? (If no, not a
proper commitment question.)
Does the question contain more facts than
necessary to test whether a prospective juror is
challengeable for cause? (If yes, not a proper
commitment question.)
c.
States improper commitment questions

The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that the
harm test to be used, when the State has been allowed
to ask improper commitment questions of the entire
panel, is whether the defendant was tried by a juror
that [sic] had prejudged him or some aspect of his
case because the State had improperly committed one
or more veniremen to a verdict or course of action
before hearing any evidence. Sanchez v. State, 165
S.W.3d 707, 714 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The court
listed seven non-exclusive factors for courts of
appeals to consider in determining whether there was
harm:
1)
Whether
the
questions
were
unambiguously improper and attempted to
commit one or more veniremen to a specific
verdict or course of action;
2) How many, if any, veniremen agreed to
commit themselves to a specific verdict or
course of action if the State produced certain
evidence;
3) Whether the veniremen who agreed to
commit themselves actually served on the
jury;
4) Whether the defendant used peremptory
challenges to eliminate any or all of those
veniremen who had committed themselves;
5) Whether the defendant exhausted all of
his peremptory challenges upon those
veniremen
and
requested
additional
peremptory challenges to compensate for
their use on improperly committed
veniremen;
6) Whether the defendant timely asserted
that a named objectionable venireman
actually served on the jury because he had to
8

waste strikes on the improperly committed
jurors; and
7) Whether there is a reasonable likelihood
that the jurys verdict or course of action in
reaching a verdict or sentence was
substantially affected by the States
improper commitment questioning during
voir dire.
Article I section 4 and article VI section 3 do not

protect the rights of the accused; they protect the
rights of the potential juror. But the only people who
can protect those rights when they are at risk in a
criminal trial are the court, the accused, and the state.
See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (defendant
can vindicate potential jurors right to equal protection
in jury selection) and Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S.
42 (1992) (state can vindicate potential jurors right to
equal protection in jury selection).
The issue of whether excluding people who have
religious preferences against judging other people
violates Texass Constitutional rule against religious
tests has not been litigated.
Sanchez v. State, 165 S.W.3d 707, 714 (Tex. Crim.

App 2005).
In Sanchez, the Anson factors (that the defendant
exhausted his peremptory challenges, that he asked for
more, that the request was denied, and that he had to
accept an objectionable person as a result, see infra,
section 3.O.6.b, Showing Harm) are only one part of
the harm analysis; it is important to make an Anson
record even when the Anson factors are not
dispositive.
Six Potential Objections

to the Can You Judge? Question
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
(1) Inability to judge

The state often looks for those jurors who,
because of their religious beliefs, are unable to judge
other people. Judges treat an affirmative answer to this
question as grounds for a challenge for cause.
The Texas Constitution provides:
3.
Texas Constitution article I Section 4.

U.S. Constitution article VI Section 3.
Texas Constitution article I Section 6.
U.S. Constitution Amendment I.
Improper voir dire.
Improper commitment question.
Denial of proper question

Refusing to allow the defendant to ask a
permissible question is error. See Loredo v. State, 59
S.W.3d 289, 29394 (Tex. App.Corpus ChristiCorpus Christi 2001) (reversing defendants
conviction because he was prevented from asking
relevant questions on voir dire concerning parole);
McGee v. State, 35 S.W.3d 294, 298 (Tex.App.
Texarkana 2001, no pet.) (reversing defendant's
conviction because he was prevented from asking
relevant questions on voir dire concerning prior
convictions); Franklin v. State, 23 S.W.3d 81, 83
(Tex.App.Texarkana 2000, no pet.) (finding error
harmful when the trial court refused the defense
counsel to further question a juror concerning the
relationship between juror and victim); Gonzales v.
State, 2 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Tex.App.Texarkana
1999, no pet.) (holding error to be harmful after the
trial court prohibited questioning the panel concerning
the theory of necessity).
In Anson v. State the Court of Criminal Appeals
held that an appellant has to go through the four-step
process applicable in other voir dire areas (showing a)
that he exhausted his peremptory challenges, b) that
he asked for more, c) that the request was denied, and
d) that he had to accept an objectionable person as a
result) to show harm arising from the trial courts
refusal to let the defense ask proper questions. Anson
v. State, 959 S.W.2d 203, 204 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)
(see infra, section 3.O.6.b, Showing Harm).
RELIGIOUS TESTS. No religious test shall

ever be required as a qualification to any
office, or public trust, in this State; nor shall
any one be excluded from holding office on
account of his religious sentiments, provided
he acknowledge the existence of a Supreme
Being.
TEX. CONST. art. I Sec. 4.
Article VI Section 3 has a similar injunction
against religious tests for public offices, without the
requirement that officers acknowledge the existence .
Does your religion prevent your judging other
people? is a religious test; juror is an office or
public trust.
The Supreme Court has held (in the capitalmurder context) that a potential juror can be barred
from service if he holds religious or personal views
that prevent or substantially impair the performance
of his duties as a juror in accordance with his
instructions and his oath. Wainwright v. Witt, 469
U.S. 412, 418 (1985).
A jurors oath does not require him to judge
the defendant, but only to render a true verdict
according to the law and the evidence. TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. art. 35.22 (setting out jurors oath). It
cannot be assumed that a person whose religion
advises him to judge not, lest he be judged cannot
perform the duties of a juror in accordance with his
instructions and his oath.
9

In Rich v. State, however, the court held:
sorry.
One thing that is apparent is that counsel must
make a clear record of the question he would have
asked in order to preserve error. Error is not preserved
for review as to a proposed question if the question is
not presented to the trial court for a ruling. See
Caldwell v. State, 818 S.W.2d 790, 794 (Tex. Crim.
App.1991). If the trial court limits a question due to its
form, trial counsel must determine the basis of the
limitation and attempt to fashion a query which
complies with the perceived inadequacy. See Wright v.
Counsels statement to the court that he would like to
have gone into that holding juveniles to higher or
lower standards and prisons for juveniles did not
make clear what the intended question was. In re
V.M.S, No. 010300072CV, 2004 WL 2475111, at
*4 (Tex. App.Houston Nov. 4, 2004).
Rich was prevented from asking a valid

question to the entire venire. Exhausting his
peremptory challenges and requesting
additional peremptory challenges would not
have remedied the trial judges error since
the error extended to the entire venire.
Rich v. State, 160 S.W.3d 575, 577 (Tex. Crim. App.
2005).
The Rich court then applied Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 44.2(b)s harm analysis to the
trial courts improper exclusion of a proper voir dire
question. This was contrary to a string of Court of
Criminal Appeals opinions holding that the exclusion
of a proper question was constitutional error. Rich v.
In 2007, the Court of Criminal Appeals clarified:
Although Rich analyzed error in refusing to permit
the asking of a proper question as non-constitutional,
it did so because the defendant did not contest the
court of appealss characterization of the error as such.
Thus, the court of appeals in this case erred in relying
upon Rich for the proposition that the error was of the
non-constitutional variety. Jones v. State, 223
S.W.3d 379, 382 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
According to Jones, if the defense is denied the
opportunity to ask a proper question, it is
constitutional error, subject to Rule 44.2(a) error
analysis.
While Jones is the leading published case, in an
unpublished 2010 case the Court of Criminal Appeals
cited Anson for its harm analysis without discussing
either Rich or Jones: The erroneous prohibition of
proper questioning of individual prospective jurors is
subject to the harm analysis traditionally applied to
the erroneous denial of a defendants challenge for
cause. Storey v. State, No. AP76018, 2010 WL
3901416, at *13 n.10 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 6, 2010)
(unpublished).
It is an open question whether the defendant who
has been denied the opportunity to ask a proper
question must make the Anson harm showings: a) that
he exhausted his peremptory challenges, b) that he
asked for more, c) that the request was denied, and d)
that he had to accept an objectionable person as a
result. Rich makes more sense than Storey; exhausting
peremptories does not help when you have not been
allowed to ask questions intended to help you decide
how to exercise your peremptories. The First Court of
Appeals wrote in Rios v. State, The only way we can
see to determine harm would be to have a motion for a
new trial hearing and ask the jurors the forbidden voir
dire questions. Rios v. State, 4 S.W.3d 400, 404 (Tex.
App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. dismd). But, for
the practitioner, it is perhaps better to be safe than

Denial of Question
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
On the record.
Ask proper question.
Invoke Texas Constitution article I, section 10:
right to be heard.
Point out that error prevents you from
intelligently exercising peremptory challenges.
Exhaust peremptory challenges.*
Request more strikes until request is denied.*
Identify an objectionable person seated on the
jury on whom you would have exercised a
peremptory challenge.*
*It is debatable whether this is necessary.

4.
Improper comments by the state

A mistrial will not be granted during voir dire
unless the statement complained of injects injurious
and prejudicial matters before the panel which are
reasonably calculated to prevent a fair trial before an
impartial jury. Herring v. State, 758 S.W.2d 849, 853
(Tex. App.Corpus Christi 1988, pet. refd) (state
discussed an exhibit, the subject of a motion in limine,
during voir dire).
The states statement in voir dire that the law
says we are not going to put him in that predicament
of lying or hiding something was improper, and
allowing it was error. Godfrey v. State, 859 S.W.2d
583, 585 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no
pet.).
The states statement in voir dire implying that
the state did not need to prove intent was improper,
and allowing it was error. Dues v. State, 634 S.W.2d
304 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982).
10

seated. Butler v. State, 830 S.W.2d 125, 131 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1992).
An excuse cannot, however, be given for an
economic reason without both parties consent. TEX.
GOVT. CODE 62.110(c) (applied to criminal case in
Jasper v. State, 61 S.W.3d 413, 424 (Tex. Crim. App.
2001)).
a.
Preserving error
When the state has made misstatements of law,
the defense preserves error by pursuing the objection
to an adverse rulingoverruled objection, denied
motion to disregard, Hackbarth v. State, 617 S.W.2d
944 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981), or denied
motion to strike the panel, see Hogan v. State, 496
S.W.2d 594, 598 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (There was
no request to have the jurors to disregard the
complained of answer and no motion was made to
discharge the members of the panel who heard the
remark.No error is shown.).
(Note that rather than a motion for mistrial, the
technically correct error-preservation step following a
granted instruction to disregard in voir dire is a motion
to quash the panel or strike those jurors who heard the
improper statements.)
It may also be necessary to exhaust peremptory
challenges against jurors who heard the comment. See
Hammett v. State, 578 S.W.2d 699, 705 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1979). (The appellant had sufficient remaining
peremptory challenges to have removed each juror he
now complains of who sat on the panel. No error is
shown.)
a.
Exemptions
Section 62.106 provides nine exemptions from
jury duty.
Nine Exemptions from Jury Duty
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Five Steps to Preserve Error:

Improper Comments to Panel
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
7.
8.
On the record.
Make a timely and specific objection.
Instruction to disregard.
Move to strike jurors who heard the comments.
Exhaust peremptory challenges against jurors
who heard the comments.
9.
Over 70 years of age.

Has legal custody of a young child and service
would require leaving the child without adequate
supervision.
Student of a public or private secondary school;
Enrolled and in actual attendance at an institution
of higher education.
Officer or an employee of the legislative branch
of state government.
In county >200k without a plan for electronic or
mechanical selection under Government Code
section 62.011, and has served in the last 24
months.
Primary caretaker of invalid.
In county >250k, has served in last three years,
unless wheel reconstituted since last service.
Active-duty military deployed out-of-county.
Tex. Govt. Code 62.106

These exemptions belong to the potential jurors;
they can use them to avoid jury duty. The defendant
does not have a right to exempt a potential juror.
Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 399 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1999).
M. Questions by the court

Only when a trial courts comments during voir
dire are reasonably calculated to benefit the State or
prejudice the defendants rights will reversible error
occur. Gardner v. State, 733 S.W.2d 195, 210 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1987).
But comments of the trial judge, which tainted
appellants presumption of innocence in front of the
venire, were fundamental error of constitutional
dimension and required no objection Blue v. State, 41
S.W.3d 129, 132 (Tex. Crim. App.2000).
O. Challenges for cause

Article 35.16 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure sets out eleven grounds for challenges for
cause available to either side.
A challenge for cause is forfeited if not made.
Webb v. State, 232 S.W.3d 109, 112 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007).
The test for a challenge for cause is whether the
venirepersons bias or prejudice would substantially
impair [his] ability to carry out his oath and
instructions in accordance with the law. Feldman v.
N.
Excusing jurors sua sponte

The trial court has broad discretion under Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure article 35.03 to excuse
prospective jurors for good reason. The power to
grant an excusal from jury service (pursuant to Article
35.03) inheres to the trial judge from the first
assemblage of the array until the juror is, at last,
11

Eleven Grounds for Challenge for Cause
Two Grounds for Challenge for Cause

Available Only to the Defense
1.
2.
3.
Juror is not qualified to vote.

Juror has been convicted of theft or a felony.
Juror is under legal accusation for theft or a
felony.
4. Juror is insane.
5. Juror has defect or disease rendering her unfit for
jury service in the case.
6. Juror is a witness in the case.
7. Juror served on grand jury that found indictment.
8. Juror served as a juror on a trial of the same case.
9. Juror has a bias or prejudice in favor of or
against the defendant.
10. Juror has prejudged the case.
11. Juror cannot read or write.
12. That the juror is related within the third degree

of consanguinity or affinity to a person injured
by the offense or to any prosecutor in the case.
13. That the juror has a bias against any part of the
law upon which the defense is entitled to rely.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 35.16(c).
Article 35.16 is a complete list of challenges for

cause Butler v. State, 830 S.W.2d 125, 130 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1992).
The statutory requirement that jurors be able to
read and write is not satisfied by a jurors ability to
write his name and nothing more. Hernandez v.
Rather, the prospective juror should be able to express
his ideas in words on paper. Id. at 887.
Where a juror has a bias or prejudice against
some part of the law applicable to the case, the test is
whether the bias or prejudice would prevent or
substantially impair the prospective jurors ability to
fully follow the law as set out in the trial courts
instructions and as required by the jurors oath.
Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 99 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2003); Feldman v. State, 71 S.W.3d 738, 744
Before venire members may be excused for
cause, the law must be explained to them, and they
must be asked whether they can follow that law,
regardless of their personal views. Gardner v. State,
306 S.W.3d 274, 295 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
The attorneys do bear the burden of providing a
sufficient record showing that the venire has been
instructed and understands the law. Presumably, if the
trial court fails to provide adequate instruction, the
lawyers may provide the missing information to the
venire or may ask the trial court to do so. Waller v.
State, 353 S.W.3d 257, 266 (Tex. App.Fort Worth
2011, pet. refd).
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 35.16(a)
Three of those groundsthat the juror has been

convicted of a felony or theft; that the juror is under
legal accusation for a felony or theft; and that the juror
is insaneare not waivable. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
art. 35.16(a).
Aside from those, there are three statutory
grounds for challenges for cause available only to the
state, and two available only to the defense:
Three Grounds for Challenge for Cause

Available Only to the State
12. In a death-penalty case, that the juror has
conscientious scruples in regard to the infliction
of the punishment of death for crime.
13. That the juror is related within the third degree
of consanguinity or affinity to the defendant.
14. That the juror has a bias against any part of the
law upon which the state is entitled to rely.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 35.16(b).
12

3.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Trick questions
The proponent of a challenge for cause has the
burden of establishing that the challenge is proper.
Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 295 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2009). The proponent does not meet this burden
until the proponent shows that the venireperson
understood the requirements of the law and could not
overcome his prejudice well enough to follow the law.
Id.
A common trick question is the one-witness
rule question; it is asked correctly of the first juror
(assuming that we prove all of the elements beyond a
reasonable doubt from the testimony of a single
witness, would you require more to convict), then a
shorthand version of the question is asked of later
jurors.
By the time the question reaches the back rows
the jurors have lost track of the underlying assumption
(that they believe the witness beyond a reasonable
doubt). I have found that these later jurors are often
rehabilitable because they answered yes only
because they did not accept the assumption.
Before the trial court may sustain a States
challenge for cause on the ground that the venireman
will not convict on the testimony of a single
eyewitness, it must be demonstrated to the trial court
that the veniremans categorical refusal is predicated
upon something other than his understanding of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. Castillo v. State, 913
S.W.2d 529, 534 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
(It is doubtful that this is a proper area of inquiry
in the vast majority of cases, in which the state does
not intend to prove its case using a single witness,
because it is not the law applicable to the case.)

Denial of Challenge for Cause
Voir dire recorded.
Strike lists on the record.
Timely and specific objection.
Use peremptory challenge on that juror.
Exhaust peremptory challenges.
Request more strikes until request is denied.
peremptory challenge.
When the trial court erroneously grants the

states challenge for cause, the defense must show
also that the state used all its strikes (because
otherwise the state could have used one of its
peremptories in place of the challenge for cause), and
that granting the challenge deprived the defendant of
a lawfully constituted jury. Jones v. State, 982
S.W.2d 386, 394 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). The logic of
this is that the accused is not entitled to a specific fair
jury, but only to a fair jury.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Nine Steps to Preserve Error

Grant of States Challenge for Cause
Voir dire recorded.
Strike lists on the record.
Timely and specific objection.
Use peremptory challenge on that juror.
Exhaust peremptory challenges.
Request more strikes until request is denied.
peremptory challenge.
Show that the state used all its strikes.
Show that the error deprived you of a lawfully
constituted jury.
4.
Rehabilitation
A venireperson who initially indicates an
inability to consider the full range of punishment may
be rehabilitated through further questioning by the
prosecutor or the trial court. See Von Byrd v. State,
569 S.W.2d 883, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978);
Westbrook v. State, 846 S.W.2d 155, 160-61
(Tex.App.Fort Worth 1993, no pet.).
By statute, a juror who says that she has reached
such a conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of the
defendant as would influence her in finding a verdict
may not be rehabilitated. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.
35.16(a)(10).
1.
Challenge for cause: bias

Jurors must be open-minded and persuadable,
with no extreme or absolute positions regarding the
credibility of any witness. Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d
547, 560 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), cert. denied, 529
U.S. 1070, 120 S.Ct. 1680, 146 L.Ed.2d 487 (2000).
5.
Courts sua sponte strikes for cause

A trial judge should not on its own motion
excuse a prospective juror for cause unless the juror is
absolutely disqualified from serving on a jury.
Goodman v. State, 701 S.W.2d 850, 856 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1985) (overruled on other grounds, Hernandez v.
State, 757 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
When the court sua sponte excludes a
2.
Vacillating jurors
When the record reflects that a venireman
vacillates or equivocates on his ability to follow the
law, the reviewing court must defer to the trial court.
Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 400 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1999).
13

disqualified jurorone who is subject to challenge for
cause[t]he defendant must establish that he was
tried by a jury to which he had a legitimate objection.
Bell v. State, 724 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
He must also exhaust his strikes and request (and be
denied) additional strikes. Green v. State, 764 S.W.2d
242, 247 (Tex. Crim. App.1989).
In support of a legitimate objection, the
appellants complaint about the jury must have a basis
in the record. In addition, the appellants complaint
should be directed to a specific juror or jurors. The
criticism will invariably relate to the jurors
characteristics and attitudes that are inconsistent with
a defendants objectives in a case but which would not
support a challenge for cause but nevertheless
distinguish the juror or jurors from other members of
the panel. Green v. State, 764 S.W.2d 242, 247 (Tex.
Crim. App.1989).
6.
Denied challenge for cause:

To preserve error for a trial courts erroneous
denial of a challenge for cause, appellant must show
that: (1) he asserted a clear and specific challenge for
cause; (2) he used a peremptory challenge on the
complained-of venire member; (3) his peremptory
challenges were exhausted; (4) his request for
additional strikes was denied; and (5) an objectionable
juror sat on the jury. Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92,
105 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
If a trial judge errs in overruling a challenge for
cause against a venire member, then a defendant is
harmed if he uses a peremptory strike to remove the
venire member and thereafter suffers a detriment from
the loss of the strike. Feldman v. State, 71 S.W.3d
738, 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)
The test is whether a bias or prejudice would
substantially impair the venire members ability to
carry out the jurors oath and judicial instructions in
accordance with the law. Gardner v. State, 306
S.W.3d 274, 295 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
In reviewing a decision to deny a challenge for
cause, courts look at the entire record to determine if
there is sufficient evidence to support the ruling.
Feldman v. State, 71 S.W.3d 738, 744 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2002).
Before a prospective juror can be challenged
under article 35.16, the law must be explained to the
prospective juror and he or she must be asked whether
they can follow the law regardless of their personal
views. Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386, 390 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1998).
The proponent of a challenge for cause has the
burden to show that the challenge was proper.
Feldman v. State, 71 S.W.3d 738, 747 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2002). The proponent does not meet that burden
until the record shows that the prospective juror
understood the requirements of the law and could not
overcome any bias or prejudice. Id.
Appellate courts review denials of challenges for
cause with considerable deference because the trial
judge is in the best position to evaluate a venire
members demeanor and responses. Gardner v. State,
306 S.W.3d 274, 295-96 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
When a venire members answers are vacillating,
unclear, or contradictory, appellate courts accord
particular deference to the trial courts decision.
Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 296 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2009).
Preserving Error:
Courts Sua Sponte Excusal of Disqualified Juror
1.
2.
3.
4.
Object to the excusal of the juror.

Exhaust all of his peremptory challenges and
request additional peremptory challenges.
At the conclusion of the voir dire claim that he is
to be tried by a jury to which he has a legitimate
objection.
Specifically identify the juror or jurors of which
he is complaining.
Green v. State, 764 S.W.2d 242, 247 (Tex. Crim.

App.1989).
When the trial court sua sponte excludes a
qualified juror (that is, one not subject to a valid
challenge for cause), a defendant can show harm and
thus reversible error by establishing that the State
exhausted its peremptory challenges. Green v. State,
764 S.W.2d 242, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). The
rationale is that the state got the effect of an additional
peremptory. Id.
Is the error-preservation portion of Green still
good law in light of Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386,
394 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998), which held that when the
trial court erroneously grants the states challenge for
cause, the defense must show not only that the state
used all its strikes, but also that granting the challenge
deprived the defendant of a lawfully constituted
jury? The same logic that applies to the state
erroneously granting the states challenge for cause
might well apply to the courts own challenge for
cause.
a.
Error preservation
A party preserves error by a timely request that
makes clearby words or contextthe grounds for
the request and by obtaining a ruling on that request,
whether express or implicit. TEX. R. APP. PROC. 33.1.
Here, a party preserves error (but does not show harm)
by making the challenge for cause and explaining
14

clearly its grounds.
Number of Peremptories
(Single-Defendant Case)
b.
Showing harm
In addition to preserving error, the defendant
whose challenge for cause has been denied must be
conscious of the need to show harm.
To show harm resulting from the denial of a
challenge for cause, the defendant must show that he
was forced by the denial to accept an objectionable
juror. This showing requires a record showing that (1)
he exhausted all of his peremptory challenges; (2) he
requested more challenges; (3) that request was
denied; and (4) he identified an objectionable person
seated on the jury on whom he would have exercised a
peremptory challenge. Anson v. State, 959 S.W.2d
203, 204 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
The fundamental basis of this rule recognizes
that without exhausting his peremptory challenges it is
impossible to conclude that the defendant had to
accept an objectionable juror. Green v. State, 764
S.W.2d 242, 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
1.
2.
3.
4.
State seeking death: fifteen.

Other felonies: ten.
Misdemeanor in district court: five.
Misdemeanor in county court: three.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 35.15

1.
Batson
The rule of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986), that the state cannot exercise peremptory
challenges for the purpose of excluding people from
the jury on the basis of their race, is codified at Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure article 35.261. The trialcourt remedy for a Batson / 35.261 violation is
dismissal of the array and calling of a new array. TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 35.261
Batson is more than just race-based peremptories
by the state, though. Race-based peremptory
challenges by the defense are barred by the Batson
line of cases, Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42
(1992), as are sex-based peremptory challenges, J.E.B.
v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
P.
Peremptory challenges
A peremptory challenge is made to a juror
without assigning any reason therefor. TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. art. 35.14.
Each party gets fifteen peremptory challenges in
a death-penalty trial with one defendant; if two or
more defendants are tried together, each defendant
gets eight peremptories and the state gets eight
peremptories per defendant. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
art. 35.15(a).
In a non-death-penalty felony trial with one
defendant, the state and defendant each get ten
peremptory challenges; if two or more defendants are
tried together, each defendant gets six peremptories
and the state gets six peremptories per defendant. TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 35.15(b).
In a misdemeanor trial with one defendant, the
state and defendant each get five peremptory
challenges; if two or more defendants are tried
together, each defendant gets three peremptories and
the state gets three peremptories per defendant. TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 35.15(c).
If one or two alternate jurors are to be
impanelled, each party gets one additional peremptory
challenge; if three or four alternate jurors are to be
impanelled, each party gets two additional
peremptories. These challenges are to be used against
alternate jurors only. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.
35.15(d).
Because no reason needs to be assigned for a
peremptory challenge, the most common issue in the
peremptory-challenge context is the Batson challenge.
a.
Batson procedure
To establish a prima facie case under Batson, a
defendant must show (1) that the state exercised its
strikes to exclude members of a cognizable racial
group from the venire, and (2) that this fact, along
with any other relevant facts and circumstances, raise
an inference that the State exercised these strikes
against the venire members because of their race. See
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712.
While there is, for obvious reasons, no caselaw
on point, in theory the procedure for the state to allege
a defense Batson violation would be the same.
Undisputed observations and uncontradicted
statements of trial counsel can provide support in the
record for a prima facie showing. See Yarborough v.
State, 947 S.W.2d 892, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997);
Emerson v. State, 820 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991); Greer v. State, 310 S.W.3d 11, 14
(Tex.App.Dallas 2009, no pet.).
A pattern of exercising strikes against venire
members of a particular race may establish a prima
facie case. See Keeton v. State, 749 S.W.2d 861, 867
What may be revealing, however, is a repetition
of such strikes in suspiciously large numbers
numbers larger than one would expect if race had
nothing to do with it. Linscomb v. State, 829 S.W.2d
164, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
The appellate remedy for a trial courts failure to
15

conduct a Batson hearing when the defense has made
a prima facie case of racially motivated strikes is
abatement for a hearing. [W]e have long abated
appeals and remanded cases to the trial court to
conduct a Batson hearing when the trial court had
erroneously denied such a hearing after the requisite
prima facie showing had been made. Hutchinson v.
2002). But it would be prudent for a trial court to
allow a full Batson hearing if there is any substantial
argument as to whether the defendant made a prima
facie showing of racial discrimination in the States
exercise of peremptory strikes. By proceeding in this
fashion, the court could create a record while
memories are fresh. Hassan v. State, 346 S.W.3d
234, 242 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2011).
The second step of the Batson challenge process
does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or
even plausible, Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 76768 (1995), but the court cannot merely accept those
explanations at face value and end the Batson
inquiry. Whitsey v. State, 796 S.W.2d 707, 716 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1989). The trial judge must consider
whether the facially neutral explanations are contrived
to avoid admitting acts of group discrimination
Keeton v. State, 749 S.W.2d 861, 868 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1988). A prosecutor may not rebut the
presumption merely by denying that he had a
discriminatory motive or by affirming his good faith
in individual selections, Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 97 (1986).
The Court of Criminal Appeals has laid out a
non-exclusive list of five factors that tend to show that
the states reasons for a challenge are not supported by
the record or are an impermissible pretext:
Five Things that Call Into Question

Race-Neutral Reasons
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
An explanation based on a group bias where the

group trait is not shown to apply to the
challenged juror specifically.
No examination or only a perfunctory
examination of the challenged juror.
Disparate examination of the challenged juror,
i.e., questioning challenged venireperson so as to
evoke a certain response without asking the same
question of other panel members.
The reason given for the challenge is unrelated to
the facts of the case.
Disparate treatment where there is no difference
between responses given and unchallenged
venirepersons.
Keeton v. State, 749 S.W.2d 861, 866 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1988).
The presence of any one of these factors tends
to show that the State's reasons are not actually
supported by the record or are an impermissible
pretext. Whitsey v. State, 796 S.W.2d 707, 713 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1989).
Once the State has articulated a race-neutral
explanation, the burden shifts back to the accused to
show that the States explanations are actually a
pretext for discrimination. Hernandez v. New York,
500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991). It is not enough merely to
show that a proffered explanation turns out to be
incorrect. Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2002).
When the State offers numerous race-neutral
reasons for challenging a venireperson, the fact that
other venirepersons possessed one or more of the
objectionable attributes is not sufficient to establish
disparate treatment. See Cantu v. State, 842 S.W.2d
667, 689 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
While [D]iligent counsel will not rely on
written questionnaires to supply any information that
counsel deems material. Gonzales v. State, 3 S.W.3d
915, 917 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), a venire members
written answers to a juror questionnaire may provide a
valid reason for a peremptory strike. See, e.g., Jasper
v. State, 61 S.W.3d 413, 422 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001);
Camacho v. State, 864 S.W.2d 524, 529 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1993).
16

voir dire. Moss v. State, 877 S.W.2d 895, 899
(Tex.App.Waco 1994, no pet.)
11. Relative or friend in prison. Chambers v. State,
866 S.W.2d 9, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), cert.
denied, 511 U.S. 1100, 114 S.Ct. 1871, 128
L.Ed.2d 491 (1994)
Batson Procedure
1.
2.
On the record.
After the parties deliver their strike lists to the
clerk.
3. Before jury is sworn.
4. Show that the state exercised its strikes to
exclude members of a cognizable racial group.
5. Show race of accused (CCP 35.261), race of
venirepeople, race of struck jurors.
6. Show facts that raise an inference that the state
struck certain people because of their race.
7. Request a hearing.
8. State provides race-neutral explanation.
9. Rebut states proffered explanation (for example,
evidence of a pattern or practice; evidence of
disparate questioning of minority jurors;
evidence of racially motivated shuffle).
10. Make sure prosecutors notes are part of record.
Factors Appellate Courts Consider

in Reviewing Batson Challenges
1.
2.
3.
b. Some race-neutral reasons:

1. Last name shared with known criminal family.
Nieto v. Texas, S.W.3d , 2012 WL 1605150,
at *5 (Tex. Crim. App. May 9, 2012).
2. Starting a new job. Meshack v. State, No. 05-0401215-CR, 2005 WL 2995098, at *5 (Tex.
App.Dallas Nov. 9, 2005, no pet.).
3. Failed to understand the States legal burdens.
Meshack v. State, No. 05-04-01215-CR, 2005 WL
2995098, at *5 (Tex. App.Dallas Nov. 9, 2005,
no pet.).
4. Wearing a large peace sign necklace. Keovixay v.
State, Nos. 05-03-01407-CR, 05-03-01408-CR,
2004 WL 1535168, at *3 (Tex. App.Dallas July
9, 2004, pet. refd).
5. Appeared to be sleeping during the courts
remarks to the jury panel. Keovixay v. State, Nos.
05-03-01407-CR, 05-03-01408-CR, 2004 WL
1535168, at *3 (Tex. App.Dallas July 9, 2004,
pet. refd).
6. Prior conviction. Holmes v. State, No. 01-0300281-CR, 2004 WL 1119954 (Tex. App.
Houston [1st Dist.] May 20, 2004, pet. refd).
7. Failure to complete jury-selection questionnaire.
Ealoms v. State, 983 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. App.
Waco 1998, pet. refd).
8. Bad record during prior jury service. Webb v.
State, 840 S.W.2d 543, 545-46 (Tex.App.Dallas
1992, no pet.);
9. Inattentiveness or disinterested appearance and
nodding in agreement with the defense during
voir dire. Tate v. State, 939 S.W.2d 738, 744-45
(Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet.
refd).
10. Inattentiveness or disinterested appearance during
4.
5.
Whether the proponent of the peremptory

challenge exercised its challenges to eliminate a
far greater proportion of jurors of the same race
of the juror in question;
Whether the reasons offered for striking the juror
in question appeared to apply equally well to
other jurors of a different race who were not
struck;
challenge utilized its option to shuffle the jury
panels in a manner that supported an inference of
race discrimination;
challenge directed questions expressly designed
to elicit grounds for peremptory challenges
disproportionately, in a manner that suggested an
intent to single out jurors of an identified race for
elimination; and
challenge had followed a formal policy to
exclude jurors of an identified race.
Adair v. State, 336 S.W.3d 680, 687 (Tex. App.

Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. refd.)
IV. FURTHER READING
Garcia-Colson et al., Trial in Action (The

Persuasive Power of Psychodrama, including a
substantial section on voir dire.
SunWolf, Practical Jury Dynamics Second

Edition, LexisNexis 2007 (how juries work [and
how they dont]).
Georgetown Law Journal Annual Review of

Criminal Procedure (for an overview of federal
criminal procedure on any topic).
V. ACKNOW LEDGEM ENTS
Brian Wices paper on preservation of error
includes a section on voir dire; this papers lists of
steps to preserve error are thanks to Brian, except for
any errors, which are mine.
Thanks to aspiring lawyers Jill Propst, Texas
Tech University School of Law 2012; and Mariel
Adrianna de la Garza, University of Texas Law
17

School 2012, for editorial assistance; to hired-gun
editor Amy Derby (Amy.Derby@gmail.com) for
casting an eye not jaundiced by a legal education on
this paper; and to Harris County Assistant District
Attorney Scott Durfee for inviting me to write this
paper, and for giving it a last-minute read to correct
some of the more glaring errors.
18
Appendix B: Table of Authorities

CASES
Abron v. State, 523 S.W.2d 405, 408 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6, 8
Anson v. State, 959 S.W.2d 203, 204 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 10, 15
Atkins v. State, 951 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Crim. App.1997) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8, 9
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1
Barajas v. State, 93 S.W.3d 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6, 8
Batchelor v. State, 757 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. App.Dallas 1988, pet. refd) ---------------------------------------------------------------- 5
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 16
Bell v. State, 724 S.W.2d 780, 795 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 14
Blue v. State, 41 S.W.3d 129 (Tex. Crim. App.2000) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12
Boyd v. State, 811 S.W.2d 105, 115-16 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5, 7
Butler v. State, 830 S.W.2d 125, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 12, 13
Caldwell v. State, 818 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Crim. App.1991) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11
Camacho v. State, 864 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 17
Cantu v. State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 3, 5, 17
Cardenas v. State, 325 S.W.3d 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3
Castillo v. State, 913 S.W.2d 529, 534 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 14
Chambers v. State, 866 S.W.2d 9, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 18
Chambers v. State, 903 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4
Chappell v. State, 850 S.W.2d 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5
Coleman v. State, 881 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7
Cuero v. State, No. 01-93-00989-CR, 1994 WL 620897 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 10, 1994) ------------------------- 9
Cuevas v. State, 742 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. Crim. App.1987) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 7
Cumbo v. State, 760 S.W.2d 251, 25556 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 8
Daniel v. State, No. 01-03-00469-CR, 2004 WL 1485470 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] July 1, 2004, no pet.) --------------- 7
Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7, 8
Davis v. State, 782 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5
De La Rosa v. State, 414 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 7
Dickson v. State, No. 74533, 2001 WL 34736485 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 13, 2004) ---------------------------------------------------- 7
District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
Dues v. State, 634 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 11
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 1447 (1968) -------------------------------------------------------------------- 2
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2
Ealoms v. State, 983 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. App.Waco 1998, pet. refd) ------------------------------------------------------------------ 17
Emerson v. State, 820 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 16
Esquivel v. State, 595 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2
Ex parte McKay, 819 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
Feldman v. State, 71 S.W.3d 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12, 13, 15
Feldman v. State, 71 S.W.3d 738, 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15
Ford v. State, 73 S.W.3d 923 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5
Ford v. State, 73 S.W.3d 923, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5
Franklin v. State, 23 S.W.3d 81 (Tex.App.Texarkana 2000, no pet.) ----------------------------------------------------------------- 10
Franklin v. State, 576 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 13, 14, 15
Gardner v. State, 733 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12
Garza v. State, 7 S.W.3d 164, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 10, 16
Godfrey v. State, 859 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no pet.) --------------------------------------------------- 11
Gonzales v. State, 2 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Tex.App.Texarkana 1999, no pet.) ------------------------------------------------------- 6, 10
Gonzales v. State, 3 S.W.3d 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 17
Gonzalez v. State, 296 S.W.3d 620, 632 (Tex. App.El Paso 2009, pet. refd) --------------------------------------------------------- 5
Goodman v. State, 701 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 14
Green v. State, 764 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. Crim. App.1989) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 14, 15
Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15
Greer v. State, 310 S.W.3d 11, 14 (Tex.App.Dallas 2009, no pet.) -------------------------------------------------------------------- 16
Hackbarth v. State, 617 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981) --------------------------------------------------------------- 11

Hammett v. State, 578 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12
Hassan v. State, 346 S.W.3d 234 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2011) ------------------------------------------------------------- 16
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991). ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 17
Hernandez v. State, 506 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13
Hernandez v. State, 563 S.W.2d 947, 950 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 8
Hernandez v. State, 757 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 14
Herring v. State, 758 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 1988, pet. refd) -------------------------------------------------------- 11
Hogan v. State, 496 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11
Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2
Holmes v. State, No. 01-03-00281-CR, 2004 WL 1119954 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] May 20, 2004, pet. refd) -------- 17
Hutchinson v. State, 86 S.W.3d 636 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 16
In re Commitment of Hill, 334 S.W.3d 226 (Tex. 2011) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6
In re V.M.S, No. 010300072CV, 2004 WL 2475111 (Tex. App.Houston Nov. 4, 2004) ----------------------------------- 7, 11
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 16
Jasper v. State, 61 S.W.3d 413, 422 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12, 17
Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 17
Johnson v. State, 982 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8
Jones v. State, 223 S.W.3d 379, 381 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6, 11
Jones v. State, 833 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5
Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13, 14, 15
Keeton v. State, 749 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 16, 17
Keovixay v. State, Nos. 05-03-01407-CR, 05-03-01408-CR, 2004 WL 1535168 (Tex. App.Dallas July 9, 2004, pet. refd) 17
Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13
Lane v. State, 828 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7
Ledbetter v. State, No. 01-07-00421-CR, 2008 WL 2756684 (Tex. App.Houston July 17, 2008). ------------------------------- 7
Linnell v. State, 935 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4
Linscomb v. State, 829 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 16
Loredo v. State, 59 S.W.3d 289, (Tex. App.Corpus Christi-Corpus Christi 2001) ------------------------------------------------ 6, 10
Machetti v. Linahan, 679 F.2d 236, 242 (11th Cir. 1982) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2
Mathis v. State, 576 S.W.2d 835, 836837 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) --------------------------------------------------------------------- 6, 8
Mayo v. State, 4 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4
McCoy v. State, 996 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. refd) ---------------------------------------------------- 8
McGee v. State, 35 S.W.3d 294, 298 (Tex.App.Texarkana 2001, no pet.) --------------------------------------------------------- 6, 10
Meshack v. State, No. 05-04-01215-CR, 2005 WL 2995098 (Tex. App.Dallas Nov. 9, 2005, no pet.) -------------------------- 17
Milton v. State, 599 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 7
Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 12, 14
Morales v. State, 32 S.W.3d 862 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5
Nelson v. State, 129 S.W.3d 108 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4
Nieto v. Texas, S.W.3d , 2012 WL 1605150 (Tex. Crim. App. May 9, 2012) ----------------------------------------------------- 17
Nunfio v. State, 808 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8
Powell v. State, 631 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982) --------------------------------------------------------------------- 7
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10
Presley v. Georgia, 130 S. Ct. 721, 725 (2010) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 4
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 16
Rich v. State, 160 S.W.3d 575, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10, 11
Richardson v. State, 83 S.W.3d 332 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 2002) ------------------------------------------------------------------- 9
Rios v. State, 4 S.W.3d 400 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. dismd) ------------------------------------------------------- 11
Rivas v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 480 S.W.2d 610, 612 (Tex. 1972) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
Sanchez v. State, 165 S.W.3d 707, 71011 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
Sanchez v. State, 165 S.W.3d 707, 714 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1, 9
See U.S. v. Rodriguez-Lozada, 558 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2009) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2
Sells v. State, 121 S.W.3d 748, 75556 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6, 7
Shipley v. State, 790 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7
Smith v. Cunningham, 782 F.2d 292 (1st Cir. 1986) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3
Smith v. State, 513 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6
Smith v. State, 703 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6, 7
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 2
Standefer v. State, 59 S.W.3d 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6, 7, 8, 9
Steadman v. State, 360 S.W.3d 499, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4
Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13
Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1

Tate v. State, 939 S.W.2d 738. (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. refd) --------------------------------------------------- 17
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 2
Trevino v. State, 572 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978) ------------------------------------------------------------------- 6
U.S. v. McAnderson, 914 F.2d 934 (7th Cir. 1990) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2
U.S. v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641 (2nd Cir. 1997) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3
U.S. v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289, 301-02 (2nd Cir. 2007) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6
U.S. v. Raszkiewicz, 169 F.3d 459 (7th Cir. 1999) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2
U.S. v. Rogers, 73 F.3d 774, 775 (8th Cir. 1996) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2
Villarreal v. State, 617 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981) ----------------------------------------------------------------- 5
Von Byrd v. State, 569 S.W.2d 883, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 14
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10
Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45, 104 S. Ct. 2210, 2215 (1984) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4
Waller v. State, 353 S.W.3d 257 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 2011, pet. refd). ------------------------------------------------------------- 13
Webb v. State, 232 S.W.3d 109, 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12
Webb v. State, 840 S.W.2d 543 (Tex.App.Dallas 1992, no pet.) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 17
Westbrook v. State, 846 S.W.2d 155, 160-61 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1993, no pet.) ----------------------------------------------- 14
White v. State, 629 S.W.2d 701 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7
Whitsey v. State, 796 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 16, 17
Wilkerson v. State, 681 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5
Williams v. State, 719 S.W.2d 573, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5
Wright v. State, 28 S.W.3d 526, 534 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11
Yarborough v. State, 947 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 16
STATUTES
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 1.05 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 33.011 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 33.03 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 35.03 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 35.14 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 35.15(a) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 15
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 35.15(b) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 15
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 35.15(c) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 15
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 35.15(d) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 15
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 35.16(b) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 35.17 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4, 5
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 35.17(1) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 35.261 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.141 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8
Tex. Govt Code 62.007 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
Tex. Govt. Code 62.001 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2
Tex. Govt. Code 62.001(a) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
Tex. Govt. Code 62.011 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
Tex. Govt. Code 62.102 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2, 3
Tex. Govt. Code 62.103 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3
Tex. Govt. Code 62.103(b) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3
Tex. Govt. Code 62.1041(b) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3
Tex. Govt. Code 62.110(c). ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1, 11
Tex. Govt. Code 62.002-62.004 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
Tex. Govt. Code 62.012-62.013 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
RULES
Tex. R. App. Proc. 33.1 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 14

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Tex. Const. art. I 10 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1, 3
Tex. Const. art. I 4 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9
Tex. Const. art. VI 3 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 9

Texas Criminal Jury Selection

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Texas Criminal Jury Selection

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Texas Criminal Jury Selection

Diligent questioning is required ................................................................................................................................................... 5

2. Commitment questions ..................................................................................................................................................... 7

3. Denial of proper question ................................................................................................................................................ 9

M. Questions by the court ................................................................................................................................... 11

O. Challenges for cause ........................................................................................................................................ 11

P. Peremptory challenges ................................................................................................................................... 15

IV. Further reading .................................................................................................................................................... 17