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4.1

Martin Heidegger's Understanding of Ultimate Meaning and Reality

Michael Gelven,

Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, Ill., U.S.A.

1.

INTRODUCTION

Martin Heidegger is one of the most influential thinkers of the twentieth century and the greatest German philosopher since Hegel. His influence, though, goes far beyond national boundaries, for his works are translated into all the major languages including Japanese and Chinese. The academic and secondary literature on Heidegger has swollen even during his lifetime, into the thousands. Yet. for all his enormous and pervading influence, he remains a thorny and difficult thinker whose followers rarely agree on a proper interpretation. These dis agreements are due as much to the originality of his language as t? the pro~und~ty of his thought. Even his life has provided troublesome speculation, for his bnef but definitive association with the National Socialists in Germany is the cause of bitter debate among his supporters and enemies. In spite of controversies ov~r both his life and his thought, however, he remains one of the central figures 10 European, Japanese and Spanish-American intellectual life, and since the. late sixties has even enjoyed considerable attention in the Anglo-American untversities. . . .' as His thoughts are seen as profoundly influencing such diverse lOter~st~ SIII modern theology, the theatre of the absurd, French and German existentlail psychiatry, linguistics and aesthetics. In no field, however, is Heideg~er mo~ r significant than in the question of ultimate reality and meaning; for all his wo tO seek to establish a profounder understanding of being and reality. In or~er r/. describe this search our essay shall be divided into considerations of his ~Ife,r/. his major works, and finally of the significance of his thoughts for the questIOnS interest 2.
LIFE ill

to the present journal.

. f SM" hureb Heidegger was born In 1889, the son of the sexton 0 t. artm s c ~ Messkirch, Baden. He attended the G~mnasium in Constance on .. he Bod~n y ~ t where, at the age of eighteen he received from Dr. Conrad Grober a c P

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Brentano's On the Manifold Sense of Being According to Aristotle. This book , appa:ently was the original influen~e for his life-long questioning of the meaning ofbemg. For a short penod he studied for the priesthood at the Jesuit seminary in freiburg, but he soon found that his proper interest was philosophy. He did his Ph.D. work under Heinrich Rickert at the University in Freiburg, where in 1915 hehimself o~ered his own first lectures, on Parmenides and Kant. Two years later,~long wI~h thousands of other Germans, he left to serve his country at the front 10 the First World War. He returned to the university in 1919 and stayed untiI1923.w~en he accepted a post at the University at Marburg, then a centre of neo-KantmOism. It was at Marburg that he published his most famous work, Sein /lnd Zeit' Being and Time' which immediately became one of the most influential worksin m~dern philosophy. In 1928 he accepted the chair of philosophy at his beloved Freiburg, where he returned, this time to stay. What would normally be the quiet and undisturbed life of a German scholar soonbecame enmeshed in one of the most frightening political movements the modern world has ever known. Heidegger, who used to argue that a philosopher's life was supremely insignificant to his thought, became in 1933 the rect?r of the .u~iversity, a post which at that time required membership in the NatIOnal O~lahst Par~y. T.here is some evidence that Heidegger's acceptance of S therectorship an~ the lOe~ltable membership in the party was urged upon him by those who felt his prestige would assure greater academic freedom for the university. But if his original acceptance was somewhat reluctant he seemed to manifestduring the few short months of his reign a considerable enthusiasm for y his duties. In a famous speech, Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universitiit ~eurged the German people, and parti~ularly the university community, to espond to .the new call for greatness which was represented by Hitler's party, and to sacnfice some of the aloof autonomy traditionally held by the university forthe s.ake of a greater national community. He couched these urgings of supp~rt m terms of his own philosophical inquiry into authentic existence seeml th us to tie up his work i ontology With what he saw as the spiritual ' . ng IS work in aWak'enmg 0f the German soul under the new movement. The Nazis of course WerctI'h .." ~ e e.lg ted t? find such a famous thinker supporting their party. But in 1933 tis~~azls, now m power, changed their image. By January of 1934 they estabR d t~e one-party rule and June saw the macabre brutality of the 'Second ~VOlutlOn' and the grisly violence of the 'Night of Long Knives.' The true tilure of Hitler's rule was becoming obvious. Heidegger, in a public disassociaon from. th ese worsenmg po I' . resigned from his rectorship in February, . . anI" teres, of Hitler's rule by the university Pr IClpatmg by several months the repudiations Olests' h ~a b 10 B onn, were the faculty walked out on Goebbel's speech and at r h ' ~,. Urg were von P'" apen s anti-Hitler speech was applauded. Heidegger's act ..thu . b' I' 4d. ~ quite a It ear ier than those other academic protests which drew such S.~lrahon. At once the Nazis' delight with Heidegger changed to suspicion. The tna: Went so far as to place watchers in his classroom. Throughout the years of Ilny and the war, Heidegger continued to write and teach at the university

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.....-----------------until, on the eighth of November, 1944, his lectures were interrupted by the invasion of the allied army. Because of his membership in the party and his early support of Hitler in 1933, the allies forbade him to teach for six years. He was finally cleared by the denazification procedures and hearings and in 1951 he once again offered lectures at the university. Many European scholars have never forgiven him his association with the Nazis, but Heidegger's continued creativity and teaching were not deterred by this criticism. Heidegger's life manifests certain obvious influences on his thought. Although he had received several impressive offers to teach at other universities, Heideg_ ger continued to have great affection for the Black Forest, and he would not leave his post at Freiburg. His thinking shows a profound mistrust of modern citY-life which, through its noise, its frenzied pace, and its artificiality keeps one from authentic understanding. Heidegger often praised the quiet and earthly peace of his beautiful homeland and the authenticity of the simple but honest folk who dwell in the country. His early training in the Catholic schools of the south and in the Jesuit seminary obviously had some effect on him, though Heidegger is in no way a specifically theistic thinker. , No aspect of his life has fascinated the critics more than his tragic association with Hitler's party. How could this articulate champion of authentic existence and human freedom have associated himself with the dark forces of that terrible movement? In trying to assess this paradox one must keep in mind two dimensions: 1) the reasons why Heidegger could support what he saw happening in 1933, and 2) the reasons why he could not support what he saw in 1934. Fascination with the first question often forfeits consideration of the second. There are elements in his thought which can, in part, explicate his original interest in National Socialism. What he saw in the early stages of the party's development was obviously a repudiation of socialism and modernistic technocracy; he saw in the fledgling movement a chance to counter the nihilism of a society interested only in pleasures and conveniences. That such an opportunity to re-establish the true values was welcomed by Heidegger is not surprising, since he always had been dubious of the worth of committees, and like Plato, sa~ little worth in populist democracy. Heidegger put considerable value on indIvidual greatness, and under the influence of Nietzsche saw worth in the achievement of a powerful will. To this extent his enthusiasm for the early for~ of National Socialism in the first year of Hitler's reign is consistent with ~s philosophical principles. His rapid disenchantment with Nazism is also conSISt tent with his principles, for it rapidly manifested an even greater misuse 0 technology; the strong leader became a tyrant, the strong will became l.icense, and spiritual leadership became ruthless political terrorism. Although Heldegge~ in later years admitted his association with the Nazis was an error, it was an e~Ob of judgment and not of principle. His error is essentially a tragic story in whtC~ the hubris of greatness is a dominating factor. From his involvement, however,of t is outrageous to infer that his philosophy can be equated with the wickedness Hitler.

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3.
HEIDEGGER'S WORK

3.1 Being and Time Nomatter how fascinating and compelling the subject of Heidegger's rectorship underthe Nazis is, it cannot offset his true importance, which is not what he was doingbut how he was thinking. Heidegger's philosophy is characterized by a singletheme: how can we think the question of being? An essential element of his thoughtis the attempt to awaken a sense of the question. We must learn to ask the questionof being and to resist the powerful influence of those persuasions which detract us from asking the question. In his first major and still greatest work, Being and Time, Heidegger argues that there are two major persuasions that keep onefrom confronting this primary question of the meaning of being. One is existential, the other theoretical. The former consists ofthose attitudes and ways ofexisting which deter the terrible confrontation with the question. Thus when oneavoids truly recognizing himself, when one chatters instead of speaks, shows mildinterest rather than concern, avoids the truth of his finitude in death and guiltrather than embracing it, one succeeds in keeping the great question, what doesit mean to be? at bay. One can thus exist in such a way as to avoid the question; but one can also think theoretically in such a way as to avoid the question.When one examines one's self and the world primarily in terms of what kindsof things exist rather than in terms of what it means to exist or for things in theworld to exist, one has erected a barrier to the truth of being. One then sees onlyentities, not being itself. This, according to Heidegger, is to overlook what heinearlier works calls the ontological difference: that is, the difference between Seienden 'entities' and Sein 'being.' For Heidegger, then, part of his task is to raise anew the question of being ratherthan the question about entities. The word 'anew' belongs, for he finds in manyof the ancient thinkers a greater sense of the question than in modern thought. This raising anew of the question of the meaning of being must be carriedout always on these two levels: 1)to shake loose the persistent tendency ofwestern philosophy to formulate the world always in terms of 'kinds of things ' and2) to actually inquire into the meaning of existence purely in terms of what it meansto be. Heidegger originally sought to include both of these accounts in his greatwork, Being and Time, but as it stands his major work is incomplete. bT?etask in Being and Time is to inquire into the meaning of being. The most ~h~IOUS point is that being is not itself an entity. There is no special kind of thing id IC~one can call 'being'. In English, of course, it is perfectly legitimate to Ih~nh~y term with a particular kind of entity, asserting that such-and-such a the P.a~ IS a being. Heidegger, ho.wever, does not utilize the term in this way. lOber, he uses the term 'being.' m the sense that is equatable with the infinitive, be')~' s when we equate 'being hungry' with 'to be hungry.' Here, 'being' (or 'to a lOisl~ .an entity ?ut the supre~e condition for all.pos~ible modes of existence. not (or b PecIaI sense IS supremely Important to bear m mmd: the search for being etter: the search for what it means to be) is not a search for a mysterious,

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mystical or God-like entity which is in any wayan ultimate cause or ground of I other things, and is essentially and always something other than what Oneis r oneself. Rather, since being is simply that meaning which underlies all other meaning, it is far from mysterious or mystical, and certainly not something other than oneself. For when I ask: 'What does it mean to be?' the object of my inquiry my being, is uniquely present. What is not obvious is its meaning. 'What does it mean to be?' As obvious and as inescapable as my being is, the question is ultimate. How, then, without any reference to kinds of things (such as gods and heavens and souls) can I inquire at all into this question? Heidegger's response is basically that one not only can but often does inquire into his existence as such. There is, then, what Heidegger calls an existential analytic: an analysis of existence. This analysis is based upon the principle that there are various waysto exist, which either reveal or cover up our own meaning. I can thus live in sucha way as to avoid becoming aware of my existence, or I can live in such a way as to I discover my meaning. With the distinction between authentic and inauthentic existence, Heidegger has established a logic of existential inquiry which does not depend on any kind of entity at all. Thus, when the inquirer distinguishes between authentic and inauthentic speech, for example, the inquiry does not ask whether there exists any speaking, it asks directly about the meaning of speaking. Something must either exist or not exist; but meaning depends rather OD whether existence as such is covered up or revealed. Since the modes of existence can be made articulate in terms of authenticity, what it means to exist can thus be examined structurally. That is to say, it is now possible to recognize the order and interrelationship of the various ways to exist. These ways of existing are now given the name 'existentials,' and for the sake of inquiry they are a priori. They are not, then, experienced; rather they approximate Kant's categories in that they are presupposed in order to make intelligible the meaning of existence. The existentials, it must be remembered, do not reveal any entity, but the meaning of existence itself. It is through the a priori existeDtials alone that one can rationally and thematically inquire into the meaning of one's existence. A frequent mistake by commentators and critics is to s~e thes~ ex!stenti~s: theories about man's essence. They see, for example, Heidegger s dISCUSSIO~ anxiety or dread as constituting a certain bleak or nihilistic view oflife. Nothl' could be further from the point. When Heidegger speaks of the importance d dread, he is not opting for dread over happiness, he is merely showing that ~e\. discloses some crucial insights into the meaning of hun:an exi~tence .. ef~ certainly not a nihilist, since he is directly arguing that existence IS mea~iOg e and indeed open to rational inquiry. But certain dimensions of human. eXlst~~ can be analyzed clearly only through a comprehension of that peculiar hU to phenomenon known as dread. This is not to say that the 'true picture' ofmanlSed see him only in the perspective of dread, nor does it suggest that weIl-balanC/It and happy people are somehow dishones~ ~ith themsel.ves. I.t m~st be ~el1l:vel bered that Heidegger's purpose in descnbmg these existentials IS to disC
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,hat it means to exist. He is not, then, preaching a doctrine of nihilism or existentialism: he is carrying out an inquiry. A major part of Being and Time is an analysis of these existentials. In order to grasp the essence of Heidegger's thought it is necessary to sketch out the meaningofa few of the most important existentials.
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3.I.I Being-in-the-World Themost basic thing that can be said about the meaning of human existence is that it always takes place from a perspective of a world, so that the most elementalof all existentials is that one can be said to be in a world. This 'being-in' isnot a spatial or even cosmological concept; it is rather a sense one has about howone exists so that the environment is somehow a priori significant. In this sense, 'world' is more like its use in such phrases as 'the world of jazz' or 'the worldof Shakespeare' rather than the objective entity called the universe. One of thedimensions by which one is characterized in light of this a priori existential is facticity. By facticity Heidegger means that we always see ourselves as bound up withthe destiny of those entities we confront in our world; that human existence hasan element of ,give ness' within the world. Thus the world is not derived from experience, it is a priori presupposed as an existential of human meaning. This D worldis seen in a variety of ways, but human existence finds itself dealing with theworld in two basic ways: either by seeing it as ready-at-hand or present-athand. The former is the more primordial, and it refers to the state in which we simply use the objects within the world for their basic purpose. Thus when I wrenchthe doorknob to open the door I am seeing the knob as ready-at-hand; but ifI were to withdraw from such immediate dealing and reflect upon the kind of entitythat is the doorknob, I am apprehending it as present-at-hand. One can see animportant epistemological point being made in regard to the existential understanding: it is a mistake to deal with one's existence in the world as primarily substantial, for one substantizes only after one reflects and relates to the world in a secondary or derived manner. What is important in such existential analysis is that we discover what it means to exist so that we find ourselves always already 10 a world: the world is not built up after an awareness of the mind. This first existential, being-in-the-world, is the broadest and most inclusive of all the existentials, and because of this it is the least specific. The other existentials should be seen in the light of this first dimension of self-reflective existential analysis: before I am aware of anything else about myself, I am already in a world.

31.2 The 'Self' and the 'They' As a thinking and inquiring being I can recognize myself in the existential T or I ~~nl~~e myself in the existential 'they.' It is important to remember that the e :y ISa dimension of human meaning and hence cannot be seen as made up of l' s~~tiesor persons other than oneself. Rather, the 'they' is a characteristic of the e . By the 'they-self,' then, Heidegger means that mode of existing in which one

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is aware of oneself solely in terms ofw~a~ the impersonal chatter and distractin ~usyness ?f everydayn~ss presents. It IS Indeed a mode of existence so unreftec~ tive and distracted that It keeps true self-awareness from occurring. This mode' contrasted with the self that is aware of itself in which we relate to the vario~S S elements of our world in the various modes of our being. Thus, according t Heidegger, I can exist in such a way as to be authentically myself; but I can alsO exist in such a wa~ that my tr~e self is taken over by the chatter, ambiguity, an~ vague~ess ~f the I~personal the~.' Throughout all the ways I exist (i.e., in all the existentials) this threa~ of losing myself In the they-~elf is very real. Now many people have recognized that one can lose oneself In triviality: we don't need the net of Heidegger's language to tell us that. But Heidegger has taken this obvious.point and made it structurally intel~igible on the level of pure ontology. He has, In other words, taken the popular WIsdom and shown its true philosopj], cal roots. The lostness of one's self in the 'they' now becomes intelligible as a mode of existence, and a part of the overall structure of the existential analytic. 3.1.3 Disclosure The meaning of our existence is something which needs to be explained in terms of how we come to be aware of it. How is the meaning of our existence made manifest to us? Heidegger explicates a three-fold way in which our existence 'discloses' itself to us. These three elements of disclosure are a priori existentials and must be seen as ways of existing. They are: state-of-mind, understanding, and discourse.

3.1.3.1 In our state-of-mind we are disclosed in terms of our actuality, but such disclosure is not through factual investigation. Rather, one's actuality is made meaningful through moods. One finds oneself in a world, which, to a certain extent, is not of one's own doing; we are, to a certain extent, thrown into the world. Heidegger interprets this 'thrownness' as an existential of human existence, so that it cannot be understood merely as a psychological phenomenon. What he means by this special term is that dimension of our existence which, asa way of existing is already determined for us. The reader should not conclude from this that Heidegger is denying free will, nor is he asserting fatalism eitherin its classical metaphysical or in its modern existential sense. He is merely shoWing that there is a side to us which manifests our existence as being partly that over which we have no control. But this is only a part. 3.1.3.2 Understanding. Equiprimordial with state-of-mind is understanding Whereas state-of-mind reveals our actuality, understanding reveals our po~sibilities. One understands by projecting possibilities which are always one S own. This projection of possibilities through the understanding balances the ef influence of actuality achieved by the moods of our state-of-mind. Heidegg claims that state-of-mind discloses our facticity (that we are as we are) wher~ understanding discloses our existentiality (that our existence is in fact ours all made up of possibilities). 120

I ).1.3.3 Discourse. There. is a third ~ode by ~hich we disclose ourselves: discourse. In talk we ~rtJculate me~nIng,. gl:e It ~orm,. express ours~lves as J1leaningful. The capacity to speak IS equiprirnordial WIth understanding and tate-of-mind; that is, it is an essential way in which we are aware ofthe meaning ~four own existence. O What Heidegger says in each of his discussions of the three elements of ~ disclosure must always be seen in t~e I!g?t of the ov~r~1I perspective of ~isclosure. Thus one ought not to see the .Inclplent determinism ?f thrownness In o~r I state-of-mind as having any gre.ater Influence ~ha~ the exaItI~g.f~~edom found In the analysis of the understanding as the projection of possibilities. It must be remembered that these elements are parts of the total disclosure of our existence. Ho~ is it t~at our .existence manifests its:lf as meanin?ful? By our mood-domInated existence In response to our actuality, by the projection of our freepossibilities in response to our existentiality, and by the articulation of such meaning through talk. Heidegger thus describes human existence so that it can bemeaningful; and he has included in it those powerful but incomplete dimensionsof our awareness that make us actual, possible, and articulate. The meaningof our existence, after all, in order to be meaningful, must disclose itself to us. Suchdisclosure itself is a mode of existing.

3.1.4 Fallenness and Its Three Moments These modes of existence which constitute the disclosure of the meaning of our existence, are, of course, capable of hiding that meaning as well. There is no guarantee that our projections will succeed in always revealing us as we are; our moods can lead us astray, and our language can serve to cover up rather than reveal. These modes of the they-self, taken together, which represent disclosure of a self which hides its meaning, are called fallenness. That is, rather than genuinely talking, we can chatter in idle talk; rather than a true awareness of our possibilities we can engage in curiosity; rather than an acute awareness of our Ownfacticity we can be pleasantly clouded over in ambiguity. Each of these terms, idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity, are described by Heidegger in great detail, showing their a priori character as existentials. The awareness of this eXistential falleness is of supreme importance, for it shows us that the meaning of or utopian: the meaning of our existence is not - existence is not conceptual Something beyond us in any ideological sense. On the other hand, neither is it Pessimistic or founded solely on the description of mankind as it is, for the ~odality ofthe existentials permits the difference between success and failure. It IS,in fact, precisely because of the modality of existence that it can be made rnanifest, and hence understood. The existential disclosure, in its three moments o~state-of-mind, understanding, and discourse, as well as in the three moments ~ falleness, thus presents an intelligible view of existence which can now be OUghtabout. r 3.1.5 Care or Concern
l'he various existentials provide a structure by which one can see that existence 121

is meaningful. This structure requires that all the existentials have a unity about them so that there must be a perspective by which the totality of such existential meaning can be thought about. This ultimate existential Heidegger argues is care or concern. Its importance as the supreme existential lies in its capacity to ground and embrace both the authentic and inauthentic moments: it not only reveals the meaning of disclosure by which human existence becomes intelligi_ ble, but also how that existence becomes hidden, in which, through falleness, it turns away from itself. What this means is that whenever and in whatever wayI exist, such ways can be seen as ways of caring, even if that caring is for the wrong thing. Again, this caring should not be seen in terms of psychological states: to care is to exist. It is thus a dimension of ontology, an existential, an a priori form by which existence as such can be thought about. An important dimension of this argument is that the perspective of scientific observation of a value-neutral world is hereby made merely one among many and several ways of being, such that it can never be seen as the ultimate way to see reality. According to Heidegger, then, the ultimate existential meaning of our existence is to care. By this argument, the source of ultimate meaning does not come from any entity outside ourselves, but by a dimension of our own selfunderstanding. Any argument, then, which asserts that our meaning must rely on an ultimate being outside of and other than ourselves is here thrown into serious doubt. Oddly though, this is not an atheistic argument, though it is a denial of certain theistic arguments of meaning. Even less is this an argument for existential relativism, for the structure of care is universally significant and not peculiar to each individual. Heidegger finds the structure of ultimate reality in the very ways in which we exist. This is not a claim about the existence or the absence of anything, for the whole argument is that one reasons not through the assertions that there exists any kind of being, but that the meaning of being itself is directly open to inquiry. The ultimate in such inquiry is seen to be care: it is the fundamental existential by which such inquiry can be carried out.

3.1.6 Death . One of the most important of Heidegger's doctrines concerns his interpre~auo~ of human death: the bold and forthright way in which he grasps the realitv 0 one's finitude in death. In death we escape completely from the influence of~he they-self, since the they-self does not die. Although it is possible for me to hve someone else's life (in the sense that I never realize the meaning of my o;~ existence) it is not possible for me to die another's death. As we have seen, . c . anon In terms 0f .0ur existendisclosure of our existence has a three-to Id articu I _~ld tiality, facti city , and fallenness. The meaning of death follows this thre~ Des structure. The projection of possibilities through our understanding .consutu~at one's existentiality, and the existentiali.ty of death consists in thre~ ~hIngs:~~~ 011 my death is absolutely my own; b) that It cannot be shared; and c) It IScerta dthe other hand, one's facticity is known through states-of-mind, and the rooD of like state-of-mind which discloses death is dread. In dread we are aware

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nothingness, and such experiences show us our radical finitude: we are beings whichcan cease to be. The experience of dread, then, is an important characteristic of our understanding of ourselves, since it makes us aware of our finitude in a radical way. Dreadis not an experience of any thing; it is not fear, nor terror, nor fright, all of which have objects. Dread is that sense or awareness we sometimes feel of nothingness itself. It is through this mood of dread, then, that one's facticity of deathis revealed: we understand the facticity of what it means to be going to die byreflecting on the meaning of our experience of nothingness in dread. The third dimension of disclosure, fallenness, also plays its role in the understanding of death. The they-self seeks to keep us aware of our death, not by denying that we die, but by treating it always as something which occurs to others, and by diverting our attention away from its proper meaning. Although the they-self abandons us in death, it also keeps us from thinking about death properly. One's authentic relation to one's own death is that of anticipatory resoluteness: an eager and forward-looking acceptance of our finitude.

3.1.7 Guilt Before any enterprise can be thematic and capable of rational inquiry, it is necessary that there be a principle of determination based on opposites. Thus, in orderfor empirical claims to be meaningful, they must first admit of being either trueor false; in order for morals to be intelligible one must admit of the bad and thegood; with aesthetics one must admit the beautiful and the ugly. Thus an essential ingredient of Heidegger 's analysis of existence is that there must be someway in which existence has a negative. This negative cannot consist of not ?eing,for we do not deny existence when we realize its negativity. The negativuy of existence must be understood in terms of a response to the question: how canI exist negatively? Without this, the enterprise of existential analysis would be.impossible. Heidegger finds this negativity of existence in guilt. To explain thisone must first sketch out that phenomenon which awakens us to the reality of ourguilt: conscience. For Heidegger, conscience is of special value to the understanding of ourselvesbecause it is the call to guilt. As calling, it has four elements: that which calls, :hatWhichis called, that which is called about, and that which one is called to do. nconscience, each of these four dimensions of calling is a different way to be the self.The self calls the self about the self to be the self. With the aid ofHeidegger's analys he. the. IS, t e~e rour eleme.nts are ma.d~ more s~eclfic: the uncanny self calls to CoIn~uthentIc self about ItS authenticity to be Itself, i.e., to be authentic. Thus s (e.nsclenced~es not be.g or depend upon the existence of an entity outside itself Psg., God): In conscience we call ourselves to be guilty. Guilt is not a f/chol~gical phenomenon, but an a priori form of existence, and indeed that ~ ~~Ich provides one with the negativity to one's existence. ca UI!tIS not the result of having done a censurable act, it is rather the a priori pacIty to do so. It is that by which we can see ourselves as negative. In
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Heidegger's analysis it thus becomes that existential reality by which one grounds his own responsibility. It is also the very ground of our own meaningful. ness, for without this negativity to our existence there would be no meaning at all. Thus, when one accepts oneself as meaningful one necessarily wants to have a conscience, for without it one could not 'fail' at existing. In addition, uPon reflection it is clear that guilt, in this special sense of being an a priori existential comes prior to ethics. The traditional view argues that only after one believe~ that certain acts are wrong, can one, upon the performance of such action, feel guilty. But Heidegger's point is that, prior to the development of any system of right and wrong, there is already (hence: a priori) a need to succeed rather than fail at existing. The system of morals is merely that by which we seek to understand how to succeed and avoid failure. Thus, the awareness of one's being guilty is prior to any ethical or moral system, and indeed makes it possible. This is another example of the argument that an understanding of our existentiality is presupposed in any and all other disciplines, making the analysis of existence the fundamental or primary discipline of philosophy. Heidegger thus has four points about guilt: 1) it is the basis of negativity in existing, which is necessary for the rationality of our understanding; 2) being guilty makes one want to have a conscience, 3) only through guilt can one be authentic; and 4) guilt is prior to ethics. Thus it is in guilt rather than in death or nothingness that Heidegger finds I his existential negative. Again, this analysis, as in the case of death, opts for the, full embrace of our finitude, a constant theme in all of Heidegger's works.

3.1.8 Time

Sharing the title of his most famous work, time is the central key to Heidegger's ontology. From the analysis of the various existentials Heidegger discovers their unity in the phenomenon of caring. But caring has an ontological structure which grounds its existential significance. This ontological structure is the three-fold character of temporality. For Heidegger, temporality has three ecstases: pre~' ent, past, and future. These three ecstases are intelligible in terms of what It means to be, not in terms of metaphysical entities. Thus, to be such that one has a future is to anticipate, to project forwards and towards, and hence: to.be possible. To be such that one has a present is to be able to declare and establtsh situations, to be able to act. To be such that one has a past is to recollect, to reac: back into one's established meaning and to function within the establish:r structure of significance. As in the other modes of existence, the elements. temporality have both authentic and inauthentic dimensions. The termi~ology I; as follows. Authentic future is called anticipation; inauthentic future IS ca!le expecting. The distinction emphasizes the eagerness of the authentic gOlng~ l11 forward, whereas the inauthentic is merely that which awaits the future to cO ur to it. The authentic past is called repetition, which means that past becomes.~ , own, and we accept it as part of ourselves; the inauthentic past is fo~gett~b; which means that the past has faded in terms of our awareness and our belOg It' authentic present is called the Moment, in which action is accepted as one'S oW '

the inauthenti~ present is called making-present, which suggests a letting of events determine us rather than the other way around. What is important in this assignment of terms is that Heidegger describes the three ecstases of time in terms o~ what it means to ~e so that time has these three dimensions and that they all admit of the authentic-inauthentic distinction. For the fundamental ontologist, the normal view of time, which is made up of moments of absolute present (or instantaneous Nows) which come into existence and go out of existence, is merely ~ derived notion and philosophically unsound. In seeking to understand the rnearung of one's existence, it is necessary to see time as ways of existing, as ~rticulating our essential finitude in respect to the three-fold way in which we exist temporally. To be is thus to be in time. Since one's existentiality is, as we have seen, due to the projection of possibilities, the future is the most important of the three ecstases, and indeed the projection of possibilities is an ingredi.ent in each of the t?ree elements. Since one's meaning must be presupposed in most of our dealings, the past is the second most important; and the actual doing of things , which constitutes the present, is the least important of the three ecstas~s. This ranking emphasizes Heidegger's interest in possibilities, and shows his abandonment of the tradition which has ever seen the actual and the present as the foundation of metaphysics. For Heidegger, such thinking is misguided. With his analysis of the structure of temporality , Heidegger has shifted from a ~ere description of the ways we exist, to the fundamental understanding of what It.mean~ to be at all. Not only do the elements of temporality establish firmly the dll~enslOns of our finitude, they also provide an ultimate basis of meaning by which the v~rious ways we.exist can be grounded. To say that the proper answer tothe ~uestlOn of our meaning is our temporality is no idle remark; Heidegger has establIshed in a thematic way the dependence of the various existentials on a ~rO'perfoundation, and this foundation can only be our understanding of our hm~tedness in time. Although many readers and critics find much enthusiasm for Heldegger's analyses of dread, death, and care, it is his analyses of temporality that Pd .h . . rovr es one Wit the key element to his thought. To dISCUSShim without reference to his theory of time is always to misread him in a rather serious way.

3.1.9 History
he importance of temporality , of course, leads one to the inevitable concern for tThnatu e f h hi . I .. re 0 t e rstonca m man. If one IS essentially characterized in terms of h IStem pora I IS one t hen ti hi ity, en time-bound? Are the epochs and developments of v ~tory absolute, so that each age determines its own ultimate meaning and e~Ue? .To argue in this way is to assert historicism, the doctrine of the nonupernahty of human truths. Although Heidegger places a great deal of emphasis on the iznifi f . . . at sigm cance 0 time and history, he IS not an historicist. He does not gUeth t t h I d . ist a rut s are mute to epochal notions, he is not an historical relativist. It he~e, however, that Heidegger finds much of one's meaning relevant to one's I1tage, fate, and destiny. These three elements of one's historicality are not

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metaphysical, but ontological dimensions. His analysis of history is consistent with his other existential analyses: the question is not, what kind of thing is historical knowledge; nor is it, what kind of metaphysical forces are responsible for what has happened in the past; rather, the question is: what does it mean to be historical? It is only because I am already that kind of being which has a fate, a heritage, and a destiny, that I can be as a being with a past. The past is thus significant because of the a priori structure of my historicality, not the other way around. I am then radically an historical being; I am as historical. 3.2 Other Works

3.2.1 The Works on Fundamental Ontology Heidegger's original intention was to include in Being and Time an investigation of certain major figures within the history of philosophy, to show how the ontological difference has played such an important role in keeping the question of being limited to questions of mere entities. One of the most important figures in this regard is Immanuel Kant; and although Heidegger's analysis of Kant does not occur in Being and Time, the analysis does take place in a subsequent volume, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. The thesis of this latter work was to interpret Kant's critique in an inquiry into fundamental ontology. Heidegger interprets Kant as laying the groundwork for metaphysics, and by his transcendental deduction, shifting the major inquiry from the objects to what it means for us to know about them. Since Kant continually insists that his investigations are not cosmological but transcendental, there is a similarity to Heidegger's endeavors. To be sure, Heidegger does not think that Kant saw the full meaning of this shift, but he does find provocative Kant's insistence on the development of an ultimate discipline from which all other philosophical inquiries could be made. Kant's point, according to Heidegger, was something like this: I cannot, a priori, tell you anything about the world; all I can do is tell you how the mind goes about its business of organizing the data it receives through appearance. For Heidegger, this is the first step away from Cartesian substances; it emphasizes what it means to know rather than what is known. Parti~ularIy when Kant then recognizes that the only reality which the mind can think directly is that of freedom, Heidegger feels his great German predecessor was on the threshold of perceiving the ontological difference. But Kant withdrew from th e h . e boldness of his insight, and, according to Heiidegger, In t h e secon d e diti n oft d 110 Critique began once again to talk about things-in-themse~~es a.nd to fe~1the n~~e to 'refute idealism.' For Heidegger then, the first edition IS supenor t.o tS second. Kant is seen as struggling to achieve a fundamental ontology, with I true anchor being one's awareness offreedom.. .. wor~' This theme offreedom continued to fascinate Heidegger, and In his next . 0 . . thlnto' On the Essence of Ground he argues that the very Idea of grounding any ne which is a basic principle to all forms of human inquiry, when pressed leads Nl to the original awareness of oneself as free. Freedom is the essence of ground.

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othe~form~ of inq~iry must presuppose the nature of ground as its ultimate start~ngPOIn~,~u.t In fundamental ontology, freedom itself is thrown open to inqUIry,and It IS In the understanding of freedom that one understands what it meansto ~round some~hing. There is a strong intuitional support for Heidegger's argument In the reflection of the sense one has of being a cause in the case offree acts.so that this ?eing is more basic than any knowledge of another thing's power to [nfluence .actlOn. However, Heidegger's analysis is not epistemic (which wou~d leavey open to Hu~e's classic criticism of 'internal cause') but ontological:i.e., he ISconcerned with what it means to be free rather than how one can 'prove' the existence of freedom. Once more, if Heidegger is right about the argument that .freedom is the essence of ground, then fundamental ontology, the stU?yof what It me~ns to be at all, is the ultimate and primordial discipline from which~II others spn~g. To ground something, or to give reasons for things, is so essentialan element In all rational disciplines that the discovery of the essence of groundswould constitute this ultimate discipline. Heidegger has shown that the onlyapproach to the question of ground is through an inquiry into what it means tobe as a ground; i.e., what it means to be free.

3.2.2 Works on Language. A.fterhe publication of the three great texts on fundamental ontology (Being and t , TII~e, Kant and the Pr?bler:z ?f Metaphysics and On the Essence of Ground) Heidegger seems to shift his Interest considerably, writing several works on lang~age and poetry. This shift is one of emphasis only, however; for the purpose of~IS study of language is to inquire into how being manifests itself. Since H~lde~gerargues that the purpose of language is not to refer to objects or even pn.manlyto tell us about the world, but rather to articulate the meaning of our eXlste?Ce,it is easy to see how he would focus upon the language, not of the sClen~lst, ut of the poet. The poet speaks original language, the language of b I meanmg.Language is 'the house of being. ' Heidegger's interest in the problems of~a?guage and poetry has considerable range, for he wrote the essay 'On the OngIn the Work of Art' in 1935, 'Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry' in 1937 of ~ndOn the W~y to Language in 1959, with many other works on poetry and anguageboth In between and since. For Heidegger, poets 'name the Holy,' and they give utterance to what it e ~eansto be in a world, to be removed from the gods or God and they do so not '" clerelYas prac tititoners 0 f a era ft, b ut as thinkers. Heidegger" has established as . I e al~~e link betwee? poet and th.inke~as a~y philosopher has ever dared; but such a S Oflk makes sense In terms of his existential analytic. Poets are the true speakers ~tt~ngu.age, nd language ma~ifests our being. In 'On the Origin of the Work of a I ~orbBeld~ggerargues that ar~lsts ~peak, not merely the beautiful, but the truth. .' tho eautIful poetry and art gives hght, or better throws light on the meaning of ' IngS Th r h . ' th IS rg t ISnecessary for thought, so that poets literally think as they do 1r eoe ~rt, and their thinking thereby reveals the truth. This is in part acI11Phshedby the tension between 'earth' and 'world,' between one's being

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bound to the earth as the source of meaning, and surpassing it to the 'world' as ( the projection of possibilities. Man is, after ~ll, transcendence, and th~ meaning and truth of this transcendence cannot be articulated by a language which merely points out objects within the visible environment. If we see that to speak is that way to be in which we confront and bring forth our meaning, then language must always be more than any symbol of reference, and it must always be something more than what it describes. Heidegger analyses several poets, above all Hol. derlin, whom he considers the most philosophical of all poets; and in these analyses he shows how language awakens a sense of being which is open to thought beyond reference. For Heidegger, the poet's naming the Holy is an articulation of being, insofar as being eternalizes itself, letting original time forever be, thereby striking awe and terror in him who is aware of it. This is nota repudiation of man's finitude, as was established in Being and Time, but an authentic dimension to his finite existence by which he becomes aware of the meaning of eternality. 3.2.3 The Works on Thinking Consistent with his revolutionary analysis oflanguage as a way of being, Heidegger also recasts the very meaning of thinking along the same lines. One's understanding of thinking cannot be discovered through a mere consideration of formal rules, nor through the psychologically dubious criterion of certainty. Rather, thinking must be seen as that enterprise of the mind which lets the meaning of things and reality itself be. In a series of essays entitled What is Called Thinking? Heidegger argues, for example, that a cabinet-maker who lovingly lets the wood in his hands speak, who, through his skill brings forth the meaning of wood and lets it manifest itself, is more truly a thinker than a scientific worker who merely applies rules and establishes inferences. The cabinet-maker is more truly a thinker because, in thoughtfully concerning himself for the meaning of wood, he lets the reality of wood come forth in the world. This again ties thought much closer to the beautiful than to the accurate. For in the same work he goes so far as to quote Holderlin's poem on 'The Love of Socrates for Alcibiades,' in which the poet identifies the deepest thinker as the one who 'loves what is most alive.' This bold identification of loving with thinking almost suggests a similarity between Heidegger and the erotic ideality in Plato's wor~s on love. In the later sections of the same work, Heidegger reflects on Nietzsch~~ thought, emphasizing Nietzsche's insistence on going beyond the merely f culative elements in human reasoning and conc.erning r~ther t~e very nat~red~' reason as law-giver. In all of these essays Heldegger IS less Interested IO. veloping an epistemological theory than in exploring the creative and revealIng dimensions of human understanding. . tic In another work, H~idegger expands even f~rther.this essential charactefl:1l8 of thinking as that which lets the meamng of things SImply appear before us. ", work entitled. Gelassenheit (dubio~sly tra~slat~d in .Englis~ as f!isC?Urse Thinking) Heidegger develops the Idea of letting things be (which IS an

:p-

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( proximation of the meaning of the German title). By 'letting things be' Heidegger doesnot mean a mere passive attitude toward life, but a serious attempt to let the meaningof things be, i.e., to let what things really mean become known. In this sense,the cabinet-maker image is useful: by his work he lets the wood be. As an essential part of his reflections on thinking, Heidegger takes great pains toshow the extreme limits and, indeed, the very threat of technology on human thinking.Technology is not only not an instance of thinking; overconcern for its successes leads one away from true thinking. In his constant attacks against the technological attitude, many critics have seen an anti-scientific or even irrationalistic attitude in Heidegger. This is an erroneous interpretation. To understand the limits of science is not to hate science: to argue for dimensions of thinkingwhich go beyond the calculus of inferences is not irrationalism. Much thatis truly characteristic of Heidegger's thinking can be discovered in these smallessays on thought, for in them he espouses the basic doctrine which was manifesteven in Being and Time; for the inquirer it is possible to ask questions aboutthe meaning of existence, and these questions require a greater attunement tohow the world speaks to us in all the various ways in which one exists, rather thanmerely observing objects in a detached way. 3.2.4 The Works on Major Philosophers , Continuinghis attack on the tradition of metaphysics, Heidegger had published severalworks on major philosophers, interpreting them in what he admits is a somewhat violent manner, in order to show how the previous thinkers were capableof throwing light on the meaning of being, even though they were bound by the limitations of metaphysical language. Aside from Kant, about whom Heideggerhas written three major works, and Nietzsche, who is the subject of severalstudies and a two-volume work with his name as title, Heidegger has also w~ittenseveral works on Hegel, and one on Schelling. Readers of these works WII.I find much more of Heidegger than of the philosopher about whom he is wntmg.For example, a major part of the two-volume work entitled Nietzsche is adiscussion of European nihilism. But since Nietzsche's major influence con~:rnst.he probl~m of ?ihilis~, this topic is a.part of Nietzsche's thought, and is nee Included In Heidegger s analysis of him. Thus, Heidegger's treatment of I~~historyof philosophy is by no means ever meant to be a treatment of what the 1 In~ersthemselves have thought, but rather, what their thinking evokes conce~nmghe question of being. This cannot be seen as a defect, since it is precisely t IV at Heidegger intends and states as his purpose.

I 4.

liE} DEGG

ER

ON

ULTIMATE

REALITY

AN D

MEA N I NG

~ 10 ~~eldeg~er,

I Fo

the ~uesti~n of ultimate reality and meaning can only be referred ~t ?se pnmary dimensions of human existence which go to make up the ou~~hgibility f all the things ~e are and d? ~ny refere~ce to something outside o elves as the source of ultimate meanmg IS thus senously questioned, if not

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thoroughly undermined philosophically. A closer look, then, at the nature of his argumentation is advisable. Heidegger's anti-substantive argumentation has a precedent in Kant's refuta. tion of Descartes' cogito . Since the argument is so similar, it is worthwhile to recall the earlier thinker's formulation. Descartes, as we remember, had argUed in the following manner. Because I think, it follows that I am an existing and thinking thing. From the awareness of my own consciousness it follows that there must be a kind of thing which thinks and which actually exists. For Descartes, then, whatever must be accepted as true by the mind must be due to the kind of thing that it is; no inference is true unless there are substances about which the inference is made. His argument has the following structure: I think, therefore I am; therefore I am a thinking thing. Kant calls this argument a paralogism. He admits the first but denies the second inference, recognizing the first as a purely formal inference, whereas the second is a substantial one. Why, Kant asks, is it necessary for me to attribute substantial reality to my cognitive awareness of myself? Surely the concept 'thing' is added spuriously to the' argument without sufficient justification. For Kant, the idea that one adds the category 'substance' to such understandings is due to the a priori apparatus by r which I interpret my experiences within the world of appear~nce, which is invalid without experience. Thus it is an unwarranted assumption that purely cognitive enterprises can establish a direct intuition of the real world. Kant's argument against Descartes is revealing of Heidegger's ar~ument for the ontological difference. Heidegger simply takes the argumentation of the paralogism and extends it ultimately to the very inquiry into the meaning of existence. Not only is it wrong for Descartes to substantize the ego found in the coglto , it is equally wrong to substantize whenever the mind considers the nat~re of ultimate reality. To say of any meaningful existence that there must ~e a kind of thing which exists in such a way is to commit the fallacy of a paralogism ona cosmological rather than a psychological level. The reason for this is that our understanding of ultimate reality is never about things at all, but about ways to exist. The classical argument that one's existence therefore needs a special and ultimate kind of entity outside itselfto ground its meaning (whether it be God or Matter or even Mankind in the abstract) is hereby denied. Since, according to Heidegger, I can think about ultimate reality independently of any entity whatsoever it is invalid to argue that the awareness of meaning implies the eXlsten.~ of any entity. Heidegger's argument is quite forceful: in order to make his pOint all he needs to do is to show that there is a kind of reasoning about mo~es to existence. For, ifthere is such reasoning, then it is obvious that it is pOSSibleY r reason without reference to entities, but if that is possible, then any nece~sais inference which establishes that entity on the basis of an awarenes~ of.mea~:~es invalid. Thus Heidegger' s.actual accomplishment ~f modal. reasonmg mval~ :niY any metaphysical reasonmg about ultimate entities. This argument no tslll discredits the classical and metaphysical proofs for the existence of God bu we classical cosmologies, including the mat~r~alists and the humanists. Th.U~ argumentation is neither atheistic nor theistic. Not the former for that main
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thatthere is no special kind of supreme entity, and that the absence of this entity ssomehow relevant to man's existence. Not the latter, for that maintains that :heexistence of the special entity grounds meaning. Nevertheless at this point it might seem that Heidegger argues atheistically, sincehe denies the necessary existence of any entity whatsoever. But as we shall see, such a judgment is completely misguided. The question of God can be reintroduced on the level of modal awareness: are there certain ways to exist, suchas to worship or to be in awe of the holy, which, as essential dimensions of our existence, make up the structure of our being? As we shall see shortly, Heidegger does establish these modes. The error, however, would be to argue thatJrom these modes one can then establish the ultimate referent of meaning to a special kind of entity beyond us. There may indeed be a God or gods who are somehowresponsible for the fact that we exist, but they (or He) cannot, in terms ofour existential make-up, ever be the source of ultimate reality and meaning, sincethat must always be found in our existentiality. The very form of the ultimate question must therefore be changed. Suppose oneasks the question: What is the purpose of man? (Or: why do I exist?) Such r questions seduce the mind to seek beyond itself, for the question as formulated demandsa response to the further question: for whose purpose does man exist? God's? Even to ask the question in its more direct form exposes the same orientation toward substance metaphysics: when I ask, 'why do I exist?' I am presupposing that there is some external ground needed to explicate my existence. But one can answer such questions in the negative: man has no purpose; hehas rather a meaning. To deny purpose, when understood properly, is as far fromnihilism as one can get. It is not by accident that the Aristotelian notion of the final cause leads I inevitably to a metaphysics of substances; and Aristotle's insistence that final cause is the highest form of causality supports his doctrine of ousia. But it is likewiseobvious that Plato's doctrine offormal cause does not lead to a substantive metaphysics (for the Forms are not substances, in spite of what Aristotle says about them), and in the Platonic dialectic one can speak about ultimate meaningwithout reference to kinds of things. In this sense Heidegger is more Platonicthan Aristotelian. The ultimate question for Heidegger is not: what is mypurpose? but rather, What does it mean to exist? This formulation is more ultimate precisely because even if I were able to answer the question as to t rurpose, the question of 'what it means' could still be asked. The proper answer t~.thepur~ose-question is: I have no purpose, if by purpose one means somepIng OutSide of me somehow justifying my existence. Doorknobs have puro~es, and so do typewriters, because they are used for the sake of something s kerthan themselves. But man is himselfthat 'for-the-sake-of' and is not for the : e of anything else. Otherwise the doctrines of determinism and fatalism p:Uld be inevitable. It is precisely because I can deny that I have any external it rpose that I have any meaning at all. Thus the ultimate question is: What does tnean to be? lieidegger's answer to this is care. The meaning of my existence lies in the
I

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structure of my caring. This formulation does not beg the existence of the I supreme entity outside of me. It focuses rather on the structure of m.y existence as intelligible. It is also a question that can be carried out, as Heidegger has actually done in Being and Time. The variou~ w.ays to be manifest th~msel~es in I a structure, and according to the supreme principle of success and failure: i.e., I can exist in such a way that the meaning of my existence is covered up (I can be not-myself: inauthentic) or I can exist in such a way as to let my meaning present itself to me (I can be myself: authentic). Hence, there is already a structure of intelligibility about my existence before I ask about my relation to anything else in the world whether it be to other people, to objects, or to God. Thus it is because my existence already matters to me (i.e., it is because I already care) that such things as my relationship to God or to the world concern me at all. If we recall the earlier discussion about how guilt comes before ethics this point can be anchored in the actual working-out of the existential analytic. We must first be guilty, i.e., we must first be able to care about doing right before we concern ourselves with which actions and deeds are commendable. To care is the ultimate presupposition for ,any inquiry into meaning whats?ever. Ther~ is r nothing more basic about man s mquiry into anything than his fear of being meaningless. As Nietzsche puts it: man would rather have the void for his I meaning than be void of meaning. Heidegger has shown this ultimate dime~sion which is presupposed by all other inquiry to be to care. Therefore, the ultimate reality and meaning is our own caring, for without that, even our concerns for \ God and the world would not make sense. This doctrine, however, is about as far from humanism and modernity as can possibly be imagined. It is precisely because my existence does matter to me that I cannot accept nihilism (that the.re is no meaning) or humanism (that man as object is the concern of man). There IS, for Heidegger, in the structure of one's existentiality an enormous sense. of awe for the very question that forfeits cosmological metaphysics: What do~s It mean to exist? This question does not make the in~uiry earth-bound or pro~alc. F~r~: awe of things greater than us (even to a certam extent, our own meanmg, whic somehow 'beyond' us) sponsors profound questions of finitude and care for greatness and an awareness that there is more to reality than what we are as nce actual beings, even if the ultimate question of our reality is grounded in co ; or care. After all, one of the essential ways we exist is to wonder, and that which we wonder is a part of our understanding of ourselves. !be For Heidegger, it is not the scientific kind oflanguage which should at~ra~oSI philosopher's attention, but the language of the poet, ~ho names th~ H~:'rnan'S thoughtful men recognize, for example, that there IS more meamng I dill understanding of his finitude and more awe for supreme reality to be foun !be . A ., entsfor Bach'sMassorWagner'sGotterdiimmerungthanm qumas argum . ~"l . B t is thiS II" existence of God. The arts tell us what It means to be what we are. u I gbl. . . emotionalism? By no means. Heidegger IS not su bsti stitutmg fiee li tng c r thOU 10 d)ill I The undisciplined emotionalism of one's 'feeling' a truth (or even a falseh~o t of . an artwork does not exhaust the meaning 0f art any more t han one s 'feelIng an one'

certitude has anything to do with scientific proof. The question is not what one feels psychologically in the presence of the artwork or poetic language, but what the artwork provokes in our thinking about our meaning. The inevitable ideality in art and poetry is not a species of emotional intensification but a form of dialectic by which the form or ideal of something is projected by means of the artist's skill and understanding. We learn to think precisely because the beauty of the artwork has provoked our a wareness of meaning beyond the actual. Thus the very meaning of divinity or eternality presupposes the structure of care. It is only because I already (a priori) care about the meaning of my existence that I can be awed by the almighty, that I can worship the beautiful, seek the truth, and emulate the good. If the ground of my meaning were de pendenton an entity beyond myself, my understanding of that relationship would be either impossible or totally servile. To be sure, Heidegger's analysis of human existence and the meaning of being does not (and ought not) to make reference to the divinity; but those who respect such things can find no source of alienation in Heidegger's thought. He is not specifically theistic any more than he is atheistic. Hehas argued that the supreme or ultimate source of reality and meaning is one's own concernful awareness ofthe meaning of existence. He has also shown how such a concern can be thematically carried out through fundamental ontology, and how such concerns are in part the result of the thought of the artist and the craftsman. But it is only because of the ultimacy of meaning that ideas such as worship and awe are possible. Further, it must be emphasized that Heidegger's philosophy does not constitute an ideology or even, strictly speaking, a doctrine. His is essentially an inquiry, and as such must be seen in the great tradition of philosophers who continually seek to understand their meaning rather than to establish doctrines of one sort or another. It is true that one must answer the question: what is Heidegger's theory of ultimate reality and meaning? with a definite and non-equivocal response that emphasizes one's understanding of one's existence in terms of care - that care is the ultimate source of our understanding of meaning and reality - but this cannot be seen as a psychological doctrine. It is rather a genuinely philosophical truth, in that it makes intelligible our continual searching for truth, our eternal longing for meaning, our worship of the beautiful, and even more amazingly, our final acceptance and embracing of our own finitude.

I{eidegger, . 1927. Sein und Zeit. 7th edition, Tiibingen: Neomarius Verlag. Engl.: 1962.Being and M .... 19T1rneNew York: Harper and Row. . 29. Vom Wesen des Grundes. Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann. Engl. 1969. The Essence of .... 19R.easons.Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press. 49. 'Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry' in Existence and Being Chicago: Regnery, pp. 293-315.

_ _ _ _ _

1951. Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. Frankfurt am Main: V. Kolstermann. Engl.: 1962. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1954. Was heisst denken? Tiibingen: Max Niemeyer. Engl.: 1968. What is Called Thinking? New York: Harper and Row. 1959a Gelassenheit. Pfullingen: Gunther Neske. Engl.: 1966. Discourse on Thinking. New York: Harper and Row. 1959b. Unterwegs zur Sprache. Pfullingen: Gunther Neske. Engl.: 1971. On the Way to Lan. r guage. New York: Harper and Row. 1961. Nietzsche. Pfullingen: Gunther Neske. 1971. 'Origin of the Work of Art' in Poetry, Language and Thought. New York: Harper and Row, pp. 17-87.

4.1
Max Scheler: A Descriptive Analysis of the Concept of Ultimate Reality
ManfredS. Frings, DePaul University, Chicago, Ill., U.S.A.

I. INTRODUCTION

MaxScheler, a German philosopher, was born in Munich on August 22, 1874. Afterhaving received his doctorate under Rudolph Eucken at lena, 1887, and after having completed his Habilitation there in 1899, he began teaching philosophyfirst at lena and then at Munich. Due to a divorce from his first wife he losthis teaching position in Munich in 1910. It was only in 1919 that he became professor of philosophy at the University of Cologne, where he was also appointeddirector of the Institute of Sociology. In 1928 he accepted a new position atthe University of Frankfurt on the Main, which, however, was understood to be only a stepping-stone before taking over the then prestigious chair of philosophyat the University of Berlin. But Scheler died in Frankfurt on May 19, 1928, shortly after the first session of a lecture series that he had also delivered elsewhere, entitled: 'The Idea of Peace and Pacifism.' In his metaphysics, one of MaxScheler's main concerns was the determination of ultimate reality. The Collected Works of Max Scheler (Francke Verlag, Berne and Munich) When completed will comprise fourteen volumes. Throughout his works thus far PUblished some influences can be found on Scheler by his contemporaries in the fieldsof psychology, sociology and phenomenology. However, such influences wereonly utilized by him to provide new directions of thought supplementing his o~n philosophy. Although Scheler had developed basic concepts of his own in P enomenology prior to his first meeting with Edmund Husserl in 1901, he ~ern~ined indebted to the latter for some insights contained in Husserl's sixth oglcalInvestigation. F: In.his first two major works: Phenomenology and Theory of Sympathetic /Z~lngS and of Love and Hate (1913) and Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal st lCSof Values (1913/16) Scheler's own objectives in phenomenological rei~rc~ are apparent. In contrast to other phenomenologists of his time he f~~Shgated wide ranges of man's emotive experience such as the community of all lng, fellow feeling, emotional contagion and psychic identification, and oVeall, love. While his work on sympathy, which was substantially enlarged in