The True Story of How the Soldiers Won the Battle and the Generals Lost Iraq in 1991

A Presentation by Douglas Macgregor, Colonel (ret) U.S. Army Author Naval Institute Press, 2009

10 March 2010

"The political object is a goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose."
Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege

Why are you stopping? asked the Republican Guard commander who was now a prisoner of war in the hands of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment. Why do you not go to Baghdad? You have the power. Your army rules the heavens and the earth In a voice filled with more anguish and frustration than fear, my new Iraqi prisoner of war looked me straight in the eye and said in heavily accented English, Major, you must go to Baghdad and end this. You must save Iraq . . . . . . Along the 73 Easting in the Iraqi desert 2200 hours, 26 February 1991

28 February 1991

Desert Storm, as the 1991 Gulf War is known, was publicized to the American people and to the world as a total victory and a triumph of American military might. But the truth was there for anyone interested in finding it.

The gate's closed What isn't escaping is heavy tanks, what isn't escaping is artillery pieces I'm talking about the gate that closed on the war machine that is out there.
General Norman Schwarzkopf, CDR, U.S. Central Command,

25 March, 1991 According to the new estimates, which represent a consensus view among CIA, DIA and NSA, about 700 of Iraq's estimated 4,550 tanks in southern Iraq and Kuwait escaped. About 1,430 of Iraq's 2,880 armored personnel carriers are now believed to have escaped... American generals say they have accomplished their mission and show no interest in reopening hostilities.
Michael Gordon with Eric Schmitt, After the war; much more armor than US believed fled back to Iraq, The New York Times, 25 March, 1991.

27 March 1991 In addition, the general (Schwarzkopf) said in the interview, major Republican Guard units had "bugged out" before the main attack by American forces and crossed the Euphrates River When the shooting stopped, the general said, he was "suckered" by Iraqi military commanders who asked for and received permission to fly helicopters over Iraq.
Patrick E. Tyler, After the War; Schwarzkopf Says Truce Enabled Iraqis to Escape, The New York Times, 27 March 1991.

The first Bush administration's decision to abandon the March uprising was a mistake of historic proportions. With U.S. help, or even neutrality, the March uprising could have succeeded, thus avoiding the need for a second costly war An American may understand what happened in 1991 as carelessness inexcusable, but not malicious. An Iraqi Shiite saw a superpower that called for a rebellion and then ensured its failure.
Peter Galbraith, The Ghosts of 1991, 30 November 2006.

1 March April 1991. Postwar Iraqi Uprising crushed by loyalist forces spearheaded by the Iraqi Republican Guard. 27 August 1992 Operation Southern Watch established.

Just as World War II began where World War I left off, Operation Iraqi Freedom began where Desert Storm ended in 1991.

7 October 1994. 80,000 Iraqi troops including two veteran Republican Guard divisions move South toward Kuwaiti Border. Madeleine K. Albright tells the UN Security Council Iraq might soon have some 60,000 troops and 1,000 tanks poised to attack Kuwait. U.S. responds putting 36,000 troops on planes and setting another 160,000 in motion. (SH plays yo-yo with US) 1 January 1997 Operation Northern Watch established. 31 October 1998 President Clinton signs the Iraqi Liberation Act into law. December 1998. Iraq accepts U.N.-sponsored oil-for-food program. 16 December 1998. Operation Desert Fox: a four-day bombing campaign against Iraq. Stated goal: Disrupt Saddam's grip on power. Air strikes by US and UK forces continue weekly into 2001. (7-14 tons per month on average) June 2002 March 2003. Operation Southern Focus. (54.6 tons dropped on Iraq in September 2002) 16 October 2002. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution enacted. 20 March 2003. Operation Iraqi Freedom Begins.

By 2000, Arab leaders realized Saddam was more popular with their subjects than they Diplomatically, the U.S. was more in a box than Iraq.
Angelo Codevilla, Advice to War Presidents, (Basic Books, 2009), page 107.

What people said before 17 January 1991:

Third U.S. Army Personnel Command estimates VII Corps will take 20,000 casualties in the first five days of fighting the Iraqi Army.
Richard Swain, Lucky War. Third Army in Desert Storm, page 205

Nobody wanted another Vietnam.

General Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesnt Take a Hero, page 427

The White House had been accustomed over the years to the military coming in with very large force requirements for contingency plans. This was clearly partly out of caution, but there was also the perception at times it was to dissuade the President from action.
Robert M. Gates, Deputy National Security Advisor, 1990, The Generals War, page 154.

If Saddam withdraws with most of his forces intact, we havent really won.
Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor, 1991 from A World Transformed, page 473.

Franks (LTG, VII Corps CDR) couldnt make a decision to pee if his pants were on fire.
Unnamed officer quoted by Rick Atkinson in Crusade: The Untold Story of the Gulf War, page 255.

Iraqi tank crews can fire every 8 to 10 seconds from a static defensive position, but are unable to hit targets beyond 500 meters and nothing that moves.
Lieutenant Colonel (ret), Israeli Defense Force, quoted in Armor Magazine, 1990.

Attack Iraqi political-military leadership and command and control; gain and maintain air superiority; sever Iraqi supply lines, destroy chemical, biological and nuclear capability; destroy Republican Guard forces in the Kuwaiti Theater; liberate Kuwait.
U.S. Central Command Operations Order 91-001, 17 January 1991

Pin (the Iraqi Republican Guard) with their backs against the sea, then, go in and wipe them out Once theyre gone be prepared to continue the attack to Baghdad.
General Norman Schwarzkopf, November 1990.

U.S. and Iraqi Land Forces January February 1991:

Iraqi ground forces in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (South of the Euphrates River) included 540,000 troops organized into 12 armored and 30 other divisions including 4550 tanks plus 2,880 armored fighting vehicles (most with 1960s-vintage Soviet and Chinese equipment). 80,000 man Iraqi Republican Guard Corps equipped with 1970 era Soviet tanks, BMPs and artillery. By 21 February 1991 when U.S. and allied ground forces attack into Iraq, Iraqi forces South of the Euphrates were reduced through air attack and desertion to 280,000 troops. On 21 February 1991, Coalition forces numbered 840,000 men and nearly 8,000 tanks. U.S. ground forces consisted of 116,000 soldiers in the XVIII Airborne Corps, 110,000 soldiers in the VII Corps and 107,000 Marines. The VII Corps, under LTG Frederick Franks Jr., was deployed to the right of XVIII Airborne Corps and consisted of the 1st Infantry Division (mechanized), 1st and 3rd Armored divisions, the British 1st Armored. Div., the U.S. 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment and the U.S. 11th Aviation Brigade.

2nd Cavalry in the VII Corps Attack Across Southern Iraq 23-24 February 1991

PL MILLER PL LONESTAR PL LITE OBJ GATES OBJ MAY

Republican Guard
Basrah

PL CORONA PL COORS

OBJ MERREL
Redfox Forward Reconnaissance Element

Kuwait City

OBJ FEUCHT PL DIXIE

PL Blacktop

PL COLT

Limit of Advance on 25 Feb. 1991 at 1000 hours.

PL BUSCH PL BUD
Cougar Battlegroup (Main Body)

Limit of Advance on 24 Feb. 1991 at 1700 hours

Limit of Advance on 24 Feb. 1991 at 1000 hours

PL BECKS

Kuwait

Limit of Advance on 23 Feb. 1991 at 1500 hours

Saudi Arabia

PL HARPS

XX 3
(3rd Armored Division) PL TANGERINE

PL LIME; Planned limit of Advance for the 2nd Cavalry.

XX 2
(Cougar)

X TAW
TAWALKANA REPUBLICAN GUARD BRIGADE

Plan resulting from decision by LTG Franks late on 25 February to move 2nd Cavalry back into the fight on 26 February.

II 3
(Wolfpack)

52nd
BRIGADE OF 52nd ARMORED DIVISION IRAQI ARMY

XX

II 1
(War Eagle)

(1st Infantry Division (mechanized))

XX XX 1 UK
(1st British Armored Division)

Rear Guard Covering Iraqi Republican Guard Corps Withdrawal

Cougar Battle Group Combat Power Soldiers - 1,100 M1A1 Abrams Tanks 42 Armored Fighting Vehicles (Bradleys) 41 155mm Self Propelled Howitzers 8 4.2 Mortars mounted in M113s 6 M113A2 12

Republican Guard Brigade Combat Power Soldiers 2,100 to 2,300 (estimated) T-72 Tanks 70 (estimated since tanks from Armored Fighting Vehicles (all types) 80+ Artillery Systems (all types) 20+ Trucks 40-50

Versus retreating units mixed in during fighting)

Cougar Squadron in the Box Formation on 26 February 1991 XX Ten Kilometer Zone of attack. Box Formation was ten kilometers deep.

Fox Troop

Ghost Troop

Direction of Movement toward 73 Easting

Hawk Company

Eagle Troop

II Dragoon Base issued a new fragmentary order (FRAGO) around 0522 hours to the regiment: 2nd ACR [Armored Cavalry Regiment] attacks East to fix Tawalkana Mechanized Division; on order, 1 ID [1st Infantry Division] passes through 2nd ACR to continue the attack East acknowledge, over! Cougar 32, I said very slowly and deliberately, be careful what you report to Dragoon. Be accurate, but dont give Dragoon Base an excuse to stop us, over.

3AD 59 XX 2nd Cavalry

68

Situation between 1600 and 1700 hours Ghost Troop

2 T72
Ghost 1st Platoon Scout Section destroys T72s in sandstorm
05

3AD XX 2nd Cavalry

73

Ghost 3rd Platoon Scouts Arrive 1620 hrs. 2nd Platoon Tanks attack at 1630.

3 T72 13 BMP

1618 hrs Cougar attacks East toward 70 Easting

MINES

Forward Line of Troops along the 73 Easting 1645 hrs.

3 T72s

17 T72 18 BMP 1640 hrs Eagle Troop Smashes through Brigade Defense to 73 Easting Eagle Troop destroys battalion + and consolidates along 73 Easting 1645-1700 hrs.

Eagle Troop

1618 hrs Eagle Troop Punches Right to attack main defense.

MINES

MINES 29 T72 2 T55 11 BMP 3 MTLB 1 SA13

00

Cougar II Wolfpack

MINES

1 T72 1 BMP

3rd Armored Division Zone of Attack

2nd Cavalrys Limit of Advance 1700 hrs 26 Feb to 0600 hrs 27 Feb along the 70 Easting

73 Easting

Actual Cougar Deployment along the 73 Easting from 1643 to 0600 hrs

Fox Troop

Ghost Troop

Note: Caisson Batterys Gun Platoons were positioned immediately behind Ghost and Eagle Troops. Hawk Company

Eagle Troop

Heavy Black Line Marks Cougar Squadrons Positions Along the 73 Easting after 1700 hours 26 February

2nd Squadron

ll
3rd Squadron

Iron Troop

N E

Forty minutes after Eagle Troop attacks, Iron Troop attacks to 73 Easting, then falls back behind 70 Easting, 2nd Cavalry Limit of Advance.

Counterattack
(1700 hrs)

4 T 72 tanks, 10 BMPs + BRDMS

73 Easting
Bradley Fighting Vehicle with Scout Squad

Red 1 (Garwick) White 1 (Kilgore)

COLT Abrams Tank Ghost 6 Ghost 5 (Sartiano) (Mecca) BMP Bunker Green 1 (Kinsley) Ghost FIST (Deskevich)

Blue 1 (Hanes)

BMP Bunker

Mortars (SFC Newman)

Actions in Ghost Troop Zone of Attack along the 73 Easting 1700 to 2100 hours, 26 February 1991
70 Easting, 2nd Cavalry Limit of Advance

Eagle Troop

73 Easting

Tactical Outcome
Cougar Squadron destroyed 93 Enemy tanks in its zone of attack along with a hundred armored fighting vehicles and trucks. After the battle, more than 500 Republican Guards surrendered. How many died is unknown, but at least 1,100 is a reasonable estimate. Cougar Squadron lost one Bradley Fighting Vehicle to enemy fire, one man killed and two wounded.
NOTE: VII Corps used less than 15 percent of the 70,000 tons of ammunition at its disposal.

Strategic Outcome
In ten years, well be back.
The Soldiers of Cougar Squadron, 2nd Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment in May 1991.

Each service was allowed to attack the way it preferred, with little thought about how an attack in one area would affect the fighting in another. Schwarzkopf yielded too unthinkingly to the Marines demand that they be given a major piece of the war and accepted more than he would later acknowledge Franks mindset that the Iraqis were a determined enemy that was prepared to stand and fight.
Lieutenant General Mick Trainor and Michael Gordon, The Generals War, page 432.

Desert Storms Military Legacy

Measured in 2010 dollars, the Korean War cost $393,000 per year for every person deployed. And the Vietnam conflict cost $256,000. By contrast, the Iraq and Afghanistan commitments have cost $792,000 per year per person.
Carl Conetta, The Pentagons Runaway Defense Budget, AntiWar.com, 4 March 2010

When Lieutenant General William Wallace, Cdr of the U.S. Armys V Corps, and Major General David H. Petraeus, Cdr of the 101st Airborne Division met on 27 March 2003 at a site near Najaf, only five days after American forces began the attack to Baghdad, the generals were deeply pessimistic. As far as they were concerned, the war was in dismal shape.
Rick Atkinson, Peter Baker and Thomas E. Ricks, Confused Start, Decisive End, Washington Post, April 13, 2003, page A01.

The American people dont fully realize whats going on, said the 27 year old Staff Sergeant from Buffalo, New York. They just know back home what the higher-ups here tell them. But the higher-ups dont go anywhere, and actually they only go to the safe places, places with a little bit of gunfire. They dont ever (expletive deleted) see what we see on the ground.
Joshua Partlow, I Dont Think This Place is Worth Another Soldiers Life, The Washington Post, 27 October 2007, page A10.

Cash is my most important weapon in the war on terror.

General David Petraeus, Commander, U.S. Central Command

Desert Storms Military Legacy

(continued)

Sergeant Nels Andrew Moller, Ghost Troop, 2nd Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment killed 26 February 1991.

The distant rear of an army engaged in battle is not the best place from which to judge correctly what is going on in front.
General U.S. Grant, Memoirs of U.S. Grant, page 152.

The battle of 73 Easting offers conclusive evidence that a much more aggressive advance across Southern Iraq by the Armys VII Corps would have cut off any attempted retreat by the Republican Guard Divisions leading to their destruction or surrender in a larger corps-size battle on the model of Cougar Squadrons fight along the 73 Easting, solving many of Americas geopolitical concerns without occupying Iraq. Understanding why Desert Storm failed to achieve its true strategic aims in 1991 and why operations since 2001 in Afghanistan and Iraq have been frustrating and expensive, means grasping the difference between the soldier who fights and the generals who command: No amount of courage and competence at the soldiers level can compensate for deficiencies of leadership and character at the general officer level.