Europe as a global actor: empire by example?

JAN ZIELONKA This article will analyse the EUs efforts to spread its norms and extend its power in various parts of the world.1 It will argue that this effort is truly imperial in the sense that the EU tries to impose domestic constraints on other actors through various forms of economic and political domination, or even formal annexations.2 The effort has proved most successful in the EUs immediate neighbourhood, where it has enormous political and economic leverage and where there is a strong and ever growing convergence of norms and values. However, in the global arena, where actors do not share European norms and the EU has limited power, the results are quite limited. Consequently, it is not only Europes ethical agenda that is in limbo; some basic social preferences across the EU also seem unsustainable. Can Europe maintain, let alone enhance, its environmental, labour or food safety norms without forcing global competitors to embrace them?3 As Harold James rightly argued, the imperial analogy offers a good way of describing the development of power on the basis of inequality and its use to handle cultural diversity.4 The imperial analogy also helps to conceptualize the EUs evolving nature as an actor. Different actors apply power differently and have a different approach to alien values. The article will analyse the unique ways in which the Union tries to handle power and norms in the international arena and will assess their efficacy. In conclusion I will argue that although the Union has a global economic reach it is not in a position to impose on other actors its preferred model of economic and political cooperation. The challenge the EU faces, therefore, is not only how
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For definitions of power and norms, see David Baldwin, Power analysis and world politics: new trends versus old tendencies, World Politics 31: 2 (1979), pp. 16194; Zaki Ladi, La norme sans la force. Lnigme de la puissance europenne (Paris: Presses de Sciences Politiques, 2005), esp. pp. 4954. Most scholars agree that these are the basic characteristics of empire, but disagree on other matters. For typologies of empires see e.g. S. N. Eisenstadt, Political systems of empires (New York: Free Press, 1963), pp. 1012. See also Alexander J. Motyl, Imperial ends: the decay, collapse, and revival of empires (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), pp. 1820; Herfried Mnkler, Empires: the logic of world domination from ancient Rome to the United States (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), pp. 117. The concept of norm used here refers to a freely accepted process of harmonization of actors preferences in order to advance common interests by strictly adhering to a certain number of rules. A vast body of such norms is already agreed within the EU, but it is not shared by the EUs global economic competitors such as the United States, Japan, China, Brazil or India. See Zaki Ladi, The normative empire: the unintended consequences of European power, Garnet Policy Brief 6, Feb. 2008, p. 1. Harold James, The Roman predicament: how the rules of international order create the politics of empire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 4.

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Jan Zielonka to enhance its global power, but also, indeed primarily, how to export rules and norms for which there is limited demand among the existing and emerging global players. In other words, Europe should try to become a model power rather than a superpower, to use David Milibands expression. 5 This is a daunting task, because the outside world looks ever less European, and Europe lacks a plausible strategy of projecting its norms. The EU as an international actor Jacques Delors used to call the EU an unidentified political object, and it is obviously difficult to comprehend the nature and behaviour of such an object. However, the Union is not the only peculiar international actor.6 Today, only a tiny minority of analysts would claim that typical Westphalian nation-states are the only influential actors in global affairs. Students of international political economy point out that some business firms are more important not only as economic but also as political actors than many of the existing states. Consider for instance, the power of Microsoft or even Gazprom. Students of international organizations argue that some of these bodies are not just agents of member states, but independent and powerful actors. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is often mentioned in this context, with particular reference to its dispute settlement mechanism. Even the United States has made major legal revisions to its trade and tax law to comply with WTO rulings. And we are also reminded that a growing number of transnational non-governmental organizations are able to shape the global agenda. These range from highly institutionalized NGOs such as Greenpeace, the Alliance for Climate Protection or Amnesty International to loosely organized movements such as No Global. So we have a plethora of non-state actors trying to exert their influence in different fields, in different manners and with different results. Obviously not all of these actors can be called power centres, but they are certainly engaged in global power politics in their own different ways. States have not withered away, but they are not necessarily the principal, let alone the sole, international actors. Moreover, there are different types of states. So-called failed states are hardly able to project power on their own, even though they attract a lot of attention and resources. This category should probably include not only dysfunctional states with extremely weak central governments, such as Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan or the Democratic Republic of Congo, but also the European quasi-protectorates of Bosnia and Kosovo (and, some would add, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia).7 There are also so-called virtual
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David Miliband, Europe 2030: model power not superpower, speech delivered at the College of Europe, Bruges, 15 Nov. 2007, www.labour.org.uk, accessed 1 April 2008. For an earlier effort to conceptualize what constitutes an international actor, see e.g. Oran R. Young, The actors in world politics, in James N. Rosenau et al., The analysis of international politics (New York: Free Press, 1972), pp. 12544. For a recent analysis of the EUs nature as a global actor, see Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, The European Union as a global actor, 2nd edn (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 1236. The term failed states is a commonly used but highly contested concept. It usually refers to states whose central government is so weak or ineffective that it has little practical control over much of its territory. See e.g. the annual Failed States Index published by Foreign Policy, most recently in JulyAugust 2007.

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Europe as a global actor: empire by example? states: entities with small territories, few natural resources and tiny manufacturing production, but with a high-level research, product design, financing and marketing capability. Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan are usually viewed as belonging to this category, which also includes Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands. As Richard Rosecrance pointed out, by transferring the bulk of their home production overseas, and shifting their economies to focus on providing sophisticated services, virtual states reshape productive and international relationships. They inaugurate a world based on mastery of flows of production and purchasing power rather than on stocks of goods. By investing in their people rather than amassing expensive production capacity, they usher in a world where education and human capital become more important than machines and physical capital.8 At the other end of the spectrum there are huge territorial states with a global military, economic and cultural reach, such as the United States. They are anything but virtual, and they defy Westphalian characteristics. The United States possesses a near-monopoly on the use of force internationally, and it subjects other states and international institutions to its scrutiny. It can impose its preferred norms on less technologically advanced societies and it can even invade other countries with impunity. The United States may not be in a position to dictate international laws and agreements, but it can ignore them or demand exceptions to them. At the same time it is able to apply some of its own domestic laws outside its territory. This is why it is seen as a new kind of empire and not just an ordinary state.9 Some students talk about the European Union as if it were a state or a state in the making.10 They point to an ever stronger European government in charge of EU external borders and an ever growing list of functional fields, ranging from agriculture, migration and trade to foreign policy, anti-terrorism and defence. They point to the EUs ever expanding diplomatic service and its growing military capability.11 They talk about Europes mission in the world and discuss the European security strategy.12 However, all this is misleading, because the EU is nothing like a state, nor is it likely to become one. The Union has no effective monopoly over the legitimate means of coercion. It has no clearly defined centre of authority. Its territory is not fixed. Its geographical, administrative, economic and cultural borders diverge. It is a polity without coherent demos, a power without identifiable purpose, a geopolitical entity without defined territorial
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Richard Rosecrance, The rise of the virtual state: wealth and power in the coming century (New York: Basic Books, 1999), p. 327. See e.g. Niall Ferguson, Colossus: the price of Americas empire (New York: Penguin, 2004), or Charles S. Maier, Among empires: American ascendancy and its predecessors (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). For other types of analogy see e.g. Andrew J. Bacevich, American empire: the realities and consequences of US diplomacy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); Colin Mooers, ed., The new imperialists (Oxford: Oneworld, 2006), esp. pp. 137228. Some commentators admit that the EU is not yet a state, but argue that it should become one. See e.g. Glyn Morgan, The idea of a European superstate: public justification and European integration (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005). See also Guy Verhofstadt, The United States of Europe (London: Federal Trust, 2006). For instance, there are currently more than 120 diplomatic missions of the Union (called EU delegations) all over the world and their number is growing. See http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/delegations/ intro/, accessed 1 April 2008. Such a strategy has indeed been adopted. See European Council, A secure Europe in a better worldEuropean Security Strategy (Brussels: European Council, 12 Dec. 2003).

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Jan Zielonka limits. The European Common Foreign and Security Policy is a misnomer because EU member states are allowed to act outside the EU framework, and frequently do so, either within the UN framework or via the OSCE, Council of Europe or NATO. European foreign and security policies are often carried out by formal or informal coalitions of the willing, by contact groups or bilateral initiatives. Europes external trade relations are largely divorced from Europes foreign policy. Responsibility for external trade is shared or split between the European Commission, the European Central Bank, the Council of Ministers, the euro area and the member states. Nevertheless, though the Union may not be a state, it is a very powerful international actor.13 With its 27 member states and their nearly 500 million inhabitants, a quarter of the worlds GNP and around 40 per cent of its merchandise exports, and a comprehensive array of economic, legal, diplomatic and military instruments at its disposal, the EU is able to exercise significant influence in various parts of the world. The euro is now the worlds second most important international reserve and trade currency, giving substantial influence to the EU around the world. European norms and regulations are progressively being adopted across the world, even prompting accusations of regulatory imperialism.14 Consider, for instance, EU regulations on financial markets, data privacy, food and health protection, the environment or criminal justice.15 Europe is also the largest provider of developmental aid. In 2006 the EU paid out for this purpose over 2 billion, which represents over 40 per cent of official aid internationally. There are also good reasons to take the European foreign policy project seriously. Diplomats from EU countries meet about 100 times a year, and adopt over 100 joint statements, communiqus and declarations. The EU framework has become the most crucial centre for European foreign policy debates, where national policies meet and part. Today all EU member states try to speak and act in the name of Europe, if not through the Union itself. In recent years the EUs contribution to international peace and security has also intensified rapidly, reaching such different and often distant places as East Timor, Congo, Sudan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Bosnia and Georgia.16
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See Christopher Hill, Superstate or superpower? The future of the European Union in world politics, in P. S. Blesa Aledo and T. Los-Nowak, eds, Narrowing the gap between east and west: a historical-political approach to current European challenges based on the Spanish and Polish cases (San Antonio and Wroclaw: Fundacin Universitaria San Antonio, 2003); also Richard G. Whitman, From civilian power to superpower? The international identity of the EU (London: Macmillan, 1998). Europe v. US business, Wall Street Journal, 17 Jan. 2008, p. A16. The article cites examples of EU efforts to cow large American firms such as Microsoft, Qualcomm and MasterCard with anti-trust laws. Other frequently cited examples of European regulatory imperialism include the Reach legislation on chemical products and the ban on the import of chlorine-rinsed poultry. See e.g. David Bach and Abraham Newman, The European regulatory state and global public policy: microinstitutions, micro influence, Journal of European Public Policy 14: 6, 2007, pp. 82746. The EU has launched civilian missions to monitor implementation of the peace process in Aceh in Indonesia, support the stabilization process in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and support the rule of law in Iraq and the reform of Palestinian civil police. It contributes to building police capacity in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. It is supporting policing elements of the African Union missions in Sudan and is also contributing to rule of law reform and border monitoring in Georgia. The missions currently in the field also include EUPOL in Afghanistan, the EU border assistance mission to Moldova and Ukraine, and the civilianmilitary supporting action to AMIS II in Sudan.

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Europe as a global actor: empire by example? This raises the question of what kind of power the EU really is. If the Union is not a state, what is it? In my view, the Union looks and acts like an empire because it tries to assert political and economic control over various peripheral actors through formal annexations or various forms of economic and political domination.17 This kind of imperial politics is most pronounced in the periphery of Europe, but one can also trace similar policy patterns towards more distant parts of the world. Europe claims that its model of interstate cooperation has a universal character, and it tries to make other actors accept its norms and standards by applying economic incentives and punishments. Of course, the Union is not an empire like contemporary America or nineteenthcentury Britain. The EU has a polycentric rather than centralized governance structure. The EUs imperial instruments are chiefly economic and bureaucratic rather than military and political. Its territorial acquisitions take place by invitation rather than conquest. Legitimizing strategies of the Union do not follow the usual imperial motto of might is right. The EU legitimizes its policies by claiming that its norms are right and that it promotes the most efficient model of economic and political integration. The periphery is often able, gradually, to gain access to the decision-making mechanisms of the European metropolis. Its sovereignty is not denied, but merely constrained by the policy of EU conditional help and accession. That said, it would be wrong to identify the Union with soft power alone. The concept of soft power, as spelled out by Joseph S. Nye, is based on diplomacy.18 Soft powers shape institutions by setting agendas. They also rely on their normative power of attraction to spread values. The Union not only applies soft power of this kind, but has also used economic power to further its objectives, including the instruments of sanctions, bribes and even coercion. Consider, for instance, the mega-fine of $1.4 billion imposed on Microsoft for failure to comply with European regulatory demands to end allegedly anti-competitive business practices.19 In the following two sections I shall first examine how the Union tries to shape its own unstable neighbourhood, and then look at the EUs global agenda.

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I developed this argument in Jan Zielonka, Europe as empire: the nature of the enlarged EU (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), esp. pp. 920. My concept of neo-medieval empire is based on the following characteristics: soft borders in flux; persistence of socio-economic and cultural differentiation; disjunction between authoritative allocations, functional competencies and territorial constituencies; and interpenetration of various types of political units and loyalties. Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande developed a concept of cosmopolitan empire, according to which the current European empire (unlike the empires of the nineteenth century) is not based on national demarcation and conquest, but on overcoming national borders, voluntarism, consensus, transnational interdependence and the political added value accruing from cooperation. See Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande, Cosmopolitan Europe (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), p. 53. Joseph S. Nye, Soft power: the means to success in world politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), p. 31. Nye identifies three types of power: military, economic and soft. See Nikki Tait and Kevin Allison, Brussels hits Microsoft with 899m antitrust fine, Financial Times, 28 Feb. 2008, p. 27.

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Jan Zielonka The EUs regional agenda The imperial pattern is most pronounced when we look at the EUs enlargement policy towards Central and Eastern Europe. In its essence enlargement was about asserting the EUs political and economic control over the unstable and impoverished eastern part of the continent through a skilful use of political and economic conditionality. True, the post-communist countries were not conquered but invited to join the EU, and they did so quite eagerly. Moreover, at the end of the accession process they were offered access to the EUs decision-making processes and resources. Nevertheless, the discrepancy of power between the EU and the candidate states was enormous, and one wonders how much actual freedom the candidate countries could ever have had in the negotiating process leading up to accession. In fact, the Union has from the start made it clear that before entering the Union the candidate countries must adopt the entire body of European lawsan acquis communautaire containing some 20,000 detailed laws and regulations. The EU not only told the applicants what they should doin terms of legislation or administrative reformbut also sent representatives to specific ministries to guide and monitor the required changes. Of course, the candidates compliance with EU instructions was often more apparent than real, but cheating is the essence of imperial relations characterized by structural asymmetries. The fact is that within empires the peripheral states operate under de facto (if not de jure) constrained sovereignty. The EUs imperial policies are also pronounced in the Balkan states, even if most of them are not yet considered suitable candidates for EU membership.20 Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina are de facto semi-protectorates governed by European officials under the formal auspices of the UN. European institutions and EU members are by far the largest donors to these countries. They have their peacekeepers and police forces on the ground there. Most of the laws and institutions in these countries are being set up and run under EU supervision. EU officials frequently intervene in detailed economic and fiscal provisions. The case of the western Balkans might be extreme, but the same pattern of how the EU deals with its poor and unstable neighbours is apparent everywhereand in respect of such diverse territories as Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, the Palestinian occupied territories, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus.21 The EU tries to make these countries look more like the Union itself. Neighbours are asked to adopt European laws and administrative solutions in exchange for aid, liberalization of mutual exchanges and integration. The process has a long timespan; it is gradual and conditional. The more certain countries manage to become compatible with the Union, the more they are integrated in various (but not all) functional fields. This is the essence of imperial
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See David Chandler, Empire in denial: the politics of state-building (London: Pluto, 2006). See Wider Europeneighbourhood: a new framework for relations with our eastern and southern neighbours, communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Brussels, 11 March 2003, COM(2003) 104 final. See also Council conclusions, Wider Europeneighbourhood, http://europa. eu.int/comm/external_relations/we/doc/cc06_03.pdf, 18 June 2003, accessed 1 April 2008.

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Europe as a global actor: empire by example? politics, in my view. However, it is an imperial politics of a peculiar type, with EU influence wielded principally through the export of laws, goods and administrative practices. Although some European military forces have been dispatched to Lebanon, Georgia and the Balkans, the tools used in Europes neighbourhood are chiefly economic. This is not surprising. The EUs most powerful instruments of pressure are in the field of economics. The application of political leverage by the EU has time and again proved most efficient when backed by a skilful application of economic sticks and carrots. Moreover, potential instability outside the EUs borders is likely to have primarily economic rather than security implications for the EU. The EU does not fear a military invasion of its territory, but it does fear a dramatic rise in inward migration as a result of war or poverty in the neighbourhood. The Union also fears a possible energy crisis caused by instability in some of its new neighbours. The EU-25 consumes about twice as much energy as its neighbours, but produces four times less oil. Most of the worlds oil production takes place in countries which are directly contiguous with the EUs neighbours. The scope and nature of EU intervention varies from case to case. Sometimes it takes the form of a very detailed economic engagement. For instance, in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina the EU envisaged a detailed package of 18 major reforms to be implemented in this country. One of the objectives was to create and maintain efficient and effective customs controls and to support reform of the taxation system, in particular the introduction of value added tax (VAT). The Union subsequently spelled out an elaborate procedure of monitoring, evaluating and conditioning these reforms and created a Bulldozer Committee to push through simplification of tax codes and boost public revenues through VAT.22 In other cases the EU tries to apply a less detailed, more nebulous programme of exporting European modes of governance. Neighbouring states are asked to approximate their legislation to that of the Internal Market and in exchange are offered further integration and liberalization to promote the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital (four freedoms).23 For example, the Euro-Mediterranean agreement with Tunisia envisages general approximation of Tunisias legislation to that of the EU, as well as the use of Community rules in standardization, metrology, quality control and conformity assessment. It also contains provisions regarding respect for human rights and democratic principles.24 The EUs aim is not separation from or containment of troublesome neighbours, but creation of a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood.25 The proposed means of action to achieve this end are not limited to trade but include building a common infrastructure, joint border management, interconnected transport, energy and telecommunications networks, cross-border cultural links, and joint tackling of security and environmental threats. It is hoped that a
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As reported by the Financial Times, 11 Nov. 2003. See also Gerhard Knaus and Felix Martin, Travails of the European Raj, Journal of Democracy 14: 3, July 2003, pp. 6074. Wider Europeneighbourhood: a new framework; Council conclusions, Wider Europeneighbourhood. See Euro-Mediterranean agreement with Tunisia: http://europa.eu/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/1998/l_097/ l_09719980330en00020174.pdf, accessed 1 April 2008. Wider Europeneighbourhood: a new framework. See n. 23.

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Jan Zielonka political, regulatory and trading framework exported by the EU will enhance economic stability and institutionalize the rule of law in Europes periphery. The strategy is to bring the neighbours as close to the Union as they can be without being members. This strategy works on the assumption that the EU acquis offers a universal model for the establishment of functioning markets and common standards for industrial products, services, transport, energy and telecommunications networks, environmental and consumer protection, health and labour. Of course, the EUs neighbours to the south and east are very poor, but this need not be a problem. After all, in the early 1990s most of the current EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe were poorer than some of the countries in the Maghreb: for instance, Algeria with its $2,060 GNP per capita or Tunisia with its $1,420 looked much better than Romania, where the corresponding figure was just $610. Today, Romania is an EU member and its GDP per capita in 2006 was estimated at $9,100. However, it is increasingly apparent that the value system of some of the current EUs neighbours is strikingly different from the Unions, and not necessarily prone to adjustment through economic and institutional means. While the elites and the public in Central and Eastern Europe have overwhelmingly embraced democracy and the liberal market economy over the last two decades, the same cannot be said of their counterparts in North Africa or Eastern Europe.26 Moreover, it is not evident that the EU would be able effectively to shape an equivalent transition in these neighbours without offering a credible prospect of EU membership. Turkey is likely to be the first major test case. Following the 1999 decision to consider Turkey as an official candidate for EU membership, the country has undertaken many important reforms to meet EU demands, some of them concerning the most sensitive religious issues.27 The EU has been closely monitoring and advising on these reform efforts, and has offered Turkey substantial economic aid. In 2001 an accession partnership was signed and in 2004 the EU engaged in formal accession negotiations. However, in recent months Turkeys admission to EU membership has increasingly been questioned by leading politicians in several member states, and it remains to be seen whether the EU would be able to maintain its influence over the course of events in Turkey were the prospect of EU membership to fade away. The EUs global agenda The EU has primarily been an experiment in regional integration, and the EUs external policy developed essentially as a by-product of its internal dynamics. But this seems no longer to be the case. This is partly because of the pressures of global interdependence. In a world that is flat it is difficult to confine policies to a certain
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See Ronald Inglehart, East European value systems in global perspective, in Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Dieter Fuchs and Jan Zielonka, eds, Democracy and political culture in Eastern Europe (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 6784. See e.g. Nathalie Tocci, Europeanization in Turkey: trigger or anchor for reform?, South European Society and Politics 10:1, 2005, pp. 7383.

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Europe as a global actor: empire by example? territory only. Europes pensions, health, personal security and even ideologies are being influenced by developments in different and often remote places. Moreover, the ever larger EU has discovered its growing impact on various parts of the world, and this has given it a clear boost of confidence. As enlargement policy has fallen out of favour among large segments of the electorate, the global project has also given Europes elites a new mission, if not a kind of raison dtat. This shift is encouraged by public opinion polls indicating support for the EUs greater role in the world.28 The question is: Will this lead to an imperial EU policy in the global context? There are certainly grounds for an affirmative answer to this question. The Union already tries hard to apply its impressive economic leverage to shape other countries policies in various fields. It also tries to promote its norms and values across the globe. And it increasingly engages in peacekeeping operations outside Europe. All these policies could indeed be called imperial because they are aimed at imposing constraints on the domestic conditions and operations of sovereign states (and other actors). This is most visible in the field of trade and trade regulation. The EU is both the worlds largest merchandise exporter and its largest services exporter, accounting for over a quarter of world trade in each sector. It is also the worlds largest importer of commercial services and second only to the United States as an importer of goods.29 It is therefore able to use access to its market in order to obtain not only economic but also political concessions from its commercial partners.30 For instance, the EU has inserted clauses on democracy into its bilateral and multilateral trade agreements with Latin American and North African countries. Trade leverage also allows the Union to shape the multilateral agenda in this fieldand it is a broad field, including trade not only in goods but also in services, which represents the largest part of the EUs GDP, as well as investment, competition, banking, accounting, government procurement, trade facilities and other related matters. In fact, the EU is already one of the most influential regulators in the world. The EU and the United States together produce around 80 per cent of international norms and standards that regulate global markets, including the dollar and the euro.31 For instance, China has already applied EU regulations to its motor industry and in food safety, and the GSM standard is used for mobile communications, cordless phones and technologies that are delivering broadband internet access to tens of millions of customers globally.32
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According to the EUs Commissioner for External Affairs, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, 70% of EU citizens want the EU to play a stronger role in the world: see Benito Ferrero-Waldner, The European Union: a global power?, speech delivered at George Bush Presidential Library Foundation and Texas A&M University EU Center of Excellence, College Station, Texas, 25 Sept. 2006. See also European Commission, Taking Europe to the world: 50 years of the European Commissions external service, DG External Relations, Brussels, 2004, p. 59. See Alaisdair R. Young and John Peterson, The EU and the new trade politics, Journal of European Public Policy 13: 6, 2006, pp. 7956. See Sophie Meunier and Kalypso Nicolaidis, The European Union as a conflicted trade power, Journal of European Public Policy 13: 6, 2006, pp. 90221. See Andr Sapir, Europe and the global economy, in Andr Sapir, ed., Fragmented power: Europe and the global economy (Brussels: Bruegel, 2007), p. 12. See Europe in the world, communication from the Commission to the European Council, June 2006, document no. 2438, Brussels, June 2006, p. 3.

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Jan Zielonka Various regulatory regimes advocated by the EU dictate to domestic actors across the world what they can or cannot produce if they want to export to the EU. Some regulations on environment or food safety may appear to be mere technicalities, but their adoption often has major economic, if not political, implications for the targeted countries. EU regulatory regimes also subject these actors to extraterritorial scrutiny and arbitration. Consider, for instance, the European Court decision effectively to prohibit the merger of two US companies (General Motors and Honeywell Bull), or the Microsoft case mentioned above. And, as noted above, the EU also uses trade to meet its foreign policy objectives. This activity represents another typical imperial agenda: promotion of the imperial centres norms and values in various peripheral actors. The EU is trying to promote its norms not only in the areas of democracy and human rights, but also on labour standards, environmental protection, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and sustainable development.33 The EU also champions the cause of international law and multilateral cooperation. Its norms are often viewed and presented as alternatives to those promoted by another global norm-setter, the United States. This is most vividly apparent in the EUs opposition to the death penalty or its support of the rights of the child (the United States having failed to ratify the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child). The EU, unlike the US, supports the Kyoto Protocol on climate change and the International Criminal Court. Even in the areas where the EU and US share a common normative agenda, for example democracy or human rights, the EU tries to promote this agenda in a different, more benign manner. For instance, unlike the Americans, the Europeans have never attempted to promote democracy and human rights by orchestrating regime change in any country.34 However, while EU norms and regulations may well benefit targeted global actors, they are at root designed to protect and promote EU interests. In fact, EU officials openly declare that the aim of their global policy is promoting the European interest and making the EU a dynamic, competitive, knowledge based society, as envisaged in the Lisbon Strategy for growth and jobs.35 The EU possesses unique know-how in setting up regulatory standards which gives it a clear edge over competitors. For instance, the worlds new great economic powers in Asia may have impressive growth rates, but they have little regulatory experience. The United States has vast regulatory experience, but its norms are specific to its own particular environment and so less exportable than EU norms, which by their nature are always intergovernmental.
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The EU Treaty states (title I, article 1-3) that the EU shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including for the principles of the United Nations Charter. See also Ian Manners, Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?, Journal of Common Market Studies 40: 2, 2002, pp. 23558. See Justin Vasse, Etats-Unis: le temps de la diplomatie transformationnelle, Chaillot Papers 95 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2006). However, it can be argued that the European intervention in Serbia was not only about protecting Kosovars, but also about orchestrating the fall of Milosevics regime there. The European interest: succeeding in the age of globalization, communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Brussels, 3 Oct. 2007, COM(2007) 581 final, pp. 2, 6.

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Europe as a global actor: empire by example? Moreover, if other actors in the world adopt European rather than, say, American regulatory frameworks, this has advantageous results for European companies because they do not need to undertake any costly adjustments. At the same time, European interests are undermined if global competitors are free to profit from less rigid labour or environmental standards (of course, compliance with EU norms is also an intra-European problem). In its regulatory effort, the Union is not just trying to enhance the competitive position of European firms; it is also trying to defend the set of European social preferences. Those preferences might not be identical across all EU member states, but they are distinct from other regions nevertheless. And it is clear that citizens in all parts of Europe are reluctant to reduce their levels of social protection or compromise their environmental standards. The Unions external policies reflect these preferences. The EU also has unique experience in setting up and running multilateral institutional arrangements which it can use to its own advantage. After all, the EU itself is probably the most advanced example of this kind, and it actively promotes its own model of regional integration in Latin America and East Asia. And there is general agreement among Europes elites that promoting democracy, human rights and sustainable development reduces the likelihood of external shocks. Local wars and economic breakdowns have proved to be very costly to Europe by causing mass migration, disturbing energy supplies and spreading infectious diseases. However, it is not only empires that use their comparative advantages to influence other actors. And it is debatable whether the EU has sufficient leverage to constrain the sovereignty of other important global players effectively. This is most visible in the case of China. China may have embraced elements of the EUs regulatory framework, but there is no significant evidence that it is prepared to change its economic policy under EU pressure. There is even less evidence that the Chinese authorities are willing to embrace Europes normative agenda, especially when it comes to issues such as political rights or the death penalty.36 This is partly because the Chinese authorities have presided over nearly double-digit annual growth for a generation, but partly also because they do not share Europes values. It is not only the ever more powerful China that is able to frustrate Europes global policies. The opposition of 20 developing countries led by India and Brazil has made it impossible for Europe to include the so-called Singapore issues above all, core labour standards and respect for environmental standards in trade relationson the multilateral trade agenda. (These issues also involve defining the rules of competition, investment, transparency in government procurement and trade facilitation, a code name for corruption.) And it is important to keep in mind that the United States is also Europes global competitor in many fields.37 In fact, it looks as if numerous global actors are increasingly able to shape Europes normative agenda, rather than the influence working in the other direction. As the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, has argued in the European Parliament:
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See e.g. Karine Lisbonne-de Vergeron, Contemporary Chinese views on Europe (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2007). See Jeffrey Kopstein and Sven Steinmo, Growing apart? America and Europe in the twenty-first century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), e.g. pp. 1215.

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Jan Zielonka Europe wishes to set an example in the fight against climate change but Europe cannot accept unfair competition from countries that impose no environmental constraints on their companies.38 In other words, Europes normative agenda in the environmental field may have to be given up or at least watered down because of competition from other countries that makes this agenda unsustainable for Europes economy. The same can be said about Europes agenda in the field of energy regulation, labour standards or financial services. The EU simply lacks the power to impose its global agenda on key actors in various parts of the world. By a skilful application of its economic leverage and institutional know-how it can shape the policies of these actors at the margins; but this does not amount to a successful extension of Europes continental empire onto a global stage. Application of power and norms The EUs imperial policy seems most effective when its power is overwhelming and its norms are shared, as was the case in Central and Eastern Europe. Likewise, when the Unions power is limited and its norms are not shared, it has problems implementing its policy agenda, let alone practising imperial politics. So far, this sounds quite obvious; but here clarity ends. We do not know what kind of combination of power and norms best serves the EUs ends. In fact, we do not even know which powers and norms are most decisive in explaining its successes and failures.39 In Central and Eastern Europe the EUs economic leverage was certainly of enormous importance. Most of these countries trade and foreign direct investment came from the EU, and the average per capita GDP of countries aspiring to join the Union was less than 15 per cent of that of the EU-15. However, it is generally accepted that the EU would not have been able to orchestrate changes in the region without a certain degree of security and stability there, and these were largely provided by American military power. As mentioned above, it is also unclear whether the economic leverage would have produced the desired transformation without a promise of EU membership. The EU enlargement process is basically about exercising political, and not merely economic, power. It is even more difficult to assess the EUs normative appeal in Central and Eastern Europe. Liberal democracy and economics have been embraced eagerly throughout the region, with no appetite for experimentation. But this did not imply eagerness to adopt EU norms on protecting the environment, labour standards or social welfare. EU efforts to foster greater convergence in these fields have been seen as a means of protecting Western Europes selfish interests and of blunting the newcomers own competitive edge. As the Czech President, Vclav Klaus put it: The claims for quasi-universal social rights are disguised attempts to protect high-cost producers in highly regulated countries, with unsustainable
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Speech delivered by the President of the Republic to the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 13 Nov. 2007. This has been analysed particularly well in the American context in Joseph S. Nye Jr, The paradox of American power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

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Europe as a global actor: empire by example? welfare standards, against cheaper labor in more productive countries.40 Many Chinese, Indian and Brazilian politicians would agree with this statement. Despite all these uncertainties, the Union has little choice but to rely chiefly on its economic power and to promote globally norms that are already adopted within the Union itself. Although the Union now has a so-called European Security and Defence Policy, it is unlikely to acquire any significant military capabilities for a long time, if ever. But in the field of economics the Union is likely to remain a formidable economic actor, capable of shaping global trade and finance. Compromising on its normative agenda in the field of environment, labour standards and social welfare is not an option, partly for political and partly for economic reasons. The European public is very keen to maintain its current standards of life, work and health, and failure to export the same standards to other countries puts European firms at a comparative economic disadvantage. In summary, the Union has no option but to try to influence the rules of international governance by the use of its economic power. This policy is largely about exporting its own model of governance to other countries, even if this imposes on them significant domestic constraints. The question then arises: How is this to be done? The choice is between an assertive and a benign policy approach. Put differently, Europe can try to act either as a superpower or as a power model. The former approach would imply the creation of a strong European centre able to impose economic pain on uncooperative actors. The latter would imply showing other actors that European norms can also work for them, and providing economic incentives for adopting these norms. Advocates of the former approach would like to see the European Commission in charge not only of trade but also of other aspects of Europes external economic policy. In their view, a fragmented power such as the current EU is unable effectively to shape the policies of global competitors. They are also in favour of the application of various punitive measures to countries that do not follow EU norms. Advocates of the latter approach would like to shape policies of global competitors by example and persuasion. In their view, centralization of EU decision-making is not necessarily helpful. They point to the fact that for the past several years the EU has failed to make any significant progress in multilateral trade negotiations, even though the European Commission has been in charge of them. Moreover, they argue that punitive measures applied to competitors often amount to protectionism that seeks to stave off globalization rather than manage it. Environmental policy is a good example of ground where the two approaches clearly clash. The power centre approach advocates setting up a tax mechanism for products from areas having low environmental standards.41 The model power approach advocates setting unilateral targets, with the offer to go further if others do the same. The success of the latter approach would depend not only on Europes normative attraction, but also on its ability to gain economic advantage in
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Vclav Klaus, Renaissance: the rebirth of liberty in the heart of Europe (Washington DC: Cato Institute, 1997), p. 113. See also Janusz Lewandowski, Skonczmy ze sztuka samoizolacji, Gazeta Wyborcza, 21 Nov. 2007. See R. Ismer and Karsten Neuhoff, Border tax adjustments: a feasible way to address nonparticipation in emission trading, Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0409, Jan. 2004, p. 42.

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Jan Zielonka environmental innovation. The success of the former approach would depend on Europes ability to continue its trade-led growth regardless of the environmental tax system. Conclusions: Europe as empire For many years academics and commentators have debated the question whether the EU is a kind of state and will act accordingly in international affairs. Today more and more of them recognize that the Union is not a state, but rather a kind of empire, however peculiar.42 Even the President of the European Commission, Jos Manuel Barroso, recently argued that the EU has the dimensions (but not the structure) of an empire.43 Academics and commentators have also debated whether the world has embraced core European (or western) values, and whether it is appropriate to declare the end of history.44 Today it is widely acknowledged that the embrace of liberal norms and values is uneven around the world, and that Europe has no choice but to come to terms with the non-European parts of that world.45 This shift in discourse reflects changes in our thinking about the ways in which power and norms can be applied and disseminated. To be successful in the presentday world the EU needs to export its governance to other countries, which effectively means imposing domestic constraints on them. This is clearly an imperial politics, even though it is carried out chiefly by economic means and even though the export products are norms and not soldiers. The degree of the EUs assertiveness may differ depending on its self-confidence and how it is received externally. However, efforts to impose European norms where there is little demand for them seems to me futile, especially considering power constraints. I therefore agree with those who would like the EU to conduct its imperial politics through example, even if this requires certain adjustments of our normative agenda, especially in the economic field. The EU should engage in a dialogue that will help it to establish commonly shared rules of morality and global governance.46 Its exercise of power should not be chiefly about indoctrination and subjugation. Instead it should be about promotion of policies, procedures and rules that lead to empowerment of other actors, however weak.47 Only then can Europes exercise of power be seen as legitimate. Only then can the empire by example have a practical rather then merely rhetorical significance.
42 43 44 45

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See e.g. Josep M. Colomer, Great empires, small nations (London: Routledge, 2007); Robert Cooper, The breaking of nations (London: Atlantic, 2003). Dimensionen eines Imperiums, interview with Jos Manuel Barroso, Die Welt, 17 Oct. 2007, p. 3. See Francis Fukuyama, The end of history and the last man (New York: Free Press, 1992). Some observers even argue that the world is becoming ever less European. See Zaki Ladi, European preferences and their reception, in Zaki Ladi, ed., The reception of Europe: EU preferences in a globalized world (London: Routledge, forthcoming 2008). See the article by Harold James in this special issue: Globalization, empire and natural law, International Affairs 84: 3, May 2008, pp. 42136. See Steven Lukes, Power and the battle for hearts and minds: on the bluntness of soft power, in Felix Berenskoetter and M. J. Williams, eds, Power in world politics (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 97.

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