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Gestalt Review, 14(1):54-70, 2010

Developing the Concept of Organismic Need

BRucE KEnOfER, ph.d.

A B S T R A C T
The emergence and satisfaction of physiological needs such as hunger or thirst in the service of homeostasis has served as the paradigmatic example for organismic self-regulation within Gestalt therapy theory. It is argued that this metaphor is a poor model of organismic self-regulation; it obscures not only differences between separable processes of homeostatic and equilibrative regulation, but also differences between physiological and psychological needs. This, in turn, has led to the failure to recognize the developmental nature of psychological needs. Kegans model of self-development is presented as an illustration of a developmentally sensitive approach.

A central tenet of Gestalt therapy is the principle of organismic self-regulation. According to this principle, organisms are motivated by the dominant need of the moment, which leads to actions to meet that need. When the need is met, closure is obtained, allowing it to recede to the background and for the next one to emerge. In the healthy organism, this process moves with fluidity, with a continuing progression of needs moving to closure followed by the emergence of the next need. one way of conceiving of psychological
Mark McConville, Ph.D., served as Action Editor on this article. Bruce Kenofer, Ph.D., is a therapist in private practice. He is also an adjunct faculty in the Graduate School of Education at Lewis and Clark College, where he teaches courses in Life-Span Development, among others. He has been a member of the training group at the Gestalt Therapy Training Center Northwest for seven years.

2010 Gestalt Intl Study Center

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difficulties is to regard them as a disturbance in organismic self-regulation, where the process of the emergence and fulfillment of needs is impeded in some way. The failure to obtain closure on these needs leads them to become factors from our past, which then interfere with the emergence and fulfillment of current needs. In this way, the past interferes with the present; the adaptability of the organism is compromised in that it is unable to be fully in the here and now and respond to current circumstances, due to a kind of preoccupation with the past. Hunger and thirst have frequently been used as examples to illustrate the ways in which pressing needs come to dominate the activity of the organism (Clarkson, 2004; Latner, 1992; Perls, 1969a; Perls, 1969b; Perls, Hefferline, and Goodman, 1951 [cited hereafter as PHG]; Yontef, 1993; Gold and Zahm, 2008). Latner (1992) provides the following illustrative example:
You are beginning to lose interest in your work, having become aware that you are hungry. Your textbooks and papers, your desk and chair fade out of your awareness as you begin thinking about the things in the refrigerator and whether the local pizza delivery place is still open. opening the refrigerator door, you sort the contents with your hands and eyes, shifting bottles and containers. Notice how your awareness is shaped by what is important to you, and how you shape your reality accordingly. You see what is interesting and important to you now, at this moment this hungry moment reaching out into the field with your eyes: you seek out and see the refrigerator, not the dishwasher, the can of beans, not the furniture wax. Conversely, the things which are not important to you at this moment your studies, your family, your sexual appetites are phenomenologically insignificant. For the moment they do not exist; you have caused them to disappear. (pp. 17-18)

Latners example illustrates that the emergence of a need like hunger can come to dominate the activity of the organism as it seeks to meet that need. Through meeting the need of hunger, this need recedes allowing a new need to emerge. This is an intuitively compelling example, in part because we have all experienced times when a need such as hunger, thirst, or sleep overtakes us and redirects our activity. In order to develop further the process of organismic self-regulation, the concept of need must be examined. According to Perls (n.d.), needs arise out of the disruption of the homeostasis of the organism:
We speak of homeostasis as the term indicating the precious balance in which the optimum of well-being is maintained. Such an

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optimum means: neither too much nor too little. A lack of water leads to dehydration, a surplus to aedema, a lack of thyroid to mongolism, a surplus to Basedows disease. The organism is so organized that it tends to replenish the lack and to shed the surplus in order to maintain the required balance. We correctly speak of a balanced diet to point to the need of proteins, fats, carbohydrates and vitamins. What holds good for the diet applies to every need. (p. 6)

In a more contemporary presentation of Gestalt therapy, Clarkson (2004) echoes the same theme. New organismic deficits or surpluses must arise in the living person. Either internal or external disturbances in the form of a need which is striving for gratification or a demand made upon us will impinge on the homeostatic balance of organism and environment (p. 38). For Perls, every emerging need is based in the imbalance of a metabolic biological process, which then serves as a motivation for the organism to redress that imbalance. As it is possible that multiple needs must be redressed, some needs must take precedence over others. The most dominant need of any given instant comes to organize the activity of the organism in the service of meeting that need. As PHG (1951) state: Each most pressing unfinished situation assumes dominance and mobilizes all available effort until the task is completed; then it becomes indifferent and loses consciousness, and the next pressing need claims attention (p. 274). Yontef (1993) presents the same basic theme in his explication of Gestalt therapy:
Even what is nourishing needs to be discriminated according to dominant needs. Metabolic processes are governed by the laws of homeostasis. Ideally the most urgent need energizes the organism until it is met or is superseded by a more vital need. Living is a progression of needs, met and unmet, achieving homeostatic balance and going on to the next moment and new need. (pp. 141-142)

However, the essential question here is: are all needs able to be reduced to biologically based metabolic imbalances? Perls explicitly answered in the affirmative. Not only did he see all needs as based in physiological homeostasis (Perls, 1969a, 1969b, n.d.), but he also relied upon hunger to provide the basic metaphor for interacting with the world in general. In Ego, Hunger and Aggression, Perls introduced the concept of mental metabolism as a way of explaining psychological processes as akin to the operation of hunger. As Perls (1969a) states: Hunger for mental and emotional food behaves like physical hunger (p. 110). He is clear that he does not mean this as simply metaphorical: I have to emphasize once more that it is difficult for most people to ac-

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cept the structural similarity of mental and physical processes (p. 114). Perls goes on to describe how the eruption of teeth in infancy provides a new way to chew on what the environment provides, allowing us to de-structure it and thus make it more digestible. This was far more than a new way of taking in physical nourishment; it provided the basis for a new way of assimilating experiences in the world. Perls took the example of hunger as a metabolic need and extended it as a general model for the operation of mental life. A literal reading of the metaphor is also consistent with Perlss stance of the unity of physiological and psychological processes (Perls, 1969a, n.d.). The concept of mental metabolism provided a way for him to ground psychological motivations within metabolic physiological processes. This viewpoint has also been expressed in a more contemporary presentation of Gestalt therapy. As Latner (1992) notes:
Eating, and its ancillary functions the development of appetite, seeking out food, taking it in, tasting and chewing it, and the subsequent digestion and elimination is a familiar and penetrating instance of figure formation. F. S. Perls, in Ego, Hunger and Aggression, developed and extended it beyond its immediate circumstances into a conceptualization called mental metabolism. Some examples in the preceding paragraphs utilize it. We have appetites for companionship, for sleep, for meaningful work, for recognition, for honesty. The folk wisdom of our culture already recognizes this, in phases such as, Let me chew on that for a while, I need something more substantial to do something I can get my teeth into, You make me sick, and Do you expect me to swallow that? (p. 50)

This quotation illustrates the way in which Latner echoes the concept of mental metabolism as a model of psychological functioning. Yontef (1993) likewise includes the concept of mental metabolism in his presentation of Gestalt therapy theory:
In Gestalt therapy, metabolism is used as a metaphor for psychological functioning. People grow through biting off an appropriate-sized piece (be this food or ideas or relationships), chewing it (considering), and discovering whether it is nourishing or toxic. If nourishing, the organism assimilates it and makes it part of itself. If toxic, the organism spits it out (rejects it). (p. 141)

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On Metaphors and Models While Yontef (1993) describes mental metabolism as a metaphor, it is not clear that he makes the distinction between hunger as a metaphor and hunger as a model. In the above quotation, he describes needs as based in metabolic processes, which implies that mental metabolism operates on the same principles of homeostatic metabolic processes as hunger. However, if eating may be used as a metaphor for other appetites, this is not the same as assuring that eating provides an adequate model for other appetites. While needs for companionship, recognition, or honesty can be metaphorically referred to as appetites, as Latner does, unless they are based in a physiological metabolic imbalance, then they are not actually comparable to either the need for food or water. In the case of such life sustaining drives, a clearly definable physical marker can be identified as the value to be monitored (e.g., Co2 levels in lungs, temperature, blood sugar levels within the blood) and maintained within parameters. These markers must be maintained within particular limits, or the ability of the organism to maintain life will cease. The toleration for values outside the limits has a different temporal quality for different physiological needs (short duration for out of limit tolerance for oxygen levels, to longer duration for other needs like food or water). Yet, each of these needs has a cyclical quality based upon the fluctuation of the values within a tolerable range, and each functions in a homeostatic fashion in which excesses or deficiencies are regulated to keep them within an optimal range. As metabolic based needs, they involve the intake of a substance, the metabolic processing or metabolizing of that substance, and the elimination of waste products. However, no such parameter can be defined for appetites involving companionship, meaningful work, recognition, or honesty. There is no marker to monitor with respect to the build up of such appetites in a time locked cyclical fashion. There is no substance taken in, metabolically processed, and no waste product to be eliminated. While we may refer to needs similar to those suggested by Latner as appetites, they are clearly not analogous to a physiologically based metabolic drive like hunger or thirst. Furthermore, if all needs were based in homeostatic metabolic processes, there would be a problem in explaining how unfinished business, or lack of closure for a need, could affect behavior across the time often attributed to it (e.g., an adult responding to unfinished business from childhood). Metabolic processes can only have a temporary degree of deferment. Actions based upon a metabolic need such as hunger may be interrupted by a separate metabolic need for rest as reflected by fatigue, for example, after a long day of unsuccessfully hunting for food. In the morning, however, the need for

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hunger will again emerge as the dominant need, thus governing the activity of the organism. While this example fits the descriptions of dominant needs provided above, due to the time locked nature of metabolic needs like hunger or thirst, these needs can only be deferred for a short period. The survival of the organism depends upon timely meeting of such needs. But unfinished business across long periods (potentially years) cannot be explained by resorting to the concept of basic physiological needs that operate in a homeostatic fashion. Clearly, one must resort to the supposition of other kinds of needs that do not operate in this time locked fashion. Such needs may be subordinate to metabolic physiological needs to the degree that metabolic needs have a kind of priority in superseding other needs, as reflected in Latners example. Yet, to conceptualize all needs as analogous to biological needs like hunger or thirst can be misleading and inhibiting to clear theoretical development. Nevertheless, the concepts of mental metabolism and the use of hunger and thirst as paradigmatic examples of self-regulation have had exactly this result. It is imperative to distinguish between such concepts as metaphors, which may be illustrative, and models, which are to be taken as structurally similar. As Lakoff and Johnson (1980) note, metaphors allow us to understand experience in one domain in terms of the experience of another, and they explicitly address the use of food as a metaphor for ideas: These food concepts give us a way of understanding psychological processes that we have no direct and well defined way of categorizing (p.148). As such, metaphors can be useful in helping us to understand processes which otherwise may be difficult to grasp. Nevertheless, metaphors must be realized as an approximate way of understanding, but not assumed to be literally correct. Metaphors may capture some aspects of the processes described, but miss others. The metaphor of ideas as food implies that ideas have form, that they can be broken down and transformed, and that they can be absorbed within the mind. This suggests a process akin to digestion. Yet, differences in kind between the two processes are obscured by the metaphor. Eating as an activity is a response to metabolic needs that operate in a homeostatic fashion. Still a hunger for knowledge is not a response to a metabolic process. The organism does not have a surplus or deficit of any substance. Words, ideas, knowledge are not in fact substances. A concept can be recognized, analyzed, elaborated, modified, or rejected, but there is no literal breakdown of a substance that is then incorporated into the organism, leading to waste products that eventually must be eliminated. Perls (1969a) likened the process of introjection to the bodily incorporation of food, and projection to the process of elimination. Such a reading, however, obscures important differences between different levels of processes. The confusion is born out of applying

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the metaphor literally as if everything true of the process of eating were also true of the process of knowing. The distinction between these levels of analysis may be expressed through another metaphor, that of the mind as a computer. While the operation of a computer depends upon an intact hardware, and the energy requirements to run that hardware, this level of analysis is independent of the software process that may be operating on that computer. In this metaphor, the hardware level is comparable to the physiological level, in which there is a requirement for the input of energy from the environment (e.g., electricity), the need to maintain a consistent level of energy to the system, and the need to dispose of waste products (e.g., heat) in the course of the operation of the computer. The processing of information on the computer depends upon an intact hardware, but such processing is of a different level and kind. Information processing involves the matching of input-output relations based upon the recognition of patterns, and the transformation of those patterns, leading to a particular output based upon those transformations. The input is not a substance, but a pattern. The output is not a waste product, but a new pattern. Understanding the operation of the hardware does not, in this case, inform us about the nature of the program running on that hardware, as different programs can be run on the same hardware, and the same program can be run on different hardware (e.g., different computers). The level of hardware and software and the nature of the processing each engages in are qualitatively different. By analogy, the levels of physiological needs and psychological needs would also be qualitatively different. Treating knowledge literally as food is to confuse the two levels. While the use of a computer as a metaphor for the mind has its limitations (Bickhard, 2004), the metaphor illustrates the difference between the two levels of analysis. On Homeostasis and Equilibrium Meeting basic biological needs like hunger or thirst are not the best paradigmatic examples of organismic self-regulation; they obscure important aspects about the nature of organismic self-regulation and the difference between the level of physiological needs and psychological needs (e.g., affective or cognitive needs). Two different forms of organismic self-regulation are operable at these levels: the first involving the process of homeostasis (regulation to maintain an optimal set point), but the second involving a distinctly separable process of equilibrium (a dynamic state of balance between organism and environment). While these two terms have often been used interchangeably, they in fact reflect two separable processes; the distinction between the two is of critical importance in understanding the nature of self-

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regulation. our use of the same term need to designate motivations of physiological or psychological nature may further obscure the differences in these levels of motivation. It may be clearer to use the term drives to refer to motivations based in physiological metabolic imbalances, while reserving the term desire to refer to motivations based in the psychological need for equilibrium. Let us, by way of illustration, examine the different kinds of needs within infancy and compare the ways in which the physiological and psychological motivations are similar and different. Hunger would be an obvious choice as a representative physiological drive. A desire for security, as postulated by attachment theory (Bowlby, 1980), might be an example of a psychological need. The similarity between a drive like hunger, and a desire like security, is that both press for completion. Clearly, however, a differentiation must be made between the basic homeostatic regulatory mechanisms (e.g., hunger, thirst, respiration), and needs that do not have the same temporal-cyclical quality and are more accurately described as maintaining psychological equilibrium rather than physiological homeostasis. There is no temporal-cyclical quality to a desire such as security. Security (in Bowlbys sense) is about a relationship between the organism and the environment, and the degree to which the environment is familiar or unfamiliar. The organism does not build up a drive for security in the same sense that one builds up hunger or thirst. When events within the environment are familiar, there is no desire for security at that moment. In Gestalt terms, this is part of the background and not figural. But the introduction of a loud noise or other unpredictable stimuli may unbalance the psychological equilibrium of the infant (described as felt insecurity); this may then lead to the psychological need for comforting (as the means of returning to a state of psychological equilibrium and the feeling of security). While the desire for security can also be characterized as a matter of organismic self-regulation, the balance in question is not about internal physiological states; it is a psychological balance between the organism and events transpiring in the external environment. But it is not a static balance, for the contact with experience changes the infant. What was once unfamiliar becomes familiar; with repeated presentation and assimilation it becomes the new balance. Thus, a particular stimulus/event does not in some way cause psychological disequilibrium. The interaction between the stimulus and the developmental experience of the infant always determines the degree to which the environment is predictable. This aspect of adaptation is captured in the Gestalt principle of creative adjustment as it happens in the relationship between organism and field; as PHG (1951) note: Its theme is the ever renewed transition between novelty and routine in the organisms quest for

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equilibrium, resulting in assimilation and growth (p. 230). However, this principle is insufficiently articulated by a failure to distinguish between the ways in which equilibrium is fundamentally different from homeostasis, and by an emphasis on using homeostatic physiological needs as the model for psychological functioning. A related problem with regarding psychological motivations as structurally equivalent to physiological motivations is the failure to recognize the developmental nature of psychological needs. Physiological needs may shift across development in a quantitative sense (e.g., one needs increased caloric intake as the organism grows in size), but do not shift in a qualitative sense. That is, both child and adult require food to address the physiological drive of hunger. At any age, we may find it workable to describe the person as being hungry and as acting in a way to meet this need. Clearly, differences in the behavioral responses occur with development. While the newborn may cry, the pre-school child may say Im hungry, and Latner may search his refrigerator, we could describe each as hungry and motivated to meet that need. If one aspect of what changes with development is the behavioral complexity of the response the person has at his/her disposal, the physiological need remains essentially the same. Hunger is readily conceptualized as a biological drive, which no one would fail to attribute to newborn infants. However, the need for meaningful work, for recognition, for honesty (Latner, 1992, p. 50), or for a myriad of other psychological needs, cannot be conceptualized as biological drives akin to hunger; nor are they readily attributable to a newborn infant. Whence come such needs? How do they emerge? And if we are willing to attribute these psychological needs at some point in development, do they undergo qualitative changes as the child grows into a pre-schooler, a schoolage child, an adolescent, and an adult? Questions like these call for the articulation of a developmental theory, one that can bridge the gap between the newborn, newly emerged into the world and highly focused upon basic biological needs, and the mature person, for whom biological needs are more often a supportive backdrop for psychological needs. From the beginning, Gestalt therapy theory has referred to physical and psychological needs (Perls, 1969a; PHG, 1951), though psychological needs were presented as derivative of physiological needs. No doubt, this was in part because Perls was building his theory on the foundation of Freuds drive reduction model. It was also necessary in Perlss theory to provide a means to ground psychological needs in physiological processes, in order to extend the model of metabolism and homeostatic regulation to the psychological level. Subsequent presentations of Gestalt therapy (Clarkson, 2004; Yontef, 1993; Latner, 1992; Gold and Zahm, 2008) have followed Perlss model of

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homeostatic regulation, frequently citing basic physiological needs as an example. Yet, many of these presentations of Gestalt therapy theory have also emphasized relational (e.g., psychological) needs as central to the well being of the organism (Breshgold & Zahm, 1992; Clarkson, 2004; Hycner & Jacobs, 1995; Mackewn, 1997; Yontef, 1993). This emphasis potentially introduces a way to elevate the importance of psychological needs, but if such needs were regarded as derivative of drives, the supposition of them would not provide a theoretical advance beyond the model articulated by Perls. In contrast, it has been argued, the drive model of psychoanalysis is actually incompatible with the view of human behavior and development later espoused by Gestalt Therapy (Breshgold and Zahm, 1992, p. 62). Such a stance would effectively divorce Gestalt therapy theory from any grounding in drive reduction, providing relational needs an independent status. Nevertheless, if relational needs are not a derivation of drives, then the application of the concept of mental metabolism, and the model of physiological needs applied with respect to psychological motivations, are called into question. Thus, relational needs would be left unanchored from the basic physiological needs of the organism. How, then, could metaphors of hunger or thirst, which are clearly drive-based motivations, be taken as a paradigm for psychological functioning? At the same time, basic physiological processes such as breathing are seen as vital aspects of self-support. A wholesale rejection of physiological drives as the basis of motivation is a case of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Such needs must be integrated into a holistic model. Yet, models based solely upon physiological drives are also insufficient. Providing a model that integrates the two presents a challenge, though; Tomkinss (1991) model of affect, which distinguishes between drives and emotions as sources of motivation, may provide one way of resolving the issue. The problem is not that presentations of Gestalt therapy theory have neglected psychological motivations; such motivations are referred to in multiple explications of Gestalt therapy theory (e.g., Clarkson, 2004; Latner, 1992; PHG, 1951; Mackewn, 1997; Yontef, 1993; Gold and Zahm, 2008). The limitation of these presentations is the equation of homeostasis and equilibrium, and a failure to distinguish between physiological metabolic needs (drives) and psychological needs (desires). A consequence is the lack of any clear articulation of the developmental change in psychological motivations, and how these motivations evolve with development. On Developmental Change Psychological needs shift across development in a qualitative sense. While the growing organism may always have a need for security, can the newborn

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have a desire for security in the same sense that we would apply the term to a child or an adult? What security means to a newborn infant is not the same as what security will mean at later ages. While the newborn may derive security from being rocked, the pre-school child may obtain it by a parent saying, It will be oK. The grade school child may derive a sense of security from his or her competencies, the adolescent from acceptance by a peer group, and perhaps the adult by the size of ones retirement account or spiritual beliefs about the afterlife. Security is ultimately about meaning about the sense that one can manage to maintain those circumstances deemed essential to happiness and survival. That they may shift from the very immediate in infancy, to the very abstract and temporally removed in adulthood, calls for a developmental theory capable of describing the qualitative nature of these shifts across development. Thus, psychological needs by nature demonstrate a developmental progression fundamentally different in kind from the biological needs of the organism. At all levels of development, the organism requires the intake of the same material from the environment (e.g., food, water, oxygen) to survive. Nonetheless, what is necessary to provide an adult with a sense of security will be different from the conditions that served the same function in childhood. The consequences of this distinction are not trivial. While meeting physiological needs may lead to physical growth, it does not lead to psychological growth. While meeting psychological needs may lead to psychological growth, it does not satisfy our hunger. Treating psychological needs as identical in operation to physiological needs obscures the nature of needs that are quite different in kind. There have been attempts to draw more attention to the need for developmental theory within Gestalt therapy theory. Breshgold & Zahm (1992) and Hycner & Jacobs (1995) have argued for the integration of the developmental theory of self-psychology with Gestalt therapy theory. Glinwater (2000) makes the case for integrating Daniel Sterns model of self- development in infancy with Gestalt therapy theory. McConville (2003) applies Lewins framework to an analysis of developmental changes in adolescence. Yet, none of these attempts captures the nature of qualitative change that occurs across development from infancy to adulthood. one of the richest possibilities for addressing qualitative developmental change may come from utilizing Piagetian theory as a developmental grounding for Gestalt therapy theory. Piagets theory shares the organismic approach of Gestalt therapy theory. At the heart of Piagetian theory is the process of equilibration and the evolution of more developmentally complex states of balance between organism and environment, which are reflected in qualitatively different ways of relating to the world. While the shared principle of equilibrium provides a link between

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Gestalt and Piagetian theory (Mortola, 2001), the extent to which Piagetian theory may provide a developmental grounding for Gestalt therapy theory is yet undeveloped. one possibility in this direction is to take Kegans (1982, 1994) model of the development of self. Kegan has extended Piagets constructive-developmental approach to the development of concepts of self and other, presenting a series of stages in the development of the individuals sense of self. At its core, Kegans approach focuses upon the evolutionary balance between the organism and the environment, and how this evolutionary balance shifts in a qualitative way across development. Every solution to a problem involves a victory over a limitation, but in its turn results in a new limitation. Understanding the very nature of a problem requires placing it within a developmental context. Gestalt therapists have often characterized a shouldistic approach as an example of dysfunction (Mackewn, 1997; Perls, 1969b; Yontef, 1993). Perls (1969b) derided phony behavior, regarding the playing of social roles to meet ones needs as manipulative and immature. In a developmental sense, however, the very ability to regulate ones behavior on behalf of a should of society is a developmental accomplishment. Those individuals who never develop this ability would be regarded as either un-socialized or downright sociopathic, and probably not anyone we would want to invite over for dinner. While an extreme focus upon what one should do, or upon what others think of me, may well pose a therapeutic problem, it is important to regard this dynamic in a developmental context. People who give higher priority to the need to be regarded by others in a particular light than to meeting their own needs for individuation may be developmentally blocked. Yet, this sort of analysis fails to recognize that there is a developmental shifting of needs such that, what is an accomplishment at one stage becomes a limitation at the next. What one needs does not stay static across development, nor can it be limited to basic biological needs. The capacity of adolescents to endow the peer group with a power to define identity, and the way in which the regard of others begins to matter to them, is a developmental achievement that is beyond the capability of the grade school child. That this capacity endows the individual with the potential for loyalty to relationships, a group, or an ideology is an advance beyond the more limited means of self-definition and relationships available to the elementary school child. But what is an advance at this level can also be a limitation, for one can become imprisoned within the self-definition formed in reference to such groups. Then it may become a therapeutic problem, though the failure to develop such a capacity in the first place would be a therapeutic issue as well.

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A Clinical Illustration of Kegans Developmental Approach While it is beyond the scope of this article to offer a detailed presentation of Kegans theory of self-development, an example may help convey the flavor of his approach. Kegan (1994) presents an interesting analysis of Perlss famous encounter with Gloria in the original Three Approaches to Psychotherapy series (Shostrom, 1965). Gloria is a recent divorcee who could be characterized as taking a shouldistic and phony approach to life. Numerous times within the interview, Perls accuses Gloria of not being genuine. Perls works the theme of phoniness throughout the interview, characterizing her behavior as a kind of manipulation. In the following exchange, we see the way in which Gloria is stung by his accusation: perls: Youre a phony! Gloria: Do you believe . . . do you mean that seriously? perls: Yeah. If you say you are afraid and you laugh and you giggle and you squirm its phony. Youre putting on a performance for me. Gloria: I . . . I resent that. Very much. . . . Gloria: Why is it phony? Im admitting to you what I am. How is that a phony? perls: It is phony because its a trick, its a gimmick, to crawl into a corner and wait until someone comes to your rescue. (Shostrom, 1965) Perls has insightfully captured a pattern that Gloria enacts, and he frequently encourages Gloria to be more genuine, more direct in expressing how she really feels, no longer to act phony. We are left with a picture of Gloria as someone neurotically avoiding contact, who lacks the courage to come out by [her]self (Shostrom, 1965). Might there be a different way of understanding Gloria? Within Kegans model, she is embedded in a context of interpersonal relatedness, where the thoughts and feelings of the other person matter to her, and where she in turn expects that her thoughts and feelings should matter to the other person. She realizes that it is important not only to take into account the others experience, but also to understand that how the individuals feel in the interaction indicates the degree to which the relationship is intact or fractured. Her definition of self is, to some extent, based upon the maintenance of the relationship. In Kegans language, Gloria is her relationships rather than having them (Kegan, 1982, p. 206). Embedded in this context, she may not be able to articulate fully the way in which her sense of being oK is bound up with her sense of how the other takes account of her experience. Perhaps she would express this more consciously in terms of values articulated as being

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respectful or considerate. Within this way of constructing relationships such qualities would be virtues. The resentment Gloria expresses upon being called a phony may well be grounded in her sense that Perlss way of acting has not taken account of her feelings, nor recognized who she is. We observe this in a later exchange, after Perls has provoked Gloria into expressing her anger. Gloria: Well Im mad at you. perls: Wonderful! Gloria: But you seem so detached. You dont even seem to care that Im mad at you. I feel like you are not recognizing me at all Dr. Perls, not a bit. (Shostrom, 1965) From Glorias perspective, we might imagine that Perls is violating the interpersonal way of constructing relationships where he should care if she is angry with him. Her reluctance to criticize him reflects her value that the other persons feelings do matter. As he presses her to be genuine with him, we see this value expressed: perls: Gloria: perls: Gloria: Can you say this to me, Fritz, you are icky. No. Whats your difficulty? Cause I feel like if you really believed me it would hurt your feelings. (Shostrom, 1965)

Glorias concern for Perlss feelings, as well as for how he feels about her, reflects the interpersonal level at which she constructs relationships. This is a way of constructing relationships that adolescents, often characterized as having a more egocentric way of relating (Elkind, 1985), have difficulty in realizing. While Gloria has long since mastered the interpersonal way of constructing relationships, she does not yet have a conception of a level beyond. Kegan describes this next level as the recognition of self-authorship and the capacity for independent self-definition. She would thus be able to maintain her sense of self independently of the relationships into which she enters. In Gestalt terms, she might be described as being authentic, but this description fails to account for the qualitative shift in what authentic means at different developmental levels. As Kegan (1994) notes:
Perls wants to foster a particular way of meaning, but his therapeutic choices often end up assuming that the [higher] order capacity is already there, that it is only in need of encouragement

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rather than helping it to come into existence. That [her] way of knowing is phony and [his] way of knowing is genuine appears only to be Perlss view of the matter, not Glorias. (p. 248)

Perlss dismissive approach clearly conveys his view that she is being phony, rather than recognizing her developmental achievement for what it is. His emphasis upon genuineness reflects a developmental demand to construct relationships in a new way. Yet, at this point in her development, Gloria can only experience acting as Perls believes she should, as a violation of her sense of values. It is perhaps ironic that, for Gloria to behave as Perlss admonishes, can only be a kind of phony or uncharacteristic behavior that violates her sense of genuineness. Might a therapist be more effective in working with Gloria, and in supporting her movement toward a more centered and authentic level of self-development, by first recognizing and affirming where she is? Kegans model of development, as applied to the Gloria session, succeeds in accounting for/describing the evolving nature of psychological needs in a way that transcends the limitations of Gestalt therapys original homeostatic model. We have here an illustration of how psychotherapy not only takes place within a developmental context but also is ultimately about the process of development. Conclusion organismic self-regulation is an essential concept for Gestalt therapy theory. Equally essential is an elaboration of the processes of self-regulation and the qualitative difference between physiological and psychological needs. However, Gestalt therapy theory, as articulated in PHG (1951), failed to make the distinction between the separable processes of homeostasis and equilibrium, and consequently treated physiological and psychological needs as equivalent. Subsequent presentations of Gestalt therapy theory have followed in Perlss footsteps in treating physiological needs (drives) as a model for psychological needs (desires). Without the articulation of the difference between homeostasis and equilibrium, the difference between these levels of needs has been obscured and the developmental nature of psychological needs largely ignored. If physiological metaphors like hunger may at times offer a simple way of conveying to clients the idea of organismic self-regulation, perhaps even providing validation that their needs are legitimate and will press for closure, the risk is that such metaphors may imply that closure is always as simple and complete as satisfying hunger. Some clients may be left feeling inadequate for not obtaining a complete closure on experiences like losses and traumatic events, which may require re-visiting and re-working

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across time and across developmental levels.1

Bruce Kenofer, Ph.D. bkenofer@lclark.edu RE f ERE nc ES

Bickhard, M. H. (2004). A challenge to constructivism: Internal and external sources of constructive constraint. Human Development, 47, 94-99. Bowlby, J. (1980). Attachment and loss (Vol. 3, Loss, sadness and depression). New York: Basic Books. Breshgold, E., & Zahm, S. (1992). A case for the integration of self psychological developmental theory into the practice of gestalt therapy. The Gestalt Journal, 15(1), 61-93. Clarkson, P. (2004). Gestalt counseling in action (3rd ed.). London: Sage. Elkind, D. (1985). Egocentrism redux. Developmental Review, 5, 218-226. Glinwater, J. T. (2000). Gestalt therapy: Treatment of the affective self. The Gestalt Journal, 23(2), 81-97. Gold, E. K., & Zahm, S. G. (2008). Gestalt therapy. In M. Herson & A. Gross (Eds.), Handbook of clinical psychology (Vol. 1, Adults), pp. 585-616. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons. Hycner, R., & Jacobs, L. (1995). The healing relationship in Gestalt therapy: A dialogic/self psychology approach. Highland, New York: Gestalt Journal Press. Kegan, R. (1982). The evolving self: Problems and process in human development. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Kegan, R. (1994). In over our heads: The mental demands of modern life. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Latner, J. (1992). The theory of gestalt therapy. In E. Nevis (Ed.), Gestalt therapy: Perspectives and applications (pp.13-56). Cleveland: Gestalt Institute of Cleveland Press. Mackewn, J. (1997). Developing gestalt counseling. London: Sage. McConville, M. (2003). Lewinian field theory, adolescent development, and psychotherapy. Gestalt Review, 7(3), 213-238. Mortola, P. (2001). Sharing disequilibrium: A link between gestalt therapy theory and child developmental theory. Gestalt Review, 5(1), 45-56. Perls, F. (1969a). Ego, hunger and aggression. New York: Random House.
1 I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer regarding the potential clinical risk of basic physiological metaphors as illustrations of closure. I wish to thank Mark McConville, Ph.D., for his many helpful suggestions, and two anonymous reviewers for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

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Perls, F. (1969b). Gestalt therapy verbatim. Moab, Utah: Real People Press. Perls, F. (n.d.). Psychiatry in a new key. Unpublished Manuscript. Perls, F., Hefferline, R., & Goodman, P. (1951). Gestalt therapy: Excitement and growth in the human personality. New York: Julian Press. Shostrom, E. (Producer and Director). (1965). Three approaches to psychotherapy [Film and video series]. Corona del Mar, California: Psychological and Educational Films. Tompkins, S. S. (1991). Affect, imagery, consciousness (Vol. 3, Anger and fear). New York: Springer. Yontef, G. (1993). Awareness, dialog and process: Essays on Gestalt therapy. Highland, New York: Gestalt Journal Press.

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