Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Winter 2013
IN THIS ISSUE:
The Cruise Industry Post-Concordia: Improved Safety and Other Consequences . . 1 Message From The Chair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Trade Talk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Direct Action Against Liability Insurers In Norway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 U .S . Fifth Circuit Defines In The Course Of Employment For Jones Act Cases . . . . . . . . . . 10 Patching The Corporate Veil: How Effective Corporate Social Responsibilities Programs Can Shield Corporations And Its Officers From Criminal Liabilities In Maritime Negligence . . . 11 Luxury Yachting At A Crossroad: Market Strategies Within a Global Financial-Legal Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2013 TIPS Calendar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Uniting Plaintiff, Defense, Insurance, and Corporate Counsel to Advance the Civil Justice System
Riker Danzig et al 1 Speedwell Ave, Headquarters Plaza Morristown, NJ 07960-6838 (973) 451-8534 Fax: (973) 451-8763 lsands@riker.com
Laurie J Sands
Scope Liaison
George Washington Univ Law Schl 2000 H St NW Washington, DC 20052-0026 (202) 994-7040 Fax: (202) 994-9817 jschaf@law.gwu.edu
Fisher & Fisher Law Offices LLC 1200 Route 940 Mount Pocono, PA 18344-1324 (570) 839-8690 Fax: (570) 839-7675 joseph.kulesa@pocono-lawyers.com 147 Bunny Trail Rd Stroudsburg, PA 18360-7693 anne.kulesa@gmail.com Troutman Sanders LLP 150 W Main St, Ste 1600 Norfolk, VA 23510-3400 (757) 687-7706 jessica.martyn@troutmansanders.com Morris Polich & Purdy LLP 1055 W 7th St, Ste 2400 Los Angeles, CA 90017-2550 (213) 891-9100 Fax: (213) 488-1178 ppalmer@mpplaw.com Horizon Lines, Inc. 4064 Colony Road, Ste 200 Charlotte, NC 28211 (704) 973-7089 kendoka1998@gmail.com Fowler White Boggs PA 501 E Kennedy Blvd, Ste 1700 Tampa, FL 33602-5239 (813) 228-7411 Fax: (813) 229-8313 scott.richards@fowlerwhite.com Severson & Werson 1 Embarcadero Ctr, Fl 26 San Francisco, CA 94111-3745 (415) 677-5627 Fax: (415) 956-0439 pls@severson.com Skanska USA Civil Inc 295 Bendix Rd, Ste 400 Virginia Beach, VA 23452-1295 (757) 578-4165 Fax: (757) 420-4089 dawn.serafine@skanska.com Phelps Dunbar LLP 365 Canal St, Ste 2000 New Orleans, LA 70130-6534 (504) 679-5509 waidr@phelps.com
Joseph Kulesa
Joan E Schaffner
Anne L Kulesa
Robins Kaplan Miller & Ciresi 2049 Century Park E, Ste 3400 Los Angeles, CA 90067-3208 (310) 229-5443 Fax: (310) 229-5800 jpkoelzer@rkmc.com
James P Koelzer
Chair-Elect
Technology Vice-Chair
3531 Helms Ave Culver City, CA 90232-2414 (502) 299-2116 jeffersonpoole@gmail.com
Jefferson Poole
Council Representative
Drew Eckl & Farnham LLP PO Box 7600 Atlanta, GA 30357-0600 (404) 885-6320 Fax: (404) 876-0992 hmckinley@deflaw.com
Vice-Chairs
Wayne Parker
Christopher Nolan
The Law Office of Lili Beneda LLC 523 Hudson St, Apt 2Fs New York, NY 10014-6119 (718) 759-8715 lili@benedalaw.com Pierce Atwood LLP 10 Weybosset St, Fl 4 Providence, RI 02903-2818 (401) 588-5113 mdaly@pierceatwood.com Deehl & Carlson PA 501 NE 1st Ave, Ste 301 Miami, FL 33132-1960 (305) 448-9111 Fax: (305) 442-0441 david@deehl.com Jones Walker et al 201 Saint Charles Ave, 50th Fl New Orleans, LA 70170-1000 (504) 582-8000 Fax: (504) 589-8224 ghurley@joneswalker.com
Scott A Richards
Michael J Daly
Membership Vice-Chair
Holland & Knight LLP 31 W 52nd St, Fl 11 New York, NY 10019-6111 (212) 513-3570 Fax: (212) 385-9010 blythe.daly@hklaw.com
Pamela L Schultz
Dawn L Serafine
Newsletter Vice-Chairs
Hamilton, Miller & Birthisel, LLP 100 South Ashley Drive, Ste 1210 Tampa, Florida 33602 (813) 223-1900 FAX: (813) 223-1933 chamilton@hamiltonmillerlaw.com
Christopher F. Hamilton
Grady S Hurley
2013 American Bar Association, Tort Trial & Insurance Practice Section, 321 North Clark Street, Chicago, Illinois 60654; (312) 9885607. All rights reserved. The opinions herein are the authors and do not necessarily represent the views or policies of the ABA, TIPS or the Admiralty and Maritime Law Committee. Articles should not be reproduced without written permission from the Tort Trial & Insurance Practice Section. Editorial Policy: This Newsletter publishes information of interest to members of the Admiralty and Maritime Law Committee of the Tort Trial & Insurance Practice Section of the American Bar Association including reports, personal opinions, practice news, developing law and practice tips by the membership, as well as contributions of interest by nonmembers. Neither the ABA, the Section, the Committee, nor the Editors endorse the content or accuracy of any specific legal, personal, or other opinion, proposal or authority. Copies may be requested by contacting the ABA at the address and telephone number listed above. Hypertext citation linking was created by application of West BriefTools software. BriefTools, a citation-checking and file-retrieving software, is an integral part of the Westlaw Drafting Assistant platform. West, a Thomson Reuters business is a Premier Section Sponsor of the ABA Tort Trial & Insurance Practice Section, and this software usage is implemented in connection with the Sections sponsorship and marketing agreements with West. Neither the ABA nor ABA Sections endorse non-ABA products or services. Check if you have access to West BriefTools software by contacting your Westlaw representative.
Listen to host and AMLC Immediate Past Chair Chris Nolan, Partner at Holland and Knight LLP, lead a discussion featuring Philip Brickman, Partner at Fowler Rodriguez Valdes-Fauli, and special guest Laurie Sands, AMLC Chair and Counsel at Riker Danzig Scherer Hyland & Perretti LLP. Phil chats about oil spill casualties and response, client experiences and expectations, and the New Orleans maritime practice in this 20 minute AMLC Inaugural Podsail Podcast.
TRADETALK
For our fifth Trade Talk piece, we are pleased to spotlight our first P & I Club lawyer, Betsy Bundy, Assistant Vice President, at Skuld North America, in New York. Skuld was established in 1897 in Oslo, Norway and some 40% of the tonnage entered with the club is Scandinavian-controlled, reflecting the clubs traditional balance between Scandinavian and non-Scandinavian business. Other big markets are Western European countries, Russia, Singapore, China including Hong Kong, and the United States. Greece and Asia are perceived as key growth areas. In addition to traditional P & I, Skuld also offers a wide range of marine and energy insurance products through its syndicate at Lloyds, Skuld 1897. Skuld is one of thirteen members of the International Group of P&I Clubs that work closely together in reinsurance and industry matters of common interest. The International Group insures approximately 90% of the worlds merchant fleet. Below are excerpts from our interview with Betsy which address her views on the maritime industry, issues concerning the hiring of outside counsel, and perhaps most importantly her devotion to the Kansas Jayhaws.
Q. Betsy, tell us what prompted you to get into the maritime legal industry? R . Luck, I guess! I am from the Midwest, primarily landlocked Kansas, and lack the type of marine background common to lawyers in this industry. I somewhat inadvertently landed a job as a law clerk with Holbrook and Murphy, a boutique maritime firm in Boston, while I was attending the New England School of Law. I really enjoyed working with Seth Holbrook and Bob Murphy and took an immediate shine to maritime law. I was especially drawn to the federal court practice along with the collegiality of the maritime bar. When moving to NYC, I specifically targeted maritime firms and have been fortunate enough to have worked at two of the best in the City, Freehill, Hogan & Mahar LLP and McDermott & Radzik LLP, in my humble opinion. Q. Can you describe your experience of working at a P&I Club? R . I am relatively new to the inside world of P&I. After working for many years at law firms, primarily involved in marine personal injury litigation, I have definitely had to adjust to this new role. Rather than 5
laboring over legal briefs involving incidents that happened years ago, I now have to opportunity to get involved in issues real time, which has been a fun and refreshing change for me. I am handling primarily personal injury, or people claims as my SKULD colleagues call them, which involves a whole range of different types of matters from dealing with stowaways to arranging for crew member medical care. My role also involves managing U.S. litigation along with providing general U.S. legal advice to our various syndicate offices and members. This aspect of my SKULD work is more familiar to me and similar to the kind of work I did in private practice. That being said, I am still getting used to my role as a client, which does pose a new set of challenges. In any event, I must admit, I do not miss keeping track of billable hours! In all seriousness, it is liberating to focus only on what needs to be done, with less emphasis on keeping track of time. All in all, this has been a great change for me and I have very much enjoyed working at SKULD. Q. What are your views on hiring outside counsel? R . To be honest, I am still working on developing my philosophy with respect to retaining counsel. I 5
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Additional Information
For more information regarding the benefits that membership in the AMLC can provide to you, check out our webpage at http://ambar.org/tipsadmiralty and join our group on LinkedIn. The Committee is open to all, including non-lawyer maritime professionals, law students and lawyers in every practice area who want to keep abreast of developments in the field.
Introduction
Should third party plaintiffs be allowed to bring a lawsuit directly against a defendants liability insurer? In which jurisdiction shall the plaintiff commence proceedings? And what defenses are available to the insurer? These are some of the fundamental questions in direct action, an insurance law theme that has been long debated in jurisdictions world-wide. In this article some of the key aspects of direct action under Norwegian law are examined, with particular focus on direct action in the context of marine insurance. Norway is an important maritime nation as it is home to some of the worlds leading marine insurers, such as Gard and Skuld, making the topic interesting for all those working with admiralty law and marine insurance. This article will compare direct action rules under U.S. law with those of Norway in order to highlight some of the similarities and differences.
perhaps the most well known. In most states, however, direct action rights are very limited or non-existent.
1 Christian Hauge is an attorney and partner with the Norwegian law firm Wiersholm. The Oslo based firm serves business clients in all industry sectors and has extensive experience and expertise within all fields of law related to the maritime industry. Mr. Hauges practice focuses on maritime law and maritime insurance and he regularly represents international clients in arbitration proceedings and in matters before the Norwegian courts. Christian can be contacted at Wiersholm, PO Box 1400 Vika, N-0115 Oslo, Norway, tel.: +47 210 210 00, email: chh@wiersholm.no. 2 yvind Molven is an associate attorney with Wiersholm. He holds a LL.M. degree from New York University. Mr. Molven has litigation experience from a wide range of matters related to the maritime industry. yvind can be contacted at Wiersholm, PO Box 1400 Vika, N-0115 Oslo, Norway, tel.: +47 210 210 00, email: omo@wiersholm.no. 3 The rules regarding direct action are found in the NICA 7-6, 7-7 and 7-8. 4 See generally http://www.mlaus.org/article.ihtml?id=576&committee=160.
Admiralty and Maritime Law Committee Annual Law Student Writing Competition
U.S. FIFTH CIRCUIT DEFINES IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT FOR JONES ACT CASES
By: Philip C. Brickman, Esq.1 The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently clarified the meaning of the phrase acting in the course of employment when considering whether an employer is liable for the negligent acts or omissions of its employee that causes injury to a co-employee in tort cases filed under the Jones Act.2 In Beech v. Hercules Drilling Company,3 the Fifth Circuit dealt with an unfortunate situation onboard a jack-up drilling rig owned by Hercules Drilling Company (Hercules). Keith Beech (Beech) was a crane operator working onboard the jack-up rig owned by Hercules. Michael Cosenza (Cosenza) worked as a driller onboard the same rig. Cosenza accidently brought a firearm onboard the rig, which was a violation of the Hercules policy prohibiting weapons on its rigs. Both Cosenza and Beech were aware of the company policy against firearms. Cosenza did not discover that he had brought the firearm until he found out one evening while doing his laundry. Even though he discovered that he had the firearm, Cosenza did not report it and kept it hidden in his locker. Cosenzas failure to report the firearms presence onboard the rig was also a violation of company policy. One evening, Cosenza was assigned to work a night shift and was the only crewman on duty. That night he was supposed to monitor the rigs generator, check certain equipment and report any suspicious activity. For these duties, Hercules encouraged him to stay in the break room, watching television and talking with fellow crewmembers. Cosenza could watch television and monitor the generator at the same time because if there were generator problems, the television would turn off. Beech was not on duty that evening, but was subject to being called on duty at any time. Both men were watching television in the break room and also talking about firearms. Cosenza then left the break room and went to his locker to retrieve his firearm because he thought that Beech might be interested in purchasing one. Upon returning Cosenza showed the firearm to Beech. As Cosenza sat back down, his arm bumped a part of the couch somehow causing the firearm to accidently discharge and kill Beech. Beechs wife filed a wrongful death action against Hercules under the Jones Act. After a bench trial in the Eastern District of Louisiana, the district court granted judgment in favor of Mrs. Beech for a substantial sum of money. Hercules appealed, arguing that neither Beech nor Cosenza were acting in the course of their employment at the time of the accident and, therefore, the judgment in favor of Mrs. Beech must be reversed. The Fifth Circuit first addressed the question of which standard of review should be applied to the course of employment issue. Hercules argued that because all the relevant facts were undisputed, only a legal determination was necessary and, therefore, the proper standard was de novo. Beech argued that the issue of whether an employee acted within the scope of his employment was a question for the fact finder and the clear error standard should be utilized. The Fifth Circuit thoroughly reviewed past authority and concluded that where there are disputed questions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact, the clearly erroneous standard should be utilized if the factual questions predominate the issue. De novo review is to be applied if legal questions predominate the dispute. However, a court can also review the legal arguments de novo where the facts at issue are completely undisputed.4 The Fifth Circuit then proceeded to the course of employment question. The Court acknowledged that the basis for the Jones Act was to create a negligence cause of action for seamen against their employers. The Court also noted that the Jones Act extends the Federal Employers
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1 Philip C. Brickman is a partner with Fowler, Rodriguez, Valdes-Fauli in New Orleans, Louisiana. Mr. Brickmans practice focuses on all aspects of maritime and environmental law with additional experience in general casualty defense litigation, representing major international and domestic marine, liability and energy underwriters, as well as vessel owners and energy companies. Contact at Fowler, Rodriguez, Valdes-Fauli, 400 Poydas Street, 30th Floor, New Orleans, Louisiana 70130, pbrickman@grvf-law.com. 2 46 U.S.C. 30101, et seq. 3 691 F.3d 566 (5th Cir. 2012). 4 Citing Hussaini v. Marine Transp. Lines, Inc., 158 F.3d 584 (5th Cir. 1998).
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PATCHING THE CORPORATE VEIL: HOW EFFECTIVE CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES PROGRAMS CAN SHIELD CORPORATIONS AND ITS OFFICERS FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITIES IN MARITIME NEGLIGENCE
By: Ngosong Fonkem1 On the evening of April 20, 2010, a gas release and subsequent explosion occurred on the Deepwater Horizon oilrig working on the Macondo exploration well for British Petroleum (BP) in the Gulf of Mexico. The explosion killed 11 workers, injured 16 others, and spewed 4.9 million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico over 87 days, making it the largest offshore oil spill in the history of the petroleum industry.2 Blame for the explosion and its aftermath has been cast broadly, with BP, Transocean, and Halliburton all listed as the primary offenders. It has been said that these companies, through their executives, chose profits over workers safety and the environment.3 The ensuing public outcry led to renewed efforts to prosecute, as well as enact legislation to enhance penalties for corporations and their employees responsible for such environmental crimes.4 Given the nature of todays environmentally sensitive world and the threat of criminal prosecution of upper-lever corporate officers, the best way for corporations and their corporate officers to avoid and/or reduce the likelihood of such criminal liabilities is to incorporate within their mission statements and operational procedures mechanisms for not only complying with the regulatory laws, but also for operating in a socially responsible manner. these liability provisions are mirrored in state statutes. Environmental crimes can be perpetrated at any legal level. In international cases, U.S. attorneys prosecute violations of federal laws arising out of United States treaties with other nations. Regarding environmental criminal statutes pertaining to the maritime industry, the primary statute dealing with pollution of United States navigable waters is the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships (MARPOL). Because MARPOL itself is not self-executing, Congress enacted Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (APPS) in 1980 to incorporate MARPOL into the United States domestic legislation. It is also the statute most commonly used and cited by the United States government in its efforts to prevent pollution and secure convictions for international MARPOL violations.5 Violation of MARPOL can, and often times do, lead to severe penalties. Specifically, Section 1908(a) of APPS makes it a class D felony to knowingly violate any provision of MARPOL.6 Class D felonies in the United States are punishable by up to six years imprisonment and a fine of up to $250,000 for an individual and $500,000 for a corporation.7 Like MARPOL, another international environmental criminal statute is the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA). Like MARPOL, MBTA is also commonly enforced through APPS, and it is usually invoked when the pollution incident results in the death of a protected bird species.8 The statute makes it unlawful to, at any time and by any means, kill any migratory bird included in the terms of the treaties.9 Conviction under the statute is a
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1 Ngosong Fonkem is a 2012 LLM graduate from Tulane Law School, Admiralty & Maritime Law program. He is currently licensed to practice law in Wisconsin. The full-length version of this article will be published soon. Contact Ngosong Fonkem at nfonkem23@gmail.com. 2 See BP leak the worlds worst accidental oil spill, Telegraph, 2010-08-03, Retrieved 2010-08-15, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/oilandgas/7924009/ BP-leak-the-worlds-worst-accidental-oil-spill.html. 3 See Weissman, Robert, Opposing view on disaster in the Gulf: Send a message, USA Today, Published 6/23/2010 7:39 PM. http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/ editorials/2010-06-24-editorial24_ST1_N.htm. 4 Fowler, Tom, Criminal Charges Are Prepared in BP Spill, Dec. 29, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203899504577126871591624572.html. See also Leahy Introduces Bill To Boost Penalties For Environmental Crimes, February 15, 2011, http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/press_releases/release/?id=42722f38-3877-4746-8abed22f2c945163. 5 Chalos, Michael & Parker, Wayne, The Criminalization of Maritime Accidents and MARPOL violations in the United States, 23 U.S.F. Mar. L. J. 206. (2010-2011) 6 33 U.S.C. 1908(a) (2006). 7 18 U.S.C. 3581(b)(4) (2012); 18 U.S.C. 3571 (b)(3) (2012); 18 U.S.C. 3571 (c)(3) (2012). 8 Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. 703-712 (2012). 9 Id. 703(a).
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1 M.A. Business Law, is a member of the Milan (Italy) Bar practicing international business law at large, focusing upon commercial contracts, JVs, M&A, commercial litigation, arbitration before the I.C.C. and CCPIT (PRC), and representation of domestic and overseas clients. He can be reached at glrosa@tiscali.it. Giuseppe shared the observations contained in this piece with the International Ship Registry Review, which published his article on October 11, 2012, with the proviso that the ABA TIPS Admiralty Committee would also be publishing his work.
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A M E R I CAN BA R A S S O C I AT I ON
www.ababooks.org Phone: 1-800-285-2221 Fax: 1-312-988-5568 Publications Orders P.O. Box 10892 Chicago, IL 60610-0892
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Plaintiffs in Giglio Sub faced legal hurdles4, but it also remains to be seen whether the Plaintiffs can overcome factual hurdles.5 But rather than taking a wait-and-see approach and placing its fate in the hands of the courts, the cruise industry has been proactively implementing or enhancing safety policies to ensure that an incident like the Costa Concordia does not happen again and to ensure that safety of passenger and crew continues to be the cruise industrys highest priority.6
passengers and crew on board. Prior to this new policy, cruise ships only had to have enough lifejackets for every cruise passenger and crewmember on board. In practice, however, cruise ships carried additional life jackets for passengers and crew. In November 2012, an additional policy, the stowage of life jackets, was implemented and requires excess life jackets to be placed close to muster stations or lifeboats on ships contracted to be built in July 2013 or later.
Life Jackets
In April 2012, a new life jackets policy was implemented to ensure that the amount of life jackets aboard cruise ships exceeded the total number of
4 On May 3, 2012, Plaintiffs filed their complaint in the United States District Court in the Southern District of Florida, despite most of the Plaintiffs being Italian residents, the incident occurring in Italian waters, the ship sailing under the Italian flags and despite the ships crew being mostly Italian. On September 26, 2012, Judge Robin S. Rosenbaum dismissed Plaintiffs complaint based on the doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens. As a consequence, the Plaintiffs must re-file their complaint in Italy should they choose to do so. 5 For example, the Plaintiffs in Giglio Sub allege that Defendants failed to conduct safety drills although they were not on board the Costa Concordia at the time of the incident. 6 After conducting a comprehensive safety study on the cruise industry in 1996, the U.S. Coast Guard concluded that the cruise industry was the safest mode of commercial transportation. http://www2.cruising.org/industry/safety.cfm. 7 The new safety policies: http://cruising.org/regulatory/cruise-industry-policies. 8 Cruise ship safety regulations are contained in the International Safety Management (ISM) Code: http://www.imo.org/OurWork/HumanElement/SafetyManagement/Pages/ ISMCode.aspx. 9 Giglio Sub, 2012 WL 4477504 at *1.
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he would have had against the insured and the insured may invoke all the defenses the insured would have had against the plaintiff. But there are some exceptions, the most important being that the insurer cannot invoke acts or omissions on the part of the insured that affect coverage if they occurred after the claim arose. As an example, in a direct action suit the insurer cannot invoke as a defense against the third party plaintiff that the insured breached his duty to notify the insurer of the incident. This is similar to Louisianas direct action statute under which insurers cannot invoke defenses that are personal to the insured.5 The provisions in the NICA are mandatory in most insurance contracts. Consequently, if the insurance contract contains provisions that put the insured (or a third party) in a position that is less favourable than under the NICA, then the NICA rules prevail. However, in the context of marine insurance, a crucial exception is that insurers have a right to contract out of the NICA as the rules are not mandatory for insurance contracts relating to ships, offshore installations, and the carriage of goods internationally. For these types of insurance contracts, which notably include P&I and hull insurance, insurers can opt out of the NICA by adding simple wording into the insurance contract protecting themselves from direct actions suits.
Unsurprisingly, Norwegian marine insurers avail themselves of this possibility. For example, the Gard and Skuld club rules (terms of insurance) state that their insurance is governed by Norwegian law, but the NICA shall not apply. See Gard rule 90 and Skuld rule 47.3. Thus, third parties are prevented from directly suing these insurers under Norwegian law, unless they have a basis for a direct action claim outside of the NICA.6 Why did the Norwegian legislator give marine insurers the right to contract out of the NICAs direct action provisions, thereby favouring them over insurers who were not given the same opportunity? The underlying considerations appear to be similar to those motivating New York law. New York excludes marine insurance policies from its direct action law in an effort to not place a competitive disadvantage on New York marine insurers.7 The NICA was crafted under similar considerations as a result of the shipping and insurance industrys lobbying efforts. There is, however, one important exception from the principle that marine insurers are free to contract out of the NICAs direct action rules. Pursuant to the NICA section 7-6 and 7-8, if the insured becomes insolvent, third parties have a right of direct action irrespective of any conflicting provisions in the insurance contract. As such, Gard rule 90 and Skuld rule 47.3, which as previously stated bar direct action
5 Nicolas R. Foster, Marine Insurance: Direct Action Statutes and Related Issues, 11 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. 261, 278 (1999). 6 The 1992 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC ) and the 2001 International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, which have been incorporated into Norwegian law through the Norwegian Maritime Code are examples of legislation that gives direct action rights to third parties outside of the NICA. 7 Alexander, Richard,Admiralty, Federalism, and the New York Direct Action Statute: Seamens Rights to Enforce Jones Act Judgments, 49 Brook. L. Rev. 179. (1982-1983).
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Time Limitation
In marine direct action cases, it is particularly important to pay careful attention to time limitation rules because of the multiple parties, claims, and, sometimes, the multiple jurisdictions involved. Usually there are two claims involved in a direct action case: the plaintiffs underlying claim against the insured upon which the direct action claim is based, and the direct action claim itself. Under Norwegian law, if the underlying claim becomes time-barred before the direct action claim arises (which under the NICA occurs at the insureds insolvency), the plaintiff not only loses his claim against the insured, but he also loses his direct action claim. As for the direct action claim itself, the time limitation rules under Norwegian law are somewhat uncertain as a result of the ambiguity of the relevant statutes and the lack of guiding case law on several key points. The following observations should be sufficient for the present purposes: legal scholars have argued that the
8 See Todd v. S.S. Mut. Underwriting Association, 601 F.3d. 329, 336, 2010 AMC 1143, 1152-53 (5th Cir. 2010); Todd v S.S. Mut. Underwriting Association, No. 08-1195, 2011 WL 1226464 (E.D. La. Mar. 28, 2011); and Edward Authement III v. Ingram Barge Co. et al., Case No. 10-2107 (E.D. La. July 13, 2012).
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Liability Acts (FELA) protections to seaman and thus, FELA case law applies to Jones Act cases.6 Further, the Jones Act should be liberally construed to accomplish its purposes to provide for the welfare of seaman. Despite the Jones Acts liberal construction, the Fifth Circuit cited to the U.S. Supreme Court and noted that liberal construction does not mean that FELA or the Jones Act should be construed as workers compensation statutes, as neither statute makes the employer the insurer of their employees safety while on duty. The basis for liability under the Jones Act and FELA is negligence, not merely the fact that an injury occurred.7 Under FELA and the Jones Act, an employer may be vicariously liable for its employees negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior, so long as the negligence occurred in the course of employment. In Beech, the question the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed is the meaning of the phrase in the course of employment, and specifically whether Cosenza and Beech were acting in the course of their employment when Cosenza accidently shot Beech. In order to hold an employer vicariously liable for one employees injury caused by the negligence of a co-employee under the Jones Act, a plaintiff must show that both employees were acting in the course of their employment at the time of the accident. The district court also concluded that Cosenza was acting in the course of employment because sitting down on the couch and watching television were part of his duties. The district court further concluded that Beech was acting in the course and scope of his employment because he was onboard the vessel and subject to the call of duty at the time he was shot. Therefore, when the accidental shooting occurred while he and Beech were talking, both men were in the course and scope of their employment. On Appeal, Hercules argued that because Cosenzas decision to show off the firearm did not further Hercules business
5 45 U.S.C. 51, et seq. 6 See Withhart v. Otto Candies, L.L.C., 431 F.3d 840. (5th Cir. 2005). 7 Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532 (1994) and Morant v. Long Island R.R., 66 F.3d 518 (2d Cir. 1995).
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issue, but it is relevant because it gives some guidance regarding how one employees conduct furthers their companys business interests. Here, Cosenza left the break room to retrieve a loaded firearm when he was supposed to be monitoring the generator and watching for suspicious behavior. His own suspicious behavior took him outside the course and scope of his own employment. The Court also noted that if Cosenzas behavior with regard to the firearm did not take him out of the course and scope of employment, it is unclear as to what could have. The Fifth Circuit therefore avoided the situation where a claim for negligence under the Jones Act was treated as strict liability. The Court, again, noted that neither the Jones Act nor FELA makes an employer the insurer of its employees safety while they are on duty, but rather only for negligent acts and/or omissions. The Fifth Circuit held Cosenza was outside the course of his employment at the time of the accident and reversed the district courts judgment in favor of Beech, thus rendering judgment in favor of Hercules. In this case, the Fifth Circuit clearly defines how a Jones Act seamans course of employment is considered when attempting to recover from his employer for injuries caused by a co-workers negligence. Both parties must have been involved in an activity where they were undertaking some action in furtherance of the employers business interests. Whether the conduct was intentional or unintentional does not matter. The Fifth Circuit also rejected the boarder argument that things incident to an employees job duties are also within the course of employment. In other words, an employee cannot be liable for its employees negligence where the employee acts entirely of his own impulse, for his own amusement, and for no purpose of or benefit to the employer. In Beech, the Fifth Circuit narrowed the course of employment definition for injuries that occurred on the job as a result of a co-workers negligence under the Jones Act, thereby avoiding situations that could lead to the Jones Act being utilized as a workers compensation statute using a strict liability theory of recovery.
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misdemeanor punishable by fines of up to $15,000 per violation and imprisonment for no more than six months.10 Similar to environmental regulations promulgated at the international level, several federal environmental statutes have the potential to form the basis of environmental criminal prosecutions. A brief analysis of these statutes and their implications on violators are provided in the following paragraphs. One of the most important environmental criminal statutes frequently used to regulate the pollution of U.S. waters is the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (the Clean Water Act) (hereinafter the CWA). The CWA makes it unlawful for any person to discharge any pollutant from a point source into navigable waters, unless a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit is obtained under the Act.11 Because of growing public awareness and concern for controlling water pollution, in 1977 Congress amended the statute to focus on toxic pollutants in U.S. waters.12 Furthermore, in 1987, the CWA was restructured to permit citizen suits.13 The CWA has evolved extensively since its enactment in 1948. The most significant amendments to the Clean Water Act are the amendments made pursuant to the federal Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90). The U.S. Congress passed OPA 90 in reaction to the EXXON VALDEZ oil spill of 1989,14 which was the largest oil spill in American history at the time.15 OPA 90 sets forth requirements designed to prevent marine pollution, and to define and increase the parameters of civil liability for oil spills in the territorial waters of the United States. OPA 90 places liability only on responsible parties. The definition of responsible party for liability purposes under OPA 90 depends on the source of the discharge.16 Thus, where a discharge comes from a vessel, any person owning, operating, or demise chartering a vessel is the responsible party.17
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Similar to the CWA, another federal environmental statute imposing criminal liability on violators is the Refuse Act. Under section 407 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 (Refuse Act), any discharge of refuse of any kind from a vessel into U.S. navigable waters is prohibited.18 A violation of the Refuse Act is a Class A misdemeanor, and a person guilty for violating the Act may be fined up to $25,000 per day or imprisoned for no less than thirty days, but no more than one year.19 The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) is another of environmental criminal statute imposing criminal penalties on violators. A violation of RCRA includes dumping hazardous waste in a manner inconsistent with the Act. Yet another act imposing criminal sanctions is the Endangered Species Act (ESA). In the context of maritime law, it is typically invoked in situation where an industrial accident causes the death of endangered species. The criminal penalties under the ESA may be a $50,000 fine, imprisonment for up to one year, or both.20 Additionally, the Sentencing Guidelines have placed an ESA offender with a base offense level of six under Federal Sentencing Guideline 2Q2.1. Specific offense characteristics add points to the offenders base offense level. Given the discretion Courts have in assessing or characterizing the base level of the Federal Sentencing Guideline, a violation of ESA could potential expose the responsible corporations and their officers to very severe criminal penalties if the courts decide to add points to the offenders base points. Although the aforementioned environmental statutes are the most common environmental criminals statutes used by the U.S. government to punish responsible offenders for illegal discharge of toxic chemicals into the environment, the list is not exhaustive. The U.S. government has the discretion to invoke other criminal statutes as well. Such statutes include: Marine Mammals Protection Act; Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act; Park System Resource Protection Act; National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act; Safe Drinking
Id. 707(a). Id. at Section 402. Id. at Section 311. Id. at Section 505. Force, Davies, & Force at 3. Cleveland, Cutler, Exxon Valdez oil spill, The Encyclopedia of Earth. (2010), http://www.eoearth.org/article/Exxon_Valdez_oil_spill. 42 U.S.C. 2701(32)(A); See, United States v. J.R. Nelson Vessel, Ltd., 1 F. Supp. 2d 172, 1998 AMC 2249 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). Force, Davies, & Force at 5. River and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, U.S.C. Vol. # 401, 403-405, 406-409, 411-118 (2012). Id. Id. at 1540(b)(1).
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Recommendations
Undeniably, the twin goals for Congressional enactment of environmental criminal statutes are to punish wrongdoers for polluting the environment and to deter others from engaging in similar conduct. Because of these reasons, in recent years, prosecutors are much more willing to take action against corporations and their officers for criminal offenses committed by their businesses. Furthermore, courts are more willing to interpret environmental statutes as public welfare legislation, and hold corporations
21 See 18 U.S.C. 1001 (2012). 22 Id. 23 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. 1519 (2012). 24 See Romrell, Randall, Why Companies Should Be Concerned About Corporate Compliance, National Association of Credit Management Business Credit, (March 1997). 25 Id. 26 Id. 27 See U.S. Department of Justice, Factors in Decision on Criminal Prosecutions for Environmental violation in the Context of Significant Voluntary Compliance on Disclosure Efforts by the Violator, Pt. I (2012). http://www.justice.gov/enrd/3058.htm.
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28 Id. 29 See Environmental Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov/region2/capp/cip/policy.htm. 30 Id. 31 Bryant, Dennis L, The Maritime Compliance Program: Foghorn protection for the shipowner, 24 Tul. Mar. L.J. 591, Pp 610 (2000). 32 See Conference of Contracting government to the 1974 SOLAS Convention, held in London in May 1994, reprinted in Benedict on Admiralty, Doc. No 14-2 (Frank L. Wiswall, Jr. ed., 7th ed. Rev. 1999). 33 Id. 34 Id. 35 Id. 36 See EPA position Statement on environmental Management Systems and ISO 14001, 63 Fed. Reg. 12,094 (1998); Code of Environmental Management Principles, 61 Fed. Reg. 54,062 (1996). 37 See 33 C.F.R. 96.210(b) (2010); ISM Code, Supra note 35, 1.2.1.
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Conclusions
Over the last few decades, the public has become acutely aware of societys growing environmental problems, and the need to do something about them. In response to societal demands, the U.S. government has aggressively began to pursue and prosecute alleged offenders. Given the threat of such criminal prosecution, the best way for corporations and their corporate officers to avoid and/or reduce the likelihood of such criminal liabilities is to incorporate within their mission statements and operational procedures mechanisms for not only complying with the regulatory laws, but also for operating in a socially responsible manner. First, a corporation operating in a socially responsible manner enhances its corporate goodwill among its stakeholders. Secondly, some environmental criminal statutes, as well as federal law require corporations in certain industries to implement compliance programs. Even in spite of these reasons, the benefits a corporation and its officers might get from implementing a compliance program substantially outweigh the burden and cost of instituting such compliance programs. For example, if such a program were in place, the United States government may elect to forgo the prosecutorial. Similarly, if the enforcement actions were to go to trial, even though there was a compliance program, the judgment may likely be more favorable to the company than it would have been had no compliance program been in place. As such, compliance programs may be extremely valuable to corporations wishing to shield themselves, and their officers, from criminal liabilities in maritime negligence.
38 See U.S. Department of Interiors Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement. http://www.boemre.gov/SEMP/; http://www.stb07.com/downloads/ SEMS-Final-Rule.pdf. 39 Id. 40 http://www.crowell.com/NewsEvents/AlertsNewsletters/Environment-Natural-Resources-Law-Alert/BOEMRE-Proposes-Additional-SEMS-Program-Requirements. 41 See http://www.stb07.com/downloads/SEMS-Final-Rule.pdf. 42 Id. 43 Id.
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