Ormoc Sugar Company Inc.

vs Ormoc City et al In 1964, Ormoc City passed a bill which read: There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any and all productions of centrifugalsugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Incorporated, in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries. Though referred to as a production tax, the imposition actually amounts to a tax on the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For production of sugar alone is not taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the sugar produced is exported. Ormoc Sugar paid the tax (P7,087.50) in protest averring that the same is violative of Sec 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides: It shall not be in the power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried into the municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to impose an import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge for wharfage, use of bridges or otherwise, shall be void. And that the ordinance is violative to equal protection as it singled out Ormoc Sugar As being liable for such tax impost for no other sugar mill is found in the city. ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection. HELD: The SC held in favor of Ormoc Sugar. The SC noted that even if Sec 2287 of the RAC had already been repealed by a latter statute (Sec 2 RA 2264) which effectively authorized LGUs to tax goods and merchandise carried in and out of their turf, the act of Ormoc City is still violative of equal protection. The ordinance is discriminatory for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinances enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon. Philippine Judges Association Vs. Prado Case Digest Philippine Judges Association Vs. Prado 227 SCRA 703 G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993 Facts: The Philippine Postal Corporation issued circular No. 92-28 to implement Section 35 of RA 7354 withdrawing the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTCs, MeTCs, MTCs and Land Registration Commission and with certain other government offices. It is alleged that RA 7354 is discriminatory becasue while withdrawing the franking privilege fromjudiciary, it retains the same for the President & Vice-President of the Philippines, Senator & members of the House of Representatives, COMELEC, National Census & Statistics Office and the general public. The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid classification in accordance with the equal protectionclause. Issue: Whether or Not Section 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional. Held: The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Section 1 of the Constitution to provide for amore specific guarantee against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from thegovernment. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is theequal protection clause. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Section 35 of RA 7354 is declared unconstitutional. Circular No. 9228 is set aside insofar Villegas v. Hiu Chiung Tsai Pao Ho 86 SCRA 270 (1978) F: An ordinance of the City of Manila prohibited the employment of aliens in any occupation or business unless they first secured a permit from the Mayor of Manila and paid a fee of P500. Respondent, an alien, employed in Manila, brought suit and obtained judgment from the CFI declaring the ordinance null and void. HELD: The ordinance is a tax measure. In imposing a flat rate of P500, it failed to consider substantial differences in situations among aliens and for that reason violates the rule on uniformity of taxation. It also lays down no guide for granting/denying the permit and therefore permits the arbitrary exercise of discretion by the Mayor. Finally, the ordinance denies aliens due process and the equal protection of the laws Source: http://www.shvoong.com/law-and-politics/1767236-case-digest-villegas-hiuchiung/#ixzz2HLUUI9yq Case Digest: Ichong, et. al. vs. Hernandez, etc. and Sarmiento FACTS: R.A. No. 1180 entitled An Act to Regulate the Retail Business was passed that nationalizes the retail trade business by prohibiting against persons not citizens of the Philippines, as well as associations, partnerships or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade with the exception of U.S. citizens and juridical entities. Aliens are

required to present registration to the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses. ISSUES: 1. Whether the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; and 2. Whether the provisions of the Act violates the due process of law RULING: 1. There is no merit in this contention. The UN Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation, or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and nations. The Treaty of Amity between China and the Philippines guarantees equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country, and is therefore not violated for all nationals except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. 2. A cursory study of the provisions of the law show that it is reasonable as it is made prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of those already engaged in the occupation to continue therein during the rest of their lives. Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law attacked as a violation of due process, is not in its reasonableness but its unreasonableness and the Court found that these provisions are not unreasonable. Ichong vs Hernandez FACTS: The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose was to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the peoples economic life.

a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to continue their business, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with law, until their death or voluntary retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term. Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act.

provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for violation of the laws on nationalization, economic control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry. provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships affected by the Act, filed an action to declare it unconstitutional for the ff: reasons: 1. it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property without due process 2. the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title 3. the Act violates international and treaty obligations 4. the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws. HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens the equal protection of the laws. There are real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the legislative classification adopted. RATIO: The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among residents. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike. The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by alien of the retail trade. It is this domination and control that is the legislatures target in the enactment of the Act. The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the Phil. where he temporarily stays and makes his living. The alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or emergency.

While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of the country, the alien may become the potential enemy of the State. The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit. Through the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, the alien now enjoys a monopolistic control on the nations economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and emergency. People vs Vera Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon. ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power. HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a way an imposition of penalty. There is undue delegation of power because there is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for aprobation officer may have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where noprobation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation. Tan vs Del Rosario

Having arrived at this conclusion, the plea of petitioner to have the law declared unconstitutional for being violative of due process must perforce fail. The due process clause may correctly be invoked only when there is a clear contravention of inherent or constitutional limitations in the exercise of the tax power. Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 (1971) Nature: Original Petition in the Supreme Court. Habeas corpus. FACTS: Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to reclusion perpetua for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping (along with Agapito, Palmares and Padua). The decision for the first two petitioners was rendered on March 8, 1954 and the third on Dec. 5, 1955. The last petitioner Bagolbagol was penalized with reclusion perpetua on Jan. 12, 1954. Each of the petitioners have been imprisoned for more than 13 years by virtue of their convictions. They now invoke the doctrine laid down in People v. Hernandez which negated such complex crime, a ruling which was not handed down until after their convictions have become final. In People v. Hernandez, the SC ruled that the information against the accused for rebellion complexed with murder, arson and robbery was not warranted under Art. 134 of the RPC, there being no such complex offense. This ruling was not handed down until after their convictions have become final. Since Hernandez served more than the maximum penalty that could have been served against him, he is entitled to freedom, and thus, his continued detention is illegal. ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 22 of the RPC which gives a penal judgment a retroactive effect is applicable in this case (WON judicial decisions favourable to the accused/convicted for the same crime can be applied retroactively) RULING: Yes. Judicial decisions favourable to the accused must be applied retroactively. Petitioners relied on Art. 22 of the RPC, which states the penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favour the accused who is not a habitual criminal. The Civil Code also provides that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution forms part of our legal system. Petitioners even raised their constitutional right to equal protection, given that Hernandez et al., has been convicted for the same offense as they have, though their sentences were lighter. Habeas corpus is the only means of benefiting the accused by the retroactive character of a favorable decision. Nuez assails the validity of the PD 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as amended by PD 1606. He was accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. It is the claim of Nuez that PD1486, as amended, is violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. He claims that the Sandiganbayan proceedings violates Nuezs right to equal protection, because appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC, instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the CA and thereafter to the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection insofar as appeals would be concerned. HELD: The SC ruled against Nuez. The 1973 Constitution had provided for the creation of a special court that shall have original jurisdiction over cases involving public officials charged with graft and corruption. The constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, the classification therein set forth met the standard requiring that it must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. Further still, decisions in the Sandiganbayan are reached by a unanimous decision from 3 justices - a showing that decisions therein are more conceivably carefully reached than other trial courts. Himagan vs people FACTS: Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged for the murder of and attempted murder. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of

9MAY G.R. No. 109289, October 3, 1994 FACTS: These two consolidated special civil actions for prohibition challenge, in G.R. No. 109289, the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7496, also commonly known as the Simplified Net Income Taxationn Scheme (SNIT), amending certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Regulations No. 293, promulgated by public respondents pursuant to said law. Petitioner intimates that Republic Act No. 7496 desecrates the constitutional requirement that taxation shall be uniform and equitable in that the law would now attempt to tax single proprietorships and professionals differently from the manner it imposes the tax on corporations and partnerships. Petitioners claim to be taxpayers adversely affected by the continued implementation of the amendatory legislation. ISSUES: 1. Is Republic Act No. 7496 a misnomer or, at least, deficient for being merely entitled, Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their Profession (Petition in G.R. No. 109289) 2. Does Republic Act No. 7496 violate the Constitution for imposing taxes that are not uniform and equitable. 3. Did the Secretary of Finance and the BIR Commissioner exceed their rule-making authority in applying SNIT to general professional partnerships? HELD: The Petition is dismissed. Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred concept of equal protection, merely requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities (Juan Luna Subdivision vs. Sarmiento, 91 Phil. 371). Uniformity does not forfend classification as long as: (1) the standards that are used therefor are substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions, and (4) the classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the same class (Pepsi Cola vs. City of Butuan, 24 SCRA 3; Basco vs. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 771). What may instead be perceived to be apparent from the amendatory law is the legislative intent to increasingly shift the income tax system towards the schedular approach in the income taxation of individual taxpayers and to maintain, by and large, the present global treatment on taxable corporations. We certainly do not view this classification to be arbitrary and inappropriate.

over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law andwould be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws. ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution.

HELD: No. The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions. If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended policemans constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. International School Alliance vs. Quisumbing nternational School (IS) pays its teachers who are hired from abroad, or foreign-hires, a higher salary than its local-hires, whether the latter are Filipino or not (most are Filipino, but some are American). It justifies this under the dislocation factor that foreigners must be given a higher salary both to attract them to teach here, and to compensate them for the significant economic disadvantages involved in coming here. The Teachers Union cries discrimination. HELD: Discrimination exists. Equal pay for equal work is a principal long honored in this jurisdiction, as it rests on fundamental norms of justice 1. Art. XIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution (Social Justice and Human Rights) exhorts Congress to give the highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and ennhance the right od all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalitites. The Constitution also provides that labor is entitled to humane conditions of work.. These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace, but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees. Lastly, the Constitution directs the State to promote equality of employment opportunities for all, regardless of sex, race, or creed. It would be an affront to both the spirit and the letter of these provisions if the State closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment. 2. International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles of law include principles of equity, i.e., fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and numerous other international Conventions all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.

and Household Workers. It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.

Issue: Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged Department Order No. 1.

Held: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to which their class was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies only tofemale contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. It is well settled hat equality before the law under the constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classification, provided that: 1. 2. 3. 4. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions That they are germane to the purpose of the law They are not confined to existing conditions They apply equally to al members of the same class

In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions. Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among other things, to the requirements of public safety as may be provided by law. Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power as been defined as the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers.

PASEI VS. DRILON [163 SCRA 386; L-81958; 30 JUN 1988] Monday, February 02, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law Facts: Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male andfemale of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutionalvalidity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled GuidelinesGoverning the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic

LACSONv.EXECUTIVESEC R ETA R Y Adherence of Jurisdiction (Exceptions) & Action of the Court when determined that it has no jurisdiction & Jurisdiction of the SB (Offense deemed committed in relation to Public Office)Facts:11 persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crimesyndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Petitioner Lacson and petitioners-intervenors Acop and Zubiawere members of ABRITG.SPO2 de los Reyes exposed to the media that what actually happened between themembers of the Kuratong Baleleng and the ABRITG was a summary execution (rub-out) and nota shootout. Ombudsman Desierto formed a panel to investigate the incident. Upon investigation,all the PNP officers and personnel allegedly involved in the incident were absolved from anycriminal liability because it was a legitimate police operation. However, a review board modifiedthe panels ruling and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against 26 respondents,including Lacson, Acop and Zubia. The Ombudsman approved the recommendation and 11informations for murder were filed against Lacson, as principal, Acop and Zubia as accessoriesbefore the Sandiganbayans Second DivisioUpon motion by all the accused in the 11 informations, the SB allowed them to file amotion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans action. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsmanfiled 11 amended informations before the SB, wherein Lacson was charged only as an accessory.The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the SB, asserting thatunder the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant toSection 2 of R.A. 7975. They said that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the SB to caseswhere one or more of the principal accused are government officials with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. They did not qualify under the said requisites because the highest ranking principal has the rank of only a Chief Inspector and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27. Thus, the SB admitted the amended informationand ordered the cases transferred to the QC RTC, which has original and exclusive jurisdictionunder R.A. 7975.The Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting the casesshould remain with the SB. Petitioner and some of the accused opposed.Pending the motions for reconsideration, RA 8249 was approved amending the jurisdiction of the SB by deleting the word principal from the phrase principal accused inSection 2 (a & c) of R.A. 7975. Even before the issue of jurisdiction came up with the filing of theamended informations, the house bill for that was already introduced in Congress.ISSUES:(1) WON Sections 4 & 7 of R.A. 8249 is unconstitutional.a. WON the statute violates the petitioners right to due process and equalprotection clause because the provisions seemed to have been designed for

theSandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the case.b. WON the statute is an ex-post facto law. (2) Whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayans or R egionalTrialCourts jurisdiction.a.WONtheoffenseofmultiplymurderwascommittedinrelationtothe officeof the accused PNP officers, making the case fall within theSandiganbayansjurisdiction. HELD:(1)SECTIONS4AND7OFR.A.8249ARECONSTITUTIONAL.The issue on due process and equal protection is too shallow to deseve merit. Therewere no concrete evidence and convincing argument presented. The classification made bythe law was reasonable and not arbitrary.There is nothing ex post facto in the statute. Generally, ex post facto laws deal with theretroactive effect of penal laws and the said R.A. is procedural in nature. For a case to be within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, it must be shown thatthe offense charged in the information was committed in relation to the office of theaccused.In People v. Montejo, the court held that an offense is said to have been committed inrelation to the office if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender andperpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. This intimacy mustbe alleged in the information, which is what determines the jurisdiction of the court. Whatis controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that would show theclose intimacy between the discharge of the accuseds official duties and the commissionof the offense charged. It does not even matter whether the phrase committed in relationtohisofficeappearsintheinformationornot.In thecaseatbar,whattheamendedinformationcontainsisamereallegationthattheoffensewascommittedbythe accusedpublicofficerinrelationtohisofficeandthatisnotsufficient. Such phrase is merely a conclusion of law. Since it was not proven that thecrimeofmurderwascommittedinthe dischargeoftheirduties,theSandiganbayandoesnot have jurisdiction over the cases. Ceniza vs. comelec Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC adopted Resolution No. 1421 which effectively bars voters in charteredcities (unless otherwise provided by their charter), highly urbanized (those earning above P40 M) cities, and component cities (whose charters prohibit them) from voting in provincial elections. The City of Mandaue, on the other hand, is a component city NOT a chartered one or a highly urbanized one. So when COMELEC added Mandaue to the list of 20 cities that cannot vote in provincial elections, Ceniza, in behalf of the other members of DOERS (Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to Succeed) questioned the constitutionality of BB 51 and the COMELEC resolution. They said that the regulation/restriction of voting being imposed is a curtailment of the right to suffrage. Further, petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering motives were behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of Mandaue City. They contend that the Province of Cebu is politically and historically known as an opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716 registered voters in the province, close to one-third (1/3) of the entire province of Cebu would be barred from voting for the provincial officials of the province of Cebu. Ceniza also said that the constituents of Mandaue never ratified their charter. Ceniza likewise aver that Sec 3 of BB 885 insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu City as highly urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial officials is inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such classification is not based on substantial distinctions germane to the purpose of the law which in effect provides for and regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal protection. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection. HELD: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of local government units. In the Declaration ofPrinciples and State Policies, it is stated that The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities. The petitioners allegation of gerrymandering is of no merit, it has no factual or legal basis. The Constitutional requirement that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in character and therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came into existence on 21 June 1969. The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of their regular annual income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It would also show whether the city has sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province where it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the provincial government thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in some instances. The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal protection of the law since the voters in other component cities are allowed to vote for provincial officials. The contention is without merit. The practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincial officials and denying the same privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of legislative discretion which violates neither the Constitution nor the voters right of suffrage. Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan [GR 118533, 4 October 1995] Second Division, Regalado (J): 3 concur, 1 on leave. Facts: On 15 December 1992, Baclaran Credit Cooperative, Inc. (BCCI), through its board member Roger de Leon, charged Paraaque Mayor Dr. Pablo R. Olivarez with Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for unreasonably refusing to issue a mayor's permit despite request and follow-ups to implement

Paraaque Sangguniang Bayan Resolution 744, (series of 1992) which Olivarez himself approved on 6 October 1992. Resolution 744 authorized BCCI to set up a night manufacturer's fair during the Christmas fiesta celebration of and at Baclaran for 60 days from 11 November 1992 to 15 February 1993 for which they will use a portion of the service road of Roxas Boulevard. Allegedly, BCCI exerted all possible efforts to secure the necessary permit but Olivarez simply refused to issue the same unless BCCI gives money to the latter. Attached to BCCIs Reply-Affidavit was a copy of Executive Order dated 23 November 1992 issued by Olivarez granting a group of Baclaran-based organizations/associations of vendors the holding of "Christmas Agro-Industrial Fair Sa Baclaran" from 28 November 1992 to 28 February 1993 using certain portions of the National and Local Government Roads/Streets in Baclaran for fund raising. Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) III Ringpis conducted a preliminary investigation and issued on 22 September 1993 a resolution recommending the prosecution of Olivarez for violation of Section 3(f) of Republic Act (RA) 3019, as amended. On 16 February 1994, the information was filed against Olivares (Criminal Case 20226). On 17 January 1994, Olivarez filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation allegedly to rectify error of law and on ground of newly discovered evidence. The motion was granted on 24 January 1994. On 9 February 1993, Ombudsman disapproved the recommendation to withdraw the information as Olivarez does not refute the allegation and that bad faith is evident with his persistent refusal to issue permit. On 18 February 1994, Olivarez voluntarily surrendered and posted a cash bail bond with the Sandiganbayan for his temporary release. On 21 February 1994, Olivarez filed an Omnibus Motion for a reexamination and reassessment of the prosecution's report and documentary evidence with a view to set aside the determination of the existence of probable cause and ultimately the dismissal of the case; which was denied by the Sandiganbayan on 3 March 1994 in Open Court. In view of Olivarez's refusal to enter any plea, the court ordered a plea of "not guilty" entered into his record. On 8 March 1994, the prosecution filed a Motion to suspend Accused Pendente Lite. On March 9, 14 and 15, 1994, Olivarez filed a Motion to Set Aside Plea and To Reduce Denial Order Into Writing (With Entry of Appearance), Supplemental Motion to Set Aside Plea and Opposition to Motion to Suspend Accused and Supplemental Pleading with Additional Opposition to Motion to Suspend Accused; which were denied by the Sandiganbayan on 4 April 1994. The Sandiganbayan, however, set aside the proceedings conducted on 3 March 1994 including Olivarez's arraignment thus revoking the plea of "not guilty" entered in his record in the interest of justice and to avoid further delay in the prompt adjudication of the case due to technicalities. On 20 April 1994, Olivarez filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted on 15 May 1994. Consequently, the case was remanded to the Office of the Ombudsman for another reinvestigation to be terminated within 30 days from notice. The reinvestigation was reassigned to SPO III Angel C. Mayoralgo who on 3 November 1994, recommended the dismissal of the case. On 9 December 1994, DSP Jose de G. Ferrer reversed the recommendation, finding Olivarez liable by giving unwarranted benefit thru manifest partiality to another group on the flimsy reason that complainant failed to apply for a business permit. The Ombudsman approved the reversal and on 27 December 1994 directed the prosecution to proceed under the existing information. On 13 January 1995, Olivarez filed a Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum and Ad Testificandum to DSP Jose de G. Ferrer, SPO III Roger Berbano, Sr., and SPO III Angel Mayoralgo, Jr. and on 16 January 1995, Olivarez filed a Motion to Strike Out and/or Review Result of Reinvestigation. The latter motion was denied by Sandiganbayan. Olivarez filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition. Issue: Whether Olivarez exhibited partiality in the denial of / inaction over BCCIs application for license. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 12 )Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Held: Olivarez's suspected partiality may be gleaned from the fact that he issued a permit in favor of the

unidentified Baclaran-based vendors' associations by the mere expedient of an executive order, whereas so many requirements were imposed on BCCI before it could be granted the same permit. Worse, Olivarez failed to show, in apparent disregard of BCCI's right to equal protection, that BCCI and the unidentified Baclaranbased vendors' associations were not similarly situated as to give at least a semblance of legality to the apparent haste with which said executive order was issued. It would seem that if there was any interest served by such executive order, it was that of Olivarez. As the mayor of the municipality, the officials referred to were definitely under his authority and he was not without recourse to take appropriate action on the letterapplication of BCCI although the same was not strictly in accordance with normal procedure. There was nothing to prevent him from referring said letter-application to the licensing department, but which paradoxically he refused to do. Whether Olivarez was impelled by any material interest or ulterior motive may be beyond the Court for the moment since this is a matter of evidence, but the environmental facts and circumstances are sufficient to create a belief in the mind of a reasonable man that this would not be completely improbable, absent countervailing clarification. Lastly, it may not be amiss to add that Olivarez, as a municipal mayor, is expressly authorized and has the power to issue permits and licenses for the holding of activities for any charitable or welfare purpose, pursuant to Section 444 (b) (3) (iv and v) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act 7160). Hence, he cannot really feign total lack of authority to act on the letter-application of BCCI Tiu v. Court of Appeals [GR 127410, 20 January 1999] En Banc, Panganiban (J): 14 concur Facts: On 13 March 1992, Congress, with the approval of the President, passed into law Republic Act 7227 ("An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes.). Section 12 thereof created the Subic Special Economic Zone and granted thereto special privileges, such as tax exemptions and duty-free importation of raw materials, capital and equipment to business enterprises and residents located and residing in the said zones. On 10 June 1993, President Ramos issued Executive Order (EO) 97 clarifying the application of the tax and duty incentives. On 19 June 1993, the President issued EO 97-A, specifying the area within which the tax-and-duty-free privilege was operative (i.e. the secured area consisting of the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base). On 26 October 1994, Conrado L. Tiu, Juan T. Montelibano Jr. and Isagani M. Jungco challenged before the Supreme Court the constitutionality of EO 97-A for allegedly being violative of their right to equal protection of the laws, inasmuch as the order granted tax and duty incentives only to businesses and residents within the "secured area" of the Subic Special Economic Zone and denying them to those who live within the Zone but outside such "fenced-in" territory. In a Resolution dated 27 June 1995, the Supreme Court referred the matter to the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Revised Administrative Circular 1-95. Incidentally, on 1 February 1995, Proclamation 532 was issued by President Ramos, delineating the exact metes and bounds of the Subic Special Economic and Free Port Zone, pursuant to Section 12 of RA 7227. The Court of Appeals denied the petition as there is no substantial difference between the provisions of EO 97-A and Section 12 of RA 7227, holding that EO 97-A cannot be claimed to be unconstitutional while maintaining the validity of RA 7227; that the intention of Congress to confine the coverage of the SSEZ to the secured area and not to include the entire Olongapo City and other areas rely on the deliberations in the Senate; and that the limited application of the tax incentives is within the prerogative of the legislature, pursuant to its "avowed purpose [of serving] some public benefit or interest. Tiu, et. al.s motion for reconsideration was denied, and hence, they filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether there was a violation of the equal protection of the laws when EO 97-A granted tax and duty

incentives only to businesses and residents within the "secured area" of the Subic Special Economic Zone and denied such to those who live within the Zone but outside such "fenced-in" territory. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 13 )Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Held: The EO 97-A is not violative of the equal protection clause; neither is it discriminatory. The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. The classification occasioned by EO 97-A was not unreasonable, capricious or unfounded. It was based, rather, on fair and substantive considerations that were germane to the legislative purpose. There are substantial differences between the big investors who are being lured to establish and operate their industries in the so-called "secured area" and the present business operators outside the area. On the one hand, we are talking of billion-peso investments and thousands of new jobs, and on the other hand, definitely none of such magnitude. In the first, the economic impact will be national; in the second, only local. Even more important, at this time the business activities outside the "secured area" are not likely to have any impact in achieving the purpose of the law, which is to turn the former military base to productive use for the benefit of the Philippine economy. There is, then, hardly any reasonable basis to extend to them the benefits and incentives accorded in RA 7227. Additionally, it will be easier to manage and monitor the activities within the "secured area," which is already fenced off, to prevent "fraudulent importation of merchandise" or smuggling. The classification applies equally to all the resident individuals and businesses within the "secured area." The residents, being in like circumstances or contributing directly to the achievement of the end purpose of the law, are not categorized further. Instead, they are all similarly treated, both in privileges granted and in obligations required. The equal-protection guarantee does not require territorial uniformity of laws. As long as there are actual and material differences between territories, there is no violation of the constitutional clause. Herein, anyone possessing the requisite investment capital can always avail of the same benefits by channeling his or her resources or business operations into the fenced-off free port zone. 109 International School Alliance of Educators (ISAE) vs. Quisumbing [GR 128845, 1 June 2000] First Division, Kapunan (J): 2 concur, 1 on official leave, 1 on leave Facts: The International School, Inc., pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees. Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School employs four tests to determine whether a faculty member should be classified as a foreign-hire or a local hire, i.e. (a) What is one's domicile? (b) Where is one's home economy? (c) To which country does one owe economic allegiance? (d) Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School responsible for bringing that individual to the Philippines? The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate 25% more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. The compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive measure to remain competitive on an international level in terms of attracting competent professionals in the field of international education. The compensation package given to local-hires has been shown to apply to all, regardless of race. There are foreigners who have been hired locally and who are paid

equally as Filipino local hires. When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on June 1995, the International School Alliance of Educators (ISAE), "a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members" of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreignhires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the parties. On 7 September 1995, ISAE filed a notice of strike. The failure of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board to bring the parties to a compromise prompted the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. On 10 June 1996, the DOLE Acting Secretary, Crescenciano B. Trajano, issued Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 14 )Narratives (Berne Guerrero) an Order resolving the parity and representation issues in favor of the School. Then DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing subsequently denied ISAE's motion for reconsideration in an Order dated 19 March 1997. ISAE sought relief from the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the School unduly discriminated against the local-hires. Held: That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes discrimination. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation 16 all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws. In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly. Herein, the International School has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions. The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction in salary rates without violating the principle of equal work for equal pay. The point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and localhires. The practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy.

On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional. Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides: Section 15, Exercise of Authority -In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board shall: (c) Establish a human resource management system which shall govern the selection, hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such system shall aim to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels of the Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound principles of management. A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the Boards approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Bangko Sentrals human resource development program: Provided, That the Monetary Board shall make its own system conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for under Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act]. Provided, however, that compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758. The thrust of petitioners challenge is that the above proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended that this classification is a classic case of class legislation, allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnels position.

Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the most important of which is to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in the BSP. Petitioner offers the following sub-set of arguments: a. the legislative history of R.A. No. 7653 shows that the questioned proviso does not appear in the original and amended versions of House Bill No. 7037, nor in the original version of Senate Bill No. 1235; b. subjecting the compensation of the BSP rank-and-file employees to the rate prescribed by the SSL actually defeats the purpose of the law of establishing professionalism and excellence eat all levels in the BSP; c. the assailed proviso was the product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of Senate Bill No. 1235, without showing its relevance to the objectives of the law, and even admitted by one senator as discriminatory against low-salaried employees of the BSP; d. GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are all exempted from the coverage of the SSL; thus within the class of rank-and-file personnel of government financial institutions (GFIs), the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon; and e. the assailed proviso has caused the demoralization among the BSP rank-and-file and resulted in the gross disparity between their compensation and that of the BSP officers. In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Petitioner also stresses: (a) that R.A. No. 7653 has a separability clause, which will allow the declaration of the unconstitutionality of the proviso in question without affecting the other provisions; and (b) the urgency and propriety of the petition, as some 2,994 BSP rankand-file employees have been prejudiced since 1994 when the proviso was implemented. Petitioner concludes that: (1) since the inequitable proviso has no force and effect of law, respondents implementation of such amounts to lack of jurisdiction; and (2) it has no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course except through this petition for prohibition, which this Court should take cognizance of, considering the transcendental importance of the legal issue involved. Respondent BSP, in its comment, contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause and can stand the constitutional test, provided it is construed in harmony with other provisions of the same law, such as fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP, and the mandate of the Monetary Board to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in accordance with sound principles of management. The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive Secretary, also defends the validity of the provision. Quite simplistically, he argues that the classification is based on actual and real differentiation, even as it adheres to the enunciated policy of R.A. No. 7653 to establish professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the national government.

Central Bank Employees Assoc. vs BSP FACTS: On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP.

ISSUE:

Thus, the sole - albeit significant - issue to be resolved in this case is whether the last paragraph of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the constitutional mandate that "No person shall be . . . denied the equal protection of the laws." RULING: A. UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF EQUAL PROTECTION, SECTION 15(c), ARTICLE II OF R.A. NO. 7653 IS VALID. Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges indubitably show that the classification created by the questioned proviso, on its face and in its operation, bears no constitutional infirmities. It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate - so long as the classification is not unreasonable. B. THE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF SUBSEQUENT LAWS - EXEMPTING ALL OTHER RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES OF GFIs FROM THE SSL - RENDERS THE CONTINUED APPLICATION OF THE CHALLENGED PROVISION A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislatures power, we hold that the enactment of subsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file employees of other GFIs leeched all validity out of the challenged proviso. The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another. A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions. The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its policies should be accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except when they run afoul of the Constitution. The deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis should not suffice. Furthermore, concerns have been raised as to the propriety of a ruling voiding the challenged provision. It has been proffered that the remedy of petitioner is not with this Court, but with Congress, which alone has the power to erase any inequity perpetrated by R.A. No. 7653. Indeed, a bill proposing the exemption of the BSP rank-and-file from the SSL has supposedly been filed. Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the rational basis test, and the legislative discretion would be given deferential treatment. But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right or the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered down view would call for the abdication of this Courts solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or the government itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the character or nature of the actor. Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue on whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations respected, is justifiable or non-political, the crux of the problem being one of legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or limitations - particularly those prescribed or imposed by the Constitution - would be set at naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such issue and the settlement thereof are the main functions of courts of justice under the Presidential form of government adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the system of checks and balances, one of its basic predicates. As a consequence, we have neither the authority nor the discretion to decline passing upon said issue, but are under the ineluctable obligation - made particularly more exacting and peremptory by our oath, as members of the highest Court of the land, to support and defend the Constitution - to settle it. In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and status,

with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive higher compensation packages that are competitive with the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in rank - possessing higher and better education and opportunities for career advancement - are given higher compensation packages to entice them to stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job marketability, it is they - and not the officers - who have the real economic and financial need for the adjustment This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all. Any act of Congress that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can pass muster. To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater concern from this Court. They represent the more impotent rank-and-file government employees who, unlike employees in the private sector, have no specific right to organize as a collective bargaining unit and negotiate for better terms and conditions of employment, nor the power to hold a strike to protest unfair labor practices. These BSP rank-and-file employees represent the politically powerless and they should not be compelled to seek a political solution to their unequal and iniquitous treatment. Indeed, they have waited for many years for the legislature to act. They cannot be asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot be given any waiting time. Unless the equal protection clause of the Constitution is a mere platitude, it is the Courts duty to save them from reasonless discrimination. IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the continued operation and implementation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is unconstitutional.