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EMBA 212: Corporate Political Strategy

National Football League


Strategy on Concussions, Antitrust & Labor Negotiation Issues Robert Paul Ellentuck

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COPYRIGHT 2010, 2011 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ROBERT PAUL ELLENTUCK

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Introduction
History of NFL
The National Football League (NFL) was formally created in 1920 by 11 teams. Currently, the league is comprised of 32 teams, divided into two conferences: the AFC (American Football Conference) and NFC (National Football Conference). Each conference has 4 divisions with 4 teams in each division, for a total of 16 teams per conference. The NFL is organized as a 501(c) (6) as a federal nonprofit and is tax exempt. The regular football season is 17 weeks (16 games and 1 bye week). At the end of the regular season, 6 teams play in the playoffs, which culminate in the Super Bowl. Each of the 32 teams is permitted 53 players and can dress 45 players to play each week. Players are members of a union, NFLPA (National Football League Players Association), which negotiates the general minimum contract for all players, the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). The current CBA was established in 2006 and is due to expire in March 2011. As an organization, the NFL is currently facing three major issues. The first issue concerns player concussions and the impact of those injuries on player health and safety. The second issue examines the recent ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court that the NFL does not have a blanket antitrust exemption and the associated ramifications for future business and policy decisions. The third issue addresses the expiration of the CBA and the ensuing labor negotiations between the owners and players. How does the NFL respond to these issues? Who are the major stakeholders? Should Congress or any other government entity become involved with these issues? What strategies can the NFL take to address these issues?

Issue: Concussions
Background
The National Football League has been aware of concussions in players for the past twenty-five years. However, since June 2007, injury caused by concussions has become a major concern in the athletic community. Published medical studies have linked head injuries to higher rates of dementia and cognitive disabilities. The long-term ramifications of repeated concussions can include Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE). In recent years, there have been four deaths of players linked to concussions (Andre Waters, Mike Webster, Terry Long, and Justin Strzelczyk). Contrary to what most people believe, a concussion is not a bruise to the brain caused by hitting a hard surface. In fact, no physical swelling of the swelling or bleeding is usually seen on radiological scans. The injury generally occurs when the head either accelerates rapidly and then is stopped or is spun rapidly. These violent tremors can cause the brain cells to become depolarized and fire all their neurotransmitters at once in an unhealthy cascade, flooding the brain with

chemicals and deadening certain receptors linked to learning and memory. The results often include confusion, blurred vision, memory loss, nausea, and sometimes unconsciousness. People who have had multiple concussions report more problems with memory, concentration, speech impediments, headaches, and other neurological problems than those who have not. Neurologists say that once a person suffers a concussion, that individual can be four times more likely to sustain a second one. Moreover, after several concussions, even smaller mechanisms of injury can require more time to recover. In September 2009, a study commissioned by the NFL reported that Alzheimers disease or similar memory-related conditions appear to have been diagnosed in the leagues retired players at vastly higher rate than the rest of the national population - including a susceptibility to Alzheimers that was 19 times higher than normal rate for men ages 30 through 49 for a professional football player. After the study results were reported, Representative John Conyers Jr., a Michigan Democrat and chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, held a hearing on the impact of head injuries sustained by NFL players. The NFL has responded to the issue by setting guidelines in place, including how long after a concussion a player must sit out of a game. However, without an MRI, it is difficult to conclusively diagnose the existence of a concussion or to assess the severity of a concussion. Given that most return to play decisions are made by medical professionals on the field (without the benefit of imaging equipment), this policy has not been terribly effective. While the NFLs short-term response to the issue of concussions lacks efficacy, they have initiated talks regarding a more plausible long-term option that stands to offer greater benefit and protection to the players. Discussions at the Congressional, state and league level have recently centered on implementing a lifetime concussion count. Similar to the pitch count used in baseball to avoid early debilitating injury to pitchers due to overuse the lifetime concussion count would use baseline testing, as well as documented frequency and severity of incidents to determine the need for a player to remove himself from the possibility of further injury. While these discussions demonstrate a certain level of concern by the NFL for the long-term health of athletes, this program also has limitations. Concussions at the youth level may not be consistently diagnosed and many youth and high school teams in low-income areas lack a team physician to diagnose concussions. Further, the implementation of such a program now would be of little benefit to NFL players for years to come.

Stakeholders
Concussions in professional football players affect a variety of stakeholders, including the following: NFL Commissioner, NFL Head, Neck, and Spine Committee, players, sports commentators, and House Committees. Reference Exhibit 1 for a more in-depth analysis of each stakeholder, their interests/power and potential coalitions.

Opponents
Although there are many stakeholders in the concussion issue, there are relatively few opponents. The chief identifiable opponent at this juncture is the contingent of former players, who resent the lack of awareness and damage caused by the leagues indifference to repeated head injuries. These retired players certainly dont oppose the implementation of better testing and diagnosis, but they may be perceived as opponents by the NFL because any acknowledgement of the long-term effects of concussive injuries might lend credence to a lawsuit by retired players for compensation for injuries suffered. Another possible opponent might be some of the players, who feel that as professionals they accept the inherent risks of their sport and do not welcome league infringement on their ability to generate income.
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Life Cycle
The NFL has only just recently started objective study of the concussion issue. The NFL is currently evaluating their policy options. Since the scientific evidence about what constitutes a concussion and what short- and long-term effects there are to concussions is still being sifted, the issue can be considered far from being resolved.

Alternatives
The NFL has several alternatives for how to address the issue of concussions. One alternative would be to simply ignore the issue, which would be consistent with the approach taken by the league for the majority of its existence. Even the current commissioner Roger Goodell had been denying the correlation between traumatic brain injury (concussions) and long-term cognitive defects until 2009. Recent admissions by the league that the preponderance of evidence does seem to denote a linkage would make it difficult to return to the position of ignorance. Recent involvement by Congress investigating the concussion issues as well as the passage of state statutes protecting younger players from traumatic brain injury also would further complicate a disinterested stance by the NFL. Another alternative would be to enforce the current return-to-play guidelines so that they are being consistently applied across all teams. Current guidance (established in 2009) mandates that that NFL players who sustain a concussion or head injury should not return to play or practice on the same day if they have any symptoms of a concussion. In order to return to play, the player must have a normal neurological exam, normal neuropsychological testing, and be cleared by the team medical staff, as well as the team's independent neurological consultant.1 A third alternative would be for the NFL to hire independent (league paid) neurologists for the athletic medical teams so that concussions would not only be properly diagnosed, but physicians would not be unduly influenced to allow the player to return to play. Under the existing system, team doctors compensated by the franchise, so one could argue that mitigating factors other than just player health might cloud the decision of player fitness. Another option would be for the NFL can increase penalties for illegal hits. This option can certainly be used in conjunction with one of the aforementioned alternatives. Already, the NFL has issued stiffer monetary fines for illegal hits in the 2010 season, not by changing the rules of the game but simply by enforcing the punitive measures cited in the NFL Handbook for tackle violations.

Recommendations
Based on the available options to address the issue of player concussions, we would recommend that the NFL should implement all of the following measures:

http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/2533203/will_the_nfls_new_returntoplay_guidelines.html?cat=14

Punishment of offenders: The NFL needs to crack down on tackles involving helmet contact with stiffer monetary and suspension penalties. These punishments should be reserved for flagrant, violent hits that endanger the safety of an opponent intentionally. Increase awareness: The NFL also needs to educate players on how to tackle in a safe manner. Investment in youth initiatives to ensure safe tackling practices would better ensure that professionals in the future establish proper mechanics to protect player health. Consistency: The NFL needs to ensure consistent application of the concussion guidelines evaluation, diagnosis, treatment, clearance across the 32 teams. Whether they elect to fund independent neurologists for each team or permit the discretion of the team doctors, franchises must be held to a consistent standard of expectation with disciplinary measures for team personnel players, coaches, etc. who ignore the rules.

Implementation
In order to implement the recommendations above, the NFL will have to consider several factors, including: the cost and logistics of adding neurologists to franchises; the cost and benefit of research investments to better qualify the long-term health effects of repeated concussive injury; the practical limitations of implementing of concussion-prevention practices; and the best means by which to develop, implement and enforce effective tackle guidelines. Every recommendation should be evaluated from a cost-benefit perspective, as all have limitations, before the NFL renders a decision and implements revised policy.

Consequences
In implementing the recommended course of action, the NFL may potentially encounter certain unintended consequences: External Revenue Loss: Several parties may be affected by sidelined players for concussive injuries, namely sponsors, retailers, and local economies. The potential loss in revenue experienced from benching high performance/ star players due to league return to play policies, may result in lawsuits by impacted parties against the NFL. Internal Revenue Loss: Similar to the situation described, restrictive league policies on eligibility may unfairly impact franchise owners and players ability to earn revenue. The NFL may face lawsuits from players willing to accept the long-term health risks associated with repeated head injuries. The franchise owners have a vested business interest in returning star players to the field; thus, they may be inclined to file suit against the league if their return on investment is unfairly impacted by restrictive league policies.

Issue: Antitrust
Background
In 1961, Congress granted the NFL an exemption from antitrust laws for the negotiation of broadcast television contracts. The current network broadcast contract between team owners and the television networks guarantees income to the owners, even during the event of a lockout, while the players receive nothing (Bedard, 2010). During the recent Supreme Court case, American Needle vs. The NFL, the NFLs single entity argument for exemption from the Sherman Antitrust Act was questioned by players and coaches. Both entities were concerned that the NFL was using this rationale as a Trojan horse, encouraging antitrust expansion so that interpretation of the protection could extend to the area of labor relations.

American Needle, Inc. vs. National Football League


In May 2010, the United States Supreme Court issued a decision that the NFL would not be granted broad antitrust protection, thereby rejecting the leagues contention that it should be considered a single entity rather than a coalition of 32 separate franchises for all purposes. This ruling was based on a case brought by American Needle, Inc., an apparel company that had been previously produced hats and other merchandise with NFL team logos for many years. When the NFL entered into an exclusive 10-year agreement with Reebok, American Needle brought suit against the NFL for antitrust violations. In the decision, the justices set forth a standard, the rule of reason, by which all future antitrust claims will be judged; according to the opinion of the Court, each of the teams is a substantial, independently-owned and independently-managed business. (Liptak, 2010). So, while the Supreme Court decided that the NFL does not have a blanket antitrust immunity, the decision does establish precedent in stating that the lower courts can still grant antitrust exemptions on a case-by-case basis. Based on the justices reasoning, the lower courts will likely grant such exemptions in situations when collective decisions are made by the teams that meet the rule of reason test and cannot be considered unreasonable restraints on trade.

Stakeholders
Antitrust implications for the NFL affect a variety of stakeholders, including the following: the NFL, franchise owners, NFLPA, team coaches and the local supporting economies. Reference Exhibit 1 for a more in-depth analysis of each stakeholder, their interests/power and potential coalitions.

Opponents
The potential opponents to the NFLs strategy on antitrust include the current players, the players union, and Congress.

The current players are a potential opponent to the NFLs strategy on antitrust. Their action would be to lobby against the existing NFL antitrust exemption to strengthen their negotiating position and/or prevent a lockout. They could potentially give up on this issue, as they are not strongly vested in the NFLs current exemption, which maximizes league revenue and benefits players. The players could also form internal alliances (NFLPA) or external ones (Congress), if they could be convinced to join the players side. Congress is another potential opponent to the NFLs strategy on antitrust. They would be unlikely to act unless the economic impact of lockout or other negative publicity became too strong. As they are unlikely to act, giving up would not be an issue. If they were to act, their obvious alliance would be with owners, who are the primary beneficiaries of the antitrust exemption. They would only form an alliance with players if the economic impact of a lockout or other negative publicity against the owners became too strong.

Life Cycle
With the issuance of the Supreme Courts decision, the contentious question of a blanket antitrust exemption based on the single entity argument has been resolved. The NFL does not possess blanket antitrust immunity. However, the American Needle case will now return to the lower court, which will apply the rule of reason test and determine whether the NFLs agreement with one apparel supplier (Reebok) is an unreasonable restraint on trade as determined by the Supreme Court. Going forward, the NFL will have to consider vendor agreements in the context of this rule of reason test, to best ascertain the likelihood of the business arrangement surviving judicial scrutiny. Additionally, the actions of the Court in rejecting a blanket antitrust immunity for league actions reduces the chances that the league will attempt to extend that previous assumption to labor negotiations, unless compelling justification exists.

Alternatives
The NFL has several courses of action available in light of the recent Supreme Court decision regarding antitrust immunity: One alternative would be to accept the current ruling and await the outcome of future cases. Since the American Needle case has been returned to the lower court, it will be decided by the application of the new standard. The NFL currently enjoys some antitrust protection and would not want to risk losing all protection by again asking for too much from the courts. Another course of action would be to pursue a blanket antitrust exemption via the legislative route by petitioning Congress, who granted the initial exemption for television contracts to extend the provisions. Unfortunately, this legislative avenue has not always been successful in the past. Since the NFL and team owners already contribute heavily toward the campaigns of many Congressional members, some speculate that this might be the best path to success.

Recommendations
Given the possible actions available to the NFL with respect to the antitrust issue, we would recommend the following strategy. The NFL should wait until the lower court makes a decision on the American Needle case. If the decision rendered finds in favor of American Needles contention of unfair trade practices, then the league should be prepared to appeal. If the decision rendered finds in favor of the NFLs argument that antitrust immunity extends to vendor apparel agreements, then the league should be prepared to respond to an appeal from American Needle. It was risky for the NFL to seek complete antitrust exemption, as both Congress and the Supreme Court have rejected a blanket exemption. The NFL should marshal its resources for future court cases on this issue and to continue to lobby Congress for additional antitrust protection.

Implementation
In order to implement the recommended strategy from above, the NFL should wait for the American Needle decision by the lower courts. There is limited human impact to this strategy, other than to the plaintiffs in the case. There is relatively limited short-term financial impact, other than the costs of litigation. Technology is not at issue here. The most relevant impact and potential consequence is that at some point the courts or Congress could completely reject the notion of antitrust protection for any actions taken by the NFL.

Consequences
In implementing the recommended course of action, the NFL may potentially encounter certain unintended consequences: The lower court could find against the NFL in the American Needle case, in which case the NFL would need to appeal the case. Since this issue is unlikely to return to the Supreme Court, it is unlikely that the NFL would suffer any significant impact from this litigation. A significant potential impact of the NFLs strategy would be if Congress moved to revoke the existing antitrust exemption. Such an action would most likely only occur combined with other events, such as a lockout. The best way to manage such an event would be to continue lobbying of Congress (under the NFL PAC) to maintain a legislative advantage.

Issue: Labor Negotiations


Background
In March 2011, the current 5-year Collective Bargaining Agreement between the NFL franchise owners and the NFL Players Association (NFLPA) will expire. Current negotiations have reached an impasse, with disputes over compensation, cost and revenue allocation, and season length. If owners and players cannot reach a compromise, one of the nations favorite sports could face the absence of a 2011 season. Currently, the players have expressed a willingness to renew the provisions of the 2006 CBA, but the franchise owners are demanding considerable changes. Since the players are willing to play, but the owners are not willing to establish employment, the situation could result in a lockout of the players by the franchises. This possibility has far reaching implications for many stakeholders the league, players, owners, broadcast networks, and the local businesses, whose jobs and revenue stream rely on professional football. Direct support personnel for the 32 NFL franchises number approximately 125,000, with the figures of additional support industry positions retail, hotel, restaurant, etc. numbering in the millions. Local economies in the areas around a NFL franchise will suffer significant financial impact with the decreased tourism revenue and potential unemployment. (LeMieux, 2010) The economic ramifications of a lockout have already incited the interjection of Congressional involvement, more than 9 months prior to the expiration of the CBA. In fact, the players started lobbying for legislative intervention more than 15 months prior to contract expiration, in February of 2010. Players currently receive close to 60% of NFL revenues, an allocation determined in the 2006 CBA and agreed to by both parties. The owners argue that this share is excessive and is causing the leagues to go into debt from the cost of building new stadiums, financing the NFL network, and other capital activities; thereby, rendering many franchises unprofitable (NFL, 2010). Most franchises refuse to engage in any sort of financial disclosure during the labor negotiations to further substantiate this assertion. The league would also like to reduce the percentage of revenue funding players costs from 18% to 9% (La Canfora, 2010). In addition, the owners suggest extending the season length by adding two more regular season games (from 16 to 18) and reducing the preseason scrimmages (from 4 to 2), with no additional compensation to the players. The NFLPA has rejected this suggestion not based on an aversion to the longer season, rather a disinclination to incur greater risk to safety without adequate compensation. Players can vote to decertify the union (as was done in 1989), thereby allowing them to file suit against the owners in the event of a lockout (NFL, 2010). Another impasse is the request by players to review the financial operations of the NFL, which the NFL has refused to share. As the only publicly owned team, the Green Bay Packers makes its financial information public. With the fiscal year ending on March 31, 2010, the team reported a net income of about $5.2 million, up from $4 million. Players see this as further proof that teams are not as unprofitable as they claim (NFL, 2010). The NFL PAC (NFL Political Action Committee) has contributed almost $250,000 in campaign contributions in 2009. While players, as a whole, have contributed less, both sides are seeking support from Congress to intervene in the event of a lockout (Eichelberger, 2010). Further evidence of this reliance on Capitol Hill to help resolve the dispute is the unions hiring of DeMaurice Smith, a lawyer at Patton Boggs, LLP to lobby on behalf of the organization (Eichelberger, 2010). In addition, Congress is inherently involved in this issue because of its power to revise antitrust issues, including the antitrust exemption the league currently enjoys.
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Stakeholders
NFL Labor negotiations affect a variety of stakeholders, including the following: franchise owners, players, support personnel, local economies, Congress, and the media. Reference Exhibit 1 for a more in-depth analysis of each stakeholder, their interests/power and potential coalitions.

Opponents
Although there are many stakeholders in the lockout issue, there are relatively few opponents. No entity with a vested stake in the outcome of the NFL labor negotiation issue benefits more from a lockout scenario than if the 2011 season were to be played. A truly jaded individual might proffer that other professional sports with overlapping seasons baseball, hockey, basketball might benefit from a lockout with increased viewership and fan base.

Life Cycle
The current labor dispute will continue until the parties can reach a resolution; depending on the timing of that resolution, the NFL must seriously consider the possibility of a player lockout if a compromise cannot be established before April 2011. Given the complexity of the contentious issues and the absence of common ground, it will likely take some compromise by both owners and players in order to reach a consensus. One positive mitigating factor acknowledges that no entity would benefit more by the lockout scenario than playing the 2011 season, so all parties have incentive to resolve the impasse. Potential economic ramifications for so many communities urges timely resolution and a variety of forces will attempt to generate compromise.

Alternatives
The NFL has several courses of action available with respect to the current labor negotiations between the players and owners: Avoid interference: The NFL can refrain from becoming embroiled in the current conflict and permit the two entities to resolve their dispute. Eschewing involvement will probably not hasten resolution and will probably render the possibility of a lockout more probable. Independent negotiator: The NFL can hire an independent negotiator to mediate the disagreement between the players and the owners. With this alternative, the league has additional options does the NFL, in sponsoring the negotiator, attempt to advance its own agenda when brokering labor negotiations? Does the NFL allow the independent negotiator the latitude to establish the best compromise for both parties, independent of league concerns? Does the NFL hire a mediator (dependent on voluntary consent of both parties with a non-binding agreement) or an arbitrator (compel both parties to present arguments so that the intermediary can render a binding decision)? Prior to pursuing this alternative, the NFL would have to agree on the capacity and authority of the negotiator, and then be reasonably assured that the two entities would accept the leagues suggestion.

Mediation: The NFL can serve as the primary mediator between the owners and the players. This alternative presents potential issues with bias (or perceived bias); depending on how closely the leagues interests are aligned with one side or the other. Contingency Plan: The NFL can accept the overwhelming likelihood of a player lockout and season-ending impasse, by attempting to establish a replacement league now. The logistics and costs associated with this alternative render the option highly unlikely for serious consideration. Government Intervention: The NFL can pursue government intervention to assist with dispute resolution, an option that can take many forms. Should the NFL petition Congress to extend blanket antitrust immunity to the league for purposes of labor negotiation? Should the NFL lobby Congressional members to interject themselves into the dispute and place pressure on the entities to reconcile their differences? Should the NFL request a federal mediator to broker compromise? Significant cost-benefit analysis is required for each of these options under the governmental intervention alternative before selecting a course of action.

Recommendations
Based on the available options to address the issue of labor negotiations, we would recommend that the NFL should implement the following measures: Financial: The NFL should encourage banks financing league franchises to extend grace periods for loan defaults through the 2011 season, to allow teams to remain solvent. The NFL should lobby Congress for additional tax subsidies for stadiums constructed with taxpayer dollars, to reallocate the cost burden away from the owners. The NFL should establish reserve accounts perhaps financed with team performance bonds to ensure compensation and healthcare coverage to affected parties (players, league personnel) in the event of an owner-caused lockout. Legal: The NFL should discourage players from decertifying the NFLPA, which encourages a player lawsuit in the event of a lockout a situation not conducive to reconciling differences. The NFL should refrain from lobbying Congress to extend the antitrust immunity to cover labor negotiations, since its a battle that they stand little chance of winning. Additionally, the league should operate in accordance with existing labor law provisions, not some perceived assumption about blanket antitrust immunity. Mediation: The NFL should pursue governmental intervention to the extent of requesting a negotiator from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, an independent agency created to promote labor-management peace in the private and public sectors and offers mediation, arbitration and other dispute resolution services. The negotiated agreements are non-binding and rely on voluntary consent by both entities. Public Relations: The NFL should take steps to avoid a public backlash against the league itself, in the event that the possibility of a lockout becomes reality. Shoring up Congressional support to encourage resolution might help. Devising measures to assist the impacted third parties support personnel, local businesses would also be wellreceived.

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Implementation
Implementing a course of action will require the NFLs consideration of a multitude of factors, as mentioned above. Devising strategic league priorities will be critical at this juncture to dictate the NFLs level of involvement over the next 6 months to insulate itself against a tide of resentment by affected parties, should a lockout occur. Detrimental financial impact to every stakeholder is reasonably certain with the advent of a lockout, so all parties share the common interest of reaching consensus and playing the 2011 season. The NFL should use this mentality a shared interest in playing football to guide their recommendations and associated courses of action.

Consequences
In implementing the recommended course of action, the NFL may potentially encounter certain unintended consequences: Public Backlash: If the NFLs steps to resolve the current labor dispute do not produce consensus, then the organization might face wrath from the devout fan base and loss of future revenue from disgruntled fans. Given the loyal adherents of the sport, any negative publicity and loss of support should be short-lived with the resolution of the dispute. Restrictive Labor Law: In light of the estimated detrimental economic impact of a lockout situation, its entirely plausible that Congress might elect to become more involved. The NFLs $8.5B industry creates a tremendous number of jobs and supporting businesses. If Congress perceives the interests of their constituents to necessitate involvement, then the NFL might face the possibility of more restrictive labor policies to encourage continuation of the industry.

Conclusion
Currently, the NFL is facing three major issues. Although intertwined, the issues have diverse backgrounds and the NFL should consider different approaches to each. Player health and safety is becoming a heated topic, particularly as the public raises awareness of player health and safety in youth-level athletics. The NFL should respond to this issue by making player health and safety a number one priority. The antitrust issue has been temporarily resolved with the recent Supreme Court ruling in the American Needle case, but future antitrust actions will be determined by lower courts on a case-by-case basis. The NFL would be wise to accept the current antitrust protection it enjoys and not to overreach for more than is reasonable. The labor dispute between the owners and players requires resolution preferably before the lockout scenario becomes a reality. The NFL will need to monitor labor negotiations closely and assist both sides in reaching a mutuallybeneficial compromise.

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References
Bedard, P. (2010). NFL Football Players Lobby Congress Ahead of Lockout. U.S. News & World Report. Retrieved October 20, 2010,http://politics.usnews.com Bichelberger, C. & Salant,J.D. (2010, February 4). Both Sides in NFL Labor Showdown Lining Up Allies in Congress. Bloomberg. Retrieved October 20, 2010, fromhttp://www.bloomberg.com La Canfora, J. (2010, January 20). Owners, playersfar apart in CBA talks, but time is their ally. NFL. Retrieved October 20, 2010, fromhttp://www.nfl.com LeMieux, G. (2010, August 6). Personal correspondence between George S. LeMieux (U.S. Senator) and Roger Goodell (NFL Commissioner). NFL. (2010). Players presented first detailed proposal for 18-game season. Retrieved October 20, 2010,http://www.nfl.com

NFL. (2010, October 5). Union head Smith: NFL owners gearing up forlockout in 2011. Retrieved October 20, 2010, from http://www.nfl.com

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Exhibit 1 NFL Stakeholder Analysis

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Exhibit 2 NFL Concussion Poster

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