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There Is a Word for that Kind of Thing: An Investigation of Two Thought Experiments Author(s): Keith S. Donnellan Source: Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 7, Language and Logic (1993), pp. 155-171 Published by: Ridgeview Publishing Company Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214120 . Accessed: 07/01/2011 04:33
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Philosophical Perspectives, LanguageandLogic, 1993 7,

THERE IS A WORD FOR THAT KIND OF THING: AN INVESTIGATIONOF TWO THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS'

KeithS. Donnellan University California, Angeles of Los

Two kinds of thought experiments challengewhat might called the be classical view of thecontents and capabilities the mindor, to use Hilary of Putnam'sneutral phrase, "what's in thehead." The classical view-as represented, for example, in Locke's An Essay ConcerningHuman Understanding-holds thatthe meaningof an individual'swords is a matter of necessary sufficient and conditions etched themind in and,derivatively, the that content our thoughts, of beliefsand otherpropositional attitudes as well are constructed from thesemental materials. twokindsof thought The experiments whichseemto undermine vieware,first, "TwinEarth" Putnam2 this of the and, those second, constructed Tyler by Burgein"Individualism theMental"3 and and on elaborated in later papers. It has often beenassumed, believe,that I Burge'sthought experiments and the Twin Earth examples depend at bottomon something like the same phenomenon. Burge himself argued,as I read him,in his paper,"Other has Bodies"4, thatthetwo sets of thought experiments shouldbe thought as of the essentially same.Andit seemsto me that others haveassumedthisas well.I am inclined think to thatthisis a mistake, in factthetwo setsof thought that experiments rest on entirely different, thoughperhaps equally important, principles. Theymay,to be sure,havesomeof thesameconsequences both for theclassicalviewsof themind for taken are and psychology, ifso theroutes but quite separate and their pointsof engagement withtheclassical view are also I believe,in fact, different. that latter the mayhavesomeresources availablein answerto theBurgeexperiments it cannotutilizewhenconfronted with that TwinEarthexamples.In thispaper,I mainly wishto arguefortheimportance of treating thesetwo sets of thought experiments independently having and,

156/Keith Donnellan S. given reasonsforthinking so, I briefly that re-explore their use as weapons against classicalview. the In regard mytreatment Putnam's to of viewson kindterms, shouldwarn I thereader that am hereassuming, thepresent I for purposes, it is generally that I correctand that my treatment it is therefore of sympathetic. do have reservations (someof which havebeenpublished5) aboutthemechanics Putnam proposes. That something like Putnam's view represents possibilityfor a language, perhaps and evenforthelanguages speak,I am convinced For we of. that his reason,it is notan idle exerciseto distinguish viewsfrom Burge's.6I aboutPutnam's view. beginwithsomeobservations I. Twin Earth and Indexicality In "The Meaning 'Meaning"', of Putnam argues that extensions many the of termsforkinds, termssuch as 'water' and 'gold', are determined the by Thus the underlying physical nature whatwe might "local paradigms". of call structure extension our term'water' is all thestuff of thathas themolecular in represented 'H20' because, as roughly speaking, stuff ourlakesandoceans the has this underlying physicalstructure. Putnam'sTwin Earth,which is On in like the stuff thelakesandoceanshas a exactly Earth, except that comparable different molecular structure-let be represented he does by 'XYZ'-the it as extension the term'water' in thelanguageof our counterparts thereby is of of different. paradigms, nature which the of the The determine extension a term suchas 'water', "local" notonlytemporally spatially, course, also of but are and in terms possibleworlds;it is thenature thestuff ourlakesand oceans in of of in this,theactual world,whichdetermines extension 'water'.But this the of modalaspectoftheviewwillnotconcern here. us One of thewell-known this important consequences Putnam drawsfrom view of thenature a largenumber terms kindsis that extension of of for the of If suchterms notdetermined thepsychological is by states usersof theterm. of in we choosea time of prior thediscovery themolecular to of structure thestuff and thelakesofoceansofEarth TwinEarth from Earth and pick and/or a person his or her counterpart Twin Earthwho are scientifically on naive, the word 'water' as each uses it will have a different extensioneven thoughtheir statesmay be identical.(As we will see later,we need to be psychological state" and whatit howwe construe somewhat careful, however, "psychological is for sucha state "determine" extension.) to the In his paperson thetopicPutnam emphasized whathe takesto be the has central in He role of indexicality obtaining result. veryearlyon, perhaps this incautiously, said flatly that"'Water' is indexical"7 and in "The Meaningof I can be 'Meaning"', less incautiously think, tells us that"Our theory he indexical as summarized sayingthatwordslike 'water' have an unnoticed

An Investigation Two Thought of Experiments157 / component: 'water'is stuff bearsa certain that similarity relation thewater to around here."8 It is possiblethat Putnam thought theclaimedindexicality wordslike of of 'water'as explaining how thepsychological statesof an Earthling a Twin and Earthling could be thesame even though extension theterm'water'for the of each is different. least thisis a reasonableimpression At one can get from reading"The Meaningof 'meaning"'.If onlyit weretrue, wouldbe a tidy it explanation. indexical For words suchas thefirst second and person pronouns (in some of thelatter's use) and of wordssuchas 'here' and 'now' in their "pure" indexical uses seemto havethisfeature. an important In sensetwopeoplecould be in identical psychological states yettheir of "I", forexample, and use would havea different obviously referent, a different extension.9 A quickand,I believe, correct response this to reading Putnam that of is the word'water'andother examples thesamesort of simply notindexical the are in required sense.Thisis Burge'sanswer "Other in Bodies".To be an indexical, is, to quotePutnam, "...to havean extension whichvariesfrom context context to 10 or token token". AndBurgesays,"I think is clearthat to it 'water', interpreted as it is in English,or as we Englishspeakers standardly interpret does not it, shiftfromcontextto context"'IIAbout this I thinkhe is absolutelyright. Nathan SalmoninReference Essence12makesa similar and point.Salmongoes on as well to suggest, I that'water' correctly,believe,that Putnam recognized and other suchterms notthemselves are indexical. AndI think straightforwardly in Salmonis also correct whenhe points that importance indexicality of out the thePutnam showsup at a deeper thought experiments really level,at thelevelof the of kindterms".13 "explaining meaning natural Salmonwas moreconcerned withthemodal consequencesto be drawnfrom them, thepointis worth but exploring againin connection ourconcerns with here.14 suchas 'water' comein toouruse ofa term Where, then, might indexicality Let me try reconstruct argument to an which putsoffindexicality thelast until in possiblemoment, argument, I think reallyinvolved thederivation the that is of themoral. The first stepis perhaps mostrevolutionary all in Putnam'suse of the of TwinEarthexamples.It is a new way of thinking for abouthow a term a kind I5 might determine extension. Let us think thisas a newkindof semantic its of rule.The semantic rulefor'water',forexample,is either just theone Putnam In the givesin "The Meaning 'Meaning"'or someclose relative.16 anyevent of important feature therulewillbe that extension theterm determined of the of is are and nature somesetofparadigms theparadigms fixed of bytheunderlying by theruleitself. But whattheparadigms nature consists whichin underlying in, theend determines extension theterm, not.Thatis leftforempirical is the of research. This is, of course, quiteopposedto theclassicalview,theone we find in Locke, that kindterms determined rulesdirectly accessibleto the all are by

158/Keith Donnellan S. necessary sufficient and essence")that directly specify mind(Locke's "nominal of of conditions beinga member theextension theterm. for at rule,I see no bar to viewingit as "in us"V In speakingof a semantical least in the sense in which linguiststhinkof the oftencomplex rules of that might the view grammar beingin us (without further of Chomsky's they as in onlya stroke inspiration of the be innately us). Mostof us feelthat factthat The of the has allowedus to formulate rulewouldnotbe an objection. nature the havenotbeeneasy and analogously semantic rulesfor demonstratives indexicals to discover,but surelyin some sense we follow such rules. That in some for important sense therulesare followedby us in thecase of terms natural aboutwhatwe would to of kindsis perhaps attested by theforce theintuitions example, Putnam by case, intuitions appealedto,for say in thisor that imagined examples. Evenifit he from TwinEarth the in defense theconclusions draws of natural kindterms suchas that rulesfor is onlywith great difficulty thesemantic in to they it 'water'and 'gold' areuncovered, maybe that principle areaccessible in immediate manner which not us a priori, although certainly in thecontinually to of ideas",was supposed be. the Locke'snominal essence, content "abstract If thisis correct, maybe a sense in whichwhatis "in our heads" there if determines extension a term of suchas 'water'.We havea rulewhich, we the of it areable tocomplete inquiries indicates, lead us tothediscovery the the may And perhaps this musthave to fallwithin extension. the properties something that ameliorates discomfort the somemayfeelwith position whatourwords the us. of of outside Butthelatter cofrectly applyto is a matter thenature theworld natureof the of position is still implied; it is a matter the fundamental and is is by paradigms that notdetermined what inourheads. if that aboutindexicality,we reflect theparadigms Returning thequestion to are to be ones available to theusersof thelanguage, maythenbe able to we if and derivesomestartling for modalresults, that, example, ourscienceis true that derived of then proposition the from underlying the nature theparadigms, 17 result, startling wateris H20 is necessarily true. We can also deriveanother that very of as the users sucha term 'water'maynothaveavailabletheresources because the to determine extension theterm. the of This will be truesimply userscan use thewordgoverned thesemantic evenin theabsenceof the rule by of nature the the the resources, uncover underlying to wherewithal, scientific are experiments richin consequences. paradigms.18 The Twin Earththought in whichmaydepend here, especially themodalresults Indexicality enter may to an reference theactualworld. uponintroducing indexical resultwe are But wheredoes indexicality enterfortheequally startling state in of interested here, possibility twopeoplein thesamepsychological the If with wordsin their different extensions? itcomesin at all vocabulary having in in rule it must of course, thespecification thesemantic of theparadigms. be, in nature thestuff of has Perhaps(roughly), 'water'is whatever theunderlying A is essential. ourlakesandoceans.Evenhere, indexicality notstrictly however,

/ Experiments159 An Investigation Two Thought of point, but no at might involve indexicals this rulesuchas we are contemplating the description denoting paradigms.19 descriptive definite onlya purely as I thinkthatregarding paradigms specifiedindexicallybecomes the the whenwe wantto generate Twin Earthexamples.To important, however, we from theseexamples, wantthesemantical to gain theconclusions be drawn in rulefor'water'on TwinEarthtobe indistinguishable, exceptforthecontext We wantthisin partat rule whichit is applied,from semantical on Earth. the statesof counterin the least in orderto ensurethat sayingthat psychological in partson thetwo planetscan be thesame,we are notimmediately trouble This because thesemantical rulesforthetwo wordsare different. is precisely be to rulesmayplausibly thought be "in thehead"of the becausethesemantical that above. If it is evenan openpossibility the usersof theword, I suggested as and TwinEarthusersof the semantical rulefor'water'is in theheadsof Earth psychological be word,then rulehad better thesameifwe are to keeptheir the states same. the with word'water'on the the associated we At thesametime want paradigms on with word TwinEarth. the associated from Earth be different theparadigms to non-indexical, by werespecified eachof therulesinpurely But iftheparadigms unlikely thattherules could be the same. it qualitative, terms seems highly exceptforthe underlying identical Twin Earthand Earthare, by hypothesis, in of someindexicality thedescription called 'water'.Without nature thestuff of to the paradigmsin the rules showingup it is difficult see how dfferent if the paradigms goingtobe specified, therulesaretobe exactly same. are of indexicals thespecification theparadigms in Butifthetworulescontain even though couldbe identical thenthere a well-known is sensein whichthey of makereference, associated as with word'water'in thevocabularies the they thetwogroups, different The to paradigms. senseis just thesensein whichtwo or in referents uses of thesame indexical different mayhavedifferent contexts extensions. is the sense,once again, exemplified Kaplan's notionof a by It 'I', peopleuse theindexical forexample, WhentwoEnglish speaking character. the though thecharacter, semantical remains samein each instance, the the rule, different.20 referent obviously is on rulesrelying paradigms should semantical be there It is stillpossiblethat in ways.Thereseemsno theoretical qualitative non-indexical and specified purely their can onlyspecify kindterms reasonforsayingthattherulesfornatural in It paradigms one way or theother. is in theserviceof TwinEarthexamples that indexicals must in. enter but TwinEarthor Earth, at a So 'water'is notitself indexical either on an of whoseunderlying deeperlevel,at thelevelofthespecification theparadigms in to indexicality enters order makeit possible the nature determines extension, rules.I want forEarthlings TwinEarthlings be usingthesamesemantical and to givenby Burge.For I experiments now to takea look at thekindsof thought think on principles. they operate quitedifferent

S. 160/Keith Donnellan II. Burge Examples and and has The case Burgegivesin "Individualism theMental" theone that Thatin Englishthisis has stuckin discussions to do withtheword'arthritis'. kindshouldnotmisleadus, ofcourse;in thesame a for probably term a natural just this point,Burge gives otherexamples,'sofa' and paper to illustrate one would suppose, fornaturalkinds. His 'contract'whichare not terms, to relationship Putnam's we whatever maysayabouttheir experiments, thought to Twin Earth examples do not and are not supposed to contribute our for kinds. understandingterms natural of We experiment. are thought of Let me givea quicksummary the'arthritis' whohas somecommand the of person Englishspeaking to imagine ordinary an Havinga pain in his mastery. although a complete not Englishword,'arthritis', that he he and we are to intuit we wouldagreethat so believes, thigh, believes, in are that that has arthritis he there. (We, of course, agreeing he has thisbelief, of in no way committed thetruth noreventhecoherence thebelief.)Told of to in his one can onlyhavearthritis a joint,he sees that previous that by a doctor of special member his beliefwas false; he defersin thisway to a somewhat the (or we But, speechcommunity. counter-factually,can imagine sameperson sense) having the same historyand (in an important his counterpart) -in a community of to states-up to thepoint talking thedoctor psychological can arthritis is allowsthat use,a use that where word'arthritis' givena wider the althoughthe subject has not occur in soft tissue. In such circumstances, shouldtell he by changed, hypothesis, now maywell have,or so ourintuitions us, a truebelief. The beliefs of the actual person and his counter-factual except the beliefs,althougheverything mustthenbe different counterpart is surrounding speechcommunity thesame. I be We should sure, think, we areclearwhat that Burgeis trying deeppoint of that meaning ones wordsare necessarily the to make.It is not,forexample, The essential principle speech community. dependenton the surrounding in experiment I believe,theone Burgeemphasizes is, involvedin thethought experiment appearto dependupon does his paperwhenhe says,"...thethought for [belief, example] thepossibility someonehaving propositional attitude a of is in This, an of mastery somenotion itscontent."'21 I think, despite incomplete in spendstimeto a veryimportant and principle itsown right Burgecorrectly to not out an pervasive phenomenon, restricted it point that represents apparently with peculiar properties. any examples we experiments can view this In regardto its role in theBurgethought of yieldtheresults the whichtogether premises as of principle thefirst three about the The experiments. second premisewe need will tell us something of mastery a notionis to be standard whereby complete(or at least greater) of the experiment subjectof situation thethought judged.In thecounterfactual as is wherethewordfortheconcept involved, theexperiment in a community

An Investigation Two Thought of Experiments161 / used by thosewitha complete at leastgreater or mastery, differs from use the made by their counterparts his actual community. thissense thespeech in In community provides standard the whereby speaker a can be said to have only incomplete mastery a notion. of A finalpremiseneeded assertsthatwhena personcan be said to have incomplete mastery concept of judged againstone standard mastery, for that in of person unchanged respect all relevant to traits behavior, history maybe etc. said to havean incomplete a mastery a different of concept when judgedagainst In of different standard mastery. theBurgeexamples,thespeechcommunity and is changesin thecounterfactual situation thesubject, unchanged, credited an with incomplete mastery thedifferent of concept designated thesameword by in thenewspeechcommunity. Once we havethesepremises conclusion the we areto drawfrom Burgethought seemsto dropoutimmediately. the experiments It is of someinterest see that secondpremise, one specifying to the the the of standard mastery atleasttheoretically for is two independent theother andmay notinvolve speechcommunity all. A somewhat a at fanciful analogueargument mayhelpto show this.Plato,I suppose,could be thought as holding the of to first premise. Insofar we can be said to have beliefsaboutjusticeor piety, as unlesswe are etc., we are said to have thesebeliefsin spiteof thefactthat, of we completely enlightened philosophers, have onlya partial mastery these of all concepts. Mostof us, perhaps of us, haveonlyincomplete knowledge the Platonicforms. And knowledge therelevant of form provides standard the for complete mastery a concept suchknowledge of and wouldbe whatis mentioned in a Platonicversionof thesecondpremise. Thus Plato wouldagreewiththe first premise,it seems,but providea different versionof the second. (The I historical Plato would have trouble, think, withwhatI countas the third premise. Thereis just one form Justice him,I believe,and all ordinary of for have of of people haveonlya partial mastery theconcept justice.Because they nottheknowledge theform of itself, is hardto see how two people in the it same relevant statescould have a partialmastery different of concepts.But to we a perhaps couldimagine fanciful relativised version Platonism of according of whichthegods haveprovided nations different forms justicefordifferent of in of havepartial people.Thentwocounterparts thetwonations might mastery different concepts).I am inclinedto think thatthisshows thatit is the first premise,the principle thatwe attribute beliefsto personswho have only a in of lies of involved thebeliefs which at theheart the partial mastery a concepts for Burge thought experiments. community of a term a standard The use as of is version thesecond a complete mastery a veryplausibleand possibly true of premise. But one can imagine other absolutely not implausible versions the if secondpremise which would, true, yieldthesameresults.

162/Keith Donnellan S. III. Comparison of Putnam and Burge Examples AretheBurgeandPutnam thought experiments merely variants thesame of I fundamental phenomenon? think not-not if we are thinking Putnam's of TwinEarth examples histreatment natural and of kindterms. in ButPutnam "The Meaning 'Meaning"'introducesprinciple, of a whathe of calls "theprinciple thedivision linguistic of labor",whichmaywell have a similarity theuse of thesurrounding to as speechcommunity a standard for in of complete mastery concepts Burgeexamples.The confusing thing that is Putnamintroduces thisprinciple if it were something as like a generalized versionof whatwe are to concludefrom Twin Earthexamples.Yet, as I the viewit,thisis an entirely different matter. The division linguistic of laborhas to do withthefactthat manyitems for in a person'svocabulary, at all restricted terms possiblenatural not to for kinds, he or she is prepared deferto theuse of thewordas represented other to by And thereis, I think, suggestionin people in the speech community. the Putnamthatin such cases the personmay be said nevertheless, a quite in ordinary sense, to know the meaningof the word. Thus I have the word in new "fuel 'carburetor' myvocabulary, ifyou ask me whether fairly but the injection systems" carburetors, are I maybe uncertain. This might because, be forexample,I am not surewhether is something a carburetor in case it just delivers mixture gasoline a of andairto thecylinders whether is one onlyif or it it does so in a certain way. A good mechanic probably can enlighten as to me howto use thewordin this respect. withthe The principleof the divisionof linguistic labor may conflict classicalview of whata wordin a person's to meansand according vocabulary whichwhatI have in my head at any moment whatI mean by determines 'carburetor' in whichno roomis provided thepossibility I tie my and for that wordsin thiswayto theusage of others. And sinceI think myuncertainty that aboutcertain applications theword'carburetor' of me does notprevent from having thoughts and beliefs thatare correctly reported for example, as, "Donnellan believesthat carburetor his needsadjusting", principle the seemsto give us a start toward conclusion the Burgereachesby supplying perhaps the most plausible version what havedistinguished thesecondpremise. of I as In fact,however,the principleis not one involvedin the Twin Earth The in kindterms.22 withnatural examplesand their employment connection I believe,is that showis the essential difference, whattheTwinEarth examples from of different the possibility a new kindof semantic rulefora term utterly is classicalmodel, modelin which extension theterm determined a the of the by set of necessary sufficient of and at conditions completely thecommand either in is theuserof theterm at anyrateof thespeechcommunity whichtheterm or rule whichemploys idea employed.The revolutionary is thatof a semantic to which and a paradigms their underlying nature, nature maynotevenbe known

An Investigation Two Thought of Experiments163 /

any usersof theterm. Nothing theprinciple thedivision linguistic in of of labor

yields such a result.Nor, it is important add, do the Burge thought to experiments. One thing thatcan obscurethisfundamental difference betweenwhatis goingon in theTwinEarthexamplesand whatis involvedin theprinciple of thedivision linguistic of laboridea is that aboutboth there be andhasbeena can loose use of thenotion "experts". mechanic an expert of My is abouttheuse of in theword'carburetor' waysin whichI am notand I am prepared defer to to him.Scientists, course,maywell be experts of abouttheunderlying nature of water and I may also deferto themwhen I agree thatbecause of their I conclusions, nothing be water, can whatever mayhave thought before, unless it is H20. But theuse of these"experts" determining extension my in the of In is terms utterly of different. thecase of 'water',itis thenature theparadigms in whichdetermines extension. the There is nothing the new notionof the TwinEarth semantical introduced Putnam's rule by examples has to do with that come in onlyinsofar they as about experts. Scientists happento haveopinions orknowledge thenature theparadigms. of of but Scientists "experts", abouttheuse of a wordor expression as are not whichthe supposedconveyers the truth of of aboutthenature theparadigms semantic ruleassociatedwithmyuse of theword'water'alludesto. It is their experiments, they, not that crucial.(Theyneed notbe in facta partof my are speechcommunity all.) WhatI defer one might at to, say,are theexperiments and observations. thecase of waterwhatI defer has nothing do with In to to members my speech community everything do withtheresultsof of and to electrodes representative and two putting into samplesof water getting parts by volume hydrogen thecathode onepart of at and oxygen theanode.23 at Another way of seeingtheindependence thesethesesis to look at how of confront classicaltheory semantics a of suchas that Locke. Locke held of they thattheextension, we wouldsay,of a term determined the 'nominal as is by essence',a setofnecessary sufficient for of and conditions thecorrect application theterm whichhe also held weretheproperty each userof theterm, that of user's termbeing governed the nominalessence in his or her mind.The by principle thedivision linguistic of of laborconflicts with Locke's viewonlyon this last point-the nominalessence may be the property the speech of and community each individual's term mayhaveitsextension governed the by Locke on thefirst rebut speechcommunity. theTwinEarth But examples point; to of rule completely antithetical the theyintroduce possibility a semantic no Locke's picture a setof necessary sufficient of which and conditions require investigation thenature thethings of of themselves.24 of Insofar we comparePutnam as and Burge,it is thentheprinciple the divisionof linguistic laborin Putnam whichforms possiblebond.The Twin a Earthexampleslead us to accept a new kindof semantical rule; the Burge This is notto denigrate latter, the examplesdo nothave thisoutcome. onlyto

164/Keith Donnellan S. say thatthere a veryimportant is difference. Burgeexamples, we have The as seenandas he emphasizes, depend upontheidea ofa partial mastery a notion of or concept.The TwinEarthresults Putnam, is important note,do not. of it to We do not need at all to imaginepeople who have a less perfect graspof a notion thantheir confreres. John In Locke'sday,no one knewthat water H20 is or that gold has atomicnumber butforall that 79, they could all have had the verysame semantic rulegoverning thoseterms their in vocabulary we do that today.The point that a similar is at stageon TwinEarth with samesemantic the rule,theextension theterms of wouldhavebeendifferent becausetheindexical specification theparadigms therule would lead to different of by underlying natures. Burgein his attacks theview he has called "individualism" argued on has that bothhisownand TwinEarth showhowthecontent thought experiments of our propositional is attitudes dependent upontheexternal world,thatwhatis wholly our as within minds, one might it,is notsufficient determine, put to for in example? whatwe believe.I wantto suggest drawn this that distinctions the paperbetween twokinds thought the of that experiments suggest theTwinEarth examples have more radical consequencesin this regardthan do Burge's examples. Because theunderlying principle behind Putnam's viewsinvolve semantic a principle Burge'sinvolve and rather principles abouttheattribution beliefs, of it is easy to construct Putnam principle a like whichhas nothing do with to belief social phenomenon yes,even natural attribution, kinds.If thisis all that is and, neededto defeat"individualism", we can do it without assumptions then any aboutsocial practices theintuitive or notion natural of kinds. so Nothing grand as that involved all. Burgeexamples, theother is at on involve in much us hand, more difficult matters. Here is an exampleof thesemantic which operation Putnam's of principle seemsat once to have little do with"natural to kinds"butat thesame timeto determine kindby how things in the"external a are world."25 seemsto show It how easy it is to generate Putnam the mechanism (whichis notto say thatit was easy toproposethemechanism as either Putnam in a moregeneric or, way, Kripke does). You and I havebefore a copyof theShorter us O4ord English Dictionary. We agree to use theword"widget"in thefollowing way: You will open the at times.Each time,we will look forthefirst dictionary randomthree entry a count"even" in designating property physical objectscan have (i.e, we won't thesenseof "divisible two").A "widget" anyphysical has is by objectwhich all threeproperties. is obvious,I think, It thatwe could develop a full-blown Putnamprinciple "widget",makingit clear thattheproperties for whichare in essential widgets thosediscovered to the are from OED we consult theactual if whatthe world, that our copyof theOED is strange has no suchentries and fallbackposition be inregard ouruse of"widget", will to etc.

Experiments165 / of An Investigation Two Thought -that, In this verysimple way we can at once get the modal results a widgetis supposingthe threeentriesare "round,""red" and "cubical", result this that round, and cubical.Andwe can gettheepistemic red necessarily to at thedictionary ascertain the -we have to look cannot known priori be a of possibility suggested viewofKripke's uponwhatyour properties. (Depending a thecontingent priori is, we could also possiblyderivetheresultthatit is which has the properties a contingently priori thata widgetis anything at of uncovered themethod looking theOED.) by if are case andothers sufficient, If thesemantic of "water" features Putnam's does italso. In the example then simple to anti-individualism, this correct, defeat for properties essential youandI willnotknowthespecific samesensein which on we search, do notknow, the until haveundertaken dictionary you widgethood we of until haveundertaken properties "water" the Putnam's account, essential if But structure,any,of water. I doubtthat theinvestigation theunderlying into to to with quiteartificial wouldbe thought havemuch do with rule, its "widget", kind. notion a natural of anyintuitive of I am inclinedto conclude fromthe fact thatthe semanticfeatures in that Putnam'sexamplescan be reproduced thisway is, first, the semantic for to stillpossiblynecessary) a term be a (though features notsufficient are that that has for kind.And,secondly, ifone thinks Putnam shown term a natural the thatthe meaningof a termcannotbe both in the head and determine of thenone mustalso think thatmyexampleshows the extension the term, In is same thing. somesense themeaning "widget" in thehead-we havea of if is the Whatis true that direct, I the determining extension. rule,youand I, for require to us a whichmakesomething widget way,properties mayputit that search. the followout therule-in thiscase foryou to go through dictionary are properties notat the Unliketheclassical,theLockean,view theessential in in respectable outset ourheads.We could,ofcourse, "widget" a perfectly use about We you have lookedat thedictionary. could speculate way even before WereI whether cup on thetablenextto thedictionary or is nota widget. is the "randomly" to havea strong aboutwhat you pagesofthedictionary might hunch in I might in Nevertheless, my even feeljustified myown conjecture. select, it is case, therulefortheuse of "widget" cleareven though does not parallel sort. essential of designate properties theordinary directly IV. Propositional Attitudes of In discussing matter will notassumemuchaboutthenature belief I this is the account itwill whatever correct andother save attitudes that propositional believed. betweenthebelieverand theproposition involvesome relationship or This relationship maybe a simpletwo place relationship it maybe more involving, a modeofpresentation. say, complex,

166/Keith Donnellan S. and pointI mastery concepts" up to this of Burgespeaksofan "incomplete I of have notchallenged aptnessof thisas a description thephenomenon the have many believe he has in mind.I now wantto do so. All of us, probably, in which can use inassertions, we words expressions ourvocabulary and requests attitudes yetforwhich and and even,it seems,in expressing propositional our can regarding proper The phenomenon occur their use. we lackimportant details this to for kinds. But,as I have tried emphasize, withwordswhich stand natural is a matter entirely separatefrom phenomenon pointedto by Putnam'sTwin as as Earthexamples.In orderto keep things straight possible,I wantto use of kinds.AndI want that concepts are,as faras we know,notconcepts natural to considerat the beginning sortof case in whichour partialgrasp is the limited. extremely Johnhas been eatingin a sortof situation. Imagine,then, following the restaurant whose conceitis to list its dishes in ritzyAmerican "continental" does them, John stabat pronouncing French. While he can makea reasonable wordson themenumean.Havingenjoyedhis notunderstand whattheFrench the of He he first mealat therestaurant, decidesto samplemore themenu. visits to he Betty. wanting appearignorant, doesn't Not restaurantsecondtimewith a orders new itemsfrom ask thewaiter explainthemenuforhim,butsimply to "I saut6s'a la themenu.At one pointhe saysto Betty believethechampignons John sincere: believesfrom is he that cremeshouldbe good". We can imagine will at restaurant be good. served this experience anything that himself in itself is and modeofexpressing The situation notoutre John's is in is deficient incorrect. John, however, certainly neither unusualnor,I think, as his somerespect. does not, to however, seemappropriate describe deficiency It As words express. far mastery theconcepts" French of the having onlya "partial a as as theconcepts he mayin facthave as perfect mastery anyoneof the go, sauce". words "mushrooms sautedina cream concepts expressed theEnglish by of of Whathe does nothave,of course,is a mastery themeaning theFrench about theirmeaning,that,for example, words. (He may know something saut6s la creme'describes edibledish). an 'champignons 'a saut6s the and believe Does John simply straightforwardly that champignons his and he the 'a la cremewillbe good?Certainly, wayin which expresses belief But in a his this. thewayin whichwe might ordinarily describe beliefsuggests in bothare misleading. Speakingentirely English,we philosophical context in the mayask whether believethat mushrooms creamsauce will be good? he he is to (For that whatthemenupromises serve).It seemsto me that does not have this belief. I am stronglyinclined to say that in the imagined the like that dish called something this, circumstances, beliefhe has is really the thisis thebeliefhe can "champignons sautes'a la creme"willbe good and that be said to sincerely it eventhough does notexpress in thisfashion. he express I mightput my inclinationby saying that the propositionthat the of in any mushrooms creamsauce willbe good is notitself partof thecontent

An Investigation Two Thought of Experiments167 / John'sbelief.Russell once spoke of knowing proposition, directly, a not but only by description.26 a way thatis whatI wantto say aboutJohn.He In believesthat proposition the expressed thewords usedis true, he does by he but nothavea direct belief that in proposition itself. It might asked how it can be correct John expresshis beliefin a be for to seemingly straightforward ifin fact belief has is strictly way the he speaking I as haveclaimed. think situation notunlike concerning use ofproper I the is one the names thathas had some recentdiscussion.Someone calls and leaves the messageon myanswering machine: "This is Mary.Have Catherine me". call Hearingthis, notknowing anysense whocalled,I tellCatherine, but in "Mary calledand wants youto call herback".This is not,I think, in incorrect ordinary speechand in somesenseexpresses sincere I my belief. Butmany, think, would I be inclined say that to what really believeis that called someonenamed "Mary" etc. Even one such as myself who believes thatproper namesoften have no Fregeansenseor descriptive content, refer historical but via connections the or like,maynevertheless think in sucha situation is notin a position that one to apprehend proposition the whichCatherine the mayapprehend upon hearing in I messageI relay. WhatI said to Catherine thecircumstancesdescribed does notdirectly expressa beliefof mine.Thereis a way in whichI pass along to a Catherine proposition whichI myself notapprehend sayingthewords do by I in which am confident fact express I couldhavedirectly it. passedon whatI do apprehend believe saying and by something "Someone like named "Mary" called, etc." If we can acceptmyinclinations thesecases forthesakeof argument in at I least,then wonder whether similar things shouldnotbe said abouttheBurge thought experiments. Whenthepersonin Burge's mostwell-known example "I I in a says to thedoctor, think have arthritis mythigh," thusdisplaying less than perfect graspof theconcept is expressed theword"arthritis",itbeyond by doubt that belief the expressed thesameas that one whohas a perfect is of grasp of theconcept? itnotthat Is has whatis really believedis onlythat speaker the in thethigh condition the called "arthritis" something that? or like accountit Continuing followmyinclination to here,werethisthecorrect in would no longerbe possible to arguefrom Burgethought the experiment whichan exactcounterpart imagined a society which"arthritis" used in in is is Or differently different that beliefcontents involved. at leastthiswouldnot are be an immediate In as conclusion coulddraw. theexample detailed Burge, one by in boththeperson theactualworld wouldbelievethat and thecounterpart they belief havein thethigh condition a properly called"arthritis". thisidentical And would be truein the first situation and false in the second. Their external circumstances wouldnotdetermine content their of but the belief, onlythetruthvalue. in Not everyone and mayagreewith inclinations thismatter I havenot my I presented,believe,morethan plausible a drawonlya possibility. me then Let

168/Keith Donnellan S. modestconclusion. pursuethecoursemyinclinations To takeme along is at least a possibilityfor one who holds a view such as Locke's. No such possibility presents itself whenwe confront Putnam the TwinEarthexamples. in For expressions operate accordance that withthesortof semantic rulethose it examplesimply, is builtintotheverysemantics thattheidentity conditions forthekindwe have beliefsaboutis to be determined investigation the of by external world. is nota matter having incomplete It of an graspofthesemantics; themostcomplete graspstillleaves thejob of investigating nature our the of two paradigms be done.Andwhether peoplehavebeliefs to aboutthesamekind or not-whetherin thefleshed examples, out they have thesame or different beliefs-will be depend not upon what is in theirmindsalone, but upon If whether their paradigms have thesame or different fundamental nature. one in admitsthat someourkindwordsfunction thewaytheTwinEarthexamples seemto imply of be they theclassicalviewrepresented that Locke must do, by a abandoned. WiththeBurgethought experiments seems,at anyrate, way there to makeat leasta temporary stand.
Notes of 1. Versions thefirst of parts thispaperwereread at theUniversity NotreDame of and in a symposium withProfessor PierreJacob at the Pacific Division 1989 meetings theAmerican of Philosophical Association. laterversionwas read at A the CentralDivision 1990 meetingwithProfessors Genoveva Marti and John Perry as commentators and subsequentlyat the Universityof California, Riverside. have greatly I benefitted thecomments theparticipants the by of and audiences in these meetings.I am also very gratefulto ProfessorCharles Crittenden Catherine and Donnellan forhelpfulcomments an earlierdraft. on but Extensivechangesfromthe earlierversionshave resulted, obviouslyI am responsible theremaining for defects. 2. Putnam, Hilary, "The Meaning of 'Meaning"' in Language, Mind and Knowledge:MinnesotaStudies in the Philosophyof Science, VII, ed. by Keith Gunderson.(Minneapolis,University MinnesotaPress, 1975). Reprinted of in Hilary Putnam, Philosophical Papers Vol II: Mind, Language and Reality (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1975). Page references are to the latter. Putnam acknowledges, correctly, debtto Saul Kripke'sviews as givenin a Namingand Necessity(Cambridge,HarvardUniversity Press 1980; originally published in 1972). I believe, however,that Putnam's views add important details and thathe is incorrect supposingthatKripke's notionof a "rigid in designator" thelocus of his debt. is 3. TylerBurge,"Individualism theMental"in MidWestStudies in Philosophy and IV. (Minneapolis,University MinnesotaPress, 1979). of Woodfield 4. TylerBurge,"OtherBodies", in Thought and Object, ed. by Andrew (New York,OxfordUniversity Press,1982). 5. "Putnamand Kripke on NaturalKind Terms", in Genet & Shoemaker, eds., and Mind,(Oxford Knowledge Univ.Press,1983). I would like to take this opportunity attempt rectify omissionof to an to some importance the paper mentioned in here. After composingthe paper,but for beforepublishing I discovered it thatmyprimary exampleused in arguing a centralpoint,an example whichdependedupon the factthatH20 can contain threedifferent isotopesof hydrogen, been previously had used by Professor Jay Atlas in a review (Philosophical Books, July1980) of the volume in which

An Investigation Two Thought of Experiments169 / Putnam's "Meaning, Reference Stereotypes" appeared. should and first I have included acknowledgment an of Professor Atlas'prior of theexample an use in assessment Putnam natural terms.believe the we eachmade of on kind I that use oftheexample somewhat was different: ittoillustrate I take be an I used what to indefiniteness thenotion important about of underlying physical properties, a notion used in thepresent paper;Professor Atlas, believe, I usedit in partto mount moreradicalattack Putnam's a on wholeproject. any case his In on discussion, pp. 134-136of his piece cited above, is important I, and and to belatedly with apologies Professor Atlas, recommend itnowtothe reader. 6. I should here theviewI ascribe Tyler say that to is Burge this in paper a viewI havedistilled hispapers, from mainly early the ones,andthat reader the should nottakeit as in anywayauthoritativewhat on Burge's position detailis. I in wantto lookat a particular important, and I think, philosophical position, one which haveonlycometo see theimportance from I of Burge'swritings. I So, attributeto him(andI think it others also). It is, in theend,however, may the viewitself about which want saysomething. I to 7. Hilary on Putnam, "Comment Wilfrid 27 Sellars", Synthese (1974)p. 451. 8. Op. Cit.p. 234. is and 9. The point elegantly madebyDavidKaplanin hisexample theCastor of Polluxtwinsin "Demonstratives" Themes in from Kaplan,(Oxford, Oxford University Press,1989,p. 534.) 10. "TheMeaning 'Meaning"'. Cit.p. 234. of Op. 11. "Other Bodies".Op. Cit.p. 103. 12. Salmon,Nathan.1981. Reference Essence.(Princeton: Princeton and The See Four. University Press). I, Part 13. Reference Essence,Op. Cit.,p. 106.In what and follows believethat am I I not withany deep pointsof Salmon's probably addingto nor disagreeing extensive of in analysis theroleofindexicality thetwin-earth examples. 14. We should that that admit, however, it is nottheoretically of thequestion a out word a kind thing for of should indexical be -not in anydeepmanner, right but on thesurface. havenotfound suchinourlanguage itis. Butit seems as I any to an possible construct imaginary example. but once upona timethere weremany Supposethat kingdoms a common contains the of The language language spoken thesubjects all therealms. by word 'kingsgold'. is howthat Here were word functioned. In eachrealm there one ormore of "royal" objects. speak kingsgold to speak the To of was of kind stuff which theunderlying has the nature theroyalobjectsin therealmwhere of to speaker happened be. A traveler among realms the might speak refer if of, to, different ofstuff different when orsheusedthe kinds at youprefer, times he word, for nature theroyal the of havebeendifferent from objects onerealm in might that another. thetraveler thesameword in or Still with samemeaning, the used to employ David Kaplan'sterm ("Demonstratives", cit. pt. VI), withthe op. samecharacter matter what no in realm orshehappened be. he to to Eventhough time was usedtheword'kingsgold' each it referred a kind, evena natural (ifthe kind particular objects a single had royal underlying nature) it seems correct saythat has an indexical to it on It nature right thesurface. not to its it feature common withcontext, had another onlychanged extension indexicals. as a person inspacecanrefer theplacehe orshe Just lost to ordinary is byusing'here'andlostin time thepresent with to time 'now',so a traveler The lostamong realms refer a kindof stuff using'kingsgold'. the can to by is difference between 'water'as we actually it and 'kingsgold' in certain use a and to between proper a namefor person the respects analogous thedifference indexical ofthe use refer thesame to pronoun 'you'.In particular both uses may but do Of name a person for means. course proper a person, they so bydifferent doesnothavetheparadigmatic ofa natural term the kind suchas 'water': aspect of semantics namesforpersons notdirect to an exploration their of do us essential properties.

170/Keith Donnellan S. is of is newand 15. Thewayofthinking howtheextension a term determined about paradigms theresulting revolutionary its use of empirical in and need for pointed tome, out research. Charles As Crittenden correspondence) (in empirical determine extension would external the to mind may that nature something the of of of theory forms. aminclined seem, example, be a feature thePlatonic for to (I to to think, course, thetwin of that earth examples point a viablewayin which and does reference fixed is externally thePlatonism not.)It needstobe pointed form Saul Kripke's of rules as outas wellthat Putnam's canbe viewed a special fixing" definite descriptions. device using of "reference a modified for term "water", example, somewhat for 16. I aminclined suggest, the to like, is formulations: something "Water thestuff version Putnam's of various ofthe we underlying physical characteristics stuff (orI) which theimportant has use 'water"'. leaveouthereexplicit of modalities, (I havebeenusedto calling does.)Thisis closetothewayI putitin"Kripke which be added Putnam can as what "we"havebeen andPutnam Natural on Kinds" (Op. Cit.). Theideais that and we givesus theparadigms water that havebeen of calling "water" loosely on properties, color, e.g., bits "water" thebasisofcertain surface calling ofstuff factwhich at temperatures, potability, It is thelatter etc. liquidity ordinary makes rule the non-circular. rule the reflect fact the the that paradigms 17. To make semantic for useof'water' the and this the we have areavailable to derive result from ruleitself, probably to world -and this to to buildin something a reference actuality, theactual like in is result indexicality. that notthestartling we areinterested But mayinvolve here. in are 18. Thisresult can geteveniftheparadigms specified therulebypurely we It here thatthis resultis perfectly qualitative descriptions. is important to with privy therule beingcompletely consistent theusersof thelanguage the but word. ruledetermines extension, it The which governs use of their the of to factsaboutthenature someparadigms does so by referring empirical are. what empirical really So onecanknow facts without having specify those to at about of the facts, leastas yet, the rule, haveno means knowing empirical but the nature the of paradigms. to ifit say, may indexicality requires, a reference 19. The full rule, however, involve in and theactual world ifthelatter essentially is indexical nature. in rulesis not to be indexicality thePutnam 20. This,by theway,showsthat notion of on restricted somevariant theindexical to thought as possibly of but modalresults, This maybe necessary thestartling for actuality. is all that and earth occupy notfor result areinterested ForPutnam's the we in. earth twin is operator not thesamepossibleworldand theindexicality theactuality of to with to in out paradigms be associated going do anywork picking different like theword 'water'. indexicals after needtobe something 'our'as The will, all, in 'ourlakesandoceans'as Putnam maintained. 21. "Individualism theMental". Cit., 83 and Op. p. labor cannothave an 22. This is not to say thatthe divisionof linguistic for kind "elm"maybe a term a natural to The application a natural term. word the in about kind. amprepared defer a knowledgeable I to to gardener whether tree about structure the is the although gardener nothing may myyard an elmornot, has ofthe is nature the DNA,ifthat what underlying oftrees todo with. to labor 23. Theprinciple thedivision linguistic has to do with of of deferring the for I may defer a of community. thus members myspeech useof a term other by uses favored group it,to as variety reasons, be abletousetheterm a certain of to It it useful. maybe will use itin a waywhich practical for purposes make more were distinction that if "carburetor" be much useful would less term an artificial and madebetween whatis to be calleda "carburetor" whatis calleda "fuel has which mechanic for And my may injection system". there be goodreasons kind usingtheterm covertheold fashioned of deviceas wellas thenewer. to work. devises of Thesereasons someexpert knowledge howthese mayinvolve

An Investigation Two Thought of Experiments171 / Butitis notthat there paradigm are carburetors what needintheendis the and I about truth their underlying nature. 24. One is reminded of thesituation regard theclassical here with to descriptions theory proper of names,whichoften tooktheform putting of descriptions the identifying referent a namein theheadofeachuser. moveawayfrom of A thiswas to suggest thatthedescriptions obtained be the from users,in the of the of to plural, thename,from community users.This is analogous the of It principle thedivision linguistic of labor. was a quite different on the attack of classical when wasargued Kripke, it and that theory names by myself others, of not be determined a set of identifying the referent a name might by at descriptions all. 25. The ideaandtheexample mine, theideaarises but are about from problems the natural kinds natural terms and kind raised Dominic by Sklenar discussion. in 26. See, forexample, The Problems Philosophy of (Oxford, Oxford University Press,1959),p. 57.