STABILITYCAMPAIGNS: LESSONSLEARNEDANDLESSONS APPLIED

AmyBattandMatthewChu

DefenceManagementStudiesProgram QueensUniversity

May2007

Stability Campaigns: Lessons Learned and Lessons Applied

UnitedStates

MilitaryTransformationandInnovation

Odom,ThomasP,etal.Transformation:VictoryRestswithSmallUnits. MilitaryReview,Volume85,Issue3. May2005. OdometalareconcernedwiththeoperationalexperienceoftheGlobalWaron Terror(GWOT),stabilityoperationsandsupportoperations(SOSO),andthe contemporaryoperatingenvironmentandhowthishasinfluencedUSArmy transformation.Theauthorsarguethatsmallunits(infantryunitsandsquads) arethekeytosuccessinanymilitaryengagement.Sincesmallunitsareneeded forstabilityoperations,thekeyfortransformationistostartatthelowestlevel. TheArmysCenterforArmyLessonsLearned(CALL)hasdocumentedmany operationalexperiencesthatsupportlowlevelArmytransformation. Cohen,EliotA.ChangeandTransformationinMilitaryAffairs.The JournalofStrategicStudies,Volume27,No.3.September2004. Thearticleanalyzestheideasofradicalchangeandtransformationofmilitary affairsthathasbeendiscussedbymilitaryanalystsoverthepasttwentyyears. Cohenposesthequestion,hasthereactuallybeenarevolutionarychangeto militaryaffairs?Orarethechangeswearewitnessingthenaturalprogressionof technologyandtheevolutionofwarfighting?Thecontextofthisarticleisframed aroundtheideasoftherevolutioninmilitaryaffairs(RMA)andmilitary transformation. Cohenarguesthattransformationisasmuchabottomupasitisatopdown withintheUSmilitary.Thegreatestchangesinwararebroughtaboutby spontaneousinnovationinreactiontotacticalproblems.Attheheartofreal changeinmilitaryaffairsisthenotionofalearningorganization.ButCohen alsonotesthatthefocusoftheRMAdebatefailedtoadequatelyincorporatethe enemyfactor.However,theUSmilitaryexperienceinIraqhasillustratedits abilitytoadaptandapplythelessonsitislearningtoitsforcestructure.The conversionofAmericanheavydivisions(4IDor1AD)tocounterinsurgencyforces isagoodexampleofthis.ThelessonslearnedfromIraqarebeingadaptedto realistictrainingexercisesintheUSbeforedeployment.Cohenconcludesthat whiletheRMAisheretostay,itrequiresagreaterinclusionofhowenemy forcesareapproachingtransformationefforts.

Stability Campaigns: Lessons Learned and Lessons Applied

DunnIII,RichardJ.Transformation:Letsgetitrightthistime. Parameters,Spring2001. DunndocumentstheUSmilitarysexperienceintheMiddleEastinthe1980s andearly1990sandhowthishasleadtoeffortstotransformtheUSArmy. DunniscriticalofthetraditionalelementsoftheArmyandthemilitary bureaucracy.HecallstheArmysometimesitsownworstenemywhenitcomes tochange.DunnissupportiveofgradualtransformationeffortsthattheArmy hasemployedastheinstitutionhaschangeditself.Mostnotablythe developmentoftheHighTechnologyLightDivision(HTLD)iswhattheArmy needstoadoptasamajorpartofitstransformation.DunnalsocitesKosovoas evidencetheArmyneedstheHTLDtobemoreeffectiveinstabilitylike campaignsinthefuture.

MilitaryDoctrineandTraining

Biddle,Stephen.SpeedKills?ReassessingtheRoleofSpeed,Precision, andSituationAwarenessintheFallofSaddam. TheJournalofStrategic Studies,Volume30,No.1.February2007. ThisarticlepresentsaninterestingperspectiveonAmericandefencepolicythat reflectsadvocatingtransformationandashifttowardasmaller,faster,leaner, highertechnologyUSmilitaryforhighintensityoperations.Scholarsbelieve thattheUSspeed,precisionandsituationawarenessaccountedmainlyforthe lownumberofcasualtiessufferedbytheCoalition.Thisarticlesuggests,based onfirsthandexperiencesandevidencecollectedfromparticipantsinbothsides oftheconflictdisplayIraqiweakness(i.e.failuretoprepareinfrastructurefor demolition,thesurvivalofremotefacilities)asthemainreasonforlowcasualty costs.Essentially,theinteractionbetweenIraqichoices,Iraqimilitary shortcomings,andCoalitionstrengthsproducedthisoutcomeafactthatshould beexaminedmorefullyforeffectivedefencepolicy,intheauthorsopinion. Burpo,FJohn.TheGreatCaptainsofChaos:DevelopingAdaptive Leaders.MilitaryReview,Volume86,Issue1.January2006. BurpoisprimarilyconcernedwithhowtheofficercorpsoftheUSArmyadapts theiractionsinthefield.BurpobelievestheUSArmyneedstoquestionwhether itsleaderdevelopmentsystemadequatelyidentifiesandpreparestheadaptive leadersanoperatingenvironmentrequires.Hespecificallyrecommendsa numberofchangestotheleaderdevelopmentsystemincluding:requiringmore graduateandpostgraduateeducationfromitsofficers(foradvancement)and reversingthetrendofincreasinglyprivatizingteachingstaffatschools,instead selectingcommandersfromthefieldforteachingassignments.

Stability Campaigns: Lessons Learned and Lessons Applied

BurporefinestheArmy'sdefinitionofadaptiveleadershipandrecommends specificcoursesofactiontodevelopadaptiveleaders.Acceptingthe unpredictabilityoftheoperatingenvironment,identifyingthevariablesthatdefine environmentsandcontinuallydevelopingadaptiveleadersindemanding situationsisthepathtocreatingadaptiveleaders.HesuggeststhattheArmy mustfindwaystoidentifyandfurtherdevelopfuturemiddleofficerswhowillbe abletoadaptandbesuccessfulinthefield. Petraeus,LieutenantGeneralDavidH.LearningCounterinsurgency: ObservationsfromSoldieringinIraq. MilitaryReview,JanuaryFebruary 2006. ThisarticlesupportstheauthorsinitialstatementthattheUSArmyhaslearneda greatdealinIraqandAfghanistanabouttheconductofcounterinsurgency operations,especiallysurroundingasymmetricalattackstoavoidUSstrengths firepower,manoeuvreandtechnology. Petraeusacknowledgesfourteen observationsfromsoldieringinIraqthatinclude: 1.Donottrytodotoomuchwithyourownhands. 2. Actquickly,becauseeveryArmyofliberationhasahalflife. 3. Moneyisammunition. 4. Increasingthenumberofstakeholdersiscriticaltosuccess. 5. Analyzecostsandbenefitsbeforeeachoperation. 6. Intelligenceisthekeytosuccess. 7. Everyonemustdonationbuilding. 8. Helpbuildinstitutions,notjustunits. 9. Culturalawarenessisaforcemultiplier 10.Successinacounterinsurgencyrequiresmorethanjustmilitary operations. 11.Ultimatesuccessdependsonlocalleaders. 12.Rememberthestrategiccorporalsandstrategiclieutenants. 13.Thereisnosubstituteforflexible,adaptableleaders. 14.Aleadersmostimportanttaskistosettherighttone. Petraeusfurtherrecognizesthatinstitutionalstructuresaresolelyinadequatefor capturinglessonstheyaredependantonsoldiersthoughtsandimpressions. Heconcludesbystatingthatnow,morethanever,modernmilitariesmustrelyon lessonslearnedinthepasttounderstandthechangingenvironmentofconflict intothefuture. Johnston,Paul.DoctrineisNotEnough:TheEffectofDoctrineonthe BehaviourofArmies.Parameters,Autumn2000. Johnstonarguesthatwritingdoctrinesisnotenoughifthepurposeofthat doctrineistochangethewayanarmyfights.Anarmysbehaviourinbattleis usuallyareflectionofitscharacterandculturemorethanthecontentsofits

Stability Campaigns: Lessons Learned and Lessons Applied

doctrinemanuals.Johnstonnotesthathistoryhasshownthatarmiestendto reformthemselvesthroughwartimeexperience,notpeacetimeinnovation. JohnstonusescasestudiesofBritishinterwaryearstheFrencharmybetween 1914and1940andtheUSexperienceduringOperationDesertStromto illustratetheinfluenceofoperationalexperiencesondevelopingwarfighting doctrine. RisCassi,RobertW.DoctrineforJointOperationsinCombined Environment:ANecessity.MilitaryReview,Volume77,No.1. January/February1997.

st RisCassiarguesthatfortheforeseeablefuture(21 Century),Americanmilitary leaderswillmostoftenbeleadersofmultinationalmilitarycoalitions.Asdoctrine continuestoevolveoutofthepostColdWarera,coalitionwarfaredoctrinemust remainapriorityeffortamongallservices.Thetoolsandlessonsdeveloped fromthisdoctrinemustbecapturedandemployedintheformationofadhoc coalitionstoacceleratethecohesionofcoalitionforces.Morecaremustbe takenforUScommanderstobeadaptivetocoalitionforceleadershipthroughthe developmentofasharedandunderstandabledoctrinalapproachtofuture campaigns.

Stability/PeaceOperations

Vines,JohnR.TheXVIIIAirborneCorpsontheGroundinIraq.Military Review,Volume86,Issue5.September2006. AfterabriefreviewoftheCorps'yearinIraq,Vinesfocusesspecificallyonthree areas:theoperationalenvironment,battlecommand,andthechallengesin achievingacommonrelevantpictureinadynamicelectronicwarfaredomainto betterprepareSoldiersandunitsfordeployment. Thisarticleisverytechnicalin itspresentationoflessonslearned.However,themainargumentisthatto succeedincurrentandfutureconflicts,theUSArmymustbeabletomaximize battlecommandandcreatesystemsthatareaccessibleatthelowestlevelsof thechain.TheUSArmymustrecognizetheimportanceofintegratingsoldiers intotheinformationbattlefield(viaeducationandtechnology)tobetterapproach futurecampaignsinvolvingstabilityoperations. Rose,DonaldG.PeaceOperationsandChangeintheUSMilitary. DefenseAnalysis,Volume17,No.2,2001. ThearticleexaminestheUSArmysinvolvementinpeace/stabilityoperationsin postColdWarconflictsofthe1990s.Roseasksthequestionofdidinvolvement intheseoperationsbringaboutchangesinArmydoctrineandtraining?In addition,didtheUSArmylearnfromitsexperiences?Bystudyingoperationsin

Stability Campaigns: Lessons Learned and Lessons Applied

NorthernIraq,Bangladesh,Rwanda,Haiti,Bosnia,andKosovo,Roseargues thattheUSArmyhasinfactlearnedfromitsexperiencesbyinstitutionalizingthe lessonslearnedintodoctrineandtraining. ThearticlespecificallyexaminestheUSArmysexperienceinOperation PROVIDECOMFORTinNorthernIraqandOperationRESTOREHOPEin Somalia.Rosetracesthehowthelessonsfromtheseoperationswere disseminatedbytheCenterforArmyLessonsLearned(CALL)andincorporated intodoctrineandtraining.ThevariouschangestotheArmysfieldmanual(FM series)duringthe1990sillustratestheincreasingimportanceofOperations OtherThanWar(OOTW)inArmydeployments.Withthesechangestodoctrine, Roseexamineshowunittrainingbegantoincorporatetheselessonslearned. Finally,thearticleexaminestheimplicationsoftheselessonsincorporatedonthe forcestructureoftheUSArmy.Rosenotestheissueofpreparingforcesfor primarilyhighintensityconflictsminimizestheamountofOOTWtrainingunits canlearn.Alternatively,themoreOOTWArmyunitstrainfor,thelessprepared theywillbeforhighintensityconflicts.RoseconcludesthattheArmysmove towardabrigadestyleapproachtofutureconflictsindicatesan acknowledgementontheArmyspartofrecognizingtheneedtomaintain traditionalwarfightingcapabilitieswhilehavingsufficienttrainingfor peace/stabilityoperations. Berdal,Mats.LessonsNotLearned:TheUseofForceinPeace Operationsinthe1990s.InternationalPeacekeeping,Volume7,No.4. Winter2000. Berdalarguesthatduringthe1990sthearmedforcesofmanywesterncountries embracedaviewthatpeaceenforcementoperationswereamilitaryactivity distinctfromwar.ThecontextualapproachtoBerdalsanalysiscritiquesthe assumptionsthatmilitaryforcecanbeusedimpartiallytoenforcecompliance withoutdesignatinganenemy,andthatusingforceinthismannerwillnot prejudicethepoliticaloutcomeoftheconflictinquestion.Theexperienceof militaryoperationsinSomaliaandBosnia,however,suggeststhatthese assumptionsareempiricallyunsustainableandoptimisticintheextreme. Berdalarguesthatwhilearmedforcesdoctrinehaschangedtoincorporate peaceoperationsoverthepastdecade,thereisamoreurgentneedforpolitical decisionmakerstorethinktheseexperiences.Specifically,politicaldecision makersneedtorethinktherequirementsfortheeffectiveuseofforceintermsof whatarmedforcescanachieve,notwhattheycando.Berdalconcludesthat advocatesofmaintainingpeaceoperationsasseparatefromwarareallowing governmentstoavoidharddecisionsabouttheimplicationsofdeployingmilitary personnel.Basedontheexperiencesofpeaceoperationsinthe1990s,revising militarydoctrinetoincludepeaceoperationsisnotenough.Politicaldecision makersmustapproachpossibleforcedeploymentsinthecontextofwhattheuse offorcecanachieve,notwhatitcando.

Stability Campaigns: Lessons Learned and Lessons Applied

Farrell,Theo.SlidingintoWar:TheSomaliaImbroglioandUSArmyPeace OperationsDoctrine.InternationalPeacekeeping,Volume2,No.2. Summer1995. FarrellarguesthattheUSArmyinterventioninSomalia,whilewarranted, reflectedtheArmysflawedconceptionofpeaceoperations.Thesepre conceptionsledtheArmytobelievethatitcouldslidefromconsentbased peacekeeping,tocoercivepeaceenforcementandbackagain.Aclearer distinctionbetweenpeacekeepingandpeaceenforcementwouldhave highlightedtheoperationalrisks,requirements,andirreversiblenatureoftheshift fromtheformertothelatter.FarrellpointsoutthatthelessonsfromSomalia havenotbeenforgottenastheUSArmyhassubsequentlychangeditsdoctrine inlightofitsexperienceinSomaliaoperations. DuringthedeploymenttoSomalia,theUSArmyfolloweditsdoctrinereleasedin 1986thatemphasizedJointAirLandBattleoperations.TheAirLandBattle Doctrinemistakenlycombinedpeacekeepingandenforcement,leadinginpartto theimbroglioofthemilitaryoperationinSomalia.Followingthelessonslearned fromSomalia,inDecember1994,theArmyreleaseditsdoctrineonpeace operations,FM10023:PeaceOperations.Thenewdoctrineprovidedan illustrationoflessonslearnedandappliedbytheUSArmywhenapproaching situationsrequiringeitherpeacekeepingorpeaceenforcement.

TheoreticalApproaches

Grissom,Adam.TheFutureofMilitaryInnovationStudies.TheJournalof StrategicStudies,Volume29,No.5.October2006. Thisarticleassessesthestateoftheartinmilitaryinnovationresearch. Grissom analyzesthefourmainschoolsofthoughtonthisissue:civilmilitary,intraservice, andcultural,onmilitaryinnovationandhowtheyrelatetotheconceptsoftop downandbottomupinnovation. Interestingly,thesefourmainschoolsdonot mentionthenotionofbottomupinnovation,eventhoughlessonsfromthefield havebeenwelldocumentedinthepast. Grissomarguesthatwhilethefourschoolsofthoughtmaystillhavevaluein explainingtopdowninnovation,theirlackofacknowledgementoftheexistence ofbottomupinnovationwouldsuggesttheyarenolongerfullyadequate.There isaneedtodevelopmorecomprehensiveapproachtobottomupinnovation. Theliteratureregardinghowunitslearninthefieldofcombatandhowthose lessonsareappliedtolateroperationsisvast.Thefutureofmilitaryinnovation studiesmustpaymoreattentiontotheinfluenceofbattlefieldexperienceand howitchangesthewaysarmedforcesconductoperations.

Stability Campaigns: Lessons Learned and Lessons Applied

Gray,ColinS.StabilityOperationsinStrategicPerspective:ASkeptical View.Parameters,Summer2006. Grayarguesthatstabilityoperationsareanintegralpartofmodernwarfareand needtobeincludedinoverallstrategicplanning.Graycontextualizeshis argumentusingthe2006QuadrennialDefenseReviewReport(QDR)released bytheDepartmentofDefense(DOD).HeevaluatestheQDRtodetermine whetherornotitsapproachisadequateinincludingstabilityoperationsinits futurestrategy.Stabilityoperationscannotbepartofphase2ofwarfare planningasithasbeeninUSstrategicplanning. TheQDRplacesaheavyemphasisontheprimacyofirregularandasymmetric warfare,butdoesnotadequatelyincorporatetheneedtoincludestability operations(throughlessonslearnedfromIraqandAfghanistan)instrategic planning.TheQDRmisrepresentsthelongwaronterrorism.Understanding thatwellplannedandexecutedstabilityoperationsaredesignedtoprotect,and ineffectwinthesupportofthepublic,nottodestroytheterrorists,canhelpthe USinitscurrentandfuturecampaigns. Yates,LawrenceA.MilitaryStabilityandSupportOperations:Analogies, PatternsandRecurringThemes.MilitaryReview,Volume77,No.4. Jul/Aug1997. ThefocusofthisarticleinontheUSmilitarysexperienceswithOperationsOther ThanWar(OOTW).YatesdevelopspatternsandthemesintheUSmilitarys experiencesinSomalia,Haiti,andBosnia.Hefindsthatcommontothese experiencesarenotionsofnontraditionalenvironments,operational constraints,crossculturalinteraction,andothers.Hismainargumentisthese patternsandthemesarenotisolatednotions,rathertheyareinterrelated.This interrelationmustberecognizedbytrainingmethodssoofficersarebetter preparedforOOTW.Yatesarguesbetterpreparationcomesfirstthroughan analysisofthehistoricalrecord(findingpatternsandthemes)andsecondto understandtheimplicationsofeachforcurrentandfutureoperations.

Canada

Stability/PeaceOperations

Coombs,HowardG.andGen.RickHillier.PlanningforSuccess:The ChallengeofApplyingOperationalArtinPostConflictAfghanistan. CanadianMilitaryJournal,Autumn2005.

Stability Campaigns: Lessons Learned and Lessons Applied

CoombsandHilliernotethedifficultiesCFoperationalcommandersfacein currentpeace/stabilityoperations.Thesedifficultieshaveincreasedsincethe endoftheColdWar.PostColdWarstabilityoperationsaremorethanjust monitoringforthepreventionorcessationoffightingbetweenparties.Stability campaignsinthe1990s(Bosnia)andcurrently(Afghanistan)illustratethe complexitiesofconductingstabilityoperationsonthegroundinpostconflict zones. TheCFsoperationalapproachtoAfghanistantodaycanbeattributedtoits experiencesandlessonslearnedinpost1992conflicts.Stabilizationeffortsare characterizedbytheharmonizationofreconstructionandredevelopmentefforts. Theauthorsarguethatthekeydifferencelearnedthatseparatesconventional militarycampaignsfromstabilitycampaignsisthatkineticoperationsare concernedwiththedestructionoftheenemywhereasduringstabilityoperations, themilitarycomponentmustconstrainthegrowthofthreatforcesandmanage perceptionthatthereisanincreaseinmeasurablegovernmentcapacity.The authorsnotethatinsomeways,thegoalofreachingastableandsecureend statehasbecomethedefactoCanadianwayofconductingwar.Thecurrent CanadianapproachtoAfghanistanisuniqueinthatstabilityeffortsarenot entirelyenshrinedindoctrine,butlegitimizedthroughpracticeinthefieldbased onthelessonsgainedfrompreviousoperations. Henrichon,Patrick.ProtectingtheCanadianForcesAgainstAsymmetric Threats.CanadianMilitaryJournal,Winter20022003. HenrichonoutlinestheincreasingprevalenceofasymmetricthreatstotheCFin thisarticle.TheendoftheColdWarhasincreasedtheuseofasymmetric warfareagainsttroopsdeployedabroadinstabilityoperations.Unconventional tacticsrequiresarmedforcestoadjustandadapttheirowndoctrinesforfighting againstthesetypesofthreats.ThemajorityofCFoverseasdeploymentsarefor stability/peaceoperations.ThesepostColdWaroperationshaveposeda numberofchallengesfortheCF,manyofwhicharerelatedtoasymmetric threats.CFdeploymentstoBosnia,theDemocraticRepublicofCongo,Kosovo, andAfghanistanhaveallseenexamplesofasymmetrictacticsusedagainstthe CF. Henrichonnotesthatbetterintelligenceisthekeytocombatingthesethreats. Hearguesthattechnologyalonecannotpreventorcounterunconventional warfareonitsownandthuscannotbereliedupon.Thebestassetsfor intelligencegatheringtocombatasymmetricthreatswillcontinuetobehuman intelligence(HUMINT)andopensources(OSINT). Henrichonalsopointsout thatwhiletheCFhascollectednotabledataonasymmetricwarfarefromthe field,ithasnooverarchingdoctrinetohandleasymmetricapproaches.Basedon whattheCFhaslearnedandislearningtoday,itmustincorporateasymmetric warfareintoitsstabilitycampaigndoctrine.

Stability Campaigns: Lessons Learned and Lessons Applied

MilitaryDoctrineandTraining

Garnett,G.L.TheEvolutionoftheCanadianApproachtoJointand CombinedOperationsattheStrategicandOperationalLevel.Canadian MilitaryJournal,Winter20022003. GarnettexaminesthetransitioneffortsoftheCFtomeetthechallengesand demandsofpostColdWarconflicts.AstheCFparticipatedinstability campaignsinEuropeandAfrica,theCFrecognizedtheneedtoreorganizeas partofitsevolutiontowardjointandcombinedoperations.Theincreasing frequencyandcomplexityofoperationsdemandedgreaterharmonizationofthe commandstructureatboththeoperationalandstrategiclevels.Garnettargues theneedtomovemoreefficientlytowardsgreaterjointnessincommandand controlstructures.TheexampleofOperationApolloillustratestheneedand urgencyrequiredindevelopingacoherentcommandandcontrolstructureforthe CF.GarnettarguesthattheCFC2systemisaddressingthisrealitythrough researchandchanges,butneedstomovefaster. Legault,Dr.Roch.TheUrbanBattlefieldandtheArmy:Changesand Doctrines.CanadianMilitaryJournal,Autumn2000. LegaultexaminestheemergingimportanceofurbanwarfaredoctrineofNATO countriesinpostColdWarconflicts.TheexperiencesofMogadishuandGrozny illustratedthedifficultyofconductingurbanoperationsagainstnonconventional forces.Legaultlooksatanumberofurbanwarfaredoctrines,includingtheUS Marines,andtheUSArmy,notingthatbothhavestressedtheimportanceof avoidingurbancombat,employingitonlyasalastresort.Legaultthencompares thesedoctrinestotheCanadianArmys,arguingthatitislimitedandlacksrigour, clarity,anddepth.SubsequentupdatestoCanadianmilitarydoctrinein1998did notaddresstheshortcomingsofthepreviousdoctrine,treatingfightinginurban areasinvagueandsuperficialterms.LegaultarguestheCanadianArmycanno longeravoidtheimportanceofurbanwarfareoperationsinitsdoctrine.Both doctrinalandculturalchangesareneededtoaddressthisproblem. Robertson,Dr.Scott.ExperimentationandInnovationintheCanadian Forces.CanadianMilitaryJournal,Summer2000. Robertsonanalyzesthesometimesconflictingdifferencesofexperimentationand innovationinthearmedforces.HearguesthattheCFneedsacoherentfutures processtoexist.Afuturesprocesswillallowaprogrammeofexperimentation thatcanassistinmeetingtheidentifiedneedtodevelopaninnovativeforce modelforthefuture.Theremustbeabalancestruckbetweenshortterm immediateneedsandthemoreabstractneedsoflongtermgoals.For experimentationthegoalistogenerateandexploreissuesassociatedwithfuture

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Stability Campaigns: Lessons Learned and Lessons Applied

warfarewithsomeregardtodevelopingforcestructures.Robertsonbelieves thatexperimentationneededintheCFnowmorethanduringtheColdWar. SincetheColdWarhasmoredefinedanddeterminedmilitaryrequirements, militaryexperimentationwasnotasimportantasitisinthepostColdWarworld.

OtherCountries

Vegi,Vinko.TheEffectsofPreviousDeploymentonSoldiersAttitudes toPeaceOperations. InternationalPeacekeeping,Volume14,No.2.April 2007. ThisarticleexploreshowSloveniancontingentsoperatingaspartofStabilization Force(SFOR)in200304feltabouttheirmissionbasedonempiricalresearch (surveys).Datareflectingsoldiersopinionsregardingtheirmissionenvironment, expectations,motivation,personalmorale,andsupportathomeshowedeachof theseinfluenceshadsubstantialimpactonanindividualsoldiersmotivation. Also,affectsofpreviousexperienceinpeacekeepingoperationsledtosoldiers feelingthattheirparticipationinstabilityforces,basedonsupportfromhomeand motivationsurroundingthesememories,wasnotnecessarilypositiveallthetime. Itisclearfromtheauthorsfindingsthattherearemanyexternalfactorsthat affectsoldiersmotivationinpeacekeepingandstabilitycampaigns. Kiszely,LieutenantGeneralSirJohn.LearningAbout Counterinsurgency.MilitaryReview,MarchApril2007. Kiszelyexamineshowmodernmilitaries(theBritisharmedforcesinparticular) haveandhavenotadequatelyadaptedtheirapproachestocounterinsurgency campaigns.HenotesthatinsurgenciesarenotanewconceptwithBritainand theUnitedStatesbothhavingexperiencefightingthesetypesofconflicts. However,Kiszelyfindsthatlearninginthemilitaryhasbeenconstrainedby inherentproblemssuchasantiintellectualism,resistancetocriticism,and confusingprogresswithactivity.Thus,hearguesthatculturalchangesare neededformilitariesfacinginsurgencies.Armedforcesmustrecognizethat operationsotherthanwar,especiallyinsurgencies,areeachuniqueto themselvesanddonothaveageneraldoctrinethatcanbeapplied. Furthermore,thereisaneedtotemperthewarriorethosthatcurrentlyexistsin manyarmedforcesifsoldiersaregoingtobeablebestcombatinsurgency campaigns.Kiszelyconcludesthattrainingarmedforcesbasedontheoriesand doctrineisnotenoughtofightinsurgenciesbecauseoftheiruncertainand unpredictablenature.Educationmustbegivenasmuchprioritytohelptrain soldierstocopewithandadapttocomplexandambiguousenvironments somethingthatcannotbeachievedwithpredeploymenttraining.Thereisalsoa needofarmedforcestorecognizethenonmilitaryfactorsinherentin

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Stability Campaigns: Lessons Learned and Lessons Applied

counterinsurgency,thusmovingbeyondthenarrowfocusofcombatoperations thatdonotaddresssignificantunderlyingissues. Gooren,RobertHE.SoldieringinUnfamiliarPlaces:TheDutch Approach.MilitaryReview,Volume86,Issue2.March2006. Goorensarticledocumentstheneedformodernmilitariestolearnfromprevious operationalexperiencesandadaptthoselessonstofuturecampaigns.Heuses theDutchmilitaryexperiencesandcontraststhiswiththerecentlessonslearned bytheUSmilitary.Thefocusofthisarticleisontheimportanceofcultural sensitivitytrainingforsoldiersbeforedeployment.Goorensmainargumentis soldiersmustseethatawarenessofculturaldifferenceandbasicrespectfor hostnationculturearecrucialtoforcesecurityand/ormissionsuccessinstability campaigns.TheselessonsarebasedontheUSexperienceinIraq.

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