Asian Surety and Insurance Co. vs. Herrera G.R. No.

25232 December 20, 1973 Facts Respondent Judge Herrera, upon the sworn application of NBI agent Celso Zoleta, Jr., issued a search warrant in connection with an undocketed criminal case of estafa, falsification, insurance fraud, and tax evasion, against the Asian Surety and Insurance Co. Asian Surety and Insurance Co. filed a petition to quash and annul the search warrant issued, assailing the validity of the search warrant. Herein petitioner claimed that it was issued in contravention of the explicit provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, particularly Section 2, of Article VI of the New Constitution, and Sections, 3, 5, 8 and 10 of Rule 126 of The Rules of Court. Asian Surety and Insurance Co. contended that the issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific offense, vaguely describing and not particularizing the properties to be search and seized, and not providing the time for making search is clearly violative of the Rules of Court, not to mention the failure of the NBI agents to provide a detailed receipt of the things to be seized. Issue Whether or not the search warrant issued is valid. HELD Petition to quash and annul the search warrant was granted. It was ruled that the search warrant was indeed issued for four separate and distinct offenses of : estafa, falsification, tax evasion and insurance fraud, and is clearly in contravention of the explicit command of Section 3 of Rule 126, of the Rules providing that : no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense. To prohibit the so-called general warrants is the evil sought to be remedied by such provision. The search warrant herein involved reads in part: property (Subject of the offense, stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense used or intended to be used as the means committing the offense) should be seized and brought to the undersigned. It is plain and clear that there are three classes of properties intended for such search warrant and respondent Judge was not able to specifically state which properties were to be searched and seized. The Court had occasion to explain the purpose of the requiring that a warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized, to make sure that the things to be seized would be limited to those particularly described in the search warrant, to avoid unreasonable searches and seizures. And thus, a detailed receipt must also be given to do away with those conducting the search a field day for having been issued such a broad and unlimited search warrant.

Mata vs. Bayona , G.R. No. L-50720 March 26, 1985 Facts: An information was filed against Soriano Mata, petitioner, alleging that he offered, took and arranged bets on Jai Alai game by selling illegal tickets known as Masiao tickets without any authority from th Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities concerened. Thereafter, a search warrant was issued by the respondent Judge against him for violation under PD 810, as amended by PD 1306. Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the reords of the said case could be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts and to which inquiry respondent judge replied, it is already with the court. This led a motion to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of the articles seized, citing and invoking , among others, Section 4 of Rule 126 od the Rules of Court. The motion was denied by respondent judge stating that the court has made a thorough investigation and examination under oath of private respondents and that the fact that documents relating to search warrant were not attached immediately to the record of the criminal case is of no moment, considering that the rule does not specify when these documents are to be attached to the records. ISSUE Whether or not the search warrant issued by respondent judge were valid. HELD The search warrant is tainted with illegality for being violative of the Constitution and the Rules of Court. Section 4 of Rule 126 provides that the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant or witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. Therefore, the search warrant is tainted with illegality by failure of the judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record. However , illegality of search warrant does not call for return of things seized which are prohibited.

Abuan vs. People, G.R. No. 168773 October 27, 2006 A search warrant was applied for to search the premises of the house of Eliza Abuan for violation of RA 6425. A Marissa Garospe was called on to substantiate the existence of probable cause. Afterwards the search warrant was issued. When the search warrant was served on Abuan, police officers were able to acquire from her 57 sachets of shabu. During the trial, it was found that Marissa

Garospe was a fictitious person. However, after trial, Abuan was still found guilty. The CA affirmed. ISSUE Whether or not the search warrant issued by the Executive Judge is void for not being based on probable cause but mere fabrications. HELD The evidence presented by Abuan that Garospe was not a resident or transient of their barangay, even if true and credible, is not at all material or necessary to the determination of probable cause. Whether Abuan and Gorospe were dealers of Avon Cosmetics may be relevant to the issue of whether there is factual basis for the finding of probable cause by the Executive Judge against Abuan; however, Abuans evidence to prove this claim is tenuous and does not warrant the quashal of the warrant and the suppression of evidence seized after the enforcement of the search warrant. The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) Probable cause is present; (2) Such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) The judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) The applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) The warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The judge in determining probable cause is to consider the totality of the circumstances made known to him not by a fixed and rigid formula, and must employ a flexible, totality of the circumstances standard. Probable cause exists if a practical common-sense evaluation of the facts and circumstances show a fair -possibility that dangerous drugs will be found in the asserted location. Stonehill vs Diokno, G.R. No. L-19550 Stonehill et al and the corporation they form were alleged to have committed acts in violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code. By the strength of this allegation 42 search warrants - on different dates- were issued against their persons and their corporation. The warrant provides authority to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit: Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers). The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and

(b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein. Stonehill averred that the warrant is illegal for: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law. The prosecution counters, invoking the Moncado doctrine, that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against them. In short, the criminal cannot be set free just because the government blunders. ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issued is valid. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et al. The SC emphasized however that Stonehill et al cannot assail the validity of the search warrant issued against their corporation for Stonehill are not the proper party hence has no cause of action. It should be raised by the officers or board members of the corporation. The constitution protects the peoples right against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides; (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. In the case at bar, none of these are met. The warrant was issued from mere allegation that Stonehill et al committed a violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code. In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code, as alleged in the aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes. The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit: Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements. Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of Stonehill et al, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of Stonehill et al and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of the Bill of Rights that the things

to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants. The Moncado doctrine is likewise abandoned and the right of the accused against a defective search warrant is emphasized. Manaban vs. CA and People of the Philippines Ramonito Manaban, petitioner vs. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, respondent. G.R. No. 150723 July 11, 2006

FACTS: At around 1:25 oclock in the morning of October 11, 1996, the victim, Joselito Bautista, who was a member of the UP Police Force, took his daughter, Frinzi, who complained of difficulty in breathing, to the UP Health Center. The doctors gave him prescriptions and so he went to BPI Kalayaan to withdraw some money from its Automated Teller Machine (ATM). When Bautista could not withdraw money, he started kicking and pounding the machine which caught the attention of herein petitioner. Bautista said that the machine captured his card and that he did not get the money he badly needed. Manaban said that the PIN entered was incorrect that is why the card was captured. Angered by what Manaban said, Bautista then continued kicking and pounding the machine. The former advised the latter to call the customer service which Bautista did but still kicked the machine. Failing to pacify the victim, petitioner fired a warning shot, and according to him fired the second one hitting, and eventually, killing Bautista. Manaban said that he feared that Bautista would pull his gun first and might kill him so he fired his gun and shot Bautista. The trial court found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide. This decision was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals with modification respect only to the award of loss of earning capacity. This case is then submitted before this court for review.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the justifying circumstance of self-defense is applicable. 2. Whether or not the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and obfuscation are present.

RULINGS:

1. Under paragraph 1, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, the three requisites to prove self-defense as a justifying circumstance which may exempt an accused from criminal liability are: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused or the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault or at least a threat to attack or inflict physical injury upon a person. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not considered unlawful aggression, unless the threat is offensive and menacing, manifestly showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. There must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, which puts the defendants life in real peril. In this case, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. The allegation of Manaban that Bautista was about to draw his gun when he turned his back at Manaban is mere speculation. Aggression presupposes that the person attacked must face a real threat to his life and the peril sought to be avoided is imminent and actual, not imaginary. Absent such actual or imminent peril to ones life or limb, there is nothing to repel and there is no justification for taking the life or inflicting injuries on another. 2. It is undisputed that Manaban called the police to report the shooting incident. When the police arrived, Manaban surrendered his service firearm and voluntarily went with the police to the police station for investigation. Thus, Manaban is entitled to the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

On obfuscation, we find that the facts of the case do not entitle Manaban to such mitigating circumstance. The threat was only in the mind of Manaban and is mere speculation which is not sufficient to produce obfuscation which is mitigating.41 Besides, the threat or danger was not grave or serious considering that Manaban had the advantage over Bautista because Manaban was already pointing his firearm at Bautista when the latter turned his back. The defense failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence the cause that allegedly produced obfuscation.

People of the Philippines vs Nicanor Salome November 28, 2010

In July 1997, Salome entered the house where the 13 year old Sally Idanan was sleeping. He poked a knife against her neck and then after raped her. He threatened Idanan so that Idanan may not report the incident to authorities. But when she found that shes pregnant she reported the incident. Salome offered the defense of alibi in court claiming that he went fishing at the time of the incident. Salome was convicted for rape qualified by the use of a bladed weapon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of dwelling be appreciated against Salome.

HELD: Salomes alibi is not tenable. His conviction is affirmed. The aggravating circumstance of dwelling is appreciated against him. He entered the house of Idanan and in the same place he successfully raped Idanan.

Where such degree of intimidation exists, and the victim is cowed into submission as a result thereof, thereby rendering resistance futile, it would be extremely unreasonable to expect the victim to resist with all her might and strength. And even if some degree of resistance would nevertheless be futile, offering none at all cannot amount to consent to the sexual assault. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation employed in accomplishing it be so great or of such character as could not be resisted; it is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind.

However, pursuant to Republic Act 9346 which suspends the death penalty, his penalty is sustained at reclusion perpetua. People vs Larraaga GF Facts: Larraaga et al were convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape on February 3, 2004; and for serious illegal detention. The first crime is punishable by death and the second is punishable by reclusion perpetua. One of the co-accused, James Andrew Uy, alleged that on July 16, 1997, the date of the commission of the crime, he was only 17 years old and 262 days old. To prove his claim, Uy presented his birth certificate duly certified by the City Civil Registrar and the National Statistics Office.

ISSUE: Whether or not Uy is entitled a mitigating circumstance due to minority? HELD: Yes. Uy was able to prove his claim hence he is entitled to a mitigating circumstance in both crimes charged against him. This is pursuant to Article 68 and 80 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that persons below 18 years of age are entitled to a penalty one degree lower than that imposed by law.