RP12 3

RP 12-3 ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS AND INSTALLATIONS POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
October 1994
Copyright The British Petroleum Company p.l.c.
Copyright The British Petroleum Company p.l.c.

All rights reserved. The information contained in this document is subject to the terms and conditions of the agreement or contract under which the document was supplied to the recipient's organisation. None of the information contained in this document shall be disclosed outside the recipient's own organisation without the prior written permission of Manager, Standards, BP International Limited, unless the terms of such agreement or contract expressly allow.
BP GROUP RECOMMENDED PRACTICES AND SPECIFICATIONS FOR ENGINEERING Issue Date Doc. No.
October 1994
RP 12-3
Latest Amendment Date
Document Title
ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS AND INSTALLATIONS POWER SYSTEM DESIGN

(Replaces BP Engineering CP 17 Pt. 3)
APPLICABILITY Regional Applicability:
International
SCOPE AND PURPOSE This document describes the basic approach to electrical power system design which is recommended for all BP operated sites. It provides guidance only and actual practices may vary to meet requirements of national or local regulations. However, in deviating from the approaches detailed in this document, security of supply factors may be created which will need to be assessed in order to ensure fit for purpose power system design.
AMENDMENTS Amd Date Page(s) Description ___________________________________________________________________
CUSTODIAN (See Quarterly Status List for Contact)
Electrical
Issued by:-
Engineering Practices Group, BP International Limited, Research & Engineering Centre Chertsey Road, Sunbury-on-Thames, Middlesex, TW16 7LN, UNITED KINGDOM Tel: +44 1932 76 4067 Fax: +44 1932 76 4077 Telex: 296041
CONTENTS Section Page FOREWORD .........................................................................................................................iii 1. INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................1 1.1 Scope ...................................................................................................................1 2. SYSTEM PARAMETERS.................................................................................................1 2.1 Voltage...................................................................................................................1 2.2 Frequency ...............................................................................................................2 2.3 Rating ...................................................................................................................2 3. LOADS ...............................................................................................................................3 3.1 Rating and Diversity Factors ...................................................................................3 3.2 Types of Load.........................................................................................................4 4. POWER SUPPLY SOURCES...........................................................................................5 4.1 General ...................................................................................................................5 4.2 Emergency Power Supply Equipment......................................................................8 4.3 Reliability................................................................................................................10 4.4 Primary Substation..................................................................................................10 4.5 Frequency and Voltage Regulation..........................................................................13 4.6 Synchronising .........................................................................................................15 4.7 Power Supplies for Control Systems .......................................................................16 5. POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS..............................................................................17 5.1 General ...................................................................................................................17 5.2 Single Radial...........................................................................................................18 5.3 Double Radial .........................................................................................................18 5.4 Triple Radial ...........................................................................................................19 5.5 Ring Fed Systems....................................................................................................20 5.6 Interconnected or Mesh Systems.............................................................................21 5.7 Power System Control ............................................................................................22 5.8 Electrical Distribution Substations...........................................................................25 6. POWER SYSTEM FAULT CONSIDERATIONS ...........................................................26 6.1 Fault Calculations ...................................................................................................26 6.2 Equipment Fault Current Ratings ............................................................................28 6.3 Methods of Limiting Fault Currents.........................................................................29 6.4 Effects of Faults on Distribution Systems ................................................................31 7. POWER SYSTEM EARTHING .......................................................................................32 7.1 General ...................................................................................................................32 7.2 Un-Earthed (Isolated) Neutral.................................................................................33 7.3 Solidly Earthed Neutrals (For systems below 1000 V).............................................33 7.4 Impedance Earthed Neutrals (For Systems rated 1000 V and above) .......................34 7.5 Generator Earthing .................................................................................................35 7.6 Earthing Resistors...................................................................................................37 8. POWER SYSTEM DESIGN PARAMETERS .................................................................37 8.1 Motor Starting ........................................................................................................37
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8.2 Overvoltages...........................................................................................................38 8.3 Harmonics ..............................................................................................................40 8.4 Power Factor ..........................................................................................................42 9. POWER SYSTEM STUDIES............................................................................................44 9.1 General ...................................................................................................................44 9.2 Conventional Studies ..............................................................................................45 9.3 Special Studies........................................................................................................48 FIGURE 1 (A) ........................................................................................................................49 DOUBLE RADIAL FEED DISTRIBUTION ...............................................................49 FIGURE 1 (B) ........................................................................................................................50 CLOSED RING MAIN DISTRIBUTION ....................................................................50 FIGURE 1 (C) ........................................................................................................................51 OPEN RING MAIN DISTRIBUTION .........................................................................51 APPENDIX A.........................................................................................................................52 DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS....................................................................52 APPENDIX B.........................................................................................................................53 LIST OF REFERENCED DOCUMENTS ....................................................................53
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FOREWORD Introduction to BP Group Recommended Practices and Specifications for Engineering The Introductory Volume contains a series of documents that provide an introduction to the BP Group Recommended Practices and Specifications for Engineering (RPSEs). In particular, the 'General Foreword' sets out the philosophy of the RPSEs. Other documents in the Introductory Volume provide general guidance on using the RPSEs and background information to Engineering Standards in BP. There are also recommendations for specific definitions and requirements. Value of this Recommended Practice This document represents the accumulated practices of the BP Group for ensuring a high degree of plant availability and electrical system integrity within the constraints for cost effective engineering. Application Text in italics is Commentary. Commentary provides background information which supports the requirements of the Recommended Practice, and may discuss alternative options.It also gives guidance on the implementation of any 'Specification' or 'Approval' actions; specific actions are indicated by an asterisk (*) preceding a paragraph number. This document may refer to certain local, national or international regulations but the responsibility to ensure compliance with legislation and any other statutory requirements lies with the user. The user should adapt or supplement this document to ensure compliance for the specific application. Principal Changes from Previous Edition This Recommended Practice is a major revision of BP CP 17 Pt. 3 Power Systems Design which was last issued in April 1986. It has been updated in the Way Forward Style to reflect significant advances in power system design. Feedback and Further Information Users are invited to feed back any comments and to detail experiences in the application of BP RPSE's, to assist in the process of their continuous improvement. For feedback and further information, please contact Standards Group, BP International or the Custodian. See Quarterly Status List for contacts.
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1.
INTRODUCTION 1.1 Scope The BP Group RP 12 series of Recommended Practices specify general requirements for electrical systems, equipment, materials and installations. This document specifies those items which apply generally to power system design for systems with a highest nominal voltage of 36 kV.
It is considered that most of the installations within the sphere of BP operations would be 34.5kV or below. However, it has been found that even for voltages of 132 kV, the same principles would tend to apply for industrial systems.
1.2
Although the following items may form part of power systems in certain activities of the BP Group, their designs are not covered by this document. Where necessary, the relevant international or national standard must be applied to these elements of electrical systems. (i) (ii) (iii) Design of overhead line. Design of large power rectifier plant. Design aspects of electrical systems which are special to mine winding plant, earth-moving equipment, conveying, crushing and associated metalliferous treatment plants. Electrical systems in ships. Electrical systems for subsea installations. Electrical design of installations in commercial, administrative, or domestic premises.
(iv) (v) (vi)
The above exclusions are considered special in nature and/or can be undertaken more efficiently by directly adopting practice which is common in the area where the installation is to be employed.
2.
SYSTEM PARAMETERS 2.1 Voltage The most economical voltages shall be selected for a Power System.
In general the voltages selected should accord with the economical voltage levels for machines which are included in BP Group RP 12-11. In any existing installation, the selection of voltage levels will be subject also to site conditions. The requirement for having the most economic system voltage is
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intended to ensure that an economic appraisal of alternative courses of action is undertaken or has been considered.
The nominal phase to phase voltage for systems where voltages exceed 1000 V, should be selected from those detailed in IEC 38. When the phase to phase voltage is below 1000 V, the appropriate nominal voltage to meet the national standards of the site location should be used. For 'greenfield' sites or offshore locations, where the possibility of interconnection with an outside authority is low, the use of nonstandard voltages below 1000 V (e.g. 660 V) shall be based on economic considerations.
In the UK the nominal LV voltage would be either 415 V or 440 V, phase to phase with a tolerance of 5%. (Notwithstanding current legislation which may suggest that nominal voltages will in future be 380 V 10% or the provisions of the Electricity Supply Regulations 1988 which require voltage tolerances to be within 6% for voltages less than 132 kV). See also 4.5.1 Any deployment of non standard voltage systems should be based upon specific economic studies which take full account of the need to hold spares which may be beyond normal stock levels.
2.2
Frequency The frequency selected for power systems will be either 50 or 60 Hz depending on the national standards of the site location. Where a site is to be remotely located and powered only from on-site generation, the frequency selected should be compatible with the frequency of supply of the nearest local electrical supply source or public utility if it is envisaged that future inter-connection is desirable. Where future interconnection with other sources of electricity supply is not envisaged as being possible or where economic advantages outweigh the benefits in future possible interconnections, the frequency of supply shall be selected on economic considerations and on ease of obtaining suitable equipment.
North Sea experience indicates that selecting 60 Hz frequency tends to offer possible economic advantages and as European equipment (i.e. widely available equipment) suppliers can gear their product range to this frequency and the 'standard' voltages within Europe, such selection becomes more likely.
2.3
Rating (i) Power systems with a voltage in excess of 1000 V should be so designed that the rms. value of the a.c. component of the shortcircuit breaking current of circuit breakers designed to IEC 56 and/or BP Group GS 112-9 should be selected from values readily available from equipment manufacturers.
The selection of 25 kA as a symmetrical short circuit breaking capacity could be found to represent a general economic ceiling to the available fault levels for equipment. Where there will be economic advantage in providing switchgear of higher ratings, e.g. 40 kA, then this would be
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encouraged. In any case in a green field situation, the Short Circuit capability of the installation should be based upon economic grounds. The capability of switchgear should always be proven by test before being accepted into full duty service. Testing would be particularly important where 'enhanced make' fault levels or enhanced d.c. content at break levels are required. The requirements for testing is contained within BP Group GS 112-9 however, at the design stage account should be taken for any need for Type Testing. See also 6.3.1
(ii)
For power systems with a voltage less than 1000V. the rms. value of the a.c. component of the short-circuit breaking current of circuit breakers designed to IEC 947 and/or BP Group GS 112-8 should not exceed 50 kA.
See the commentary for (i) above. Where economically viable the selection of 80 kA or above rated switchgear is encouraged. BP Group GS 112-8 includes testing requirements for LV circuit breakers.
3.
LOADS 3.1 3.1.1 Rating and Diversity Factors Electrical equipment shall be rated to carry continuously the maximum load associated with peak design production with an additional 10% contingency. The ambient conditions at which this rating applies shall be defined in equipment specifications, and shall not be less than 40C maximum air temperature at an altitude not exceeding 1000 m.
A load list would normally identify all process loads and would further identify the power to be absorbed by the mechanical drive. This would be adjusted for efficiency of the electrical drive to arrive at a value of power to be drawn from the electrical system. Aggregated plant loading should be carried out in accordance with 3.1.2. Beyond this estimate only one allowance of contingency should be taken on the thus identified 'after diversity plant load'. Where a total system load is to be estimated, which includes a number of individual switchgear loads estimated in this manner, care should be taken to be assured of only one overall estimate for contingency. The specification of maximum temperature and elevation are chosen in order to be assured that equipment has sufficient capacity for the most arduous of likely conditions, albeit at a 'standard' elevation. However, where the location is such that it is clear that there is no possibility of reaching the 'standard' 40C level and there is economic advantage in relaxing the temperature, the actual maximum and minimum temperatures should be specified. Similarly if the elevation is above 1000m the actual elevation should be specified.
3.1.2
Assessment of maximum load requirements of an installation shall allow for diversity between various loads, drives or plants. Appropriate factors shall consider the likelihood of loads, drives, production or process trains coincidentally requiring peak demands and shall be based on similar installations wherever possible.
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It is considered important that power system loading estimates be based upon absorbed demands for machine loads with appropriate allowances for efficiency and power factor. In addition the effect of diversity should be assessed preferably by using a concept of intermittence or alternatively by the application of well proven diversity factors. In the absence of either of these methods, an average maximum loading expectation may be assessed by adding 50% of the intermittent load (that controlled by level switches or by thermocouples or other control devices) to the continuously running loads. In addition to this aggregated load, an assessment of likely standby load operating should be made. A maximum of standby operation may be obtained by considering boiler outage (insufficient steam for steam turbine drivers) or by a maximum product throughput condition.
3.2
Types of Load All loads shall be presented with clear definition of their types in accordance with the following:-
3.2.1
Basic Information For each identified electrical load, a description of the service should be given together with an indication of whether the device is a machine or a static load.
(i) Dynamic These are electric motors driving rotating equipment. (ii) Static
These are non-moving types of electrical equipment such as lighting, heating, supplies to rectifiers, etc. The bulk of the loads on the majority of BP installations comprise dynamic loads and the proportions of dynamic to static loads are generally in the ratio of 10:1. Where there are machines supplied by Variable Speed Drives, these may exhibit properties similar to those of some static loads viz. constant power demand despite voltage variations. Their contribution to system fault level is limited by the power electronic system, in some cases to zero contribution.
3.2.2
Essential Loads These are loads which are important to the safety of the installation or the operational staff, and which require power to permit a reasonably controlled shutdown in emergency. They shall have a second independent power source and be generally associated with no break supplies. In certain cases, a short supply break may be acceptable if this does not represent a hazard to safety.
BP Group RP 12-5 contains advice concerning the categorisation of power supplies suitable for control systems. The concept of essential loads used here is fairly close to the concept of Class A contained in that RP, however, the loads would not require the level of duplication required for Class A systems. Included in the
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concept of essential power system loads are such devices as Lub. oil pumps for Gas Turbines, ventilation systems, helipad lighting some floodlighting systems, navigational aids, radio systems etc. The term Essential used here was chosen to align with the term Essential as defined in the IEE Recommendations for the Electrical and Electronic Equipment of Mobile and Fixed Offshore Installations. It is noted that some loads which are essential by this definition may require the provision of Emergency Power Supply Facilities in order to meet Legislative Requirements. This is not inconsistent with the definition of Essential Loads used here which is aimed at providing a convenient process for being assured that all such critical loads are covered by the appropriate level of power supply. (See further Section 4.2.1)
3.2.3
Process Sensitive Loads These are loads whose loss would affect continuity of plant operation resulting in loss of revenue but would not result in an unsafe situation arising. Any decision to provide an alternative source of supply for these types of load shall be based on economic considerations.
Included in this category are general lighting systems and process demands. It is sometimes possible, particularly where process loadings are relatively low, to include sufficient into an emergency generator capacity to allow some processes to continue on reduced capacity when main power generators are not available. There are no general rules for this type of provision except to emphasise that application of such loads should not compromise any emergency services. Each case would be project specific.
3.2.4
Non-sensitive Loads Non-sensitive loads are those which do not form an important component of a production or process plant and their disconnection could be borne for relatively long periods with minimal or nuisance value. They usually form a small proportion of the total connected load and may have a single power source.
Typical examples of these loads are the domestic part of accommodation, offices, Workshops, some water injection, some potable water systems etc.
4.
POWER SUPPLY SOURCES 4.1 General The power supply system shall be designed to provide safe and economical operation. The safety aspects should cover both plant and personnel. Economic considerations shall cover capital, maintenance and running costs and include an assessment of the reliability and consequent availability of the system. The cost of improved power systems reliability should be weighed against the progressive potential savings due to decreased loss of production.
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It is expected that for any significant power system design there will have been an economic comparison of alternative arrangements. Larger projects would be expected to initiate a formal safety review and this process would ensure that the basic safety needs of the project would be satisfied. For smaller projects or plant extensions where such a formal review may not be arranged, the designer should nonetheless consider safety aspects relating to the electrical system and produce an outline document which presents these issues for the record.
All negotiations with public utilities shall be the sole responsibility of BP

In as much as the arrangements with Public Authorities will form part of the long term operational environment for the installation, it is considered necessary that the operator (assumed to be BP in the context of this document) is fully aware and has the sole responsibility for the longer term compliance with the requirements arising from any negotiations. Such responsibility should not be delegated to a third party unless the third party has an ongoing operational responsibility. It is considered that Contractors may request information from Public Utilities on behalf of BP in pursuit of the determination of options relating to possible installations or changes to existing installations but that in doing so it is made clear that any formal agreement which arises from the information or investigation will be with the operating company (BP.)
The principal source of electrical supply for any location, subject to the requirements of 4.1.1 to 4.1.3. shall be defined.
The power supply arrangements are fundamental to any operating site and need to feature strongly in the overall project concept. A power supply philosophy document which records the arrangements for power supply and the reasoning associated with any selection is considered highly desirable. A contractor may have part of his workscope associated with an evaluation and selection of power supply arrangements in which case such a presentation is assured. The selection of the power supply arrangements may have formed part of a feasibility (or Statement of Requirements) study which may have been produced by BP in which case the definition of the power supply arrangements would form part of a contractors specification.
4.1.1
Electrical Import from a Public Utility Where the principal source of electrical power is selected to be from a public utility, the supply should be via duplicate feeders. An exception to this may be permitted for economic reasons where low power loads are to be supplied and where a single feeder may be employed.
It would be expected that there could be a cost/benefit statement to justify the use of single feeds. Where the supply is low power and not essential for operations (e.g. Cathodic Protection supplies) the justification is trivial, however single supplies with on site standby generation which will operate to supply full load in the event of a main power supply failure may be an economic alternative to a duel supply arrangement.
Essential loads should always be provided for by on-site power supply equipment.
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See 3.2.2 (commentary.)
Where economically viable, power generation on site may be arranged to peak-lop or otherwise supplement the external power supply. 4.1.2 On-site Generation with no Public Utility Connection Where a site is offshore, or remote from a public utility network, or has a surplus of fuel or process energy, on-site generation will normally be expected as the principal source of power. The on-site power generation arrangements shall be defined taking into account the following factors:(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) The fuel source. The nature of the process energy. The process steam or other heat requirements, if any. The relationship between electric power requirements and the energy sources on any given site.
The number and arrangement of power generating sets should reflect the particular needs of the installation in terms of Availability and Reliability. Where an availability of above 80% is required, a minimum of 2 generating sets, will be required on sites where there is no alternative electricity supply. Under these circumstances, the following criteria should be satisfied:(i) There should be sufficient generation to meet the Maximum Demand when the largest single source of electrical supply is out of service at peak demand times due to maintenance or any other reason. Where more than 2 generators are installed, those loads considered as Process Sensitive (i.e. those loads which must operate to maintain either full or a reduced production) shall be supplied when the largest capacity generator is out of service and the second largest generator is coincidentally shut down due to unforeseen circumstances.
(ii)
All power generation facilities which cannot derive alternative power from another source shall be arranged with Black Start facilities. The Black Start arrangements may involve use of Emergency or In-House diesel generators.
For systems requiring high reliability, the probability of having sufficient power generation for 100% of the load (provided by the main power supply system) in a 12 month period should be 99%. This would normally require an installation of at
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least 3 generators. Under some circumstances this (high) reliability requirement can be relaxed, particularly where the consequences of power supply failure are not severe. In such circumstances only two (or even one) main power generators could be considered. Where multiple power generators are provided there needs to be a philosophy of supply related to normal operation, maintenance shutdown and to failure. Where 3 generators are installed it is reasonable to expect that substantial production could be achieved by a single set remaining available following failure of the second set with the third unavailable.
4.1.3
On-site Generation Run in Parallel with a Public Utility Where on-site generation is selected to be the principal source of power and where a connection to a public utility is available, consideration shall be given to the following options related to connection to the Public Utility:(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) As a standby source of electric power. A means of export of surplus electrical power. A combination of both. As a Black Start Facility
It is expected that the power generation philosophy would consider these options which would be contained within a formal design record. See also 4.1.1 where there may be economic benefit in peak lopping of the Public Utility supply taking advantage of tariff opportunities.
4.2 4.2.1
Emergency Power Supply Equipment Power supplies to Essential loads should be achieved by one or more of the following:(i) (ii) Providing an alternative source of energy, such as batteries. Increasing the amount (or being assured of sufficient sheer numbers) of normal supply generation equipment with an arrangement for duplicate fuel supply which effectively avoids single contingency power outage. Ensuring a number of alternative supply feeds are available to the loads and that the alternatives effectively provide duplication to avoid single contingency power loss. Local Diesel Generation.
(iii)
(iv)
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In general it is expected that Essential loads would receive battery supplies or would be associated with an emergency generator. However where this is impractical, leads to low reliability or is prohibitively expensive, the least cost of the remaining alternatives should normally be adopted. The concept of increased power generation in (ii) above is meant to allow for emergency power supplies to be designed as part of a normal power generation and distribution system. The criteria for design would be that the power source and the distribution system for the Essential loads would maintain sufficiently high security for these safety critical systems. A similar concept is considered appropriate for the concept of having a suitable number of alternative supply feeds detailed in (iii) above.
4.2.2
In the application of 4.2.1 (ii), the power supply to Essential loads shall be designed to remain available in the event of at least two of the installed main power generators being unavailable. The probability of zero interruptions to the Essential load feed busbar over a 12 month period shall be 99% or better. Where necessary a loadshedding scheme shall be installed to secure the supply to the Essential loads. Essential loads shall not form part of the loadshedding arrangements.
The concept of additional power generation being suitable for emergency supply duty will clearly not be possible without there being at least 3 power generation sets available. Where one power generator thus installed is of lower capacity than the system maximum demand and/or the nature of the load can lead to instability, it is expected that a load shedding scheme would be employed to ensure that the Essential loads would be maintained for any fault condition which could leave a single machine on the busbar.
4.2.3
Where increased main generating plant or local standby plant is selected to provide power to Essential loads, it shall be either diesel engine or gas turbine driven generator set(s). Local standby or emergency generator prime movers shall have their own dedicated fuel supply. All prime movers, for main generators (where these are deemed to provide Essential supplies) shall be arranged for two fuel sources with automatic transfer. Power generation for Essential loads shall be rated to have a spare capacity of at least 10%.
These provisions are designed to ensure that a single contingency fault (e.g. fuel supply failure) will not cause power supply loss.
4.2.4
Emergency generator sets shall be capable of starting and running when no alternative source of electrical a.c. power is available i.e., a 'black start' capability. This may be achieved by compressed air starting with air receivers being capable of six engine starts from one air charge, or by battery starting with a similar capability or by both methods.
The requirements for emergency generators are contained in BP Group GS 160-1. In general two starting methods are required. It should be noted that the location of emergency generators should normally be in a non-classified area with supply air derived from a clean source. For offshore installations the location of the
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emergency generator should be on an outside wall which can have louvers open to supply combustion air. Care should be taken to ensure that the exhaust and air intakes are located to avoid problems associated with other adjacent plant or systems.
4.2.5
Emergency generators shall be provided with automatic starting and loading facilities. A simple and reliable method of ensuring that emergency generators can be immediately switched to their pre-defined load shall be arranged. Manual facilities shall also be provided for regular testing purposes. Testing facilities should permit the loading of standby generator sets.
It is preferred that the emergency generator should be capable of running in parallel with the mains supply for testing purposes and for the purposes of transferring load without the need for supply break.
4.3
Reliability For each power supply arrangement a reliability assessment shall be carried out to determine the probability of failure of supply.
In the early stages of design a reliability study may be undertaken as part of the comparison of alternative methods of providing power supplies. Such studies would also be useful in determining the cost of material failures. The undertaking of these studies may form part of the Contractors workscope. Where the Project Team is required to carry out such a study, the terms of reference related to objectives, data gathering, and evaluation shall be clearly specified.
4.4 4.4.1
Primary Substation Generator circuits (other than local emergency generators) and public utility power intakes, should be connected together at a common primary substation, the busbars of which are used as the main load distribution centre. Where generators and public utility power intakes may be located at different points throughout the site, these shall be interconnected.
Thus there will be at least one and, for larger sites more primary substations.
4.4.2
The switchgear for primary substations shall comply with BP Group GS 112-9 (or BP Group GS 112-8 where only LV supplies are involved).
Detailed guidance for HV and LV switchgear is contained in BP Group RP 12-6 and BP Group RP 12-7.
4.4.3
Busbar arrangements shall be selected to be cost effective, operationally flexible and safe. The following technical points shall be taken into account.
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(i)
Operational flexibility to permit loads and power supplies to be effectively connected under scheduled and unscheduled outages of circuits and busbar sections. Minimal switchgear per circuit and simple control and protection. Unscheduled loss of busbar sections shall not shut down the system beyond the level designed and provided for. Scheduled maintenance of busbars shall be possible without system shutdowns beyond those designed and provided for.
(ii) (iii)
(iv)
It may often be found necessary to locate the incoming circuit breakers of a busbar to a location half way along one side of a busbar in order to be more assured that 100% of the load is unlikely to flow in one section of the busbars. The possibility of bus section circuit breaker fault conditions in metal enclosed switchgear which may cause a full switchboard shutdown for remedial repairs should be considered. However, unless there are overriding reasons for the contrary, BP do not design switchboards to cater for this eventuality.
4.4.4
Single busbar arrangements for primary supply substations should be provided subject to the following criteria:(i) (ii) The switchgear shall be indoor metalclad type. The single busbar shall be split into a number of sections by using suitable switchgear. The number of sections of busbars shall be consistent with the acceptable loss of incoming or outgoing circuits under both scheduled and unscheduled loss conditions. Routine busbar maintenance shall not be considered to be necessary or shall be an infrequent occurrence.
(iii)
Where there would be 3 incoming transformer feeders, the busbar would normally be expected to be in 3 parts with feeder circuit breakers arranged on each of the sections of busbar.
4.4.5
Double busbar arrangements shall be provided in installations where outdoor air insulated busbars are installed or where regular busbar maintenance is considered necessary for environmental or pollution reasons. They may also be supplied, where the operational flexibility available from being able to connect incoming power circuits and outgoing load circuits in a variety of ways is considered to be particularly advantageous.
The perceived need for double busbar arrangements for indoor metalclad HV switchgear was strong in early Refinery designs but has virtually disappeared from modern Refinery and other industrial installations. Therefore the use of double busbar arrangements needs to be carefully considered and advantages balanced
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against the considerable additional costs of Building, Switchgear and Protective arrangements. One generally clear case for double busbar arrangements lies in outdoor installations where maintenance work on busbars would be greater.
4.4.6
Ringbars or mesh busbars arrangements shall not be used.

Ring or mesh arrangements are generally difficult to extend and therefore are considered to have limited application. However, this type of arrangement has switchgear saving advantages where the system is unlikely to require modification.
4.4.7
Where the power supply is obtained from a public utility via equipment such as transformers or feeders, the busbars shall be sectionalised to prevent total power system shutdown in the event of unscheduled outage of any busbar section. Coincidental maintenance of a public utility intake transformer shall not be considered.
It is considered that maintenance of incoming transformers and feeds would be low and would be quickly completed. Therefore high expense in order to reduce an already unlikely event is not considered worthwhile.
4.4.8
The maximum number of busbar sections should not exceed the number of individual power sources.
This requirement sets out to avoid over flexibility in a power system which, although useful in contemplation, is of little economic benefit in practice.
4.4.9
The outgoing load circuits shall be connected to busbar sections in such a way as to optimise power flow across busbar section switches commensurate with reliability and operating considerations and shall also permit unscheduled and scheduled busbar section outages with the minimum disturbance to the loads being supplied.
See also the commentary to section 4.4.3
4.4.10
Generators may be connected either directly to the primary power supply busbar or via generator transformers. The type of connection shall be selected depending upon the economics associated with both the generation voltage and the primary supply busbar voltage. Typical arrangements for primary substations for a variety of types of power supply are shown in Figure 1. Primary substations should be located in areas which are not classified as hazardous. The selected location within the site shall:(a) Take account of the ability to distribute power to the onsite loads without unnecessarily high distribution equipment costs. Be adjacent to the generation or public utility intake.
(b)
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(c)
Be suitable for future expansion.
Where it is impossible to locate the primary substation outside of the hazardous areas, arrangements for forced ventilation of the substation shall be made. Air for the ventilation shall be taken from a remote and safe area, the substation shall be equipped with air lock doors, gas detectors (which shall cause immediate deenergisation of all electrical equipment in the substation which is not suitable for a zone 1 environment) and loss of sufficient ventilation and pressurisation shall initiate an alarm condition which, although not causing a trip of the switchgear, shall be used as an operator based time dependent system for the effect of repair. Shutdown shall be initiated should repairs not be possible within an operator defined time scale.
4.5 4.5.1
Frequency and Voltage Regulation The power system design shall be arranged to ensure that the voltage variation (between full load and lightly loaded conditions) experienced at any piece of equipment designated as a load (i.e. not including distribution equipment) shall not exceed 5% of the declared system nominal voltage. Further the power system shall be arranged to be able to withstand without undue stress a transient voltage variation to 80% of nominal for a 10 second period or such longer duration at specific points if necessary. Special consideration shall be given to power frequency overvoltage effects and the need for Power System equipment to withstand higher overvoltages under some circumstances.
This requirement ensures that standard equipment parameters would not be compromised. Where the system voltage deviates beyond the 5% limit, apart from equipment life expectation being eroded, there is a danger of exceeding the hazardous area certification limits for that equipment installed in a hazardous area. This may not actually yield failures or temperatures likely to cause ignition of a vapour which may be present but will increase the likelihood of such occurrences and will infringe the basic safety intention. The Electricity Supply Regulations 1988 requires voltage variations to be within 6%. However, standards for equipment state a 5% tolerance for voltage. Hence the lower limit is specified here. Where power systems which have automatic voltage control can experience significant load rejection (e.g. as may be the case of a Power System supplied by generators must direct-on-line start large machines which subsequently exhibit rapid VAr decrease leaving machines in an overexcited state), significant overvoltage levels may be predicted (120% to 125% of nominal voltage can be predicted). This may require special specification of transformers to avoid problems caused by overfluxing or increased current due to magnetic excitation. Special attention should be paid to voltage and frequency tolerance specifications for generator transformers which may need to match the run up characteristic of the generator. This can require the transformer to be capable of withstanding full rated voltage at 80% of rated frequency.
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See 8.1.1 for motor starting requirements. This can give rise to a voltage depression at motor terminals of 20% which therefore requires that the power system should be able to successfully accept this condition for the starting period. Typical starting periods can range from 1 to 10 seconds depending upon machine and system ratings and machine inertia. Starting times beyond 10 seconds are possible where particularly high inertia loads need to be accelerated (e.g. fans) however, these would constitute a special application and should be treated by exception.
4.5.2
Where the public utility intake of a site is via transformers, these transformers and their voltage regulation equipment shall comply with BP Group GS 112-5.
Detailed guidance on transformer construction and specification is given in BP Group RP 12-9. Where necessary for voltage regulation purposes, the incoming transformers shall be equipped with on load and automatic tap change equipment.
4.5.3
Where there is on-site generation, the generators and their governor and voltage regulation equipment shall comply with BP Group GS 1126 or BP Group GS 160-1.
Detailed guidance on generator application is not featured as a separate part of the BP Group RP 12 series of documents.
4.5.4
Automatic voltage regulation equipment of power systems which have both on-site generation and public utility intakes via transformers shall be designed so that there is no detrimental inter-action.
There are a number of options which can be considered for voltage control. In general the excitation of the power generators can be arranged for zero VAr import/export for the whole site and at the same time the intake transformer controller can be arranged to maintain voltage at a pre set level.
4.5.5
The excitation systems of synchronous motors shall be arranged to ensure no detrimental interactive effects with transformer automatic tap change equipment.
In the case of synchronous motors where it is probable that the synchronous motor would be small in relation to the supply intake capacity, it is probable that the excitation can be arranged to maintain a constant power factor to the machine and the transformer tap change control would be arranged to maintain voltage within pre set levels.
4.5.6
The controls associated with the governors of on-site generation where the site has no public utility connection shall be designed such that generator loading may be automatically shared between the operating sets and that the nominal supply frequency is maintained within the approved tolerance.
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Where governor droop control is employed, there should be an operator in attendance who could take action from time to time to ensure that the system frequency remained within reasonable limits. Such limits should be 1% and the output system frequency time should be within 30 seconds of "standard" time. Statement of these limits for design purposes does not indicate a need to supply an appropriate "standard" clock arrangement although power plants supplying townships or camp areas are encouraged to have this facility. The limit for frequency time may be relaxed for small power plants, and those where frequency time is considered unimportant. (e.g. Where there are no time signals reliant upon mains frequency.) For unmanned power plants or for those where constant operator intervention would be undesirable, the system frequency may be controlled by an isochronous controller designed to provide overall frequency and generator loadings within prescribed limits.
4.5.7
The controls associated with the governors of on-site generation at a site with a public utility connection shall be designed for parallel operation with the public utility and shall incorporate the protection arrangements which shall ensure that under public utility collapse ( or unacceptable major disturbance), the site will retain a defined loading condition. The arrangement shall also incorporate the means for independent operation.
Where a facility is interconnected with a Public Utility, the control of the power system frequency must be under the control of the Public Utility. Therefore only defined load governor settings or droop load sharing control systems are possible. However, such interconnection is always subject to disconnection under automatic protection system operation which will leave the power generators supplying the site load. Under these conditions, whatever the original generator control arrangements, the generators must revert to independent load sharing control.
4.6 4.6.1
Synchronising Synchronising and/or check synchronising equipment shall be provided wherever more than one source of power may be operated in parallel with another. A synchronising philosophy shall be prepared.
See also sections 4.6.3 and 4.6.4. Because there can be many alternative ways of achieving a reasonable synchronising arrangement, it is expected that there would be prepared a synchronising/check synchronising philosophy (or design document) for every installation which will define the particular arrangements.
4.6.2
Manual synchronising arrangements shall always be provided for the incoming power generator circuit breakers. This shall comprise voltmeters and a synchroscope to show the voltage and frequency differences between the two systems that need to be paralleled. A check synchronising relay should be utilised to prevent operator maloperation but in order to allow closing a power source on to a dead system, as is required under black start conditions, the check synchronising relay shall have a means of manual or automatic override.
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Wherever possible and economically feasible, the manual synchronising system supplied shall also include automatic synchronising applied to the generator controls. Manual synchronising facilities should also be applied to any primary switchgear bus section circuit breaker and to circuit breakers incoming to the primary switchboard which can make a parallel connection with other sources.
4.6.3
Synchronising or check synchronising facilities shall be fitted to busbar section and bus coupler circuit breakers where it is possible to run the two systems feeding either section of a busbar completely segregated from the other. The number of circuit breakers provided with synchronising or check synchronising facilities should be kept to a minimum. A similar logic shall be applied to public utility intake circuits. Alternatively, circuit breaker interlocking schemes shall be installed to preclude the possibility of paralleling two sources of power where synchronising facilities are excluded.
Notwithstanding the provisions of 4.6.4, it is not expected that there would be a need to include synchronising or check synchronising facilities on system voltage levels more than two levels removed from the power generation busbar where the power system is operated with bus sections normally closed. However, this is a general rule and should the system be commonly operated with open bus sections for significant periods and there is little central system control or information dissemination, the arrangement should be reviewed.
4.6.4
Synchronising facilities shall be provided at the primary power supply voltage and should be avoided at other voltages by use of appropriate circuit breaker interlocking.
The form of interlocking should avoid the need for break-before-make action unless absolutely necessary. This may need to be associated with upstream bus section circuit breakers and incoming circuit breakers to the upstream switchboard. See 4.6.3 (commentary) for provisions should distances be too great for the economic use of interlocking.
4.7
Power Supplies for Control Systems Detailed guidance on this subject is given in BP Group RP 12-5. d.c. power supplies for control systems shall comply with BP Group GS 112-11 and a.c. power supplies shall comply with BP Group GS 11210.
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5.
POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS 5.1 5.1.1 General The distribution network shall be designed to carry continuously at least 110% of the Maximum Demand associated with peak design production at the maximum ambient conditions.
The requirement for 110% capacity is considered to be applicable to all components within the distribution system including transformer capacity. It does not include capacity of equipment considered to constitute a load to the power system e.g. Induction Machines, which should be rated as close as possible to actual process demands. Refer also to the commentary to Section 3.1.1. Switchboards should be supplied with a degree of spares and room for expansion. Further details may be found in BP Group RP 12-6 and 7.
5.1.2
Where required the reliability associated with any part of the system shall be assessed and presented in qualitative and quantitative terms.
In general the design of the power system distribution should be based upon qualitative requirements which include assessments for meeting power supply continuity in the event of maintenance and in the event of failure. Since electrical distribution systems are inherently reliable, the design requirements are commonly based upon the need to disconnect distribution electrical equipment to carry out routine maintenance and at the same time keep power supplies available for operating plant. However, under some circumstances the need to assess the electrical reliability may arise (perhaps as part of an overall assessment of plant failure but possibly as part of a comparison of alternative supplies for new plant). Under these circumstances, the Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) and the Mean Time To Repair (MTTR), concerning power system failure at any particular switchboard would be required. In addition it is recommended that the quantitative statement indicate the probability of failure occurring over a particular timeframe. (e.g. Provide a value and definition of the probability of zero failures over a 12 month period). See also sections 4.1.2 (commentary), 4.2.2 and 4.3.
5.1.3
The distribution system shall be designed using one of the basic arrangements further outlined in 5.2 through 5.6 and incorporating the control features of 5.7. The system designed shall be described in a design philosophy document.
It is considered that the design features contained in sections 5.2 through 5.6 would be suitable for all of the industrial power systems likely to be required by BP. However, should an alternative philosophy be available, it should be compared with a "standard" double radial system in terms of operation, reliability, maintainability and cost. The depictions in the drawings which illustrate the texts of 5.2 and 5.5 are fairly conventional in that Contactors are employed only for motor feeders. Under some
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circumstances Contactors can prove an economic choice for transformer or Switchboard feeders. The depictions are for an extensive installation typical of Refinery or other large system. Offshore systems may be considered as similar but without the higher voltage level and interconnections to Public Utility.
5.2 5.2.1
Single Radial These should be used to provide power to non essential electrical loads, those where alternative sources of energy are available such as standby generating plant or those process loads for which a lower availability can be accepted.
Where minimum facilities engineering is required and the process plant can be (or will regularly be) switched off, then single radial systems may be contemplated to satisfy process demands. It is considered that maintenance of electrical systems could be scheduled for normal process plant shutdown times and the reliability of electrical distribution systems is generally much better than required by the process system.
5.2.2
Each component of the single radial circuit shall be capable of supplying 110% of the required electrical load. Transformers or other plant which includes forced cooling equipment shall not rely entirely on the forced cooling arrangements to obtain the necessary rating.
Refer to the commentary to Section 3.1.1 for more detail on load estimation. Where the loading is of a cyclical nature and the forced cooling would not be expected to operate for more than 2 hours in any 12 hour period, then capacities based upon forced cooling can be considered. However, where this is the case, a cooling system failure alarm shall be provided.
5.3 5.3.1
Double Radial Essential and Process Sensitive loads should be supplied by two or more identically rated radial systems.
Figure 1(a) details a double radial system of feed.
5.3.2
In double radial systems, each circuit shall be capable of carrying a 110% of the Maximum Demand and all busbars shall include bus section switchgear. They shall be arranged to ensure that unscheduled outage of any component of the circuit would not result in loss of power supply after the faulty equipment has been disconnected from the system.
See section 3.1.1 for detail on load estimation. Exceptions to the requirement for all supplies to be maintained may be made in the following cases:-
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(a)
For bus section circuit breaker faults. These may sometimes cause damage which may require complete switchboard shutdown. However, the occurrence of such faults is sufficiently rare as to be neglected. Where there may be some non-essential loads supplied from a double radial system. These may receive a single radial supply from a double radial system and therefore would not receive a supply in the event of some forms of double radial system outage.
(b)
5.3.3
Double radially fed systems should generally be operated in parallel with all bus-section switches closed.
It is considered that the advantage of continuity of supply in the event of relatively light fault conditions which is offered by closed bus section systems outweighs the disadvantages of increased fault disturbance for heavy fault conditions. It is also more inherently safe since the switchgear fault conditions are based upon the worst possible supply condition. However, see also section 5.3.4.
5.3.4
Where switchgear fault levels are found to be above the values outlined in 2.3, attention shall be given to operating with bus-section breakers open as opposed to purchasing higher fault level switchgear. Where an open bus-section breaker philosophy is being given attention, the need to restore rapidly the supplies to drives shall determine whether automatic closure of bus section circuit breaker(s) is to be employed.
Switchgear fault levels could be readily reduced by increasing the impedance of incoming transformers. (Where new transformers will be purchased.) However, increasing the impedance of transformers increases the voltage regulation between light and full load. There is therefore a trade-off between fault duty and normal voltage regulation.
See 5.7 for automatic transfer schemes. 5.4 5.4.1 Triple Radial Critical and essential loads may be alternatively supplied by triple identically rated radial systems. These systems are preferred to double radial systems wherever there is an overall total cost advantage.
A triple radial system comprises three feeders and three feeder transformers to provide supply to a distribution switchboard.
5.4.2
Each circuit of triple fed radial systems shall be capable of providing at least 55% of the Maximum Demand and all busbars shall be split into at least three sections with two bus-section switches.
This will allow for the loss of any one of the three circuits, leaving the two healthy circuits still capable of providing 110% of the Maximum Demand.
5.4.3
Triple radial systems shall be provided where the power flow is relatively large. They shall generally be operated with only two circuits
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in parallel to reduce switchgear fault levels. The incoming circuit breaker on the third identically rated feeder shall be left open and automatically reclosed in order to restore rapidly full supplies to the load.
See 5.7 for automatic transfer schemes. Switchgear fault duty shall be based upon 2 of the 3 transformer incomers connected. An electrical interlock scheme shall be arranged to ensure that fault duties shall not be exceeded.
5.5 5.5.1
Ring Fed Systems Power may be distributed from a primary or central substation to a number of subsidiary load centres by using two primary cable feeds connected in a ring emerging from the source busbar and controlled by circuit breakers. Ring type distribution systems should be used only if the lower reliability of supply to the load supplied can be accepted.
Figures 1(b) and (c) details ring systems of feed. These systems have lower reliability than double radial systems but can offer a cost optimal choice where distances between substations is large. The cost benefits should be weighed against the lower reliability for those cases where ring systems are contemplated. It is expected that there would be a design philosophy document which would provide the reasoning leading to acceptance of the ring system of feeding. This reasoning could be qualitative in nature or could contain a cost/benefit analysis should the question of reduced reliability be of concern.
5.5.2
Ring fed systems should normally duplicate only the primary cables to the load substation. They may however, duplicate the load substation transformers and the low voltage busbar by providing a low-voltage or secondary bus section breaker.
Duplication of downstream equipment would be dependent upon the need to maintain electrical equipment and retain electrical feeds to the downstream substation.
5.5.3
Where the ring feed is operated closed, intermediate primary circuit breakers, including unit feeder protection, shall be provided at all vital or essential load centres on the ring, thereby ensuring fault clearance of only the unhealthy section of the ring. The whole of the ring circuit shall be fully rated to be capable of supplying 110% of the Maximum Demand at all substations.
It is not proposed that economy should be made by arranging that the ring feeders be 'tapered'.
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Essential or critical loads may be supplied by ring systems if they are operated closed. Their choice shall be based on the comparative reliability and cost as compared to the duplicate radial systems. Refer to Section 3.1.1 for detail on load estimation.
5.5.4
Ring fed systems which are operated open need not include circuit breakers on the ring.
Fault clearance would be achieved at the source substation and in that event power would be lost to all loads fed between the source and the open point on the ring.
In order that a faulty section of the primary ring may be disconnected and repaired without power loss during the whole of the repair period, the ring shall include isolating means at every load substation. These ring isolators may be of the off-circuit or on-load type dependent on availability, cost, and the need for rapid reconnection of load.
The need for fault location shall be considered in order to assist rapid re-connection of healthy components and avoid possible re-application of the fault.
Open operated ring fed systems shall be permitted only to supply nonsensitive loads.
The choice of an open ring system shall consider the comparative reliability and cost of a single radially fed systems with a non automatic standby power supply backup.
The rating of each section of open operated rings shall be capable of providing 110% of the Maximum Demand of the ring taken as a whole.
It is not proposed that economy should be made by arranging that the ring feeders be 'tapered'. It is recognised that manual initiated switching will be necessary before loads can be applied to each of the normally operating legs of the ring. Therefore, under some circumstances it may be possible to ensure that only a known amount of load is transferred to a ring feeder. Where economically desirable and under such known and flexible loading conditions, the requirement for the first sections of the ring to carry the Maximum Demand of the whole ring may be relaxed.
5.6
Interconnected or Mesh Systems The distribution of electrical power by solidly interconnected systems should be undertaken only upon specific design justification which confirms reliability, operation and safety.
Mesh connected schemes considered for HV systems are permissible providing protection arrangements are suitable for the process plant needs and providing that the fault duties of switchgear are not compromised. Solidly interconnected mesh systems for LV are rarely found in industrial settings and can be difficult to predict in terms of protection system operation and level of
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disturbance during a fault condition. For this reason and because they would present a point of non-standardisation if used in hazardous areas they are to be avoided.
5.7 5.7.1
Power System Control The operational control of the power system shall be described in a prepared control philosophy document. The operator actions and his access to power system information shall be defined and the level of Central Control Room operator control shall be defined.
It is expected that for power systems having multiple machines, the Central Control Room operator would have control of the generation functions:(a) (b) (c) (d) Stop/Start. Synchronising. Generator Loading (i.e. Speed Control). Generator Excitation (Possibly AVR Setting only).
Additionally it is expected that the Central Control Room Operator would have control of:(a) (b) (c) Primary Substation Circuit Breakers. Emergency Generator Stop/Start/Synchronisation (where significant). Some downstream circuit breakers.
See 5.7.2 for method of information and control. It is recommended that the Central Control Room Operator have available information and control of the entire power system by the means described. However, it is recognised that in general there would need to be some limitations placed upon the ability of the power system operator to individually control process loads.
5.7.2
The power system shall utilise protection relays which incorporate the means for indication and control via a Hiway connection. The form and performance of the dual function protection relay system shall detail;(a) (b) Speed of response for the control functions. Degree of programmable automation of power system operation. Range of protection functions offered in the relay types proposed. System architecture.
(c)
(d)
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(e) (f) (g)
Central Operator Information and Control Screens. Proposed alarm and information conditions. Interface arrangements with process control systems.
The dual function protection and information/control relay should be arranged with a clear and effective method for ensuring that protection settings cannot be changed by the action of control system software. Sole reliance of a password embedded in the high level software system is not considered sufficient for this purpose and a relay located function is generally expected. It is expected that in the longer term the availability of the information offered and the availability of the control offered by such dual function relays will provide benefit to BP operations. Therefore relaxing the requirement for new installations to be equipped with these relays should be specific and based upon the assertions:(a) and (b) That the alternative system indeed yields a significant cost saving. That the site will never need to gather data and have such control
It is recognised that under some circumstances only the dual function relays may be employed with a later intent to effect operator control via Hiway connections.
5.7.3
Within switchboards, automatic transfer schemes shall be provided where there is a need to obtain a reliability level consistent with two or more sources of supply (and the scheme is not arranged as a parallel operating arrangement). Their use shall be economically justified when compared against other ways of providing duplication of power sources, and shall be limited to installations where there is a need to reduce switchgear short circuit levels either for reasons of cost or nonavailability of switchgear with sufficiently high rating. All schemes shall include only load transfers that never parallel the preferred and emergency sources. Load transfer schemes may use circuit breakers, or on load transfer switches/contactors. Where automatic transfer schemes are provided, the power system design shall be arranged to successfully transfer the load without causing a general system failure.
Other methods of ensuring duplication of supply include:(a) (b) Feeding alternative loads from different switchboards. Providing a parallel operating arrangement of the incomers.
Where manual transfer is to be arranged (perhaps in order to undertake maintenance on the presently employed incomer) and it is undesirable to suffer a break-before-make operation, the manual intervention may be considered as a make-before-break arrangement which automatically disconnects the transferring (from) circuit upon successful energisation of the transferring (to) circuit.
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5.7.4
Load transfer schemes may be applied to either static loads or induction motor loads or a combination of the two. They shall not be used where synchronous motor loads are supplied. The load transfer shall be arranged so that the residual voltage of induction motors has decayed to less than 25% of the rated source voltage before the transfer is initiated. The rate of residual voltage decay shall be calculated and the motor's ability to withstand the out-of-phase reclosure shall be checked.
The need to ensure that the induction motor flux has decayed arises form the need to ensure that both switchgear and machine system are not over stressed upon direct-on-line re energisation. These factors should be addressed when considering the speed of operation of a transfer scheme. in general 1 second should be adequate for all 415 V machines and 1.8 seconds should be selected for HV machines up to 1000 kW.
5.7.5
Induction motors which are controlled by circuit breakers, or contactors of the mechanically latched type shall include a time delay under voltage relay. This relaying shall be set to trip the controller under those power system under voltage conditions from which recovery would be otherwise not possible. Transfer schemes associated with switchgear supplying these types of induction motor controllers shall be designed either to be capable of re accelerating the motors if the transfer takes place within the motor under voltage tripping time, or time delaying the transfer to be in excess of the motor under voltage tripping time.
The selection of under voltage trip time should be confirmed by power system studies which would be aimed at ensuring reasonable power system recovery following a fault. An infinite setting would indicate that the machine would be able to accelerate to operating level whenever the voltage recovers from total collapse and considering that there could be a number of such latched machines on the circuit. In general a setting of say 2 seconds where the voltage has fallen below 75% may be appropriate.
5.7.6
Motors which are controlled by unlatched a.c. contactors will inherently disconnect from the supply on loss of voltage. Where it is required to restore power to these types of motor drives the auto transfer schemes shall be supplemented by contactor control schemes which restart motors individually or in groups after a requisite time delay.
It is expected that the re-acceleration scheme would be achieved by relays individually associated with each motor starter.
5.7.7
Load transfer schemes for the start up, run up and loading of a standby generator on to a busbar normally fed from a preferred a.c. source shall be initiated by time delayed under voltage relaying which shall trip the a.c. source and auto-start up the standby generator.
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The auto start of the emergency (or standby) generator could be initiated before disconnection of the normal supply in order to provide the main power system greater chance of recovery (i.e. taking advantage of the finite time it takes a standby generator to start). It is expected that start initiation would be based upon main power system collapse below 75% for say 2 seconds and that trip of the main supply and energisation of the emergency supply would be initiated upon 85% voltage at system frequency for the incoming set. (NB energisation would need to be time delayed from the trip signal to allow flux decay of the machines which may have been hitherto in operation).
5.7.8
Power system re-acceleration and restart studies to determine the most technically acceptable and cost effective solution shall be carried out for each load transfer scheme considered.
The studies should provide confirmation of under voltage relay settings and define the fault conditions which give rise to the conclusions. BP approval is considered necessary to ensure that process and other wider system issues have been considered (e.g. System fault conditions which may be remote from the system under immediate calculation).
5.8
Electrical Distribution Substations

The requirements for substations which are detailed as part of Section 5.8 are generally based upon Shore installations. Substation designs for Offshore installations should firstly consider project specific parameters which will include module construction philosophy, economic layout factors and safety considerations. Other than the project specific factors, Offshore installations can be considered as needing to satisfy subsequent clauses of Sections 5.8.1 and 5.8.2.
5.8.1
All substations shall be located as close as possible to the electrical centre of the load being supplied. They should normally be connected to their incoming supplies by cables. The primary and secondary voltage switchgear and auxiliaries shall be installed in permanent rooms or buildings which if located in areas classified as potentially hazardous (Zone 1 or Zone 2) shall be ventilated in such a manner (type of protection p), to permit the use of standard industrial equipment.
For rooms located in areas classified as Zone 2, standard industrial equipment may be used, providing there is no opening from the building into the classified area or if there is such an opening, the opening has been assessed to determine that a flammable atmosphere will not enter the room. Smaller non essential process switchgear may be located outdoors or equipped with a shelter and if situated in an area classified as hazardous, the equipment shall be selected in accordance with BP Group RP 12-2.
5.8.2
Transformers shall be located as close as possible to the secondary switchgear.
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This requirement is designed to keep the more expensive and high capacity electrical connections as short as possible.
5.8.3
Substation building design shall ensure that no possibility exists for ingress of surface water or for any hydrocarbon which may migrate along the sheath of cables which enter the Substation.
Building design requirements are contained in BP Group RP 4-4. The requirements consider that there would always be a possibility for hydrocarbon contamination to enter buildings via rainwater, a rising water table or by finding a way through the sheath of buried cables and travelling beneath the cable sheath and into the switch room. By raising the elevation of the lowest point of a substation well beyond the exterior grade level, the surface and sub-surface water ingress is eliminated. The provision of a cable basement is a more effective remedy because there would then be no possibility for hydrocarbon vapour (which may have been given off from contaminated water present in an entry duct albeit not reaching floor level) from entering the substation.
6.
POWER SYSTEM FAULT CONSIDERATIONS 6.1 6.1.1 Fault Calculations The fault currents that flow as a result of short circuits should be calculated at each system voltage for both three phase and phase to earth fault conditions. These calculated currents shall be used to select suitably rated switchgear and to allow the selection and setting of protective devices to ensure that successful discriminatory fault clearance is achieved.
It is expected that in order to be assured of reasonable accuracy, the study should be based upon a suitable computer calculation package. The contribution of induction motors should be included in the study, preferably by direct dynamic modelling and the studies should include break and make points for the fault level. (See also section 6.1.3) It is important to ensure that at design stage, tolerances for equipment should be considered and also that a design margin is allowed to account for later additions. The allowance is best arranged by undertaking the studies showing later additional loads on stream and represented by induction motors.
6.1.2
The voltage disturbance sustained during the faults and after fault clearance should also be ascertained to ensure that transient disturbances do not result in loss of supplies due to low voltages or over stressing of plant insulation due to high voltages.
In assessing the transient performance of the system, accurate modelling of any AVR action is required. It would also be necessary to model the governor system of any rotating power generators.
6.1.3
The calculation of fault currents shall include the fault current contributions from generators and from synchronous and induction
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motors. Both the a.c. symmetrical and d.c. asymmetrical components of fault currents should be calculated at all system voltages. Public utility fault infeeds should be obtained from the public utility concerned, and they shall exclude any decrement associated with fault duration, though maximum and minimum values consistent with annual load cycles and anticipating utilities systems switching conditions should be obtained.
The fault levels of utility company networks is subject to variation due to the amount of generation plant which they may have connected and also could be subject to variation due to the manner in which the public utility operates the system (e.g. Line outages will affect fault levels as will open busbar systems.
6.1.4
Three phase balanced fault current calculations should be carried out to obtain prospective circuit breaker duties and should include:(i) Asymmetric make capacity Expressed in peak amperes and calculated half a cycle after fault inception. Both a.c. and d.c. current decrements shall be included for the half cycle. Asymmetric break capability Expressed in rms. amperes calculated at a time at which the breaker contacts are expected to part and allowing a maximum of 10 ms for instantaneous type protection operation. Both a.c. and d.c. decrements shall be included for the selected time. Symmetrical break capability Expressed in rms. amperes calculated at a time as defined in item (ii) above. This assumes nil d.c. current component and shall allow for a.c. decrement for the selected time.
(ii)
(iii)
6.1.5
On systems where the earth fault currents are limited by neutral earthing equipment, the currents may be assumed to include no decrement and shall be considered constant whatever the level of bonding between the conductor and the faulted phase. Both the a.c. and d.c. components of motor fault current contributions should be calculated and included in calculation of prospective fault currents.
At the instant of fault inception the a.c. peak symmetrical component and the d.c. component shall be taken to be identical. Both values shall be taken as the peak direct-on-line starting current, this being dictated by the motor locked rotor reactance. Both these currents shall be taken to decay exponentially with time using a.c. and d.c. short circuit time constants respectively. The a.c. time constant should be determined by using the ratio of the locked rotor reactance and the standstill rotor resistance. The d.c. time constant should be determined by using the locked rotor reactance and the stator resistance.
6.1.6
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Where faults are not directly on the motor terminals, these time constants would be modified (preferably by the integrated computer programme) to take account of external impedances to the point of fault.
6.1.7
The calculation of individual fault current contributions should be carried out for individual motors of significant ratings on the power system. All other motors on the system may be treated as a number of typical equivalent motors of total rating equal to the connected rotating loads, at different locations. The ratings of these equivalent motors shall be selected to be consistent with the actual drives at a given location.
Generally motors with ratings 1000 kW or greater should be represented as individual machines. However, where there are multiples of these on a single busbar, they too may be represented by lumped parameters.
6.1.8
Any computer based model used for calculation shall be of a reputable type with software support and validation checks available.
It is equally important that where system stability models are examined, the specific model for the parameters used has validity. (e.g. Where machine AVRs and Governors are used on particular machines, factory and site test arrangements should be modelled and the predicted and actual behaviour of the machine or system can then be compared with the model). In this manner some form of assurance can be obtained for the system studied. Where it is necessary for BP to retain the results for future use or in support of later power system studies to be carried out in support of operations, the software used should be IPSA or should be IPSA compatible. See also section 9.2.2.
6.2 6.2.1
Equipment Fault Current Ratings The power distribution system should be designed to provide the required security and quality of supply with prospective fault levels within the capability of commonly available switchgear (See 2.3). All equipment shall be capable of withstanding the maximum short circuit requirements when operating in accordance with 5.1.1.
Security of supply generally is a subjective judgement. See also 5.1.2 (commentary). However, a quantitative assessment of security can be considered. See 4.2.2. Quality of supply is reflected by tolerances of measured quantities, (see 4.5.1) and by the severity of expected disturbances (see 8.1 and 8.2).
6.2.2
All switchgear and distribution equipment on the power system shall be capable of carrying the prospective symmetrical fault currents for a specified short time duration of 1 or 3 seconds without deleterious effect. The choice between 1 and 3 second durations shall be dictated by availability, economics and fault current protection clearing times.
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The backup fault current protection clearing times shall always be less than the equipment short time current rating.
Generally 3 second short time ratings for switchgear are preferred to avoid the necessity for rapid protection. Where switchgear of 0.6 second short circuit withstand time is offered, the protection arrangements should be reviewed to ensure that the switchgear will be fully protected.
6.2.3
The closure of switchgear on to a short circuit fault or other possible out of sequence condition shall not result in shock load damage to healthy parts of the system as a result of peak asymmetrical make currents flowing. The selection of circuit breakers shall be dependent on the make and break duty which the breaker is required to cater for. Switching devices that may be closed on to a fault shall have the necessary fault making capability. Where plant is protected by fault current limiting HRC type fuses, the fuse characteristic may be taken into account in assessing the short circuit duty of the plant.
It is expected that where fuse cut off action is accounted, there would be presented appropriate calculations and fuse data to demonstrate the validity of the fault duty.
6.2.4
6.2.5
6.3 6.3.1
Methods of Limiting Fault Currents Where the power system design indicates prospective short circuit requirements exceeding the proposed circuit breaker ratings, the following alternatives should be considered:(i) Increase the system reactances, provided this causes no other technical or commercial problem. Change the operating mode by operating with certain breakers open and provide auto transfer facilities to reinstate the supply security and quality levels. Purchase switchgear and equipment to provide for the higher short circuit levels if these are available. Provide fault current limiting devices other than fuses. Carry out any combination of the alternatives listed in items (i) to (iv) above.
(ii)
(iii)
(iv) (v)
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See also 2.3
6.3.2
The selection of the most appropriate of the alternatives (i) to (v) given in 6.3.1 shall be based on least cost.
Saturable reactors (used as resonant links) offer elegant methods for short circuit limitation for HV systems and do not suffer from attendant regulation problems , however, their expense generally precludes their use. The use of Is limiters should be avoided for new installations but sometimes find useful application where existing systems will be expanded or interconnected with new systems.
6.3.3
Where fault limiting (series) reactors are used to increase the reactance between the source and potential fault location, these shall comply with BP Group GS 112-5.
Detailed guidance is given in BP Group RP 12-9.
6.3.4
Where fault limiting reactors are deemed necessary, they should be installed between busbar sections, thereby limiting voltage profile problems under normal operating conditions.
It is recognised that interconnection of reactors in bus sections may not be a cost optimum arrangement. Therefore alternative arrangements would be acceptable provided that the alternative of connection between the bus section switch has been considered.
6.3.5
The impedance of series reactors shall be chosen to limit the fault current passed through the reactor to a level which ensures that total calculated fault levels on either side of the reactor are no greater than 90% of the selected plant short circuit ratings. The reactors themselves may be single or three phase, dependent on space and cost considerations. They shall have a thermal ability to carry the rated short circuit symmetrical current for at least 2 seconds.
The time rating of the reactor would be dependent upon the protection arrangements.
6.3.6
The voltage drop through series reactors under the motor start, restart or re acceleration conditions shall be checked to ascertain that no unacceptable transient under voltage occurs. Where series reactors are installed between two power systems, the transient stability of the generator sets should feature in power systems studies.
See also 10.2
6.3.7
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6.4
Effects of Faults on Distribution Systems The effects of three phase fault applications and clearances should be investigated for the following conditions:(i) Possible loss of synchronism between parallel running synchronous machines. This would only be likely for dissimilar machines or for identical machines connected to the fault which are not electrically symmetrical.
See also 9.2.4
(ii)
The possibility of motor contactors dropping out, (due to low voltage) and the consequential need to re-start the motors, either manually or automatically.
Three phase faults on the system (considering zero fault impedance) will depress the voltage at the point of fault and downstream of the fault to approximately zero. All locations between the source of fault current and the fault will experience reduced voltages. This condition will apply until the faulty section has been cleared at which stage voltages will be rapidly restored. Such studies would form part of the conventional study series described in 9.2.1.
(iii)
Possible extinction of certain discharge lamps and the time for re-ignition.
The provision of emergency lighting systems may avoid the need to feature this as discharge lighting may be limited to those areas where the outage time may not be important. (e.g. Street lighting).
(iv)
Loss of electronic and control equipment supplies resulting in maloperation.
The provision of d.c. or 'no break' supplies (possibly using UPS equipment) for vital loads may avoid the need to feature this.
(v)
The extent of overvoltage on the system components resulting from fault clearance.
This could cause unacceptable transient recovery voltages occurring for short periods which may have a destructive effect on electrical insulation. However, it is recognised that many analysis programmes are based upon linear theory and may not account for saturation effects which may preclude overvoltages occurring but could result in an electrical protection relay trip.
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7.
POWER SYSTEM EARTHING 7.1 General Guidance on the earthing of equipment and systems is detailed in BP Group RP 12-16. The following clauses relate only to neutral earthing of power systems.
There is a statutory requirement to conform with the Electricity Supply Regulations 1988 and with the Electricity at Work Regulations 1989.
7.1.1
The earthing of each part of a power system operating at a specific voltage shall be considered individually. Where such systems are required to be earthed solidly, or via an impedance, the neutrals should be connected to a common plant earthing system. This system shall have a resistance to earth that ensures operation of protective devices in the various circuits in accordance with BP Group RP 12-16, and shall not be in excess of 4 Ohms. If connected to a Public Utility supply HV system earth, the combined earth resistance of the Public Utility earth and this earthing system shall be less than 1 Ohm.
The selection of 4 Ohms as power system resistance to earth is relatively arbitrary and therefore this value may vary depending upon the basic design and safety requirements (See 7.1.4). However, the possibility of earthing system resistance variation due to varying soil conditions through time needs to be considered also. The requirement for 1 Ohm resistance of a combined Public Utility HV system earth and the interconnected earth for solidly earthed neutrals arises from the need to minimise neutral potentials under Public Utility HV earth fault conditions. The requirement for an interconnected value of less than 1 Ohm is specified in the Electrically at Work Regulations 1988. A 1 Ohm earthing resistance is not considered mandatory where HV systems and LV systems are both owned and operated by BP and are earth bonded together with negligible probability of HV faults giving rise to LV system neutral potential rise with respect to 'true' earth. (Where true earth represents the potential of the earths core. This may be transferred to structures if these are not bonded to the site earthing system).
7.1.2
The neutral connections for earthing equipment shall be provided at generators, transformers or both, which have their neutral brought out, and which are the source of power to the distribution system. Where such power sources are delta connected, and do not have neutrals brought out, neutral earthing may be carried out at other star connected power transformers on the system or by the provision of earthing transformers.
It is intended that power systems will be earthed. However, under some circumstances BP would consider operating unearthed power systems. See 7.2.
7.1.3
Power systems operating at a common voltage which may be normally or abnormally run unparalleled shall have a neutral earthing connection
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facility provided for each system. The neutral earthing system shall be designed to ensure that there is no possibility of inadvertently operating a system with an isolated neutral.
Under some circumstances, an alarm for the condition of power system in operation without neutral earthing should be satisfactory. Typical of such circumstances is the condition whereby a single earthed neutral is desirable (perhaps in order to limit circulating currents between power generators) and there would be a complex and difficult automatic system for earthing switching in the event of power system disconnection.
7.1.4
All plant earthing system designs shall be subject to approval by BP. The potential between immediate metalwork and a 'true earth' (which may be transferred to the immediate locale typically by telephone services) shall be calculated for all representative single phase to earth conditions. The calculations shall be presented as support to the earthing system design.
The earthing arrangements of a site are a fundamental feature of safety and it is therefore necessary that BP, where acting as an operator is assured that no dangerous potentials can be obtained. It is important that touch potentials be less than 430 V under any single phase-earth fault where there is overcurrent protection arranged to de-energise the live conductor. It is common for Control Systems to demand 'clean' or 'reference' earth points which are associated with earthing electrodes not connected to the general site earthing system. This practice can give rise to dangerous situations under HV system faults and should be avoided.
7.2 * 7.2.1
Un-Earthed (Isolated) Neutral An un-earthed or isolated neutral system shall be used only subject to approval by BP.
Such systems may be used where the highest integrity against faults is required. (e.g. Unearthed systems are often used for Oil Well Drilling power supplies and for d.c. shutdown system power supplies). Where unearthed systems are installed it should be recognised that the power system conductors (phase conductors) could constitute a danger of electrical shock or fire as a result of contact with them and earth. The danger is a result of capacitance coupling of the power system conductors and earth. Where it is approved that the power system should be unearthed, an earth fault detection system should be installed and there should be operator action to clear any earth faults that occur as a matter of priority.
7.3 * 7.3.1
Solidly Earthed Neutrals (For systems below 1000 V) All low voltage systems should have their neutrals solidly connected to the plant earthing system. Impedance earthing of systems with a voltage below 1000 V shall only be used subject to approval by BP.
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Where single phase supplies are taken from LV systems, the neutral shall be solidly earthed at the supply point only. (TN-S system to IEE Regs Section 542). Where the LV supply is taken from a Public Utility, the neutral will be solidly earthed but the supply system may be defined as TN-C-S. In this latter case the installation within the BP premises shall conform with a TN-S arrangement with no further neutral earths being required within the installation. Where PME (Protective Multiple Earth) power supplies are taken from a Public Utility it is considered that there should be no need for isolation transformers to achieve the TN-S arrangement within the BP premises, however, the design shall conform with government legislation and this may require that under certain circumstances, isolation transformers are required. (Refer to HS(G) 41). Impedance earthed LV systems may be considered where the system will be 3 wire without neutral connections and there is benefit in limiting damage during earth fault conditions. (e.g. Where a special voltage 660 V may be used in preference to say 3.3 k V and in effect replaces the HV system in its application).
7.4 7.4.1
Impedance Earthed Neutrals (For Systems rated 1000 V and above) Neutral earthing equipment to limit earth fault currents should be provided in the neutral connection to the plant earth system on all highvoltage power systems.
Such provision limits the overall transient system disturbance caused by earth faults and also limits the amount of damage caused by this most common type of fault.
7.4.2
Where the power system at the specific voltage contains no direct connected generators under any mode of operation, the provision of the earthing resistor and its earth connection should consider the following possibilities:(i) (ii) (iii) At the source star connected transformers. At other star connected power transformers. At earthing transformers.
The neutral earthing equipment should comprise a resistor with a minimum 10 second fault rating selected to reduce the fault current to the full load rating of the power source transformer. The use of reactors to earth neutral systems shall only be used subject to approval by BP.
Systems employing reactor earths are uncommon in UK practice but have been used in other countries or under special circumstances. One special circumstance is where a 'Petersen Coil' is used to avoid a circuit trip due to a transient earth fault e.g. lightning induced flashover in overhead lines. Such special circumstances are unlikely in industrial installations.
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Where reactance earthing is considered, its use should be tested against the cost/benefit compared with resistance earthing. Special attention should be taken of the possible tuning effects between the earthing reactor and the power system.
7.4.3
Where direct connected generators are or may be operated in parallel with source transformers, the neutral earthing arrangements shall provide for either system operating independently. The neutral earthing equipment shall, wherever practical, be identically rated for all power sources. Where resistors are provided, these should comprise 10 second fault rated, solid resistors. The resistors shall reduce the fault current to a convenient level one half to full load rating of the lowest rated power source, provided this fault current is sufficient to operate the distribution system earthing protection and provide suitable discrimination. Where the normal ratings of the source transformer and parallel running generators are significantly different, the resistor rating selection shall be dictated by the requirement to ensure that the most insensitive earth fault protection on any incoming or outgoing circuit operates positively with the smallest possible source of earth fault current connected to the system.
Where there is a 4 wire supply system, solid earthing will be provided in order to keep neutral voltages as close to earth as possible. In this case the neutral earthing arrangement should be simplified by arranging for the neutral to be earthed at the switchboard. See also 7.5.3. Refer also to 7.1.3 for the requirements for systems having more than one power source.
7.5 7.5.1
Generator Earthing The neutrals of generators directly connected to the distribution switchgear in 3 wire systems (i.e. HV systems or special LV systems) may be solidly or resistance earthed. However, solid earthing should be limited to generators where the earth fault capacity of the generator is approximately equal to the current level required to operate the distribution system protection.
Where solid earthing of the neutral is applied to a system where the (relatively) low capacity generator is in parallel with a larger power source which has resistance earthing, the generator should have a neutral circuit breaker which should be automatically controlled. However, where the influence of the fault on other equipment is not unduly compromised by too high an earth fault current, the generator neutral could be allowed to remain solidly connected.
7.5.2
Resistor earthing of generators directly connected to the distribution switchgear should be used wherever possible. The resistor should be of the 10 second (minimum) fault rated, solid type, and its resistance should be selected to reduce the fault current to a level between the half and full load current rating of the machine, provided this is sufficient to operate the distribution system protection system selectively.
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Grid type resistors offer a virtually maintenance free installation and should be employed wherever possible. However, this type of earthing resistor will prove uneconomic for 33 kV systems where liquid neutral earthing resistors will offer an optimum choice.
7.5.3
Where generators directly connected to the distribution switchgear are operated in parallel and earthed either solidly or through resistors, the provision of neutral switchgear for each generator shall be considered to avoid third harmonic current flows and their heating effect. Where such neutral switchgear is provided, it shall be connected and operated in a manner to ensure that only one generator neutral switch is always closed at a time. Neutral switchgear may comprise contactors on resistor earthed schemes instead of circuit breakers. The provision of neutral switchgear schemes may be avoided if identical pitch generators are paralleled, or if the provision of neutral earthing resistors sufficiently reduces the prospective third harmonic currents to acceptable levels. A 1% or less derating as a result of third harmonic currents shall be considered acceptable.
A possibility would be for the neutral of each generator to be permanently earthed via a resistor where the resistance thus installed would limit the circulating currents to acceptable levels. However, this type of earthing would mean that earth fault current levels on the power system would vary depending upon how many power generators were operating. Such an installation would be acceptable where it showed economic advantages.
7.5.4
Where generators are connected to the distribution switchgear system via unit transformers, the generator neutral shall be connected to earth via the primary winding of a single phase distribution transformer. The secondary winding of this transformer shall be shunted by a resistor with a resistance value which is calculated to be approximately the same as the zero sequence capacitance for the generator winding system.
Manufacturers standard arrangements for high impedance earthing systems for these types of generators will be acceptable. It is expected that the arrangements will be aimed at raising 5 to 10 A under earth fault conditions. Selection of a resistance equal to the system-to-earth capacitance under earth fault conditions will ensure that the system capacitance will discharge energy reasonably and overvoltages will be eliminated even for arcing earth faults.
7.5.5
The rated primary voltage of generator earthing transformers shall be taken as the generator phase voltage although voltages of at least 1.5 times generator line to neutral voltages will be acceptable to obtain standard transformers. Transformer ratings shall be the product of the primary current and rated primary voltage using a 30 second (6 times overload factor) duty cycle.
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Conservative sizing of the transformer is preferred as its reactance has little effect on the earthing system. The secondary resistor should have a continuous duty as its size and cost will not normally be significant.
7.6
Earthing Resistors All earthing resistors shall be provided with insulation suitable for the phase to phase voltage of the systems to which they are connected. They shall be designed to carry their rated fault current for the times specified in the preceding clauses, without any destructive effect to their component parts.
It is expected that resistors will be located in an outdoor environment where transformer earthing is involved but could be indoors for generators. There is no mandatory requirement for locating these devices indoors other than normal economic factors.
8.
POWER SYSTEM DESIGN PARAMETERS 8.1 8.1.1 Motor Starting Direct-on-line (DOL) starting of motors shall be arranged wherever possible. The maximum voltage drop at the motor terminals during starting shall be limited to 20% calculated for the minimum generation and system configuration which would be deemed as representing the minimum duty condition. Where connection is made to a public utility, system voltage dips at the public utility point of common coupling shall be kept to a value which has been agreed between BP and the public utility.
There is a general requirement implied that the power system will be capable of withstanding this 20% voltage depression. See 4.5.1 for this requirement. Public utility systems in the UK require that voltage depressions observed at the point of common coupling (which is a concept related to how the interference will affect others on the electrical power system and needs to be established as to exact location with the public utility) shall be no more than 3% for infrequently started machines (i.e. no more frequent than once in 2 to 6 hours, the time here should be established with the public authority) and no more than 1% for frequently started machines.
8.1.2
The acceptability of the above voltage dips during motor starting shall be contingent on the motor satisfactorily accelerating, and the voltage dips not causing unacceptable disturbances to the power system. The DOL starting of the largest and electrically most remote motors (or groups of motors on an automatic re-acceleration scheme) at all voltages, shall be investigated to ensure that no problem exists. Where unacceptable voltage dips during motor starting may be found, the following solutions shall be considered:-
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(i)
Time vary the starting time to be assured of less co-incident starting between machines. Obtain motor(s) with a lower starting current. Increase the short circuit level within the presently envisaged switchgear rating limits by decreasing system source impedance to the motor busbars. Consider assisted start methods to reduce voltage dips if this solution is limited to a few specific motor drives. Any combination of items (i) to (iv) above. Increase the system short circuit level to a level beyond that presently envisaged if such higher short circuit level switchgear is available.
The selection of the most appropriate method will normally be made on the basis of lowest cost and under some circumstances may require provision of a mechanical driver other than electricity for the largest machine envisaged. Reduced voltage starting of a few specific motors should be considered only if it is found to be economical and the additional complication associated with assisted start equipment is operationally acceptable.
(ii) (iii)
(iv)
(v) (vi)
8.1.3
Where motor load shedding and restart schemes are adopted, the method of initiation shall be developed on the basis of cost effectiveness for the project under consideration.
Where the load is predominantly induction motors, voltage reductions would not cause load shedding whereas lower system frequency would tend to be an effective load shedding method. For this reason it is likely that system load shedding would best be initiated by a frequency based arrangement. Anticipation of a power generation deficiency can be employed if total generation capacity is known together with total system load. Under these conditions immediate load shedding may be initiated. Such immediate load/generation matching schemes can vary from a simple generator auxiliary contact used to initiate fixed loadshedding to a complex microprocessor based system which monitors multiple generators and multiple loads and constantly updates the amount of loadshedding for any specific incident. The effect that electrical load shedding will have on the process system needs to be presented for Project approval. There may need to be some massaging of the scheme to ensure that particular loads critical to process well-being is not shed.
8.2 8.2.1
Overvoltages Overvoltages due to static charging shall be avoided by effectively earthing the electrical system and all metallic structures that may, or
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may not, contain electrical conductors, detailed guidance being given in BP Group RP 12-16. Physical contact between higher and lower voltage systems shall be guarded against by using metal enclosures and barriers wherever practical between the two systems. Overvoltages of this type between transformer windings shall be limited by effectively earthing the neutrals of the secondary voltage system. Auto transformers if used shall have the neutral solidly earthed.
It should be noted that an auto transformer will effectively connect the neutral earthing systems of both the primary and secondary systems.
8.2.2
Overvoltages due to resonant effects shall be investigated on all unearthed neutral systems, those which may be earthed by reactors or systems with high impedance earthing. These effects shall also be considered when power system equipment is or could be operated without a neutral earth connection for short periods of time.
Resonant inductive-capacitive overvoltages can occur when normally unearthed systems experience earth faults. The prospect of resonant or ferroresonance effects should be avoided by solid earthing the neutrals of systems below 1000 V, and resistance earthing the neutrals of systems rated 1000 V and above. See 7.4.2 (commentary). Intermittent earth faults on unearthed systems may cause overvoltages of the order of five or six times system voltages. Neutral earthing, or resistor earthing arranging for earth fault currents greater than line to earth charging currents, may be used to eliminate these prospective overvoltages. (See also 7.5.4).
8.2.3
Switchgear and power system equipment shall be selected to ensure that transient recovery voltages produced by switchgear arc extinctions do not exceed the insulation capability of the system.
Current zero arc extinctions commonly result in transient overvoltages when switchgear is opened under fault conditions and the healthy side of the system endeavours to return to the normal system voltage but overshoots. The introduction of resistance during fault current flow either by special means or by using switchgear with naturally high arc resistances should be considered to reduce the value of transient recovery voltage that is generated.
8.2.4
Where the use of vacuum switches is considered they should be designed to limit overvoltages to acceptable withstand levels for a particular voltage rating.
The production of high overvoltages due to the forcing of a current zero can occur with fuses and vacuum switches. Current limiting fuses shall only be used within their voltage class. Such fuses of a particular voltage rating shall not be used on electrical systems of lower operating voltages. Limiting the voltage overvoltage on vacuum break devices may require the provision of surge limiting equipment on the vacuum switch.
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8.2.5
The highest overvoltage to which power systems are subjected are those caused by lightning. To avoid problems caused by lightning strikes on outdoor electrical equipment, all such equipment shall be earthed. Detailed guidance is given in BP Group RP 12-16. Lightning overvoltages can reach the equipment by travelling down overhead lines Sites which are fed by a public utility via overhead lines shall be protected against travelling surges and the methods for protection will be subject to agreement between BP and the public utility.
It would be the normal intention to ensure that the public utility provided surge diversion and/or arcing horns on the equipment connection at the overhead line. (e.g. on a pole box for cables or on the primary winding of a transformer. Where there will be appreciable overhead lines within the installation operated by BP, suitable surge diversion equipment shall be specified for all of the equipment interfaces.
8.2.6
Overvoltage surge protection shall be provided for power generators where these are interconnected with an overhead line system by short lengths of cable. The switchgear connecting power generators to the power system shall be assessed for switching overvoltage generation and, if necessary, surge diverters shall be provided for the generator stator winding.
UK practice has generally not found it necessary to provide power generators with surge diverters to account for switching surges. However, it is prudent that the matter be checked in order to be assured of there being no problem.
8.3 8.3.1
Harmonics The power systems voltage waveform shall be arranged to be within the tolerance 5% THF. as defined in IEC 34-1.
This level of distortion is compatible with hazardous area certification assumptions and must therefore be adhered to where the voltage will be used to supply electrical equipment in hazardous areas. Specific reference to the distortion is made in IEC 34-1 which details irregularities of waveform. Although primarily concerning synchronous generators, it is clear that the distortion could be imposed on to any equipment supplied from the generator's output. Hence it is reasonable that the supply would have at least this level of distortion and still remain suitable for supplying equipment which will be used in hazardous areas. The most sensitive equipment from a hazardous area viewpoint will be that which employs magnetic effects. This includes machines, relays and any equipment with transformers. Where more than 5% THF is anticipated the system equipment receiving supply should be rated for the specific harmonic content of the voltage waveform. Greater than 5% THF voltage waveform distortion may be allowed for that supply feeding hazardous area equipment provided that the equipment has been suitably certified or, where waveform irregularities are not significantly different from this tolerance, assessed and confirmed by the manufacturer as satisfactory for the certification for the duty. (One extreme example of a case of such need is where a Variable Speed Drive will be used for a machine in hazardous area duty. In this
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case the machine should be certified for such use given the specific harmonics yielded by the VSD) Where more than 5% THF is anticipated and the manufacturer of the electrical equipment cannot confirm its suitability for this service, then in principle the following should be considered:Re-specify the equipment for Ex(p). Revise the electrical system to eliminate the harmonic problem by:Power system supply configuration modifications to the circuits providing supply to the non-linear equipment causing the problem. Provision of filter equipment at a convenient point on the Power System which will protect the supply to the hazardous area equipment.
However, in some cases it may be that the voltage waveform interference is a transient effect, (e.g. as may be the case of drilling activities offshore). Where the transient nature of the problem may be confidently defined, this can ease the equipment manufacturers concers over possible temperature effects.
. 8.3.2 Notwithstanding any arrangements needed to meet 8.3.1, any harmonic distortion of the voltage waveform shall be of a type which will cause no maloperation of power system protection, control or other equipment.
Often multiple zero crossings of the voltage waveform can lead to maloperation of equipment receiving the supply. This is particularly true for that equipment which uses mains supply for information transfer or for timing operations.
8.3.3
Where interconnection is made with a public authority, that authorities regulations in respect of harmonic loading shall be adhered to.
Harmonics result in power losses and overheating of rotating machinery, interference on communication and control circuits, overloading of capacitor banks, and maloperation of electronic equipment. In the UK, Engineering Recommendation G5/3, dated September 1976 issued by The Electricity Council specifies acceptable limits of harmonics in the UK public supply system and this shall be taken as a guide for all BP systems, in the absence of other particular detailed requirements.
8.3.4
Wherever significant amounts of rectification or inversion equipment is purchased, the possible use of phase shifted transformers or harmonic filters shall be taken into account. The presence of harmonics in common earthing systems shall be assessed and limited if they are considered to cause prospective hazards.
See 9.3.1 for further information concerning the need for harmonic studies.
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8.3.5
Transformer inrush harmonic current caused by energisation shall be considered in the design of the electrical protection system. See BP Group RP 12-4 for further information concerning the protection arrangements associated with transformer inrush.
8.4 8.4.1
Power Factor Power factor improving equipment shall be considered for all installations where energy is imported from a public utility which applies a tariff associated with low power factor energy provision. The equipment may be capacitors or synchronous motors, depending on economics and suitability over the range of known operating condition.
It is expected that an economic assessment would be made to determine the merit of installing power factor improvement equipment. The economic case should be illustrated both in terms of payback and for an Internal Rate of Return based upon a 10 year project life. The economic case for installing such equipment will normally be considered as proved if the capital expenditure for the equipment is recovered from reduced energy payments within 2 years of commencement of operation.
8.4.2
Where the public utility system is normally operated in parallel with onsite generation, the generating equipment should be designed and operated to supply the as much of the reactive load of the site as is feasible. The economic case for power factor correction equipment shall be made based upon the differing scenarios which may be considered from there being site generation available and there being no site generation available. Availability of the power generation system shall be included in the assessment.
Using the on site power generation to supply site reactive demand will avoid the need for power factor improving equipment to be installed for the normal parallel operating mode and will limit its consideration to that required for standby (unparalleled) operation alone. See also 4.5.4 (commentary).
8.4.3
Any installation of capacitance provided either to reduce system losses, provide system voltage control or increase the loading density of the installation shall be subject to approval.
The economic case for such a proposal for installing capacitors should follow the same criteria as outlined in 8.4.1. The location for the capacitors needs to be carefully considered where voltage support and reduction of losses are the motivators and a comparison of alternative methods of achieving the same objectives would be expected as part of the justification for the installation. Where existing plant power factors are known to be below 0.8 lagging, plant extensions may compare the cost of providing power factor improvement equipment against that of increasing the distribution system capacity. On new installations, there could be an economic investigation into the provision of power factor improving equipment, as a means of reducing power distribution system capacity.
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Such analysis should be undertaken wherever it is imperative that costs be saved and where loading estimates are considered to be firm. Where the case for installing capacitors is proven, synchronous motors or capacitors (whichever has been found to offer the appropriate advantage) shall be located as near as possible to the loads.
See also the requirements of 8.4.5 and 8.4.6. 8.4.4 Where synchronous motors are supplied for power factor improvement, they shall include constant power factor control equipment.
It is recognised that synchronous machines may be changed from operating in a reactive power control mode to operating in a constant power factor mode. This would be the case should the motor be a small part of the overall installation demand or where operation in reactive control mode could make the motor operate for long periods near an excitation condition which may give rise to stability problems.
8.4.5
In order to avoid risks of overvoltages or high transient torque, induction motors shall not be switched as a unit with any power factor improving capacitors, unless the capacitive current at full voltage is less than the no load magnetising current of the associated induction motor. Any capacitor installed on the motor side of the switchgear can act as an excitation source when the motor is coasting. Two problems may be apparent:(a) (b) The machine terminal voltage may exceed insulation capability. The terminal voltage can remain high for a long period and thus compromise reclosure.
Thus if capacitance on the motor side of the switchgear is excessive, either the motor insulation should be able to withstand high overvoltages (not above 150% as the induction motor iron circuit can be expected to show some signs of saturation) or the capacitor needs to be separately switched.
8.4.6
Where power factor correction capacitors are installed, induction motor voltage under supply system circuit breaker trip shall be considered and, if necessary, overvoltage protection shall be applied to the induction motor control circuit.
An induction motor could be connected to a system having large capacitance and suffer an upstream circuit breaker trip effectively leaving the motor coasting with high system capacitance. Under this situation an overvoltage trip should be arranged for the induction motor circuit breaker.
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9.
POWER SYSTEM STUDIES 9.1 9.1.1 General The power system design aspects of new installations and extensions to existing plants should be studied using computer programs to aid analysis where necessary. The performance of the system shall be defined together with any arrangements necessary for ensuring the defined performance.
See also sections 5.7.5 (commentary), 5.7.8, 6.1 and 6.3.7. It is considered necessary that a document be prepared which details the basic design performance of the Power System. The document may also contain or reference the protection relay arrangements and settings. Switchgear ratings and voltage limits are readily assessed for acceptability. However, power system dynamic performance is often project specific and acceptance is often accompanied by the economic assessment of 'would it be worth the cost of any improvement?'.
9.1.2
The analysis shall be used:(i) (ii) (iii) To define equipment parameters before purchasing. To select control arrangements and protective relay settings. To ascertain the system reaction to normal and abnormal operating conditions.
Where system instabilities are predicted measures which may be contemplated include:-
(a)
reduce the severity of the disturbance, possibly by decreasing the fault severity. load shedding. (With or without load re-acceleration). detection of the condition and sectionalising the power system into 'Islanding ' units.
(b) (c)
9.1.3
System behaviour and performance shall be examined under steady state, transient stability following fault disturbance and voltage recovery following fault disturbance. Induction motor stability shall feature in the studies and the starting performance of the most critical drives (and groups of drives) shall be examined to ensure that the system can perform satisfactorily under the defined conditions.
RP 12-3
PAGE 44
It is clearly necessary to define the steady state conditions prior to a particular fault condition and also to define the fault (or onerous) condition which the system is required to experience and recover from. These conditions could include:(a) Minimum power generation, one line (or transformer) out of service for maintenance and starting of the largest induction machine (presumed direct-on-line). Maximum load, minimum spinning spare and a 3 phase symmetrical fault condition which removes the largest capacity generator from the power system. Simple loss of the largest capacity generator from the power system at times of minimum spinning spare. (NB This may be a less severe condition than if the generator were faulted but could illustrate the level of load shedding which may occur). Maximum loading and power transfer between two systems followed by a 3 phase short circuit which removes one of a number of links between power generation sources (and thus may cause transient instability).
(b)
(c)
(d)
9.2 9.2.1
Conventional Studies These should include:(i) Loadflow analysis. To check voltage profiles and circuit loading conditions under steady state conditions. Short circuit studies. To analyse fault currents that might flow under a variety of symmetrical, asymmetrical and unbalanced fault conditions. These shall be used for switchgear specification and control and protective relay application and setting purposes. The requirements of these studies are specified in 6.1. Stability studies. To analyse the transient and dynamic performance of power systems after large load changes and fault disturbances. These should be used to check:The ability of the system to stay in synchronism. Induction motor stability after start. Re acceleration and restart schemes. The need and effectiveness of under frequency load shedding schemes.
(ii)
(iii)
(a) (b) (c) (d)
They should also be used to consider the technical merit of:(e) Auto-changeover schemes.
RP 12-3
PAGE 45
(f) (g) (h)
Parallel or open operation, or radial feeders. Operation of fault limiting devices. Insertion of switched reactors or capacitors, etc.
See sections 4.5.1 (for steady state voltage conditions), 8.1.1 (for transient voltage conditions). Motor Starting, Dynamic Performance (including load shedding arrangements and protection arrangements) and Short Circuit requirements will be subject to the specific design features of the project.
9.2.2
The studies detailed by 9.2.1 should be carried out with clear terms of reference early as possible within a project. The software programs and computer capability should also be defined. Models for generators, automatic voltage regulators, governors, motors, transformers, cables and loads should be sufficiently detailed and proven to give confidence in the results of the studies.
The terms of reference for studies which are to be presented by a design contractor should be developed as soon as possible. These should contain definitions for the required system performance where this is not sufficiently detailed by sections 4.5.1, 5.7.3, 5.7.7 and 6.4. In certain circumstances, preliminary study work may be carried out by BP to ensure that design contractors terms of reference are reasonable and to instigate a permanent data file, which would be suitable for operational use and can be modified as changes occur. This would be the basis of detailed design, and should be modified as necessary to include the detailed design equipment parameters. the computer data file would then be available throughout the life of the installation. This process would be considerably eased if the power system analysis software were the same for preliminary studies through to final studies and the data files were directly transferable between the systems used by Contractors and that used by BP. Therefore, it is preferable that power system studies are undertaken using the IPSA power systems analysis suite. Should an alternative power system analysis programme suite be employed, the data should be transferable either manually or via a computer based conversion programme into an IPSA compatible form. See also section 6.1.9 for software validation.
9.2.3
Generator operating charts should be prepared and presented to assist in assuring that they are always likely to be operated within their prescribed stability limits.
The operating charts should be presented for voltages between 0.95 p.u. to 1.05 p.u. in steps of .05 p.u. The charts should also contain those key machine parameters from which the charts are constructed. e.g. Xd , Xq , etc.
9.2.4
Transient stability studies shall be carried out on systems which include:(i) Dissimilar on-site generators.
RP 12-3
PAGE 46
(ii) (iii) (iv)
On-site generators operating in parallel with a public utility. Synchronous motors. Where power generation busbars are interconnected by appreciable impedance.
These studies shall be used to determine whether synchronous machines are liable to lose synchronism after the most severe single disturbance.
Generally the most severe fault condition would be a three phase fault applied at the generator busbars for a fault duration determined by the protecting switchgear, which when cleared results in the disconnection of the largest single fault contributor from the system. However, a number of fault locations followed by plant disconnections should be tried.
9.2.5
Where transient stability studies are undertaken, (in order to assess the ability of generators to remain in synchronism following a fault disturbance) the steady state operating condition before the fault is applied should be one in which the spinning reserve of generation is kept at a minimum due to assumed maintenance of the largest onsite generator.
The primary object should be to identify the maximum acceptable fault clearing time, but secondary objectives, such as the best location of system open bus section points and the relationship between impedance earthing to stability, should also be ascertained from these studies. The studies would be used as support for a particular system design and also to ensure that the protection arrangements would not compromise the expected system performance. In pursuit of this latter factor, the studies may be undertaken with actual protection arrangements if these are known. In doing this it should be noted that if protection settings were to change, the system response to fault conditions may need to be re-studied. See also 9.1.3 (commentary).
9.2.6
Dynamic and induction motor stability studies shall be carried out to investigate the voltage and frequency performance of the system after a major disturbance for the period from fault inception to the time when steady state equilibrium is reached. These studies shall require detailed Automatic Voltage Regulator (AVR) and governor modelling as these items assist the return to steady state and will react positively in the time scales likely to be considered.
These studies are expected to illustrate successful system recovery. A decreasing oscillatory voltage or frequency result where the average is within acceptable bounds would indicate a satisfactory performance.
9.2.7
System stability studies shall be carried out to consider the effect of the loss of the largest power supply component under a fault condition
RP 12-3
PAGE 47
which causes no other electrical disturbance. Where the transient frequency excursion is predicted to exceed 6%, under frequency load shedding schemes shall be considered. The stability studies shall be used to define the minimum number and magnitude of the various stages of load shedding that will be necessary to keep the frequency loss within acceptable limits.
Earth faults or mechanical system trip conditions do not normally result in motor loads being tripped by a.c. contactors dropping off under low voltage, and may therefore result in the greatest post fault generation deficiency.
9.2.8
Induction motor performance studies shall be carried out to demonstrate the ability to start, re accelerate or restart motor loads without their stalling or tripping under overload. Re acceleration studies shall determine whether motors re accelerate after disturbances (e.g. Fault conditions or under voltage conditions) have cleared. Where motor restart schemes are required, induction motor performance studies shall be used to define the maximum number and magnitude of the various stages of restart that will be possible after clearance of faults. Special Studies Harmonic studies may be necessary to analyse the magnitude and location of harmonic distortions within the power system. These studies shall be required whenever conversion equipment represents a significant proportion of the total rating of a system at any one voltage level or where there is concern about harmonic levels being excessive.
See 8.3. The studies would normally be expected to be based upon frequency domain methods which involve conversion equipment manufacturers providing a Fourier series for the harmonics in the load current assuming a sine wave voltage input. Using this data the amount of voltage waveform disturbance at any point in the network can be estimated. However, if the voltage waveform contains harmonics, then the conversion equipment would actually yield a differing set of load current harmonics. Therefore the frequency domain analysis is at best an approximation and needs to be compared with actual plant performance to be assured that the system predictions can be accurate. An alternative technique may be to undertake the harmonic study by employing a time domain approach where system parameters are used directly into the analysis. In this manner the need for iteration of data input is avoided. However, there remain inaccuracies caused by approximations used for system component impedances to each harmonic frequency. Therefore the check with actual system performance should still be carried out.
9.3 9.3.1
RP 12-3
PAGE 48
PUBLIC UTILTY
A
PRIMARY SUBSTATION
A A A A A A
A
UP TO 36KV
AREA SUBSTATION
A A
A A
A
UP TO 12KV
C
PROCESS SUBSTATION
C
DESCRIPTION
C D C C D
UP TO 7.5KV
A C D M G
CIRCUIT BREAKER - REMOTE OR LOCAL CONTROL CIRCUIT BREAKER - LOCAL CONTROL VACUUM CONTACTOR TYPE MOTOR STARTER - REMOTE CONTROL AIRBREAK CONTACTOR TYPE MOTOR STARTER - REMOTE CONTROL SWITCHFUSE - MANUALLY OPERATED FAULT MAKE, LOAD BREAK ISOLATING SWITCH - MANUALLY OPERATED
C
PROCESS SUBSTATION
C A C
UP TO 1KV
GENERATOR
MOTOR
FIGURE 1 (A) DOUBLE RADIAL FEED DISTRIBUTION
RP 12-3
PAGE 49
FROM THE PRIMARY SUBSTATION
A AREA SUBSTATION A
UP TO 12KV
A A CLOSED RING MAIN SYSTEM (TYPICAL)
C PROCESS SUBSTATION C
C UP TO 12KV
C TRIPLE RADIAL MAIN DISTR. (TYPICAL)
DOUBLE RADIAL MAIN DISTR. (TYPICAL)
SINGLE RADIAL MAIN DISTR. (TYPICAL)
C D C C D C D D C
C C
C C D
UP TO 7.2KV
PROCESS SUBSTATION
PROCESS SUBSTATION
C UP TO 1KV
DESCRIPTION
M M G M M M M
A C
CIRCUIT BREAKER - REMOTE OR LOCAL CONTROL CIRCUIT BREAKER - LOCAL CONTROL VACUUM CONTACTOR TYPE MOTOR STARTER - REMOTE CONTROL AIRBREAK CONTACTOR TYPE MOTOR STARTER - REMOTE CONTROL SWITCHFUSE MANUALLY OPERATED FAULT MAKE, LOAD BREAK ISOLATING SWITCH MANUALLY OPERATED GENERATOR
D
DOUBLE RADIAL FEED (TYPICAL) SINGLE RADIAL FEED (TYPICAL) TRIPLE RADIAL FEED (TYPICAL)
M G
MOTOR
FIGURE 1 (B) CLOSED RING MAIN DISTRIBUTION
RP 12-3
PAGE 50
FROM THE PRIMARY SUBSTATION
A
AREA SUBSTATION
A A
UP TO 12KV
OPEN RING MAIN SYSTEM (TYPICAL)
PROCESS SUBSTATION
UP TO 12KV
C
SINGLE RADIAL MAIN DISTR. (TYPICAL)
C
PROCESS SUBSTATION
C
UP TO 12KV
D M
D M
D M
C
DESCRIPTION
A C D M
CIRCUIT BREAKER - REMOTE OR LOCAL CONTROL CIRCUIT BREAKER - LOCAL CONTROL VACUUM CONTACTOR TYPE MOTOR STARTER - REMOTE CONTROL AIRBREAKCONTACTOR TYPE MOTOR STARTER - REMOTE CONTROL SWITCHFUSE - MANUALLY OPERATED FAULT MAKE, LOAD BREAK ISOLATING SWITCH - MANUALLY OPERATED GENERATOR
C
PROCESS SUBSTATION
C
UP TO 1KV
G M
MOTOR
FIGURE 1 (C) OPEN RING MAIN DISTRIBUTION
RP 12-3
PAGE 51
APPENDIX A DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Definitions Standardised definitions may be found in the BP Group RPSEs Introductory Volume. Abbreviations AVR DOL HV HRC IEC IEE IPSA LV MTBF MTTR PME THF VSD Automatic Voltage Regulator Direct On Line High Voltage High Rupturing Capacity International Electrotechnical Committee Institution of Electrical Engineers Interactive Power System Analysis Low Voltage Mean Time Between Failures Mean Time to Repairs Protective Multiple Earth Telephone Harmonic Factor Variable Speed Drive
RP 12-3
PAGE 52
APPENDIX B LIST OF REFERENCED DOCUMENTS
A reference invokes the latest published issue or amendment unless stated otherwise. Referenced standards may be replaced by equivalent standards that are internationally or otherwise recognised provided that it can be shown to the satisfaction of the purchaser's professional engineer that they meet or exceed the requirements of the referenced standards. International IEC 34 IEC 38 IEC 56 IEC 947 Industrial IEE Wiring Regulations (16th Edition) Electricity Council Recommendation G5/3 (1976) Health and Safety Executive Guidance Note 41 BP Group Documents BP Group RP 4-4 Buildings (replaces BP CP 19) Equipment in Flammable Atmospheres and Combustible Dusts (replaces BP CP 17 Part 2) Power System Protection and Control (replaces BP CP 17 Part 4) Power Supplies for Control Systems (replaces BP CP 17 Part 5) HV Switchgear (replaces BP CP 17 Part 6) LV Switchgear (replaces BP CP 17 Part 7) Transformers and Reactors (replaces BP CP 17 Part 9) Rotating Electrical Machines Standard Voltage (6th Edition) HVAC Circuit Breakers LV Switchgear and Control Gear
BP Group RP 12-2
BP Group RP 12-4
BP Group RP 12-5
BP Group RP 12-6
BP Group RP 12-7
BP Group RP 12-9
RP 12-3
PAGE 53
BP Group RP 12-11
Motors (replaces BP CP 17 Part 11) Earthing and Bonding (replaces BP CP 17 Part 16) Transformers and Reactors (replaces BP Std 223) Electrical Requirements for A.C. Generators (replaces BP Std 224 Part 1) LV Switchgear and Controlgear (replaces BP Std 227) HV Switchgear and Controlgear (replaces BP Std 225) Emergency Generator Package
BP Group RP 12-16
BP Group GS 112-5
BP Group GS 112-6
BP Group GS 112-8
BP Group GS 112-9
BP Group GS 160-1
UK Law Electricity supply Regulations (1988) Electricity at work Regulations (1989)
RP 12-3
PAGE 54

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RP 12-3 ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS AND INSTALLATIONS POWER SYSTEM DESIGN

Copyright The British Petroleum Company p.l.c.

Copyright The British Petroleum Company p.l.c.

Latest Amendment Date

ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS AND INSTALLATIONS POWER SYSTEM DESIGN

APPLICABILITY Regional Applicability:

AMENDMENTS Amd Date Page(s) Description ___________________________________________________________________

CUSTODIAN (See Quarterly Status List for Contact)

(iv) (v) (vi)

All negotiations with public utilities shall be the sole responsibility of BP

See 3.2.2 (commentary.)

Ringbars or mesh busbars arrangements shall not be used.

Be suitable for future expansion.

(e) (f) (g)

Electrical Distribution Substations

Transformers shall be located as close as possible to the secondary switchgear.

See also 2.3

See also 9.2.4

Loss of electronic and control equipment supplies resulting in maloperation.

(a) (b) (c) (d)

(f) (g) (h)

(ii) (iii) (iv)

FIGURE 1 (A) DOUBLE RADIAL FEED DISTRIBUTION

FROM THE PRIMARY SUBSTATION

A A CLOSED RING MAIN SYSTEM (TYPICAL)

C TRIPLE RADIAL MAIN DISTR. (TYPICAL)

DOUBLE RADIAL MAIN DISTR. (TYPICAL)

SINGLE RADIAL MAIN DISTR. (TYPICAL)

FIGURE 1 (B) CLOSED RING MAIN DISTRIBUTION

FROM THE PRIMARY SUBSTATION

OPEN RING MAIN SYSTEM (TYPICAL)

FIGURE 1 (C) OPEN RING MAIN DISTRIBUTION

APPENDIX A DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

APPENDIX B LIST OF REFERENCED DOCUMENTS

UK Law Electricity supply Regulations (1988) Electricity at work Regulations (1989)

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